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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/22677-8.txt b/22677-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd9b99e --- /dev/null +++ b/22677-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10114 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Greece and the Allies 1914-1922, by G. F. Abbott + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Greece and the Allies 1914-1922 + +Author: G. F. Abbott + +Release Date: September 19, 2007 [EBook #22677] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GREECE AND THE ALLIES 1914-1922 *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines (This file was created from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive/American +Libraries.) + + + + + + +GREECE AND THE ALLIES + +1914-1922 + + + +BY + +G. F. ABBOTT + + + +BY THE SAME AUTHOR + + SONGS OF MODERN GREECE + MACEDONIAN FOLKLORE + THE TALE OF A TOUR IN MACEDONIA + GREECE IN EVOLUTION (ED.) + TURKEY IN TRANSITION + TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE GREAT POWERS + UNDER THE TURK IN CONSTANTINOPLE + + + +WITH A PREFACE BY + +ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B., M.V.O. + + LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY + AND HEAD OF THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION TO GREECE + + + +METHUEN & CO. LTD. + +36 ESSEX STREET W.C. + +LONDON + + + + +First published in 1922 + + + + +{v} + +PREFACE + +The late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival +of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance +or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune. + +Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for +the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of +the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the +battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown +the present troubles. + +In this book we get a clear account of the little-understood relations +between the Greek and the Serb; of the attitude of Greece towards the +Central Powers and the Entente; of the dealings between Greece and the +Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott traces +the evil to its source--the hidden pull of British versus French +interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between +M. Venizelos and King Constantine. + +All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting +is the last. + +The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied +countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most +tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case. Its effect on the state of +Europe during and since the War is remarkable. If King Constantine's +advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the +Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been +shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could +have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and +collapse would not have taken place; for, instead of having Turkey to +assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have been between and +separating these two countries. {vi} + +In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his +country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to +be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the +country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas +colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk. + +It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's policy was fully +endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of +the subject, which was a purely military one. These were the late +Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the +head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, +British Military Attaché in Athens; but the advice tendered by these +three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the +civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers. + +Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the +history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which +have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the +official originals, to prove the case. + +For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish in Great +Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the +welfare of the British Empire at heart. + + +MARK KERR + +4 _October_, 1922 + + + + +{vii} + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE + +As this work goes to press, the British Empire finds itself forced to +vindicate its position in the East: a position purchased at the cost of +much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the +conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France. + +In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events +which have inevitably led up to this crisis: an account of transactions +hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation +and every known artifice for manipulating public opinion. + +The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral +situation. It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried +on through six years. A slight account of the earlier events appeared +as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, _Turkey, Greece, +and the Great Powers_: that was my first effort to place the subject in +its true perspective. The results were interesting. I was honoured by +the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several +public critics; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous +scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On the +other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of +passion, retained their respect for facts. + +I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two of my +contributions saw the light; the third was suppressed by the +Authorities. Its suppression furnished material for a debate in +Parliament: "This is a cleverly written article," said Mr. John Dillon, +"and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression. +All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the +Government do not like to be known, not that they injure the military +situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the +opinion of the writer, made certain very bad blunders." The Home +Secretary's answer was {viii} typical of departmental dialectics: "It +is inconceivable to me," he declared, "that the Government would +venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, 'This is our +view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.'" What the +Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the _National Weekly_ +was: "This is not our view. Publish it not. If you do, you will +suffer." + +With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the +evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of +war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through +the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns +of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the +printer, now lies before me, and together with it a letter from the +publisher stating that the Authorities had forbidden its publication on +pain of proceedings "under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm +Regulations." + +And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the +voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted +by credulity. The delay had its advantages: it gave the story, through +the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would +have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a +fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously +inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-revealing +publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here +related. + +I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new +information respecting these transactions even to those who are best +acquainted with their general course. If they find nothing attractive +in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful, +something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of +it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient +history. Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from +the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the +present crisis--a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but +at bottom a conflict between French and British policies affecting the +vital interests of the British Empire. + +G. F. A. + +5 _October_, 1922 + + + + +{ix} + +_Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly +drawn from the following sources_: + +Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time. + +_White Book_, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the +title, "_Diplomatika Engrapha_, 1913-1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920. + +_Orations_, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M. +Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and +his opponents, MM. Stratos and Rallis. The Greek text ("_Agoreuseis, +etc._," Athens, 1917) and the English translation ("_A Report of +Speeches, etc.,_" London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M. +Stratos only in summary. The French translation ("_Discours, etc., +Traduction de M. Léon Maccas, autorisée par le Gouvernement Grec,_" +Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches. + +Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, 1917; _Apologia_, 1919; _Semeioseis_, 1921. +The first of these publications is the ex-Premier's Reply to statements +made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917; +the second is his Defence; the third is a collection of Notes +concerning transactions in which he took part. All three are of the +highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration +from November, 1915, to June, 1916. + +_Journal Officiel_, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of +the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22 +June, 1916. + +Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some +personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading +French actors in the drama: + +_Du Fournet_: "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-1916." By +Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920. + +_Sarrail_: "Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918." By General +Sarrail, Paris, 1920. + +_Regnault_: "La Conquête d'Athènes, Juin-Juillet, 1917." By General +Regnault, Paris, 1920. + +{x} + +_Deville_: "L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie. Notes d'histoire et +souvenirs." By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919. The author was French +Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work +which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting. + +_Jonnart_: "M. Jonnart en Grèce et l'abdication de Constantin." By +Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though not written by the High +Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official +record of his mission. + +The only English publications of equal value, though of much more +limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so +far are: + +The Dardanelles Commission _Reports_ (Cd. 8490; Cd. 8502; Cmd. 371), +and the _Life of Lord Kitchener_, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. III, +London, 1920. + +Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also +been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is +referred for details on particular episodes. The absence of reference +to certain other narratives is deliberate. + + + + +{xi} + +CONTENTS + + PAGE + INTRODUCTION - - - - - 1 + CHAPTER I. - - - - - 7 + CHAPTER II. - - - - - 17 + CHAPTER III. - - - - - 21 + CHAPTER IV. - - - - - 33 + CHAPTER V. - - - - - 50 + CHAPTER VI. - - - - - 65 + CHAPTER VII. - - - - - 76 + CHAPTER VIII. - - - - - 85 + CHAPTER IX. - - - - - 95 + CHAPTER X. - - - - - 105 + CHAPTER XI. - - - - - 114 + CHAPTER XII. - - - - - 123 + CHAPTER XIII. - - - - - 139 + CHAPTER XIV. - - - - - 152 + CHAPTER XV. - - - - - 162 + CHAPTER XVI. - - - - - 172 + CHAPTER XVII. - - - - - 177 + CHAPTER XVIII. - - - - - 186 + CHAPTER XIX. - - - - - 200 + CHAPTER XX. - - - - - 207 + CHAPTER XXI. - - - - - 217 + AFTERWORD - - - - - - 230 + INDEX - - - - - - 239 + + + + +{1} + +GREECE AND THE ALLIES + +1914-1922 + + +INTRODUCTION + +Ingenious scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret +historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the +course of nations unknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory, +but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature everywhere responds +to the influence of personality. In Greece this response is more +marked than anywhere else. No people in the world has been so +completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously +from their feuds, ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides, +king of men, and god-like Achilles. + +The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King +Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; and her history +during that troubled era inevitably centres round these two +personalities. + +By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King +Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897. +His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an +earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a halo +of military romance--a thing especially dear to the hearts of +men--shone about the head of Constantine; and his grateful country +bestowed upon him the title of {2} _Stratelates_. In town mansions and +village huts men's mouths were filled with his praise: one dwelt on his +dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his +sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose +hardships he shared, and for whose life he evinced a far greater +solicitude than for his own. + +But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine +appealed to the hearts of his countrymen. They loved to explain to +strangers the reason of the name _Koumbaros_ or "Gossip," by which they +commonly called him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had +stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the +campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the +people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal +companion. + +In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a democratic +people. With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which +strength and dignity were happily blended with simplicity, he had a +manner of address which was very engaging: his words, few, simple, +soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect; they were the words of one +who meant and felt what he said: they went straight to the hearer's +heart because they came straight from the speaker's. + +Qualities of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose +himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current +in the Chancelleries of the world. + +Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a +series of political convulsions to high notability in his native +island; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece--brought about not +without his collaboration--opened to him a wider sphere of activity. +The moment was singularly opportune. + +The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of +their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into +something like despair. Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by +annexing Eastern Rumelia: Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the +risk, if the Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the {3} +fulfilment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever. A +group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader +translated the popular feeling into action: a revolt against the reign +of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every +effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the +interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left +Greece a prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old politicians +who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure. A new +man was needed--a man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt +past--a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough +to push on with inexorable purpose to the goal. + +During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable +organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever +manipulator of seditious movements. But he had mainly distinguished +himself as a rebel against authority. And it was in the temper of a +rebel that he came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well as +internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With the quick +adaptability of his nature, he turned into a guardian of established +institutions: the foe of revolution and friend of reform. Supported by +the Crown, he was able to lift his voice for a "Revisionist" above the +angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a "Constituent Assembly." + +All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the new man; and +the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him. Through the +next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive +statesmanship. His Government had strength enough in the country to +dispense with "graft." The result was a thorough overhauling of the +State machinery. Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished. +Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future. It +was a miraculous change for a nation whose political life hitherto had +exhibited two traits seldom found combined: the levity of childhood and +the indolence of age. + +For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged {4} to M. +Venizelos. He had brought to the task a brain better endowed than any +associated with it. His initiative was indefatigable; his decision +quick. Unlike most of his countrymen, he did not content himself with +ideas without works. His subtlety in thinking did not serve him as a +substitute for action. To these talents he added an eloquence of the +kind which, to a Greek multitude, is irresistible, and a certain gift +which does not always go with high intelligence, but, when it does, is +worth all the arts of the most profound politician and accomplished +orator put together. He understood, as it were instinctively, the +character of every man he met, and dealt with him accordingly. This +tact, coupled with a smile full of sweetness and apparent frankness, +gave to his vivid personality a charm which only those could appraise +who experienced it. + +Abroad the progress of M. Venizelos excited almost as much interest as +it did in Greece. The Greeks are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign +opinion: a single good word in a Western newspaper raises a politician +in public esteem more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric. M. +Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business; and from the +outset every foreign journalist and diplomatist who came his way was +made to feel his fascination: so that, even before leaving his native +shores, the Cretan had become in the European firmament a star of the +third or fourth magnitude. Reasons other than personal contributed to +enlist Western opinion in his favour. Owing to her geographical +situation, Greece depends for the fulfilment of her national +aspirations and for her very existence on the Powers which command the +Mediterranean. A fact so patent had never escaped the perception of +any Greek politician. But no Greek politician had ever kept this fact +more steadily in view, or put this obvious truth into more vehement +language than M. Venizelos: "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the +Sea Powers," was his maxim. And the times were such that those Powers +needed a Greek statesman whom they could trust to apply that maxim +unflinchingly. + +{5} + +With the recovery of Greece synchronized, not by chance, the doom of +Turkey: a sentence in which all the members of the Entente, starting +from different points and pursuing different objects, concurred. The +executioners were, naturally, the Balkan States. Russia began the work +by bringing about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia; England +completed it by bringing Greece into the League. There ensued a local, +which, in accordance with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead +to the universal conflagration. Organized as she was, Greece succeeded +better than anyone expected; and the national gratitude--the exuberant +gratitude of a Southern people--went out to the two men directly +responsible for that success: to King Constantine, whose brilliant +generalship beat the enemy hosts; and to M. Venizelos, whose able +statesmanship had prepared the field. Poets and pamphleteers vied with +each other in expatiating on the wonders they had performed, to the +honour and advantage of their country. In this ecstasy of popular +adoration the spirit of the soldier and the spirit of the lawyer seemed +to have met. + +But the union was illusive and transient. Between these two men, so +strangely flung together by destiny, there existed no link of sympathy; +and propinquity only forced the growth of their mutual antagonism. The +seeds of discord had already borne fruit upon the common ground of +their Balkan exploits. Immediately after the defeat of Turkey a +quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors. King Constantine, +bearing in mind Bulgaria's long-cherished dream of hegemony, and +persuaded that no sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more +than defer a rupture, urged a Graeco-Servian alliance against their +truculent partner. He looked at the matter from a purely Greek +standpoint and was anxious to secure the maximum of profit for his +country. M. Venizelos, on the other hand, aware that the Western +Powers, and particularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coalition +as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to retain those +Powers' favour, was prepared to concede {6} much for the sake of +averting a rupture. Not until the Bulgars betrayed their intentions by +actual aggressions in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the +alliance with Servia, which ushered in the Second Balkan War and led to +the Peace of Bucharest. He yielded to the pressure of the +circumstances brought to bear upon him; but the encounter represented +no more than the preliminary crossing of swords between two strong +antagonists. + + + + +{7} + +CHAPTER I + +From the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July, +1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deliberately adopted an +attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia's +assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter. Such an +attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Graeco-Servian +Alliance. For, although the Military Convention accompanying the +Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war +between one of the allied States and "a third Power," the Treaty itself +had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.[1] + +In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to +Servia's assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000 +men.[2] Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by +practical considerations. It was to the interest of Greece--a matter +of self-preservation--not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia +calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power established by the +Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with +Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might. But as to +Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not +offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that +she {8} should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for +such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobilization and precipitate +complications. For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of +Servia's war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded +absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of +Greece's recent crisis with Turkey.[3] On that occasion Greece had +obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that +the _casus faederis_ would arise only in the event of Bulgarian +intervention.[4] + +Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on +armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs +under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced +that it fully performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting, +until Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrality. The +co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would +harm Servia; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally +forces negligible compared with the enemy's, while she would inevitably +expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war +material, to an Austrian attack; and, moreover, she would weaken her +army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check +on Bulgaria.[5] + +A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the +conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria +by intervening against Servia jeopardize the _status quo_ established +by the Bucharest Treaty--in which case the action of Greece would have +a purely Balkan character--was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after +a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.[6] + +This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of +the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not +yet been harmonized. Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek +Government's declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to +compromise {9} the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action +against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian +Government, on its part, promised to abstain from manifesting any +solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war.[7] +Not so Berlin. + +The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which +Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to +join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and +interest he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been +assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian +assassins; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating +herself, under the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage +which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula; if, +contrary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other side, she +would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and +Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and +Constantine would be broken for ever. He ended with the words: "I have +spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without +delay and with the same absolute frankness." + +He had nothing to complain of on that score. King Constantine on 2 +August replied that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an +active part in the Austro-Servian conflict, it was equally impossible +for her "to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall +upon them, since they are our allies. It seems to me that the +interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance +of the _status quo_ in the Balkans such as it has been created by the +Treaty of Bucharest." He went on to add that Greece was determined, in +concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at +the expense of Servia; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans +would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which +the Kaiser feared. "This way of thinking," he concluded, "is shared by +the whole of my people." + +What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on +the margin, "Rubbish." This, however, was not meant for his +brother-in-law's ears. To him he {10} used less terse language. On 4 +August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in +Berlin that an alliance had that day been concluded between Germany and +Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on +Germany's side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean +were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus +all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against +Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out? His Imperial Majesty appealed +to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the +German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law; he reminded him that it was +thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla; he +begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser's side and +march hand in hand against the common enemy--Slavism. He made this +urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece +would respond to it. If not, all would be over between the two +countries--this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal +note: "I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once." + +King Constantine's answer was tactful but final: His personal +sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's +side. But alas! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely +out of the question. Greece could not under any conceivable +circumstances side against the Entente: the Mediterranean was at the +mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the +Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and +wipe Greece off the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was +the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's +threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled +under the guise of an "assurance not to touch his friends among my +neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our +local Balkan interests." [8] + +{11} + +Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff. The +Kaiser's Government thought King Constantine's attachment to neutrality +reasonable--for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter +as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and +Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter +country as the bear's skin of which it would be a good stroke of +business for Greece to secure a share. The German Minister at Athens, +better acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naïve +line. He did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to +advise that she should free herself from the ties that bound her to +Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in +the lurch. But, if he went less far than his chief in one direction, +he went farther in another, threatening, should Greece move on Servia's +behalf, to ask for his passport. This threat, like all the others, +failed to move the Athens Government;[9] and, unable to gain Greece as +an ally, Germany was henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy. + +So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be +unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the European +cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the Balkan +equilibrium. Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent +tendencies. + +King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War +would be of long duration and doubtful issue: in this battle of giants +he saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils. At the same time, he +did not forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered +enemies {12} who would most probably try to fish in the troubled +waters. If they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a +definite objective and on a definite military plan which took into +account the elements of time, place, and resources. + +The King's standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and soldiers +of note: they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with +possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable +moment. But it did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution was +foreign to M. Venizelos's ambitious and adventurous temperament. +Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind. +Taking the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and +imbued with a sort of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and +star, he looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist +aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an +instant's delay. + +It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface. + +In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit +mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the +possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against +the Austrians on the Danube--far away from the Greek Army's natural +base in Macedonia. On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared +that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the +Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation. M. Streit +remonstrated that there had been no "invitation," but at most a +sounding from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet +with a counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the +suggestion was serious. Further, he objected that, before Greece +committed herself, it was necessary to find out where she would be +expected to fight, the conditions under which she would fight, and the +compensations which she would receive in the event of victory. As a +last resort he proposed to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon. +But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose: the War would +be over in three weeks.[10] Whereupon {13} M. Streit resigned, and M. +Venizelos offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece +forthwith. + +The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged; but +from the French Minister's descriptions of it as made "_à titre +gracieux_" and "_sans conditions,_" [11] it seems to have been +unconditional and unqualified. On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a +later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the +disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.[12] +And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was +Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands +conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy +with two German units, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_. However that +may be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite +willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army, +but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek +forces should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need +arose, operate against Bulgaria. + +The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him for +the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider. The +French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France, +however, adding: "For the moment we judge that Greece must use all her +efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to avoid +anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its +neutrality." The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same +effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey +and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision. She only +suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a +view to eventual action. + +This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill, +who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central +Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the +Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a plan +for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the {14} Gallipoli +Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of +Marmara.[13] But it no way affected the British Government's policy. +The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in order to meet +the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to prevent +the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles; France also +holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of war material +on an adequate scale.[14] + +Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M. +Venizelos--it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had +pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to +vent his ill-humour. King Constantine, in a reply to the British +Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not +fight Turkey unless attacked by her--a statement in strict consonance +with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time. But M. Venizelos +objected. After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers, and +after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told his +sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey was their +enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with +many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight +her single-handed?[15] + +Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those +allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war +against Turkey--because, anxious above all things to establish close +contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open: "a promise that, +should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against +Turkey . . . we would be at their disposal." [16] And he professed +himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to +him could possibly be obscure to others. But he had a theory--a theory +which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every +difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed +{15} with the personal factor. According to this theory, when face to +face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as +soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind. This happened not +once, but many times.[17] We have here a question of psychology which +cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos's persuasive powers are +notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine underwent +the fascination which this man had for others. But behind it all, +according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element: + +"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty +and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the +wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in +co-operation with Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid +down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the +result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions +between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast +developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the +Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M. +Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony +between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his +resignation.[18] + +M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch +none the less. At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the +Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the +same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to +throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without +any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more +circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as +prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this +view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation, +since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent. +But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King +Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through +Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his +Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to +supply the British Government, through the same channel, with +information from his secret service.[19] + + + +[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention. As this article originally +stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case +of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria." It +was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without +objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war +between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under +the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance." +But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty +relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other +interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite +the "third Power" phrase in the Military Convention. All the documents +are to be found in the _White Book_, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6. + +[2] See Art. 5 of the Military Convention. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 19, 20, 22. + +[4] _White Book_, Nos. 11, 13, 14. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 23. + +[6] Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin, +Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish. (No. 23,800.) + +[7] _Ibid._ + +[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in _Die deutschen +Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch_, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter +Schuking; part in the _White Book_, Nos. 24 and 26. As much +acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last +dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was +sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in +Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it +to him: "He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs. +However, to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send +on this occasion a sympathetic answer." (See _The Times_, 9 Dec., +1920.) The communication, therefore, was no secret from the British +Government. Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is +but a summary of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's +Government itself to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation, +Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the _White Book_, +this document may now be read in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. +381-3. + +[9] _White Book_, Nos. 28, 29, 30. + +[10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit +himself. + +[11] Deville, pp. 119, 128. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 93-4. + +[13] _Dardanelles Commission_. _Supplement to First Report_, par. 45. + +[14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5 +Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914. + +[15] _White Book_, No. 31. + +[16] See _Orations_, p. 103. + +[17] _Ibid_, pp. 41-2, 98. + +[18] _White Book_, No. 31. + +[19] See the Admiral's statements in the _Weekly Dispatch_, 21 Nov., +and in _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920. Though the plans in question were +not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable information +with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the command of the +Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.--_Dardanelles Commission, Final +Report_, par. 17. + + + + +{17} + +CHAPTER II + +Before proceeding any further with the development of the position in +Greece, it will be well to cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by +the other Balkan States and the views entertained towards them by the +Entente Powers. One must know all the possible combinations on the +Balkan chess-board before one can profitably study or estimate the real +place of the Greek pawn. + +Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain neutral; but, to judge +from the Greek diplomatic representatives' reports, there was every +indication that she only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some +brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to invade +Servia without risk. Meanwhile, well-armed irregular bands, equipped by +the Bulgarian Government and commanded by Bulgarian officers "on +furlough," made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the +Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.[1] + +Alarmed by these symptoms, the Greek General Staff renewed the efforts +which it had been making since the beginning of 1914, to concert plans +with the Servian military authorities for common action in accordance +with their alliance, and asked the Servian Minister of War if, in case +Bulgaria ordered a general mobilization, Servia would be disposed to +bring part of her forces against her, so as to prevent the concentration +of the Bulgarian army and give the Greek army time to mobilize. The +reply was that, if Bulgaria did order mobilization, the Serbs were +obliged to turn against her with all their available forces. Only, as +Austria had just started an offensive, nobody could know how many forces +they would have available--perhaps they could face the situation with the +25,000 or 30,000 men in the new provinces; but, in {18} any case, it did +not seem that Bulgaria meant to mobilize, or, if she did, it would be +against Turkey. A little later, in answer to another Greek step, M. +Passitch, the Servian Premier, after a conference with the military +chiefs, stated that, as long as there was no imminent danger from +Bulgaria, Servia could not draw troops from the Austrian frontier, +because of her engagements towards the Entente, and that, should the +danger become imminent, Servia would have to consult first the +Entente.[2] By Entente, he meant especially Russia, for M. Sazonow had +already told the Greek Minister at Petrograd that it was all-important +that the Servian army should be left free to devote its whole strength +against the Austrians.[3] + +Rumania, on whose co-operation Greece counted for restraining Bulgaria +and preserving the balance established by the Treaty of Bucharest, +maintained an equivocal attitude: both belligerent groups courted her, +and it was as yet uncertain which would prevail.[4] For the present +Rumanian diplomacy was directed to the formation of a Balkan _bloc_ of +neutrality--between Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece--which might +enable those four States to remain at peace with each other and the whole +world, exempt from outside interference. The first step to the +realization of this idea, the Rumanian Government considered, was a +settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey; and, in +compliance with its invitation, both States sent their plenipotentiaries +to Bucharest. + +The only result of this mission was to enlighten the Hellenic Government +on Turkey's real attitude. At the very first sitting, the Turkish +delegate, Talaat Bey, in answer to a remark that the best thing for the +Balkan States would be to keep out of the general conflagration, blurted +out: "But Turkey is no longer free as to her movements"--an avowal of the +Germano-Turkish alliance which the Greeks already knew from the Kaiser's +own indiscretions. After that meeting, in a conversation with the +Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which that gentleman reported to +the Greeks, Talaat said that, in his opinion, Greece could ignore her +Servian alliance, for, {19} as things stood, she might find herself at +war, not only with Bulgaria, but also with Turkey--a contingency not +foreseen when that alliance was made. From these utterances the Greeks +derived a clear impression that Talaat acted on a plan drawn up in +Berlin.[5] For the rest, the despatch of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ +to Constantinople, followed by the continued arrival of German officers +and sailors for the Ottoman Navy, spoke for themselves. M. Sazonow +shared the Greek conviction that Turkey had made up her mind, and that no +amount of concessions would avail: "It is," he said to the Greek Minister +at Petrograd, "an abscess which must burst." [6] The Greeks had even +reason to suspect that Turkey was secretly negotiating an agreement with +Bulgaria, and on this point also the information of the Russian +Government confirmed theirs.[7] + +It was his intimate knowledge of the Balkan situation that had inspired +King Constantine's proposal to the Entente Powers in August for common +action against Turkey, qualified with the stipulation of holding Bulgaria +in check. The proposal took cognizance of Balkan difficulties and might +perhaps have solved them, had it been accepted: an advance of the Greek +army on Thrace, combined with a naval attack by the British Fleet, early +in September, might have settled Turkey, secured Bulgaria's neutrality, +if not indeed her co-operation, or forced her into a premature +declaration of hostility, and decided Rumania to throw in her lot with us. + +But the Entente Powers were not yet ripe for action against Turkey: they +were still playing--with what degree of seriousness is a delicate +question--for the neutrality of Turkey, and for that Greek neutrality was +necessary. As to Bulgaria, our diplomacy harboured a different project: +the reconstruction of the Balkan League of 1912 in our favour, on the +basis of territorial concessions to be made to Bulgaria by Servia and +Greece, who were to be compensated by dividing Albania between them. +Greece also had from England an alternative suggestion--expansion in Asia +Minor: a vague and {20} unofficial hint, destined to assume imposing +dimensions later on. At this stage, however, the whole project lacked +precise outline. One plan of the reconstructed League included +Rumania--who also was to make concessions to Bulgaria and to receive +compensations at the expense of Austria; and the League was to be brought +into the field on the side of the Entente. Another plan had less +ambitious aims: Servia and Greece by conciliating Bulgaria were to +prevent a combination of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, or of Bulgaria +and Turkey, on the side of the Central Powers. The more sanguine plan +was especially cherished by Great Britain; the other by Russia, who +feared a Rumano-Bulgaro-Turkish combination against her. But the +key-stone in both was Bulgaria, whose co-operation, or at least +neutrality, was to be purchased at the cost of Servia and Greece.[8] +Meanwhile, the less serious the Entente Powers' hopes for Turkey's +neutrality, the more lively their anxiety must have been about Bulgaria's +attitude; and it is not improbable that in repelling King Constantine's +offer, they were actuated not so much by the wish to avoid Turkish +hostility--the reason given--as by the fear lest the stipulation which +accompanied his offer, if accepted, should provoke Bulgaria. + +Highly speculative as this project was, it might have materialized if +Serbs and Greeks were willing to pay the price. But neither Serbs nor +Greeks would think of such a thing. At the mere report that they were +about to be asked to cede Cavalla, the Greeks went mad, and M. Venizelos +himself, though he favoured the reconstruction of the Balkan League, +loudly threatened, if the demand was formulated, to resign. Whereupon, +his consternation having been transmitted to the Entente capitals, he +received an assurance that no demand of the sort would be made[9]--for +the present. + + + +[1] Naoum, Sofia, 11, 20 Aug. (O.S.); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 19 July, 19 +Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[2] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 31 July, 19, 26 Aug. (O.S.) 1914. + +[3] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 20 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[4] Politis, Bucharest, 27 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[5] Politis, Bucharest, 15 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[6] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 17 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[7] Dragoumis, _ibid._ + +[8] Gennadius, London, 8, 10, 15, 23 Aug.; Romanos, Paris, 31 July, 16 +Aug.; Dragoumis, Petersburg, 31 July, 12, 20 Aug.; Naoum, Sofia, 31 July, +11, 20, 23 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, Nish, 18 Aug.; Papadiamantopoulos, +Bucharest, 25 July (O.S.), 1914. + +[9] Venizelos to Greek Legations, Petersburg, Bordeaux, London, 2 Sept. +(O.S.), 1914. + + + + +{21} + +CHAPTER III + +Two tasks now lay before the Allies in the East: to help Servia, and to +attack Turkey, who had entered the War on 31 October. Both enterprises +were "under consideration"--which means that the Entente Cabinets were +busy discussing both and unable to decide on either. Distracted by +conflicting aims and hampered by inadequate resources, they could not act +except tentatively and in an experimental fashion. + +At the beginning of November the representatives of France, England, and +Russia at Athens collectively seconded a Servian appeal for assistance to +M. Venizelos, which the Greek Premier met with a flat refusal. He gave +his reasons: such action, he said, would infallibly expose Greece to +aggression from Bulgaria, and it was more than probable that an automatic +agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey might engage the Greek army in a +struggle with the forces of three Powers at once. Even if the attack +came from Bulgaria alone, he added, the Greek army needed three weeks to +concentrate at Salonica and another month to reach the theatre of the +Austro-Servian conflict, and in that interval the Bulgarian army, +invading Servia, would render impossible all contact between the Greek +and Servian armies. The Entente Ministers endeavoured to overcome these +objections by assuring M. Venizelos that Bulgaria could not possibly +range herself against Russia, France, and England; and besides, they +said, their Governments could ask Rumania to guarantee Bulgarian +neutrality. M. Venizelos replied that, if the co-operation of Bulgaria +with Rumania and Greece were secured, then the Greeks could safely assist +Servia in an effective manner; or the next best thing might be an +undertaking by Rumania to guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria; and he +proceeded to ascertain the Rumanian Government's views on the subject. +He learnt that, in {22} answer to a question put to the Rumanian Premier +by the Entente Ministers at Bucharest, "whether he would undertake to +guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria towards Greece if the latter Power +sent succour to the Serbs," M. Bratiano, while professing the greatest +goodwill towards Greece and the Entente, declined to give any such +undertaking.[1] Add another important fact to which the Greek Government +had its attention very earnestly drawn about this time--that not only +Servia, but even Belgium, experienced the greatest difficulty in +procuring from France the munitions and money necessary for continuing +the struggle.[2] + +In the circumstances, there was no alternative for M. Venizelos but to +adopt the prudent attitude which on other occasions he was pleased to +stigmatize as "pro-German." True, his refusal to move in November was +hardly consistent with his eagerness to do so in August; but, taking into +account his temperament, we must assume that he had made that rash _à +titre gracieux_ offer blindfold. Events had not borne out his +predictions of a speedy victory, and, though his faith in the ultimate +triumph of the Entente remained unshaken, he had come to realize that, +for the present at any rate, it behoved Hellas to walk warily.[3] + +Some ten weeks passed, and then (23 January, 1915) Sir Edward Grey again +asked M. Venizelos for assistance to Servia in the common interest; as +Austria and Germany seemed bent on crushing her, it was essential that +all who could should lend her their support. If Greece ranged herself by +Servia's side as her ally, the Entente Powers would willingly accord her +very important territorial concessions on the Asia Minor Coast. The +matter was {23} urgent, for, were Servia crushed, though the ultimate +defeat of Austria and Germany would not be thereby affected, there would +during the War come about in the Balkans accomplished facts which would +make it difficult or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to +obtain afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually in view. +Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece and Rumania in the War +would, by bringing about the defeat of Austria, secure the realization of +Greek, Rumanian and Servian aspirations. To render such participation +effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured that, if +Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were realized, she would obtain +satisfactory compensations in Macedonia, on condition that she came in or +at least maintained a not malevolent neutrality. But the question of +compensations affected chiefly Servia: all he asked of M. Venizelos on +that point was not to oppose any concessions that Servia might be +inclined to make to Bulgaria. + +Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal or was merely +in the nature of a suggestion is hard to determine. But M. Venizelos +seems to have understood it in the latter sense, for in speaking of it he +made use of the very informal adjective "absurd." No one, indeed, could +seriously believe that Bulgaria would be induced to co-operate, or even +to remain neutral, by the hypothetical and partial promises which Sir +Edward Grey indicated; and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her +flank Greece could not march to Servia's aid. So M. Venizelos, under the +impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work, and within a few +hours produced a scheme calculated to correct the "absurdity" of the +British notion, to earn the gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an +Asiatic Empire for his country. It was nothing less than a complete +reversal of his former attitude: that Greece should not only withdraw her +opposition to concessions on the part of Servia, but should voluntarily +sacrifice Cavalla to the Bulgars, provided they joined the Allies +forthwith. This scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he +submitted to the King. + +M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the cession of Cavalla +would be, and therefore he had to use very strong arguments to commend it +to his Majesty. In the {24} first place, he emphasized the imperative +need of helping Servia, since, should Servia be crushed, the +Austro-German armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or Bulgaria +might be invited to take possession of Servian Macedonia, in which case +Greece would have either to let the Balkan balance of power go by the +board, or, in accordance with her Treaty, go to Servia's assistance under +much more disadvantageous conditions. In the second place, he argued +that the sacrifice of Cavalla was well worth making, since Greece would +eventually receive in Asia Minor compensations which would render her +greater and more powerful than the most sanguine Greek could even have +dreamt a few years before; and in Macedonia itself the loss of Cavalla +could be partially compensated for by a rectification of frontiers +involving the acquisition from Servia of the Doiran-Ghevgheli district. + +In the event of Bulgaria accepting Cavalla and the Servian concessions as +the price of her alliance, M. Venizelos argued that the outcome would be +a reconstructed League of the Balkan States which would not only ensure +them against defeat, but would materially contribute to the victory of +the Entente Powers: even the ideal of a lasting Balkan Federation might +be realized by a racial readjustment through an interchange of +populations. Should Bulgarian greed prove impervious, Greece must secure +the co-operation of Rumania, without which it would be too risky for her +to move.[4] + +Sacrifices of territory, in King Constantine's opinion, were out of the +question; but he thought that, if Rumania agreed to co-operate, it might +be possible for Greece to go to Servia's assistance, as in that case +Bulgaria could perhaps be held in check by Rumanian and Greek forces left +along her northern and southern frontiers. The Bucharest Government was +accordingly sounded, and returned an answer too evasive to justify +reliance on its co-operation. So M. Venizelos fell back on the scheme of +buying Bulgarian co-operation by the cession of Cavalla, and submitted a +second memorandum to the King. + +If the first of these documents was remarkable for its optimism, the +second might justly be described as a {25} masterpiece of faith pure and +undefiled by any contact with sordid facts. Its theme is the magnitude +of the compensations which Greece might expect in return for her entry +into the War: "I have a feeling," says the author, "that the concessions +in Asia Minor suggested by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit +to sacrifices to the Bulgars, assume such dimensions as to double the +size of Greece. I believe that if we demanded"--he specifies in detail a +vast portion of Western Asia Minor--"our demand would probably be +granted." He calculated that the surface of this territory exceeds +125,000 (the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres, while +the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed 2,000 square kilometres, +and that loss would be further halved by the acquisition from Servia of +the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square +kilometres. Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be giving up a +hundred and fortieth part of what she would be getting. In point of +population also Greece would be receiving twenty-five times as much as +she would be sacrificing--an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of +30,000 souls; and that loss could be obviated by obliging Bulgaria to buy +up the property of the Cavalla Greeks, who, he had no doubt, would gladly +emigrate _en masse_ to Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there. +How was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportunity--an +opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful on land and supreme in +the Aegean Sea--"an opportunity verily presented to us by Divine +Providence for the realization of our most audacious national +ideals"--presented to-day and never likely to occur again? + +M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction which appeared so +desirable and feasible to him must appear equally desirable and feasible +to others: and great was his surprise to find that such was by no means +the case. The General Staff, he complained, "seem, strangely, not +attracted strongly by these views." And the same might be said of +everyone who judged, not by the glow of prophetic insight, but by a cold +examination of facts. When Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek +Minister in London, that shrewd diplomat answered: "Greece would not +commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in {26} Asia Minor she +would find herself up against Great Powers as well as against Turkey." +[5] At Athens to this objection were added others not less weighty. The +General Staff pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money +required for the permanent occupation and efficient administration of +that distant region. They feared both the difficulties of defending +those Turkish territories in Asia and the danger of future attack from +Bulgaria in Europe. In short, they held that Greece by embarking on what +they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be undertaking responsibilities +wholly incommensurate with her resources.[6] + +Dangers and difficulties! cried M. Venizelos: can you allow such things +to stand in the way of national ideals? And he proceeded to demolish the +obstructions: the administrative success achieved in Macedonia proved +that the resources of Greece were equal to fresh responsibilities; the +Turks of Asia Minor--after the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, +which he deemed inevitable--would become contented and law-abiding Greek +subjects, and at all events the local Greek population would in a very +short space of time supply all the forces needed to maintain order in +Asia, leaving the main Greek army free for the defence of the European +frontiers. During that brief period of transition, he thought it easy to +form an agreement with the Entente Powers for military assistance against +a Bulgarian attack, or, even without the Entente, "should the Bulgars be +so demented by the Lord as to attempt aggression, I have not the +slightest doubt that Servia, moved by her treaty obligations, her +interests, and her gratitude for our present aid, would again co-operate +with us to humble Bulgarian insolence." [7] + +Thus at a moment's notice M. Venizelos became an impassioned advocate of +the policy of which he had hitherto been an impassioned opponent, and he +would have us believe that the King, persuaded by his eloquence, +authorised him to carry out his new plan. Be that as it may, M. +Venizelos did not avail himself of this permission. {27} For almost +simultaneously came the news of a Bulgarian loan contracted in the +Austro-German market--an event which made him abandon all hopes of +conciliating Bulgaria and profiting by the British overture. During the +months when the revival of the Balkan League was perhaps still +practicable, he had combated the only expedient which might have given it +a chance of realization: by the time he became a convert, it was too late. + +The Balkan situation remained as it was before Sir Edward Grey's +suggestion: so much so that, when a few days later the Entente Powers +again asked Greece to go to Servia's relief, offering her as security +against the Bulgarian danger to transport to Macedonia a French and a +British division, M. Venizelos, considering such security insufficient, +again refused;[8] a refusal which, justified though it was, gave great +umbrage.[9] + +While the Greek Premier was going through these mental evolutions, the +scene of Entente activity shifted: and his flexible mind perforce veered +in a new direction. + +As far back as 3 November, the outer forts of the Dardanelles had been +subjected to a brief bombardment with the object of testing the range of +their guns; and by 25 November the idea of a serious attack on the +Straits had engaged the attention of the British War Council. But no +decision was arrived at until January, when Russia, hard pressed by the +Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a demonstration against them in some +other quarter. In compliance with this appeal, the British War Council +then decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy +alone. After the failure of the naval attack of 19 February, however, it +was realized that the operations would have to be supplemented by +military action;[10] and as the magnitude of the enterprise became +clearer and the troops at the disposal of England and France were very +limited, the need of securing Balkan allies became more obvious. + +From the first greater importance was attached to Bulgarian co-operation +than to Greek. Even the grant of {28} a loan to Sofia by the Central +Powers appears to have produced little or no impression upon those +concerned. Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposition +that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without being satisfied that +their money will not be used against themselves. But at the time, after +a momentary shock, the Entente Governments were deluded, either by +Bulgarian diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that +"Bulgaria would not commit the stupidity to refuse the advantages +offered." [11] Nor, in thus reckoning on enlightened bad faith, were +they alone. M. Venizelos, who a moment before had declared that the loan +had opened his eyes to the fact "that Bulgaria was definitely committed +to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that, "notwithstanding the +loan, Bulgaria was capable of betraying her then friends and turning +towards those who promised her greater profits." [12] Anxious, +therefore, to forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that he +had been obliged on three occasions to decline requests from the Entente, +he spontaneously proposed, on 1 March, to offer three Greek divisions for +the Dardanelles expedition, stating that this proposal was made with King +Constantine's assent.[13] + +As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General Staff approved of +M. Venizelos's strategy. Having made a systematic study of the +Dardanelles problem, they judged that the Allies' enterprise, even under +the most skilful handling, presented but few chances, and those chances +had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful handling: the +bombardment of the Straits in the previous November had given the Turks +warning of the blow and ample time to prepare against it--and the Turks +were no longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency one +might formerly have counted; they now mounted guard over the gates of +their capital equipped with German guns and commanded by German officers. +The enterprise was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the +jealousy of the Bulgars. If, therefore, Greece did join in, besides all +the other risks, she would expose herself to a {29} Bulgarian assault; +and with a considerable portion of her forces engaged in Gallipoli, and +no prospect either of Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to +face that assault? + +The King's disapproval was known to no one better than to M. Venizelos +himself. But, for all that, he felt entitled to tell the British +Minister at Athens that he had the King's assent. Here is his own +explanation: "The King was opposed to the enterprise. I sought another +interview in order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with me +a third memorandum"--which has never been published, and cannot yet be +published. "I asked him to let me read it to him, for in it were set +forth fully all the arguments which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation. +I read it. I saw that the King became agitated. For--I must do him that +justice--he rarely remained unconvinced when face to face with me. So +profound was the emotion with which I spoke, so powerful were the +arguments which I used that the King, greatly moved, said to me: 'Well, +then, in the name of God.' That is, he assented." [14] + +However, the General Staff remained unconvinced; and Colonel Metaxas, a +brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of the Staff, resigned as a protest +against military proposals being made by a Greek minister to other +countries without previous consultation with the military experts of his +own. M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers should +presume to meddle with the plans of statesmen; his view being that the +Staff's business was simply to carry out the policy of the Government. +Nevertheless, impressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of +a Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their opinions +might be heard. The Council met on 3 March and again on 5 March. At the +first sitting M. Venizelos admitted that the objections of the military +experts, without altering his own convictions, might still inspire doubt +as to which policy was preferable: neutrality or intervention. Should +the policy of neutrality be adopted, it must be carried on by a new +Cabinet, to which he would accord his parliamentary support. At the +second sitting he endeavoured to remove the objections of the military +experts by reducing his proposed contribution to the {30} Gallipoli +expedition from three divisions to one, which should be replaced in the +existing cadres by a division of reserves, so as to leave the Greek Army +practically intact against a possible attack from Bulgaria. And having +thus modified the conditions of intervention, he refused to entertain any +other policy or to support a Cabinet pledged to neutrality.[15] + +Momentarily infected by the Cretan's enthusiasm, nearly all present urged +upon the King the acceptance of his proposal; one of them, M. Rallis, +even going so far as to say: "Sire, pray consider that you have a +Government clothed with the full confidence of the nation. Let it carry +out its policy. Else, you will incur undue responsibility." The King's +answer was: "If you wish it, I will abdicate." [16] He would rather give +up his crown than assume the responsibility of sanctioning a policy which +his whole military training and experience told him was insane and +suicidal: how justly, the event soon showed. The losses of men and ships +which Gallipoli cost far exceeded the whole of Greece's military and +naval resources; and if that cost proved more than embarrassing to +England and France, it would have literally ruined Greece. M. Rallis and +the other ex-Premiers in less than a fortnight gratefully recognised the +justness of the King's opposition to their views,[17] and thenceforth +parted company with M. Venizelos. + +Meanwhile M. Venizelos hastened from the Palace to the British Legation, +and, "in order to save time till he could make an official _démarche_," +he made to the Entente Ministers there assembled a semi-official +communication to this effect: "Following the natural evolution of its +policy of solidarity with the Entente Powers, the Royal Government has +judged that the Dardanelles operations afford it a favourable occasion to +translate its sentiments into deeds by abandoning its neutrality and +offering its co-operation in that enterprise with the whole of its Fleet +and one division of its army." All this, "though the King {31} has not +yet given his adhesion." [18] His hurry arose from the belief that the +Allies would reach Constantinople in a few days. + +But the General Staff still remained unconvinced. Yes, they said, one +division to begin with; but what if the Allies get stuck in the Straits, +as we believe they will be, and call upon us for more? And, once we join +them, how can we refuse to supply their needs? We shall be incurring +unlimited liabilities. So the King, who had full confidence in his +military advisers, and who could not bring himself to look upon the +Gallipoli adventure as a "serious enterprise," [19] declined his adhesion +to M. Venizelos's plan; and M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March). + +Then came the Entente replies to his communication; from which it +appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now the impetuous Cretan ran ahead +of the Powers: that, whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would +not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even agreed as to +whether they desired her co-operation. + +England regarded the communication as a merely preliminary and +preparatory step, and waited for a definite proposal after the King's +decision, when she would consult with her allies. France and Russia +insisted on the impossibility of Greece limiting her participation to a +war against Turkey alone: to be an effective partner of the Entente, +Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and Germany also. France added +that the question of the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles +enterprise could not be a useful subject of discussion between the Allies +until a definite decision by the Greek Government was taken. Russia did +not even envisage the usefulness of such a discussion. M. Sazonow +pointedly declared that he did not consider Greek co-operation in the +Dardanelles at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of +Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers alone without +the intervention of third parties, and that Russia did not desire the +entry of a Greek army into Constantinople, though she had no objection to +its operating against Smyrna or elsewhere.[20] + +{32} + +Some days later, it is true, M. Delcassé affirmed that he had overcome +Russia's repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding +to pressure, would have accepted the participation of Greek troops, she +made no secret of her satisfaction at not having had to do so: "We +heartily consent to your receiving large compensations in Asia Minor," +said the Russian Minister at Athens, in the presence of his British +colleague, to a high official of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs. +"But as to Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there; it +would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable for everybody to +turn you out." [22] + +M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did not covet +Constantinople: what he coveted, so far as material gains went, were the +large compensations in Asia Minor.[23] There lay the chief objective of +his strategy, and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him and +those elements in the country which still believed that the policy of +Greece must be governed by the solid necessities of the Balkan situation, +not by nebulous visions of Imperialist expansion. + + + +[1] Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov.; Venizelos to Greek +Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./7 Nov., 1914. + +[2] Romanos, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914. + +[3] He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making his +offer of 18 Aug., 1914, he bore in mind "the impossibility of going to +Servia's assistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."--_Orations_, +p. 93. But precisely similar was the objection to going against Turkey +without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality: only the Bulgars, in the one +case, would have been on Greece's left flank and in the other on the +right. The truth seems to be that the vision of M. Venizelos lacked the +penetration which, in matters of this sort, can only come from long study +and reflection. + +[4] First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 21 March (O.S.), +1915. + +[5] Gennadius, London, 10 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[6] _Orations_, p. 43. + +[7] Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), +1915. + +[8] See his own statement in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[9] Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 1915. + +[10] Dardanelles Commission, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final Report, +pp. 6-8. + +[11] Deville, pp. 163, 215. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 103, 104. + +[13] Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3. + +[14] _Orations_, pp. 105-6. + +[15] See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the _Balkan Review_, +Dec., 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos's very meagre +account of these proceedings in _Orations_, pp. 107-8. + +[16] _Orations_, pp. 266-7. + +[17] _Ibid_, pp. 267-8. + +[18] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20 Feb./5 +March, 1915. + +[19] _Orations_, p. 267. + +[20] Gennadius, London, 21 Feb.; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb.; Dragoumis, +Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915. + +[21] _White Book_, No. 37. + +[22] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, Athens. 25 Feb./10 March, +1915. + +[23] _Orations_, pp. 108, 113-14. + + + + +{33} + +CHAPTER IV + +Immediately after the resignation of M. Venizelos it was decided to +dissolve the Chamber and to have General Elections, in which for the +first time the territories conquered in 1912-13 would participate. +Meanwhile, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of +considerable ability, though with none of the versatility of mind and +audacity of character which distinguished his predecessor, to carry on +the Government and to preside over the elections. Under ordinary +circumstances these would have taken place at once. But owing to the +need of preparing electoral lists for the new provinces, they were +delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King +Constantine which supervened--causing intense anxiety throughout the +nation and bringing political life to a standstill--two more months +passed before the new Parliament met. The interval proved fruitful in +developments of far-reaching importance. + +On its accession to power, the new Government issued a _communiqué_, +announcing that it would pursue the policy adopted at the beginning of +the War: a policy of neutrality qualified by a recognition of the +obligations imposed by the Servian Alliance, and a determination to +serve the interests of Greece without endangering her territorial +integrity.[1] And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed a +certain disappointment at not finding in the _communiqué_ any allusion +to the Entente Powers,[2] M. Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, +in order to remove all uneasiness on that score, instructed the Greek +representatives in London, Paris, and Petrograd to assure the +respective Governments categorically that the new Ministry did not +intend to depart in any way from the pro-Entente attitude dictated by +hereditary sentiments and interests alike. The only {34} difference +between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets--the difference which +brought about the recent crisis and the change of Government--was one +regarding the danger of immediate action, but did not affect the basis +of Greek policy.[3] + +That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M. Gounaris +thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as, +indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international +affairs thought--namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest +and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the +Entente.[4] The only question was whether she should enter the field +then, and if so, on what conditions. + +M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition +presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "God grant +that Greece may not miss." [5] His successors had no wish to miss the +opportunity--if such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in +the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan's infinite +capacity for taking chances. Even in war, where chance plays so great +a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is +not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with +success. + +And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified +to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her +co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the +vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried +to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the +extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin" +offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point that, +having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for +the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the +Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of +January. On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a +substantial portion of the hinterland"--a definition with which his +Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said +that they had no instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked +whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective +Governments M. Venizelos's interpretation of Sir Edward Grey's offer +regarding its geographical limits. The British Minister replied that +he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard +of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had +received no answer. The Russian Minister replied that he had +transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had been +informed of it in but a vague way by the late Cabinet. The French +Minister stated that the subject had never been mentioned to him, and +consequently he had not been in a position to make any communication to +his Government.[6] Thus the grandiose Asiatic dominion of which M. +Venizelos spoke so eloquently dwindled to "Smyrna and a substantial +portion of the hinterland." + +However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet went on with +their work, and were joined by Prince George, King Constantine's +brother, who had come from Paris to Athens for the express purpose of +discussing with the Government the question of entering the war against +Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by negotiations of +which Paris might be the centre. In that order of ideas, they had +already indicated as the best guarantee the simultaneous entry of +Bulgaria, who, according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the +point of joining. But this condition having proved {36} +unrealisable--Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if at all, at a +price of Greek territory which Greece would on no account pay--they +dropped it and set about considering by what other combinations they +could come in without compromising their country's vital interests. +The upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated 14 April, to +the following effect: + +If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the +War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of +her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval +forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would +be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman +Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm. +It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial +compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war +material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do +her part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece would +assume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were +ready to combine their forces with hers. All military details were to +be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint +Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria +continued to stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be +placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory Note added a few +days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon +the ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was +expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces +which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and +Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited +to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the +Allies wished it, they should have the military assistance of Greece on +the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops +first.[7] + +Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as +a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take +any notice. Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on +approaching M. Delcassé, was told that, since the Hellenic Government +viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an +understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest, +that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the +Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no +longer the same as it was some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and +anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its +dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government assured M. +Delcassé that it continued always animated by the same desire to +co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it +wished to know what proposals would be acceptable. M. Delcassé replied +that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be +acceptable.[8] But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator and later +French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M. +Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies. + +This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed to offer to +enter the war against Turkey with her naval forces only, reserving her +army for her own protection against Bulgaria.[9] The Entente Powers +intimated through M. Delcassé that they would accept such an offer, +provided it was made without any conditions.[10] Before deciding, +Greece wanted to be assured that the integrity of her territory during +the War and in the treaty of peace would be respected, that all the +necessary money and material would be forthcoming, and that the +compensations in Asia Minor allotted to her would represent +approximately the area indicated by M. Venizelos. If it was found that +on these three points the Hellenic Government interpreted the +intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would immediately submit +a Note in which the three points would be mentioned as going of their +own accord, so that the official reply of the Entente might cover, not +only the offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.[11] {38} +M. Delcassé refused to listen to any points: Greece, he insisted +irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions, coupling her +offer simply with "hopes to have the benefit of full solidarity with +her allies, whence results a guarantee of her territorial integrity," +and "entrusting the full protection of her vital interests to the three +Entente Powers." The formula was not incompatible with the best +construction which one chose to put upon it; and Prince George--who had +returned to Paris directly after the first offer and acted as a +personal representative of King Constantine, together with the official +representative of the Hellenic Government--warmly advocated its +adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in without delay and +without conditions, she might safely trust the Allies.[12] + +Whether Prince George's plea sprang from blind faith or from +far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the sequel may throw some +light; for the present enough to state that it produced no effect. In +a matter concerning the integrity of national territory acquired so +dearly, King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any +ambiguity or uncertainty: he was willing to waive the other two points, +but not that. He therefore begged his brother to see M. Poincaré and +solicit in his name the President's help to secure that indispensable +assurance. "The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente Powers +should give us a solemn promise that they will respect and make others +respect, until the re-establishment of peace, our territorial +integrity, and that they will not permit any damage to it by the future +Peace Treaty. Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished +that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally decline to explain +themselves clearly with her." [13] What was in the King's mind may be +seen from the President's answer: The Powers did not wish to give a +formal pledge in as many words lest the Bulgars should be stirred to +{39} hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to them.[14] + +Prince George, in reporting M. Poincaré's reply, added that the fear of +any damage being inflicted on Greek territorial integrity by the future +Peace Treaty was completely devoid of foundation; that, having himself +expressed this fear, he had been answered: "How can you imagine that we +could dispose of any part whatever of the territory of an allied State +without its consent?" [15] + +These fair words failed to reassure the Hellenic Government, which, +after mature reflection, concluded that the formula suggested by M. +Delcassé did not sufficiently safeguard Greece against combinations +likely to affect her territorial integrity. Its misgivings, which +sprang in the first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise, +were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincaré for that refusal. +Consequently, it regretted that the Entente Powers did not see their +way to come to an understanding for a collaboration which both sides +desired, and repeated the assurance of a most benevolent neutrality +towards them.[16] + +The Greek position was plain: Greece made proposals which constituted a +break with the policy pursued deliberately since the beginning of the +War--proposals for an active partnership, and in return put forward +conditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge that she +should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed of Cavalla. +There were certain things she could do and, therefore, wished to do. +There were certain things she could not do, and must be assured that +she would not be made to do them. The Entente Powers, on the other +hand, would bind themselves to nothing: which is preferable, they said +in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond, or the spirit of +spontaneous co-operation; a legal obligation or the natural union of +hearts? What Greece needs, rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a +signature, is the steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends. If you +come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the {40} liberation +of the world and righteousness, how could we fail to be with you in +every single question affecting compensations or the integrity of your +territories? That's all very fine, said the Greeks. But---- + +The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded. Although +Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed the free passage of +German munitions which enabled Turkey to carry on the defence of +Gallipoli, the Entente Powers, satisfied with her Premier's +explanations and professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of +seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M. +Poincaré told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that +happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia, +being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced. + +About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments +that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the +Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual +safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the +Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon both Servia and +Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian +susceptibilities--and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers, +who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship--by +the unhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere the end +of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer +to Bulgaria. + +They received the intelligence as might have been expected. The +Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the +Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of +the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of +her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands: +the Constitution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction +of the National Assembly. He asked them to understand that this +decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be +counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present +Government embraced every political party.[18] + +Not less uncompromising was the attitude of Greece. When the news +reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic Government could hardly believe +it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty +proclaimed by the Entente Powers--it seems to us absolutely impossible +to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has +been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its +territories the help of a people which has hitherto done all it could +to help the enemies of the Entente. By what right, and on what ground +could they mutilate our country? The opinions once expressed by M. +Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not constitute +a sufficient ground for spoliation. The whole thing is an unthinkable +outrage: it shows that our fears were justified and our demand for a +guarantee was absolutely indispensable." [19] + +France, through M. Delcassé, and England, through Lord Crewe, sought to +dispel these fears by formally disclaiming any intention to press upon +Greece a mutilation to which she objected, and explaining that the +eventual cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she +should consent of her own accord. M. Zographos, however, who had done +his best to bring Greece in on reasonable terms, convinced of his +failure, resigned; and after his departure the Gounaris Government +would permit itself no further discussion upon the subject of +intervention. + +During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff once more, in +June, approached the Servian Government with detailed suggestions for a +common plan against Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a +preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the +Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian +advantage in rapidity of mobilization. These steps proved as barren as +all the preceding: while Servia would not try to conjure the Bulgarian +peril by the sacrifices which the Entente recommended, she could not +provide against it by entering into arrangements with Greece which the +Entente disapproved. + +{42} + +Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British Minister at Sofia +made to the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of Cavalla and an +undefined portion of its hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in +Macedonia, stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on +those countries, and make the cession to them of any compensations +elsewhere conditional on their consent to this transaction. + +The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long anticipated. M. +Passitch, the Servian Premier, in an interview with the Greek Minister +at Nish, expressed his profound dismay at the corner into which Servia +was driven; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that she was +entirely dependent on the Entente--whose high-handed methods he did not +fail to criticize--forced her to give it consideration. + +If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged. M. Gounaris addressed +a strongly-worded remonstrance to the British Minister at Athens, +reminding him that in May his Government had protested against the +offer of Greek territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M. +Delcassé had disavowed any intention to bring the least pressure to +bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to count on her independence +being respected. The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could +promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of +Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards. +But they were greatly mistaken. The Hellenic Government, voicing the +unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment, +repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an +object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the +courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most +energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to +inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of +international law. + +In reply, the British Government quietly informed the Hellenic +Government that the Entente Powers still hoped that Greece would come +into line with their policy, and that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted +their offer, they would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail +with {43} the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic +concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.[20] + +This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with M. Gounaris's +Government to an end. It is a strange record. We have, to begin with, +the curious reception of his first offer--the whole Greek Army, the +intervention of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a +victory. Doubtless, there were reasons for declining so considerable a +reinforcement. We know that, although Russia had modified her +objection to Greek participation, she still regarded the presence of a +large Greek force in European Turkey with disfavour; that the +dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France; that +the Allies could not at that time afford the military contingents +stipulated by the Greek General Staff. There will be no disposition to +underrate the complexities of the situation, or want of sympathy for +those upon whom fell the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all +the Powers concerned. But, though these complexities might be good +reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were hardly reasons +for not acknowledging it, even in the interest of ordinary courtesy. + +Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris. Here, again, +political difficulties explain without justifying the attitude of the +Entente Powers. Their refusal of the guarantee demanded by Greece as +an essential condition of her entry into the war was, of course, a +natural result of their Bulgarian policy--a policy for which very +little could be said. Time perhaps was, at the beginning of the War, +when Bulgaria might have been won; for it is not necessary to adopt the +Graeco-Servian view that she had from the first decided to join the +enemies of the Entente and that no amount of reasonable concessions +would have satisfied her ambition; the Bulgars are a practical people, +and there was at Sofia a pro-Entente party which might have prevailed, +if the Entente Powers had, without delay, defined the proposed +concessions and proceeded to press Greece and Servia to make them--to +expect from either {44} State a voluntary self-mutilation was to expect +a miracle. By not doing so, by shilly-shallying at Athens, Nish, and +Sofia, they only lost the confidence of Greeks and Serbs without +gaining the confidence of the Bulgars, who could hardly take seriously +proposals so vague in their formulation and so uncertain of their +fulfilment. If, on the other hand, the Allies were unable to define +the concessions or afraid to shock public opinion by forcing them upon +Greece and Servia, then they ought to have dropped their hopeless +scheme, without wasting valuable time, and worked on the lines of +Graeco-Servian co-operation against Bulgaria. Instead, they squashed, +as we saw, every attempt which the Greek General Staff made to that end. + +But it is not the only aberration with which history will charge our +statesmen and diplomats. + +Greece was going through an internal crisis; and those who know Greece +will know what that means. In private life no people is more +temperate, more moderate, than the Greek: a sense of measure always +seasons its pleasures, and even the warmest passions of the heart seem +to obey the cool reflections of the brain. In public life, by way of +compensation, the opposite qualities prevail; and as citizens the +Greeks display an astonishing lack of the very virtues which +distinguish them as men. The spirit of party burns so hot in them that +it needs but a breath to kindle a conflagration. That spirit, whose +excesses had, several times in the past, brought the fundamental +principles of the Constitution into question, and the country itself to +the brink of ruin, was once again at work. Former friends had become +deadly enemies: the community was rent with dissensions and poisoned +with suspicions. Preposterous falsehoods were freely scattered and +readily snatched at on both sides: the side of M. Venizelos and the +side of M. Gounaris. Politicians who had been eclipsed by the Cretan's +brilliance, came forth now to regain their lustre at his expense. For +like all men who have played leading parts on the world's stage, M. +Venizelos had gathered about him as much animosity as admiration; and +hate is more enterprising than love. + +M. Venizelos and his partisans were at least as resourceful as their +opponents. The Cretan had never been able to bear contradiction. If +his greatness had created him {45} many enemies, his pettiness had +created him more. His tone of prophetic and impeccable omniscience was +vexatious at all times, but particularly galling at this agitated +period. It was now his constant cry that the situation called for the +work of a statesman and not of an international lawyer or strategist. +There were times when he declaimed this thesis in so violent a fashion +that no self-respecting man could work with him. He had lost all the +able collaborators of the great Reconstruction era, and nothing could +make him forgive these "apostates." Everybody who could not see eye to +eye with him was to M. Venizelos a traitor. It was impossible for M. +Venizelos to admit that others besides himself might be actuated by +patriotic as well as by personal motives; that he did not possess an +exclusive patent of sincerity any more than of vanity. He found it +easier to believe that the alpha and the omega of their policy was to +undo him. He would undo them--even at the cost of the cause he had at +heart: to see Greece openly on the side of the Entente. It is not that +he thought less of the cause, but he thought more of himself. His +egoism was of that heroic stature which shrinks from nothing. His +nature impelled him to this labour; his privileged position as the +particular friend of the Entente supplied him with the means. + +M. Venizelos had taken a long stride towards that end when he +insinuated that King Constantine's disagreement with him was due to +German influence. Henceforth this calumny became the cardinal article +of his creed, and the "Court Clique" a society for the promotion of the +Kaiser's interests abroad and the adoption of the Kaiser's methods of +government at home. M. Streit, though no longer a member of the +Cabinet, was represented as its mainspring: a secret counsellor who +wielded the power, while he avoided the title, of Minister; M. +Gounaris, though in name a Prime Minister, was in reality a mere +instrument of the sovereign's personal policy--so were the members of +the General Staff--so was, in fact, everyone who held opinions at +variance with his own: they all were creatures of the Crown who tried +to hide their pro-Germanism under the mask of anti-Venizelism. Their +objections to his short-sighted and wrong-headed Asiatic +aspirations--objections the soundness of which has been amply {46} +demonstrated by experience--were dictated by regard for Germany, the +patron of Turkey. Their offers to fight for the dissolution of +Germany's protégé were not genuine: the conditions which accompanied +them were only designed to make them unacceptable. The Entente should +beware of their bad faith and learn that M. Venizelos was the only +Greek statesman that could be trusted.[21] + +The Powers who had long since adopted M. Venizelos found it convenient +to adopt all his theories. M. Delcassé, when called upon to explain +why the Greek offer met with such scant ceremony, did so by saying that +it came from M. Gounaris, who was the instrument of the personal policy +of the sovereign, and who combated among the electors M. Venizelos, the +champion of rapprochement with the Entente; that the proposal for the +dispatch of large contingents to the East, involving as it did a +depletion of the Western Front, was calculated to please the imperial +brother-in-law of King Constantine; that the territorial guarantee +demanded by Greece would have become known to Bulgaria, thrown her into +the arms of Germany, and precipitated her against Servia, whom King +Constantine intended to leave to her fate; the trick was too gross to +deceive the Allies, and they gave it the reception it deserved. +Likewise in squashing the Greek efforts to concert with Servia measures +for mutual safety against Bulgaria, while there was yet time, the +Allies, said M. Delcassé, acted on the advice of M. Venizelos, who told +them that the Graeco-Servian Treaty was purely defensive: that it did +not provide for action unless Bulgaria attacked; and what a misfortune +if Servia, by such measures, should appear to take an initiative which +would give Bulgaria an excuse for the aggression she meditated. +Therefore, they bade Servia devote her whole attention to the security +of her Austrian frontier and not play Bulgaria's game by furnishing her +with a pretext for attack.[22] + +{47} + +On this side of the Channel the inventions of M. Venizelos, it would +seem, were accepted as discoveries with equal solemnity. During the +Paris pourparlers, according to the French Ambassador in London at all +events, England was much annoyed by the Greek Government's hesitations, +which she attributed to King Constantine's opposition, and asked +herself whether she could either then or in the future treat with a +country governed autocratically. She was persuaded that Greece lay +under the influence of Germany, and asked herself whether she could in +future support a country which let itself be guided by Powers whose +interests were absolutely contrary to her own.[23] + +The Entente Ministers at Athens, as was natural, had greater +opportunities of displaying their solidarity with M. Venizelos. They +would perhaps have been better advised had they followed the example of +their colleagues at Rome. It can hardly be questioned that the +discreet and decorous aloofness of the Entente diplomats from the +long-protracted struggle between the Italian advocates of war and +neutrality, assisted by Prince von Bülow's indiscreet and indecorous +participation in that struggle, facilitated a decision in our favour: +nothing does so much to alienate a high-spirited nation as an attempt +on the part of outsiders to direct its internal affairs. In Greece the +need for discretion was even more imperative. All controversy at such +a juncture was injudicious. But if preference had to be shown, it +would have been better to have taken the King's side, for all that was +valuable to us from the military point of view rallied round him; and, +in any case, since the hopes of the Venizelists for oversea expansion +depended on the goodwill of the Sea Powers, {48} they were tied to us +securely enough: so if the land school represented by the General Staff +could have been satisfied, the country would have remained united and +on our side. Instead of adopting this sane attitude, the local agents +of the Entente ostentatiously associated themselves with the +Venizelists and boycotted the others, thus gratuitously contributing to +a cleavage from which only our enemies could profit. + +And that was not all. Having begun by endeavouring to influence the +Greeks, they ended by being entirely influenced by them. Forgetting +that no correct perception of facts or estimate of motives is possible +without a certain mental detachment, they allowed themselves to be +swallowed up, as it were, in the atmosphere of suspicion and slander +generated by party friction: they ceased to have any eyes, ears, or +minds of their own; they saw and heard just what M. Venizelos willed +them to see and hear, and thought just as M. Venizelos willed them to +think. If the King refused to enter the War, his refusal was inspired +by the desire to serve the Kaiser; if he offered to do so, his offers +were prompted by the desire to dish M. Venizelos.[24] + +Hence, every proposal made to the Entente by M. Venizelos's successors +was rejected. Greece was kept out of the Allies' camp, and Servia was +sacrificed. For it should be clearly understood that the fate of +Servia was decided in the months of June and July, 1915, not only by +the development of the Germano-Bulgarian plan, but also by the failure +of all co-operative counter-measures on the part of the Serbs, Greeks, +and Entente Powers while time was still available. If only there had +been anyone of sufficient authority and independence of view to +correlate and compose the clashing interests of the moment, a gallant +ally might have been saved from destruction. But those best qualified +to judge of what was coming, and in a position to frame the +corresponding policy, had been driven into reserve by the storm of +calumny, whereby their motives were misconstrued, their counsels +derided, and their authority undermined; so that in the general uproar +their voices were scarcely heard. And there were none--or {49} very +few--to act as intermediaries; for the personnel of the Entente +Legations, "wholly believing a lie," had withdrawn in a body from all +intercourse with them, had nicknamed them "Boches," and were accustomed +to assess as concocted in Berlin every notion that emanated from them. +Even the few members of those Legations who had the moral courage to +walk the streets without blinkers were subjected to every form of +odious insinuation and attack. Venizelos in office, out of office, on +matters technical or lay, to him and to him only would anyone listen, +and as he knew rather less about the rudiments of the military art than +most people, and refrained from consulting those that did, the results +were not difficult to predict. + +Yet, as late as June, the elements of a good plan were ready to hand in +abundance. The General Staff was, as stated, continuing its efforts +for co-operation with the Serbs. The King, though too ill to conduct +business, would have assented to any military proposal put forward by +the General Staff. The people would have followed the King as one man. +And the enemy were not ready. All that was necessary was to study with +attention and sympathy the advice of the experts: to call the soldiers +of the countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint +campaign. It was not done--and it is difficult to say now to whom the +failure proved most disastrous--to Servia, to Greece, or to the Entente +Powers. But for this failure a proportionate share of blame must be +laid upon those who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece, +did everything they could to foment them. + + + +[1] _White Book_, No. 34. + +[2] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./10 March, 1915. + +[3] _White Book_, No. 35. + +[4] The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist _White Book_, No. +36,--an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the probabilities of the +War, dated 13/26 March, 1915. It is both striking and illuminating +that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria, the author +considers three alternatives: (1) Bulgaria in alliance with the +Entente. (2) Bulgaria as neutral. (3) Bulgaria as an enemy of the +Entente. In dealing with the attitude of Greece he does not for a +single moment contemplate more than two alternatives: (1) Greece as an +ally of the Entente. (2) Greece as neutral. Further, in the course of +the argument which follows, M. Streit discusses a possible +understanding between Greece on the one part and Rumania and Bulgaria +on the other, with the object either of a common neutrality or, failing +that, of a simultaneous entry into war in favour of the Entente, "on +whose side alone we can range ourselves." + +[5] See the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[6] _Conversation entre le Président du Conseil et les Ministres des +Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 mars/12 avril, 1915_. + +[7] Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the Proposal +of same date; _Orations_, pp. 67-9. + +[8] Romanos, Paris, 17/30 April, 1915. + +[9] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 18 April/1 +May, 1915. + +[10] Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915. + +[11] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 1915. + +[12] Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915. + +[13] King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/10 May, 1915. From +this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincaré had assured +the Prince that such a guarantee would certainly be given to Greece, +"_pour la période de la guerre et durant la période des négociations de +la paix_." + +[14] Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/11 May, 1915. + +[15] _Ibid._ + +[16] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 30 +April/13 May, 1915. + +[17] Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. +M. Delcassé, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain over +Bulgaria _coûte que coûte_, deploring the possession of Cavalla by +Greece. See Deville, pp. 163, 218. + +[18] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915. + +[19] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915. + +[20] Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/3 Aug.; +Greek Premier's reply (No. 8118); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 23 July/5 +Aug.; 25 July/7 Aug.; Communication by British Minister at Athens, 23 +July/5 Aug., 1915. + +[21] See the _Nea Hellas_, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915; _Orations, +passim_. + +[22] _Journal Officiel_, p. 76. To appreciate the community of +sentiments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcassé fully, one must compare +the above statement with that in _Orations_, pp. 68-9. The differences +are equally instructive. The Venizelist orator, prudently suppresses +from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated the General +Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia; he boldly surmises, on the +other hand, that behind the General Staff's stipulations as to the +sphere of Greek military action lurked the _arrière pensée_ to confront +the Allies with the risk of provoking Bulgaria, whom they still +regarded as a potential friend: so the stipulations were, as they were +intended to be, unacceptable. Again, while M. Delcassé, addressing a +French audience nervous about the Western Front, reckoned that the +Entente contingents demanded by the Greek General Staff would amount to +at least 600,000 or 800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically, +estimates them at 450,000 men: this force, which Greece deemed +necessary for success, it will be seen, was not far removed from that +which France and England eventually wasted in failure. + +[23]Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. + +[24] See M. Poincaré's statement to the _Matin_, reproduced in the +_Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 386; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9. + + + + +{50} + +CHAPTER V + +On 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a result of the General +Elections held on June 13. The outcome of those elections proved how +great his popularity still was. True, in 1910 he had obtained 146 +seats out of 182, and now only 185 out of 314. But the majority, +though diminished, remained substantial enough to show that he still +was, for most people, the man who had cleansed Greece. Nor did M. +Venizelos imperil his popularity by revealing his differences with the +King. On the contrary, in his own country, his attacks were carefully +confined to the statesmen and soldiers opposed to him: the King, M. +Venizelos proclaimed, far from sharing their narrow, unpatriotic, +pro-German views, "did not exclude exit from neutrality under given +conditions, but accepted it in principle as imposed for the serving of +the national rights." [1] By his organs, too, the King was described +as "a worthy successor of the Constantines who created the mighty +Byzantine Empire--imbued with a sense of his great national +mission--Greek in heart and mind." [2] So anxious, indeed, was M. +Venizelos not to lose votes by any display of ill-feeling against the +popular sovereign that he even took some pains to have himself +photographed calling at the Palace to inquire after the King's health. + +As to policy, it is difficult to determine the part which it played in +the contest. M. Venizelos refrained from publishing any sort of +programme. His opponents asserted that a vote for Venizelos meant a +vote for war. But his most prominent supporters declared that such was +by no means the case: although, at a certain moment, he was ready to +participate in the Gallipoli enterprise, circumstances had changed, and +his future course would depend on the situation which he would find on +returning to {51} power. This vagueness, though not very helpful to +the voters, doubtless helped the voting; for there was hardly any +pro-war feeling among the masses. The noble ideals emblazoned upon the +Entente banners produced little impression on their minds. The +experience of two thousand years has taught the Greeks that Governments +never fight for noble ideals, and, if they relieve a small nation from +a foreign yoke, it is, as often as not, in order to impose a new one. +To them the War was a struggle for power and plunder between two +European groups. It was matter of common knowledge that Constantinople +had been allotted to the Russians, and the Greeks were not particularly +keen on shedding their blood in order to place a Tsar on the Byzantine +throne. Nor did the Smyrna bait attract them greatly, since it +involved parting with Cavalla. At the same time, the lurid accounts of +German frightfulness disseminated by the Entente propaganda, instead of +inflaming, damped still further their enthusiasm.[3] The Venizelist +candidates were, therefore, wise in repudiating the allegation that +their victory would inevitably mean intervention in the conflict; and, +on the whole, the people who voted for the Cretan statesman seem to +have paid a tribute to his personality rather than to his policy. + +Meanwhile, Servia, under pressure from the Entente, had decided to +promise Bulgaria territorial concessions, and the communication of this +decision to the Hellenic Government formed the occasion of M. +Venizelos's first official act. Greece, he wrote in reply, not wishing +to embarrass her friend and ally at a moment when imperative necessity +forced the latter to submit to painful sacrifices, abandoned her +objections. But she would be lacking in sincerity if she failed to +tell Servia straightway that "the _raison d'être_ of the +Alliance--namely, the territorial equilibrium and the mutual guarantee +of their respective possessions--being profoundly affected by the +contemplated changes, the reciprocal obligations of the Alliance could +not survive except by virtue of a renewal." M. Passitch replied +verbally that he thought like M. Venizelos. But, as it happened, the +question did not arise; Servia's promise was coupled with so many +stipulations and reservations, that, in the opinion of the Entente +Powers, {52} it amounted almost to a refusal;[4] and the thread of the +negotiations was very soon broken by events. Destiny moved too fast +for diplomacy. + +Hardly had these dispatches been exchanged, when Colonel Vlachopoulos, +the emissary of the Greek General Staff to Servia, arrived in Athens, +bringing a report of the gravest nature. After twelve months' +evasions, the Servian Minister of War had at last mentioned to him the +need for an understanding between the two Staffs, and the Servian +Director of Military Operations stated that Servia, far from being able +to contribute to a common struggle against Bulgaria the 150,000 +combatants stipulated by the Graeco-Servian Convention, could not at +the moment transport to the northern parts of the Bulgarian frontier +more than one or two divisions, while as to the southern parts, which +most immediately concerned Greece, they would have to be left with the +eight regiments of 1915 conscripts--that is, raw recruits. +Simultaneously, the fear which the Greek military authorities had +expressed to their Servian colleagues in the previous spring--that +delay might prove fatal--was being realized: from all sides came +intelligence of the concentration of large Austro-German forces towards +the Danube. + +In the circumstances, after studying Colonel Vlachopoulos's report, the +Greek General Staff submitted to the Government (14 September) the +opinion that for Greece to embark on a war against Bulgaria, so long as +she was not assured of the co-operation of adequate Servian forces, was +tantamount to courting annihilation; and of such co-operation there was +no prospect: the moment the Serbs found themselves faced by a superior +Austro-German army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars as well +as, in all probability, the Turks alone. + +As if in confirmation of this forecast, a week later (21 September), +the Hellenic Government received from Sofia the official announcement +of the conclusion of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement and of Bulgarian +mobilization; the latter measure being, according to the Bulgarian +Premier, purely precautionary: as the Austro-German {53} armies had +just begun an attack on Servia, and the theatre of war approached the +Bulgarian frontiers, his country was obliged to take up an attitude of +armed neutrality.[5] + +The news threw M. Venizelos into a fever of excitement. He had, +meanwhile, become most solicitous about Greece-Servian co-operation, +and had not permitted his mind to be impressed by Colonel +Vlachopoulos's report. When Austria and Germany had their hands full +elsewhere, Servia's peril had left him cold; it set him on fire now +when they were ready to hurl their legions into the Balkan +Peninsula--when it was no longer for Greece a question of fighting +Bulgaria only, but Bulgaria and Turkey and the Central Empires. M. +Venizelos was a statesman of broad ideas, a hater of dry facts, and an +impenitent believer in his own star. For the matter of time he cared +very little; considerations of odds did not weigh with him unduly; and +he cherished a sovereign contempt for the cautious attitude of +professional soldiers and other uninspired persons. Never did these +qualities appear more vividly than on this 21st of September. + +At 5 p.m. M. Venizelos went to Tatoi, the King's country residence, to +confer with him, having previously arranged that a mobilization Order +should be drawn up and presented to his Majesty for signature at 6.30 +p.m., by which time he expected to have finished his conversation. The +following is a synopsis of that memorable interview based on a report +from M. Venizelos's own lips.[6] + +The King readily agreed to mobilize, but firmly resisted the proposal +to enter the war, on the ground that the odds were too heavy. M. +Venizelos argued that, even if Germany had five million men available +on other fronts, she could not bring them to the Balkans, and +consequently there was no cause for fear: he spoke learnedly and at +enormous length of geographical conditions and means of transport, of +victualling, of guns and bayonets, of _morale_--he had allowed himself +an hour and a half. How the King must have felt under this harangue, +any expert who has had to listen to an amateur laying down the law to +him on his own subject may imagine. On finding his military arguments +fruitless, M. Venizelos shifted his ground; though, the military habit +being too strong, he {54} could not get away from military phraseology: +"I was then obliged," he tells us, "to bring forward my heavy +artillery." + +"Majesty," I said, "I have not succeeded in persuading you. I am very +sorry; but it is my duty, as representing at this moment the +Sovereignty of the People, to tell you that you have no right to +disagree with me this time. The people by the last elections has +approved my policy and given me its confidence. It knew that the basis +of my policy was not to let Bulgaria, by crushing Servia, become too +big and crush us to-morrow. You cannot therefore at this moment depart +from this policy--unless you decide to set aside the Constitution; in +which case you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution by a +Decree and assuming the responsibility." + +The King replied: "You know I recognize that I am bound to obey the +popular verdict when it is a question of the internal affairs of the +country; but when it is a question of foreign affairs--the great +national questions--my view is that, so long as I consider a thing +right or wrong, I must insist that it shall or shall not be done, +because I feel responsible before God." + +At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, "I remember that a feeling of +distress came over me, and with clasped hands, I shook my head in a +melancholy manner, saying: 'Alas! we are before the theory of kingship +by the grace of God: poor Greece!'" [7] After a little, he told the +King that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake a +struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation. + +The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian +mobilization? In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay +even twenty-four hours. After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will +attack Servia? It is possible that she may maintain an armed +neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay +in power and carry on your policy." Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew +his resignation. + +Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55} +announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for +Bulgaria at once. But how? In his own mind, as he had already +demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked +the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking +their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the +King set such store. They objected Servia's inability to contribute, +as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants. +Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think +we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish +150,000 combatants of their own?" + +"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan +(European) troops, not Colonials." + +By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the +King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these +reinforcements, to depart from neutrality. He left Tatoi with a clear +perception of the divergence between their respective points of view: +while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was +for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon +appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means +or other. + +A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his +feet: + +"I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the curious record, +"and telephoned to the Entente Ministers to come and see me quickly. +When they came, I informed them that a mobilization Order was being +signed at that very moment and would be published that evening; but for +our further course I needed to know if the Powers were disposed to make +good the 150,000 combatants whom Servia was obliged by our Treaty to +contribute for joint action against Bulgaria. They promised to +telegraph, and immediately dispatched an extra urgent telegram, adding +that they would let me know the answer. This happened at about 8 p.m., +and at 8.15 there arrived M. Mercati (the Marshal of the Court) with a +message from the King, asking me not to make this _démarche_ to the +Entente. I replied that the _démarche_ had already been made." [8] + +{56} + +Forty-eight hours later arrived the Entente Powers' answer, that they +would send to Salonica the 150,000 men asked for. M. Venizelos, on +communicating this answer to the King, was requested by him to tell the +Entente Ministers that, so long as Bulgaria did not attack Servia, and +consequently the question of Greece going to Servia's assistance did +not arise, no troops should be sent, as their landing on Greek soil +would constitute a violation of Greek neutrality. M. Venizelos tells +us that he communicated the King's wish to the Entente Ministers, who +telegraphed it to their Governments. + +King Constantine, it would seem, was left under the impression that the +affair had ended; and the general belief was that the policy of +neutrality still held good; when suddenly the report came that Allied +troops were on their way to Salonica and that Greece was expected to +assist in their landing. + +The news would have astonished the Greeks in any circumstances; but the +circumstances in which it reached them were of a nature to heighten +astonishment into alarm. Just then (28 September) Sir Edward Grey +stated in the House of Commons, amid loud applause, "Not only is there +no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a +warm feeling of sympathy;" and he reiterated the Balkan policy of the +Entente--a Balkan {57} agreement on the basis of territorial +concessions. The inference which the Greeks drew from this coincidence +was that the Entente Powers were sending troops to despoil them on +behalf of the Bulgars--that they intended to bid for Bulgaria's +friendship at the twelfth hour by forcibly seizing the parts of +Macedonia which they had endeavoured in vain to persuade Greece to +yield.[9] + +M. Venizelos himself carried the report to the King, inveighing, it is +said, intemperately against the Allies: "I will protest with the +greatest energy," he cried, trembling with anger. "I will protest +against this unqualifiable violation of our soil." + +"Certainly," replied the King, "you must protest very energetically." +[10] + +{58} + +And M. Venizelos hurried off to his office and drew up the following +telegram, which, now printed for the first time, reveals many things: + +"A grave misunderstanding threatens to develop between Greece and the +Entente Powers on the subject of the despatch of international troops +through Salonica to Servia. When I suggested the dispatch of 150,000 +men destined to complete the Servian contingents in case of a common +struggle against Bulgaria, I did not ask this succour for Greece, but +for Servia in order to remove the objection raised against our +Alliance, said to have become null by Servia's inability to fulfil her +engagement. By accepting in principle to proceed to such dispatch the +Powers rendered above all a service to Servia and to their own cause in +the East. Likewise, I had clearly specified that, so long as Greece +was neutral, the landing of international troops at Salonica could not +have our official adhesion. Our neutrality imposed upon us to protest +for form's sake; after which matters would go on as at Moudros." [11] + +{59} + +"It remained for us to take all the necessary measures for facilitating +the landing and the direct passage to Servia of the international +troops, combining these operations with the needs of our own +mobilization. The Minister of Communications was to go at once to +Salonica with a number of engineers to arrange on the spot these +technical matters, very complicated from the paucity of means of +transport in Macedonia. It was understood that, before any dispatch of +troops to Salonica, we should have twenty-four hours' notice. + +"Things were at this point, when the Military Governor of Salonica--on +Wednesday--received a visit from the French Consul, the Commander of a +French man-of-war, and two French officers from the Dardanelles, who +told him that, in pursuance of a pretended understanding between the +Premier and the French Minister, they were going to start +reconnaissance work for the landing of French troops and the defence of +Salonica against enemy submarines. Furthermore, on Thursday there +arrived at Salonica General Hamilton with his Staff and notified the +Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the town and +port, and put them in a state of defence with a view to a landing of +troops. General Moschopoulos, very firmly though very politely, +declared to them that, without orders from his Government, it would be +his painful duty to oppose any seizure of national territory. + +"Such a misunderstanding inspires us with the liveliest alarm, for the +contemplated landing has not yet been definitely accepted, and after +being accepted it cannot be carried out, (1) without a preliminary +protest for form's sake, which the British Government has informed us +it does not want;[12] (2) without the absolute maintenance of the +powers of our authorities, who alone would decide the measures for the +use of the port and railways in such a manner as not to compromise the +transport and concentration of our own armies." + +{60} + +"Moreover, the great emotion caused in the public by the recent speech +of Sir Edward Grey compels the Royal Government to demand from the +Entente Powers certain preliminary assurances. While people here +expected to see the Powers, after the Bulgarian mobilization, proceed +to decisive acts, and at the very least to a declaration that the +territorial promises made to Bulgaria in August would be cancelled if +within a very short time she did not agree to co-operate with the +Entente, they were stupefied to see that to the most evident proof of +Bulgarian duplicity and disloyalty they replied by redoubling their +solicitude and goodwill. Sir Edward Grey's speech, followed closely by +the visits made without notice at Salonica by the representatives of +the French and British Staffs, gives birth to the fear that certain +Entente Powers may harbour the design of using the troops which would +be sent to Servia as the fittest instrument for giving practical effect +to the territorial ambitions of the Bulgars in Macedonia. Well or ill +founded, this fear exercises over people in Greece, and we have reason +to believe in Servia also, a demoralizing effect and threatens to +compromise the success of our mobilization. + +"The Royal Government finds itself confronted with a situation created +much against its will, which imposes upon it the duty, in order to calm +as soon as possible the alarms of the people now in arms, of asking the +Powers to dispel the fears inspired by their attitude towards Bulgaria +by declaring, if possible, that the offers made to her are henceforth +null, and that the eventual dispatch of international troops to Servia +would in no case be turned to the detriment of the territorial +integrity of Greece and Servia. Only formal assurances in this sense +could justify in the eyes of Greek public opinion the Government which, +while protesting for form's sake, would agree to facilitate the landing +at Salonica and the passage across its territory of international +troops destined for Servia. + +"Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this +telegram." [13] + +From the tenor of this interesting document we gather that, while fully +aware of the King's attitude, M. Venizelos {61} went on negotiating +with the Allies for immediate action; and that the Allies proceeded to +act before any agreement had been reached. To judge by its tone, M. +Venizelos seems to have been annoyed at the Allies' haste as at an +unwarrantable attempt to commit him irretrievably without heeding his +conditions or waiting for his definite consent: so grave a breach of +propriety could not but pain him. But, however annoyed he might be on +the surface, at bottom he was doubtless pleased: the move supplied the +best means for the conversion of his Sovereign--no argument is so +persuasive as an accomplished fact. That was what really mattered--the +manner was a detail; and it is impossible to suppose that he meant to +let his annoyance stand in the way of his high purpose.[14] +Themistocles, to whom the Cretan statesman bears some affinity, it will +be remembered, forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis by a similar +stratagem. + +This, of course, does not exculpate the Allies. Their conduct merits +at least the appellation of irregular. But when foreign diplomats and +native politicians become fused into a happy family, it would be +strange, indeed, if irregularities did not occur. The whole of the +Greek story is so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of old-fashioned +melodrama that no incident, however startling, seems out of place. + +What follows is something of an anticlimax. Next day, the French +Minister--from this point onwards France takes the lead and England +recedes into the second place--had the honour to announce to his +Excellency the Greek Premier the arrival at Salonica of a first +detachment of troops, declaring at the same time that the Entente +Powers sent it to assist their ally Servia, and that they counted on +Greece, who had already given them so many proofs of friendship, not to +oppose measures taken in the interest of a country to which she also +was allied.[15] + +{62} + +In reply, the Greek Premier had the honour to declare to his Excellency +the French Minister that, being neutral, Greece could not authorize +measures which violated her neutrality. The Hellenic Government was +therefore obliged to protest against the passage of foreign troops +through Greek territory. The circumstance that those troops were +destined solely to the assistance of Servia, who was Greece's ally, +nowise altered the case; for, before the _casus faederis_ was realized, +the neutrality of Greece could not be affected by the danger which +menaced Servia.[16] + +To return from formalities to realities. On the same day (2 Oct.), the +Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while the +Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube; and +on the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria. This rapid +fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the +highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the Entente had not yet +been extinguished. On the very day on which the Petrograd Government +delivered its tardy and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the +Chamber held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first +time proclaimed that the Graeco-Servian Treaty imposed an absolute +obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey; adding--in +answer to a question, what he would do if on going to Servia's +assistance he met the German and Austrian armies--that Germany and +Austria must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his thesis +with those appeals to honour which, whether pertinent or not, seldom +fail to move a popular audience. The debate lasted till four o'clock +in the morning and ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's +military policy--a policy which M. Venizelos, a civilian, expounded to +an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without waiting for the +consent of the King and in defiance of the technical advice of the +General Staff. In fairness to the Chamber, it should be added that the +motion was carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement.[17] + +{63} + +But we know King Constantine's attitude; and if M. Venizelos hoped by +these tactics to force his hand, he was speedily undeceived. No sooner +was the debate over than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked +him to modify his policy or to resign. Faced by such a dilemma, M. +Venizelos did the only thing he could do--he resigned; and his country +shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality. + +It was a narrow escape--how narrow became evident a few hours later. +The Allies had promised to send 150,000 combatants. Even if this +promise had been kept, the Allied force would not have been, in any +strategical sense, an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent. +For it was not in place for covering purposes or subsequent offensive +action; it was not trained to Balkan fighting; it was not equipped for +mountain warfare; and, coming to the same ports as the Greeks, it would +have delayed the process of concentration. But, be that as it may, the +promise was not kept. What is more, it could not possibly have been +kept. Politicians casting about for arguments wherewith to back their +views may leave their hearers to imagine that Great Powers keep armies +ready to be planked down at any point at a moment's notice; but the +fact is that an army, even if it can be spared from other tasks, is a +cumbrous affair to move about, requiring all sorts of tiresome +things--food, arms, ammunition--the provision of which requires, in its +turn, complicated processes, before the army is potentially effective +for the role assigned to it in the creative mind of an excited orator. +Something of the sort had, indeed, been intimated to the Hellenic +Government by the Entente Powers themselves when they wished both +Greeks and Serbs to avert Bulgarian hostility by territorial +concessions--namely, that, as after the commitment of troops to +Gallipoli, none remained to rescue Servia, there was nothing for it but +to conciliate Bulgaria. Of course, it may be asked, such being the +facts, what value had the promise of 150,000 men? This {64} is a +question which M. Venizelos would have done well to ponder, as King +Constantine and his military advisers pondered it. As it was, when +that afternoon the Allied forces turned up at Salonica, the Greek +people had the mortification to find that they amounted to 20,000. Nor +did they approach the stipulated figure for months after. + +The arguments which had prevailed with many some hours before were +suddenly exploded, and to the feeling of confidence which had prompted +the Chamber's vote immediately succeeded a feeling of panic. What! +cried everybody at Athens, are we to stake our liberty--our national +existence--on such a chance: 150,000 Greeks, _plus_ 200,000 +half-exhausted Serbs, _plus_ 20,000 Allies, against 200,000 +Austro-Germans, _plus_ 300,000 Bulgars, _plus_ 100,000 Turks? Nay, if +the French and the English love gambling, we don't: we cannot afford +the luxury. Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped, said some; +others, Venizelos has tried to dupe us. + +Such were the circumstances under which the Allies landed at Salonica. +Their action has been pronounced immoral and perfidious by some English +and even by some French critics; and as it was attended with ill +success, it brought double shame upon the contrivers.[18] Certainly, +it will not bear investigation from the standpoint of political tact: +it was the first of the many performances which little by little +alienated a friendly nation from them and discredited M. Venizelos with +his countrymen. + + + +[1] M. Venizelos in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[2] _Ibid._ + +[3] Deville, p. 174. + +[4] Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, +Nish, 19 Aug./1 Sept.; 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 22 Aug./4 Sept., 1915. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 41. + +[6] _Orations_, pp. 131-8. + +[7] This utterance, for the exactness of which we have to rely entirely +on M. Venizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge henceforth +brought against King Constantine that he claimed to reign by Divine +Right. + +[8] According to another and ampler version of these events, it had +been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while the latter +opened conversations with the British and French Ministers about the +possibility of sending 150,000 combatants, the former should +simultaneously open conversations with the German Emperor relating the +steps taken in regard to the Entente, and asking what Germany would +give for Greek neutrality. But when M. Venizelos returned to Athens, +he sent a letter to the King informing him that he had changed his mind +and that, as a responsible Minister, he could not sanction the +projected negotiations with Germany. Whereupon the King forwarded by +M. Mercati a reply that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to +approach the Entente with regard to reinforcements. See the _Balkan +Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 387-8. Yet another version supplies some +additional details: M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his _démarche_ +was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State in +the least; next day he repeated this assurance to the King himself and, +at the King's instance, promised to cancel the _démarche_; and two days +afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally declared to the +King that M. Venizelos's _démarche_ was considered as null and +void--_nulle et non avenue_.--See S. Cosmin's _Diplomatic et Presse +dans l'Affaire Grecque_ (Paris, 1921), pp. 123-4. + +[9] The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing their +Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops of the +territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria; and the suspicion that +a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have for its object +"really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion of peace, the +territories coveted by her," has been expressed even by a French +diplomat.--See Deville, p. 129, n. 1. + +[10] I venture to borrow this little scene from S. Cosmin, p. 125. M. +Venizelos at this stage of the proceedings is more eloquent than +coherent. He tells us (_Orations_, p. 139), that on informing the King +that the Allied troops were on their way to Salonica, his Majesty said: +"That's all right. Only please let your protest be in any case, +emphatic," and that he replied: "Emphatic--yes, but only up to a +certain point, considering what lies beneath." Now, as on M. +Venizelos's own showing, the King was no party to the Allies' step, it +is not very easy to see how he could have spoken to him as if the King +had a secret understanding with them. The episode is one on which more +light could be shed with advantage. The same may be said of an +allegation that King Constantine secretly informed Bulgaria that, even +in the event of an attack on Servia, she would meet with no opposition +from Greece. This allegation is supported chiefly by a telegraphic +dispatch from the Bulgarian Minister at Athens to Sofia (_White Book_, +No. 43), which somehow (it is not stated how) fell into the hands of M. +Venizelos's friends and was produced by them in the Skouloudis Inquiry. +The authenticity of this document was publicly denied by its alleged +author, and its portentous length (three large pages of close print), +as well as its unusual style render it very suspicious: it begins: +"To-day, 9th instant," and it is dated "23"--as if the author did not +know that the difference between the Old and New Calendar was 13 days. +In face of these difficulties, strong evidence would be required to +establish its genuineness: the more because that Inquiry witnessed a +number of similar curiosities--among them an alleged dispatch from the +Turkish Minister at Athens to the Grand Vizier, regarding the +conclusion of a secret Graeco-Turkish treaty. When challenged, M. +Skouloudis declared that such treaty never was even thought of and +denounced the dispatch as "from beginning to end a forgery," whereupon +nothing more was said. (See Skouloudis's _Apologia_, pp. 85-8). These +matters are of interest as illustrating the atmosphere of mistrust that +poisoned Greek politics at this period, and particularly the relations +between the King of Greece and her leading politician. + +[11] In pursuance of a decision taken by the War Council on 16 Feb., a +British force was sent to Lemnos to support the naval attack on the +Dardanelles, landing at Moudros on 6 March. Greece told the British +Government that she considered the action irreconcilable with her +position as a neutral. The British Government justified it by saying +that, as Turkey had not accepted the verdict of the Powers whereby +Lemnos and the other islands conquered in 1912 were assigned to Greece, +England had the right to treat them as Turkish territory: at the same +time declaring that this did not entail any diminution of Greek +sovereignty. Thus, whilst Turkey was a friend, the British Government +had decided that these islands did not belong to her; it recognized her +claim to them when she became an enemy; but not altogether--only for +the duration of the War: it was merely a temporary expedient to meet a +temporary exigency. By the same line of reasoning, England in the +following July justified the occupation of Mytilene. The Greek answer +was that "without consenting to the occupation of part of her territory +or admitting the arguments put forward by the British Government to +justify its action from the standpoint of International Law, Greece had +to bow before an accomplished fact."--Elliot to Greek Premier, Athens, +9 March, 25 July; Minister for Foreign Affairs to Greek Legations, +London and Paris, 16/29 July, 1915. + +[12] Sir Edward Grey objected to a protest because it would enable +Germany to say that we had violated Greek neutrality.--Gennadius, +London, 29 Sept., 1915. + +[13] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, Rome, 18 +Sept./1 Oct. 1915. (Confidential.) + +[14] "For my policy the arrival of the Anglo-French was a most material +asset. I went for war against Bulgaria and had made up my mind, if +Bulgaria attacked Servia, to fight. It was in my interest, besides the +150,000 Greek and the 200,000 Servian bayonets, to have 150,000 +Anglo-French, consequently it was a political move absolutely necessary +for the prosecution of my own policy."--_Orations_, p. 140. + +[15] Guillemin to Venizelos, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915. + +[17] Venizelos to Guillemin, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915. This +merely formal protest--quite distinct from the confidential dispatch +given above--is the only one of which the world has hitherto been +allowed to hear. + +[17] M. Venizelos had insisted that the reports spread through the +Press concerning the divergence of views between him and the Crown +should be contradicted, and, by telling the King that otherwise the +mobilization would have no effect on Bulgaria, had obtained the King's +permission to publish a _communiqué_ in which he stated that "the Crown +is in accord with the responsible Government not only as regards +mobilization but also as regards future policy."--_Orations_, p. 136. + +[18] See House of Commons Debate, in _The Times_, 19 April, 1916; +Chambre des Deputés, secret debate of 20 June, 1916, in the _Journal +Officiel_, p. 77. + + + + +{65} + +CHAPTER VI + +M. Zaimis formed a Government pledged to the policy which Greece had +pursued since the beginning of the European War: her future course +would be guided by the course of events: meanwhile, she would seek to +safeguard her vital interests by remaining armed.[1] + +As regards Servia, the new Premier had an opportunity of expressing his +views at length soon after his accession to office. The Servian +Government, judging that the imminent attack from Bulgaria realized the +_casus faederis_, asked him if, in conformity with her alliance, Greece +would be ready to take the field. M. Zaimis answered that the Hellenic +Government was very sorry not to be able to comply with the Servian +demand so formulated. It did not judge that in the present conjuncture +the _casus faederis_ came into play. The Alliance, concluded in 1913, +for the purpose of establishing an equilibrium of forces between the +Balkan States, had a purely Balkan character and nowise applied to a +general conflagration. Both the Treaty and the Military Convention +accompanying it showed that the contracting parties had in view only +the case of an isolated attack by Bulgaria against one of them. +Nowhere was there any allusion to a concerted attack by two or more +Powers. Nor could it be otherwise: it would have been an act of mad +presumption for either of the contracting parties to offer the other +the manifestly powerless and ridiculous assistance of its armed forces +in the case of a war with several States at once. And such was the +present case. If the Bulgarian attack apprehended by the Servian +Government took place, it would be in concert with Germany, Austria, +and Turkey: it would be combined with the attack already carried on by +the two Central Empires: it would be an episode of the European War. +{66} The Servian Government itself had recognized this in advance by +breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in imitation of the +Entente Powers, her European Allies, without a previous understanding +with Greece, her Balkan ally. In these circumstances, the Hellenic +Government was convinced that no obligation weighed upon it. + +Further, Greece was persuaded that her armed assistance freely offered +at such a moment would ill serve the common interest of the two +countries. Greece had remained neutral in the European War, judging +that the best service she could render Servia was to hold in check +Bulgaria by keeping her forces intact and her communications open. The +common interest demanded that the Greek forces should continue in +reserve for better use later on: that Greece should remain neutral and +armed, watching the course of events carefully with the resolution to +guard in the best possible way, not only her own vital interests, but +also those which she had in common with Servia. + +The Hellenic Government, while deeply and sincerely regretting that it +was materially impossible for it to do at present more for Servia, +wished to assure her that, faithful to their friendship, it would +continue to accord her every assistance and facility consistent with +its international position.[2] + +The Entente Powers took no exception to this attitude; which is not to +be wondered at, seeing that they had hitherto uniformly ignored the +Graeco-Servian Treaty, and, by their project of territorial concessions +to Bulgaria, had laboured, as much as in them lay, to annul a pact made +for the defence of the territorial _status quo_ against Bulgaria: not +until Bulgaria had been at open war with Servia for some days (14 +Oct.), could they bring themselves to declare that the promises of +Servian and Greek territory which they had made to her no longer held. +Unable, therefore, to tell Greece that she was under any obligation to +enter the War on Servia's behalf, Sir Edward Grey attempted to induce +her to do so for her own benefit by offering her the island of Cyprus. +This offer, made on 17 October, Greece felt compelled to decline: what +would it have profited her to gain Cyprus and lose Athens? And what +could an acceptance have profited Servia either? As {67} M. Zaimis +said, by intervening at that moment Greece would perish without saving +Servia. + +Servia could have been saved had an Anglo-French expedition on an +adequate scale taken place at any of the times which the Greek General +Staff proposed for Graeco-Servian co-operation--indeed, at any time +except only the particular time chosen by the Entente. When their +troops arrived at Salonica, the Servian army--what had been left of it +after fourteen months' fighting and typhus--was already falling back +before the Austro-Germans, who swarmed across the Drina, the Save, and +the Danube, occupied Belgrade and pushed south (6-10 Oct.), while the +Bulgars pressed towards Nish (11-12 Oct.). On the day on which the +English offer was made (17 Oct.), the Austro-Germans were fifteen miles +south of Belgrade, and by the 2nd of November there was no longer any +Servia to save, the Bulgars having on that day entered Monastir. + +The co-operation of Greece might still have been obtained if the Allies +could even then have sent to Salonica forces large enough to assure her +that the struggle would be waged on more equal terms.[3] There had +always been an influential group among the principal military leaders +at Athens who held that it was to the vital interest of their country +that Bulgaria should be attacked, and who, to secure the help of the +Entente Powers against Bulgarian pretensions in the future, were +prepared to run great immediate risks. As it was, the dilatoriness of +the Allies imposed upon M. Zaimis a policy of inaction. + +This policy, besides being imposed by circumstances, also accorded with +the new Premier's character. + +M. Zaimis stands out in the political world of Greece as a singular +anomaly: a politician who never made speeches and never gave +interviews: a silent man in a country where every citizen is a born +orator: an unambitious man in a country where ambition is an endemic +disease. To find a parallel to his position, one must go back to the +days when nations, in need of wise guidance, implored reluctant sages +to undertake the task of guiding them. This thankless task M. Zaimis +performed several times to everybody's temporary satisfaction. On the +present, as on other occasions, he enjoyed the confidence of the +Entente Powers, {68} as well as the confidence of the King and the +people of Greece. Even the journals of M. Venizelos, and the +Anglo-French Press which M. Venizelos inspired, paid the customary +tribute to M. Zaimis's integrity and sagacity. The homage was due to +the fact that M. Zaimis was neither a Venizelist nor an +anti-Venizelist, but simply a Zaimist. In domestic affairs he belonged +to no party; in foreign affairs to no school: he neither sought nor +shunned a change of course. + +That explains why he succeeded in ruling Greece for four weeks, and +also why he failed to rule her longer. + +M. Venizelos had not abandoned his standpoint. Of M. Zaimis's person +he spoke with much respect; but of his policy he spoke just as one +might have expected M. Venizelos to speak: M. Zaimis had broken the +Servian Treaty and would go down to history as a man who had +dishonoured the signature of Greece. With regard to the Entente +Powers, M. Venizelos thought that M. Zaimis meant honestly--the fact +that he was as well known to them as M. Venizelos himself, having +served as their High Commissioner in Crete for two years (1906-08), +exempted him from the imputation of duplicity--and since the Entente +Powers tolerated him, he would do likewise. He only taunted the Zaimis +Government in Parliament for not obtaining for its policy a price from +those whom that policy unintentionally helped: Greece, to be sure, did +not remain neutral to serve Germany's but her own interests, +nevertheless, as Germany benefited by that neutrality, she should be +asked to give a _quid pro quo_.[4] + +It was not the first time that M. Venizelos expressed this idea. At +the Crown Council of 3 March he had suggested, if his own policy of +intervention was not adopted, to ask from Germany compensations for the +continuance of neutrality; and he urged that the King should personally +bargain with the Kaiser's Minister. Again on 21 September, when +sounding the Entente Powers on the {69} possibility of sending troops +to Salonica, he advised the King simultaneously to sound the German +Emperor on the price of neutrality.[5] King Constantine had always +shrunk from entering into any understanding whatever with Germany. +And, although the advice may have been given in good faith, it is easy +to guess the use to which its acceptance might be turned by M. +Venizelos, who, even as it was, did not hesitate to whisper of +"pledges" given to Germany. So M. Zaimis endured the taunt and avoided +the trap. + +This state of truce lasted for a month. Then strife broke out afresh. +Early in November a member of the Government insulted the Opposition. +The Opposition demanded his dismissal. This was refused and matters +were pushed to a crisis--whether by the adversaries of M. Venizelos, +anxious to get rid of a Chamber with a hostile majority, or by M. +Venizelos himself, anxious to get rid of a Cabinet that had succeeded +in establishing friendly relations with the Entente, it is impossible +to say. Both conjectures found favour at the time, and both seem +probable.[6] In any case, M. Venizelos made of that incident an +occasion for an attack on the Government's foreign policy, which, +ending in an adverse vote, led to the resignation of M. Zaimis and the +formation of a new Ministry under M. Skouloudis (7 November). + +There ensued a dissolution of the Chamber (11 November) and a fresh +appeal to the people; the King, on the advice of M. Skouloudis, +inviting M. Venizelos to the polls, as who should say: When you got +your majority in June, the nation was with you; many things of the +gravest national concern have happened since; let us see if the nation +is with you now. M. Venizelos declined the invitation: "The +elections," he said, "will be a farce. All my supporters are detained +voteless under arms, and the only votes cast will be those of the older +and more timid men." How many supporters he had under arms the near +future was to show. Meanwhile, he and his partizans reinforced this +reason for abstention from the polls with other arguments. + +{70} King Constantine, they alleged, was guilty of unconstitutional +behaviour. He had twice disagreed with a Government supported by a +majority of the representatives of the people, and twice within a few +months had dissolved a Parliament duly chosen by the people. Was such +a thing ever heard in a constitutional State? The Constitution had +been violated: openly, insolently violated. + +In Greece this cry has always been among the Opposition's common +stock-in-trade: it is enough for a Minister to misapply fifty drachmas +to acquire the title of a violator of the Constitution, and nobody ever +is the wiser or the worse for it. M. Venizelos himself had often been +accused by his opponents of aiming at the subversion of Parliamentary +Government. But in this instance the cry was destined to have, as we +shall see, epoch-making results, and for this reason it merits serious +examination. + +The King's supporters denied that any violation of the Constitution had +taken place. The Constitution of Greece, they pointed out, gives the +Crown explicitly the right to dismiss Ministers and to dissolve +Chambers.[7] M. Venizelos himself had, no longer ago than 5 March, at +the second sitting of the Crown Council, declared himself an adversary +of the doctrine that the Parliamentary majority is absolute, and +recognized the right of the Crown to choose another Government; "On the +other hand," he said, "the necessary consequence of the formation of a +Cabinet not enjoying a majority in the Chamber is the dissolution of +the Chamber." [8] It was in pursuance {71} of this advice that the +King, who, as M. Venizelos on that occasion emphatically stated, "has +always absolutely respected the Constitution," [9] dissolved the +Chamber. + +The only question, therefore, is about the dissolution of the Chamber +elected on 13 June, 1915, which gave M. Venizelos a majority of 56. +This action, it was alleged, violated the spirit, though not the +letter, of Constitutional Law, because the dissolved Chamber +represented the will of the people. But, the other side retorted, it +was precisely because there was ground for believing that the +Parliamentary majority had ceased to represent the will of the people +that the King proceeded to a dissolution; and in so doing he had +excellent precedent. His father had dissolved several Chambers +(specifically in 1902 and 1910) on the same ground, not only without +incurring any censure, but earning much applause from the Venizelist +Party.[10] In fact, the last of those dissolutions had been carried +out by M. Venizelos himself under the following circumstances: The +General Elections of August, 1910, had given a majority to the old +parties: King George, however, in the belief that public opinion really +favoured M. Venizelos, called him to power, though he was only the +leader of a Parliamentary minority. M. Venizelos formed a Government, +but, as the majority in Parliament obstructed his policy, he persuaded +the Sovereign to dissolve it,[11] declaring in the House (11/24 +October, 1910): that "it is impossible to limit the prerogative of the +Crown to dissolve any Chamber." Obviously, what was {72} lawful for +King George could not be unlawful for King Constantine; and the fact +that M. Venizelos's majority of 56 had since the recent elections +dwindled to 16, was reason sufficient for the belief that he no longer +represented the will of the people, even if it were conceded that the +issue of war had been clearly put before the electors who had voted for +him in June, and that, at best, a majority of 56 in an assembly of 314 +was an adequate expression of the will of the people on so grave an +issue. Events had moved so fast in those months and the situation +changed so abruptly that King Constantine would have been guilty of a +dereliction of duty had he not, by exercising his indisputable +prerogative, given the nation an opportunity to reconsider its opinion. + +Sophisms suited to the fury of the times apart, the whole case of M. +Venizelos against his Sovereign rested, avowedly, on the theory, +improvised for the nonce, that the Greek Constitution is a replica of +the British--a monarchical democracy in which the monarch is nothing +more than a passive instrument in the hands of a Government with a +Parliamentary majority.[12] It is not so, and it was never meant to be +so. The Greek Constitution does invest the monarch with rights which +our Constitution, or rather the manner in which we have for a long time +chosen to interpret it, does not. Among these is the right to make, or +to refrain from making war. That was why M. Venizelos in March, 1915, +could not offer the co-operation of Greece in the Dardanelles +enterprise officially without the King's approval, and why the British +Government declined to consider his semi-official communication until +after the King's decision. Similarly M. Venizelos's proposals for the +dispatch of Entente troops to Salonica in September, so far as that +transaction was carried on above-board, were made subject to the King's +consent. Of course, if the King exercised this right without advice, +he would be playing the part of an autocrat; but King Constantine +always acted by the advice of the competent authority--namely, the +Chief of the General Staff. In truth, if anyone tried to play the part +of an autocrat, it was not the King, but M. Venizelos. His argument +seemed to be that the King should acquiesce in the view {73} which a +lay Minister took of matters military and in decisions which he arrived +at without or in defiance of technical advice. + +In this again, M. Venizelos appears to have been inspired by British +example. We saw during the War the responsibility for its conduct +scattered over twenty-three civil and semi-civil individuals who +consulted the naval and military staffs more or less as and when they +choose, and the result of it in the Gallipoli tragedy. We saw, too, as +a by-product of this system, experts holding back advice of immense +importance because they knew it would not be well received. The +Reports of the Dardanelles Commission condemned this method. But it is +to a precisely similar method that the Greek General Staff objected +with such determination. "Venizelos," they said, "does not know +anything about war. He approaches the King with proposals containing +in them the seeds of national disaster without consulting us, or in +defiance of our advice. Greece cannot afford to run the risk of +military annihilation; her resources are small, and, once exhausted, +cannot be replaced." The King, relying on the right unquestionably +given to him under the terms of the Constitution, demanded from his +chief military adviser such information as would enable him to judge +wisely from the military point of view any proposal involving +hostilities made by his Premier. It was this attitude that saved +Greece from the Gallipoli grave in March, and it was the same attitude +that saved her a second time at the present juncture. + +But, in fact, at the present juncture the King acted not so much on his +prerogative of deciding about war as on the extreme democratic +principle that such decision belongs to the people, and, finding that +the Party which pushed the country towards war had only a weak +majority, he preferred to place the question before the electorate, to +test beyond the possibility of doubt the attitude of public opinion +towards this new departure. + +From whatever point of view we may examine Constantine's behaviour, we +find that nothing could be more unfair than the charge of +unconstitutionalism brought against it. M. Venizelos himself a little +later, by declaring that he aimed at the "definite elucidation of the +obligations and rights of the royal authority," through a "new {74} +Constitution," [13] unwittingly confessed that the actual Constitution +could not bear his interpretation. As things stood, the charge might +with a better show of justice be brought against M. Venizelos, who, it +was pointed out, had violated the Constitution by inviting foreign +troops into Greek territory without the necessary Act of Parliament.[14] + +Nor should it be forgotten that King Constantine had suffered +grievously both as a Greek and as a general from too punctilious an +observance of parliamentary etiquette by his father in 1897. At that +date the policy of M. Delyannis was supported by the whole Chamber. It +was a policy which the late Lord Salisbury very aptly summed up at the +time in the one word, "strait-waistcoat." But, for lack of a man at +the top strong enough and courageous enough to take the responsibility +of opposing it, it was carried out: Greece rushed headlong into war +with a superior power and was smashed. Upon King Constantine, then +Crown Prince, had devolved the tragic duty of leading the Greek army to +self-destruction, and it was upon his devoted head that afterwards the +nation visited the criminal levity of M. Delyannis. Was he to suffer +calmly a repetition of the same catastrophe on an infinitely larger +scale--to see his country trampled under German and Bulgarian +heels--for M. Venizelos's sake? + +The practical wisdom and patriotism of the King's conduct cannot be +questioned; but we should guard ourselves against exaggerating its +moral courage. King Constantine, in turning an inattentive ear to the +warlike outpourings of the People's Chosen, knew perfectly well that he +ran no risk of wounding the people's conscience--just {75} as in +offering to lay the question before the tribunal of public opinion he +knew that he ran no risk of finding it at variance with his own. He +could afford to act as he did, because the country trusted him +implicitly. Writing about the middle of November, an English observer +described the situation as follows: "The people generally are afraid, +waiting and leaving everything to the King. . . . No one now counts in +Greece but the King." [15] And the absence of any popular murmur at +the rejection of the offer of Cyprus, to anyone who knows how deeply +popular feeling is committed to the ultimate union of that Greek island +with the mother country, speaks for itself. + +This does not mean that M. Venizelos had as yet lost caste altogether. +On that fateful 5th of October his reputation as a serious statesman +among his countrymen had received a severe blow. The idolatrous +admiration with which he had been surrounded until then gave way to +disenchantment, disenchantment to bewilderment, and bewilderment to +dismay: the national prophet from whom fresh miracles had been +expected, was no prophet at all, but a mere mortal--and an uncommonly +fallible mortal at that. Nevertheless, while many Greeks found it hard +to pardon the Cretan politician for the ruin into which he had so very +nearly precipitated them, there were many others who still remained +under the spell of his personality. Yet it may well be doubted +whether, had a plebiscite been taken at that moment, he would have got +anything more than a substantial minority. Fully conscious of the +position, M. Venizelos, in spite of advice from his Entente friends to +stand his ground, boycotted the polls, and the new Parliament, returned +by the elections of 19 December, was a Parliament without an +Opposition. M. Skouloudis remained at the helm. + + + +[1] _White Book_, No. 45. + +[2] _White Book_, No. 46. + +[3] See _The Times_, 1 Nov., 1915. + +[4] _Orations_, pp. 143-50. It would hardly be credited, did it not +come out of his own mouth, that the compensations and guarantees which +M. Venizelos thought, or at least said, that Greece could obtain from +Germany in return for her neutrality (a neutrality always benevolent +towards Germany's enemies) exceeded those which the Entente had refused +to grant Greece for her active alliance! + +[5] _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 384, 387; _Orations_, p. 266. + +[6] It may not be irrelevant to note that the end of the truce +coincided with the end of the Allies' uncertainty as to whether they +would persist in the Salonica enterprise or give it up. + +[7] Art. 31, 37. + +[8] Extracts from Minutes in _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 385. +Not for the first time had M. Venizelos expounded that thesis. Here is +a speech of his on 2/15 May, 1911. + +"We are accused of seeking the destruction of Parliamentary Government, +because we conceive that one of the foundations of the Government is +that those who represent the majority do everything, that it is enough +for them that they represent the majority to impose their will. But +we, the Liberal Party, entertain an entirely opposite conception both +of the State and the Laws and of the powers of majorities, because +modern progress has proved that humanity cannot prosper so long as the +action of those in authority is not subjected to rules and restrictions +preventing every transgression or violation of justice. We shall make +the Greeks truly free citizens, enjoying not only the rights which +emanate from the Constitutional ordinances, but also those which +emanate from all the laws. _We shall defend them against every +tyrannical exercise of Government power derived from a majority._" + +This report is taken from a panegyric on the speaker: _Eleutherios +Venizelos_, by K. K. Kosmides, D.Ph., Athens, 1915, pp. 56-7. On p. 58 +of the same work, occurs another reply by M. Venizelos to a charge of +anti-Parliamentarism, dated 14/27 Nov., 1913. + +[9] _The Balkan Review, loc. cit_. Cp. _The New Europe_, 29 March, +1917, where M. Venizelos expressly admits that "in February, 1915, the +King's action might be regarded as constitutional." + +[10] _Orations_, pp. 17-8. Cp. p. 217. + +[11] His opponents then acted as he did now: to avoid exposing their +weakness, they pronounced the dissolution unconstitutional and +boycotted the new elections. For a full account of these events see +another panegyric: _E. Venizelos: his life--his work_. By Costa +Kairophyla, Athens, 1915, pp. 73-82. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 12-15. + +[13] _Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916; _Orations_, p. 102. + +[14] See Art. 90 of the Constitution. + +It was in order to defend himself against this grave charge that M. +Venizelos denied in the Chamber and out of it, that he had "invited" +the Allies to Salonica. Just as it was in order to avoid the charge of +violating International Law that Sir Edward Grey in the House of +Commons (18 April, 1916) and M. Briand in the Chamber of Deputies (20 +June, 1916), affirmed that the Allies had been "invited." From the +account of that affair already given, the reader will easily see that, +for forensic purposes, both the denial and the affirmation rest on +sufficient grounds. The discrepancy might be removed by the +substitution of "instigated" for "invited." + +[15] J. M. N. Jefferies, in the _Daily Mail_, 23 Nov., 1915. The +testimony is all the more notable because it comes from an avowed +partisan of M. Venizelos: "the only man in Greece with a policy." + + + + +{76} + +CHAPTER VII + +A momentous question--upon the answer to which depended, among other +things, the fate of Greece during the War--confronted the Allies as +soon as they realized that their Balkan campaign had come to an +untimely beginning. + +The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originally was based on the +agreement that M. Venizelos would get Greece to join. Once M. +Venizelos failed to do so, the plan fell to the ground. Again, the +object of the expedition was to rescue Servia; and Servia being already +conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose. Such were the +views of the British Government, and similar views were held in France +by many, including M. Delcassé, who resigned when Bulgaria's +"defection" sounded the knell of his Balkan policy. But other French +statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in Macedonia a field which +promised great glory and gain, if only the noble British nation could +be brought to understand that there were interests and sentiments at +stake higher than agreements.[1] + +The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand +and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister. "As regards +Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of +the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out. +They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go +on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece +in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2] + +Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly +that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la +noble nation britannique n'est pas restée sourde_. The truth is, +France was set on what {77} M. Delcassé now called the _mirage +balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly +for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near +East--and England could not leave her there alone. So the "_nous +resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of +Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to +abnormal relations with the Greek Government. + +The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the +safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the +earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one +group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The +little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one +triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the +German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser's legions were at +Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality +would bring them in a month to Athens. + +M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times +the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's +insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to +do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the +circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of +self-preservation. + +Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all +hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to +be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or +unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his +thoughts. + +On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical +assurances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of +neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them. The +new Ministry," he added, "adopts M. Zaimis's repeated declarations of +Greece's friendly attitude towards the Allied armies at Salonica, and +is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her debt to them +not to deviate for the whole world from this course, and hopes that the +friendly sentiments of those Powers towards Greece will never be +influenced by false {78} and malicious rumours deliberately put into +circulation with the object of cooling the good relations between +them." To Servia also he expressed "in the most categorical terms +sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady determination to continue +affording her every facility and support consistent with our vital +interests." [3] + +But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister that a Servian +army might probably, pressed by the enemy, enter Greek territory, he +replied that he wished and hoped such a thing would not happen--that +Greece might not find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of +applying the Hague Rules regarding the disarmament of a belligerent +taking refuge in neutral territory. And he repeated this statement to +the French Minister, adding, in answer to a question. What would +Greece do if the Allied forces retired into Greek territory? that it +would be necessary to apply the Hague Rules, but that he hoped very +much the contingency would not present itself. On being reminded of +the assurances given by his predecessor that no material pressure would +ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he replied that the Hellenic +Government nowise proposed to go back on those assurances, and hoped +that the Powers, taking into consideration the irreproachable attitude +of Greece, would be pleased to relieve her of complications and find a +solution safeguarding all interests concerned.[4] + +The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should re-embark; in +which case Greece was prepared to protect the parting guests "even by +her own forces, so as to afford them the most absolute security." [5] + +But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his explanation did +not satisfy the Allies. M. Skouloudis was therefore obliged to give +their representatives again and again to understand that in no case +would the Hellenic Government think of exerting the least pressure, and +that, if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrality, he had done +so because such ought to be the official language of a State which was +and wished to remain neutral. But from the very first he had clearly +indicated that Greece did not mean to apply those Rules: she would +confine {79} herself to a mere reminder of international principles +without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them. Greece being +and wishing to remain neutral, could not speak officially as if she +were not, nor trumpet abroad the assurances which she had not ceased +giving the Entente Powers. Surely they must perceive the most delicate +position in which Greece stood between the two belligerent groups, and, +given that they did not dispute, nor could dispute, her right to remain +neutral, it was reasonable and just that they should accept the natural +consequences and not demand from her impossibilities.[6] + +The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the reasonableness of +this plea; but neither could they ignore the inconveniences to +themselves that would arise from its frank recognition. Between their +base at Salonica and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak +interposed several Greek army corps; at Salonica also Greek camps lay +among the Franco-British camps scattered round the town: these +conditions impeded organized operations. General Sarrail, the +Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had nothing but praise for the +courtesy of the Greek authorities, both civil and military. Yet not a +day passed without incidents. He complained that obstacles were placed +in his action through a multitude of secondary details: the +Municipality claimed duties; the Railway Service did not assist as +liberally as could be wished in the work of getting off the stores +which arrived at the port. It was necessary that the Greek troops +should be moved out of the Allies' way and leave them in full control: +privileges which no State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral; +which no army could forgo and work efficiently. So the General, while +confessing that "we often place them in a difficult position by +demanding permissions which their virtual neutrality cannot allow them +to give," impressed on the Entente Governments the need of taking +strong measures with the Greeks.[6] + +Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting words--beyond a +casual "Necessity knows no law." But nations fighting for noble ideals +could not imitate Germany's cynicism. A case had to be made out to +{80} justify coercion. It was. Greece did not really wish to remain +neutral. Misled by a Germanophile Court, she only waited for a chance +of joining the enemy--of stabbing the Allies in the back. When this +amazing theory--widely popularized by the French and English Press--was +hinted to M. Rallis by "Our Special Correspondent," on 18 November, the +Greek Minister could hardly credit his collocutor's sanity: "It is +mad!" he cried out. "It is senseless to imagine such a thing--when you +could have the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities!" The answer, +however--an answer the conclusiveness of which a glance at the map is +enough to demonstrate to the dimmest intelligence--fell upon +deliberately deaf ears. The very journal which in one page recorded +it, in another wrote: "Bulgaria has gone; Greece is trembling in the +balance. Only a display of overwhelming force on our part can hold her +steady and prevent the accession of another 500,000 men to the enemy's +strength." + +That the publicists who argued thus and who, to give to their argument +greater cogency, generously added to the Greek army some 200,000 men, +were persuaded by their own reasoning, it is hard to believe without +libelling human sense. Apart from the ocular refutation supplied by +the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the enemies of the +Entente? That she would lose all her islands, have her coast towns +pulverized and her population starved, was certain. What she could get +in return, it needed a very robust imagination to suggest. The only +countries at whose cost the Hellenic Kingdom could possibly compensate +itself for these inevitable sacrifices were Turkey and Bulgaria; and +those countries were Germany's allies. A moment's reflection raises a +number of equally unanswerable questions: If the Greeks wanted to join +Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser invited them at the +very beginning of the War? Why did they not resist the landing of the +Allies? Why did they not attack them when they had them at their +mercy: 60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the Bulgars in +front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them and Salonica?[8] + +{81} + +In this connexion the evidence of an eminent English soldier and an +eminent French statesman who visited Athens at that time to study the +situation on the spot may be cited. To each King Constantine and M. +Skouloudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that the +Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece. Each was convinced of +their sincerity, and of the true motives of their attitude: "They +both," reported Lord Kitchener, "seem very determined to stick to their +neutrality." Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff, +and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente publics as +Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener of their genuine concern +about the British sphere in the East, and startled him by pressing upon +him a plan of action "almost exactly the same as detailed in my +telegrams, and based their conclusions on the same argument almost word +for word. They emphatically stated that there was no other way of +preventing the accomplishment of the German project." [9] M. Denys +Cochin even went so far as to publish to the whole world that the +suspicions entertained against King Constantine had no other source +than party rancour.[10] + +For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers themselves did +not believe the story of the Greek Government's hostile intentions is +afforded by the fact that, instead of demanding, they deprecated the +disbandment of the Greek army. When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skouloudis, +the latter said that the Allies' mistrust might well force Greece to +consider whether it would not be better for her to demobilize, leaving +to them all responsibility for the consequences. Lord Kitchener, in +the presence of the British Minister, replied that, "as to some partial +demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according to her interests, +but he did not think a general demobilization advisable." And again, a +little later on, when {82} M. Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh +exhibition of mistrust, told the French Minister that, in face of such +a state of things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to +order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente Powers do +what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out, "Ah, no. I am +decidedly against demobilization." Naturally: "the Greek Army," said +Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British Military Attaché, to General +Moschopoulos. Military Governor of Salonica, "saves and secures the +flanks and rear of the Allies." [11] + +However, the story served the purpose of supplying a pretext for +pressure. All ships carrying foodstuffs and other commodities were +held up. In addition, Milo--an island not far from Athens--was +occupied, and the Allied Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things +should be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce, to destroy +the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, _en respectant les monuments +anciens_.[12] + +Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by which even the +ancient ruins might have suffered, did not arise. General Sarrail, who +at first urged that the naval demonstration against Athens should be +proceeded with immediately, on second thoughts, prompted by nervousness +as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action. At the same +time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade--Greece never has more +than a very limited food reserve--invited the Allies to state their +demands, saying that he would accede to them if it was possible to do +so.[13] + +Whereupon the Allies, "ever animated by the most benevolent intentions +towards Greece, and anxious that the equivocal situation in which +events had placed her towards them should come to an end and their +relations be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting +confidence," demanded first of all a formal assurance that in no +circumstances would the Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the +retiring Allied troops, but that the policy of benevolent neutrality +promised would be maintained with all its consequences. They disavowed +any wish or intention to compel the Hellenic Government to {83} +participate in the European War from which it had declared that it +meant to hold aloof. But it was a vital necessity for them not to let +it in any way hinder the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or +compromise the security of their troops throughout the field of their +operations. They therefore must be assured that they will obtain, +according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all the facilities +which they might require, notably in the port of Salonica and on the +roads and railways. It was understood that the Entente Powers would +restore in full at the end of the War all the parts of Greek territory +which they might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that +they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused by the +occupation.[14] + +M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for the benevolent +intentions with which they declared themselves to be animated towards +Greece, willingly repeated the assurances he had so many times already +given, that the Greek troops would in no circumstances seek to disarm +or intern the Allied troops, and that the Greek Government in its +relations with the Entente Powers would in everything hold fast to its +policy of benevolent neutrality. He once more noted the reiterated +disavowal by the Allied Governments of any wish or intention to force +Greece into the War, and on his part disavowed any wish or intention to +hinder in any way the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to +compromise in any way the security of their troops. The Hellenic +Government had always kept the promises made by M. Zaimis to the very +utmost of its ability, and had no difficulty in renewing the assurance +that the Allied Governments would continue to receive all the +facilities their troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on +the roads and railways.[15] + +These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement, +the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and +"not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the +occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to +protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not +as a mere form"--a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]--and +emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their +movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would +withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle +their differences." + +The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis +expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the +Greek Government's sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply +with its request for financial and commercial facilities. They +promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military +authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the +French Minister repeated his Government's declaration that it would be +happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon +as the situation cleared.[17] + + + +[1] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 61, 70, 75-8. + +[2] Sir George Arthur's _Life of Lord Kitchener_. Vol. III. p. 261. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 47, 48, 49. + +[4] Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. 43-5. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 52. + +[6] _White Book_, No. 51. + +[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 198. + +[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.--_Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, +p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above +questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness": +"Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's +interest that the Anglo-French should not land? Because, immersed in +politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"--Orations, p. +140. + +[9] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, pp. 202-3. + +[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the _Daily +Mail_, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. _Le Temps_, 25 Nov. + +[11] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 4-5; _Semeioseis_, p. 46. + +[12] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 71-2. + +[13] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 199-203. + +[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915. + +[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915. + +[16] "_Le Gouvernement Grec se réservait de protester; nous nous +réservions de ne pas répondre_. (_Rires_)." M. Briand in the _Journal +Officiel_, p. 72. + +[17] _White Book_, No. 54. + + + + +{85} + +CHAPTER VIII + +The situation did not clear--how could it? Of all diplomatic fictions +that of "benevolence" is perhaps the most incompatible with the grim +realities of war. + +General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered to take any measures +which he might judge necessary at his discretion. But fear of the +Greek army for a time compelled him to temper vigour with caution. +That fear decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in +Macedonia increased; and hence a series of acts which show how the +General used his discretion. + +First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of Demir-Hissar. +He blew it up--thus completely cutting off the Greek forces in Eastern +Macedonia, and, incidentally, letting the enemy know that no offensive +across the Struma was contemplated by the Allies. Next, he judged it +necessary to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which commands the entrance +to Salonica Harbour. He seized it--despite a solemn engagement to the +contrary.[1] Then he judged it necessary to occupy the town of +Florina. He occupied it. An appreciation of the efficacy or +expediency of these measures--beyond a passing allusion to the obvious +blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar bridge--would +be out of place here. For our present purpose their interest lies in +the light they throw upon the conditions, apart from the purely +military difficulties, created by the intrusion of foreign troops on +neutral soil. + +Afloat the Allies were not less vigorous than ashore. They judged it +necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to accommodate the remnants of the +Servian army that had escaped across Albania. They occupied Corfu. +They judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the coast +of Asia Minor. They occupied Castellorizo. They {86} judged it +necessary to occupy Suda Bay in Crete and Argostoli Bay in Cephalonia. +They occupied them. + +It is worthy of note that the occupation of Castellorizo was prepared +by a local revolt stirred up by the French Consular and Naval +authorities,[2] and that the occupation of Corfu constituted a flagrant +violation of international pacts (Treaties of London, 14 Nov., 1863, +and 29 March, 1864) to which the Entente Powers were signatories, and +by virtue of which the perpetual neutrality of the island was +guaranteed as strictly as that of Belgium--a circumstance that afforded +the Central Powers an opportunity to protest against Anglo-French +contempt for the sanctity of treaties.[3] + +Among other arbitrary proceedings may be mentioned numerous arrests and +deportations of enemy subjects and Consuls, and even the execution of +some Greek subjects, by the Allied military and naval authorities.[4] + +Against each of these encroachments upon its sovereignty the Greek +Government protested with ever-deepening bitterness. The Entente +Governments accepted its protests and disregarded them: International +Law is the will of the stronger. Besides, says M. Briand, "we were +there in a country where force is more effective than anywhere else." +[5] From this utterance, which was received by the French Chamber with +applause, we get a glimpse into the workings of the official Entente +mind, and more than a glimpse of the guiding principles of Entente +policy in Greece during that period. + +The reason for that policy publicly alleged was, as we have seen, the +Allies' need to do their own fighting in {87} peace and security. +Their real aim, M. Skouloudis believed, was to draw Greece gradually +into the War. In so believing he interpreted correctly the French +Government's views as the French Government itself had expounded them +to the British Government: "To bring Greece in." [6] With that as one +of its objects the Salonica expedition had been persisted in; and as +Greece persisted in standing out, the question resolved itself into one +of continuous pressure. + +M. Skouloudis was confirmed in his belief by the fact that the Allies +would not allow demobilization, and at the same time would not lend +Greece the 150 million francs which had been promised: they knew, +through the International Financial Commission, that the mobilized army +swallowed up every available resource, and they calculated that, when +the strain reached the breaking point, Greece would fall at their feet +and beg for relief at any price: the Ministry would have either to give +way or make place for one which favoured war. The Ministry, determined +to do neither, cast about for some means of making ends meet, when +Germany came forward with an offer to lend temporarily a portion of the +sum promised by France. This offer, though, of course, prompted by the +desire to enable Greece to maintain her neutrality, was free from any +political conditions, and M. Skouloudis accepted it thankfully. +Negotiations began on 20 November, 1915, and by 7 March, 1916, an +instalment of 40 million francs was actually paid. For obvious reasons +the transaction was carried through without the knowledge of the +Allies, from whom the Greek Premier still cherished some faint hopes of +receiving the 150 millions.[7] + +Whether he had any right to cherish such hopes, after accepting +financial assistance from their enemies, is a very nice ethical point; +but a nicer point still is, whether the Allies had any right left to +question the ethics of others. M. Skouloudis doubtless could plead in +self-justification that his remaining armed was admittedly a boon to +them, as much as his remaining neutral was a boon to their enemies; and +that both sides should therefore help to defray the cost. He was +impartial. However, his hopes were dashed to the ground. + +{88} + +On 5 April the French and British Ministers called on the Premier and +informed him that the Servian army at Corfu, having sufficiently rested +and recovered, the Entente proposed to transport it to Salonica through +Greece, and they had no doubt that Greece would readily consent. M. +Skouloudis replied that Greece could not possibly consent. The +transport of over 100,000 men across the country would mean +interruption of railway traffic and suspension of all economic life for +at least two months; it would expose the population to the danger of +infection by the epidemic diseases from which the Serbs had been +suffering; above all, it would be regarded by the Central Powers as a +breach of neutrality and might force Greece into the War against her +will. M. Skouloudis urged these reasons with all the firmness, and +more than all the plainness, that diplomacy allowed, ending up with an +emphatic: "No, gentlemen, such a thing we will not permit. I declare +this to you officially." + +"Our Governments," retorted the French Minister, "have not instructed +us to ask for your permission, but to notify to you their decision." + +M. Skouloudis was a proud old man, fiercely jealous of his country's +independence and inflexible in his defence of it. Of his iron +determination he had already given the Allies ample proof. But +hitherto he had kept his gathering indignation under control. He could +do so no longer: the Frenchman's speech and, more than the speech, the +manner in which it had been delivered, were too much for his feelings. + +"And I," he repeated, "declare to you that my Government's decision is +not to permit this overland passage--further, I declare to you that, in +the contrary event, I shall find myself under the necessity of blowing +up the railway,"--then, in a crescendo of rage, he went on: "You have +left us nothing sound in this country--neither self-respect, nor +dignity, nor liberty, nor the right to live as free men. But do not +forget that there is a limit to the most benevolent patience and to the +most willing compliance, that one last drop makes the cup +overflow. . . ." + +The British Minister, seeing that the conversation with his colleague +grew every moment more tempestuous, interposed by asking if Greece +would equally object to a {89} sea-passage of the Serbs by the Canal of +Corinth; and, the Cabinet having been consulted, a favourable answer +was given. But meanwhile the demand for an overland passage was +pressed by the Servian Minister, and was supported by all the Entente +representatives. Again M. Skouloudis gave a categorical refusal, and +in a telegraphic circular to the Greek Ministers in London, Rome, and +Petrograd--experience had taught him that it was worse than useless to +argue with Paris--he reiterated the reasons why Greece could not +consent, laying special stress on the now inflamed state of public +opinion, and pointing out that the dangers of the sea route were +greatly exaggerated since most of the journey would be through close +waters. He added that, in view of the absence of any real military +necessity for an overland transport, and of the international +consequences which compliance involved, the whole civilized world would +justify Greece in her refusal and condemn any coercion on the part of +the Entente as an outrage. He concluded by requesting the Greek +Ministers to place all these reasons before the respective Governments +in order that, on realizing the iniquity of the project, they might use +all their influence to dissuade the French Government from it. England +appreciated the force of M. Skouloudis's arguments and, thanks to her, +diplomatic pressure ceased. But there remained another form of +pressure, from which France would not desist. + +M. Briand angrily declared that, under the circumstances, there could +be no talk of a loan. M. Skouloudis pleaded that Greece had not asked +the loan as a price for the violation of her neutrality; she had asked +it on the supposition that the Entente Powers could not see with +indifference her military and economic paralysis.[8] + +The plea made no impression; and, rebuffed by Paris, M. Skouloudis's +Government once more turned to Berlin. It received another credit of +forty million marks; but, notwithstanding this supply, day by day it +saw its expenses increasing and its revenues diminishing. Besides the +men under arms, there were crowds of destitute refugees from Turkey, +Bulgaria and Servia to be provided for, and the native population, +owing to the rise in the cost of living {90} and to unemployment, also +stood in urgent need of relief. At the same time, customs and other +receipts became more and more precarious owing to the Allies' constant +interference with the freedom of commerce.[9] + +Truly, after the Allies' landing on her soil, the neutrality of Greece +became something unique in the annals of international jurisprudence: a +case defying all known maxims, except Machiavelli's maxim, that, when +placed between two warring powers, it is better for a state to join +even the losing side than try to remain neutral. By trying to do so, +Greece could not avoid, even with the utmost circumspection, exposing +herself to insult and injury. + +One more corollary of the Salonica Expedition deserves to be noted. +Since the beginning of the War, Athens, like other neutral capitals, +had become the centre of international intrigue and espionage; each +belligerent group establishing, beside their officially accredited +diplomatic missions, secret services and propagandas. In aim, both +establishments were alike. But their opportunities were not equal. +The Germans had to rely for procuring information and influencing +public opinion on the usual methods. The French and the British added +to those methods others of a more unusual character. + +From the riffraff of the Levant they had recruited a large detective +force which operated under the sanctuary of their Legations.[10] The +primary function of these gentry was to discover attempts at the +fuelling and victualling of German submarines; and, stimulated by a +permanent offer of a reward of 2,000 pounds from the British Minister, +they did their best to discharge this necessary function. Hardly a day +passed without their supplying information which, transmitted to the +Fleets, led to raids at all points of the Greek coasts and isles. Let +one or two examples suffice for many. + +{91} + +The French Intelligence Service reported that the Achilleion--the +Kaiser's summer palace at Corfu--was a thoroughly organized submarine +base, with a wharf, stores of petrol, and pipes for carrying it down to +the water's edge. On investigation, the wharf turned out to be an +ordinary landing stage for the palace, the stores a few tins of petrol +for the imperial motor cars, and the pipes water-closet drains.[11] + +In consequence of similar "information received from a trustworthy +source"--that a Greek steamer had by order of the Greek Government +transported to Gerakini and handed over to the Custom House authorities +for the use of German submarines a quantity of benzine--a French +detachment of marines landed, forced its way into the Custom House, and +proceeded to a minute perquisition, even digging up the ground. The +result was negative, and the officer commanding the detachment had to +apologize to the Chief of the Custom House. Whereupon the Greek +Government asked the French Minister for the source of the information, +adding that it was time the Allies ceased from putting faith in the +words of unscrupulous agents and proceeding to acts both fruitless and +insulting.[12] + +Were the Allies in the mood to use ordinary intelligence, they would +have seen the truth themselves; for not one discovery, after the most +rigorous search, was ever made anywhere to confirm the reports of the +Secret Services.[13] As it was, the spies were able to justify their +existence by continuing to create work for their employers; and the +{92} lengths to which they were prepared to go are well illustrated by +a case that formed the subject of some questions in the House of +Commons. M. Callimassiotis, a well-known Greek Deputy, was denounced +by the French Secret Service as directing an organization for the +supply of fuel and information about the movements of Allied shipping +to German submarines. A burglarious visit to his house at the Piraeus +yielded a rich harvest of compromising documents. The British Secret +Service joined in following up the clues, and two Mohammedan merchants +of Canea were arrested and deported to Malta on unimpeachable evidence +of complicity. Closer investigation proved the whole affair from +beginning to end a web of forgery and fraud. The hoax ended in the +British Minister at Athens apologizing to the Greek Deputy, and in the +Mohammedan merchants being brought back home as guests aboard a British +destroyer.[14] + +Thus a new field was opened up to those who wished to ruin business +competitors, to revenge themselves on personal enemies, or, above all, +to compromise political opponents. From the words of Admiral Dartige: +"The revelations of the Venizelist Press concerning the revictualling +of German submarines in Greece are a tissue of absurd legends," [15] we +learn the main source of these myths and also the principal motive. +For if M. Venizelos and his party had, by their voluntary abstention, +deprived themselves of a voice inside the Chamber, they more than made +amends by their agitation out of doors. The coercion of Greece came as +grist to their mill. The Liberal newspapers triumphantly pointed to it +as concrete proof of the wisdom of their Leader's policy, and held up +the names of the men who had thwarted him to obloquy and scorn. M. +Skouloudis and his colleagues were abused for drawing down upon the +country through their duplicity the wrath of the Powers which could +best help or harm it. The "revelations" served a twofold purpose: to +foster the belief that they promoted secretly the interests of Germany, +and to furnish the Allies with fresh excuses for coercion. And in the +Franco-British Intelligence organization the scheming brain of M. +Venizelos found a {93} ready-fashioned tool: men willingly shut their +eyes to the most evident truths that hinder their designs, and readily +accept any myth that furthers them. + +Nor did that organization assist M. Venizelos merely by traducing his +opponents' characters and wounding their _amour-propre_. In March, +1916, the Chief of the French Secret Service, at a conference of the +Allied admirals, proposed that they should lay hands on the internal +affairs of Greece: that they should stick at nothing--_qu' on devait +tout oser_. The motion was rejected with disgust by the honest +sailors. But the mover was in direct communication with political +headquarters in Paris; and his plan was only deferred. Meanwhile he +and his associates with the rogues in their pay made themselves useful +by collaborating in the Venizelist agitation, mixing themselves up in +party disturbances, carrying out open perquisitions and clandestine +arrests, and preparing the ground for graver troubles in the future.[16] + +The representatives of the Entente at Athens pursued these unedifying +tactics in the firm conviction that the cause of M. Venizelos was their +cause; which was true enough in the sense that on him alone they could +count to bring Greece into the War without conditions. As to the +Entente publics, M. Venizelos was their man in a less sober sense: he +kept repeating to them that his opponents under the guise of neutrality +followed a hostile policy, and that his own party's whole activity was +directed to preventing the King from ranging himself openly on the side +of the Central Powers. The Entente Governments, whatever they may have +thought of these tactics and slanders, did not dream of forbidding the +one or of contradicting the other, since the former aided their client +and the latter created an atmosphere which relieved them from all moral +restraints. + +They only upbraided M. Venizelos gently for keeping out of Parliament. +So M. Venizelos, seeing that he had gained nothing by abstention and +forgetting that he had {94} pronounced the Chamber unconstitutional, +obeyed. Early in May, two of his partisans carried two bye-elections +in Eastern Macedonia, and the leader himself was returned by the island +of Mytilene. Three seats in Parliament could not overturn M. +Skouloudis; and it cannot be said that his re-appearance on the scene +enhanced the credit of M. Venizelos with the nation. Ever since the +landing of the Allies, and largely through their own actions, his +prestige in Greece declined progressively. He was reproached more and +more bitterly for his "invitation" to them; and these reproaches grew +the louder, the closer he drew to the foreigners and the farther he +diverged from his own King. In a letter from Athens, dated 24 May, +occurs the following passage: "Venizelos becomes every day more and +more of a red republican. How that man has duped everybody! We all +thought him a genius, and he simply is an ambitious maniac." + +Later on M. Venizelos explained why he had not already revolted. A +revolution there and then, no doubt, would have saved a lot of trouble; +"But before the idea of revolution matures in the mind and soul of a +statesman, there is need for some evolution, which cannot be +accomplished in a few moments," he said. Since October, this idea had +had time to evolve in his mind and soul. But his hate of "tyranny" was +not blind. It was peculiarly clear-sighted, and he judged the +difficulties with precision: "Such a step would not have been favoured +by the Entente Powers, whose support would have been indispensable for +its success." Then again: "If before the Bulgarian invasion of +Macedonia I had kindled a civil war, public opinion would have held me +responsible for the invasion, and that would certainly have arrested my +movement." [17] + +It so chanced that, scarcely had a fortnight passed since his +reappearance in the Chamber, when the Bulgars provided M. Venizelos and +at least one of the Entente Powers with this requisite for their +evolution. + + + +[1] See the Agreement of 10 Dec., 1915 (Art. 5), _White Book_, No. 54; +Sarrail, pp. 94-6, 322-30. + +[2] Skouloudis to Greek Legation, Paris, 12, 14, 16 Dec. (O.S.); +Guillemin to Skouloudis, 16/29 Dec.; Skouloudis to Guillemin, 17/30 +Dec., 1915. + +[3] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 31 Dec., 1915/13 Jan., +1916; Gryparis, Vienna, 4/17 Jan., 1916. + +[4] Among the Greek State Papers there is a voluminous file labelled +"Violations of Hellenic Neutrality by the Entente Allies." It contains +a mass of complaints by the Central Powers to the Greek Government and +by the Greek Government to the Entente Governments. Special attention +is drawn to the case of two Greeks put to death by the French military +authorities in Macedonia for having been found in possession of German +proclamations dropped from aeroplanes: See Skouloudis to French +Legation, Athens, 13/26 April, 1916. + +[5] _Journal Officiel_, p. 70. + +[6] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 261. + +[7] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 3-11; _White Book_, Nos. 75-8, 82-3, +88, 91. + +[8] Skouloudis, _Semeioseis_, pp. 33-6; _White Book_, Nos. 57-63. + +[9] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 12-14. + +[10] Of the 162 individuals who, by the end of 1916, composed the +personnel of the Franco-British Secret Police at Athens, only about 60 +were natives of Old Greece; the rest came from Crete, Constantinople, +Smyrna, etc. An analysis of the official List, signed by the Prefect +of the Greek Police, reveals among them: 7 pickpockets, 8 murderers, 9 +ex-brigands, 10 smugglers, 11 thieves, 21 gamblers, 20 White Slave +traffickers. The balance is made up of men with no visible means of +subsistence. + +[11] Du Fournet, pp. 115-17; Skouloudis to Greek Legation, Paris, 19 +Feb./4 March, 1916. + +[12] Politis to Guillemin, 9/22 Feb., 1916. + +[13] Considering the extent of the coast-line of Greece and the poverty +of her inhabitants, this would be incredible, were it not attested by +the Allies' Naval Commander-in-Chief, whose task it was to verify every +report transmitted to him: "_Jamais un seul de ses avis n'a été reconnu +exact; la plupart étaient visiblement absurdes._" "_Malgré les +vérifications les plus répétées jamais un seul de ces avis n'a été +reconnu exact. Un certain nombre de coquins, incompétents mais malins, +vivaient du commerce de ces fausses nouvelles._"--Du Fournet, pp. 115, +304. Cp. also pp. 85, 270. The French Admiral of Patrols, Faton, and +the British Admiral Kerr, are equally emphatic in testifying "that all +these stories about supplying the submarines were fabrications."--See +Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920. + +[14] J. C. Lawson, _Tales of Aegean Intrigue_, pp. 93-143. + +[15] Du Fournet, p. 304. + +[16] Du Fournet, pp. 112-16. In this work we find a full picture of +the French Secret Service. Unfortunately, or fortunately, no +authoritative record has been published of its British counterpart. +Mr. Lawson's account deals only with a provincial branch of the +establishment. + +[17] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _Orations_, pp. 142-3. + + + + +{95} + +CHAPTER IX + +When M. Venizelos taunted M. Skouloudis with forgetting that he had +promised the Allies "not only simple neutrality, nor simply benevolent +neutrality, but most sincerely benevolent neutrality," the aged Prime +Minister, who apparently had a sense of humour, replied: "I do not know +how there can be such a thing as benevolent neutrality. A neutrality +really benevolent towards one of the belligerents is really malevolent +towards the other, consequently it is more or less undisguised +partiality. Between benevolence and malevolence there is no room for +neutrality." He only knew, he said, one kind of neutrality--the +absolute neutrality towards both belligerents.[1] And he lived up to +his knowledge so conscientiously that he earned the gratitude of +neither, but saw himself the sport of both. + +No sooner had the Allies begun to fall back from Krivolak, than the +German Military Attaché at Athens presented to King Constantine a +telegram from General von Falkenhayn, dated 29 November, 1915, in which +the Chief of the German General Staff intimated that, if Greece failed +to disarm the retreating Entente forces or to obtain their immediate +re-embarkation, the development of hostilities might very probably +compel the Germans and the Bulgars to cross her frontiers. After a +consultation, the Skouloudis Cabinet replied through the King that +Greece did not consent to a violation of her soil; but if the violation +bore no hostile character towards herself, she would refrain from +opposing it by force of arms on certain guarantees: that the Bulgars +should categorically renounce every claim to territories now in Greek +possession, that simultaneously with their entry into Macedonia Greece +should be allowed to occupy Monastir as a pledge for their exit, that +in no circumstance whatever should the King of Bulgaria or his sons +enter Salonica, {96} that all commands should be exclusively in German +hands, and so forth--altogether nineteen conditions, the principal +object of which was to ward off the danger of a permanent occupation, +but the effect of which would have been to hamper military operations +most seriously. + +The German Government, perturbed by the extent and nature of the +guarantees demanded, referred the matter to Falkenhayn, who would only +grant three comprehensive assurances: to respect the integrity of +Greece, to restore the occupied territories at the end of the campaign, +and to pay an indemnity for all damage caused. On those terms, he +invited Greece to remove her army from Macedonia so as to avoid the +possibility of an accidental collision. The King refused, giving among +other reasons that such a concession had been denied to the Entente. +Thereupon Falkenhayn asked, as an alternative to a total evacuation, +that Greece should pledge herself to resist Entente landings in the +Gulfs of Cavalla and Katerini. Again Greece refused, on the ground +that this would involve the use of force against the Entente, whereas +she was determined not to abandon her neutrality as long as her +interests, in her own opinion, did not compel her so to do.[2] + +After this answer, given on 27 January, 1916, conversations on the +subject ceased for about six weeks. + +Thus it appears that during the period when the Allies were, or +professed to be, most nervous about the intentions of Greece, it was +the fear of Greek hostility, carefully nursed by Greek diplomacy, that +checked the Germans and the Bulgars from following up their advantage +and sweeping the Franco-British troops into the sea. It was the same +attitude of Greece that made the enemy hesitate to break into Macedonia +during the following months, and gave the Allies time to fortify +themselves. + +On 14 March, Falkenhayn returned to the charge, and was once more met +with a list of exorbitant conditions. This time the conversations +assumed the character of recriminations; the Greek Government +complaining of Bulgarian encroachments on the neutral zone fixed along +the frontier, Falkenhayn retorting that the provocative movements of +the Entente Forces obliged the Central Powers to fortify their +positions and threatening a rupture {97} if the Greek soldiers +continued to hinder the Bulgars.[3] Then, after another interval, he +announced (7 May) that, owing to an English advance across the Struma, +he found it absolutely necessary to secure in self-defence the Rupel +Pass--key of the Struma Valley.[4] + +M. Skouloudis endeavoured to make the German Government dissuade the +General Staff from its project. Falkenhayn, he said, was misinformed +as to an English advance--only small mounted patrols had crossed the +Struma. He suspected that he was deceived and instigated by the +Bulgars who, under cover of military exigencies, sought to realize +their well-known ambitions at the expense of Greece. Their frequent +misdeeds had already irritated Greek public opinion to such a degree +that he could not answer for the consequences, should the project be +carried out. The appearance of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia would +create a national ferment of which Venizelos and the Entente Powers +would take advantage in order to overthrow the present Ministry and +force Greece into war.[5] + +Impressed by these arguments, the German Government did its utmost to +induce Falkenhayn to abandon his scheme; von Jagow even going so far as +to draw up, with the assistance of the Greek Minister at Berlin, a +remonstrance to the Chief of the General Staff. But it was all to no +purpose. The political department had very little influence over the +High Command. Falkenhayn insisted on the accuracy of his information, +and adhered to his own point of view. He could not understand, he +said, why a German move should cause any special excitement in Greece, +seeing that it was directed against the French and the English, who +paid no heed to Greek susceptibilities, and he irritably complained +that, while Greece allowed the Entente full liberty to improve its +position day by day, she raised the greatest obstacles to Germany's +least demand.[6] In brief, from being more or less pliant, the Chief +of the General Staff became rigid: he would no longer submit to rebuffs +and denials. Strategic reasons, perhaps, had brought about this +change; perhaps the Bulgars were the instigators. It is impossible to +say, {98} and it does not much matter. The essential fact is that the +man had power and meant to use it. + +There followed a formal communication from the German and Bulgarian +Ministers at Athens to M. Skouloudis, stating that their troops were +compelled in self-defence to push into Greek territory, and assuring +him that neither the integrity and sovereignty of Greece nor the +persons and property of the inhabitants would in any way suffer by this +temporary occupation. M. Skouloudis took note of this decision without +assenting to it, but also without protesting: he felt, he said, that a +premature protest could only lose Greece the guarantees of restoration +and reparation offered. Sufficient unto the day the evil thereof: +confronted with powerful Empires in the height of their military +strength, he had done all that was humanly possible to ward off their +advance, and, though unsuccessful in the end, he had at least obtained +a solemn pledge of their ultimate retreat. The protest came a few days +later, when the invasion actually took place.[7] + +On 26 May, a Germano-Bulgarian force appeared at Rupel. The garrison, +in accordance with its instructions of 27 April (O.S.) to resist any +advance beyond 500 metres from the frontier line, fired upon the +invaders and drove them back. But on fresh orders reaching it to +follow the instructions of 9 March (O.S.)--which prescribed that, in +the event of a foreign invasion, the Greek troops should withdraw--it +surrendered the fort.[8] + +In Entente circles it had long been assumed that, let the King and his +Government do what they liked, the instant a Bulgarian foot stepped +over the border, soldiers and civilians would fly to arms. Nothing of +the sort happened. However painful to their feelings their orders +might be, the soldiers obeyed them. Among the civilians also the +shock, severe as it was, produced no demoralization. The Greek people +generally understood that the surrender of Rupel was an inevitable +consequence of the landing at Salonica. Nevertheless, the fears of M. +Skouloudis that {99} a Bulgarian invasion would place a powerful weapon +in the hands of his opponents were abundantly fulfilled. + +By representing the event as the result of a treacherous collusion +between Athens and the Central Powers,[9] M. Venizelos roused the +Allied nations to fury. Their Governments, of course, knew better. +Even in France official persons recognized that the occupation of Rupel +was a defensive operation which Greece could not oppose by force. Yet +they had hoped that she would have averted it by diplomatic action. As +it was, they concluded that she must have received from the Central +Powers very strong assurances that the occupied territories would be +restored to her. In any case, they said, the Skouloudis Cabinet's +passivity in face of a move calculated to prejudice the Allies' +military position contradicted its oft-repeated protestations of a +benevolent neutrality towards them.[10] + +M. Skouloudis hastened to vindicate his conduct. He did not tell the +Entente Powers, as he might have done, that he had by diplomatic action +put off an invasion for six months, and thus enabled them to increase +their forces and consolidate their position. Neither did he tell them +another thing which in itself formed an ample refutation of the charge +of collusion--that on 27 April (10 May) General Sarrail had occupied +the frontier fort Dova-tépé with the tacit consent of the Hellenic +Government, which had deliberately excluded that fort from the +instructions of resistance issued that day to its troops, and that +Greek officers urged him at the same time to occupy Rupel, dwelling on +the military importance of the fort for the defence of Eastern +Macedonia; an advice which the French General had ignored on the ground +that Rupel lay altogether outside the Allies' zone of action, and he +could not spare the troops necessary for its occupation.[11] + +{100} + +The Greek Premier simply said that his Government's passivity was in +strict accord with the explicit declarations of its policy and +intentions, enunciated at the very outset, ratified by the Agreement of +10 December, 1915, and reiterated _ad nauseam_ to the Entente +Ministers--viz., that "should the Allied troops by their movements +bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so +as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle their +differences." Far from changing his attitude, he once more, in reply +to M. Briand's threat that, "if the Bulgarian advance continued without +resistance there might ensue the most serious consequences for the +Hellenic Government," emphatically declared: "Resistance is only +possible if we abandon our neutrality, and the demand that we should +resist is therefore in flagrant contradiction to the oft-repeated +protestations of the Entente Powers that they have neither the wish nor +the intention to force us into the War." Nor could he understand how +they could think of blaming Greece for receiving from the Central +Powers the same assurances of eventual restoration as those given by +themselves.[11] + +M. Skouloudis spoke in vain. Paris had made up its mind to treat the +incident as indicating a new and malevolent orientation against which +it behoved the Allies to protect themselves. Accordingly, on 1 June, +M. Briand authorized General Sarrail to proclaim a state of siege at +Salonica. + +General Sarrail, who had long sought to be freed from the trammels of +Greek sovereignty--"_et à être maître chez moi_"--but had hitherto been +denied his wish by the British Government, jumped at the permission, +and he improved upon it with a personal touch, trivial yet +characteristic. So far back as 27 April he had recommended that "we +must strike at the head, attack frankly and squarely the one enemy--the +King." Pending an opportunity to strike, he seized the occasion to +slight. He fixed the proclamation for 3 June, King Constantine's name +day, which was to be celebrated at Salonica as in every other town of +the kingdom with a solemn _Te Deum_. {101} The British General, Milne, +who had arranged to assist at the _Te Deum_, after vainly trying to +obtain at least a postponement of the date out of respect for the King, +found himself obliged to yield. And so on that festal morning martial +law was proclaimed. Allied detachments with machine guns occupied +various strategic points, the public offices were taken possession of, +the chiefs of the Macedonian gendarmerie and police were expelled, and +the local press was placed under a French censor. All this, without +any preliminary notification to the Hellenic Government, which +expressed its indignation that a French General, forgetting the most +elementary rules of courtesy and hospitality, thought fit to choose +such a moment for inaugurating a state of things that formed at once a +gratuitous affront to the sovereign of the country and a breach of the +terms of the Agreement of 10 December.[13] + +But this was only a prelude, followed on 6 June by a blockade of the +Greek coasts, established in pursuance of orders from Paris and +London--_pourpeser sur la Grèce et lui montrer qu'elle était à notre +merci_.[14] Even this measure, however, did not seem to M. Briand +sufficient. He advocated intervention of a nature calculated to disarm +our enemies and to encourage our friends. His views did not meet with +approval in London: Sir Edward Grey had "_des scrupules honorables_," +which M. Briand set himself to overcome by pen and tongue. The Entente +Powers, he argued, were protectors of Greece--guarantors of her +external independence and internal liberty. The Greek Government was +bound to defend its territories with them against all invaders, and it +had broken that obligation. Further, it had sinned by violating the +Constitution. On both counts the Entente Powers had not only the right +but the duty to intervene. Thus only could they justify, in the eyes +of the Greek people, the blockade by which the whole population +suffered, and which it would otherwise not understand. There was no +time to lose: the dignity of France demanded swift and drastic action: +the Athenians had gone so far as to ridicule in a cinema the {102} +uniform of the heroes of Verdun. If England would not join her, she +must act alone.[15] + +These arguments--particularly, one may surmise, the last--overcame Sir +Edward Grey's honourable scruples; and on 16 June a squadron was +ordered to be ready to bombard Athens, while a brigade was embarked at +Salonica for the same destination. Before the guns opened fire, +hydroplanes would drop bombs on the royal palace; then the troops would +land, occupy the town, and proceed to arrest, among others, the royal +family. Such were the plans elaborated under the direction of the +French Minister at Athens, much to the joy of General Sarrail, who had +said and written again and again that "nothing could be done unless the +King was put down." [16] + +All arrangements for this "demonstration" completed, on 21 June the +Entente Powers, "ever animated by the most benevolent and amicable +spirit towards Greece"--it is wonderful to what acts these words often +form the accompaniment--had the honour to deliver to her Government a +Note by which they demanded: + +1. The immediate and total demobilization of the Army. + +2. The immediate replacement of the present Cabinet by a business +Ministry. + +3. The immediate dissolution of the Chamber and fresh elections. + +4. The discharge of police officers obnoxious to them. + +They admitted neither discussion nor delay, but left to the Hellenic +Government the entire responsibility for the events that would ensue if +their just demands were not complied with at once. + +As M. Briand had anticipated, the sight of our warships' smoke +quickened the Greek Government's sense of justice. King Constantine +promptly complied, the "demonstration," to the intense disappointment +of M. Guillemin and General Sarrail, was adjourned, and a Ministry of a +non-political character, under the leadership of M. Zaimis, was +appointed to carry on the administration of the country until the +election of a new Chamber.[17] + +The event marked a new phase in the relations between {103} Greece and +the Entente Powers. Henceforth they appear not as trespassers on +neutral territory, but as protectors installed there, according to M. +Briand, by right--a right derived from treaties and confirmed by +precedents.[18] Concerning the treaties all comment must be postponed +till the question comes up in a final form. But as to the precedents, +it may be observed that the most pertinent and helpful of all was one +which M. Briand did not cite. + +At the time of the Crimean War, Greece, under King Otho, wanted to +fight Turkey, and realize some of her national aspirations with the +assistance of Russia. But France and England, who were in alliance +with Turkey against Russia, would not allow such a thing. Their +Ministers at Athens told King Otho that strict neutrality was the only +policy consonant with the honour and the interest of Greece: while +hostilities lasted her commerce, as a neutral nation, would flourish, +and by earning their goodwill she could, at the conclusion of peace, +hope not to be forgotten in the re-making of the map of Eastern Europe. +For refusing to listen to these admonitions King Otho was denounced as +a pro-Russian autocrat, and the Allies landed troops at the Piraeus to +compel obedience to their will. + +Once more a Greek sovereign had drawn down upon himself the wrath of +the Protecting Powers, with the traditional charges of hostile +tendencies in his foreign and autocratic tendencies in his domestic +conduct, for daring to adopt an independent Greek policy. + +This time the three Powers were united in a common cause, which +necessitated unity of action on all fronts. But it would be an error +to imagine that this unity of action rested everywhere upon a community +of views or of ulterior aims. Certainly such was not the case in +Greece. France had her own views and aims in that part of the world. +M. Briand was bent on bringing Greece into the War, not because he +thought her help could exercise a decisive influence over its course, +but because he wanted her to share in the spoils under French auspices: +he considered it France's interest to have in the Eastern Mediterranean +a strong Greece closely tied to her.[19] + +{104} + +That programme France intended to carry through at all costs and by all +means. England and Russia, for the sake of the paramount object of the +War, acquiesced and co-operated. But the acquiescence was compulsory +and the co-operation reluctant. The underlying disaccord between the +three Allies reflected itself in the demeanour of their representatives +at Athens. + +M. Guillemin, the French Minister, stood before the Greek Government +violently belligerent. Brute force, accentuated rather than concealed +by a certain irritating finesse, seemed to be his one idea of +diplomacy, and he missed no conceivable opportunity for giving it +expression: so much so that after a time the King found it impossible +to receive him. Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister, formed a +pleasing contrast to his French colleague: a scrupulous and courteous +gentleman, he did not disguise his repugnance to a policy involving at +every step a fresh infringement of a neutral nation's rights. As it +was, he endeavoured to moderate proceedings which he could neither +approve nor prevent. Prince Demidoff, a Russian diplomat of amiable +manners, seconded Sir Francis Elliot's counsels of moderation and +yielded to M. Guillemin's clamours for coercion.[20] + +It is important to bear this disaccord in mind in order to understand +what went before and what comes hereafter: for, though for the most +part latent, it was always present; and if it did not avert, it +retarded the climax. + + + +[1] _Orations_, p. 155; Skouloudis's _Semeioseis_, p. 36. + +[2] _White Book_, Nos. 70-4, 79, 81, 84, 86-90. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 92, 93, 96-102. + +[4] _White Book_, No. 104. + +[5] _White Book_, Nos. 106, 111, 113. + +[6] _White Book_, Nos. 110, 112, 116. + +[7] _White Book_, Nos. 117-20, 134, 135; Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. +25-6. + +[8] _White Book_, Nos. 95, 105, 126, 130-33, 137. The instructions of +27 April had been issued chiefly in consequence of information that +bands of Bulgarian irregulars (_Comitadjis_) were at that moment +preparing to cross the frontier. Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, p. 23. + +[9] The charge was supported by garbled "extracts" from the +instructions to the Greek troops (the full texts of which may now be +read in the _White Book_), published in Paris. See the _Saturday +Review_, 10 Sept., 1921, pp. 321-2, citing the _Petit Parisien_ of +Dec., 1916. + +[10] _White Book_, Nos. 140, 146. + +[11] _Sarrail_, p. 104. Anyone familiar with the political and +psychological atmosphere would have seen that the Greeks were anxious +to keep the Bulgars out by inducing the French to forestall them. But +Sarrail detected in their advice a subtle contrivance either to find +out his plans, or to cast the blame for the loss of Rupel on him! + +[12] _White Book_, No. 142. + +[13] _Journal Officiel_, p. 72; Sarrail, pp. 105-8, 112, 355-7; _White +Book_, Nos. 142, 145. + +[14] _Sarrail_, p. 113. + +[15] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 72-3. + +[16] Sarrail, pp. 115-24; Du Fournet, pp. 91-3. + +[17] _Journal Officiel_, p. 99; Sarrail, pp. 125-7; Du Fournet, p. 93. + +[18] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 72, 73. + +[19] Romanos to Zaimis, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916. + +[20] See Du Fournet, pp. 110-11. + + + + +{105} + +CHAPTER X + +In their Note of 21 June the Allies assured the Greek people that they +acted for its sake as much as for their own. One half of the preamble +was taken up by their grievances against the Skouloudis Government--its +toleration of foreign propagandists and its connivance at the entry of +enemies, which formed a fresh menace for their armies. The other half +was devoted to the violation of the Constitution by the dissolution of +two Chambers within less than a year and the subjection of the country +to a regime of tyranny. Their aim, they said, was to safeguard the +Greek people in the enjoyment of its rights and liberties.[1] + +These generous sentiments left the Greek people strangely cold. +Indeed, the absence of any manifestations of popular joy at the Allies' +success was as striking as had been the manifestations of resentment at +the means employed. The only persons who did applaud the action were +the persons whose party interests it served. The Venizelist Press +hailed the triumph of violence as a victory for legality. M. Venizelos +addressed to M. Briand his felicitations, and gave public utterance to +his gratitude as follows: "The Note solved a situation from which there +was no other issue. The just severity of its tone, the sincerity of +its motives, its expressly drawn distinction between the Greek people +and the ex-Government, give it more than anything else a paternal +character towards the people of this country. The Protecting Powers +have acted only like parents reclaiming a son's birthright." [2] + +Pared down to realities, the aim of the Protecting Powers was to bring +their protégé to power and Greece into the War. The demobilization of +the army, which stood first on their list, was the first step to that +end. M. Venizelos {106} had been asserting that the people were still +with him, and, given a chance, would uphold his policy, but that chance +was denied them by the mobilization. With a pardonable ignorance of +the people's feelings, and also, it must be owned, with a too naïve +confidence in the accuracy of the People's Chosen, the Allies had +decided to act on this assumption: an assumption on which M. Venizelos +himself was most reluctant to act. + +We have it on his own evidence that he looked for a solution of his +difficulties, not to an election, but to a revolution. Further, he has +told us that, eager as he might be for a revolutionary stroke, he could +not lose sight of the obstacles. To those who held up French +revolutions as a model, he pointed out that the analogy was fallacious: +in France "long years of tyranny had exasperated the people to its very +depths. In Greece the people had a king who, only two years earlier, +had headed his armies in two victorious campaigns." [3] So he scouted +the idea of intervention at Athens, convinced that any attack on the +Crown would spell destruction to himself.[4] His project was to steal +to Salonica and there, under General Sarrail's shield, to start a +separatist movement "directed against the Bulgars, but not against the +king," apparently hoping that the Greek troops in Macedonia, among whom +his apostles had been busy, fired by anti-Bulgar hate, would join him +and drag king and country after them. This project had been +communicated by the French Minister at Athens to General Sarrail on 31 +May:[5] but, as the British Government was not yet sufficiently +advanced to countenance sedition,[6] M. Venizelos and his French +confederate saw reason to abandon it for the present. + +Thus all concerned were committed to a test of the real desires of the +Greek people by a General Election, which they declared themselves +anxious to bring off without delay--early in August. This time there +would be no ambiguity about the issue: although the Allies in their +Note, as was proper and politic, had again disclaimed any {107} wish or +intention to make Greece depart from her neutrality, M. Venizelos +proclaimed that he still adhered to his bellicose programme, and that +he was more confident of victory than ever[7]: had not the Reservists +been set free to vote, and were not those ardent warriors his +enthusiastic supporters? With this cry--perhaps in this belief--he +entered the arena. + +It was a lively contest--rhetoric and corruption on both sides +reinforced by terrorism, to which the Allies' military authorities in +Macedonia, and their Secret Service at Athens, whose efficiency had +been greatly increased by the dismissal of many policemen obnoxious to +them, and by other changes brought about through the Note of 21 June, +contributed of their best. + +But even veteran politicians are liable to error. The Reservists left +their billets in Macedonia burning with anger and shame at the +indignities and hardships which they had endured. The Allies might +have had among those men as many friends as they pleased, and could +have no enemies unless they created them by treating them as such. And +this is just what they did: from first to last, the spirit displayed by +General Sarrail towards the Greek army was a spirit of insulting +distrust and utterly unscrupulous callousness. + +Unable to revenge themselves on the foreign trespasser, the Reservists +vowed to wreak their vengeance on his native abettor. They travelled +back to their villages shouting: "A black vote for Venizelos!" and +immediately formed leagues in the constituencies with a view to +combating his candidates. The latter did all they could to exploit the +national hate for the Bulgars and the alarm caused by their invasion. +But fresh animosities had blunted the edge of old feelings: besides, +had not the Bulgarian invasion been provoked by the Allies' occupation, +and who was responsible for that occupation? For the rest, the +question, as it presented itself to the masses, was no longer simply +one of neutrality or war. Despite M. Venizelos's efforts, and thanks +to the efforts of his adversaries, his breach with the King had become +public, and {108} the division of the nation had now attained to the +dimensions of a schism--Royalists against Venizelists. Nor could there +be any doubt as to the relative strength of the rival camps. + +Thus, by a sort of irony, the action which was designed to clothe +Venizelos with new power threatened to strip him of the last rags of +prestige that still clung to his name. Therefore, the elections +originally fixed for early in August were postponed by the Entente to +September. + +Such was the internal situation, when external events brought the +struggle to a head. + +With the accession of 120,000 Serbs, 23,000 Italians, and a Russian +brigade, the Allied army in Macedonia had reached a total of about +350,000 men, of whom, owing to the summer heats and the Vardar marshes, +some 210,000 were down with malaria.[8] Nevertheless, under pressure +from home and against his own better judgment,[9] General Sarrail began +an offensive (10 August). As might have been foreseen, this display of +energy afforded the Bulgars an excuse, and the demobilization of the +Greek forces an opportunity, for a fresh invasion. M. Zaimis, in view +of the contingency, imparted to General Sarrail his Government's +intention to disarm the forts in Eastern Macedonia, so that he might +forestall the Bulgars by occupying them. But again, as in May, the +Frenchman treated the friendly hint with scornful suspicion.[10] There +followed a formal notice from the German and Bulgarian Ministers at +Athens to the Premier, stating that their troops were compelled, by +military exigencies, to push further into Greek territory, and +repeating the assurances given to his predecessor on the occupation of +Fort Rupel.[11] + +The operation was conducted in a manner which belied these assurances. +Colonel Hatzopoulos, acting Commandant of the Fourth Army Corps, +reported from his headquarters at Cavalla that the Bulgarian troops +were accompanied by irregular bands which indulged in murder {109} and +pillage; that the inhabitants of the Serres and Drama districts were +fleeing panic-stricken; and that the object of the invaders clearly +was, after isolating the various Greek divisions, to occupy the whole +of Eastern Macedonia. He begged for permission to call up the +disbanded reservists, and for the immediate dispatch of the Greek +Fleet. But the Athens Government vetoed all resistance, and the +invasion went on unopposed.[12] By 24 August the Bulgars were on the +outskirts of Cavalla. + +Truth to tell, the real authors of the invasion were the Allies and M. +Venizelos, who, by forcing Greece to disarm before the assembled enemy, +practically invited him. But it was not to be expected that they +should see things in this light. They, as usual, saw in them a new +"felony"--yet another proof of King Constantine's desire to assist the +Kaiser and defeat M. Venizelos[13]--and acted accordingly. + +M. Venizelos opened the proceedings with a meeting outside his house on +Sunday, 27 August, when he delivered from his balcony a direct +apostrophe to the King--an oration which may have lost some of its +dramatic effect by being read out of a carefully prepared manuscript, +but which on that account possesses greater documentary value: + +"Thou, O King, hast become the victim of conscienceless counsellors who +have tried to destroy the work accomplished by the Revolution of 1909, +to bring back the previous maladministration, and to satisfy their +passionate hate for the People's Chosen Leader. Thou art the victim of +military advisers of limited perceptions and of oligarchic principles. +Thou hast become the victim of thy admiration for Germany, in whose +victory thou hast believed, hoping through that victory to elbow aside +our {110} free Constitution and to centre in thy hands the whole +authority of the State." After enumerating the disastrous results of +these errors--"instead of expansion in Asia Minor, Thrace, and Cyprus, +a Bulgarian invasion in Macedonia and the loss of valuable war +material"--the orator referred to the elections and warned the King +that persistence in his present attitude would involve danger to the +throne: "The use of the august name of Your Majesty in the contest +against the Liberal Party introduces the danger of an internal +revolution." The discourse ended with another scarcely veiled menace +to the King: "If we are not listened to, then we shall take counsel as +to what must be done to rescue all that can be rescued out of the +catastrophe which has overtaken us." [14] + +It was not an empty threat. The Chief spoke on Sunday, and on +Wednesday his followers at Salonica rose up in revolt and, supported by +General Sarrail, took possession of the public offices, set up a +revolutionary committee under a Cretan, and launched a war proclamation +for Macedonia on the side of the Entente. The Royalist troops, after +some fighting, were besieged in their barracks, starved into surrender, +and finally shipped off to the Piraeus, while many civil and +ecclesiastical personages were thrown into prison. The French General +received notice that M. Venizelos himself would arrive on 9 September +to take command of the movement.[15] + +Concurrently with this first product of the plot hatched between M. +Venizelos and M. Guillemin in May, was carried on the more orthodox +mode of action inaugurated by the Allied Governments in June. At the +news of the Bulgarian invasion, the French Minister at Athens felt or +feigned unbounded fear--_tout était à redoubter_: even a raid by Uhlans +to the very gates of the capital--and asked Paris for a squadron to be +placed at his disposal. Paris did what it could. On 26 August Admiral +Dartige du Fournet was ordered to form a special squadron and proceed +against Athens according to the plans drawn up {111} in June. He +immediately left Malta at the head of thirty-four ships, and on the +28th arrived at Milo, where he found a British contingent of +thirty-nine ships awaiting him. The joint armada thus formed was +believed to be strong enough to preclude all danger of resistance. For +all that, every precaution was taken to secure to it the advantage of a +surprise, though in vain: its size and the proximity of its objective +rendered secrecy impossible. + +Four days were wasted in idleness--a delay due to England's scruples. +But at last all was ready; and on the morning of 1 September the Allied +Fleet stood out to sea: seventy-three units of every description, the +big ships in single file, flanked by torpedo-boats, steaming bravely at +the rate of fifteen knots, and leaving behind them a track of +white-crested waves that stretched to the very edge of the horizon: _le +coup d'oeil est impressionant_. + +All arrangements for battle had been made, and each contingent had its +special role assigned to it: only the Intelligence Services, being +otherwise occupied, had failed to furnish any information about Greek +mines and submarines. It was therefore necessary to be more than ever +careful. But the six hours' voyage was accomplished safely, and not +until the armada cast anchor at the mouth of the Salamis Strait did it +meet with a tangible token of hostility. The Greek Admiral commanding +the Royal Fleet before the arsenal of Salamis--a force composed of two +ironclads, one armoured cruiser, eighteen torpedo-boats and two +submarines--failed to bid the Allies welcome: a breach of international +rules which was duly resented and remedied. + +The expedition had for its objects: (1) To seize a dozen enemy +merchantmen which had taken refuge since the beginning of the War in +the harbours of Eleusis and the Piraeus; (2) to obtain the control of +Greek posts and telegraphs; (3) to procure the expulsion of enemy +propagandists, and the prosecution of such Greek subjects as had +rendered themselves guilty of complicity in corruption and espionage on +the wrong side. + +Of the first operation, which was conducted to a successful issue that +same evening "with remarkable activity" by one of Admiral Dartige's +subordinates, no justification was attempted: we needed tonnage and +took it. The {112} pretext for the second was that the Allies had +heard "from a sure source" that their enemies were furnished by the +Hellenic Government with military information. So serious a charge, if +made in good faith, should have been supported by the clearest proofs. +Yet even Admiral Dartige, whose disagreeable duty it was to prefer it, +bitterly complained that "he never received from Paris a single proof +which could enlighten him." On the other hand, he did receive abundant +enlightenment about the "sure source": the Russian Minister needed to +send a cipher message to the American Embassy at Constantinople which +was entrusted with Russian interests, and, the Hellenic Government +readily agreeing to transmit it through its Legation at Pera, Prince +Demidoff, with the consent of his Entente colleagues, proceeded to make +use of the Athens wireless for that purpose. Within forty-eight hours +the Admiral received from Paris an excited telegram asking him what +measures he had taken to prevent the Hellenic Government from +"violating its engagements." The rebuke, explains the Admiral, was the +result of a sensational report from the head of the French Secret +Intelligence at Athens, denouncing the above transaction as an example +of "the bad faith of the Greeks." On this pretext all the means by +which the Hellenic Government could communicate with its +representatives abroad and reply to the attacks of its enemies passed +under the Allies' control. + +Somewhat less neat were the methods adopted to secure the third object +of the expedition. The Secret Services had compiled a voluminous +register of undesirable persons out of which they drew up a select list +of candidates for expulsion and prosecution. Unfortunately, despite +their industry, it teemed with embarrassing errors: individuals put +down as Germans turned out to be Greeks; and the suspects of Greek +nationality included high personages, such as M. Streit, ex-Minister +for Foreign Affairs, General Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxas, ex-Chiefs +of the General Staff, and so on. At last an expurgated list was +approved and carried out summarily.[16] Some of the criminals escaped +punishment by transferring their services from the German to the French +and British propagandas; for, {113} while to intrigue with the former +was to commit a crime, to intrigue with the latter was to perform a +meritorious deed. + +There the Allies and M. Venizelos stopped for the moment, hoping that +Rumania's entry into the War, which had just taken place, would induce +Greece to do likewise. + + + +[1] _Journal Officiel_, p. 99. + +[2] The _Daily Mail_, 24 June, 1916. + +[3] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[4] Du Fournet, p. 91. + +[5] Sarrail, pp. 107, 354-5. + +[6] "_L'Angleterre avait mis son veto._"--Sarrail, p. 153. + +[7] See his statement to the Correspondent of the Paris _Journal_, in +the _Hesperia_, of London, 7 July, 1916. + +[8] Du Fournet, p. 99. + +[9] Caclamanos, Paris, 1/14 June, 1916. + +[10] M. Zaimis's deposition on oath at the judicial investigation +instituted by the Venizelos Government in 1919. Cp. Sarrail, p. 152. + +[11] _White Book_, Nos. 158-60. + +[12] _White Book_, Nos. 161-5. + +[13] "The King, having no illusions as to the result of an election," +says M. Venizelos, in the _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, "organized, in +connivance with the Germans and Bulgarians, the invasion of Western and +Eastern Macedonia. As the Liberals thus lost about sixty seats, the +King might hope . . . to secure at least some semblance of success at +the coming elections." On the first opportunity that the people of +Macedonia, Eastern and Western alike, had of expressing their +opinion--at the elections of 14 Nov., 1920--they did not return a +single Venizelist.--See Reuter, Athens, 15 Nov., 1920. + +[14] For the Greek original, see the _Hesperia_, 1 Sept., 1916. A much +longer text, apparently elaborated at leisure, with a colourless +English translation, was published by the Anglo-Hellenic League. + +[15] Sarrail, pp. 152-4; Official statement by the Revolutionary +Committee, Reuter, Salonica, 31 Aug., 1916. + +[16] Du Fournet, pp. 99-104, 122-4, 127, 129. + + + + +{114} + +CHAPTER XI + +Rumania's policy had always been regarded by the Greeks as of capital +importance for their own; and as soon as she took the field, King +Constantine, though suffering from a recrudescence of the malady that had +nearly killed him in the previous year, set to work to consider whether +her adhesion did not make such a difference in the military situation as +to enable him to abandon neutrality. Two or three days before the +arrival of the Allied Fleet he had initiated conversations in that sense +with the Allied Ministers.[1] + +Simultaneously the question of a war Government came up for discussion; +the actual Cabinet being, by order of the Allies, a mere business +Ministry charged only to carry on the administration until the election +of a new Parliament. + +Two alternatives were suggested. The first, which found warm favour in +Entente circles, was that M. Zaimis should lay down the cares of office +and make place for M. Venizelos. Constantine was advised to "bend his +stubborn will to the inevitable and remain King of the Hellenes"--that +is, to become an ornamental captain--by abandoning the ship of State to +the management of the wise Cretan. "It is now possible," the homily ran, +"that the precipitation of events will prevent the return of M. +Venizelos by the voice of the electorate." But that did not signify: "M. +Venizelos can count on the backing of nine-tenths of the nation, given a +semblance of Royal support." [1] In less trenchant language, the British +Minister at Athens expounded the same thesis. + +But Constantine showed little inclination to perform this noble act of +self-effacement. On no account would {115} he have a dictator imposed +upon him to shape the fortunes of Greece according to his caprice, +unfettered by "military advisers of limited perceptions." If Greece was +to have a dictator, the King had said long ago, he would rather be that +dictator; though he had no objection to a Cabinet with a Venizelist +admixture. In fact, he insisted on M. Venizelos accepting a share in the +responsibility of war, either by himself sitting in the Cabinet or by +permitting three of his friends to represent him in it. "It will not +do," he said frankly, "to have his crowd standing out, trying to break up +the army and making things difficult by criticizing the Government." [3] + +The other alternative was that M. Zaimis should be invested with +political functions; but for this the consent of the Allies and of their +protégé was needed. The latter, in his oration of 27 August, had +magnanimously declared himself willing, provided his policy were adopted, +to leave the execution of it in the hands of M. Zaimis, whose honesty and +sincerity remained above all suspicion: "the Liberal Party," he had said, +"are prepared to back this Cabinet of Affairs with their political +authority." On being asked by M. Zaimis to explain precisely what he +meant, M. Venizelos broached the subject of elections. As already seen, +he and the Allies had reason to regret and to elude the test which they +had exacted. It was, therefore, not surprising that M. Venizelos should +stipulate, with the concurrence of the Entente Ministers, that the +elections now imminent be postponed to the Greek Kalends.[4] By +accepting this condition, M. Zaimis obtained a promise of support; and +straightway (2 Sept.) proceeded to sound London and Paris. + +Before making any formal proposal, he wanted to know if the Western +Powers would at least afford Greece the money and equipment which she +required in order to prepare with a view to eventual action. England +welcomed these overtures, convinced that thus all misunderstandings +between Greece and the Allies would vanish; {116} but, before giving a +definite reply, she had to communicate with France. France manifested +the greatest satisfaction; but M. Briand urged that there was no time for +negotiations: the vital interests of Greece demanded immediate action: +she should hasten to make a formal declaration without delay; after which +he would do all that was necessary to provide her, as soon as possible, +with money and material. M. Zaimis in his very first dispatch had said: +"Unfortunately the state of our finances and of our military organization +does not permit us to think of immediate action: we need a certain delay +for preparation"; and all the exhortations of M. Briand to leap first and +look afterwards failed to move him. Besides the matter of equipment--a +matter in which the Entente Powers, owing to their own necessities, had +been the reverse of liberal to their small allies, as Belgium and Servia +had already found, and Rumania was about to find to her cost--there was +another point Greek statesmen and strategists had to weigh very carefully +before committing themselves: would Rumania co-ordinate her military +action with theirs? Unless she were inclined and able to divert enough +forces from the Austro-Hungarian to the Bulgarian frontier, her entry +into the War could not be of any help to them. So, after nine days' +correspondence, we find M. Zaimis still writing: "When the English answer +arrives, the Royal Government will take account of it in the examination +in which it will engage before taking a definite decision--a decision +which will be subordinated to its military preparations and to the course +of war operations in the East." [5] + +Directly afterwards (11 Sept.) M. Zaimis resigned "for reasons of +health." These reasons convinced no one: everyone agreed in ascribing +his withdrawal to his discovery that he was the victim of duplicity; but +as to whose duplicity, opinions differed. According to M. Venizelos, +while the conversations about entering the War went on, King Constantine, +in consequence of a telegram from the {117} Kaiser assuring him that +within a month the Germans would have overrun Rumania and flung Sarrail's +army into the sea, and asking him to hold out, reverted to the policy of +neutrality; and M. Zaimis, realizing that he was being fooled, refused to +play the King's game and resigned.[6] For this statement we have M. +Venizelos's authority; and against it that of M. Zaimis, who, on hearing +from Paris that his resignation gave rise to the supposition that the old +policy had prevailed, replied: "My impression is that the Cabinet which +will succeed me will not quit the line of policy which I have pursued." +[7] + +Another account connected the fall of the Cabinet with an incident which +occurred at that critical moment and strained the situation to the +utmost. In the evening of 9 September, as the Entente Ministers held a +conference in the French Legation, a score of scallywags rushed into the +courtyard, shouting "Long live the King! Down with France and England!" +fired a few revolver shots in the air, and bolted. Immediately M. Zaimis +hastened to the Legation and expressed his regrets. But that did not +suffice to placate the outraged honour of the French Republic. Despite +the objections of his colleagues, M. Guillemin had a detachment of +bluejackets landed to guard the Legation; and next day a Note was +presented to the Greek Premier demanding that the perpetrators of this +grave breach of International Law should be discovered and punished, and +that all Reservists' leagues should instantly be broken up. It was even +proposed that the King should be asked to issue a Proclamation disavowing +and condemning the demonstration. Inquiry proved that the demonstration +was the work of _agents provocateurs_ in the pay of the French Secret +Service which acted in the interest of M. Venizelos. + +Whereupon, M. Zaimis, realizing that the negotiations he was trying to +conduct could not be sincere on the part of the French, begged to be +relieved of his mandate. The King was loth to let him go. The British +Minister was equally upset, and added his plea to that of the Sovereign. +M. Zaimis said that, if M. Guillemin disavowed {118} the intrigue and +displayed a willingness to continue the negotiations in a spirit of +candour, he would remain; but M. Guillemin could not bring himself to go +so far.[8] + +Whatever may be the truth in this matter--for, owing to lack of +documentary evidence, it is impossible fully to ascertain the truth--the +whole position, for a man of M. Zaimis's character, was untenable: if +sense of duty had prompted him to take up the burden, common-sense +counselled him to lay it down. So he resigned; and the fat was once more +in the fire--and the blaze and the stench were greater than ever; for his +resignation synchronized with another untoward event. + +Colonel Hatzopoulos with his own and the Serres Division had for some +time past been isolated at Cavalla--the Bulgars occupying the forts on +one side, while the British blockaded the harbour on the other. +Suddenly, upon a false report that King Constantine had fled to Larissa +and Venizelos was master at Athens, the demeanour of the Bulgars, which +had always been harsh, became thoroughly hostile. They strengthened +their outposts, cut off the food supplies that came from Drama and +Serres, and, on 6 September, demanded that the heights immediately above +the town still held by the Greeks should be abandoned to them, on the +plea that otherwise they would be unable to defend themselves in case of +an Entente landing: refusal would be considered an unfriendly act. As +his orders forbade resistance, Colonel Hatzopoulos had no choice but to +yield. Thus the Greeks were reduced to absolute helplessness; and their +isolation was completed on 9 September, when British sailors landed and +destroyed the wireless station. + +The worst was yet to come. Next morning (10 Sept.) a German officer +peremptorily notified Colonel Hatzopoulos on the part of Marshal von +Hindenburg that, as the Greek troops scattered over Eastern Macedonia +obstructed the operations of the Bulgarian army, they should all be +concentrated at Drama. Colonel Hatzopoulos, perceiving that compliance +meant captivity in the hands of the Bulgars, asked that, as his +instructions were that all the troops should concentrate at Cavalla, and +as he could not act otherwise without orders from the King, he might be +{119} allowed to send a messenger to Athens via Monastir. This being +refused on the ground that the journey would take too long, he pleaded +his inability to decide about so grave a matter on his own initiative, +but must call a council of the principal officers. Meanwhile, in order +to avoid capture by the Bulgars, he asked if, should they decide to +surrender, Hindenburg would guarantee their transportation to Germany +with their arms. The German promised to communicate with headquarters +and to let him know the answer on the following morning. + +Evidently the invaders, who would formerly have been more than content +with the withdrawal of the Greek forces, were now--in violation of the +pledges given to Athens by the German and Bulgarian Governments--resolved +on making such withdrawal impossible. It is not hard to account for this +change. The pledges were given in the belief that Greece would continue +neutral. This belief had been shaken not only by the Venizelist +movement, but more severely still by M. Zaimis's soundings of the Entente +Powders. The Greek Premier had from the first insisted on secrecy, +stating among the main reasons which rendered absolute discretion +imperative, "the presence in part of our territory of the eventual +adversary," and "the need to extricate two divisions and a large quantity +of material" from their grip.[9] Nevertheless, the Entente Press gloried +in the hope that the Allies would soon have the only non-belligerent +Balkan State fighting on their side, and the principal Entente news +agency trumpeted abroad M. Zaimis's confidential conversations.[10] +Hence the desire of the Germano-Bulgars to prevent the escape of men and +material that might at any moment be used against them. + +On the other hand, the Greek officers' council decided {120} to try first +every means of escape, and only if that proved impossible to comply with +the German demand on condition that they should be taken to Germany and +not be left in the hands of the Bulgars. Accordingly, Colonel +Hatzopoulos addressed a most earnest appeal to the British for vessels to +get his men away to Volo or the Piraeus, and, having received a promise +to that effect, he secretly arranged for flight. In the night of 10 +September all the men with their belongings gathered on the sea-front +ready to leave. But they reckoned without the partisans of M. Venizelos +in their midst. One of them, the Commandant of the Serres Division, a +month ago had informed General Sarrail that he would fight on the side of +the Allies,[11] and another on 5 September, in a nocturnal meeting on +board a British man-of-war, had proposed to kidnap Colonel Hatzopoulos, +arm volunteers, and attack the Bulgars with the aid of Allied detachments +landed at Cavalla. His proposal having been rejected, it was agreed that +all "patriotic" elements should be transported to Salonica. In pursuance +of this agreement, only those were allowed to embark who were willing to +rebel. Those who refused to break their oath of allegiance to their King +were turned adrift. Some tried to gain the island of Thasos, but their +boats were carried to the open sea and capsized, drowning many, the rest +got back to the shore in despair. + +As a last hope of escape, Colonel Hatzopoulos begged the British naval +authorities, who controlled all means of communication between Cavalla +and Athens, to transmit to his Government a message asking if he might +surrender to the British and be interned in the isle of Thasos. The +message was duly transmitted through the British Legation on 11 +September, and in reply the Greek Minister of War, after an understanding +with the British authorities, ordered him through the same channel to +embark at once with all his men and, if possible, material for Volo, on +Greek ships by preference, but if such were not available, on any other +ships. Whether these orders were never forwarded, or whether they +reached their destination too late, is not quite clear. It is certain, +however, that during the critical hours when the fate of the unhappy +soldiers hung in the balance, the British Fleet did not permit +embarkation {121} except to the few who joined the Rebellion.[12] For +the loyal majority there was nothing left but the way to Drama. + +Nor was any time allowed for vacillation. When, in the morning of 11 +September, Colonel Hatzopoulos met the German officer, the latter handed +to him a telegram from Hindenburg, guaranteeing the transport of the +Greeks to Germany with their arms, where they would be treated as guests. +He added that the departure from Cavalla would not be enforced for the +present. But in the afternoon he intimated that this was due to a +misunderstanding, and that they should leave the same night. Their +efforts to escape had obviously become known to the Germans, who, taking +no chances, imposed immediate departure under threat to cancel +Hindenburg's guarantee. Thus, the two Greek divisions were under +compulsion huddled off to Drama, whence, joined by the division stationed +there, they were taken to Germany and interned at Goerlitz.[13] + +Nothing that had hitherto happened served so well to blacken the rulers +of Greece in the eyes of the Entente publics, and the mystery which +enveloped the affair facilitated the propagation of fiction. It was +asserted that the surrendered troops amounted to 25,000--even to 40,000: +figures which were presently reduced to "some 8,000: three divisions, +each composed of three regiments of 800 men each." The surrender was +represented as made by order of the Athens Government: King Constantine, +out of affection for Germany and Bulgaria, and hate of {122} France and +England, had given up, not only rich territories he himself had +conquered, but also the soldiers he had twice led to victory. + +In point of fact, as soon as the Athens Government heard of the +catastrophe--and it did not hear of it until after the arrival of the +first detachment in Germany--it addressed to Berlin a remonstrance, +disavowing the step of Colonel Hatzopoulos as contrary to his orders, and +denying Germany's right to keep him as contrary to International Law: +"for Greece being in peaceful and friendly relations with Germany, the +Greek troops can neither be treated as prisoners of war nor be interned, +internment being only possible in a neutral country, and only with regard +to belligerent troops--not vice versa." The dispatch ended with a +request that "our troops with their arms and baggage be transported to +the Swiss frontier, whence they may go to some Mediterranean port and +return to Greece on ships which we shall send for the purpose." [14] + +Berlin answered that she "was ready to meet the desire of the Greek +Government, but actual and effective guarantees would have to be given +that the troops under German protection would not be prevented by the +Entente Powers from returning to their fatherland, and would not be +punished for their loyal and neutral feeling and action." [15] This +because the Entente press was angrily denouncing the step as a +"disgraceful desertion" and asking "with what ignominious penalty their +War Lord has visited so signal and so heinous an act of mutiny, perjury, +and treason on the part of his soldiers" [16]--the soldiers who went to +Germany precisely in order to avoid committing an act of mutiny, perjury, +and treason. Truly, in time of war words change their meaning. + + + +[1] See _Constantine I and the Greek People_. By Paxton Hibben, an +American journalist who took part in these diplomatic transactions, pp. +281-90. + +[2] See Crawfurd Price, Athens, 1 Sept., in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, 15 +Sept., 1916. + +[3] Paxton Hibben, p. 289. + +[4] "_La question de la dissolution de la Chambre fut écartée. . . . De +plus tout faisait supposer que de nouvelles élections ne seraient pas +favorables an parti venizéliste, dont la cause était si intimement liée à +la nôtre._"--Du Fournet, pp. 121-2; Paxton Hibben, pp. 278-9, 306-7. + +[5] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; Rome, +Bucharest, Petrograd, 29 Aug./11 Sept. Romanos, Paris, 20 Aug./2 Sept., +22 Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 26 Aug./8 Sept. Gennadius, London, 22 +Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 1916. + +[6] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[7] Romanos, Paris, 31 Aug./13 Sept.; Zaimis, Athens, 1/14 Sept., 1916. + +[8] Paxton Hibben, pp. 313-19; Du Fournet, pp. 119-21, 129. + +[9] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept., 1916. +All his dispatches are marked "strictly confidential and to be deciphered +by the Minister himself." The replies are to be addressed to him +personally, and for greater security, must be prefaced by some +meaningless groups of figures. + +[10] See messages from the Athens Correspondents of _The Times_ and the +_Daily Chronicle_, 3 Sept.; Reuter, Athens, 9 Sept., 1916. In view of +the strict censorship exercised during the war and in view of the +Franco-Venizelist anxiety to rush Greece into a rupture these +indiscretions can hardly be considered accidental. + +[11] Sarrail, p. 152. + +[12] King Constantine has publicly taxed the Allies with not forwarding +the orders (see _The Times_, 8 Nov., 1920). On the other hand, there is +on record a statement by Vice-Consul Knox that the orders were forwarded +from Athens and that he himself delivered them at Cavalla. Cp. Admiral +Dartige du Fournet: "_Au moment ou les Grecs virent les Bulgares en +marche sur Cavalla, Us voulurent embarquer lews troupes et leur matériel. +L'amiral anglais qui commandait en mer Egée leur refusa son concours, +espérant sans doute les déeterminer à se défendre. Quand, se rendant un +compte plus exact de la situation, il donna son assentiment à cette +évacuation, il étaii trop tard: les Bulgares entraient à Cavalla le jour +même._"--Du Fournet, p. 151. + +[13] My chief sources of information concerning this event are a Report +by Col. Hatzopoulos to Marshal von Hindenburg, dated "Goerlitz, 13/26 +Oct., 1916," and another report drawn up at Athens in July, 1921, from +the records of the judicial investigation instituted by the Venizelos +Government in 1919, including the evidence of the British Vice-Consul G. +G. Knox. + +[14] _White Book_, No. 173. + +[15] Telegram from Berlin reported by Renter's Amsterdam Correspondent, +23 Sept., 1916. I find this confirmed by a dispatch from the Greek +Minister at Berlin (Theotokis, Berlin, 18/31 Oct., 1916), in which he +gives an account of his efforts to obtain from the German Government the +return of the troops and restitution of the war material, as well as the +Greek officers' protests to Hindenburg and Ludendorff against the +pressure under which they had been hurried from Cavalla. It is to be +regretted that M. Venizelos did not find room for this document and for +Col. Hatzopoulos's illuminating Report in his _White Book_. + +[16] Leading article in _The Times_, 19 Sept., 1916. + + + + +{123} + +CHAPTER XII + +Meanwhile the unfortunate King of Greece was faced by a state of things +which he himself describes with admirable lucidity in a dispatch to his +brother Andrew, then in London, labouring, vainly enough, to obtain a +fair hearing for the Royalist side, while another brother, Prince +Nicholas, was engaged on a similar mission at Petrograd. The document is +dated 3/16 September, 1916, and runs thus: + +"The resignation of the Cabinet of M. Zaimis, who enjoyed my absolute +confidence, as well as the unanimous confidence of the country, and whom +the Entente Governments declared to me that they surrounded with their +entire sympathy, has rendered the situation very difficult. + +"I charged M. Dimitracopoulos to form a new Cabinet. He declared himself +ready to continue the conversations opened recently by M. Zaimis in the +hope of bringing them to a happy conclusion. Before accepting +definitely, he thought it necessary to sound the views of the Powers on +important questions of an internal order, and went to the _doyen_ of the +Diplomatic Corps, the British Minister, whence he carried away a very +clear impression that, not only the coercive measures would not be raised +before mobilization, but that they might be intensified, notably by +direct interference in personal domestic questions, and that, even after +mobilization, the measures would be only relaxed. As to the question of +elections, after having demanded by the Note of 8 (21) June the +dissolution of the Chamber and new elections, which we accepted, now they +demand that the elections shall not take place, without, at the same +time, allowing the existing Chamber to meet. M. Dimitracopoulos has laid +down his mandate. + +"Under these conditions the situation becomes inextricable. The military +and naval authorities of the Entente foment and encourage in the country +a revolution and armed sedition, and they favour by every means the {124} +Salonica movement by continuing the vexatious measures and restricting +all freedom of thought and action. The Entente Ministers paralyze all +Government. Thus the country is pushed towards anarchy. + +"Such conduct not only conflicts with the assurances which they have +given us, but excludes all practical possibility of reconsidering our +policy freely to the end of taking a decision in a favourable direction. +For the rest, Greece divided would not be of any use as an ally. It is +necessary that there should return in the country comparative calm and +the feeling of independence, indispensable for taking extreme +resolutions. It is necessary that confidence in the sympathy of the +Entente should be restored. A resolution to participate in the war taken +under present circumstances would run the risk of being attributed to +violence and of being received with mistrust. More, that resolutions may +be taken without danger of disaster, there is need of circumspection and +discretion, so as not to provoke an attack from the Germano-Bulgars who +are in our territory, before we are ready to lend real assistance to the +Entente. A more definite declaration of principle, which would have to +be kept secret in the common interest, would be of no practical value. + +"Under certain circumstances, rendering the participation of Greece +useful and conformable to our interests, I have already declared that I +am ready to enter into the war on the side of the Entente. I am ready to +envisage negotiations in this sense. But, before all, I need, that I may +be able to occupy myself usefully and with a certain mental calmness with +foreign questions, to see comparative quiet restored at home, and so to +save the appearances of liberty of action. In this I ask, for the sake +of the common interest, the Powers to give me their help. + +"I have charged M. Calogeropoulos to form a Ministry: he is equally +animated by the best intentions towards the Entente." + +The new Premier, who had already held office with distinction as Minister +of the Interior and as Minister of Finance, possessed every qualification +for the delicate task entrusted to him. On the day of his accession _The +Times_ Correspondent wrote of him: "In the Chamber he is highly esteemed. +Although he is a Theotokist, and {125} therefore anti-Venizelist, M. +Calogeropoulos, who studied in France, declared to me that all his +personal sympathies are with the Entente. He is likewise a member of the +Franco-Greek League." [1] In harmony with this character was his +programme: "The new Cabinet, inspired by the same policy as M. Zaimis, is +resolved to pursue it with the sincere desire to tighten the bonds +between Greece and the Entente Powers." This declaration, made in every +Allied capital, was supplemented by a more intimate announcement in Paris +and London: "Sharing the views which inspired the negotiations opened by +its predecessor, the Royal Government is resolved to pursue them in the +same spirit." [2] + +No sooner had M. Calogeropoulos spoken than M. Venizelos set to work to +cast doubts on his sincerity, with remarkable success: "M. Venizelos does +not believe that the composition of the new Ministry permits of the hope +that a national policy will be adopted, since it springs from a party of +pro-German traditions," [3]--this ominous paragraph was added by the +_Times_ Correspondent to his report the same day. And next day the +British Minister, in an interview with the editor of a Venizelist +journal, said: "The situation is certainly not an agreeable one. I have +read in the papers the declaration of the new Premier. What has +surprised me is to find that M. Calogeropoulos characterized his Ministry +as a political one, whereas in their last Note the Allies required that +Greece should be governed by a business Cabinet. This, as you see, makes +a distinct difference." [4] Simultaneously, the Entente Press, under +similar inspiration, reviled the new Cabinet as pro-German, clamoured for +M. Venizelos, whom they still represented as the true exponent of the +national will, threatened King Constantine with the fate of King Otho, +and his country with "terrible and desperate things." [5] + +{126} + +It was in such an atmosphere that M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues +attempted to resume the conversations which M. Zaimis had opened. They +realized that, since elections and like legal methods no longer commended +themselves to the Allies, since they menaced the country with "terrible +and desperate things," Greece might drift into chaos at any moment. They +were anxious to avoid chaos. But how? A blind acceptance of the +Venizelist policy of an immediate rush into the War, without regard to +ways and means, might prove tantamount to burning one's blanket in order +to get rid of the fleas: while saving Greece from the coercion of the +French and the British, it might expose her to subjugation by the Germans +and the Bulgars: the plight of Rumania afforded a fresh warning. They +therefore adopted the only course open to sane men. + +On 19 September Greece formally offered to the Entente Powers "to come in +as soon as by their help she had accomplished the repair of her military +forces, within a period fixed by common accord." But, "as her armed +intervention could not, obviously, be in the interest of anyone +concerned, unless it took place with chances of success, the Royal +Government thinks that Greece should not be held to her engagement, if at +the time fixed the Balkan theatre of war presented, in the opinion of the +Allies' General Staffs themselves, such a disequilibrium of forces as the +military weight of Greece would be insufficient to redress." [6] + +Russia received these advances with cordiality, her Premier declaring to +the Greek Minister at Petrograd that she would be happy to have Greece +for an ally, and that the Tsar had full confidence in the sentiments of +King Constantine. He added that he would immediately communicate with +Paris and London.[7] There was the rub. French and British statesmen +affected to regard the offer as a ruse for gaining time: they could not +trust a Cabinet three members of which they considered to be ill-disposed +towards the Entente: a "national policy" {127} should be carried out by a +"national Cabinet"--that is, by M. Venizelos.[8] + +While frustrating his country's efforts to find a way out of the pass +into which he had intrigued it, the Cretan and his partisans did not +neglect other forms of activity. We have seen that rebellion had already +broken out at Salonica. In Athens itself the walls were pasted with +Venizelist newspapers in the form of placards displaying headlines such +as these: "A LAST APPEAL TO THE KING!" "DRAW THE SWORD, O KING, OR +ABDICATE!" It was no secret that arms and ammunition were stored in +private houses, that the French Intelligence Service had a depot of +explosives in a ship moored at the Piraeus, and a magazine of rifles and +grenades in its headquarters at the French School of Athens.[9] The +Royalist journals threatened the Venizelists with condign punishment for +their treasonable designs. The Venizelist journals, far from denying the +charge, replied that they would be fully justified in arming themselves +against the hostile Reservist Leagues. In short, the capital swarmed +with conspirators, but the guardians of public order were powerless, +owing to the proximity of the Allied naval guns, ready to enforce respect +for the Allied flags under whose protection the conspiracy was carried +on. By this time the French and British detectives had usurped the +powers and inverted the functions of the police organs;[10] and the +French and {128} British agents, after fomenting those fatal differences +which divide and degrade a people, had developed into directors of plots +and organizers of sedition. + +But, in spite of such encouragement, the capital--or, indeed, any part of +Old Greece--had never appealed to M. Venizelos as a starting-point of +sedition. He knew that only in the recently acquired and as yet +imperfectly assimilated regions--regions under the direct influence of +the Allies--he could hope to rebel with safety. His plan embraced, +besides Salonica, the islands conquered in 1912, particularly his native +Crete. In that home of immemorial turbulence his friends, seconded by +British Secret Service and Naval officers, had found many retired bandits +eager to resume work. Even there, it is true, public opinion was not +strikingly favourable to disloyalty; but the presence of the British +Fleet in Suda Bay had much of persuasion in it.[11] + +Our diplomacy did not openly commit itself. Sir Francis Elliot still +nursed the hope of effecting a reconciliation between the ex-Premier and +his King. When, in August, a conference was secretly held at Athens +between M. Venizelos and a number of Cretan conspirators, the latter +carried back the depressing intelligence that British official sympathy +with their project lacked the necessary degree of warmth. And again, on +11 September, when the British Consul of Canea went over to Athens with +some of those conspirators, he was ordered by the British Legation to +stay there, so as to avoid any suspicion of complicity. This attitude of +correct reserve on the part of the British Foreign Office, however, did +not prevent the British naval authorities on the spot from working out, +in concert with the insurgents, a plan of operations under which some +chieftains were to invest the coast towns on the land side, while our +men-of-war patrolled the sea in their interest.[12] + +{129} + +France, on the other hand, made no distinction between diplomatic and +naval action. On 18 September M. Guillemin informed Admiral Dartige du +Fournet that M. Venizelos was sailing for the islands, and orders were +given for a French escort. But at the last moment M. Venizelos did not +sail. He hesitated. The French Secret Service urged the National Leader +to lead, instead of being prodded from behind; but he resisted their +pressure and their plain speaking.[13] When questioned by the Associated +Press Correspondent if there was any truth in the reports that he was +going to put himself at the head of the revolutionary forces, he replied: +"I cannot answer now. I must wait a little while yet and see what the +Government propose to do." + +It is possible that this was the reason why M. Venizelos paused +irresolute on the brink. It is possible that he suffered, as the +disrespectful Frenchmen hinted, from one of those attacks of timidity to +which he was subject in a crisis. It is possible that the ambiguous +attitude of England damped his martial spirit. For the rest, to make a +revolution is a matter that may well give the strongest-minded pause. +What wonder if, reckless, obstinate, and unscrupulous as he was, M. +Venizelos, when faced with the irrevocable, felt the need to weigh his +position, to reconsider whether the momentous step he was taking was +necessary, was right, was prudent? + +However, events soon put an end to his hesitation. The decisive +event--the hair which turned the scale--according to M. Venizelos +himself, was supplied, appropriately enough, by a barber. One day, +whilst the Leader of the Liberals wrestled with his soul, a friend called +and reported to him a talk he had just had with his hairdresser, "a +terrible Venizelist, who spoke thus: 'We here, simple folk, say that +Venizelos bears a heavy responsibility: he tells us we are going to the +dogs. Eh, well then, why doesn't he stop us?' This conversation shook +me deeply. My friend gone, I said to myself: 'Indeed, this barber speaks +wisely, and my hesitations to discharge my duty to the end must vanish, +because they may possibly spring from purely egotistical motives. Sir, I +said to myself, having laid up from many struggles and many successes +{130} a capital above the average, you don't wish to risk it and think it +better to sit quiet, choosing to enjoy the moral satisfaction of seeing +the fulfilment of your prophecies rather than make an effort to prevent +it.'" [14] It is always interesting to trace mighty events to trifling +causes; and it would have been particularly pleasant to believe that the +destinies of Greece for once literally stood "on a razor's edge." [15] +But we will do M. Venizelos the credit of believing him less childish +than he represents himself. There were weightier things "to shake" him +into a decision. + +On 20 September, when, according to plan, he was due in Crete, the train +laid there exploded. His friends had come down from the hills thirsting +for the blood of Greek and Mohammedan victims: should the massacre they +meditated take place, M. Venizelos would never leave Athens alive.[16] +The news was of a nature to compel him at last to take the plunge; and in +the small hours of 25 September, the National Leader stole out of Greece +on a ship escorted by a French torpedo-boat. His flight had been +organized by the French Secret Service like a carnival masquerade, on the +painful details of which, says Admiral Dartige, it would be better not to +dwell.[17] + +His advent in Crete had been so efficiently prepared by the British +Secret Service and naval officers--without whom there would have been +neither mutiny nor insurrection--that, on landing, M. Venizelos had +nothing to do but instal himself in the best hotel at Canea and proclaim +himself with his confederate Admiral Coundouriotis the Provisional +Government.[18] + +Under the fostering care of the Allied men-of-war the movement spread to +Samos, Mytilene, Chios, Lemnos, and Thasos, where the constitutional +operations witnessed in Crete were duly repeated. But all the other +islands and the mainland--that is, the whole of the Hellenic Kingdom, +with the exception of the new territories--adhered {131} steadfastly to +the person and the policy of their King. As for the armed forces of the +Crown, Admiral Coundouriotis had hoped by his prestige, deservedly high +since the Balkan wars, to bring away with him the whole or a large part +of the Fleet: he brought away only two torpedo-boats and another small +unit, the desertion of which was effected by a trick, "for which," says +the French Admiral, "France would have cause to blush." [19] + +In itself the Venizelist movement, as a disruptive force, was +negligible.[20] But the co-operation of the French Republic and the +British Empire invested it with an alarming significance. + +M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues who watched this rising tempest +anxiously did everything they could to conjure it. Although to their +offer no reply was given, on hearing informally that the Entente Powers +would not accept the proffered alliance unless Greece declared war on +Bulgaria at once, they signified their willingness so to do, if, content +with that, the Entente would accord Greece adequate military and +financial assistance during the struggle and support her territorial +claims at the conclusion of peace; if, in addition, M. Briand deemed the +Cabinet question of immediate importance, they were prepared to solve it +definitely for the sake of restoring complete harmony between Greece and +the Entente Powers.[21] + +The authors of this message were given to understand that the reply would +be handed to King Constantine himself, the Entente Governments declining +to recognize the actual Cabinet; that it would be in the form of an +ultimatum, demanding that Greece should declare war on Bulgaria within +forty-eight hours unconditionally, after which they promised to supply +her with money and munitions during the struggle and at the conclusion of +peace to take into account her territorial claims as far as {132} +circumstances would permit; meanwhile, they demanded the formation of a +new Ministry, and, failing compliance, they threatened "most energetic +measures." M. Briand kindly added that he delayed the presentation of +this ultimatum in order to give His Majesty the advantage of making a +spontaneous gesture without the appearance of compulsion.[22] + +Whereupon (3 Oct.) M. Venizelos at Canea was sounded whether, if the +Calogeropoulos Cabinet made place for one ready to declare war on +Bulgaria, he would insist on presiding over such a Cabinet or would be +satisfied with being represented in it by some of his partisans. + +These overtures may be regarded as a last attempt on the part of Athens +to take the Cretan at his word. For M. Venizelos had never tired of +professing his willingness to support any Government which would adopt +his policy of prompt action: it was not personal power he hungered after, +but national prosperity. Even at the moment of going to head a +rebellion, he had not ceased to proclaim his patriotic unselfishness.[23] +We have seen to what extent hitherto his actions had accorded with his +professions: how adroitly he had maintained abroad the reputation, +without incurring the sacrifices, of magnanimity. Once more he gave +proof of the same adroitness: + +"True to his previous declarations, M. Venizelos replied that he was +ready to give his support and that of his party to a Government which +would declare war on Bulgaria, and that he asked neither to preside over +such a Government nor to be represented in it by his partisans. As a +patriot and a statesman, seeking only his country's welfare," etc., etc., +etc. But--"the principal followers of M. Venizelos do not believe that +this new step taken by the authorities at Athens indicates a change in +the right direction in the councils of the Palace. They maintain that +the idea behind this _démarche_ is simply to gain time. I have pressed +M. Venizelos on this, and, although he did not wish to appear to be as +emphatic as his followers, he had to admit to me that he had no illusions +and that he remained sceptical. If King Constantine is really {133} +sincere, he can give a proof which will allay all doubts. Let him order +a mobilization at once . . . and call in M. Venizelos to form a new +Government." [24] + +King Constantine, instead of treating the Cretan as a rebel, still wished +to treat him as a responsible citizen, and by his moderation to give him +an opportunity of a decent return to legal order. But he could not, even +if he wished, call to power a man in open revolt: by so doing he would +alienate the loyal majority without conciliating the disloyal minority. + +After thus burning the last boat that might have carried him back to +legality, M. Venizelos took the first boat that travelled in the opposite +direction. He left Suda Bay on 5 October, amidst the cheers of the +Allied squadrons, bound for Salonica by way of Samos and Mytilene. At +Samos he received a fresh token of the approval with which the Entente +viewed his operations: the commander of a British man-of-war, acting on +instructions, officially called on him and paid his respects.[25] + +And so he reached Salonica, took up his abode at the royal residence, and +with Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis composed a Triumvirate +which, having appointed a Ministry, began to levy taxes and troops, and +to negotiate for a loan. + +The metamorphosis of a Prime Minister into an insurgent chief, though a +remarkable phenomenon, is no matter for surprise. M. Venizelos sprang +from people among whom insurrection formed the traditional method of +asserting political opinions. His father was a veteran of the Greek +Revolution of 1821, and passed most of his life plotting. His +grandfather is supposed to have been a refugee of the earlier Greek +revolt of 1770.[26] He himself had grown up amidst vivid echoes of the +Cretan Rebellion of 1866. While contact with the frock-coated world of +{134} modern Europe during the latter period of his career had clothed +him with a statesman's proper external circumstance, it had not +eradicated the primitive instincts implanted in him by heredity and +fostered by environment. Sedition was in his blood, which perhaps +explains the _flair_--the almost uncanny _flair_--he had for the business. + +Nor did he lack experience. After sharing in one Cretan insurrection +against the Sultan in 1896, he led another against Prince George in 1905. +This exploit--known as the Therisos Movement--deserves special notice, +for it bears a curious and most instructive analogy to the enterprise +with which we are now dealing. + +In 1899 M. Venizelos became a member of the first Cretan Administration +appointed by the High Commissioner, Prince George--King Constantine's +brother. The status of the island was provisional, and the fulfilment of +the national desire for union with Greece depended partly on the policy +of the Powers which had combined to act as its Protectors, partly on the +prudence of the islanders themselves and of their continental kinsmen. +Such was the situation when, in 1901, M. Venizelos suddenly conceived +the idea of turning Crete into an autonomous principality. Prince George +objected to the proposal, arguing that neither in Crete nor in Greece +would public opinion approve it. M. Venizelos sounded the Hellenic +Government and the Opposition, and was told by both that, from the +standpoint of national interest and sentiment, his scheme was absolutely +unacceptable. Nevertheless, he persevered and succeeded in forming a +party to support his views. It may be, as he affirmed, that his scheme +was a merely temporary expedient intended to pave the way to ultimate +union. But the Greeks, interpreting it as a proposal for perpetual +separation, remained bitterly hostile, and the fact that autonomy was +known to be favoured in certain foreign quarters deepened their +resentment. M. Venizelos was roundly denounced as a tool of foreign +Powers, and Prince George was accused of complicity, and threatened with +the lot of a traitor unless he dismissed him. The High Commissioner made +use of the right which the Constitution of the island gave him, and M. +Venizelos was dismissed (March, 1901). + +A truceless war against the Administration and everyone {135} connected +with it ensued. Prince George was attacked--not directly, but through +his entourage--as a born autocrat holding in scorn the rights of the +people, tyrannizing over the Press, persecuting all those who refused to +bow to his will, aiming at the subversion of free institutions. At first +this campaign met with more success abroad than at home. The Cretan +people expressed its opinion by its vote: among the sixty-four deputies +elected to the Chamber in 1903 there were only four Venizelists. + +His defeat did not daunt M. Venizelos, who, after a brief repose, resumed +operations. He hesitated at no calumny, at no outrageous invention, to +get even with his adversaries. Charges of all kinds poured in upon the +Prince. Speeches which he had never made were attributed to him, and +speeches which he did make were systematically misreported and +misinterpreted. At last, in 1904, when Prince George decided to visit +the Governments of the Protecting Powers in order to beg them to bring +about the union of Crete with Greece by stages, M. Venizelos, dropping +the scheme which had lost him his popularity, rushed in with an +uncompromising demand for immediate union, though he knew perfectly well +that such a solution was impracticable. The Cretans knew it, too. On +finding that they looked upon his change of creed with suspicion, he +resolved to seize by violence what he could not gain by his eloquence. +With some 600 armed partisans (out of a population of 300,000) he took to +the hills (March, 1905), called for the convocation of a National +Assembly to revise the Constitution, and meanwhile urged the people to +boycott the impending elections. Despite his speeches and his bravoes, +only 9,000 out of the 64,000 electors abstained from voting; and most of +them abstained for other reasons than the wish to show sympathy with the +insurgents. + +The High Commissioner wrote to the Powers at the time: "If M. Venizelos +was truly animated by the desire to defend constitutional institutions, +he would have come before the electors with his programme and, whatever +the result, he would certainly have earned more respect as a politician. +But, instead of choosing the legal road to power, he preferred to stir up +an insurrection, disguising his motives under the mask of 'The National +Idea,' but, {136} as is proved by his own declarations, really inspired +by personal animus and party interest. It mattered little to him how +disastrous an effect this upheaval might have on the national cause by +plunging the country into civil war or into fresh anarchy. Can anyone +recognize in this way of acting the conduct of a genuine and serious +patriot?" + +M. Venizelos repelled these imputations, protesting that his movement was +no way directed against the Prince. Yet it resulted in the departure of +the Prince: the Powers who went to Crete to restore order entered into +relations with the rebels; the manner in which these intimacies were +carried on and the decisions to which they led made the Prince's position +untenable, and he gave up his Commissionership in 1906. Likewise M. +Venizelos affirmed that he had not stirred up an insurrection, but only +headed a spontaneous outbreak of popular discontent. Yet even after his +triumph he failed, in the elections of 1907, to obtain a majority.[27] + +The Therisos performance in every point--plot and staging, methods and +motives--was a rehearsal for the Salonica performance. Would the +denouement be the same? This question taxed M. Venizelos's dialectical +dexterity very severely. + +At the outset he repudiated as a monstrous and malicious calumny the +common view that his programme was to march on Athens and to dethrone the +King. His movement was directed against the Bulgars, not against the +King or the Dynasty: "We are neither anti-royalist nor anti-dynastic," he +declared, "we are simply patriots." Only, after the liberation of Greece +from the foreign invaders, her democratic freedom should be assured by a +thorough elucidation of the duties and rights of the Crown--a revision of +the Constitution to be effected through a National Assembly.[28] + +So spoke M. Venizelos at the outset, partly because the {137} Allies, who +did not want to have civil war in the rear of their armies, bade him to +speak so,[29] and partly because he wished to give his cause currency by +stamping upon it the legend of loyalty. He realized that for the present +any suspicion that he wished to embark on a campaign against King +Constantine would be fatal, and by declaring war only against the Bulgars +he hoped to entice patriotic citizens anxious to help their country +without hurting their sovereign. But when time proved the futility of +these tactics, the same M. Venizelos avowed that his programme was, first +to consolidate his position in Macedonia by breaking down resistance +wherever it might be encountered, and then, "when we had gathered our +forces, we meant to follow up our work, if need be by arms, on the +remainder of Greek territory." If he had not given an anti-dynastic +character to his enterprise, that, he naïvely explained, was "because the +Entente had been good enough to promise me their indispensable aid under +the express stipulation that the movement should _not_ be anti-dynastic." +However, the error was not irreparable: "After victory, grave internal +questions will have to be solved," he said. "King Constantine, who has +stepped down from the throne of a constitutional king to become a mere +party chief, must accept the consequences of the defeat of his policy, +just as every other defeated party chief." [30] + +In other words, the Salonica sedition, though not solely revolutionary, +involved a revolution within certain limits. M. Venizelos was far too +astute to countenance the republican chimeras cherished by some of his +followers. Republicanism, he knew well, found no favour in Greece and +could expect no support from England. Therefore, with the monarchical +principle he had no quarrel: his hostility was directed wholly against +the person of the reigning monarch. A prince pliant to his hand would +suit M. Venizelos. If he got the best of it, his avowed intention was to +treat King Constantine precisely as he had treated King Constantine's +brother in days gone by. + +We now understand Prince George's earnestness in urging his brother, as +long ago as May, 1915, to run before {138} the gale: he spoke from bitter +experience of the Protecting Powers and their protégé. + +It is seldom that history repeats itself so accurately; and it is more +seldom still that the historian has the means of tracing so surely a +rebel's progress. In most cases it is hard to decide whether the hero +was guided by events which he could not have foreseen, or whether he had +from the first a clear and definite goal in view. In the case of M. +Venizelos this difficulty does not exist. Each of his actions, as +illuminated by his past, was a step to an end; and he has himself defined +that end. + + + +[1] _The Times_, 18 Sept., 1916. + +[2] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16 +Sept., 1916. + +[3] _The Times, loc. cit._ + +[4] Exchange Tel., Athens, 17 Sept., 1916. Cp. Romanos, Paris, 5/18 Sept. + +[5] See leading articles in _The Times_, 19 Sept., and the _Morning +Post_, 20 Sept., 1916. + +[6] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 6/19 Sept., 1916. + +[7] Panas, Petrograd, 14/27 Sept., 1916. + +[8] Romanos, Paris, 10/23 Sept. Cp. Reuter statement, London, 26 Sept., +1916. This view is crystallized in a personal dispatch from the Greek +Minister at Paris to the Director of Political Affairs, at Athens: +"_L'appel au pouvoir par S.M. le Roi de M. Venizélos paraît au +Gouvernement français le seul moyen de dissiper la méfiance que +l'attitude des conseillers de S.M. le Roi ont fait naitre dans l'esprit +des cercles dirigeants à Paris et à Londres. . . . L'opinion publique en +France n' approuveraii une alliance avec la Grèce et les avantages qui en +découleraient pour nous, que si l'homme politique qui incarne l'idée de +la solidarité des intérêts français et grecs était appelé au +pouvoir._"--Romanos to Politis, Paris, 29 Sept./12 Oct., 1916. + +[9] Du Fournet, p. 116. Small wonder that the honest sailor's gorge rose +at such proceedings: "Could I associate myself with manoeuvres of this +sort?" he asks in disgust. "When German arms and bombs were seized in +the bag from Berlin to Christiania, when similar things were discovered +at Bucharest, and were detected in the United States under Bernstorf's +protection, the Allies manifested their indignation. They were a hundred +times right; but what was odious in America, was it not odious in Greece?" + +[10] The British Intelligence Service demonstrated its sense of humour +and shame by furnishing its secret agents with a formal certificate of +their identity to be presented at the central office of the Greek Police: +one such patent of British protection was issued to an ex-spy of Sultan +Abdul Hamid who had also spent six months in German pay. Besides the +certificate, was issued a brassard, which the rogue might wear to protect +him from arrest when breaking the Greek Law on British account. +Incredible, yet true. See J. C. Lawson's _Tales of Aegean Intrigue_, p. +233. + +[11] Lawson, pp. 143-66. + +[12] Lawson, pp. 168-78. + +[13] Du Fournet, pp. 130-1. + +[14] Orations, p. 190. + +[15] "Now, to all of us it stands on a razor's edge: either pitiful ruin +for the Achaians or life." Homer, _Iliad_, X, 173. + +[16] Lawson, pp. 180-9. + +[17] Du Fournet, p. 131. + +[18] Lawson, pp. 198-226. + +[19] Du Fournet, p. 136. + +[20] A paragraph of the Debierre Report, adopted by the French Senate on +21 Oct., 1916, may be quoted in this connexion: "_La révolution +Salonicienne vue de près, n' est rien. Elle est sans racine, sans +lendemain probable. Venizélos est trés amoindri. La Grèce, dont les +officiers et les soldats ne veulent pas se battre, est avec +Constantin._"--Mermeix, _Le Commandement Unique_, Part II, p. 60. + +[21] Romanos, Paris, 14/27, 15/28 Sept.; Carapanos to Greek Legation, +Paris, 15/28 Sept., 1916. + +[22] Romanos, Paris, 16/29, 17/30 Sept.; Gennadius, London, 17/30 Sept., +1916. + +[23] See "Message from M. Venizelos," in _The Times_, 27 Sept., 1916. + +[24] The _Daily Telegraph_, 5 Oct., 1916. + +[25] The _Daily Telegraph_, 7 Oct., 1916. + +[26] The authentic history of the Venizelos family begins with our hero's +father; his grandfather is a probable hypothesis: the remoter ancestors +with whom, since his rise to fame, he has been endowed by enthusiastic +admirers in Western Europe, are purely romantic. In Greece, where nearly +everyone's origin is involved in obscurity, matters of this sort possess +little interest, and M. Venizelos's Greek biographers dwell only on his +ascent. + +[27] For one side of this affair see _Memorandum de S.A.R. Le Prince +Georges de Grèce, Haut Commissaire en Crète, aux Quatre Grandes +Puissances Protectrices de la Crète_, 1905. The other side has been +expounded in many publications: among them, _E. Venizelos: His Life, His +Work_. By Costa Kairophyla, pp. 37-65; _Eleutherios Venizelos_. By K. +K. Kosmides, pp. 14-16. + +[28] See _The Times_, 27 Sept.; _The Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct. (O.S.), +1916. + +[29] Du Fournet, p. 176. + +[30] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + + + + +{139} + +CHAPTER XIII + +M. Venizelos had unfurled the standard of rebellion in the true spirit +of his temperament and traditions. To him civil war had nothing +repulsive about it: it was a normal procedure--a ladder to power. +Naturally, he persuaded others, and perhaps himself, that he acted +purely with the patriotic intention of devoting to the public benefit +the power which, for that purpose only, it became his duty to usurp. +Moved by the ambition to aggrandize Greece, he felt at liberty to use +whatever means might conduce to so desirable an end. The sole question +that troubled him was, whether this old ladder would serve him as +faithfully as in the past. And once again the answer depended on the +attitude of the "Protecting Powers." + +Those Powers had hitherto blundered in all their Balkan dealings with +depressing uniformity. First came the mistake about Bulgaria. The +hate of the Greeks for the Bulgars was a psychological force which, +properly estimated and utilized, could without any difficulty have been +made to do our work for us. But that force was never properly +estimated by our diplomacy. The Entente Governments, instead of +enlisting it on their side, ranged it against them; thereby sacrificing +Servia and estranging Greece. To that initial error was added a +second. Until the truth could no longer be ignored, the Allies +persisted in the egregrious [Transcriber's note: egregious?] fallacy +that the popularity of King Constantine was as nothing compared with +the popularity of M. Venizelos--to our detriment. "Two years before," +observes Admiral Dartige du Fournet, "all the Greeks were the friends +of France; in October, 1916, two-thirds of them were her enemies." +That was the fact; and, according to the same witness--who described +himself, not without reason, as "a Venizelist by profession"--the cause +was this: "The mass of the people of continental {140} Greece was +hostile to the Chief of the Liberals. When that mass saw that M. +Venizelos started a sedition and that we supported him, it became +plainly hostile to us." [1] + +The Admiral mentions also German pressure, but he rightly regards it as +a subsidiary cause. The Germans did little more than "blow on the fire +kindled by our own clumsiness and violences." Baron Schenck, the +director of the German propaganda at Athens, watched our coercion of +King Constantine with that apparent indignation and secret joy which +the faults of an enemy inspire, and when expelled by the Allies, said +that he did not mind going: the Allies could be trusted to carry on his +mission. They did. + +What their plan was will appear from their actions. We cannot +penetrate into the minds of men, and we cannot always believe their +words; but their actions are open to observation and speak more truly +than their lips. + +As soon as he settled at Salonica, M. Venizelos applied to the Entente +Powers for official recognition of his Provisional Government. They +refused him this recognition: but instructed their Consuls to treat +with the Provisional Government "on a _de facto_ footing";[2] and, +while pouring cold water upon him with one hand, with the other they +gave him money. This mode of action was the result of a compromise, +achieved at the Boulogne Conference, between France and her partners. +A feeble and inconsequent way of doing things, no doubt. But to be +consequent and powerful, a partnership must be bottomed on some common +interest or sentiment; and such in the Greek question, as already +explained, did not exist. + +At Athens the action of the Allies was less open to the criticism of +tameness. + +After a life of three weeks passed in fruitless efforts to enter into +relations with the Entente Powers, even by proposing to discard the +Ministers obnoxious to them, the Calogeropoulos Cabinet resigned (4 +Oct.), and King Constantine, having exhausted his stock of politicians, +sought a candidate for the Premiership in circles which, remote from +party intrigue, might have been thought immune from suspicion. +Professor Lambros, who accepted the {141} mandate (8 Oct.), was known +as a grave savant, generally esteemed for his kindly nature as much as +for his intellectual eminence and administrative capacity. But +Professor Lambros laboured under the universal disability of not being +a Venizelist. Therefore, he was "believed to be Germanophile," and it +was "questionable whether his Cabinet will be recognized by the Entente +Powers." [3] However, in less than a week, he "established contact" +with their representatives. It was "contact" in a sense of the term +more familiar to soldiers than to statesmen. + +On 10 October Admiral Dartige de Fournet resumed his activities by +launching on the Hellenic Government an Ultimatum. Greece was +summoned, within twenty-four hours, to disarm her big ships, to hand +over to him all her light ships intact, and to disarm all her coast +batteries, except three which were to be occupied by the Allies. In +addition, the port of the Piraeus, the railways, and the police were to +be placed under Allied control. + +The demand for her Fleet, Greece was told, arose from uneasiness about +the safety of the Allied armada--a pretext that exposed itself: the +Greek Fleet consisted of only five battleships dating from 1891-2, +except one whose date was 1908; two cruisers, dating from 1911 and +1914; and a microscopic light flotilla. "To see there a serious +danger, it would be puerile," says Admiral Dartige himself; and far +from feeling elated at the success of the operation, he tells us that +he "suffered at being constrained by events to use force against a +neutral and weak nation." But he had to do it: though not a matter to +be proud of, it was a precaution not altogether unjustifiable. He +could, however, neither justify nor qualify the other measures. They +involved, he says, a high-handed encroachment on the internal affairs +of the country--an abuse of power pure and simple: "We admitted +officially the right of Greece to neutrality, and yet we laid hands +upon part of her national life, even upon the secrets of the private +life of every Greek. It was the execution of the plan which the +admirals assembled at Malta had repelled in March, 1916. Well might +the Germanophiles point out that Germany did not act thus in Denmark, +in Sweden, in Holland; that a victor would not have imposed {142} +harder terms of armistice." These measures were entirely the work of +the French Government: the French Admiral himself disapproved of them +as much as did the Ministers of England and Russia.[4] + +The Hellenic Government could not be deceived by pretexts which their +very authors despised. But neither could it argue with persons +accustomed to + + "Decide all controversies by + Infallible artillery, + And prove their doctrine orthodox + By apostolic blows and knocks." + +It could only protest and submit. + +The Hellenic people proved less discreet. What could be the motive of +such measures? they asked. Were they intended to prevent or to provoke +troubles? The answer lay under their very eyes. From the moment when +M. Venizelos left Athens, the Allies did everything they could to +assist his partisans in following the Leader to Salonica. Their +warships patrolled the coast picking up rebels, and giving them a free +passage: even entertaining the more important among them as the +personal guests of the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship. But now +they took the movement openly under their direction. With an excess of +zeal which the British Minister deplored and the French Admiral himself +condemned, the French Secret Service at Athens organized convoys of +insurgents which defiled through the streets of the capital escorted by +French marines under French officers in uniform.[5] + +The resentment of the Greeks was intense; but the consciousness of +impotence served as a curb on their emotions. It is true that one day, +as Allied aeroplanes flew over Athens, they were greeted with derisive +shouts: "Not here; to Berlin!" another day, as a band of rebels were +convoyed through the principal streets by the French, the crowds gave +vent to lively protests; and every day the newspapers told the +champions of Liberty and Justice what they thought of them so frankly +that the French Chief of the Police Control had to warn their editors +to desist on pain of suspension. But of active hostility, such as any +western capital would have manifested in similar circumstances, there +was no sign at Athens. The only impressive manifestations were +manifestations of {143} loyalty to the King, who set his subjects the +example of self-restraint. At a review of the crews of the warships +taken by the French, he thanked them for their fidelity and expressed +the hope that they would soon be able to return to their vessels. +After this quiet ceremony, bodies of citizens paraded the streets +carrying portraits of their sovereign.[6] + +Had there been no popular demonstrations at all, one can fancy M. +Venizelos and the Allies pointing to that fact as proof of their +contention that the great majority of the people remained Venizelist. +As it was, they derived what profit they could from the opposite fact. +The various incidents were attributed by the Anglo-French and +Venizelist journals to German intrigue. The consolation which the King +administered to his sailors--men who had so brilliantly disappointed +the rebels' expectations by not deserting--was twisted into a defiance +of the Entente. The bodies of peaceful demonstrators were exaggerated +into crowds of rioters. And so, "in the interests of public order," +Admiral Dartige proceeded to land reinforcements for the police: 1,200 +bluejackets. Some occupied the town hall at the Piraeus and the +railway stations; some went to the forts on the heights; others were +posted about the harbour, or were told off to patrol the streets (16 +Oct.), while a detachment was quartered at Athens itself, in the +Zappeion--a large exhibition building within a few hundred yards of the +Royal Palace.[7] + +Under such circumstances the diplomatic intercourse between the Entente +and the new Greek Government went on. M. Lambros declared that he +intended to continue his predecessor's policy of friendly relations +with all the belligerents and of benevolent neutrality towards the +Allies, dwelling on the fact that nearly everyone of his predecessors +had plainly stated Greece's willingness to co-operate with the Entente +on terms not contrary to her own interests, and recalling that the +Calogeropoulos Ministry had set forth the conditions of co-operation, +but the Entente Governments had given no reply. So the Premier spoke +to the Entente representatives and asked that the coercive measures +might be brought to an end, {144} expressing the fear lest, should +these measures go beyond a certain limit, their acceptance by Greece +might become very difficult, and emphasizing the sorrow which the Greek +people felt at seeing its independence fettered.[8] + +England found this declaration satisfactory; but before answering it +definitely, she must take counsel with her allies.[9] France, by the +mouth of M. Briand, pronounced the allusion to friendly relations with +all the belligerents unfortunate: she was unable to understand how +Greece could maintain friendly relations with Germany and even with +Bulgaria after the occupation of Eastern Macedonia.[10] And so, having +taken counsel together, the Allies set forth their views in a tardy +reply to King Constantine's last offer. The gist of it was contained +in this phrase: "The Greek Government has several times since the +beginning of the War offered to come in on our side; but its offers, +and particularly the last one, were accompanied by conditions which +rendered them unacceptable." The Entente Powers added that they did +not want Greece, unless she declared, on her own initiative, war +against Bulgaria. It was the only way to gain their confidence.[11] + +In other words, Greece should take the field without any agreement, so +that she should have no claims either to adequate support during the +war or to compensations at the conclusion of peace: nay, it was even +hoped in Paris and London that Bulgaria might yet be seduced from the +Central Powers, and in that case not only would Greece gain nothing in +Thrace, but might very likely lose a portion of Macedonia.[12] It was +the old story--to which King Constantine could never listen. He would +suffer anything rather than plunge his country into war without even an +assurance of its territorial integrity. When at this juncture a +well-intentioned adviser warned him that his policy might cost him his +throne, he answered promptly: "I do not care about my throne. I only +think of Greece." [13] + +{145} + +At the same time, there was little he would not do to remove those +fears and suspicions which were perpetually pleaded as reasons for +coercion. The surrender of the Fleet had allayed once for all the +Allies' uneasiness about their forces at sea. There remained their +uneasiness about their forces on land. In spite of his repeated +declarations that under no circumstances would Greece take up a hostile +attitude, the King was credited with a treacherous design--to mass in +Thessaly 80,000 men, lay up munitions and provisions, wait until the +Allied Army should march on Monastir, and then attack it from +behind.[14] After reading M. Venizelos's own avowal of his intention +to follow up the conversion of Macedonia with an attack on the rest of +Greece, particularly Thessaly,[15] one hardly needs to be told at whom +King Constantine's precautions were aimed. + +Yet, wishing to prove his good faith in a practical manner, the King +called the British Minister and offered to reduce his army to less than +half by disbanding about 35,000 men and to withdraw certain units from +Thessaly. The British Minister, delighted by this spontaneous offer, +thanked the King, expressing the hope that his action would be greatly +appreciated, that all mistrust would vanish, and that the Powers would +moderate their coercions. With a remark from the King, that the one +thing he would not tolerate was a descent of rebels on Thessaly and the +rest of Old Greece, and that he would attack them if they appeared, Sir +Francis Elliot fully concurred. + +Instead of the return which the King expected to this spontaneous proof +of his sincerity, he received (20 October) an intimation that the +Powers not only demanded what he had already granted, but in addition +things which he could not possibly grant--the internment of the small +remnant of his army in the Peloponnesus and a surrender of arms and war +material equivalent to a complete disarmament. These measures, while +exceeding all requirements for the security of the Allies, put the +security of Greece in danger by leaving her a prey to revolutionary +agitation. The King, therefore, begged the Powers not {146} to insist +on concessions which neither could he make nor would his people let him +make.[16] + +Nothing, indeed, was better calculated to excite to the highest degree +the passions fermenting against the Allies than an insistence on total +disarmament at a moment when M. Venizelos at Salonica and his partisans +at Athens were arming. Fortunately a mediator appeared in the person +of M. Benazet, a French Deputy and Reporter of the War Budget, who was +passing through Athens on his way to Salonica to inspect the sanitary +condition of the Army. His connexions had brought him into touch with +the most influential leaders of both Greek parties; and with the +sanction of M. Briand, procured through M. Guillemin, who, himself no +longer received at Court, saw an advantage in reaching it by proxy, he +undertook to negotiate an amicable arrangement between King Constantine +and the Entente. + +M. Benazet's idea was to obtain from the King not only tangible pledges +which would eliminate all possibility of danger from the Allies' path, +but also positive reinforcements for them in arms and men; and as a +price he was prepared to guarantee to Old Greece her neutrality, her +liberty in the management of her internal affairs, and her immunity +from aggression on the part of M. Venizelos. Young, eloquent, and +refined, the spokesman brought into an environment corrupted by +diplomatic chicanery a breath of candour. His manner inspired and +evoked confidence. The King readily agreed, besides the reduction +which he had already offered, to transfer the remainder of his army to +the Peloponnesus, to hand over to the Allies a considerable stock of +guns, rifles, and other war material, and to allow all men who were +released from their military obligations, and all officers who first +resigned their commissions, to volunteer for service in Macedonia. M. +Benazet, on his part, made himself guarantor for the French Government +as to the pledges which the King required in exchange.[17] + +This agreement met, at least in appearance, with the approval of M. +Briand, who sent a telegram of congratulations {127} to M. Benazet,[18] +and with that of M. Guillemin, who was at last received by the King. +Both the French Premier and his representative at Athens expressed +themselves enchanted with the new turn of affairs, and even the +fire-breathing Head of the French Secret Service declared that the +result of the negotiation surpassed all hopes. As to Admiral Dartige, +he could not but rejoice at an arrangement so consonant with his own +ideas.[19] Thus all outstanding differences seemed happily settled, +and the removal of mutual misunderstandings was celebrated by inspired +pens in Paris and London.[20] + +The only discordant note was struck by the Venizelist Press, which made +no attempt to conceal its disappointment. And suddenly, just as the +withdrawal of the royal troops from the north was about to begin, the +troops of the Provisional Government attacked Katerini on the southern +frontier of Macedonia. M. Venizelos had dropped the pose that his +movement was directed solely against the Bulgars: he marched on Old +Greece. Did he by this move try to force the hand of the Allies, as +formerly by bringing them to Salonica he had tried to force the hand of +the King? And was he encouraged in this move by those who were +secretly opposed to an accommodation with the King? Admiral Dartige +did not know. What he did know was that this _coup de force_ was +designed to compromise the arrangement with Athens; and as he could +neither play nor appear to play a double game, he immediately +telegraphed to Salonica demanding the retreat of the Venizelists. At +the same time the King informed the French and British Ministers that +he could not withdraw his troops from Thessaly until all danger was +removed, and asked them to do everything that depended on them to +remedy this state of things. Whereupon General Roques, the French +Minister of War then at Salonica, disavowed the Venizelist action, and +to prevent similar exploits in future decided to create a neutral zone +under French occupation and administration. The Athens Government was +not pleased to see part of its territory passing into French hands; +but, after some demur, bowed to the decision.[21] + +{148} + +Not so the Salonica Government. M. Venizelos keenly resented this +barrier to his impetuosity. The neutral zone, he complained, by +blocking off his access to Thessaly, forbade all extension of his +movement and prevented him from "carrying with him three-fifths of +Greece and levying important contingents such as would have made him +the absolute master of the country." [22] But the Allies were no +longer to be deluded. They had discovered that "the mass of the people +of continental Greece was hostile to the Chief of the Liberals." An +extension of his movement could only be effected by overwhelming force, +and as M. Venizelos had neither the men nor the arms required for the +enterprise, the Allies would have to provide both. In other words, +civil war in the rear of their armies would not only jeopardise their +security but entangle them in a campaign for the conquest of Greece: a +thing which they could not afford to do even to oblige M. Venizelos. +They preferred a subtler and safer, if slower, way to the success of +their common cause. + +Baulked in his design on continental Greece, M. Venizelos demanded from +Admiral Dartige the light flotilla in order to promote his cause in the +islands. But here, also, he met with a check. The Admiral had a +different use for those vessels in view. Many months back he felt the +want of patrol and torpedo-boats to cope with the growing submarine +peril, and had suggested asking Greece for the cession of her light +flotilla. The matter was postponed in the expectation that the vessels +would go over to the Allies spontaneously as a result of the Venizelist +movement, and on this expectation being disappointed they were, as we +have seen, sequestered under the pretence of security for the Allied +armada. Another excuse was needed for their appropriation; and it came +in the nick of time: two Greek steamers at that moment struck mines, +presumably sown by an enemy submarine, in the Gulf of Athens. With the +promptitude that comes of practice, Admiral Dartige announced to the +Hellenic Government his decision to employ, at a valuation, its light +flotilla in the submarine {149} warfare, and to use the Salamis arsenal +for repairs (3 November.)[23] + +M. Lambros replied that compliance with the Admiral's request involved +a breach of International Law, which forbade the sale of naval units by +a neutral State to a belligerent, as well as a breach of a Greek law +which forbade the alienation of ships possessing military value. +Besides, public opinion would never endure to see the country stripped +of its naval means of defence and exposed to possible aggression. He +was, therefore, regretfully obliged to refuse the Hellenic Government's +consent.[24] + +The Admiral could not let a refusal stand in his way: "It would be +unpardonable," he wrote in answer, "to leave these vessels unutilized +whilst German submarines, heedless of the neutrality of Greece, came +and sank her merchant ships in her waters, thus stopping maritime +traffic and seriously prejudicing the life of the country." [25] + +Having got over these little formalities, he hoisted the French flag on +the vessels and seized the arsenal (7 November). The Hellenic +Government's protest against this fresh outrage,[26] naturally, had no +effect. Only the British Minister made it clear that the act was +exclusively the work of France.[27] + +Nothing done by one group of belligerents, needless to say, escaped the +attention of the other; and the representatives of the enemy Powers, +besides fulminating against a step which, "in flagrant contravention of +the principles of neutrality came to augment the armed forces of their +adversaries," improved the occasion by reciting all the proofs of "a +benevolent neutrality without parallel," which Greece had been giving +those adversaries since the beginning of the War: the free passage of +munitions and provisions for Servia; the facilities accorded to Entente +shipping; the toleration of recruiting bureaux and wireless stations in +Greek territory; the use of isles and ports as naval bases. Then the +landing of the Allies in Macedonia {150} had inaugurated a period of +continuous violations of neutrality and the establishment of a regime +of terror towards them: their Consuls were arrested, members of their +Legations were assaulted, great numbers of their nationals were led +into captivity or driven into exile, their merchant ships were seized, +and the Ministers themselves were deprived of all means of +communicating with their Governments. Last of all came the +installation of Allied troops in Athens itself and the sequestration of +the Greek navy, now transformed into a definite cession; and, +according to trustworthy intelligence, the Entente Powers meant to +exact shortly the disarmament of the Greek army also. They ended with +a hint that the indulgence of their Governments might reach its +limit.[28] + +A more painful position for a free people and its rulers could not be +imagined. But King Constantine comforted himself with the thought that +the "pledges of friendship" exacted from him by the Allies would be +followed by corresponding pledges from them. His negotiation with M. +Benazet had received its finishing touches in the evening of 7 +November: the Entente Powers would present to the Greek Government a +Note setting forth their demands in the form of a "Summons," the terms +of which were, word for word, agreed upon between the two parties. By +this document the Allies bound themselves "to repeal the coercive +measures taken up to now and never to tolerate that armed Greek bodies +which had declared to have as their sole aim a struggle for the +vindication of national ideas should turn aside from that aim in order +to engage in acts of sedition." [29] + +This clause formed the corner-stone of the whole pact. "It is clear," +telegraphs M. Benazet to Paris, "that some sort of compensation is +admitted in principle,"--for very good reasons: "The King's sole +fear--and a very intelligible one--is lest his own arms should be +handed over to Greeks who would use them to march on Athens and +overthrow his dynasty." Moreover, without such guarantees it will be +impossible for the King and his Premier "to make disarmament acceptable +by the Royalist Party, {151} which constitutes the great majority of +the nation." He added that neither the King nor his Premier was +unaware of the hostility with which these efforts for conciliation were +viewed by certain personalities: but both were resolved to show the +greatest patience until the agreement had produced all its effects. +The negotiator himself, equally aware of the hostile forces at work, +left Athens with a heart full of misgivings.[30] + + + +[1] Du Fournet, pp. 132, 171. + +[2] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _The Times_, 17 Oct., 1916. + +[3] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 8 Oct., 1916. + +[4] Du Fournet, pp. 138-9, 141-3. + +[5] Du Fournet, pp. 133-5, 146. + +[6] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 16 Oct., 1916. + +[7] Du Fournet, pp. 146-8. + +[8] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16 +Oct., 1916. + +[9] Gennadius, London, 6/19 Oct., 1916. + +[10] Romanos, Paris, 7/20 Oct., 1916. + +[11] Gennadius, London, 10/23 Oct., 1916. + +[12] Romanos, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916; Cp. Deville, pp. 221. +foll.; Du Fournet, p. 171. + +[13] P. E. Drakoulis, in _The Times_, 30 Nov., 1920. + +[14] Du Fournet, p. 149. + +[15] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[16] Zalocostas to Greek Legations. Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, +7/20 Oct., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 149-50. + +[17] Du Fournet, pp. 152-4, and Appendix 5. + +[18] Du Fournet, p. 316. + +[19] Du Fournet, pp. 155-6. + +[20] _The Times_, 28 Oct., 1 Nov., 1916. + +[21] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 12 Oct./3 Nov.; +General Roques to Greek Premier, Athens, 2/15 Nov.; Zalocostas to Greek +Legation, Paris, 4/17 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 169-70, 182. + +[22] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[23] Du Fournet, pp. 135-6, 165, 167, 183. + +[24] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916. + +[25] Dartige du Fournet to Lambros, on board the _Provence_, 7 Nov., +1916. + +[26] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 25 Oct./7 Nov., 1916. + +[27] Du Fournet, p. 168. + +[28] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 26 Oct./8 +Nov., 1916. + +[29] Du Fournet, p. 177. + +[30] Du Fournet, pp. 174-8. + + + + +{152} + +CHAPTER XIV + +A week had hardly elapsed since the conclusion of the agreement between +the King of Greece and the French Deputy, when (16 November) Admiral +Dartige du Fournet addressed to the Hellenic Premier a letter, claiming +18 batteries of field and 16 of mountain artillery with 1,000 shells for +each gun; 40,000 rifles with 220 cartridges for each rifle; 140 +machine-guns with ammunition; and 50 motor-vans. The claim was presented +as "compensation" for the war material abandoned to the Germano-Bulgars +in Cavalla: about guarantees not a word.[1] + +The King called the Admiral (19 November) and, with perfect courtesy, yet +with a visible change in his attitude, expressed his astonishment at so +unexpected a version of the "Summons" agreed upon. The Admiral had no +explanation to give to the King. But to us he explains everything. The +French Minister at Athens was hostile to M. Benazet's amicable +arrangement, and repudiated his pledges, notably the one concerning the +spread of sedition. "We are not made to defend kings against their +peoples," he said. The French Government likewise completely ignored the +agreement, and the French Minister of War had dictated the lines on which +the claim was drafted. Admiral Dartige's comments on this volte-face are +interesting: "Without wanting to give the Greek Government the two +guarantees which it demanded, they claimed from it the fulfilment of the +engagements of which those guarantees were the counter-part. It was a +truly draconian and unexpected pretension," he says, and to base that +pretension on the Cavalla affair was "to misconstrue in part the reality +of facts." [2] + +Why, then, was M. Benazet encouraged to negotiate? Probably there were +in France moderate elements strong enough to make it necessary to throw a +sop to them. But the extremists were the stronger party; and when it +came {153} to a decision they carried the day. However, be the motive of +the mission what it may, its repudiation meant that the old policy still +held the field. It was an essential part of that policy not to allow +Greece any attitude other than that of a belligerent. So, while the +Entente Cabinets continued disclaiming all desire to drag an unwilling +country into war and declaring that the only thing they asked for was the +observance of a benevolent neutrality, the practical exponents of their +policy on the spot continued to take steps in which Greece could +acquiesce only if she contemplated a rupture with the Central Powers. + +In the evening of the same day (19 November) Admiral Dartige, at the +instance of the Entente Ministers, ordered their German, Austrian, +Turkish, and Bulgarian colleagues to quit the country in three days.[3] +The Hellenic Government, to whom the Admiral communicated his decree, +protested against this blow at the representatives of Powers with whom +Greece, in virtue of her neutrality recognized by the Entente, was on +terms of friendship and peace; pointing out that the step was a breach +not only of the inviolability assured to diplomats by International Law, +but also of a formal promise given by the French and British Ministers to +Premier Zaimis when the Allied Fleet arrived at the Piraeus--viz. that +the missions of the Powers at war with the Entente had absolutely nothing +to fear. It asked that the decision might be revoked.[4] + +Our representatives experienced no difficulty in disposing of this +protest. The promise given was merely "an act of spontaneous +courtesy"--it had not "any character of a definite, irrevocable +engagement"--"and could not, in any case, have for effect to guarantee +the Ministers of countries at war with the Entente against the +consequences of hostile acts foreign to their diplomatic functions and +contrary to the neutrality of Greece"--acts of espionage and intrigue +which, as a matter of fact, form an integral part of a diplomat's +functions. They did not, therefore, "deem it possible to ask Admiral +Dartige du Fournet to revoke the decision taken by him in virtue of the +powers with which he was invested." [5] + +{154} + +Thus the Ministers of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria were bundled +off (22 November), protesting vigorously "against the outrages committed +on four diplomatic representatives in neutral territory," characterising +the things which took place at Athens as "beyond all comment," and +wondering "whether a firmer attitude would not have spared the country +these affronts on its sovereignty." [6] + +This unprecedented measure added still further to the irritation of the +Greeks, and the manner in which it was executed--without even a show of +the courtesies prescribed between diplomats by the tradition of +centuries--shocked the very man who acted as the executioner. Not for +the first time had Admiral Dartige been made to serve ends which he did +not understand, by means which he did not approve, in association with +persons whom he could not respect. But the worst was yet to come. + +The Greek Premier delivered his answer to the Admiral's claim on 22 +November. In that answer M. Lambros showed that the Allies had already +"compensated themselves" amply: the war material which they had +appropriated--not to mention the light flotilla--being superior both in +quantity and in quality to anything that had been abandoned to their +enemies. Then he went on to state that the surrender of any more +material would be equivalent to a departure from neutrality; and the +Central Powers, which had already protested against the light flotilla's +passing into the hands of the Entente, would so regard it. Lastly, +public opinion would never tolerate that Greece should so denude herself +of arms as to be unable to defend herself in case of need. For all these +reasons, the Hellenic Government categorically refused the Admiral's +claim.[7] + +The Admiral felt keenly the iniquity of compelling a neutral country to +give up, without conditions, the arms which constituted its safeguard at +once against invasion and against insurrection. But what could he do? +He had his orders, and it was his duty to carry them out as soon as +possible.[8] So, making use of the plenary authority {155} thrust upon +him, he retorted (24 Nov.) with an Ultimatum: ten mountain batteries +should be handed over to him by 1 December at the latest, and the +remainder by 15 December. Failing obedience to his command, suitable +steps would be taken on 1 December to enforce it. He declined to believe +that "the public opinion of a country so enlightened as Greece could +regard as intolerable the idea of handing over to Powers towards whom it +professed a benevolent neutrality a stock of arms and munitions destined +for the liberation of territory saturated with the noblest Greek blood: +their place was, not at the bottom of magazines, but at the front." [9] + +There is always a limit beyond which human intelligence cannot be +insulted with success, or human patience tried with impunity. France had +long since overstepped that limit. Across all the self-contradictory +subtleties of her statesmen, the Greeks, thanks to the self-revealing +acts of her soldiers, sailors, and agents, had discerned the real object +of her diplomacy: to force upon them M. Venizelos and to rule them +through him: she had already helped M. Venizelos to establish his sway +over New Greece, and was now attempting to extend it over Old Greece. +The creation of a "neutral zone" did not blind them: they had only too +much reason to know what neutrality meant in the vocabulary of the +Allies: they had taken the King's ships: all that remained was to take +his arms and to hand them over to their protégé. Such was the true +significance of the fresh "pledges of friendship" claimed from them; and +the claim aroused unanimous indignation: we will not submit to any +further robbery, they cried. What have we gained by submission so far? +Our conciliatory attitude towards the Allies and our efforts for a +friendly settlement of the questions daily raised by them are regarded as +signs of fear and rewarded accordingly: their arrogance increases with +our compliance. No more compliance. The indignation was, naturally, +most pronounced in military circles, and the officers of the Athens +garrison took a vow to lay down their lives in defence of the King's and +country's honour. + +Before pushing matters to extremes, Admiral Dartige called on the King +(27 Nov.) and tried to intimidate him {156} by telling him that the +Allied armada had Greece at its mercy, and that by simply cutting off the +supplies of corn and coal it could break all resistance. The King agreed +that the Allies possessed all-powerful means of persuasion, but did not +seem as much impressed as was expected. He reminded the Admiral that he +had done everything possible to prove his goodwill by spontaneously +reducing his active army. He could do no more: the people and the army +were so excited over this last demand that to make them accept it was +beyond his power. The measure might be accepted, if the quantity claimed +was lessened: he would take steps in that sense with the French +Government through his brother, Prince George. It was clear that the +King's change of tone arose from the absence of the guarantees which he +had asked and hoped for: not having received those guarantees he +considered himself released from the promises he had given. The Admiral +understood the position perfectly, and in his heart did not blame the +King for rejecting the "draconian pretension" that he should disarm while +not secure that his arms would not be used against himself. But he had +his orders and could only say that he meant to carry them out: on Friday +morning, 1 December, he would impose the will of the Entente Governments. +He still thought that the King would not resist "energetic pressure." [10] + +Proportionate to their loyalty was the Athenians' animosity against the +Venizelists in their midst, who had long been plotting and arming in +conjunction with the French, and preparing for one of those _coups_ for +which Paris had set the fashion during a hundred years. Admiral Dartige +had expressed his concern for these unhappy patriots to the King at his +last interview, and on going from the Palace to the French Legation he +found there the British Minister greatly alarmed because several +important Venizelists had prayed him to obtain for them the Admiral's +protection; but no sooner had the Admiral acted on their prayer, than the +panic-stricken patriots implored him not to protect them, lest the +measures taken for their safety should cause their destruction.[11] +However, next day, the King assured the Admiral through his Marshal of +the Court, that neither the persons nor the {157} property of the +Venizelists should suffer, on condition that neither the Entente Powers' +detectives nor the detachments he was going to land indulged in arrests, +deportations, or disappearances of Greek subjects, and that the +Venizelists themselves abstained from acts calculated to provoke +reprisals.[12] + +Such was the state of things created by the Admiral's Ultimatum. What +would happen when the time-limit expired? The inhabitants of Athens +debated this question anxiously, and their anxiety was deepened by the +sight of many disquieting symptoms: day after day Allied aeroplanes and +automobiles carried out reconnaissances over the capital, paying special +attention to the Royal Palace, intensifying the irritation of civilians +and soldiers, and stiffening their resolution to resist, come what might. + +The Hellenic Government endeavoured to ward off the storm by +remonstrating with the Governments of the Entente direct. As the +Admiral's claim was presented exclusively in the name of France, it began +with Paris. The answer was that King Constantine had promised to the +French Government the war material demanded, and the French Government +had promised in exchange to relax the coercive measures: since the Greek +Government declared that it could not fulfil this promise, it must suffer +the consequences. Paris, in Admiral Dartige's words, "wanted to reap the +fruit of the Benazet negotiation without paying the price agreed to." +[13] Whatever London may have thought of this manoeuvre, it said that +the British Government was in full knowledge of the French Admiral's +steps and supported them. Petrograd was equally cognizant of the affair, +and, as it was a question of military measures with which Russia could +not interfere, advised Greece to comply, assuring her that "what was done +was for her good." [14] + +As a last resource, Greece appealed to neutral countries, describing the +condition in which she had long found herself, because she was not strong +enough to impose respect for her neutrality, and protesting against this +latest demand as most injurious to her honour and {158} subversive of all +her rights.[15] The solicitation remained fruitless. The great American +Republic was too intimately connected with France and England to +intervene on behalf of Greece. The small states knew too well from their +own experience how frail are the foundations upon which rest the honour +and the rights of weak neutrals in a world war. + +Nevertheless, firm in the knowledge that he had the vast majority of the +nation behind him, M. Lambros, on 30 November, by a final letter, +declared to the French Admiral that his claim was utterly unacceptable. +"I do not wish to believe," he concluded, "that, after examining in a +spirit of goodwill and equity the reasons which render it impossible for +the Greek people and its Government to give you satisfaction, you will +proceed to measures which would be incompatible with the traditional +friendship between France and Greece, and which the people would justly +regard as hostile acts." [16] + +In face of Greece's unequivocal determination not to yield, the Admiral +would have been well advised to insist with his Government on an amicable +accommodation. He had not the means of carrying out his threats. It is +true, his ships dominated the sea and their guns the capital; but, since +the Greeks were determined to stand another blockade and to risk the +bombardment of their capital rather than surrender their arms, how could +he take them without an army? The problem had not escaped the worthy +sailor. So grave a claim, he tells us, could not be enforced without +war; and the Entente Powers were not thinking of going to war with +Greece. Therefore, he had hit on the expedient of giving to his action +the name and, so far as the nature of the thing permitted, the character +of a "pacific demonstration." Not one shot would be fired except in +self-defence: the troops would not seek to seize the material by +violence: they would simply occupy certain points of vantage until they +received satisfaction. He admits that his confidence in the success of +these tactics, since his last interview with the King, had suffered some +diminution. But he still {159} nourished a hope--based on the fact "that +the Athens Government had always hitherto ended by bowing to our will." +[17] He overlooked the inflamed minds of the people. + +Before break of day, on 1 December, a body of marines some 3,000 weak +landed at the Piraeus with machine-guns and marched on Athens in three +columns, driving back the Greek patrols, which retired at their approach, +and occupied some of the strategic positions aimed at without +encountering any resistance. So far the pacific demonstration lived up +to its name. Both sides conformed to their respective orders, which were +to avoid all provocation, and on no account to fire first. But for all +that the situation teemed with the elements of an explosion. Admiral +Dartige, on landing, had noted the faces of the people: sullen and +defiant, they faithfully reflected the anger which seethed in their +hearts. And, about 11 o'clock, at one point the smouldering embers burst +into flame. How, it is not known: as usually happens in such cases, each +side accused the other of beginning. Once begun, the fight spread along +the whole line to the French headquarters in the Zappeion. + +At the sound of shots, King Constantine caused a telephone message to be +sent through the French Legation to the French flagship, asking for +Admiral Dartige, to beg him to stop the bloodshed. The officer at the +other end of the wire hesitated to disclose the Admiral's whereabouts, +fearing a trap; but at last he replied that his Chief had gone to the +Zappeion, where indeed he was found shut up. A parley between that +building and the Palace led to an armistice, during which negotiations +for a peace were initiated by the Entente Ministers. In the middle of +these, fighting broke out afresh; according to the Royalists, through the +action of the Venizelists who, desirous to profit by the foreign invasion +in order to promote a domestic revolution, opened rifle fire from the +windows, balconies, and roofs of certain houses upon the royal troops +patrolling the streets: a statement more than probable, seeing that arms +had long been stored in Venizelist houses with a view to such an +enterprise. At the same time, Admiral Dartige, who seems to have +completely lost his head, {160} considering the armistice at an end, +ordered the warships to start a bombardment. + +While shells fell upon the outlying quarters of the town, and even into +the courtyard of the Royal Palace itself, forcing the Queen to put her +children in the cellar, the Entente Ministers arrived to conclude the +treaty: + +"Are these your arguments, gentlemen?" asked the King, as he received +them. Amid the general consternation, he alone maintained his calmness. + +The conference went on to the accompaniment of whistling and bursting +shells, and at 7 o'clock ended in an agreement, whereby Admiral Dartige +consented to stop hostilities and accept the King's offer of six mountain +batteries, in lieu of the ten he had demanded; the Entente Ministers +undertaking to recommend to their Governments the abandonment of his +other demands. + +There ensued an exchange of prisoners, and the retreat of the Allies to +their ships during the night, followed next day by the detachment +quartered at the Zappeion, and all the controllers of police, posts, +telegraphs, telephones, and railways. Many of the ruffians in the pay of +the Franco-British Secret Services anticipated this evacuation by +slipping out of the capital which they had terrorized for nearly a year. + +And so the pacific demonstration was over, having cost the Greeks 4 +officers and 26 men killed, and 4 officers and 51 men wounded. The +Allied casualties were 60 killed, including 6 officers, and 167 wounded. + +For the rest, no epithet was less applicable to the affair than that of +"Athenian Vespers," with which the Parisian press christened it. Admiral +Dartige protests indignantly against the grotesque exaggerations of his +imaginative compatriots. Apart from the tragic features natural to a +pacific demonstration, he declares that the whole drama passed off as +pleasantly as a drama could. Not a single Allied subject was +ill-treated. Not one shot was fired on the Legations of the Entente +Powers, whose Ministers and nationals, in the midst of it all, incurred +only such danger as came from their own shells--shells showered upon an +open town. Even the French bluejackets, who had long been a thorn in the +very heart of Athens, were conducted back to their proper place under a +Greek escort, ingloriously {161} but safely. A like spirit, to a still +higher degree, marked the treatment in Greek hospitals of the Allies' +wounded, whose rapid recovery, says the Admiral, testified to the care +which they received. "We assisted in a civil war: the Royalists struck +in our marines the protectors of their political enemies." [18] + +It was upon those enemies that Royalist wrath satiated itself. On 2 +December, veritable battles took place in many parts of Athens; suspect +houses, hotels, offices, and shops being assailed and defended with +murderous fury. The house of M. Venizelos, as was fitting, formed the +centre of the conflict. Twenty Cretan stalwarts had barricaded +themselves in it and held out until machine-guns persuaded them to +surrender. Within was discovered a small arsenal of rifles, revolvers, +hand-grenades, dynamite cartridges, fuses: among them a bundle of weapons +still wrapped in the French canvas in which it had arrived. Tell-tale +articles of a similar nature were discovered on the premises of other +conspirators, who were led off to prison, pursued by crowds hooting, +cursing, spitting at them, so that their escorts had the greatest +difficulty in saving them from being lynched. Although not comparable to +parallel scenes witnessed by many a Western city under analogous +circumstances, the event was an exhibition of human savagery sufficiently +ugly in itself: it did not require the legends of massacre and torture +with which it was embellished by pious journalists anxious to excite in +the Allied publics sympathy for persons whom the Allies' own advance had +instigated to violence and their precipitate retreat had exposed to a not +unmerited vengeance.[19] + + + +[1] Du Fournet, pp. 188-9. + +[2] Du Fournet, pp. 151, 179-80, 182-3, 190-1. + +[3] Du Fournet, pp. 195-7. + +[4] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 7/20 Nov, 1916. + +[5] Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdani, Demidoff, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916. + +[6] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916. + +[7] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 9/22 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du +Fournet, pp. 192-4. + +[8] Du Fournet, p. 187. + +[9] Du Fournet, pp. 197-9. + +[10] Du Fournet, pp. 201-4. + +[11] Du Fournet, pp. 202-3. + +[12] Du Fournet, pp. 208-9. + +[13] Du Fournet, p. 205. + +[14] Romanos, Paris, 15/28, 16/29 Nov.; Gennadius, London, 16/29 Nov.; +Panas, Petrograd, 17/30 Nov., 1916. + +[15] Zalocostas to Ministers of the United States, etc., Athens, 14/27 +Nov. + +[16] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 17/30 Nov., 1916. + +[17] Du Fournet, p. 204. + +[18] Du Fournet, pp. 210-51; Paxton Hibben, pp. 440-80; _Resumé du +Rapport Official sur les Evenements du 18 novembre/1 decembre_, 1916. + +[19] According to the Hellenic Government, the losses of the Royalists in +this civil strife amounted to 13 soldiers killed and 24 wounded, 6 +civilians killed and 6 wounded, besides 5 killed (including 3 women) and +6 wounded (including 4 women) by the insurgents accidentally; the +Venizelist losses were limited to 3 killed and 2 wounded.--Zalocostas to +Greek Legations abroad, Athens, 27 Nov./10 Dec. 1916. + + + + +{162} + +CHAPTER XV + +By 3 December calm had descended on Athens. But echoes of the storm +continued reverberating in Paris and London. In Paris it was asserted, +and in London repeated, that the French Admiral had fallen into a +cunningly laid trap: King Constantine had promised to hand over his war +material; but when the Allies landed to receive it, he caused them to +be treacherously attacked and murdered.[1] On the strength of this +assertion, the Entente newspapers demanded punishment swift and +drastic: a prince who broke faith deserved no pity. His offer of six +batteries was "an atonement" both cynical and inadequate for the +"ambush" by which French and English blood had been spilt. Similarly +the internecine strife of 2 December and the subsequent proceedings +against the Venizelists were depicted as a wanton hunt of harmless and +law-abiding citizens. Day by day the stream of calumny, assiduously +fed from the fountain-head at Salonica, grew in volume and virulence; +and King Constantine was branded with every opprobrious epithet of +liar, traitor, and assassin. + +These were weapons against which the King of Greece and his Government +had nothing to oppose. They tried to explain the true nature of the +abortive Benazet negotiation, showing that, if there was any breach of +faith, it was not on their part; they denounced the falsehoods and the +exaggerations relating to the suppression of the seditious outbreak; +they asked that a mixed Commission should be appointed to conduct an +impartial inquiry on the spot while the events were still fresh and +evidence abundant. The French and British Press Censors took care that +not a whisper of their defence should reach the French and British +publics.[2] Frenchmen and Englishmen {163} might hear of M. +Venizelos's deeds through his friends. They were allowed to hear of +the King's only through his enemies. It was clear that the policy +which had prompted the disastrous enterprise of 1 December had not yet +worked itself out to its full issue. + +Admiral Dartige could not very well endorse the breach of faith legend. +He knew that the engagement about the delivery of arms was reciprocal, +and that, as France had failed to ratify it on her part, King +Constantine rightly considered himself free from all obligations on his +part. He also knew that, far from being lured into landing by false +assurances of surrender, he had been emphatically warned against it by +categorical refusals and intimations of resistance. Yet, human nature +being what it is, the honest sailor, maddened by his discomfiture, +called the inevitable collision a "_guet-apens_" and, even whilst +negotiating for release, he meditated revenge. + +To him the peace arranged through the instrumentality of the Entente +Ministers was but a "_sorte d'armistice_." He had agreed to it only in +order to extricate himself from his present difficulties and to gain +time for resuming hostilities under more favourable conditions. He and +his men, he tells us with an engaging candour, were at the mercy of the +Greeks: had he not accepted the King's offer--outnumbered, surrounded, +and without food or water for more than twenty-four hours--they would +have been ignominiously arrested. Besides, the configuration of the +ground sheltered the Greek troops from the naval fire, while the +Legations both of the Entente and of neutral Powers lay exposed to it. +Lastly, a continued bombardment might have driven the Greeks to +exasperation and perhaps to a massacre of Entente Ministers and +subjects. It was imperative to give the Allies and neutrals time for +flight and himself for serious war preparations. The delivery of the +whole stock of arms had been fixed by his Ultimatum for 15 December. +In that fortnight he proposed to obtain from his Government the forces +necessary {164} for a battle, and permission to bombard Athens in +earnest--with or without notice to its inhabitants, but, of course, +always with due regard for its _monuments historiques_. + +Such was his plan. General Sarrail embraced it with ardour; the Paris +Government sanctioned it; troops began to arrive and French and British +residents to flee (3-5 Dec.). But very soon difficulties became +manifest. The transports had brought men and mules, but no provisions +for either. Greek volunteers and regulars mustered in defence of their +capital. The British Admiral declined to take part in any war +operations. The French Minister dreaded open hostilities. In the +circumstances, Admiral Dartige found it expedient to "give proof of his +spirit of self-denial," by renouncing his heroic dream of vengeance +"_immédiate, retentissante,_" and by advising Paris not to set up a new +front at Athens: after all, the matter was not really worth a war. He +now proposed, instead, a pacific blockade; and, Paris assenting, he +proclaimed the blockade as from 8 December.[3] + +With this act Admiral Dartige du Fournet's career came to a sudden end. +A few days later the French Government deprived him of his command and +placed him on the retired list. After a decent interval, the British +Government decorated him with the Grand Cross of the Bath.[4] Whether +his conduct entitled him to a decoration, his character should +certainly have saved him from disgrace; for of all the men engaged in +these transactions, he seems to have been the most respectable. No +impartial reader of his book can fail to see that he blundered because +he moved in the dark: it was never explained to him what political +designs lay beneath the pretended military necessities; and the +constant incongruity between the avowed aims of his employers and the +steps dictated by his instructions tended to bewilder a mind devoid of +all aptitude or appetite for diplomacy. + +Admiral Dartige gone, the blockade was carried on by his successor, +Admiral Gauchet. The Greeks took it as an accustomed evil. "This +measure," wrote one of their {165} leading journals, "cannot terrify a +population which has faced with serenity and fortitude much greater +dangers. The Hellenic people did not hesitate, when the need arose, to +come into collision with four Great Powers in defence of its +independence and honour. It did so without hate, without perturbation, +but calmly, as one performs an imposed and unavoidable duty. It +deliberately chose to risk annihilation rather than see its fatherland +disarmed and enslaved. It preferred a hopeless struggle to +degradation. To-day it is threatened with the spectre of famine. It +will face that spectre with serenity and fortitude. The menace is +aimed at its stomach: very well, the people will tighten its belt." [5] + +At the same time, Paris, London, and Petrograd were vigorously +discussing the demands which were to be enforced by the blockade; but, +owing to the wide divergences of opinion existing between the various +Cabinets, decisions could only be reached by degrees and dealt out by +doses. Not until 14 December did the Entente Governments deliver +themselves of the first-fruit of their travail: Greece was to keep the +arms of which she could not be despoiled, but she should remove them, +as well as her army, from the northern regions bordering on Macedonia. +The Hellenic Government was given twenty-four hours in which to comply; +refusal would constitute an act of hostility, and the Allied Ministers +would forthwith leave Athens.[6] + +To show that they were in earnest, the French and British Ministers +embarked on two ships moored at the Piraeus, where they awaited the +Hellenic Government's reply; and, before the time-limit expired, the +French Admiral, by a notice put up at the Piraeus town-hall, warned the +inhabitants to close their shops and retire to their homes by 4 p.m. in +view of an impending bombardment of Athens. + +The Hellenic Government acceded to the contents of the Ultimatum, and +immediately gave orders for the removal of troops and war material.[7] +This prompt compliance was received by the people of Greece with {166} +loud disapproval. They criticized vehemently their rulers' readiness +to yield as pusillanimous and injudicious. The Government, they said, +instead of profiting by the events of 1 December to clear up the +situation, drifts back into the path of concessions which led to those +fatal events: it encourages the Entente Powers to put forward +increasingly exorbitant pretensions, and, forgetting that it is for us +to complain and claim better treatment, it creates the impression that +they are in the right and we in the wrong. For some time past such had +been the tone even of moderate critics; and upon this fresh submission +there was a general outcry of alarm. It is true, the Allies in their +Note averred that they demanded the removal of troops and guns simply +and solely "in order to secure their forces against an attack." But +the Greeks were less inclined than ever to treat the alleged danger to +the Allied army in Macedonia as anything more than a pretext: the true +object, they maintained, was to secure M. Venizelos's return and the +expulsion of King Constantine. + +The conduct of the Entente representatives hitherto had given only too +much ground for such bitter suspicions, and the search of Venizelist +houses had recently produced concrete evidence, in the form of a letter +from the Leader to one of his adherents stating, among other things, +that a definite agreement concluded between him and the representatives +of the Entente Powers assured his speedy domination of Athens through +the whole strength of the Entente. The publication of this document, +with a photographic facsimile,[8] had confirmed the apprehensions which +had long haunted the popular mind. Nor did M. Venizelos's indignant +denial of its authenticity, or the Entente Ministers' emphatic +protestation that never, since the Cretan's departure from Athens, had +they done anything to facilitate his return, shake the conviction that +the big coup was planned for 1 December. + +If any doubts as to the Allies' ulterior aims still lingered, they were +dispelled by their Press, the most serious organs of which, on the eve +of Admiral Dartige's landing, pointedly referred to the great error +committed by the Powers in allowing King Constantine to dismiss M. +Venizelos in September, 1915, and urged that the time had come to {167} +remedy that error, informing their readers that England, France and +Russia were not bound to guarantee the possession of the Greek throne +to any individual sovereign, irrespective of his constitutional +behaviour. The coup having failed, the same organs, in commenting on +the Allies' present Ultimatum, still declared that the true remedy for +Greece was to place her under the control of M. Venizelos; but, as such +a course was not possible in the presence of a hostile King and an +over-excited army, the first necessity was to eliminate the Greek +army.[9] + +However, the Greeks submitted to it all with sullen resignation: they +had learned that the wisest thing for the weak is to control themselves. + +The next step remained with the Entente Governments, who were exhorted +by their Press organs not to be deluded by King Constantine's +concessions. For it was one of the ironies of the situation that, +while his own subjects blamed the King for his conciliatory attitude, +that attitude was denounced by his enemies as a fresh instance of +duplicity. They affirmed--with what amount of accuracy will appear in +the sequel--that this great deceiver was making, in concert with the +Kaiser, stealthy preparations for war against the Allies, and that +meanwhile he intended by a semblance of submission to lull them into a +false security. Extreme measures were, therefore, needed, not only to +punish him for his past crimes, but also to prevent Greece from +becoming a base of hostile operations in the near future. + +Thus certain in advance of public support, the Allies, on 31 December, +served upon the Hellenic Government a series of demands divided into +guarantees and reparations. Under the first heading, Greece was +required to transfer all her arms and munitions to the Peloponnesus, +which, being practically an island, could be guarded by the Allied +Fleet; to forbid all Reservist meetings north of the Peloponnesus; to +enforce rigorously the law prohibiting civilians from carrying arms; to +admit the re-establishment of the foreign controls over her police, +telegraphs, telephones, and railways. Under the second, all persons +detained on charges of high-treason, conspiracy, and sedition, should +be immediately released, and those who {168} had suffered indemnified; +the General commanding the Athens garrison on 1 December should be +cashiered; formal apologies should be tendered to the Allied Ministers +and their flags publicly saluted in the presence of the assembled +garrison. On their part, the Powers gave Greece a formal undertaking +that they would not allow the forces of the Salonica Government to take +advantage of the withdrawal of the Royal troops from Thessaly in order +to cross the neutral zone. They ended with the announcement that the +blockade would be maintained until satisfaction had been accorded on +all the above points, and that they reserved to themselves full liberty +of further action should the attitude of the King's Government give +them fresh cause for complaint.[10] + +Before returning a definite answer to this Note, the Hellenic +Government submitted a Memorandum by which it promised forthwith the +reparations demanded, except the wholesale release without trial of +political prisoners; and accepted in principle the demand for +guarantees on condition that the Powers, on their part, should give an +absolute and irrevocable guarantee against the extension of the +revolutionary movement, not only across the neutral zone, but over any +territories which had not been annexed by the Salonica Committee before +1 December, pointing out that this was an indispensable requisite to +reassure the nation and induce it to acquiesce in total disarmament. +In conclusion, the Hellenic Government expressed the hope that, as +total disarmament would put Greece out of all possibility of hurting +the Allies, they would renounce the liberty of further action which +they had reserved to themselves, and that they would, in justice to the +people, raise the blockade.[11] + +In reply, the Allies launched another Ultimatum: insisting upon the +definite acceptance of their demands. If such acceptance were not +forthcoming within forty-eight hours, or if, after an undertaking was +given, any obstacles were wilfully placed in its execution, they +threatened to have recourse to their military and naval weapons. On +the other hand, they promised to respect Greece's resolution {169} to +keep out of the War, and pledged themselves not to allow the adherents +of the Salonica Government to take advantage of the withdrawal of the +Greek troops into the Peloponnesus in order to invade by land or by sea +any part whatever of Greek territory thus left defenceless, or to +permit the installation of Venizelist authorities in any territories +actually in the possession of the Royal Government which they might see +fit to occupy hereafter for military reasons. Lastly, they signified +their readiness to raise the blockade as soon as special delegates +should judge that the evacuation of troops and material had been partly +carried out, and that its completion was assured.[12] + +These pledges, which had been the subject of acute discussion between +the Allies at the Rome Conference, and were carried in face of strong +opposition from France, marked another victory of moderation over +consistency. That they lessened the alarm of the Greek people may be +doubted; but the Greek people had by this time found that if it wanted, +not only to live at peace, but to exist at all, it had to accept the +situation on the Allies' own terms. + +As to the rulers, they understood the popular feeling, sympathized with +it, shared it. But their powerlessness prevented them from refusing +terms which their pride compelled them to resent. They could not +entertain seriously thoughts of active resistance, unless the Allies +were attacked by the Germans; but how little prospect of this there was +has been revealed by a number of messages exchanged at that period +between Athens and Berlin. From these documents it appears that on 6 +December the Queen, whose indignation at the long-sustained persecution +had been brought to a head by the bombardment of her home and the +narrow escape of her children, telegraphed to her brother, anxiously +inquiring when the Germans would be ready for a decisive offensive in +Macedonia. On 16 December the Kaiser replied to his sister, condoling +with her on the ordeal she and her husband had gone through, +congratulating them on the courage they had displayed, pointing out +that the Entente had once more {170} shown clearly what its real aims +were, and expressing the opinion that no other course was left to King +Constantine but "to turn openly on his executioners: Tino's +intervention with his main forces against Sarrail's left wing would be +decisive," he said. The Queen answered, on 26 December, that the +solution the Kaiser advised would be possible only if Sarrail, attacked +by the Germans, were forced to retire into the parts of Greece occupied +by the Royalists: as it was, the distance which separated his left wing +from them was too great and their lines of communication would be too +much exposed: besides, their provisions and munitions were not +sufficient for a prolonged struggle. Under these conditions, she +added, only a speedy attack by the Germans could afford Greece the +opportunity of fighting for deliverance from a frightful situation. +But Von Hindenburg did not see his way to promise an attack. +Meanwhile, the pressure of the blockade increased. By 2 January, the +Queen, as her indignation cooled, prepared to resign herself to the +situation: "We have bread only for a few days more, other provisions +are also running short," she telegraphed, "consequently war against the +Entente is out of the question now. I consider the game lost." Her +husband concurred.[13] + +The King and his Ministers also knew that, unless they accepted the +Allies' terms, worse would be forced upon them by starvation. Clearly, +the first thing to be done was to have the blockade raised. So far the +little ship had contended with the gale hardily--in fact, +foolhardily--coming out of the contest with scarce a sail. Captain and +crew at last decided to give up the unequal struggle: the gale appeared +to have almost spent itself: conversations for peace were at that +moment in progress between the belligerents: at the worst, things would +go on much as they had been going on, until the end of the War put an +end to the sorry drama. So, on 10 January, after an all-night sitting +of the Crown Council, Greece made her {171} unconditional surrender: +she would drain the cup of humiliation to its bitterest dregs.[14] + +To all seeming, the pledges given by both sides formed a solid basis +for a _modus vivendi_: the King gave guarantees thoroughly safeguarding +the Allies against any danger, real or imaginary; and the Allies gave +guarantees equally safeguarding the King against seditious intrigues. +All that remained was that the Allies should exact from the King a +fulfilment of his engagements, and fulfil their own. They did not fail +in the first part of the programme. The transfer of troops and +armaments to the Peloponnesus was scrupulously carried out under the +supervision of an Allied Military Commission, which counted and +examined every man, every gun, every rifle and cartridge both at the +point of departure and at the point of arrival. The Reservists' +leagues were dissolved, and the people, in so far as such a measure is +possible, were compelled to give up the firearms, mostly obsolete, in +their possession. The foreign Controls, so far as the Hellenic +Government was concerned, might be re-established at the Allies' +discretion. The Venizelist prisoners were set free, and a mixed +Commission was in due course appointed to deal with the question of +indemnities. The General commanding the Athens garrison was cashiered. +Formal apologies were tendered to the Allies' Ministers, and their +flags were saluted with all the solemnities prescribed by themselves. +In brief, on the unanimous testimony of Entente diplomatists and +publicists, Greece loyally fulfilled every one of her obligations, +serious and frivolous.[15] Yet, despite her Government's reiterated +prayers that the blockade should in accordance with the promise given, +be raised, the blockade was not only continued, but, as the months +dragged on, was intensified. + + + +[1] See _Le Temps_ and _The Times_, 4 Dec., 1916. + +[2] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, Rome, 24 +Nov./7 Dec.; 25 Nov./8 Dec.; 26 Nov./9 Dec. 28 Nov./11 Dec.; Metaxas, +Paris, 24 Nov./7 Dec; 2/15 Dec. Delyannis, London, 3/16 Dec., 1916. +The documents containing the King's promises to M. Benazet were not +published until 1918 (see _The Times_, April 22, 1918); while those +containing M. Benazet's promises to the King became known only through +the publication of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's book in 1920. + +[3] Du Fournet, pp. 226-9, 234, 256-7, 260-2, 266, 269-72. + +[4] Du Fournet, pp. 272-4, 284-5. He complains bitterly of the +injustice of his treatment: he was condemned unheard--like King +Constantine; and for a similar reason: "_un débat large et public await +établi toutes les responsabilités_." + +[5] The _Nea Himera_, 25 Nov./8 Dec., 1916. + +[6] Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdari, Demidoff, Athens, 1/14 Dec., 1916. + +[7] Zalocostas to the Legations of France, England, Italy, and Russia. +Athens, 2/15 Dec., 1916. + +[8] The _Nea Himera_, 21 Nov./4 Dec., 1916. + +[9] See leading articles in _The Times_, 30 Nov., 16 Dec., 1916. + +[10] Guillemin, Elliot, Demidoff, Piraeus, 18/31 Dec., 1916. + +[11] Zalocostas to Legations of France, England and Russia, Athens, 23 +Dec,/5 Jan., 1917. + +[12] Guillemin, Bosdani, Demidoff, Erskine, Salamis Strait, 26 Dec./8 +Jan., 1917. + +[13] In his one message (6 January) he dwelt on Greece's critical +condition, asking if a German attack was intended, and when it would +probably take place. Such is the gist of these famous telegrams. For +the rest, they consist of allusions by the Queen to her sufferings and +appropriate epithets applied to the authors of them. See _White Book_, +Nos. 177 foll. + +[14] Zalocostas to Legations of France, England, Italy and Russia, 28 +Dec./10 Jan., 1917. + +[15] See _The Times_, 20, 23, 24, 30 Jan., 1917. + + + + +{172} + +CHAPTER XVI + +Among the acts sanctioned by International Law, none is more worthy of +a philosopher's or a philanthropist's attention than the "pacific +blockade." The credit for the institution belongs to all the great +civilised communities, but for its pleasant designation the world is +indebted to the eminent jurist M. Hautefeuille--a countryman of the +ingenious Dr. Guillotin. It denotes "a blockade exercised by a great +Power for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on a weaker State, +without actual war. That it is an act of violence, and therefore in +the nature of war, is undeniable";[1] but, besides its name, it +possesses certain features which distinguish it advantageously from +ordinary war. + +First, instead of the barbarous effusion of blood and swift destruction +which open hostilities entail, the pacific blockade achieves its ends +by more refined and leisurely means: one is not shocked by the unseemly +sights of a battlefield, and the wielder of the weapon has time to +watch its effects as they develop: he can see the victim going through +the successive stages of misery--debility, languor, exhaustion--until +the final point is reached; and as his scientific curiosity is +gratified by the gradual manifestation of the various symptoms, so his +moral sense is fortified by the struggle between a proud spirit and an +empty stomach--than which life can offer no more ennobling spectacle. +Then, unlike crude war, the pacific blockade automatically strikes the +nation at which it is aimed on its weakest side first: instead of +having to begin with its manhood, one begins with its old men, its +women, and its infants. The merits of this form of attack are evident: +many a man who would boldly face starvation himself, may be reasonably +expected to flinch at the prospect of a starving mother, {173} wife, or +child. Lastly, whilst in war the assailant must inevitably suffer as +well as inflict losses, the pacific blockade renders him absolutely +exempt from all risk. For "it can only be employed as a measure of +coercion by maritime Powers able to bring into action such vastly +superior forces to those the resisting State can dispose of, that +resistance is out of the question." [2] + +In brief, the pacific blockade is not war, but a kind of sport, as safe +as coursing, and to the educated mind much more interesting. The +interest largely depends on the duration of the blockade, and its +duration on the victims' physical and moral resources. + +When the blockade was proclaimed on the 8th of December, Allied +journalists predicted that its persuasive force would be felt very +soon. The country, they reasoned, owing to the manifold restrictions +imposed upon its overseas trade by the Anglo-French Fleet, had been on +short commons for some time past. The total stoppage of maritime +traffic would bring it to the verge of famine within a week. And, in +fact, before the end of the month Greece was feeling the pinch.[3] As +might have been expected, the first to feel it were the poor. Both the +authorities and private societies did their utmost to protect them by +keeping prices down, and to relieve them by the free distribution of +food and other necessaries.[4] But, although the achievement was +great, it could not prove equal to the dimensions of the need. The +stoppage of all maritime traffic caused a cessation of industry and +threw out of employment thousands of working-people. As the factories +grew empty of labourers, the streets grew full of beggars. The +necessary adulteration of the flour produced epidemics of dysentery and +poisoning, especially among children and old people, while numerous +deaths among infants were attributed by the doctors to want of milk in +their mothers' breasts. Presently bread, the staple food of the +Greeks, disappeared, and all classes took {174} to carob-beans and +herbs.[5] On 23 February a lady of the highest Athenian society wrote +to a friend in London: "If we were in England, we should all be fined +for cruelty to animals. As there is no flour, our tiny portions of +bread are made of oats, and rather rotten ones, that had been reserved +for the cab-horses. Now the poor things have nothing to eat and have +become a collection of Apocalyptic beasts. We go on foot as much as we +can, as they really could not carry us." + +Next to bread, the most prominent article of Greek diet is fish. The +French, who in their treatment of this neutral nation gave evidence of +a thoroughness and efficiency such as they did not always display in +their operations against the enemy, saw to it that this source of +subsistence also should, within the measure of their ability, fail +their victims. French cruisers stopped the fishing-smacks and asked if +their community had joined the Rebellion. When the answer was in the +negative, they sank the vessel and confiscated the tackle, often +accompanying the robbery of property with violence on the persons of +the owners and abuse of their sovereign. To the wretched fishermen's +protests, the French commanders replied: "If you want to be left alone, +you have only to drive out your King." [6] + +These speeches confirmed the general suspicion that the ultimate object +of the blockade was to propagate rebellion. Other things spoke even +more eloquently. The few cargoes of flour that arrived in Greece now +and then were sequestered by the Allies and sent to the Salonica +Government, which used them as a bait, inviting the King's subjects +through its agents to sell their allegiance for a loaf of bread. +Generally the reply was: "We prefer to die." [7] Of this stubborn +endurance, the women of modern Greece gave instances that recall the +days of ancient Sparta. In a village near Eleusis, on the Sunday +preceding Lent, the matrons and maidens set up a dance, and while +dancing they improvised songs in praise of Hunger. At the end, {175} +the men who stood round listening with tears in their eyes, burst into +frenetic cheers for the King.[8] + +Never, indeed, in the hour of his triumphs had King Constantine been so +near the hearts of his people as he was in this period of their common +affliction. Although the operation-wounds in his ribs were still open, +he met the emergency with dauntless fortitude, and never for a moment +forgot his part, either as a prince or as a man. "The King is +wonderful," wrote the correspondent already quoted. "He never +complains, and gives us all courage." Many a time, as the weary months +dragged on, he went over his past course, asking himself: "Could he +have been mistaken, after all?" No; the more he pondered, the more +convinced he felt that what he had done was the best for Greece. Now, +if the worst came to the worst, his sincerity at least could not be +questioned. When his friends ventured to express their admiration of +his stoicism, he answered simply: "I know that I am doing right." The +great source whence he derived consolation amidst all his calamities +was undoubtedly this consciousness of rectitude: a sense which in him +seems to have been as free from arrogance as it was from rancour. + +The people who had formerly admired their sovereign as a hero, now +revered him as a martyr; and the man upon whom they visited their anger +was he whom they regarded as the true cause of their misery. After his +flight to Salonica M. Venizelos was never mentioned except by the name +of The Traitor; after the events of 1 December he was formally +impeached as one; and after the blockade had been in force for some +weeks, he was solemnly anathematized: on 26 December, the Archbishop of +Athens, from a cairn of stones in the midst of a great multitude, +pronounced the curse of the Church upon "the traitor, Venizelos." The +Government had forbidden the demonstration, but that did not prevent +myriads of people from going to add their own stone to the monument.[9] +One old woman was heard, as she cast her contribution, crying: "We made +him Premier; but he was not content. He would make himself king. +Anathema!" Subsequently, every village and hamlet repeated the +ceremony. "These {176} spontaneous ceremonies," observes an +eye-witness, "were vastly more indicative than any elections could ever +have been of the place to which the great Cretan had fallen in the +esteem of his countrymen." [10] + +Appeals from the Holy Synod of the Greek Church to the Pope and the +heads of other Christian Churches availed as little as the appeals of +the Greek Government to Allied and neutral Governments. Month after +month the blockade went on, and each month produced its own tale of +suffering: deaths due directly to starvation; diseases due to the +indirect effects of inanition; a whole nation wasting for want of food; +horses starved to provide it; mothers praying to God for their daily +bread with babes drooping at their desiccated bosoms.[11] Yet of +yielding there was no sign: "Give in?" said a woman outside a +soup-kitchen at the Piraeus, in March. "We will eat our children +first!" + +In such a manner this ancient race, which has lived so long, done so +much, and suffered so much, bore its martyrdom. By such an exercise of +self-discipline it defied the Powers of Civilisation to do their worst. +In spite of the licence given to brute force, in spite of the removal +of the machinery of civil control, in spite of the internment of the +army and its arms, in spite of the ostentatiously paraded support to +the Rebel, in spite of actual famine and the threat of imminent ruin, +the people held to the institutions of their country, rallied to their +King; and expressed their scorn for the usurper of his authority by +inscribing over the graves of their babies: "Here lies my child, +starved to death by Venizelos." + + + +[1] See the article on "Pacific Blockade" in the _Encyclopaedia +Britannica_ (10th Ed.), Vol. XXXI, p. 401. + +[2] _Ibid._ + +[3] _The Times_, 9, 19, 21, 30 Dec., 1916. + +[4] Among these charitable organizations the foremost place belongs to +the "Patriotic League of Greek Women," which, under the competent +management of the Queen, was able to distribute 10,000 meals a day, as +well as clothes, blankets, medicine, milk for infants, etc. + +[5] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 Jan./7 Feb.; 3/16 Feb.; +12/25 March, 1917. + +[6] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 3/16 Feb.; to French Minister +at Athens, 16/29 March, 1917. + +[7] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 Jan./7 Feb.; 15/28 Feb.; +12/25 March. + +[8] The _Nea Himera_, 15/28 Feb., 1917. + +[9] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 14/27 Dec., 1916. + +[10] Paxton Hibben, p. 522. + +[11] The Censorship succeeded in keeping these facts, as it kept many +others, from the British public; they were not suitable subjects for +war propaganda. + + + + +{177} + +CHAPTER XVII + +It seems now proper to return to M. Venizelos and to consider in some +detail the other measures which he and his patrons at this time adopted +for the purpose of consolidating and extending his dominion. + +As we have seen, shortly after the Cretan's installation at Salonica, +the Entente Powers, by a diplomatic fiction, decided to treat his +Committee as a _de facto_ Government. It was not until his countrymen +impeached him as a traitor that the recognition assumed a _de jure_ +character, by the appointment of duly accredited diplomatic agents to +his capital. These steps were accompanied by other marks of sympathy. +While the Allies negotiated with the King, their naval commanders +canvassed for M. Venizelos--sweeping islands under his sway: Syra was +first shepherded into the fold, and a little later the rest of the +Cyclades. + +A brief suspension of operations supervened as a result of the solemn +promise given to Athens that the Allies would neither by land nor by +sea allow the extension of the revolutionary movement. For an instant +the Entente respected its own pledges. Just before the surrender of +the Lambros Cabinet, on 10 January, the Cretan had rushed to establish +another accomplished fact by liberating the island of Cerigo; but, on +the Government's protest, the Allies obliged him to undo his +accomplishment; though, on the plea that the island would resent being +replaced under King Constantine's yoke, it was made temporarily +autonomous.[1] + +Soon, however, these pledges went the way of all words. Between +February and May, Cephalonia, Zante, and Corfu {178} were converted one +by one: everywhere the apostles from Salonica preaching, "Be our +brethren or die of hunger"; and everywhere having behind them the guns +of France and England to enforce respect for their gospel. The +instance of Leucas, the last of the Ionian Isles to be gathered into +the fold, will suffice as an illustration. In the middle of March a +French vessel, carrying a consignment of maize, rice, and Venizelist +missionaries, called at the island and invited the inhabitants to come, +buy, and be saved: they answered that they would never touch food +brought by traitors. Towards the end of May, the French Admiral +commanding the Ionian Reserve was able to announce that the Leucadian +population had joined the National Movement.[2] + +To secure his authority over these maritime possessions, the Cretan +obtained from his patrons some of the warships of which they had robbed +the King. + +A similar propaganda was simultaneously going on in the "neutral zone" +and in the lands to the south of it--particularly Thessaly--whose +immunity from emancipation the Allies had also guaranteed. Only, as +this region lay nearer to the base of the Franco-Venizelist Mission, it +benefited more severely from its influence. General Sarrail's patrols +raided the villages, harrying the peasants and sparing not even the +honour of their women. Anyone who knows the Greek peasant's fierce +views on feminine chastity can imagine the indignation which such an +outrage would have aroused in any case; but in this case their horror +was deepened by the circumstance that the assailants sometimes were +African semi-savages--the Senegalese whom France brought to Greece, as +to other parts of Europe, oblivious of the most rudimentary dictates of +decency and sound policy. On one occasion (22 Feb.) the coloured +libertines paid for their lust with their lives: a patrol of a dozen of +them was surprised and massacred.[3] + +Summary executions were among the methods of {179} military tyranny in +which General Sarrail rejoiced without scruple and with a certain +brutal pride. When once he found himself obliged to justify his +conduct, he wrote: "The six inhabitants of Dianitza, who were shot, +were _Comitadjis_. There is no doubt in that respect. Doubt still +exists about eight others. If they are proved to be in the same case +as the former, they will be shot in the same way. The two men shot at +Lourani were put to death because they were known to be _Comitadjis_. +The other two, whose houses were burnt down, are likewise _Comitadjis_: +they would have been shot, if they were not away: they shall be, if +they are caught. If a church has been burnt down, it was because it +had been transformed into a magazine for arms. If barley has been +carried away, it has been paid for or requisitioned." After some more +statements of the same enlightening kind, the gallant soldier +concludes: "To sum up, the Greek Government organizes bands and +maintains them. The security of our Army in the Orient exacts their +suppression. I have given orders to put to death all irregulars. +These orders have been carried out: they shall continue to be carried +out." [4] + +It was by precisely similar arguments that General von Bissing +justified his severities in Belgium: with this difference, that in +Greece the danger never existed. Comitadjis--bands of irregulars--did +exist; it would have been strange if the adherents of the King had not +done everything to counter the efforts of his enemies. Long before +this period the French Secret Service, Admiral Dartige du Fournet tells +us, had been busy equipping guerillas on the frontier.[5] Further, in +the mainland, as in the islands, the Venizelist recruiting sergeants +sought "volunteers" by force: "How many villages had to be surrounded +by constabulary. . . . How much shooting had to be done to keep the +men of military age from escaping. . . . How many deserters or those +unwilling to serve had to be rounded up from hiding places!" exclaims +General Sarrail.[6] Some of the recruits thus enlisted snatched at the +earliest opportunity of regaining {180} their freedom: they fell in +during the day, and at night they fled with their arms. + +The assertion that these bands were organized and maintained by the +Greek Government to harass the Allies and keep the line of +communication with Albania open, with a view to an eventual junction +between the forces of King Constantine and those of the German Emperor, +rested on evidence which, for some obscure reason, was not produced.[7] +But it supplied pretexts for action the true objects of which were not +obscure. + +Despite his press-gangs, in six months M. Venizelos had only succeeded +in sending to the front some 10,000 men. He explained to his Western +friends that he had failed to fulfil their expectations better because +the neutral zone barred the extension of his movement into Thessaly.[8] +He had respected that zone until now; but now that the Allies gave him +a free hand over the sea, he saw no longer any reason why they should +restrain him on land. Therefore, while the agents from Macedonia +goaded the inhabitants to seek rest in apostacy and provoked incidents +supplying an excuse for intervention, the advocates of M. Venizelos in +Paris and London laboured to clear his way by publishing reports which +told how the people of Thessaly prayed for liberation from the yoke of +King Constantine,[9] and exhausted their ingenuity in endeavours to +show the Entente publics how to break faith with honour and decency, as +well as with advantage. + +The victualling of the Allied army in Macedonia, always difficult, had +become distressingly precarious with its own growth and the growth of +the enemy's submarine activity. Were the Allies to go on transporting +food and fodder from distant lands across dangerous seas, with the rich +cornfields of Thessaly within short and safe reach of their trenches? +The seizure of the Thessalian granary, besides {181} helping to keep +the Allies in plenty, would help to reduce the Royalists to despair by +robbing them of the harvest to which they looked forward with strained +eyes and tightened belts. In this wise both military and political +problems could be solved by one masterly stroke. + +In April, General Sarrail obtained from his Government the orders he +had been soliciting since January, to go to Thessaly and seize the +crops; only, as the offensive against the Bulgars deprived him of +adequate means for the moment, he decided to put off the stroke until +the middle of May.[10] + +Alarmed by these sudden, though not wholly unexpected, developments, +King Constantine dismissed Professor Lambros, and had once more +recourse to M. Zaimis; hoping that this statesman, the only +non-Venizelist Greek whom the slander of Germanophilism had left +untouched, might prove able to placate the Allies. M. Zaimis, as in +all previous crises, so now obeyed the call and set himself to discover +some path out of the wood (2 May). On the one hand, he opened +negotiations with the Entente Ministers; on the other, he tried to +bring about a reconciliation with M. Venizelos--the King being +understood to be willing to meet the Cretan half-way. + +M. Venizelos, on his part, alarmed by the prospect of a _rapprochement_ +between Athens and the Entente Powers, set himself, as on all similar +occasions, to impugn the Hellenic Government's sincerity. At a signal +from the Conductor, all the instruments of the orchestra broke into the +familiar chorus. The whole Press of France and England rang again with +calumny and fairy-tale. Out they came again in regular sequence and +with unvarying monotony: plots and secret letters, weird stories of +German intrigue, constant repetition of names compromised or +compromising; all ready, cut and dried, for burking any attempt at +accommodation that did not include the return and domination of the +Great Cretan. + +It was maintained that the formation of a Government under M. Zaimis +was but a new artifice of King Constantine, adopted at the Kaiser's +suggestion, to temporize by ostensibly throwing over a few of his +Germanophile favourites. During more than five months he had contrived +{182} to checkmate the blockade by drawing on the reserves of food he +had laid up at his depots. Now those reserves were exhausted: he +needed the Thessalian corn to replenish his magazines, to feed and +increase his army, so that in the fullness of time he might bring it +out of the Peloponnesus against the Allies.[11] + +Even more sinister were the motives which prompted the King's advances +to the Cretan. While holding out the right hand to M. Venizelos, +Constantine with the left aimed a dagger at his heart: a band of eleven +assassins had just been arrested at Salonica on a charge of conspiring +to murder him--to murder him in the very midst of his own and his +allies' military forces, and under circumstances which made detection +certain and escape impossible. Even thus: "their plan was to arrange a +banquet to which M. Venizelos would have been invited. _They are said_ +to have confessed that they were sent from Athens to kill the Head of +the National Government and were promised 4,000 pounds for the murder." +[12] + +Day by day it became increasingly clear that the question of Thessaly +formed only part of the larger question of Greece; that behind the +campaign for the crops lurked the conspiracy against the King. A +"radical solution" was demanded, on the ground that so long as he +reigned at Athens we could not consider Greece a friendly neutral. The +Greek organ of M. Venizelos in London now openly described the Cretan +as a man sent to heal Hellas of the "dynastic canker," and expressed +the opinion that the healing could only be effected by "Prussian +methods." [13] + +During the whole of May this concert of sophistry and calumny went on: +now sinking into low, deadly whispers; now swelling into an uproar that +rolled like a mighty, muddy river in flood through every Allied +capital, ministering to the inarticulate craving of the public for +fresh sensations, thrilling its nerves, and feeding its hate and fear +of King Constantine. At the end of the month the curtain went up, and +M. Venizelos stepped forward to {188} make the declaration for which +his instrumental music had prepared our minds: "I reject all idea of +reconciliation firmly, flatly, and finally!" + +His confederates and subordinates, as usual, went further: Admiral +Coundouriotis: "Neither in this world nor in the next will I have +anything to do with King Constantine or his dynasty." + +Minister Politis: "No compromise is possible between Liberal Greece and +the reigning dynasty." + +Minister Averoff: "The one and most important thing is that the dynasty +of Constantine should, like the Turks, be turned bag and baggage out of +Greece." [14] + +So the Great Cretan and his company had given up at last pretending +that their plot was not directed against their King, or that they +intended to postpone the settlement of their accounts with him till +after the War. Their relief must have been proportionate to the +strain: it is not hypocrisy, but the need of consistency that harasses +a hypocrite. But their outburst of candour was chiefly interesting as +an index to the attitude of the Powers from whom they derived their +significance. + +France had long since made up her mind on the deposition of +Constantine, if not indeed on the subversion of the Greek throne. +Apart from the hold upon Greece which they would gain by placing her +under a ruler created by and consequently dependent on them, French +politicians did not lose sight of the popularity which the sacrifice of +a king--and that king, too, the Kaiser's brother-in-law--would earn +them among their own compatriots. Further, a triumph of French policy +over Greece was calculated to obscure in the eyes of the French public +the failure of French strategy against Bulgaria: "For me the +destruction of Athens the Germanic came second to the struggle against +Sofia," wrote General Sarrail[15]; and there were those who believed +that his expedition had for its primary objective Athens rather than +Sofia. + +For a time French politicians had flattered themselves that their aim +would be attained by an explosion from within. But it was gradually +borne in upon them that the National Movement represented but a small +minority {184} of the nation. That truth first became manifest in the +summer of 1916, when the demobilization set the Reservists loose--the +Reservists upon whom M. Venizelos had miscounted: their verdict was +conclusive; for they were drawn from all districts and all classes of +the community: the tillers of the plains, the shepherds of the hills, +the fishermen who lived by the sea, the traders, the teachers, the +lawyers--they represented, in one word, the whole population of +military age. The disillusion was furthered by the swift suppression +of the seditious attempt on 1 December, and was completed by the +Blockade, which demonstrated the solidarity of the nation in a manner +that utterly upset the calculations and disconcerted the plans of its +authors. Instead of a people ready, after a week or two of privation, +to sue for mercy--to revolt against their sovereign and succumb to his +rival--the French found in every bit of Old Greece--from Mount Pindus +to Cape Malea--a nation nerved to the highest pitch of endurance: +prepared to suffer hunger and disease without a murmur, and when the +hour should come, to die as those die who possess things they value +more than life. This was not what the inventors of the Pacific +Blockade contemplated: this was not sport: this was strife--strife of +strength with strength. + +There was nothing left but force--the danger of creating a new front +had been eliminated by the internment of the army, and by the blockade +which had succeeded, if not in breaking the spirit of the people, in +reducing it to such a state of misery that it now offered a safe +subject for attack. M. Ribot, who had replaced M. Briand as Premier +and Minister for Foreign Affairs, adopted this "radical solution." He +proposed to dispatch to Athens a plenipotentiary charged with the +mission of deposing King Constantine, raising M. Venizelos to +dictatorial power, and thus establishing the influence of France +throughout Greece. + +There remained some difficulties of a diplomatic character. Russia had +never viewed her ally's uncompromising hostility to King Constantine +with enthusiasm. But the French thought that this attitude was due to +dynastic ties and monarchic sympathies, and expected the downfall of +the Tsar to change it: they could hardly {185} imagine that the Russian +Republic would withdraw even that reluctant co-operation in the +coercion of Greece which the Russian Empire had accorded; and, at any +rate, the voice of a country in the throes of internal disintegration +could have little effect upon the march of external events. + +The decision really lay between France and England. England's, like +Russia's, co-operation hitherto had been but a concession to France. +Neither the Foreign Office nor the War Office had ever taken the +Salonica Expedition seriously; and both departments would gladly have +washed their hands of a business barren of profit and credit alike. +But the motives which had impelled London to keep Paris company so far +were as potent as ever, and English politicians had hitherto proved +themselves so pliant that, provided French pressure continued, the +utmost which could be apprehended from them was a feeble show of +resistance followed by abject acquiescence. Notwithstanding the +moderation England had insisted upon at the Boulogne and Rome +Conferences, France had managed to lead her from violence to violence, +till this last iniquity, to the logical French mind, seemed inevitable. + + + +[1] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 30 +Dec./12 Jan.; to Entente Legations, Athens, 19 Jan./1 Feb.; 8/21 March, +1917. For a full and intimate account of this intrigue, somewhat +ambitiously styled "The Conquest of Cerigo," see Lawson, pp. 241 foll. + +[2] Zalocostas to Greek Ministers abroad, 12/25 March; The _Nea +Himera_, 8/21 March; Exchange Tel., Athens, 16 April, 28 May, 1917. + +[3] General Sarrail mentions the punishment (Sarrail, p. 235), but not +the provocation. This, together with other atrocities, is the subject +of a Note from M. Zalocostas to the French Minister at Athens, 9/22 +March, 1917. + +[4] Le Temps, 11 April, 1917; Sarrail, pp. 236-7. + +[5] Du Fournet, p. 116. + +[6] "La Grèce Vénizeliste," in the _Revue de Paris_, 15 Dec., 1919. + +[7] Such a project is only discussed in some of the messages exchanged +between Athens and Berlin in December, 1916 (_White Book_, Nos. 177, +183, 186)--before the definite acceptance of the Allies' terms by the +Lambros Cabinet. But there is absolutely nothing to show that the idea +ever materialised. + +[8] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[9] See telegrams, dated Salonica, 29 March, published in the London +Press by the Anglo-Hellenic League; letter from _The Times_ +correspondent, dated Syra, 23 April, 1917, etc., etc. + +[10] Sarrail, p. 238. + +[11] For details of this apocryphal scheme see a report from Salonica, +dated 16 May, disseminated by the Anglo-Hellenic League; _The Times_, 8 +and 30 May; the _Daily Mail_, 9 and 30 May, 1917. + +[12] _The Times_, 14 May, 1917, dispatch dated Salonica 11 May. + +[13] _The Hesperia_, 11, 18, 25 May, 1917. + +[14] _The Times_, 30 May, 1917. + +[15] Sarrail, p. 234. + + + + +{186} + +CHAPTER XVIII + +At the end of May, M. Ribot, accompanied by M. Painlevé, Minister of +War, came to London and laid before the British Government his +solution. Again our allies found on this side of the Channel "_des +scrupules_"; and again they set themselves to demonstrate that "_des +scrupules, si légitimes soient-ils_," weigh light against interests. +Even when the principle was conceded, there still lingered some +disquietude regarding the practicability of bringing about the King's +dethronement without bloodshed. But the French did not share this +disquietude, and, after three days' hard talking, they converted the +English Ministers to their point of view. It was agreed that the +operation should be carried out without war. The only measures of a +military nature to which the British Government consented were the +establishment in Thessaly of outposts for the control of the crops, and +the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, should King Constantine +attempt to move his army out of the Peloponnesus: unless the King +committed acts of hostility, no violence should be used. Having thus +satisfied their conscience, the British Ministers abstained from any +closer scrutiny.[1] + +The task was entrusted to M. Jonnart, a Senator of large African +experience, who, armed with the title of High Commissioner of the +Protecting Powers of Greece, set out at once "to re-establish the +constitutional verity"--such was the formula. "His Majesty King +Constantine, having manifestly violated, on his own initiative, the +Constitution of which France, Great Britain, and Russia are the +guarantors, has lost the confidence of the Protecting Powers, and they +consider themselves released from the obligations to him resulting from +their rights of protection." [2] + +With the violation of the Constitution by King Constantine we have +already dealt exhaustively. We must here {187} deal as exhaustively +with the three Powers' claim to act as its "guarantors" and their +"rights of protection." + +The claim rested on a phrase in the Treaty of 13 July, 1863, between +them and Denmark, concerning the accession to the Hellenic throne of +the late King: "Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of +Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts, forms a monarchical, +independent, and constitutional State." [3] That guarantee was no +innovation, and had no reference to the Constitution. The Protocol of +the Conference held on 26 June, 1863, explains that "as regards the +guarantee of the political existence of the Kingdom of Greece, the +three Protecting Powers maintain simply the terms in which it is +enunciated in Article IV of the Convention of 7 May, 1832," [4]--that +is, the Convention between the three Powers and Bavaria concerning the +accession to the Hellenic throne of her first King. Turning to that +document, we find Article IV running as follows: "Greece, under the +sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of +the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent State, +according to the terms of the Protocol signed between the said Courts +on the 3rd of February, 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the +Ottoman Porte." And above it, in Article I, we read: "The Courts of +Great Britain, France and Russia, duly authorized for the purpose by +the Greek Nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece to the +Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria." [5] Nothing could be plainer than +that the guarantee referred to the "political existence of Greece," not +to her constitutional form of government, and that the three Powers in +disposing of her throne acted, not by their own authority, but by the +authority of the Greek Nation, which alone had the right to do so, and +which exercised that right directly in choosing its last king. But +this is not all. Turning to the Protocol of the 3rd of February, 1830, +we read in its very first article: "Greece shall form an independent +State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative and +commercial, pertaining to complete independence." [6] + +{188} + +As to the term "protection" occasionally employed by the three Powers, +and by the Greeks themselves, its true sense can be shown beyond +ambiguity. "Greece," wrote the Duke of Wellington, "once established +and her boundaries guaranteed as proposed, she will have the same right +to assistance and protection against foreign aggression as any other +State in Europe, of which there are many, which exercise an independent +action in all their concerns, external as well as internal." Far from +claiming to limit her independence in any way, the British Foreign +Secretary emphatically declared "that the permanent policy of this +country towards Greece must be friendly, if Greece should be really +independent and conduct herself as an independent Power." [7] + +Likewise, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, tracing the history +of events and negotiations which culminated in the establishment of +Greek freedom, dwelt on France's successful desire "not only to +liberate Greece from the Ottoman yoke, but to make of Greece a real +State, a State independent in right and in fact, a State that should +not be put officially under the tutelage of anyone, a State that should +not need any perpetual semi-official intervention." By thus making +Greece "free to choose her friends and allies," and "not under anyone's +protection," the French expected that she would "look towards France, +who can promise her, in need, her assistance without menacing her with +her protection." The Minister concluded by boasting that "the success +is complete. Greece exists, she is independent. All Europe recognizes +her: she depends on no Power either as sovereign or as guarantor." [8] + +Since the date of these documents and statements, practice had +confirmed the principles enunciated in them. As a completely +independent Power Greece had waged wars and concluded treaties with +other Powers. It is true that on certain occasions she was prevented +from fighting by coercive measures; but these measures were not taken +by the three Powers--sometimes they were {189} taken by two alone; +sometimes by the whole Concert of Europe--nor were they taken in virtue +of any right other than the right of the stronger. Likewise, Greece +had framed and revised her Constitution, dethroned and enthroned Kings +without asking anyone's permission or sanction. It is true that in her +domestic revolutions the influence of the three Powers could be plainly +detected, but it was wholly in the nature of backstairs +intrigue--carried on by each against the others--such as even the +greatest Empires experience on the part of interested outsiders. In +short, since its birth until 1916, no one had dreamt of questioning the +status of the Hellenic Kingdom as a completely independent Power, or +attempted to give to "the guarantee of the political existence of +Greece," which aimed at securing her against external aggression, the +interpretation that it referred to her form of government and conferred +a right of interference in her internal affairs. + +The present interference, clearly, had no more legal basis than all the +other invasions to which Greece had submitted during the War under +protest. Casuistry was merely called in to cloak the exigencies of +policy: King Constantine's dethronement was decreed, not because it was +lawful, but because France required it, and England, for good reasons, +could not let France bring it about alone: what Russia thought of the +transaction, she soon let the whole world know with disconcerting +bluntness. Petrograd not only withdrew her troops from the +performance, but made short work of the "guarantee" and "protection" +quibbles by roundly declaring that "the choice of the form of +government in Greece, as well as its administrative organization, +appertains exclusively to the Greek people." [9] + +Meanwhile M. Jonnart sped eastward, eager and determined to serve the +Imperialist ambitions of the French Republic in the Orient. His +mandate gave him unlimited choice of means, diplomatic and military, +and he fully justified the trust placed in his tact. On the maxim +that, the more prompt the display of force, the less likely the +occasion to use it, he decided, contrary to the instructions he had +received in London, not to wait and see whether {190} King Constantine +meditated hostile acts or not; he arranged for the necessary naval +measures with Admiral Gauchet, whom he met off Corfu, and, after a +brief stop in the Road of Salamis, he hastened to Salonica, where he +arranged with General Sarrail for the military measures: a simultaneous +invasion of Thessaly, occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, and a +landing at Athens. At the same time he conferred with M. Venizelos, +who pronounced all these arrangements excellent, and suggested that, +after the removal of the King, he must give the public mind time to +calm down before returning to Athens: in the interval M. Zaimis might +be left in power. The period of transition should perhaps last several +months: a prudent counsel with which M. Jonnart fully concurred: both +he and M. Ribot recognized the danger of hurrying the return of the +Cretan to a city which he had been describing as ready to embrace him. +The programme settled in all its details, M. Jonnart left Salonica with +General Regnault, who was put in command of the divisions told off for +Corinth and Athens, and in the evening of 9 June arrived in the Road of +Salamis, where he took up his abode on board the ironclad _Justice_.[19] + +Here the most delicate part of his mission, and the one in which he +displayed most of his tact, commenced. On the following evening (10 +June) he met M. Zaimis on board the _Bruix_ at the Piraeus. It was, as +we know, essential that M. Zaimis should be induced to remain in power +for a while, to bridge over the gap between the deposition of the King +and the elevation of M. Venizelos. But it was most unlikely that M. +Zaimis would consent to play the part assigned to him, if he knew what +he was doing. Therefore, at this first interview M. Jonnart did not +think fit to demand anything more than the control of the Thessalian +crops and the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth. Agreeably +surprised at demands which fell so far short of the objects with which +rumour had credited the High Commissioner, the Premier raised no +difficulties; and M. Jonnart, in order "to gain his confidence," spoke +to him with his usual "accent of loyalty and frankness" about the +magnificent future the Protecting Powers had in store for Greece. +Then, under the pretence that he was awaiting {191} fresh instructions +that night, he made another appointment for the following morning.[11] + +The Greek left, and next morning (11 June) returned to hear more. At +this second interview M. Jonnart handed to him an Ultimatum with a +twenty-four hours' limit, demanding that the King should abdicate and +go, after naming as his successor, not the legitimate Heir, but his +second son--a young man who, having no will of his own, was highly +recommended by M. Venizelos. Thus the re-establishment of +constitutional verity was to begin with the violation of a fundamental +article of the Constitution--the succession by order of +primogeniture.[12] M. Zaimis stood aghast--"wrung with emotion." M. +Jonnart spoke eloquently and urgently: the Powers only sought the unity +and liberty of Greece--the greatness of Greece, now divided, partly +dismembered, in a state of anarchy, on the eve of civil war. The High +Commissioner would do all that in him lay that the change of reign +might be accomplished in the most pacific manner. He appealed warmly +to the Premier's patriotism.[13] + +According to some accounts, he added two more instances of his "loyalty +and frankness" by stating that, when the War was over, the Powers would +have no objection to the restoration of King Constantine, if such +should be the wish of the Greek people--a statement which he authorized +M. Zaimis to publish;[14] and that they had no intention to bring M. +Venizelos back: as soon as the unity of Greece was achieved, the +Salonica Government would disappear; only later on M. Venizelos might +return to office by the legal way and after new elections. On the +other hand, if the Ultimatum was not executed, he threatened the +downfall of the whole dynasty, the forcible establishment of a +Republic, and the immediate return of M. Venizelos.[15] + +The interview ended with a grim declaration by M. Jonnart that, unless +his decree was obeyed to the letter, he would do to Athens what the +Germans had done to his native Arras--reduce it to a heap of ruins.[16] + +{192} + +There could be no doubt that M. Jonnart meant business: he was an +ex-Governor of Algeria; his mentality and his methods had been formed +in the African school of International Law. Remonstrance was futile +and resistance would be fatal: a column was already marching into +Thessaly; part of an army corps had landed at Corinth; a powerful +squadron rode off Salamis with its guns trained on Athens; troops were +in the ports of Piraeus and Phaleron ready at a signal to land and +march on the capital. Confronted with the choice either to help in the +pacific liberation of his country or to witness its devastation, M. +Zaimis chose the lesser evil; and M. Jonnart was able to report, with +pardonable complacency: "I persuaded him to continue in office, to take +the message demanding his abdication to the King, and to advise the +King to accept." [17] + +With this message the Premier hurried off to Athens and straightway +communicated it to his sovereign. Immediately a Crown Council was +called at the Palace. Besides M. Zaimis, all the ex-Premiers and +leaders of parties were present: Rallis, Dragoumis, Skouloudis, +Gounaris, Lambros, Calogeropoulos, Dimitracopoulos, Stratos. From the +first the King announced that he had decided to accept the Ultimatum +and leave Greece with the Crown Prince, in order to spare her greater +calamities, such as would result from a conflict with the Entente +Powers. + +Whether Constantine would not have been better advised to have opposed +the landing of the Allies at Salonica; or interned their army when he +had it at his mercy; or arrested Admiral Dartige du Fournet and his +marines and held them, together with the Entente Ministers and +subjects, as hostages: whether by any of those acts he might not have +escaped this final blow, was now of small account: though the point +provides matter for very interesting speculation. Now, with his troops +and arms bottled up in the Peloponnesus and his people reduced by +starvation to helplessness, all chance of escape was cut off. A +pitiful situation, no doubt, but more pitiful had he attempted +resistance. In such event, the Powers would immediately declare that a +state of war existed {193} and France might acquire a permanent footing +by right of conquest.[18] + +Nevertheless, two only of the statesmen assembled, M. Zaimis and M. +Stratos, pronounced in favour of submission. The rest were against it. +True, they argued, Greece completely disarmed could offer no effective +resistance to the armies and fleets which hemmed her in on every side. +Yet it were better that the King should let violence be used against +him, better that he should be made the Powers' prisoner, than yield. +His hopes of sparing Greece greater calamities by his abnegation were +vain. No calamity could be greater than that which would be produced +by an acceptance of M. Jonnart's Ultimatum. They recalled all the +encroachments upon her neutrality, all the infringements of her +sovereignty, to which Greece had submitted unresistingly, trusting to +the Allies' solemn promises. And how had they kept those promises? +After the violation of so many pledges, how was it possible to put +faith in M. Jonnart's assurances? If the French troops pursued their +march into the country, imposed upon it Venizelos by force, dragged it +into the war, who could stop them? Better perish without dishonour. + +Such, in substance, were the arguments used. The King remained +unshaken. "We have no right to doubt the good faith of M. Jonnart," he +said. Despite past experience, the man who was perpetually accused of +having no scruple about breaking his word, was still slow to believe +that others could break theirs. He made all present promise that they +would use their utmost endeavours to have his decision accepted by the +people, so that no disturbance might aggravate a situation already +sufficiently menacing. They all left the Council Chamber in tears.[19] + +In the afternoon a Cabinet meeting took place under the presidency of +the King, who, quite unmoved by the objections and entreaties of his +Ministers, persisted in his resolution. It was then decided that M. +Zaimis should draw up the reply, and that the draft, after receiving +the {194} King's approval, should be communicated to M. Jonnart. This +was done, and M. Jonnart having declared himself satisfied, the +document was handed to him next morning. By that reply the Greek +Premier, after noting the three Powers' demand for the abdication of +King Constantine and the designation of his successor, briefly stated +that "His Majesty, solicitous as always only for the interest of +Greece, has decided to quit the country" (_not_ to abdicate) "with the +Crown Prince, and designates as his successor Prince Alexander." [10] + +Thus far the High Commissioner's enterprise had prospered beyond the +anticipations of the most sanguine. And now his anxieties began. From +the moment of his arrival the populace, which two years of contact with +the Allies had made suspicious, became very uneasy and excited. +Throughout the night of 10 June rumours circulated that an ultimatum of +an extreme nature had been presented to the Government. Groups were +formed in the streets and squares, discussing the situation, +criticizing the Government bitterly, and inveighing against M. Zaimis, +who, it was said, was ready to accept still more rigorous demands. The +crowds grew in numbers and vehemence as the night advanced; and, in the +morning of the 11th, while M. Zaimis was still with M. Jonnart, the +Government, to avert disturbances, issued a _communiqué_, stating that +all the rumours of fresh demands were devoid of foundation. The +Premier in his first conversation with the representative of the three +Powers had not detected any danger whatever either to the independence +of the country or to the dynasty or to the regime. On the contrary, M. +Jonnart had expressed the will of the Powers to see Greece great, +strong, and absolutely independent. Consequently the Greek people +ought to remain quiet, certain that by its peaceful conduct it would +contribute to the success of the King's and the Government's +efforts.[21] + +This declaration had calmed the public for a few hours. But after the +return of M. Zaimis from his second interview with the High +Commissioner, the object of M. Jonnart's mission began to leak out: the +whisper went round that the King's abdication was demanded. The hasty +{195} convocation of a Crown Council intensified the public uneasiness. +The special measures for the maintenance of order taken by the +authorities, the advice to keep calm whatever happened, which emanated +from every influential quarter, the haggard faces of all those who came +out of the Palace, left no doubt that something very serious was afoot. +More, it became known that during the night the Isthmus of Corinth had +been occupied by large numbers of French troops which had taken up the +rails of the line joining the Peloponnesus to the capital, that the +French fleet in Salamis Strait had been reinforced, that the three +Powers' Ministers had quitted their Legations and nobody knew where +they had slept. Hour by hour the popular distress increased, until +late in the afternoon the news spread through the town that the King +had decided to go; and as it spread, the shops closed, the church bells +began to toll as for a funeral, and masses of people rushed from every +side towards the Palace, to prevent the King from going. Soon all +approaches to the Palace were blocked and the building itself was +completely besieged by a crowd of agitated men and sobbing women, all +demanding to see their sovereign, and shouting: "Don't go! Don't go!" + +Numerous deputations appeared before the King and implored him to +change his mind--in vain. To one of them, sent by the officers of the +Athens garrison, he spoke as follows: "You know my decision. The +interest of our country demands that all, be they civilians or +soldiers, should submit to discipline. Keep calm and preserve your +prudence." To a delegation composed of the heads of the city guilds he +replied: "In the interests of the State, gentlemen, I am obliged to +leave the country. The people must have confidence in my advisers. +God will always be with us, and Greece will become happy again. I +adjure you, gentlemen, in the name of the Almighty, to offer no +opposition. Any reaction would be in the highest degree dangerous to +the State. If I, born and bred in Athens and Greek to the marrow of my +bones, decide to go, I don't do so, you understand well, except in +order to save my people and my country. Pray go to your corporations +and our fellow-citizens and tell them to cease from gathering: to be +calm and sensible, {196} because the King, at this moment, is +performing a sacred duty." [22] + +The same delegation succeeded in reaching M. Zaimis, and on coming out +it published through a special edition of a journal the result: "The +Premier, with tears in his eyes, and the other three Ministers present +at the audience, after relating the sequence of political events which +have led to this cruel decision about our beloved King, begged us to +advise the people in his name to face the crisis with sang-froid, and +to assure it that the abdication of the King is but temporary, since, +according to M. Jonnart's declaration, it rests with the people to call +him back after the War; that all resistance on the part of the people +will result in the abolition of the dynasty and the establishment of a +Republic under Venizelos; that the Allies would not recoil from a +bombardment of the capital and a military occupation; but if the people +keep quiet, there will be no military occupation of Athens, only some +soldiers may land at the Piraeus to stretch their legs--and so on." [23] + +Nothing, however, could allay the popular agony. As darkness fell, +Athens presented a strange sight--silent figures marching, one after +another, towards where King Constantine was spending his last night in +his capital. They made their forlorn pilgrimage without the least +noise, and as they went they passed other groups returning with equal +noiselessness. "It was," says an eye-witness, "as if the people of +Athens were visiting a tomb or a lying-in-state." [24] + +A crowd remained on guard all night long. About 4.30 a.m. a motor car +was seen drawing up at a side entrance of the Palace. The crowd +recognized the King's chauffeur and guessed that he had come for the +King and the royal family, who presently appeared at the door. The +guardsmen threw themselves on the ground as much as to say that the +vehicle must pass over their bodies. The King and royal family +withdrew, and the car went away empty. Two other attempts to leave the +Palace proved equally unsuccessful. The crowd would not let any door +be opened. Compact and silent, it mounted guard. + +{197} + +So passed the night; and the morning (12 June) dawned on the faithful +men and women who watched by the Palace. The churches again began to +toll funeral peals, and again thousands began flowing in the same +direction: the whole town through all its streets--mournful groups, +soon waxing to mournful multitudes, and other multitudes, streamed on. +From an early hour the Palace was again entirely surrounded: + +"We will not let you go," they shouted. "We want our King!" + +This was the answer the people made to the farewell message which the +King had caused to be posted at the street corners: "Obeying necessity, +and performing my duty towards Greece, I am departing from my beloved +country with my heir, leaving my son Alexander on the throne. I beg +you to accept my decision with serenity, trusting to God, whose +blessing I invoke on the nation. And that this sacrifice may not be in +vain, I adjure all of you, if you love God, if you love your country, +if, lastly, you love me, not to make any disturbance, but to remain +submissive. The least disorder, even if prompted by a lofty sentiment, +may to-day lead to the most terrible disasters. At this moment the +greatest solace for the Queen and myself lies in the affection and +devotion which you have always shown to us, in the happy days as in the +unhappy. May God protect Greece.--Constantine R." [25] Motionless and +silent groups read this message; but the crowd outside the Palace went +on crying, monotonously: "No! No!" and "He mustn't go!" + +These things began to fill the emissary of the Protecting Powers with +uneasiness. He felt that a clear manifestation of the fact that the +King had been superseded must be given to the populace.[26] A +proclamation in King Alexander's name was accordingly issued. +Simultaneously, a notice, the text of which, it is affirmed, had been +settled between the Government and M. Jonnart, was published. It ran: +"To-day at noon, after the administration of the oath to King +Alexander, M. Jonnart by a special messenger announced to the Greek +Government that it could send at once authorities to Salonica, since +the Provisional {198} Government is henceforward dissolved. It is +equally well-known that M. Venizelos shall not by any means come to +Athens, and that the Powers have no ulterior design to establish him in +power. Greece is nowise bound to pursue the policy of the Triumvirate, +but is free to adhere to her neutrality." [27] + +For all that, the people continued restive. The King's departure had +been fixed for noon; but in face of the popular unwillingness to let +him go, the departure seemed impossible. It became evident that the +methods of persuasion which sufficed for the Premier did not suffice +for the people. Something more effective than the march into distant +Thessaly and the landing at remote Corinth was needed. Accordingly, +the destroyers came into Phaleron Bay, and French troops began to +disembark.[28] The Athenians, however, did not seem to be cowed even +when they saw that the French troops advanced close to Athens. What +was to be done? Was M. Jonnart, after all, to succeed no better than +Admiral Dartige du Fournet? The ex-Governor of Algeria, put on his +mettle, acted promptly. He sent word to M. Zaimis that the King's +departure should not be any longer delayed: if the Greek police were +unable to disperse the crowd, the High Commissioner was ready to send +from the Piraeus some companies of machine-guns.[29] + +Then, at 5 p.m., a last attempt was made by the royal family to leave +the Palace. It succeeded, thanks to a feint which decoyed the crowd to +a side door, while the fugitives escaped by the main entrance. + +The day, in spite of all forebodings, ended without a disturbance. The +parade of overwhelming force by M. Jonnart and his unmistakable +determination to use it mercilessly had, no doubt, convinced a populace +quick to grasp a situation that opposition spelt suicide. But it was +mainly the example and exhortations of their King that compelled them +to suppress their rage and resign themselves to the inevitable. +For--Greece is a land of paradoxes--no full-blooded Greek, whether +statesman or soldier, was ever clothed with the same amplitude of +authority over his countrymen as this simple, upright, {199} kindly son +of a Danish father and a Russian mother, in whom the subtle Hellenes +found their ideal _Basileus_. + +And so the drama which had been staged for more than a year by French +diplomacy was satisfactorily wound up; and the curtain fell, amid the +applause of the spectators.[30] + + + +[1] Jonnart, pp. 60-67. + +[2] _Ibid_, pp. 109-10. + +[3] Nouveau Recueil Général des Traités. By Ch. Samwer, Vol. XVII, +Part ii. + +[4] _Ibid._ + +[5] _Papers re Affairs of Greece_, 1830-32. + +[6] _Papers re Affairs of Greece_, 1826-30. + +[7] Wellington to Prince Leopold, 10 Feb., 1830. _State Papers_, +1820-30. + +[8] Duc de Broglie's Speech, 18 May, 1833. _Écrits et Discours_, Vol. +II, pp. 415 foll. + +[9] Communiqué of the Russian Government, Reuter, Petrograd, 7 July, +1917. + +[10] Jonnart, pp. 70-95. + +[11] Jonnart, pp. 102-4. + +[12] See Art. 45. + +[13] Jonnart, pp. 109-12. + +[14] When the Greek Premier did so, M. Jonnart repudiated it as "a +mistake of M. Zaimis."--See _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[15] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, Geneva, 1917, pp. 13, 14. + +[16] Jonnart, p. 113. + +[17] _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[18] Even as it was, General Sarrail lamented the advent of M. +Venizelos at Salonica as "a Greek master-stroke" calculated "to keep +'the coveted city' Greek."--Sarrail, pp. 153, 154. He evidently +preferred not to have even a portion of Greece as an ally, that he +might treat the whole of it as an enemy. + +[19] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, pp. 14-18. + +[20] Jonnart, pp. 116-7. + +[21] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, p. 11. + +[22] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, pp. 28-9. + +[23] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, pp. 26-7. + +[24] _The Weekly Dispatch_, 17 June, 1917. + +[25] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, pp. 30-1. + +[26] M. Jonnart, in _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[27] _Le Départ du Roi Constantin_, p. 34. + +[28] _The Weekly Dispatch_, 17 June, 1917. + +[29] Jonnart, p. 128. + +[30] Of all English newspapers the _Weekly Dispatch_ (17 June, 1917) +alone gave some account of this last scene of the drama. The rest +atoned for their self-denial in narrative by proportionate +self-indulgence in comment. One of them described the _coup_ as "a +distinct gain both to _our_ interests in the East and to our _moral_ +position in the world." British agents on the spot must have been +strangely blind to this aspect of the business; for General Sarrail +complains that the _coup_ succeeded in spite of the obstacles raised +"by our allies, the English. It was _à contre-coeur_ that 500 of their +men were furnished me for the descent on Thessaly. The Chief of the +British Staff, no doubt by order, sought to learn my plans that he +might telegraph them and ruin our action, etc."--Sarrail, p. 242. +Without for a moment accepting the French General's suggestions of +British double-dealing, we have every reason to believe that he was +right in the view that the disgraceful affair did not enjoy British +official sympathy. + + + + +{200} + +CHAPTER XIX + +M. Jonnart celebrated his triumph with yet another proclamation by +which he assured the Greek people that the "guaranteeing" Powers were +there to restore Constitutional Verity and the regular working of +constitutional institutions; that all reprisals against Greeks, to +whatever party they might belong, would be ruthlessly repressed; that +the liberty of everybody would be safeguarded; that the "protecting" +Powers, respectful of the people's sovereignty, had no intention of +imposing a mobilization upon it.[1] + +The sincerity of these professions was soon brought to the test. While +penning them, M. Jonnart had before him two lists of persons marked +down for reprisals. The first contained thirty victims, foremost among +them M. Gounaris, General Dousmanis, and Colonel Metaxas--M. Streit had +anticipated his doom by accompanying his sovereign into exile; these +were deported to Corsica. The second list comprised one hundred and +thirty persons--two ex-Premiers, MM. Skouloudis and Lambros, six +ex-Ministers of State, one General, one Admiral, other officers of high +rank, lawyers, publicists--who were to be placed under surveillance. +The King's three brothers--Princes Nicholas, Andrew, and +Christopher--were banished with their families to Switzerland. In +addition, certain individuals of lower class who had participated in +the events of 1 and 2 December, and whose culpability was vouched for +by the French Secret Service, were to be arrested and brought to +book.[2] + +M. Jonnart, forbidden by his diplomatic art from meddling openly in the +internal affairs of the country, caused this _épuration_ to be carried +out through M. Zaimis. It was hard for the poor Premier to expel +fellow-citizens {201} who had occupied eminent positions and with whom +he had been in close relations--not to mention the flagrant illegality +of such a proceeding.[3] But how could he hope to argue successfully +against a man who, under the appearances of a scrupulous conscience, +recognized no law? So it came that, after a long interview on board +the _Justice_ (16 June), M. Zaimis fell in with M. Jonnart's wish.[4] + +This rapid fulfilment of the "no reprisals" pledge was declared +necessary to make Athens safe for the Allies.[5] It certainly was +indispensable to make it safe for M. Venizelos, whose immediate return, +by a modification of the original plan, had been resolved upon. The +French, finding things composed into tranquility much sooner than they +anticipated, saw no cause for delay. Was it not a fact that whenever +the High Commissioner visited the capital, he met with nothing but +respect, sympathy, and cries of "_Vive la France_"?[6] It was: in all +ages, from the time of the Roman Consul Flamininus onwards, there have +been found Greeks loving liberators more than liberty. + +But M. Venizelos knew better. Whilst at Salonica, he used to assure +his Western friends that "the great majority at Athens remained +Venizelist. If proof be desired, it is only necessary to organize a +referendum, subject, of course, to guarantees of impartiality. Let the +King and his satellites be put aside for the moment, let controllers be +appointed from all countries . . . and let the people be asked to vote +freely. . . . I am sure of a great majority. Let them take me at my +word!" [7] When, however, the King and his satellites were about to be +put aside, M. Venizelos, as we have seen, had stipulated for some +months of delay; and now that they had been put aside, he still felt +that the partial _épuration_ did not suffice for his safety. No doubt, +the bayonets which had pulled the King down were able to set him up. +But M. Venizelos, for reasons both personal and patriotic, shrank from +leaning on foreign bayonets more than was unavoidable. He had no +desire to justify the nickname, bestowed upon him months ago, {202} of +"Archisenegalesos" ("Chief of the Senegalese")--an epithet conveying +the suggestion that he aimed at turning Greece into a dependency of +France. M. Jonnart seemed to share this laudable delicacy.[8] + +General Sarrail, however, cared nothing for appearances, but itched to +get M. Venizelos out of Salonica at the earliest possible moment. His +first favourable impression of the Cretan as "somebody" had not +survived closer acquaintance. He considered him wanting in courage. +He had no patience with his hesitations. He felt, in short, no more +respect for him than men usually feel for their tools; and since he had +never learned to put any restraint on his tongue, he expressed his +opinion of this "ex-revolutionary transformed into a Government man" +freely. The Greek was too discreet to say what he thought of the +Frenchman; but as he was not less vain and domineering, their +intercourse at Salonica had been the reverse of harmonious.[9] Thus +the Leader of the Liberals found himself prodded back to the city from +which he had been prodded nine months before. + +He arrived on board a French warship off the Piraeus on 21 June. But +he gave out that he did not intend to come to Athens, or to call +himself to power. An agreement, he said, had been reached between M. +Jonnart and M. Zaimis to the effect that a mixed Ministerial Commission +should be formed to negotiate the unification of the country.[10] That +was true. With his usual sense of propriety, the High Commissioner +would not dream of usurping the place of the acknowledged chiefs of the +Greek people. It was for them to take the initiative. The +"guaranteeing" Powers which he represented respected the national will +too much to dictate the terms of the fusion between the two sections +into which Greece had been so unfortunately divided. Therefore, he +invited the heads of the two Governments, M. Zaimis and M. Venizelos, +to enter into direct conversations: he offering to act as a simple +{203} adviser, mediator, at most arbitrator. Both seized on the +invitation.[11] + +The main question had already been settled between M. Jonnart and M. +Venizelos: the latter should return to power at once. But, legally he +could only return by a parliamentary election, and, as he could not +hope for a majority, neither he nor M. Jonnart wanted an election. It +was accordingly decided that, since no reliance could be placed on the +popular will of the present, an appeal should be made to the popular +will of the past: the Chamber of 13 June, 1915, in which M. Venizelos +had a majority, should be recalled to life, on the ground that its +dissolution, in their opinion, was illegal. This decision--so well +calculated to preserve externals with all the reverence which +expediency permitted--was, on 24 June, formally conveyed by the High +Commissioner to M. Zaimis, who, doing what was expected of him, +tendered his resignation. The High Commissioner thanked him and +promptly obtained from King Alexander a declaration that he was ready +to entrust the Government to M. Venizelos, who only asked for a delay +of two days to fetch his Cabinet from Salonica.[12] + +Meanwhile, the news that M. Venizelos was coming had spread, and the +return at that delicate moment of the yacht _Sphacteria_ which had +carried King Constantine away added fuel to the flame. In the evening +(24 June), the crew of the boat, joined by students and reservists, +paraded the streets with a portrait of the King and cried "Long live +Constantine!" The column of demonstrators grew as it went along--the +police being unable or unwilling to check it. Without a doubt, M. +Venizelos was right: the _épuration_ of the capital had not gone far +enough. To prevent surprises, General Regnault, commander of the +landing forces, immediately took the measures which he had carefully +planned in advance. By dawn of 25 June, French troops with artillery +had occupied all the heights round the town: they were to stay there as +long as M. Venizelos wanted them--and, perhaps, even longer.[13] + +{204} + +Under such conditions the People's Chosen formed his Ministry (26 +June), and nerved himself to face the people. Every preparation for +his entry into the capital had been made. Nothing remained but to fix +the hour. But this he evaded doing in a manner which puzzled and +exasperated the French General. It was the goal towards which they had +moved steadily and methodically, step tracing step, through so many +weary months--the crown of their joint adventure. Why, then, did he +not seize it? Why did he shrink from possession? What did he mean by +it? The General did not know. But he felt that it would not do. "M. +le President," he said to him, incisively, "Here you are in power; it +is up to you to assume the responsibility. I have the force in my +hands, and it is my business to secure your installation in Athens. +But I must have your instructions. Tell me what measures you want me +to take." The request was a command. M. Venizelos thanked the General +effusively, pressing his hands. "After all," he said, "it is certain +that people will always say that I did not return to Athens but with +the support of the Allies." Finally it was arranged that he should +land in the forenoon of 27 June. An ordeal which could not be avoided +ought not to be postponed. + +At the appointed hour the French troops entered Athens with their +machine-guns and occupied the principal points along the route by which +M. Venizelos was to proceed, while the vicinity of the Royal Palace +where he was to take the oath of office and the interior of it were +watched by 400 Cretan gendarmes, his faithful bodyguard, come from +Salonica. Notwithstanding all these precautions, M. Venizelos and his +Ministers, modestly averse from exposing themselves to the enthusiasm +of their fellow-citizens, motored at top speed straight to the Palace, +eschewing the central thoroughfares, and thence to the Hotel Grande +Bretagne, in the corridors of which also Cretan stalwarts mounted +guard. Thanks to this vigilance, as General Regnault observes, the +assassins whom the Premier and his friends feared to see rise from +every street corner, and even in the passages of the Palace and hotel, +had not materialized. But M. Venizelos, where his own life was +concerned, took no chances: a Cretan regiment {205} from Salonica +landed that afternoon to replace the foreign battalions.[14] + +Towards evening a demonstration organized in the square before the +hotel gave M. Venizelos an opportunity of appearing on the balcony and +making an eloquent speech. He reminded his hearers how the last +warning he had addressed to King Constantine from the balcony of his +house ten months ago had been disregarded, and how, in consequence, the +part of the nation still healthy had risen to save the rest. The cure +thus begun would go on until it had wrought out its accomplishment. In +due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to revise the +Constitution so as to place beyond peradventure the sovereignty of the +people. Meanwhile, the national system had been singularly enfeebled +and corrupted by the late autocratic regime: the public services did +not do their work as they ought; impurities had crept into the blood; +the body politic needed purging. He would put all this right. He +would restore the system to vigorous activity. Every impurity would be +cleansed from it, and pure, refreshed blood would circulate all over +the body politic, giving health to every fibre of the State. As to +matters external, he thought it needless to say that the place of +Greece was by the side of the Powers who fought for democracy.[15] + +The next two days saw this programme at work. + +A rupture of relations with the Central Empires, to be followed by a +mobilization, marked the end of Greek neutrality. King Alexander, as +yet a novice in statecraft, expressed surprise at the inconsistency +between these acts and the repeated assurances given to the Greek +people. He was told that the accession of M. Venizelos could mean +nothing else but war: his Majesty knew it: having accepted Venizelos, +he must accept his foreign policy.[16] + +Not less was the young king's shock at another act of the new +Government--the suspension, by a Royal Decree, of the irremovability of +judges which is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. "They +accused my father of {206} violating the Constitution," he said to M. +Jonnart, "and the first thing they ask me to do is to violate it." So +acute an interpreter of Constitutional Law could have small difficulty +in disposing of these scruples. He explained to the young monarch that +he could sign the decree without any compunction: the Constituent +Assembly which would be elected by and by to revise the Constitution +would legitimatize everything. He went on to give him a little, simple +lecture on the elements of Constitutional Verity, its theory and its +practice: "In a short time," he concluded suavely, "Your Majesty will +know on this subject as much as any of your Ministers,"--whenever he +experienced the need of further instruction, he only had to call the +High Commissioner, who promised to come and solve his perplexities in a +trice.[17] + +The soundness of the instruction might be questionable. But the source +from which it came gave it unquestionable weight. + +By the time M. Jonnart left Athens (7 July), he had every reason to +feel gratified at the complete success of his efforts. France's +protégé was installed at the head of the Hellenic Nation, ready to lead +it forth by her side; the regular working of Constitutional +institutions was assured; and the foundations of a democratic +government were well and truly laid. In all history it would be +difficult to find a more signal instance of brute force and bad faith +triumphing in the name of Law and Verity. + + + +[1] Reuter, Athens, 16 June, 1917; Jonnart, pp. 137-40. + +[2] Jonnart, pp. 147-51, 179-80. + +[3] See Art. 4 of the Greek Constitution. + +[4] Jonnart, p. 147. + +[5] _Ibid_, p. 160. + +[6] _Ibid_, p. 170. + +[7] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327. + +[8] Jonnart, p. 159. + +[9] Sarrail, pp. 102, 153, 234-5. One of their quarrels arose from the +fact that General Sarrail claimed entire jurisdiction over the +inhabitants of the country, many of whom he had deported to France as +suspects and refused to give them up to the courts competent to deal +with them. + +[10] Reuter, Athens, 21 June, 1917. + +[11] Jonnart, p. 161. + +[12] Jonnart, pp. 162-73, 180-1. + +[13] Jonnart, pp. 176-8, 199-201. The Italians, who had stepped into +Epirus, only evacuated it when they made sure that their allies were +quitting Thessaly and Attica. + +[14] Regnault, pp. 100-2; Jonnart, p. 184; The _Morning Post_, 29 June, +1917. + +[15] Jonnart, pp. 185-90. + +[16] _Ibid_, pp.191-3, 195-6. + +[17] Jonnart, pp. 194-5. + + + + +{207} + +CHAPTER XX + +It is not my intention to give a minute and consecutive account of the +abnormal state which prevailed in Greece during a period of more than +three years. I will, for once, flatter its authors by imitating their +summary methods. + +M. Venizelos, hating monarchy, yet unable to dispense with it; +despising democracy, yet obliged to render it lip-homage; maintained +his own unlimited power by the same system of apparent liberty and real +violence by which he had attained it. The semblance of a free +Constitution was preserved in all its forms: Crown, Parliament, Press, +continued to figure as heretofore. But each only served to clothe the +skeleton of a dictatorship as absolute as that of any Caesar. King +Alexander, without experience or character, weak, frivolous and +plastic, obediently signed every decree presented to him. When +recourse to the Legislature was thought necessary, the Chamber +perfunctorily passed every Bill submitted to it. The newspapers were +tolerated as long as they refrained from touching on essentials. + +At the very opening of Parliament, for so we must call this +illegitimate assembly, the King, in a Speech from the Throne written by +M. Venizelos, expounded his master's policy, external and internal. +Externally, Greece had "spontaneously offered her feeble forces to that +belligerent group whose war aims were to defend the rights of +nationalities and the liberties of peoples." [1] Internally, she would +have to be purified by the removal of the staunchest adherents of the +old regime from positions of trust and influence. But neither of these +operations could be carried out save under the reign of terror known as +martial law. Parliament, therefore, voted martial law; and M. +Venizelos, "irritated by the arbitrary proceedings" {208} of the +Opposition, which protested against the restrictions on public opinion, +"emphasised the fact that the Government was determined to act with an +iron hand and to crush any attempt at reaction." [2] + +Never was promise more faithfully kept. Within the Chamber it soon +became a parliamentary custom to refute by main force. Sometimes +Liberal Deputies volunteered for this service; sometimes it was +performed by the Captain of the Premier's Cretan Guard, who of course +had no seat in the House, but who held a revolver in his hand. + +Out of Parliament the iron hand made itself felt through the length and +breadth of the country. + +With a view to "purging and uplifting the judiciary body" and "securing +Justice from political interference," [3] all the courts were swept +clean of Royalist magistrates, whose places were filled with members of +the Liberal Party. In this way the pernicious connexion between the +judicial and political powers, abolished in 1909--perhaps the most +beneficial achievement of the Reconstruction era--was re-established, +and Venizelism became an indispensable qualification for going to law +with any chance of obtaining justice. + +An equally violent passion for purity led at the same time, and by a +process as unconstitutional as it was uncanonical, to ecclesiastical +reforms, whereby the Holy Synod was deposed and an extraordinary +disciplinary court was erected to deal with the clerical enemies of the +new regime, especially with the prelates who took part in the +anathematization of M. Venizelos. Only five bishops were found in Old +Greece competent or compliant enough to sit on this tribunal; the other +seven came from Macedonia, Crete, and Mytilene, though those dioceses +were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose +sanction was neither asked nor given. With the exception of six, five +of whom belonged to the disciplinary court, all the prelates of the +Kingdom were struck by it: some were degraded and turned out to subsist +as they might, on charity or by the sale of their holy vestments; +others were sentenced to humiliating punishments; and {209} where no +plausible excuse for a trial could be discovered, exile or confinement +was inflicted arbitrarily. On the other hand, as many as repented +received plenary absolution. For instance, the Bishops of Demetrias +and Gytheion were deprived for having cursed M. Venizelos; but on +promising in future to preach the gospel according to him, they were +not only pardoned, but nominated members of the second disciplinary +court created to continue the purification of the Church. Even more +instructive was the case of the Metropolitan of Castoria who was tried, +convicted, and confined in a monastery, but after recanting his +political heresies was retried, unanimously acquitted, and reinstated. +All this, in the words of the Speech from the Throne, "to restore the +prestige of the Church." + +Side by side went on the reform of every branch of the Administration. +All the Prefects, and many lesser functionaries, were discharged. +Schoolmasters and schoolmistresses were dismissed by the hundred. The +National University, the National Library, the National Museum, the +National Bank, underwent a careful disinfection. In every Department +the worst traditions of the spoils system prevalent before 1909 were +revived and reinvigorated. Other measures marked an improvement on +tradition. Some two thousand Army and Navy officers, from generals and +admirals downwards, were put on the retired list or under arrest. And +an almost hysterical desire manifested itself to strike terror into +every civilian whom his opinions rendered objectionable and his +position dangerous to the new order: tactics the full brutality of +which was revealed in the treatment of M. Venizelos's principal +adversaries. + +M. Rufos, a former Cabinet Minister, languished in the Averoff gaol +from 1917 until the spring of 1920, when the Athenian newspapers +announced his release. About the same time M. Esslin, an ex-President +of the Chamber, who had been imprisoned at the age of seventy-eight in +the Syngros gaol, was released by death. + +All the members of the Skouloudis Cabinet, with the exception of +Admiral Coundouriotis, Minister of Marine who had afterwards proved his +patriotism by enlisting under the Cretan's banner, were arraigned for +high treason, {210} referring mainly to the surrender of Fort Rupel. +The preliminary examination dragged on from year to year and produced +only evidence which established the innocence of the accused.[4] One +of them, ex-Premier Rallis, in April 1920, after being for years +libelled as a traitor, suddenly found himself exempted by Royal Decree +from further persecution, because at that time M. Venizelos conceived +the hope that this statesman might be induced to undertake the +leadership of an Opposition accepting his regime. The rest, +particularly M. Skouloudis and M. Dragoumis, one aged eighty-two and +the other seventy-seven, after a long confinement in the Evangelismos +Hospital, remained to the end under strict surveillance, with gendarmes +guarding their houses and dogging their footsteps. + +The Lambros Cabinet was similarly harassed, until one of its members +turned Venizelist and three others died; among the latter M. Lambros +himself and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Zalocostas. Both +these gentlemen, though in poor health, had been confined on desolate +islets of the Archipelago, where they were kept without proper medical +attendance or any of the comforts which their condition required, and +were only brought home to expire. + +In each case--as also in that of the soldiers responsible for the +surrender of the Cavalla garrison, whose "treasonable" conduct became +likewise the subject of judicial investigation--trial was sedulously +deferred by a variety of ingenious contrivances; nothing being more +remote from the Government's mind than an intention to draw the truth +into the light. The motive of these proceedings doubtless was one of +policy chiefly--to ruin the enemies of the regime in public esteem by +branding them as traitors, even if no conviction could be obtained. +But policy was not the only element. To judge by the harshness +displayed, there was the personal factor, too. M. Venizelos had had a +feud with these men and had vanquished them. They were men whom, all +things considered, it was more a shame to fight than an honour to +vanquish--and they were humbled: they were in his power. For a proud +spirit that would have been enough; it was not enough for {211} M. +Venizelos. He acted as if he wanted to enjoy their humiliation, and +because he had them down to profit by their helplessness. + +Identical treatment could not be meted out to those in Corsica and +Switzerland, though some of them were sentenced to death by default for +conspiring against M. Venizelos. But all that could be done from a +distance to embitter their lot was done. Whilst at home the blackest +calumnies were thrown upon them: in exile they were pursued by the same +blight. Special attention was directed to the "arch-traitor." He had +been dethroned and expatriated; but this was not enough. His pension +was cut off. He and all the members of his family, with the exception +of Prince George, who stayed in Paris, were forbidden to visit Entente +countries, even for the purpose of attending the death-bed of a +relative. Entente subjects visiting Switzerland were forbidden to go +near them: lest any particle of the truth should percolate. Until the +end of the War they lived segregated, shunned, and spied upon like +malefactors. During the Liberal regime in Greece, while Italian and +Swiss hotels flourished all the year round on Royalist refugees, +Royalist exiles populated the semi-desert islands of the Archipelago: +they were gathered in batches and shipped off--persons of every degree, +from general officers whose guilt was attachment to their King, down to +poor people convicted of owning the King's portrait. For the +possession of a portrait of Constantine supplied one of the most common +proofs of "ill-will towards the established order" (_dysmeneia kafa tou +kathestotos_)--a new crime invented to meet a new constitutional +situation. It extended to the utmost confines of the kingdom. As the +farmers were at work in the fields, gendarmes raided and ransacked +their cottages for such portraits; butchers and fishmongers were haled +before courts-martial for like indications of ill-will; and--matter for +laughter and matter for tears are inseparable in modern Greek history +(perhaps in all history)--one met a cabman beaten again and again for +calling his horse "Cotso" (diminutive of "Constantine"), or a woman +dragged to the police-station because her parrot was heard whistling +the Constantine March. Volumes would be needed to record the petty +persecutions which arose from {212} the use of that popular name: +suffice it to say that prudent parents refrained from giving it to +their children. + +If enemies had to be frightened by every exhibition of severity, it was +not less imperative to gratify friends by every mark of generosity. As +already noted, a Mixed Commission had been appointed under the old +regime to indemnify out of the public purse the Venizelists who +suffered during the Athens disturbances of 1 and 2 December, 1916. +This body, after the expulsion of the King, was remodelled by the +substitution of a Venizelist for the Royalist Greek member; was +authorized to enlarge its purview so as to cover all losses occasioned, +directly or indirectly, by Royalist resentment throughout the Kingdom +throughout the six months' blockade--including even the cases of +persons who, compelled to flee the country, were torpedoed in the +course of their voyage; and was invested with powers of deciding +unfettered by any legislation or by any obligation to give reasons for +its decisions. Thanks to their unlimited scope and discretion, the +Commissioners, after rejecting some 2,500 claims as fraudulent, were +still able to admit 3,350 claims and to allot damages representing a +total sum of just under seven million drachmas.[5] + +The number of old adherents confirmed in the faith through this +expedient, however, was as nothing to the legions of proselytes won by +the creation of new Government posts of every grade in every part of +the Kingdom, by the facilities afforded in the transaction of all +business over which the State had any control--which under existing +conditions meant all important business--and by the favours of various +sorts that were certain to reward devotion to the cause. Beside the +steadily growing swarm of native parasites, profiteers, jobbers and +adventurers who throve on the spoils of the public, marched a less +numerous, but not less ravenous, host of foreign financiers, concession +and contract hunters, to whom the interests of the State were freely +bartered for support to the party in the Entente capitals. + +The economic exhaustion caused by this reckless waste of national +wealth, in addition to the necessary war {213} expenditure, was +concealed at the time partly by credits furnished to M. Venizelos in +Paris and London, and partly by an artificial manipulation of the +exchange for his sake. It became apparent when these political +influences ceased to interfere with the normal working of financial +laws. Then the Greek exchange, which at the outbreak of the European +War stood at 26 or 27 drachmas to the pound sterling, and later was +actually against London, dropped to 65, and by a rapid descent reached +the level of 155. Thus in the domain of finance, as in every other, +the valuable reconstructive achievement of 1909--which had led to the +transformation of a deficit of from ten to twelve millions into a +surplus of fifteen millions and to the accumulation of deposits that +enabled the Greek exchange to withstand the shock of several +conflicts--was demolished by its own architect. + +The illusion that M. Venizelos had the nation behind him was diligently +kept up by periodical demonstrations organized on his behalf: joy bells +announced to the Athenians his home-comings from abroad, the destitute +refugees harboured at the Piraeus were given some pocket money and a +free ticket to attend him up to the capital, the cafés at the bidding +of the police disgorged their loafers into the streets, and the army of +genuine partisans thus augmented with auxiliaries, accorded their Chief +a reception calculated to impress newspaper readers in France and +England. But observers on the spot knew that the "national enthusiasm" +was as hollow as a drum, which under the manipulation of an energetic +minority could be made to emit a considerable amount of noise; that the +demonstrators to a large extent were a stage crowd which could be moved +rapidly from place to place and round the same place repeatedly; that +since the schism the great Cretan had loomed small in his own country +and that he had grown less by his elevation. + +Such terrorism of opponents and favouritism of adherents; such +encouragement of oppression and connivance at corruption; such a +prostitution of justice; such a cynical indifference to all moral +principle--unparalleled even in the history of Greece--could not but +make the Cretan's rule both odious and despicable. What made it more +hateful still in the eyes of the people was the fact {214} that it had +been imposed upon them by foreign arms, and what made it more +contemptible still was the fact that it functioned under false +pretences. As free men, the Greeks resented the violence done to their +liberty; but as intelligent men they would have resented open violence +less than a profanation of the name of liberty that added mockery to +injury and administered a daily affront to their intelligence. There +was yet a spirit of resistance in the country which would not be +crushed, and a fund of good sense which could not be deceived. If they +formerly anathematized M. Venizelos as a traitor, the masses now +execrated him as a tyrant: a mean and crafty bully without bowels of +mercy who gave licence to his followers to commit every species of +oppression and exploitation in the interest of party. + +Such were the feelings with which the very name of Venizelos inspired +the mass of the people. And that the mass of the people was in the +main right can scarcely be contested. It would, of course, be absurd +to hold M. Venizelos directly responsible for every individual act of +oppression and corruption, most of which occurred during his absences +from the country and of which he was not cognizant. But it was he who +had initiated both oppression and corruption. M. Jonnart's +prescriptive lists were really M. Venizelos's, who had long since made +his own enemies pass for enemies to the Entente. The "purification" of +the public services, as well as the prosecutions, the imprisonments and +deportations of eminent personages, some of whom died of the hardships +and privations they underwent, were his own doing. The multiplication +of offices and officials began with his creation, at the very outset, +of two new Ministries; a measure to which even King Alexander demurred +when the list of M. Venizelos's Cabinet was presented to him.[6] Nor +is there upon record a single case in which the Chief seriously +attempted either to restrain or to punish his subordinates. In truth, +he was not free to do so. He was bound to the system he had brought +into being and was irretrievably committed to all its works. + +A man who gains supreme power against the wishes of {215} the majority, +and only with the consent of a faction, cannot maintain himself in it +except by force and bribery. He must coerce and corrupt. Moreover, to +rule without a rival, he must surround himself with men vastly inferior +to him both in talent and in virtue: men who, in return for their +obsequious servility, must be humoured and satisfied. Whenever such a +usurpation occurs, all the maxims upon which the welfare and freedom of +a community normally rest are annihilated, and the reign of profligacy +and of tyranny inevitably supervenes: a regime born in party passion +must live for purely party ends. + +We may break or circumvent all laws, save the eternal and immutable law +of cause and effect.[7] + +The best of M. Venizelos's followers sincerely regretted the unceasing +persecution of their adversaries: they saw that stability could not be +attained without conciliation and co-operation; but they did not see +how clemency could be combined with safety. The thousands of officers +and officials who had been turned out of their posts, and the +politicians who were kept out of office found employment, and the +private individuals who had suffered for their "ill-will towards the +established order" relief in plotting and intriguing: there was so much +unrest that the authorities had to use severe measures. + +M. Venizelos himself wished to make his administration milder and +cleaner and to broaden its basis--he was even credited with the one +joke of his life in this connexion: "I will yet head anti-Venizelism." +But the thing was beyond his power: he had not a sufficient following +in the country to replace armed force; and he dared not trust the +Royalists with a share in the government for fear lest they should use +it against him. None, indeed, was more painfully conscious of the hate +for him which every month increased in the breasts of his countrymen +than M. Venizelos himself. From the very beginning of the schism he +had assumed a prophylactic in the form of a cuirass;[8] and since his +installation he neglected none of {216} the precautions requisite for +his personal security. During his rare sojourns in Athens he always +went about escorted by his Cretan guards; while on the roof of a +building facing his house stood two machine-guns, "for," as a witty +Athenian informed an inquisitive stranger, "the protection of +minorities." + +In general, it is true, the plotting and intriguing which permeated the +country were too fatuous to be dangerous. But every now and then they +took on formidable shape. In November, 1919, a carefully organized +military conspiracy at Athens only miscarried through the indiscretion +of a trusty but tipsy sergeant. Among the letters intercepted and +produced at the trial was one from a Royalist exile in Italy to another +at home. The writer, a lady, reported her brother as wondering how +anybody in Greece could fail to understand that there no longer existed +such things as a Government and an Opposition, but only tyrants and +tyrannized over, who worked, the former to maintain their arbitrary +authority, the latter to shake it off and recover their liberty. The +work of neither could, in the nature of things, be carried on according +to any constitutional rule or law. He went on to argue that, under +such conditions, deeds which would otherwise be crimes were justified +and even glorified by history as unavoidable fulfilments of a patriotic +duty: force must be met by force.[9] + +So the national demoralization inaugurated by foreign pressure went on +being promoted by domestic tyranny; and of cure there was no hope. +Good men would not associate themselves with the Venizelist regime, +because it was bad; and even men by no means notorious for goodness +shunned it, not because it was bad, but because they were shrewd enough +to perceive it was too bad to last. + + + +[1] For the full text of the Speech, see _The Hesperia_, 10 Aug., 1917. + +[2] The _Morning Post_, 9 Aug., 1917. + +[3] Speech from the Throne. + +[4] It also brought to light documents of real historic value, such as +the dispatches included in the _White Book_ (Nos. 70 foll.). + +[5] _Rapport officiel de la Commission mixte des indemnités_, Paris, +1919. + +[6] Jonnart, p. 183: "A clean sweep in Greece."--The _Daily Chronicle_, +2 July, 1917--an outline of M. Venizelos's programme. + +[7] There have been usurpers, like Oliver Cromwell, who managed to +temper tyranny with probity; but their cases are exceptional and their +success only a matter of degree. + +[8] An article of this kind was found in his house after the fighting +of 2 Dec., 1916. + +[9] _The Hestia_, 27 Dec. (O.S.), 1919. + + + + +{217} + +CHAPTER XXI + +The Liberal regime, having few roots in the soil and those rotten, could +not but be ephemeral, unless the external force that had planted +continued to uphold it: in which case M. Venizelos might have lived to +weep over the triumph of his cause and the ruin of his country. This +contingency, however, was eliminated in advance by the clashing ambitions +of the Allies--the real guarantee of Greek independence. Foreign +interference, made possible by the War, had to cease with it. And that +was not all. M. Ribot, on 16 July, 1917, had declared in the French +Senate that the changes brought about in Greece would have to be ratified +by a Greek National Assembly. M. Venizelos also had, as we saw, stated +on his advent that the 1915 Chamber was but a temporary solution: that in +due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to settle matters--a +statement which he repeated shortly afterwards in Parliament: "The +representatives of the Nation," he said, "watch with perfect calmness the +internal evolution of the political life of the country and wait for the +removal of the obstacles which do not permit the immediate convocation of +the National Assembly that will lay definitely the basis of the State." + +After nearly three years of "internal evolution," the time for the +redemption of these pledges seemed to the people overdue. In vain did M. +Venizelos endeavour to put off the day of trial by arguing that it was +advisable to avoid the agitation inseparable from an election whilst +Greece was still at war with Turkey, and by promising that the elections +would follow close upon the signature of peace. It was natural that he +should adopt this course: he could not but hope that the fruits of his +foreign policy--fruits never even dreamt of a few years before--would +reconcile the people to his domestic administration. It was equally +natural that the people should be impatient: {218} Turkey may not sign +peace for ages, they protested; meanwhile are we to go on living under +martial law? They demanded the dissolution of the illegal and, at best, +long superannuated Chamber, and fresh elections. The call for freedom +grew louder, more insistent, more imperious and dangerous, until M. +Venizelos took a first tentative step towards a return to normality. + +On 6 May, 1920--the day of the publication of the Turkish Peace terms +granted by the Allies at San Remo--a Royal Decree was issued at Athens +abolishing martial law. As at a signal, the Press turned its +search-lights on the inroads made into the Constitution. Abuses and +excesses hitherto held back by the Censorship gained publicity. +Political groups started organizing themselves for the electoral contest, +with every grievance of the past as an incitement to action in the +future. Most disturbing manifestation of all--though one that might have +been foretold--streets and taverns resounded again with the song in which +King Constantine was referred to as "The Son of the Eagle" leading his +army to glory. Evidently the efforts to root up loyalism had not +succeeded: far from it. + +While M. Venizelos grew less by his elevation, King Constantine was +raised by his humiliation to a condition, if not actually divine, +half-way towards divinity. In many a house his portrait stood among the +holy icons, with a light burning before it, and the peasants worshipped +it much as their pagan ancestors would have done. It was but the +culmination of a process long at work--a process in which the historical +element was strangely mingled with the mythical.[1] Since the Balkan +Wars, King Constantine had been identified in the peasant mind with the +last Byzantine _Basileus_--his namesake, Constantine Palaeologus, slain +by the Turks in 1453; who, according to a widely believed legend, lay in +an enchanted sleep waiting for the hour when he should wake, break with +his sword the chains of slavery, and replant the cross {219} on the dome +of Saint Sophia. This singular fancy--whether a case of resurrection or +of reincarnation, is not clear--was strengthened by the fact that his +fall occurred on the very anniversary (29 May/11 June) of the day on +which that unfortunate Emperor fell in the ramparts of Constantinople. +The coincidence completed the association between the monarch who +sacrificed his life to save his people from subjection and the monarch +who, after leading his army in two victorious campaigns and doubling the +extent of his country, did not hesitate to sacrifice his crown to save +his people from disaster. Henceforth, even in minds not prone to +superstition, the two events were linked by the same date, the mourning +for the one rekindled the memory of the other, and King Constantine +acquired a new and imperishable title to the gratitude of the nation. If +all the efforts made in the past to blast his glory or to belittle his +services had only heightened his popularity, all the efforts made since +to blot out his image could only engrave it still deeper on the hearts of +the people. His very exile was interpreted, symbolically, as the +enchanted sleep whence he would arise to fulfil the ancient prophecies. + +Mysticism apart, during the sad period preceding his departure, the +affection of the masses for their sovereign, intensified by compassion, +had assumed the quality of veneration. Now that he was gone, they +brooded over the wrongs which had driven him, a lawful and popular king, +into exile: wrongs which suffered for their sakes enhanced his claims on +their loyalty. They remembered wistfully the splendour of his victories, +his manly courage, his saintly patience, and perhaps most of all his +unfailing kindness to the humble and the weak. This was the quality +which drew men most strongly to Constantine, and the absence of which +repelled them most from M. Venizelos.[2] The experience of the last +three years had helped to emphasize the contrast: when the Eagle's Son +was up above, there were few vultures in the land; now there were +vultures only. So the name of Constantine became a synonym for orderly +government, loyalty to his person was identified with the principle of +liberty, and the people who had never regarded Alexander as anything more +than {220} a regent, who cried after the departing monarch from the shore +at Oropus: "You shall come back to us soon," hailed the return to +normality as presaging the return of the legitimate sovereign as well as +of a legal Constitution. + +This, however, was the very last thing the powers that were contemplated +even as a remote potentiality. For them the monarch in exile was dead; +and the sooner his memory was buried the better. Accordingly, a police +circular, issued on 26 May, prohibited conversations favourable to the +ex-king, pictures of the ex-king, songs in honour of the ex-king, cheers +for the ex-king. And, these regulations having been found insufficient +to curb royalist fervour, five days later M. Venizelos demanded and +obtained from Parliament the re-establishment of martial law, on the +ground that "talk about the return of the ex-king was calculated to +excite public feeling; and then the Opposition might have cause to blame +the Government for not respecting the freedom of elections." The +question of the ex-king, he argued, was utterly irrelevant to the +forthcoming contest: the people would not be called upon to elect a +Constituent, but merely a Revisionist Assembly: "Who has said there is to +be a Constituent Assembly?" he asked. + +The answer, of course, was easy: he himself had said so, on his +installation in 1917. But lapses of memory are permissible to statesmen +who mean business. M. Venizelos wanted a National Assembly which would +have powers to ratify the dethronement of the King, the suspension of the +irremovability of judges, and all other revolutionary illegalities, +besides perhaps altering fundamental articles of the Constitution--such +as the right of the Crown to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to +dissolve Parliaments--powers which essentially belong to a Constituent +Assembly. But he wanted it to be merely Revisionist. The paradox made +havoc of his logic; but it no way affected his purpose; which was that, +while as Constituent in its nature the Assembly should effect any +alterations in the government of the country that he desired, as +Revisionist in name it would not be competent to discuss the restoration +of the King, and, if it proved recalcitrant, would be subject to +dissolution by the {221} executive. Consistency and M. Venizelos had +been divorced long ago, and the decree was now to be made absolute. + +While these eccentricities prevailed at home, abroad the gamester-spirit +of the Cretan scored its crowning triumph. By the Treaty of Sèvres (10 +Aug., 1920), which embodied the territorial arrangements already made at +San Remo, Greece obtained practically the whole of Thrace outside the +enclave of Constantinople, and a mandate over Smyrna and its hinterland. +No doubt, this enormous extension of the kingdom, though still largely +problematical, appealed to that compound of idealism and greed (mostly +greed) which constitutes Hellenic, as it does all other, Imperialism. +But it did not fully compensate for the suppression of popular liberties +within its frontiers. Except among the followers of M. Venizelos the +national aggrandisement evoked but little enthusiasm: "What is a man +profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" wrote +one of the Opposition leaders, voicing a widespread sentiment--a +sentiment which, only two days after the publication of the Treaty (12 +Aug.), found sinister expression. As he was about to leave Paris, M. +Venizelos was shot at and slightly wounded by two Greek ex-officers. The +assailants, on being arrested, declared that their object had been "to +free Greece from its oppressor and to ensure freedom for their +fellow-citizens." [3] + +The Paris outrage had a sequel at Athens, as significant and more tragic. +The followers of M. Venizelos, like those of King Constantine, included a +set of fanatics who preached that the salvation of the country demanded +the extirpation of their adversaries. To these zealots the moment seemed +propitious for putting their doctrine into practice. "Hellenes!" cried +one of their journals, "our great Chief, our great patriot, the man who +has made Greece great and prosperous, the man who has made us proud to be +called Greeks, has been murdered by the instruments of the ex-King. +Hellenes, rise up all of you, and drive the murderers out of the +fatherland." The Hellenes in general remained unmoved. But some gangs +of hooligans did rise up (13 Aug.) and, under the eyes of the police and +the _gendarmerie_, wrecked a number of Royalist newspaper {222} offices, +clubs, cafés, and sacked the houses of four prominent anti-Venizelist +statesmen. The authorities, on their side, had a dozen leaders of +Opposition groups thrown into prison and, pending their conviction, M. +Repoulis, a Minister who in the absence of M. Venizelos acted as his +Deputy, declared that the attempt on the Premier formed part of a plot +long-planned for the overthrow of the regime: it had failed, but the +heads of the culprits would fall without fail. In fact, one of the +Opposition leaders--Ion Dragoumis, son of the ex-Premier of that +name--was assassinated by the Cretan guards who had arrested him. The +others, after being kept in solitary confinement for twenty-four days, +had to be released for want of any incriminating evidence. + +M. Venizelos in Paris, when he heard of the riots, was reported as being +beside himself with righteous indignation; and he sent a strongly-worded +telegram to the Government, expressing the fear that part of the +responsibility for the disorders rested upon its organs, and assuring it +that he should exact full account from everyone concerned.[4] But when +he returned home he publicly embraced M. Repoulis, who explained in the +Chamber to the entire satisfaction of his Chief that the Government had +been overawed and very nearly overthrown by the extremists in its own +ranks (8 Sept.). + +Everything that could be done--short of a massacre--to disorganize and to +intimidate the Opposition having been done, martial law was suspended (7 +Sept.), and the question of Elections began to engage M. Venizelos's +attention seriously. It was a trial which involved his political life or +death, and therefore required the utmost care and vigilance: one +ill-considered step, one omission on his part might send him to his doom. + +He began with the enfranchisement of Thrace (9 Sept.). This province, +still under military occupation and martial law, was to vote: further, a +political frontier was erected between it and the rest of Greece, which +only those possessing a special pass could cross, whilst a rigorous +censorship kept all anti-Venizelist newspapers out of it; and, lastly, it +was enacted, for the benefit of an electorate alien in its majority and +unable to read or write Greek, that the {223} Thracian votes, contrary to +the general rule, should be polled by ballot paper, instead of by a ball. + +Another Bill enabled the army on active service, for the first time in +the history of Greece, to participate in elections, the assumption being +that among the soldiers Venizelist feeling predominated, or that, at all +events, they would be controlled by their officers. + +As exceptional importance has always attached to the district and city of +Athens--"which," M. Venizelos said, "symbolizes the very soul of the +country," [5]--it was incumbent upon him to pay special attention to this +area. The difficulty was that the actual population was notoriously +unsympathetic. M. Venizelos hastened to overcome this difficulty by +three strokes of the pen: 18,000 refugees from all parts who lived on the +Ministry of Public Relief were enrolled as Athenian citizens; to these +were added some 6,000 Cretan gendarmes and policemen; and, to make up the +deficiency, 15,000 natives of Smyrna, supposed to have earned Greek +citizenship by volunteering in the war, had their names inscribed on the +electoral lists of Attica. + +There followed promises and warnings. On the one hand, the people were +promised fresh labour legislation, the conversion of the great landed +estates into small holdings, and public works on a large scale. On the +other hand, they were warned that an adverse vote from them would have +disastrous consequences for the country: Greece had been aggrandized by +the Allies for the sake of M. Venizelos; if she discarded him, she would +forfeit their goodwill and her territorial acquisitions. But M. +Venizelos and his partisans did not trust altogether to the practical +sense and the Imperialist sensibilities of the people. + +For months past the extremists among his followers openly threatened +that, if by any mishap Venizelos did not win the day after all, they +would make a _coup d'état_ and strike terror into the hearts of their +adversaries. This threat, which primarily presented itself as an +extravagance of irresponsible fanaticism, was on 7 September officially +espoused by M. Venizelos, who declared in Parliament that, should +perchance his adversaries obtain a majority in the new Assembly, and +should that Assembly decide {224} to convoke a Constituent Assembly, and +should this Constituent Assembly invite King Constantine back, the +"Reaction" would find itself confronted with the hostility of a large +political party which had become the mortal enemy of the ex-king; and he +went on to foreshadow a fresh schism in the army: that is, civil war. +Encouraged by so solemn a sanction, Venizelist candidates--notably at +Tyrnavo in Thessaly and Dervenion in Argolis--told their constituents +without any circumlocution that, in the event of a defeat at the polls, +the Government would not surrender its power, but would maintain it +through the Army of National Defence, which was pledged to a new +Revolution: the Parliamentary system would cease to function even in +name, and many a malignant would swing. + +These appeals to the sovereign people, published in the Royalist and not +contradicted by the Venizelist Press, will doubtless seem startling for a +Government whose mission was to establish democratic liberties. But they +were justified by necessity. M. Venizelos and his partisans could not +afford to be very fastidious: their political existence was at stake: +they must make every effort, and summon every resource at their command. +Anyone who was in Athens at that time and saw the Cretan guards, often +with the Premier's photograph pinned on their breasts, assault such +citizens as displayed the olive-twig (emblem of the Opposition), or saw +the gendarmes, who patrolled the streets with fixed bayonets, protect the +excesses of Venizelist bravoes, would appreciate how far the Government +was prepared to stoop in order to survive. + +In the midst of these electoral activities, King Alexander died--of blood +poisoning caused by the bite of a pet monkey. Alive he had neither +exercised nor been wanted to exercise any influence over the destinies of +his country: he had simply played the part required by the cast in which +a whimsical fortune had placed him. His death proved of more importance, +inasmuch as it forced the question of the throne upon M. Venizelos +irresistibly: the vacancy had to be filled. Anxious to perpetuate the +comedy, M. Venizelos sought a successor in a still younger and +less-experienced scion of the dynasty: Prince Paul, a lad in his teens, +who refused the offer on the ground that, until his father and his eldest +brother renounced their rights, {225} he could not lawfully ascend the +throne. After threatening to change the dynasty rather than admit any +discussion on the restoration of King Constantine, M. Venizelos, by one +of those swift turns characteristic of him, suddenly made that +restoration the main issue of the Elections. He challenged the +Opposition to this test of the real wishes of the Greek people. The +Greek people, he said, should be given the chance of deciding whether it +will have Constantine back; and if it so decided, he himself would go. + +The Opposition, which consisted of no fewer than sixteen different groups +united only by a common desire to get rid of the Cretan Dictator, would +fain decline the challenge. Some of the leaders were ardent Royalists; +others were very lukewarm ones; and others still could hardly be +described as Royalists at all. Generally speaking, the politicians out +of office had found in the cause of Constantine a national badge for a +party feud. Moreover, they realized that the question of Constantine +possessed an international as well as a national aspect, and they did not +wish to compromise the future of Greece and their own; which would have +been nothing else than stepping into the very pit M. Venizelos had dug +for them. But neither could they repudiate Constantine without losing +popular support: to the Greek people the main issue of the fight was +indeed what M. Venizelos made it. + +At length the day of trial arrived: a Sunday (14 Nov.)--a day of leisure +in a land of universal suffrage. From an early hour people of all +classes thronged the polling-stations quietly. They had clamoured for a +chance of expressing their sentiments; yet now that the chance had come, +they took it with an extraordinary composure. Even to the most expert +eye the electors' demeanour gave no indication of their sentiments: the +olive-twig had very curiously withered out of sight. Nor did the +behaviour of the voters in the last three years afford any clue to the +use they would make of their present opportunity. Greeks are past +masters of simulation and dissimulation. Openly some might have +pretended friendship to the Venizelist regime from hopes of favour, +others again dissembled hostility through fear; but the voting was secret. + +Both Government and Opposition shared the suspense, {226} though the +Government anticipated an overwhelming majority;[6] which was natural +enough, since all the advantage seemed on its side. + +Presently the votes were counted--and "it was officially announced that +the Government had been mistaken in its anticipations." The magnitude of +the mistake appeared on the publication of the figures: 250 seats to 118: +the Royalists had swept the polls, to the astonishment of all parties, +including their own.[7] The very men who had fought at the bidding of M. +Venizelos had pronounced themselves against him: having fulfilled their +duty as soldiers, they vindicated their right to live as free citizens. +His own constituency had rejected him. And would the rout stop there? +Among the millions who had submitted to his rule with sullen irritation +there were many whose hearts swelled with rage, in whom old wounds +rankled and festered: might not these men now have recourse to other +weapons than the vote in order to get even with the bully? + +For a moment M. Venizelos felt stupefied: the edifice that had seemed so +solid was collapsing about him, and he was in danger of being buried +under the ruins. Then he wisely stole out of the country he had done his +best to aggrandize and to disintegrate.[8] + +The result of the elections was virtually an invitation to King +Constantine to return and resume his crown. But the King, not content +with an indirect verdict, wanted an explicit plebiscite _ad hoc_, clear +of all other issues. The Allies, after a conference in London, +telegraphed (2 Dec.) {227} to M. Rallis, the new Greek Premier, that they +"had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, but they +felt bound to declare publicly that the restoration of the throne to a +king whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the +War caused them great embarrassment and loss could only be regarded by +them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts." [9] This +message--yet another fruit of Franco-British compromise--was followed up +(6 Dec.) by a second Note, enumerating the consequences, political and +financial, of the Powers' displeasure. But it produced little effect: +out of the 1,013,724 electors who took part in the plebiscite (7 Dec.), +only 10,383 voted against the King.[10] M. Rallis, in acquainting him +with the result, stated that he considered it tantamount to a formal +request from the country to the Sovereign to come into his own again, and +invited him to respond to the clearly expressed wish of the nation. +Which King Constantine did, nothing loth. + +Few of those who witnessed the event will ever forget it. On the eve of +the King's return (18 Dec.) Athens could scarcely contain her emotion. +All day long her beflagged streets rang with the cry: "_Erchetai! +Erchetai!_" ("He is coming! He is coming!")--hardly anybody failed to +utter it, and nobody dared to say "_Then erchetai_" ("He is not coming"), +even if referring to an unpunctual friend. At night the song in which +Constantine was alluded to as "The Son of the Eagle" echoed from one end +of the illuminated city to the other. But this was only a preparation +for next morning's welcome. + +Owing to stress of weather the cruiser carrying the King and Queen of the +Hellenes was compelled to put in at Corinth, where the exiles landed. +From that point to the capital their journey was a triumphal progress. +The train moved slowly between lines of peasants who, their hands linked, +accompanied it, shouting: "We have wanted him! We have brought him +back!" [3] When {228} the King stepped out at the station, officers +fought a way to the carriage with blue and silver dressed postillions +which waited for him and the Queen. He had to keep tossing from one hand +to the other his baton, as men and women pressed upon him for a +handshake. The carriage struggled forward, men and women clinging to its +steps and running with it, trying to kiss the hands and feet of the royal +pair, and baulked of this, kissing even the horses and the carriage +itself. All the way dense masses of people pressed round the carriage, +shouting: "He has come!" or singing the chorus, "Again our King will draw +the sword." An eye-witness had a vision of a soldier who, amid cries of +"We will die for you, Godfather!" clambered into the carriage head first +and fell to kissing the knees of the King and Queen, while around people +fainted and stretchers pressed through the crowd.[12] + +And so the fight for the soul of Greece ended in a victory for +Constantine. + +The character of this prince has been painted in the most opposite +colours, as must always be the case when a man becomes the object of +fervent worship and bitter enmity. But the bare record of what he did +and endured reveals him sufficiently. His qualities speak through his +actions, so that he who runs may read. His most conspicuous defect was a +want of suppleness--a certain rigidity of spirit which, when he +succeeded, was called firmness, and when he failed, obstinacy. Yet the +charge so often brought against him, that he allowed himself to be misled +by evil counsellors, shows that this persistence in his own opinion did +not spring from egoism nor was incompatible with deference to the +opinions of others. It arose from a deep sense of responsibility: he +stubbornly refused to deviate from his course when he believed that his +duty to his country forbade deviation, and he readily laid down his crown +when duty to his country dictated renunciation. For the rest, a man who +never posed to his contemporaries may confidently leave his character to +the judgment of posterity. + +As for M. Venizelos, history will probably say of him {229} what it has +said of Themistocles: Though he sincerely aimed at the aggrandizement of +his country, and proved on some most critical occasions of great value to +it, yet on the whole his intelligence was higher than his morality--a man +of many talents and few principles, ready to employ the most tortuous and +unscrupulous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves patriotic, +but often merely for aggrandizing himself. By nature he was more fitted +to rule in a despotic than to lead in a constitutional State. Had he +been born an emperor, his fertile genius might, unless betrayed by his +restless ambition, have rendered his reign prosperous and his memory +precious. As it is, in his career, with all its brilliance, posterity +will find not so much a pattern to imitate as an example to deter. + + + +[1] There is always so much of mystery surrounding the peasant mind, that +its workings must often be accepted rather than understood. But those +who wish to understand somewhat the psychological process which led in +antiquity to the deification of kings during their life-time could not do +better than study the cult of Constantine among the modern Greek +peasantry. + +[2] See Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920. + +[3] The _Daily Mail_, Aug. 13, 1920. + +[4] _Eleutheros Typos_, 5/18 Aug., 1920. + +[5] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327. + +[6] "Even if the Opposition sweeps the Peloponnese and gains a majority +in Acarnania and Corfu, it is still doubtful whether it will have 120 +seats in the new Chamber, which will contain 369 Deputies; and the +Venizelists anticipate that their opponents will emerge from the struggle +with less than 100 Deputies."--_The Times_, 15 Nov., 1920. + +[7] The _Daily Mail_; The _Evening News_, 16 Nov, 1920; Reuter, Athens, +15 Nov.: "Not a single Venizelist was returned for Macedonia and Old +Greece, except in Epirus and Aegean Islands." + +[8] We learn that his followers "urged upon him the advisability of a +_coup d'état_. It would have been the easiest thing in the world to +carry out, and with so much at stake for Greece and for democratic +principles generally, it seemed justifiable."--"M. Venizelos at Nice," in +_The Times_, 29 Nov., 1920. But, "fears are entertained, it is said, +that the regular Army--which is strongly anti-Venizelist--may get out of +hand."--The _Daily Mail_, 17 Nov. + +[9] The terms of the Note were communicated to the House of Commons by +Mr. Bonar Law the same night. + +[10] Reuter, Athens, 9 Dec., 1920. + +[11] Another version of this refrain, which might be seen in crude +lettering over a café at Phaleron, is: "So we willed it, and we brought +him back" (_Etsi to ethelame, kai ton epherame_)--a distinct expression +of the feeling that the people, by bringing back its sovereign in the +face of foreign opposition, asserted its own sovereignty. + +[12] See _The Times_, 20 Dec.; The _Daily Mail_, 21 Dec., 1920. + + + + +{230} + +AFTERWORD + +In default of a Providence whose intervention in human affairs is no +longer recognized, there still is a Nemesis of history whose operations +can scarcely be denied. International morality, strange as the +juxtaposition of the two words may seem, exists no less than the law of +gravity; and a statesman who offends against the one must expect much +the same catastrophe as an engineer who ignores the other. But it is +not often that this law of retribution asserts itself so swiftly as it +has done in the drama for which Greece supplied the stage to French +statesmen during the last few years; for it is not often that a +Government in the pursuit of practical interests overlooks so +completely moral principles, flouts so openly national sentiments, and, +while priding itself on realism, shuts its eyes so consistently to +realities. + +The logic of French action is as above reproach, as its motives are +beyond dispute. + +Nine decades ago the Duc de Broglie clearly explained that the aim of +France in assisting to liberate Greece from the Turkish yoke was to +have in the Eastern Mediterranean an instrument of her own ambition: "a +State disposed to turn her eyes constantly towards that Power who has +made her free--to watch for us over the ports of the Levant, to guard +with us the mouth of the Black Sea and the keys of the Bosphorus +[Transcriber's note: Bosporus?]";--it followed that the greater the +client, the better for the patron's purpose. After undergoing many +fluctuations and modifications, this idea was revived at the time of +the Balkan wars, when France, together with Germany, supported the +Greek claim to Cavalla, and it was fostered to an unhealthy growth +during the European War. Hence the identification of France with M. +Venizelos, who stood for a policy of expansion at all hazards, and her +hostility to King Constantine who, preferring safety to hazardous +ventures, stood for Greece's right to shape her course without +dictation from Paris any more than from Berlin. + +{231} + +By the methods which she employed, France succeeded in gaining Greece +and losing the Greeks. Nothing else could have been expected: friends +are sometimes to be won by good offices; sometimes by the promise of +good offices; and sometimes by good words. They are seldom won by +injuries, and by insults never. It is curious that so elementary a +lesson in human nature should have been unknown to the able men who +guided the policy and diplomacy of France during the War, who raised +her military prestige and re-established her position in the first rank +of the European Powers. Yet it is a fact--a fact which can be easily +verified by a reference to their utterances: they are upon record. +Brute force, and brute force, and again brute force: such is the burden +that runs through them all; and it embodies a doctrine: the Greeks are +Orientals and must be wooed with terror: on the notion, enunciated by +an English humorist as a paradox, and adopted by French statesmen as an +axiom, that terror sown in the Oriental heart will yield a harvest of +esteem--even of affection. With this mad dogma nailed to her mast, +France set out upon her voyage for the conquest of the Hellenic heart. +It was the first of her mistakes--and it was accompanied by another. + +Even if Greece were willing to play the part of a French satellite, she +could not do so; for her geographical situation exposes her to the +influence of more than one Power. Italy, who has her own ambitions in +the Eastern Mediterranean, opposed during the War a policy the object +of which was Greek expansion over territories coveted by herself and a +readjustment of the balance of forces in favour of France; and it was +partly in order not to alienate Italy during the War that French +statesmen wanted Greece to come in without any specified conditions, +leaving the matter of territorial compensations for the time of +settlement. Russia showed herself not less suspicious of French +diplomacy for similar reasons. But it was with England chiefly that +France had to reckon. In the past the rivalry between France and +England in the Eastern Mediterranean, though often overshadowed by +their common antagonism, first to Russia and subsequently to Germany, +was a perennial cause of discord which kept Greece oscillating between +the two Powers. + +{232} + +During the War England, of necessity, lent France her acquiescence and +even assistance in a work which she would rather not have seen done. +But, once done, she endeavoured to secure such profit as was to be +derived therefrom. The Greeks in Asia Minor--it was thought--could +serve to check the Turks from troubling us in Mesopotamia and other +parts of the Near and Middle East. Hence the Treaty of Sèvres, which +provided for the aggrandizement of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman +Empire in Asia as well as in Europe, to the seeming satisfaction of +both French and British interests. But the adjustment--even if it had +been forced upon Turkey--could, by the nature of things, be only +temporary. Owing to her geographical situation, Greece must inevitably +move within the orbit of the Power who dominates the sea. + +Psychology accelerated a movement imposed by geography. While France +based her action upon an English humorist's paradox, England based hers +upon a French thinker's maxim: _Lorsqu'on veut redoubler de force, il +faut redoubles de grâce_. Although her diplomatic, military, and naval +representatives did participate in every measure of coercion and +intimidation as a matter of policy, they (if we except the Secret +Service gentry) never forgot the dictates of decency: they never, +figuratively, kicked the person whom they deemed it necessary to knock +down. The ordinary British soldiers, too, for all the relaxation of +moral rules natural in war, maintained throughout the campaign a +standard of behaviour which contrasted so favourably with their +comrades' that it earned them among the inhabitants of Macedonia the +honourable nickname of "the maids." It was particularly noted during +the fire which devastated Salonica that, while others took advantage of +the turmoil to loot, the British soldier devoted himself wholly to +rescuing. Some of these things were perhaps resented by our allies as +weak, and some were ridiculed as naïve; but they must be judged by +their effect. At the end of the War one nation was respected by the +Greeks as much as the other was hated and despised. British prestige +rose exactly in proportion as French prestige sank. And the object +which France elected to seek, and sought in vain, by {233} means of +violence and terror, England attained by a conduct which, if not more +lawful, was much more graceful. + +Still, French statesmen counted on M. Venizelos--"_l'homme politique +qui incarne l'idée de la solidarité des intérêts français et +grecs_"--to keep his country on their side. And as in the first +instance they had made the alliance conditional on his being placed in +control, so now they made the benefits accruing from it to Greece +dependent on his remaining in control. That M. Venizelos could not +always remain in control does not seem to have occurred to them. Nor +that he might not always be content to be a mere puppet in their hands. +Murmurs at his pro-British leanings were indeed heard occasionally. +But on the whole the Cretan possessed in an adequate measure the +faculty of adapting himself to rival points of view, of making each +Power feel that her interests were supreme in his regard, and of using +the ambitions of both to promote his own. As long as he remained in +control, France, with whatever reservations, felt sure of her share of +influence. + +The collapse of M. Venizelos and the demand of the Greek people for +King Constantine's return, came to French statesmen as a painful +surprise. That they had for several years been laboriously building on +illusions could not be disguised, and being made to look absurd before +those of their own compatriots who had all along advocated a policy +based on the preservation and exploitation of Turkey, rendered the +situation doubly awkward. Unable to rise above personal pique, they +would fain veto the return of a prince whom they hated and whom they +had wronged beyond hope of conciliation. England, however, free from +petty animosities, and sensible that, under whatever ruler, Greece +would be with her, refused to sanction lawlessness in the midst of +peace; and her view that, if the Greeks wanted Constantine, it was +their business and not ours, prevailed. But, on the other hand, by way +of compromise, France obtained that he should return to an empty +treasury, with foreign credits cut off, and the loans made by the +Allies to the Venizelist Government, to facilitate the waging of a +common war against Turkey, revoked. + +It was an impossible position which King Constantine was called upon to +face: a position none of his own making, {234} yet one from which there +was no retreat. The Greek people's imperialism had been roused. The +leaders who once criticized M. Venizelos's Asiatic policy as a +dangerous dream, opposed to economic, strategic, and ethnic realities, +might still hold those views and mutter in secret that Smyrna would +prove the grave of Greece; but they no longer dared express them, out +of deference to public opinion. To the masses M. Venizelos's wild game +of chance seemed vindicated by its results, and while they rejected the +man they clung to his work. + +The Greek Government had no choice but to carry on the conflict under +enormous disadvantages. As France anticipated, with foreign credits +cut off and a progressive fall in the exchange, the expense of +maintaining a large army on a war footing proved too heavy for the +National Exchequer. And that was not the worst. France, who since the +Armistice had betrayed a keen jealousy of England's place in a part of +the world in which she claims special rights, presently concluded a +separate agreement with Turkey--an example in which she was followed by +Italy--and gave the Turks her moral and material support in their +struggle with the Greeks; while England, though refusing to reverse her +policy in favour of their enemies, contented herself with giving the +Greeks only a platonic encouragement, which they were unwise enough to +take for more than it was worth. + +Everyone knows the melancholy sequel: our unhappy "allies," left to +their own exhausted resources, were driven from the Asiatic territories +which in common prudence they should never have entered; and the +overseas Empire which M. Venizelos had conjured up vanished in smoke. + +The rout in Asia Minor had its repercussion in Greece. For nearly two +years the people, though war-worn and on the edge of bankruptcy, bore +the financial as they had borne the famine blockade, trusting that +England would at any moment come forth to counter the vindictiveness of +France, and sturdily resisted all the efforts of the Venizelist party +to shake the stability of the Royalist regime: Constantine again +appeared in their eyes as a victim of the Cretan's intrigues. But the +loss of Ionia and the danger of the loss of Thrace; the horror and +{235} despair arising from the sack of Smyrna, whence shiploads of +broken refugees fled to the Greek ports; all this, reinforced by an +idea that the maintenance of the King on the throne prevented the +effective expression of British friendship and his fall would remove +French hostility, created conditions before which questions of +personalities for once faded into insignificance, and put into the +hands of M. Venizelos's partisans an irresistible lever. + +On 26 September an army of 15,000 insurgent soldiers landed near Athens +and demanded the abdication of the King. The loyal troops were ready +to meet force by force. But the King, in order to avert a fratricidal +struggle which would have dealt Greece the finishing stroke, forbade +opposition and immediately abdicated, "happy," as he said, "that +another opportunity has been given me to sacrifice myself once more for +Greece." In fact, once more Constantine was made the scape-goat for +disasters for which he was in no way responsible--disasters from which +he would undoubtedly have saved his country, had he been allowed to +pursue his own sober course. + +M. Venizelos would not go back to Athens until the excitement subsided, +lest people should think, he said, that he had had any part in the +revolution: but undertook the defence of the national interests in the +Entente capitals. His mission was to obtain such support as would +enable him to save Greece something out of the ruin which his insane +imperialism had brought upon her, so that he might be in a position to +point out to his countrymen that he alone, after the disastrous failure +of Constantine, had been able to secure their partial rehabilitation. +That accomplished, he might then hope to become a perpetual Prime +Minister or President. + +France made it quite clear that no changes in Greece could alter her +policy: however satisfied she might be at the second disappearance of +the antipathetic monarch, it should not be supposed that, even were a +Republic to be set up, presided over by the Great Cretan, her attitude +on territorial questions would be transformed: Thrace, after Ionia, +must revert to Turkey. French statesmen longed for the complete +demolition of their own handiwork. M. Poincaré, in 1922, was proud to +do what the Duc de Broglie ninety years before scoffed at as an {236} +unthinkable folly: "_Abandonner la Grèce aujourd'hui, détruire de nos +propres mains l'ouvrage que nos propres mains ont presque achevé!_" + +England's expressed attitude was not characterized by a like precision. +It is true that after the Greek debacle she dispatched ships and troops +to prevent the Straits from falling into the hands of the Turks; but in +the matter of Thrace she had already yielded to France: and how the +restoration of Turkish rule in Europe can be reconciled with the +freedom of the Straits remains to be seen. + +What the future may have in store for Greece and Turkey is a matter of +comparatively small account. What is of great and permanent importance +is the divergence between the paths of France and England revealed by +the preceding analysis of events. + +From this analysis have been carefully excluded such superficial +dissensions as always arise between allies after a war, and were +especially to be expected after a war in which every national +susceptibility was quickened to a morbid degree: they belong to a +different category from the profound antagonisms under consideration. +These--whatever the philosopher may think of a struggle for +domination--present a problem which British statesmen must face +frankly. It is not a new problem; but it now appears under a new form +and in a more acute phase than it has ever possessed in the +past--thanks to the success of the "knock-out blow" policy which +governed the latter stages of the War. + +With the German power replaced by the French, the Russian for the +moment in abeyance, French and Italian influences competing in Turkey, +French and British aims clashing in the Arab regions wrested from +Turkey--while indignation at Occidental interference surges in the +minds of all the peoples of the Orient--the Eastern Mediterranean +offers a situation which tempts one to ask whether the authors of that +policy have not succeeded too well? Whether in pursuing the success of +the day--to which their personal reputations were attached--they did +not lose sight of the morrow? Whether they have not scattered the seed +without sufficiently heeding the crop? However that may be, unless +this situation was clearly foreseen by its creators and provided for--a +hypothesis {237} which, with the utmost goodwill towards them, does not +appear very probable--they have an anxious task--a task that, under +these conditions, demands from British statesmanship more thinking +about the Near Eastern question and the Greek factor in it than was +necessary before 1914. + +As a first aid to an appreciation of the problem by the public--which +the present crisis found utterly unprepared--it would have been well if +the fundamental differences between the respective attitudes of France +and England towards each other and towards the peoples concerned had +been candidly acknowledged, and all pretence of Franco-British +co-operation in the Near East abandoned. Lasting co-operation cannot +be where there is neither community of interests nor consonance of +ideas: where the loss of one party is welcomed as gain by the other, +and the wisdom of the one in the eyes of the other is folly. Pious +talk of a common Allied mission in the Near East has only served to +obscure issues and to render confusion in the public mind worse +confounded. It was idle to make a mystery of the support given by +France to the Turks and of her insistence on the revision of the Sèvres +Treaty--preliminary steps to her demand for the evacuation of Chanak +and the consequent elimination of British sea-power. The object of +these tactics was evident to every serious student of history: France +pursues now the plan laid down by Louis XIV, continued by Napoleon, +fitfully carried on throughout the nineteenth century, and facilitated +by her installation in Syria--the equivalent of the German _Drang nach +Osten_: a plan incompatible with the safety of the British Empire in +the East. This is the truth of the matter, and nothing has been gained +by hiding it. + +The people who fought a ruinous war without quite knowing the ends +aimed at, had a right to know at least the results obtained; and after +France's separate agreement with Turkey, the denial to them of any part +of that knowledge could not be justified on any principle of honour or +plea of expediency. + + + + +{239} + + INDEX + + + Achilleion, 92 + Albania, Suggested partition of, 19 + Alexander, King, 197, 203, 205-7, 219, 224 + Andrew, Prince, 123, 200 + Asia Minor, Concessions to Greece in, 19, 22-26, 32, 34, 35, 37, + 221, 232. + ---- ----, Greeks driven from, 234 + Athens, Naval demonstrations against, 82, 102, 110, 111 + ----, Fighting at, 159-161 + ----, Bombardment of, 160 + ----, Occupation of, 204 + ----, Conspiracy at, 216 + ----, Riots at, 221, 222 + ---- electorate, 223 + Austria and Greece, 9 + ---- and Servia, 7, 17, 22 + Averoff, M., 183 + ---- gaol, 209 + + Balkan League, 4, 19, 20, 24, 27 + Benazet, M., Negotiation of, 146, 147, 150-152 + Blockades, 82, 101, 164, 172-176, 184 + Boulogne, Conference at, 140, 185 + Bratiano, M., 22 + Briand, M., 76, 86, 89, 100-103, 105, 116, 131, 132, 146 + Broglie, Due de, 188, 230, 235 + Bucharest Treaty, 7-9, 18 + ----, Conference at, 18 + Bulgaria and Greece, 7, 8, 21, 23, 67 + ---- ---- Servia, 7, 17, 21, 62 + ---- ---- Turkey, 21, 52 + ---- ---- Central Powers, 27, 40 + ---- ---- Entente, 21, 28, 38, 40, 43, 57, 60, 66, 144 + Bülow, Prince von, 47 + + Callimassiotis, M., 92 + Calogeropoulos, M., Premier, 124-132, 140, 192 + Canea, 92, 128, 130, 132 + Castellorizo, 85, 86 + Castoria, Metropolitan of, 209 + Cavalla allotted to Greece, 10, 230 + ----, Proposed cession of, to Bulgaria. 20, 23-25, 39, 41-42 + ---- surrendered to Germano-Bulgars, 118-21 + Cephalonia, 86, 177 + Cerigo, 177 + Chanak, 237 + Chios, 130 + Church, Greek, 175, 176, 208, 209 + Churchill, Mr. Winston, 13 + Cochin, M. Denys, 81 + Constantine, King: his popularity, 1, 2, 75, 131, 175, 198, 218-220 + ----, ----; policy, 5, 8-12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 34, 35, 38, 55, 81, + 114, 124, 144, 146, 150, 156, 181, 230 + ----, ----: defeat in 1897, 1, 74 + ----, ----, and M. Venizelos, 5, 14, 15, 53-57, 115, 133, 145, 181 + ----, ----, and the Kaiser, 9, 10, 56, 69, 95, 96, 170 + ----, ----, Agitation against, 70, 121, 127, 143, 145, 167, 181, 182 + ----, ----: dethronement, 186, 191-199 + ----, ----: restoration, 227, 228 + ----, ----: character, 198, 199, 228 + ----, ----: abdication, 235 + Constantinople, Russia and, 31, 32 + Constitution, Greek, 70-74, 191, 201, 205, 220 + Corfu, 85, 86, 91, 177 + Corinth, 186, 190, 192, 195, 227 + Coundouriotis, Admiral, 103, 131, 133, 183, 209 +{240} + + Crete, 2, 86, 128, 130, 133-136, 208 + Crewe, Lord, 41, 42 + Crimean War, 103 + Crown Councils, 29, 68, 170, 192 + Cuninghame, Sir Thomas, 82 + Cyprus, 66, 75 + + Danglis, General, 133 + Dardanelles, 14, 15, 27-31, 34, 59, 72. _See also_ "Gallipoli" + Dartige du Fournet, Admiral, 91, 92, 110, 112, 129, 130, + 131, 139, 141, 143, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153-160, 163-164 + Delcassé, M., 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 76 + Delyannis, M., 74 + Demidoff, Prince, Russian Minister at Athens, 32, 35, 104, 112 + Demir-Hissar, Bridge of, 85 + Deville, M., quoted, 13, 28, 40, 51, 57 + Dimitracopoulos, M., 123, 192 + Dousmanis, General, 81, 112, 200 + Dova-tépé, Fort, 99 + Dragoumis, Ex-Premier, 192, 210 + ----, Ion, 222 + Drama, 109, 118, 121 + + Elections of June, 1915, 33, 50 + ---- ---- December, 1915, 75 + ---- demanded and eluded (June-September, 1916), 102, 106-108, + 114, 115, 123 + ---- of November, 1920, 222-226 + Eleusis, 111, 174 + Elliot, Sir Francis, British Minister at Athens, 35, 88, 104, + 114, 117, 123, 125, 128, 142, 145, 149, 156, 165 + England, Policy of, 13, 20, 22, 31, 42, 56, 77, 102, 104, 106, + 128, 144, 185, 186, 232-234, 236 + Esslin, M., 209 + Evangelismos hospital, 210 + + Falkenhayn, General von, 95-97 + Fleet, Greek, 131, 141, 148, 149 + Florina, 85 + France, Policy of, 13, 31, 46, 77, 87, 103, 129, 144, 153, 155, + 183-185, 230, 231, 233-235, 237 + + Gallipoli, 14, 30, 31, 36, 43, 50, 63, 73. _See also_ + "Dardanelles" + Gauchet, Admiral, 164, 190 + George, King of Greece, 71 + ----, Prince, 35, 38-40, 134-137, 156, 211 + Gerakini, 91 + Germany and Greece, 11, 87, 89, 95-98, 121, 122 + Goerlitz, Greek troops interned at, 121 + Gounaris, M., Premier, 33-46, 200 + Grey, Sir Edward, 22, 23, 25, 35, 56, 59, 60, 66, 101, 102 + "Guarantee" of Greek constitution, 187-189 + Guillemin, M., French Minister at Athens, 37, 56, 61, 82, 88, + 102, 104, 106, 110, 117, 118, 129, 146, 152, 164 + + Hamilton, General, 59 + Hatzopoulos, Colonel, 108, 118-121 + Hautefeuille, M., 172 + Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von, 118, 119, 121, 170 + Holy Synod, Appeals from, 176 + ---- ---- deposed, 208 + + Ionia, 234, 235 + Italian troops in Macedonia, 108 + ---- ---- ---- Epirus, 203 + ---- policy, 231, 234 + + Jagow, Von, 97 + Jonnart, M., his mission to Greece, 186, 189-206 + + Kaiser, The, and King Constantine, 9, 10, 117, 180, 181 + ----, ----, ---- Queen Sophie, 169, 170 + Kara-Burnu, 85 +{241} + + Katerini, 96, 147 + Kerr, Admiral Mark, 10, 14, 15, 219 + Kitchener, Lord, 13 + ----, ----, on French policy, 76 + ----, ----, in Greece, 81 + Krivolak, 79, 95 + + Lambros, Prof., Premier, 141, 143, 149, 154, 158, 181, 200, 210 + Larissa, 118 + Lemnos, 58, 130 + Leucas, 178 + London, Treaties of (1863 and 1864), 86 + ----, Conference in, 186 + + Macedonia, Allies in, 76-80, 82-85, 108 + ----, Germano-Bulgarian invasion of, 94, 97, 98, 108, 109 + ----, Elections in, 94, 109 + ----, British soldiers' conduct in, 232 + Mercati, M., 55, 56 + Metaxas, Colonel, 29, 8l, 112, 200 + Milne, General, 101 + Milo, 82, 111 + Monastir, 67, 77, 95, 145 + Moschopoulos, General, 59, 82 + Moudros, 58 + Mytilene, 58, 94, 130, 133, 208 + + Near East, Franco-British rivalry in, 231, 237 + Neutral zone, 147, 148, 168, 178, 180 + Nicholas, Prince, 123, 200 + + Oropus, 220 + Otho, King, 103, 125, 187 + + Painlevé, M., 186 + Palaeologus, Emperor Constantine, Legend of, 218 + Passitch, M., 18, 40, 42, 51 + Paul, Prince, 224 + Peloponnesus, 146, 167, 169, 171, 192, 195 + Phaleron, 198 + Piraeus, 103, 110, 120, 127, 141, 143, 159, 165, 176, 190, 202, 213 + Poincaré, M., 38, 40, 235 + Politis, M., 47, 183 + + Rallis, M., 30, 80, 210, 227 + Regnault, General, 190, 203, 204 + Repoulis, M., 222 + Reservists, 107, 117, 127, 171, 184, 203 + Ribot, M., 184, 186, 190, 217 + Rome, Conference at, 169, 185 + Roques, General, 147, 152 + Rufos, M., 209 + Rumania, 9, 10, 18, 21-24, 113, 116 + Rupel, 97, 98, 99, 210 + Russia and Greece, 31, 32, 43, 104, 126, 157, 184, 185, 189 + ---- ---- Bulgaria, 62 + ---- ---- Servia, 18 + ---- ---- Turkey, 19, 27 + + Salamis, 111, 149, 190, 195 + Salisbury, Lord, on Greek policy in 1897, 74 + Salonica, Allies' landing at, 56, 58-62, 64, 74 + ---- in state of siege, 100 + ----, Revolt at, 110 + ----, Fire at, 232 + Samos, 130, 133 + San Remo, 218 + Sarrail, General, 79, 82, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 108, 110, 164, + 178, 179, 181, 183, 202 + Sazonow, M., 18, 19, 31 + Schenck, Baron, 140 + Secret Services, French and British, 90-93, 107, 112, 117, + 127-130, 179 + Serres, 109, 118, 120 + Servia, Greek alliance with, 7, 8, 17, 33, 51, 52, 55, 58, 65, 66 + ----, Entente and, 18, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 51 + Sèvres, Treaty of, 221, 232, 237 + Skouloudis, M., Premier, 69 + ---- and Entente, 77-79, 8l-84, 88, 89, 99, 100 + ---- ---- Germany, 87, 89, 95-98 +{242} + + Skouloudis, M., Premier, placed under surveillance, 200 + ---- impeached, 209, 210 + Smyrna, 35, 36, 221, 223, 234, 235 + Sophie, Queen, 160, 169, 170, 173 + Staff, Greek General: Dardanelles, Plans of, 15, 16 + ----, ---- ----, and Servia, 17, 40, 41, 49, 52 + ----, ---- ----, ---- King Constantine, 13, 31, 35, 72, 73 + ----, ---- ----, ---- M. Venizelos, 25, 28, 29, 45, 55, 62, 73, 81 + ----, ---- ----, ---- Lord Kitchener, 81 + ----, ---- ----, on Gallipoli enterprise, 28, 29, 31, 36, 47 + ----, ---- ----, opposed to Asiatic expansion, 25, 26 + Straits, Russia and the, 31 + ----, France and the, 230 + ----, England and the, 236 + Stratos, M., 192, 193 + Streit, M., 8, 12, 13, 15, 34, 45, 112, 200 + Struma, 85, 97 + Submarines, German, Alleged fuelling of, 90-92 + Suda Bay, 86, 128, 133 + Syngros gaol, 209 + Syra, 177 + Syria, 237 + + Talaat Bey, 18 + Tatoi, 53, 55 + Thasos, 120, 130 + Therisos movement, 134, 136 + Thessaly, 145, 147, 168, 178, 180, 181, 186, 190, 192 + Thrace, 19, 221, 222, 234, 235, 236 + Turkey and Entente, 4, 13, 19, 232, 233, 235, 236 + Turkey and Germany, 10, 13, 18, 19 + ---- ---- Bulgaria, 19, 52 + ---- ---- Greece, 13, 18, 19, 217, 218, 232, 233, 234 + + Venizelos, Eleutherios: early career, 2-5, 133-136 + ----, and King Constantine, 5, 14, 15, 29, 50, 53-57, 109, 110, + 136, 137, 183, 220, 225. + ----: policy, 7, 8, 12-14, 20, 21-27, 28-32, 51, 53, 55, 61, 68, + 127, 205, 207, 221, 230 + ----: first resignation, 31 + ----: return to power, 50 + ----: popularity, 5, 50 + ----: second resignation, 63 + ----: unpopularity, 75, 94, 107, 108, 175, 176 + ----: agitation, 44-48, 70-74, 92-94, 99, 127 + ----: rebellion, 106, 110, 128-131, 133, 136-138 + ----: Salonica Government, 133, 140, 147, 148, 168, 169, 174, + 177, 178 + ----: anathematization, 175 + ----: elevation, 202-206 + ----: rule, 207-216 + ----: attempt on his life, 221 + ----: fall, 226 + ----: character, 229 + ----: representative of Greece in Entente capitals, 235 + Vlachopoulos, Colonel, 52, 53 + Volo, 120 + + Wellington, Duke of, 188 + + Zaimis, M., Premier, 65-69, 102, 108, 114-119, 181, 190-203 + Zalocostas, M., 210 + Zante, 177 + Zappeion, 143, 159, 160 + Zographos, M., 33, 37, 41 + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Greece and the Allies 1914-1922, by G. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Greece and the Allies 1914-1922 + +Author: G. F. Abbott + +Release Date: September 19, 2007 [EBook #22677] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GREECE AND THE ALLIES 1914-1922 *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines (This file was created from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive/American +Libraries.) + + + + + + +GREECE AND THE ALLIES + +1914-1922 + + + +BY + +G. F. ABBOTT + + + +BY THE SAME AUTHOR + + SONGS OF MODERN GREECE + MACEDONIAN FOLKLORE + THE TALE OF A TOUR IN MACEDONIA + GREECE IN EVOLUTION (ED.) + TURKEY IN TRANSITION + TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE GREAT POWERS + UNDER THE TURK IN CONSTANTINOPLE + + + +WITH A PREFACE BY + +ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B., M.V.O. + + LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY + AND HEAD OF THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION TO GREECE + + + +METHUEN & CO. LTD. + +36 ESSEX STREET W.C. + +LONDON + + + + +First published in 1922 + + + + +{v} + +PREFACE + +The late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival +of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance +or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune. + +Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for +the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of +the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the +battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown +the present troubles. + +In this book we get a clear account of the little-understood relations +between the Greek and the Serb; of the attitude of Greece towards the +Central Powers and the Entente; of the dealings between Greece and the +Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott traces +the evil to its source--the hidden pull of British versus French +interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between +M. Venizelos and King Constantine. + +All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting +is the last. + +The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied +countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most +tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case. Its effect on the state of +Europe during and since the War is remarkable. If King Constantine's +advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the +Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been +shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could +have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and +collapse would not have taken place; for, instead of having Turkey to +assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have been between and +separating these two countries. {vi} + +In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his +country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to +be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the +country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas +colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk. + +It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's policy was fully +endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of +the subject, which was a purely military one. These were the late +Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the +head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, +British Military Attache in Athens; but the advice tendered by these +three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the +civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers. + +Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the +history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which +have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the +official originals, to prove the case. + +For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish in Great +Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the +welfare of the British Empire at heart. + + +MARK KERR + +4 _October_, 1922 + + + + +{vii} + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE + +As this work goes to press, the British Empire finds itself forced to +vindicate its position in the East: a position purchased at the cost of +much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the +conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France. + +In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events +which have inevitably led up to this crisis: an account of transactions +hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation +and every known artifice for manipulating public opinion. + +The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral +situation. It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried +on through six years. A slight account of the earlier events appeared +as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, _Turkey, Greece, +and the Great Powers_: that was my first effort to place the subject in +its true perspective. The results were interesting. I was honoured by +the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several +public critics; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous +scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On the +other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of +passion, retained their respect for facts. + +I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two of my +contributions saw the light; the third was suppressed by the +Authorities. Its suppression furnished material for a debate in +Parliament: "This is a cleverly written article," said Mr. John Dillon, +"and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression. +All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the +Government do not like to be known, not that they injure the military +situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the +opinion of the writer, made certain very bad blunders." The Home +Secretary's answer was {viii} typical of departmental dialectics: "It +is inconceivable to me," he declared, "that the Government would +venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, 'This is our +view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.'" What the +Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the _National Weekly_ +was: "This is not our view. Publish it not. If you do, you will +suffer." + +With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the +evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of +war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through +the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns +of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the +printer, now lies before me, and together with it a letter from the +publisher stating that the Authorities had forbidden its publication on +pain of proceedings "under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm +Regulations." + +And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the +voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted +by credulity. The delay had its advantages: it gave the story, through +the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would +have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a +fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously +inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-revealing +publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here +related. + +I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new +information respecting these transactions even to those who are best +acquainted with their general course. If they find nothing attractive +in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful, +something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of +it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient +history. Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from +the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the +present crisis--a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but +at bottom a conflict between French and British policies affecting the +vital interests of the British Empire. + +G. F. A. + +5 _October_, 1922 + + + + +{ix} + +_Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly +drawn from the following sources_: + +Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time. + +_White Book_, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the +title, "_Diplomatika Engrapha_, 1913-1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920. + +_Orations_, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M. +Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and +his opponents, MM. Stratos and Rallis. The Greek text ("_Agoreuseis, +etc._," Athens, 1917) and the English translation ("_A Report of +Speeches, etc.,_" London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M. +Stratos only in summary. The French translation ("_Discours, etc., +Traduction de M. Leon Maccas, autorisee par le Gouvernement Grec,_" +Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches. + +Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, 1917; _Apologia_, 1919; _Semeioseis_, 1921. +The first of these publications is the ex-Premier's Reply to statements +made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917; +the second is his Defence; the third is a collection of Notes +concerning transactions in which he took part. All three are of the +highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration +from November, 1915, to June, 1916. + +_Journal Officiel_, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of +the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22 +June, 1916. + +Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some +personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading +French actors in the drama: + +_Du Fournet_: "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-1916." By +Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920. + +_Sarrail_: "Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918." By General +Sarrail, Paris, 1920. + +_Regnault_: "La Conquete d'Athenes, Juin-Juillet, 1917." By General +Regnault, Paris, 1920. + +{x} + +_Deville_: "L'Entente, la Grece et la Bulgarie. Notes d'histoire et +souvenirs." By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919. The author was French +Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work +which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting. + +_Jonnart_: "M. Jonnart en Grece et l'abdication de Constantin." By +Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though not written by the High +Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official +record of his mission. + +The only English publications of equal value, though of much more +limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so +far are: + +The Dardanelles Commission _Reports_ (Cd. 8490; Cd. 8502; Cmd. 371), +and the _Life of Lord Kitchener_, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. III, +London, 1920. + +Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also +been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is +referred for details on particular episodes. The absence of reference +to certain other narratives is deliberate. + + + + +{xi} + +CONTENTS + + PAGE + INTRODUCTION - - - - - 1 + CHAPTER I. - - - - - 7 + CHAPTER II. - - - - - 17 + CHAPTER III. - - - - - 21 + CHAPTER IV. - - - - - 33 + CHAPTER V. - - - - - 50 + CHAPTER VI. - - - - - 65 + CHAPTER VII. - - - - - 76 + CHAPTER VIII. - - - - - 85 + CHAPTER IX. - - - - - 95 + CHAPTER X. - - - - - 105 + CHAPTER XI. - - - - - 114 + CHAPTER XII. - - - - - 123 + CHAPTER XIII. - - - - - 139 + CHAPTER XIV. - - - - - 152 + CHAPTER XV. - - - - - 162 + CHAPTER XVI. - - - - - 172 + CHAPTER XVII. - - - - - 177 + CHAPTER XVIII. - - - - - 186 + CHAPTER XIX. - - - - - 200 + CHAPTER XX. - - - - - 207 + CHAPTER XXI. - - - - - 217 + AFTERWORD - - - - - - 230 + INDEX - - - - - - 239 + + + + +{1} + +GREECE AND THE ALLIES + +1914-1922 + + +INTRODUCTION + +Ingenious scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret +historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the +course of nations unknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory, +but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature everywhere responds +to the influence of personality. In Greece this response is more +marked than anywhere else. No people in the world has been so +completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously +from their feuds, ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides, +king of men, and god-like Achilles. + +The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King +Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; and her history +during that troubled era inevitably centres round these two +personalities. + +By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King +Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897. +His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an +earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a halo +of military romance--a thing especially dear to the hearts of +men--shone about the head of Constantine; and his grateful country +bestowed upon him the title of {2} _Stratelates_. In town mansions and +village huts men's mouths were filled with his praise: one dwelt on his +dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his +sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose +hardships he shared, and for whose life he evinced a far greater +solicitude than for his own. + +But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine +appealed to the hearts of his countrymen. They loved to explain to +strangers the reason of the name _Koumbaros_ or "Gossip," by which they +commonly called him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had +stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the +campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the +people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal +companion. + +In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a democratic +people. With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which +strength and dignity were happily blended with simplicity, he had a +manner of address which was very engaging: his words, few, simple, +soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect; they were the words of one +who meant and felt what he said: they went straight to the hearer's +heart because they came straight from the speaker's. + +Qualities of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose +himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current +in the Chancelleries of the world. + +Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a +series of political convulsions to high notability in his native +island; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece--brought about not +without his collaboration--opened to him a wider sphere of activity. +The moment was singularly opportune. + +The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of +their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into +something like despair. Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by +annexing Eastern Rumelia: Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the +risk, if the Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the {3} +fulfilment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever. A +group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader +translated the popular feeling into action: a revolt against the reign +of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every +effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the +interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left +Greece a prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old politicians +who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure. A new +man was needed--a man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt +past--a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough +to push on with inexorable purpose to the goal. + +During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable +organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever +manipulator of seditious movements. But he had mainly distinguished +himself as a rebel against authority. And it was in the temper of a +rebel that he came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well as +internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With the quick +adaptability of his nature, he turned into a guardian of established +institutions: the foe of revolution and friend of reform. Supported by +the Crown, he was able to lift his voice for a "Revisionist" above the +angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a "Constituent Assembly." + +All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the new man; and +the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him. Through the +next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive +statesmanship. His Government had strength enough in the country to +dispense with "graft." The result was a thorough overhauling of the +State machinery. Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished. +Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future. It +was a miraculous change for a nation whose political life hitherto had +exhibited two traits seldom found combined: the levity of childhood and +the indolence of age. + +For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged {4} to M. +Venizelos. He had brought to the task a brain better endowed than any +associated with it. His initiative was indefatigable; his decision +quick. Unlike most of his countrymen, he did not content himself with +ideas without works. His subtlety in thinking did not serve him as a +substitute for action. To these talents he added an eloquence of the +kind which, to a Greek multitude, is irresistible, and a certain gift +which does not always go with high intelligence, but, when it does, is +worth all the arts of the most profound politician and accomplished +orator put together. He understood, as it were instinctively, the +character of every man he met, and dealt with him accordingly. This +tact, coupled with a smile full of sweetness and apparent frankness, +gave to his vivid personality a charm which only those could appraise +who experienced it. + +Abroad the progress of M. Venizelos excited almost as much interest as +it did in Greece. The Greeks are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign +opinion: a single good word in a Western newspaper raises a politician +in public esteem more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric. M. +Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business; and from the +outset every foreign journalist and diplomatist who came his way was +made to feel his fascination: so that, even before leaving his native +shores, the Cretan had become in the European firmament a star of the +third or fourth magnitude. Reasons other than personal contributed to +enlist Western opinion in his favour. Owing to her geographical +situation, Greece depends for the fulfilment of her national +aspirations and for her very existence on the Powers which command the +Mediterranean. A fact so patent had never escaped the perception of +any Greek politician. But no Greek politician had ever kept this fact +more steadily in view, or put this obvious truth into more vehement +language than M. Venizelos: "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the +Sea Powers," was his maxim. And the times were such that those Powers +needed a Greek statesman whom they could trust to apply that maxim +unflinchingly. + +{5} + +With the recovery of Greece synchronized, not by chance, the doom of +Turkey: a sentence in which all the members of the Entente, starting +from different points and pursuing different objects, concurred. The +executioners were, naturally, the Balkan States. Russia began the work +by bringing about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia; England +completed it by bringing Greece into the League. There ensued a local, +which, in accordance with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead +to the universal conflagration. Organized as she was, Greece succeeded +better than anyone expected; and the national gratitude--the exuberant +gratitude of a Southern people--went out to the two men directly +responsible for that success: to King Constantine, whose brilliant +generalship beat the enemy hosts; and to M. Venizelos, whose able +statesmanship had prepared the field. Poets and pamphleteers vied with +each other in expatiating on the wonders they had performed, to the +honour and advantage of their country. In this ecstasy of popular +adoration the spirit of the soldier and the spirit of the lawyer seemed +to have met. + +But the union was illusive and transient. Between these two men, so +strangely flung together by destiny, there existed no link of sympathy; +and propinquity only forced the growth of their mutual antagonism. The +seeds of discord had already borne fruit upon the common ground of +their Balkan exploits. Immediately after the defeat of Turkey a +quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors. King Constantine, +bearing in mind Bulgaria's long-cherished dream of hegemony, and +persuaded that no sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more +than defer a rupture, urged a Graeco-Servian alliance against their +truculent partner. He looked at the matter from a purely Greek +standpoint and was anxious to secure the maximum of profit for his +country. M. Venizelos, on the other hand, aware that the Western +Powers, and particularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coalition +as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to retain those +Powers' favour, was prepared to concede {6} much for the sake of +averting a rupture. Not until the Bulgars betrayed their intentions by +actual aggressions in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the +alliance with Servia, which ushered in the Second Balkan War and led to +the Peace of Bucharest. He yielded to the pressure of the +circumstances brought to bear upon him; but the encounter represented +no more than the preliminary crossing of swords between two strong +antagonists. + + + + +{7} + +CHAPTER I + +From the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July, +1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deliberately adopted an +attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia's +assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter. Such an +attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Graeco-Servian +Alliance. For, although the Military Convention accompanying the +Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war +between one of the allied States and "a third Power," the Treaty itself +had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.[1] + +In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to +Servia's assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000 +men.[2] Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by +practical considerations. It was to the interest of Greece--a matter +of self-preservation--not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia +calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power established by the +Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with +Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might. But as to +Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not +offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that +she {8} should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for +such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobilization and precipitate +complications. For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of +Servia's war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded +absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of +Greece's recent crisis with Turkey.[3] On that occasion Greece had +obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that +the _casus faederis_ would arise only in the event of Bulgarian +intervention.[4] + +Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on +armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs +under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced +that it fully performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting, +until Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrality. The +co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would +harm Servia; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally +forces negligible compared with the enemy's, while she would inevitably +expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war +material, to an Austrian attack; and, moreover, she would weaken her +army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check +on Bulgaria.[5] + +A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the +conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria +by intervening against Servia jeopardize the _status quo_ established +by the Bucharest Treaty--in which case the action of Greece would have +a purely Balkan character--was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after +a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.[6] + +This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of +the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not +yet been harmonized. Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek +Government's declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to +compromise {9} the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action +against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian +Government, on its part, promised to abstain from manifesting any +solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war.[7] +Not so Berlin. + +The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which +Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to +join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and +interest he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been +assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian +assassins; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating +herself, under the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage +which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula; if, +contrary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other side, she +would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and +Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and +Constantine would be broken for ever. He ended with the words: "I have +spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without +delay and with the same absolute frankness." + +He had nothing to complain of on that score. King Constantine on 2 +August replied that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an +active part in the Austro-Servian conflict, it was equally impossible +for her "to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall +upon them, since they are our allies. It seems to me that the +interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance +of the _status quo_ in the Balkans such as it has been created by the +Treaty of Bucharest." He went on to add that Greece was determined, in +concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at +the expense of Servia; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans +would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which +the Kaiser feared. "This way of thinking," he concluded, "is shared by +the whole of my people." + +What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on +the margin, "Rubbish." This, however, was not meant for his +brother-in-law's ears. To him he {10} used less terse language. On 4 +August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in +Berlin that an alliance had that day been concluded between Germany and +Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on +Germany's side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean +were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus +all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against +Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out? His Imperial Majesty appealed +to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the +German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law; he reminded him that it was +thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla; he +begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser's side and +march hand in hand against the common enemy--Slavism. He made this +urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece +would respond to it. If not, all would be over between the two +countries--this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal +note: "I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once." + +King Constantine's answer was tactful but final: His personal +sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's +side. But alas! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely +out of the question. Greece could not under any conceivable +circumstances side against the Entente: the Mediterranean was at the +mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the +Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and +wipe Greece off the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was +the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's +threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled +under the guise of an "assurance not to touch his friends among my +neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our +local Balkan interests." [8] + +{11} + +Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff. The +Kaiser's Government thought King Constantine's attachment to neutrality +reasonable--for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter +as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and +Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter +country as the bear's skin of which it would be a good stroke of +business for Greece to secure a share. The German Minister at Athens, +better acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naive +line. He did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to +advise that she should free herself from the ties that bound her to +Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in +the lurch. But, if he went less far than his chief in one direction, +he went farther in another, threatening, should Greece move on Servia's +behalf, to ask for his passport. This threat, like all the others, +failed to move the Athens Government;[9] and, unable to gain Greece as +an ally, Germany was henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy. + +So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be +unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the European +cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the Balkan +equilibrium. Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent +tendencies. + +King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War +would be of long duration and doubtful issue: in this battle of giants +he saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils. At the same time, he +did not forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered +enemies {12} who would most probably try to fish in the troubled +waters. If they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a +definite objective and on a definite military plan which took into +account the elements of time, place, and resources. + +The King's standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and soldiers +of note: they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with +possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable +moment. But it did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution was +foreign to M. Venizelos's ambitious and adventurous temperament. +Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind. +Taking the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and +imbued with a sort of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and +star, he looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist +aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an +instant's delay. + +It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface. + +In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit +mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the +possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against +the Austrians on the Danube--far away from the Greek Army's natural +base in Macedonia. On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared +that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the +Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation. M. Streit +remonstrated that there had been no "invitation," but at most a +sounding from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet +with a counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the +suggestion was serious. Further, he objected that, before Greece +committed herself, it was necessary to find out where she would be +expected to fight, the conditions under which she would fight, and the +compensations which she would receive in the event of victory. As a +last resort he proposed to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon. +But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose: the War would +be over in three weeks.[10] Whereupon {13} M. Streit resigned, and M. +Venizelos offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece +forthwith. + +The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged; but +from the French Minister's descriptions of it as made "_a titre +gracieux_" and "_sans conditions,_" [11] it seems to have been +unconditional and unqualified. On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a +later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the +disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.[12] +And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was +Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands +conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy +with two German units, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_. However that +may be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite +willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army, +but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek +forces should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need +arose, operate against Bulgaria. + +The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him for +the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider. The +French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France, +however, adding: "For the moment we judge that Greece must use all her +efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to avoid +anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its +neutrality." The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same +effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey +and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision. She only +suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a +view to eventual action. + +This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill, +who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central +Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the +Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a plan +for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the {14} Gallipoli +Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of +Marmara.[13] But it no way affected the British Government's policy. +The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in order to meet +the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to prevent +the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles; France also +holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of war material +on an adequate scale.[14] + +Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M. +Venizelos--it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had +pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to +vent his ill-humour. King Constantine, in a reply to the British +Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not +fight Turkey unless attacked by her--a statement in strict consonance +with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time. But M. Venizelos +objected. After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers, and +after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told his +sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey was their +enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with +many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight +her single-handed?[15] + +Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those +allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war +against Turkey--because, anxious above all things to establish close +contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open: "a promise that, +should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against +Turkey . . . we would be at their disposal." [16] And he professed +himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to +him could possibly be obscure to others. But he had a theory--a theory +which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every +difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed +{15} with the personal factor. According to this theory, when face to +face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as +soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind. This happened not +once, but many times.[17] We have here a question of psychology which +cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos's persuasive powers are +notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine underwent +the fascination which this man had for others. But behind it all, +according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element: + +"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty +and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the +wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in +co-operation with Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid +down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the +result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions +between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast +developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the +Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M. +Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony +between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his +resignation.[18] + +M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch +none the less. At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the +Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the +same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to +throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without +any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more +circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as +prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this +view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation, +since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent. +But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King +Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through +Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his +Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to +supply the British Government, through the same channel, with +information from his secret service.[19] + + + +[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention. As this article originally +stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case +of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria." It +was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without +objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war +between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under +the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance." +But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty +relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other +interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite +the "third Power" phrase in the Military Convention. All the documents +are to be found in the _White Book_, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6. + +[2] See Art. 5 of the Military Convention. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 19, 20, 22. + +[4] _White Book_, Nos. 11, 13, 14. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 23. + +[6] Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin, +Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish. (No. 23,800.) + +[7] _Ibid._ + +[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in _Die deutschen +Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch_, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter +Schuking; part in the _White Book_, Nos. 24 and 26. As much +acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last +dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was +sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in +Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it +to him: "He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs. +However, to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send +on this occasion a sympathetic answer." (See _The Times_, 9 Dec., +1920.) The communication, therefore, was no secret from the British +Government. Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is +but a summary of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's +Government itself to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation, +Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the _White Book_, +this document may now be read in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. +381-3. + +[9] _White Book_, Nos. 28, 29, 30. + +[10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit +himself. + +[11] Deville, pp. 119, 128. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 93-4. + +[13] _Dardanelles Commission_. _Supplement to First Report_, par. 45. + +[14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5 +Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914. + +[15] _White Book_, No. 31. + +[16] See _Orations_, p. 103. + +[17] _Ibid_, pp. 41-2, 98. + +[18] _White Book_, No. 31. + +[19] See the Admiral's statements in the _Weekly Dispatch_, 21 Nov., +and in _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920. Though the plans in question were +not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable information +with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the command of the +Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.--_Dardanelles Commission, Final +Report_, par. 17. + + + + +{17} + +CHAPTER II + +Before proceeding any further with the development of the position in +Greece, it will be well to cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by +the other Balkan States and the views entertained towards them by the +Entente Powers. One must know all the possible combinations on the +Balkan chess-board before one can profitably study or estimate the real +place of the Greek pawn. + +Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain neutral; but, to judge +from the Greek diplomatic representatives' reports, there was every +indication that she only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some +brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to invade +Servia without risk. Meanwhile, well-armed irregular bands, equipped by +the Bulgarian Government and commanded by Bulgarian officers "on +furlough," made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the +Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.[1] + +Alarmed by these symptoms, the Greek General Staff renewed the efforts +which it had been making since the beginning of 1914, to concert plans +with the Servian military authorities for common action in accordance +with their alliance, and asked the Servian Minister of War if, in case +Bulgaria ordered a general mobilization, Servia would be disposed to +bring part of her forces against her, so as to prevent the concentration +of the Bulgarian army and give the Greek army time to mobilize. The +reply was that, if Bulgaria did order mobilization, the Serbs were +obliged to turn against her with all their available forces. Only, as +Austria had just started an offensive, nobody could know how many forces +they would have available--perhaps they could face the situation with the +25,000 or 30,000 men in the new provinces; but, in {18} any case, it did +not seem that Bulgaria meant to mobilize, or, if she did, it would be +against Turkey. A little later, in answer to another Greek step, M. +Passitch, the Servian Premier, after a conference with the military +chiefs, stated that, as long as there was no imminent danger from +Bulgaria, Servia could not draw troops from the Austrian frontier, +because of her engagements towards the Entente, and that, should the +danger become imminent, Servia would have to consult first the +Entente.[2] By Entente, he meant especially Russia, for M. Sazonow had +already told the Greek Minister at Petrograd that it was all-important +that the Servian army should be left free to devote its whole strength +against the Austrians.[3] + +Rumania, on whose co-operation Greece counted for restraining Bulgaria +and preserving the balance established by the Treaty of Bucharest, +maintained an equivocal attitude: both belligerent groups courted her, +and it was as yet uncertain which would prevail.[4] For the present +Rumanian diplomacy was directed to the formation of a Balkan _bloc_ of +neutrality--between Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece--which might +enable those four States to remain at peace with each other and the whole +world, exempt from outside interference. The first step to the +realization of this idea, the Rumanian Government considered, was a +settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey; and, in +compliance with its invitation, both States sent their plenipotentiaries +to Bucharest. + +The only result of this mission was to enlighten the Hellenic Government +on Turkey's real attitude. At the very first sitting, the Turkish +delegate, Talaat Bey, in answer to a remark that the best thing for the +Balkan States would be to keep out of the general conflagration, blurted +out: "But Turkey is no longer free as to her movements"--an avowal of the +Germano-Turkish alliance which the Greeks already knew from the Kaiser's +own indiscretions. After that meeting, in a conversation with the +Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which that gentleman reported to +the Greeks, Talaat said that, in his opinion, Greece could ignore her +Servian alliance, for, {19} as things stood, she might find herself at +war, not only with Bulgaria, but also with Turkey--a contingency not +foreseen when that alliance was made. From these utterances the Greeks +derived a clear impression that Talaat acted on a plan drawn up in +Berlin.[5] For the rest, the despatch of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ +to Constantinople, followed by the continued arrival of German officers +and sailors for the Ottoman Navy, spoke for themselves. M. Sazonow +shared the Greek conviction that Turkey had made up her mind, and that no +amount of concessions would avail: "It is," he said to the Greek Minister +at Petrograd, "an abscess which must burst." [6] The Greeks had even +reason to suspect that Turkey was secretly negotiating an agreement with +Bulgaria, and on this point also the information of the Russian +Government confirmed theirs.[7] + +It was his intimate knowledge of the Balkan situation that had inspired +King Constantine's proposal to the Entente Powers in August for common +action against Turkey, qualified with the stipulation of holding Bulgaria +in check. The proposal took cognizance of Balkan difficulties and might +perhaps have solved them, had it been accepted: an advance of the Greek +army on Thrace, combined with a naval attack by the British Fleet, early +in September, might have settled Turkey, secured Bulgaria's neutrality, +if not indeed her co-operation, or forced her into a premature +declaration of hostility, and decided Rumania to throw in her lot with us. + +But the Entente Powers were not yet ripe for action against Turkey: they +were still playing--with what degree of seriousness is a delicate +question--for the neutrality of Turkey, and for that Greek neutrality was +necessary. As to Bulgaria, our diplomacy harboured a different project: +the reconstruction of the Balkan League of 1912 in our favour, on the +basis of territorial concessions to be made to Bulgaria by Servia and +Greece, who were to be compensated by dividing Albania between them. +Greece also had from England an alternative suggestion--expansion in Asia +Minor: a vague and {20} unofficial hint, destined to assume imposing +dimensions later on. At this stage, however, the whole project lacked +precise outline. One plan of the reconstructed League included +Rumania--who also was to make concessions to Bulgaria and to receive +compensations at the expense of Austria; and the League was to be brought +into the field on the side of the Entente. Another plan had less +ambitious aims: Servia and Greece by conciliating Bulgaria were to +prevent a combination of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, or of Bulgaria +and Turkey, on the side of the Central Powers. The more sanguine plan +was especially cherished by Great Britain; the other by Russia, who +feared a Rumano-Bulgaro-Turkish combination against her. But the +key-stone in both was Bulgaria, whose co-operation, or at least +neutrality, was to be purchased at the cost of Servia and Greece.[8] +Meanwhile, the less serious the Entente Powers' hopes for Turkey's +neutrality, the more lively their anxiety must have been about Bulgaria's +attitude; and it is not improbable that in repelling King Constantine's +offer, they were actuated not so much by the wish to avoid Turkish +hostility--the reason given--as by the fear lest the stipulation which +accompanied his offer, if accepted, should provoke Bulgaria. + +Highly speculative as this project was, it might have materialized if +Serbs and Greeks were willing to pay the price. But neither Serbs nor +Greeks would think of such a thing. At the mere report that they were +about to be asked to cede Cavalla, the Greeks went mad, and M. Venizelos +himself, though he favoured the reconstruction of the Balkan League, +loudly threatened, if the demand was formulated, to resign. Whereupon, +his consternation having been transmitted to the Entente capitals, he +received an assurance that no demand of the sort would be made[9]--for +the present. + + + +[1] Naoum, Sofia, 11, 20 Aug. (O.S.); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 19 July, 19 +Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[2] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 31 July, 19, 26 Aug. (O.S.) 1914. + +[3] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 20 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[4] Politis, Bucharest, 27 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[5] Politis, Bucharest, 15 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[6] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 17 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[7] Dragoumis, _ibid._ + +[8] Gennadius, London, 8, 10, 15, 23 Aug.; Romanos, Paris, 31 July, 16 +Aug.; Dragoumis, Petersburg, 31 July, 12, 20 Aug.; Naoum, Sofia, 31 July, +11, 20, 23 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, Nish, 18 Aug.; Papadiamantopoulos, +Bucharest, 25 July (O.S.), 1914. + +[9] Venizelos to Greek Legations, Petersburg, Bordeaux, London, 2 Sept. +(O.S.), 1914. + + + + +{21} + +CHAPTER III + +Two tasks now lay before the Allies in the East: to help Servia, and to +attack Turkey, who had entered the War on 31 October. Both enterprises +were "under consideration"--which means that the Entente Cabinets were +busy discussing both and unable to decide on either. Distracted by +conflicting aims and hampered by inadequate resources, they could not act +except tentatively and in an experimental fashion. + +At the beginning of November the representatives of France, England, and +Russia at Athens collectively seconded a Servian appeal for assistance to +M. Venizelos, which the Greek Premier met with a flat refusal. He gave +his reasons: such action, he said, would infallibly expose Greece to +aggression from Bulgaria, and it was more than probable that an automatic +agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey might engage the Greek army in a +struggle with the forces of three Powers at once. Even if the attack +came from Bulgaria alone, he added, the Greek army needed three weeks to +concentrate at Salonica and another month to reach the theatre of the +Austro-Servian conflict, and in that interval the Bulgarian army, +invading Servia, would render impossible all contact between the Greek +and Servian armies. The Entente Ministers endeavoured to overcome these +objections by assuring M. Venizelos that Bulgaria could not possibly +range herself against Russia, France, and England; and besides, they +said, their Governments could ask Rumania to guarantee Bulgarian +neutrality. M. Venizelos replied that, if the co-operation of Bulgaria +with Rumania and Greece were secured, then the Greeks could safely assist +Servia in an effective manner; or the next best thing might be an +undertaking by Rumania to guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria; and he +proceeded to ascertain the Rumanian Government's views on the subject. +He learnt that, in {22} answer to a question put to the Rumanian Premier +by the Entente Ministers at Bucharest, "whether he would undertake to +guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria towards Greece if the latter Power +sent succour to the Serbs," M. Bratiano, while professing the greatest +goodwill towards Greece and the Entente, declined to give any such +undertaking.[1] Add another important fact to which the Greek Government +had its attention very earnestly drawn about this time--that not only +Servia, but even Belgium, experienced the greatest difficulty in +procuring from France the munitions and money necessary for continuing +the struggle.[2] + +In the circumstances, there was no alternative for M. Venizelos but to +adopt the prudent attitude which on other occasions he was pleased to +stigmatize as "pro-German." True, his refusal to move in November was +hardly consistent with his eagerness to do so in August; but, taking into +account his temperament, we must assume that he had made that rash _a +titre gracieux_ offer blindfold. Events had not borne out his +predictions of a speedy victory, and, though his faith in the ultimate +triumph of the Entente remained unshaken, he had come to realize that, +for the present at any rate, it behoved Hellas to walk warily.[3] + +Some ten weeks passed, and then (23 January, 1915) Sir Edward Grey again +asked M. Venizelos for assistance to Servia in the common interest; as +Austria and Germany seemed bent on crushing her, it was essential that +all who could should lend her their support. If Greece ranged herself by +Servia's side as her ally, the Entente Powers would willingly accord her +very important territorial concessions on the Asia Minor Coast. The +matter was {23} urgent, for, were Servia crushed, though the ultimate +defeat of Austria and Germany would not be thereby affected, there would +during the War come about in the Balkans accomplished facts which would +make it difficult or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to +obtain afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually in view. +Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece and Rumania in the War +would, by bringing about the defeat of Austria, secure the realization of +Greek, Rumanian and Servian aspirations. To render such participation +effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured that, if +Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were realized, she would obtain +satisfactory compensations in Macedonia, on condition that she came in or +at least maintained a not malevolent neutrality. But the question of +compensations affected chiefly Servia: all he asked of M. Venizelos on +that point was not to oppose any concessions that Servia might be +inclined to make to Bulgaria. + +Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal or was merely +in the nature of a suggestion is hard to determine. But M. Venizelos +seems to have understood it in the latter sense, for in speaking of it he +made use of the very informal adjective "absurd." No one, indeed, could +seriously believe that Bulgaria would be induced to co-operate, or even +to remain neutral, by the hypothetical and partial promises which Sir +Edward Grey indicated; and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her +flank Greece could not march to Servia's aid. So M. Venizelos, under the +impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work, and within a few +hours produced a scheme calculated to correct the "absurdity" of the +British notion, to earn the gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an +Asiatic Empire for his country. It was nothing less than a complete +reversal of his former attitude: that Greece should not only withdraw her +opposition to concessions on the part of Servia, but should voluntarily +sacrifice Cavalla to the Bulgars, provided they joined the Allies +forthwith. This scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he +submitted to the King. + +M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the cession of Cavalla +would be, and therefore he had to use very strong arguments to commend it +to his Majesty. In the {24} first place, he emphasized the imperative +need of helping Servia, since, should Servia be crushed, the +Austro-German armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or Bulgaria +might be invited to take possession of Servian Macedonia, in which case +Greece would have either to let the Balkan balance of power go by the +board, or, in accordance with her Treaty, go to Servia's assistance under +much more disadvantageous conditions. In the second place, he argued +that the sacrifice of Cavalla was well worth making, since Greece would +eventually receive in Asia Minor compensations which would render her +greater and more powerful than the most sanguine Greek could even have +dreamt a few years before; and in Macedonia itself the loss of Cavalla +could be partially compensated for by a rectification of frontiers +involving the acquisition from Servia of the Doiran-Ghevgheli district. + +In the event of Bulgaria accepting Cavalla and the Servian concessions as +the price of her alliance, M. Venizelos argued that the outcome would be +a reconstructed League of the Balkan States which would not only ensure +them against defeat, but would materially contribute to the victory of +the Entente Powers: even the ideal of a lasting Balkan Federation might +be realized by a racial readjustment through an interchange of +populations. Should Bulgarian greed prove impervious, Greece must secure +the co-operation of Rumania, without which it would be too risky for her +to move.[4] + +Sacrifices of territory, in King Constantine's opinion, were out of the +question; but he thought that, if Rumania agreed to co-operate, it might +be possible for Greece to go to Servia's assistance, as in that case +Bulgaria could perhaps be held in check by Rumanian and Greek forces left +along her northern and southern frontiers. The Bucharest Government was +accordingly sounded, and returned an answer too evasive to justify +reliance on its co-operation. So M. Venizelos fell back on the scheme of +buying Bulgarian co-operation by the cession of Cavalla, and submitted a +second memorandum to the King. + +If the first of these documents was remarkable for its optimism, the +second might justly be described as a {25} masterpiece of faith pure and +undefiled by any contact with sordid facts. Its theme is the magnitude +of the compensations which Greece might expect in return for her entry +into the War: "I have a feeling," says the author, "that the concessions +in Asia Minor suggested by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit +to sacrifices to the Bulgars, assume such dimensions as to double the +size of Greece. I believe that if we demanded"--he specifies in detail a +vast portion of Western Asia Minor--"our demand would probably be +granted." He calculated that the surface of this territory exceeds +125,000 (the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres, while +the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed 2,000 square kilometres, +and that loss would be further halved by the acquisition from Servia of +the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square +kilometres. Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be giving up a +hundred and fortieth part of what she would be getting. In point of +population also Greece would be receiving twenty-five times as much as +she would be sacrificing--an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of +30,000 souls; and that loss could be obviated by obliging Bulgaria to buy +up the property of the Cavalla Greeks, who, he had no doubt, would gladly +emigrate _en masse_ to Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there. +How was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportunity--an +opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful on land and supreme in +the Aegean Sea--"an opportunity verily presented to us by Divine +Providence for the realization of our most audacious national +ideals"--presented to-day and never likely to occur again? + +M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction which appeared so +desirable and feasible to him must appear equally desirable and feasible +to others: and great was his surprise to find that such was by no means +the case. The General Staff, he complained, "seem, strangely, not +attracted strongly by these views." And the same might be said of +everyone who judged, not by the glow of prophetic insight, but by a cold +examination of facts. When Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek +Minister in London, that shrewd diplomat answered: "Greece would not +commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in {26} Asia Minor she +would find herself up against Great Powers as well as against Turkey." +[5] At Athens to this objection were added others not less weighty. The +General Staff pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money +required for the permanent occupation and efficient administration of +that distant region. They feared both the difficulties of defending +those Turkish territories in Asia and the danger of future attack from +Bulgaria in Europe. In short, they held that Greece by embarking on what +they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be undertaking responsibilities +wholly incommensurate with her resources.[6] + +Dangers and difficulties! cried M. Venizelos: can you allow such things +to stand in the way of national ideals? And he proceeded to demolish the +obstructions: the administrative success achieved in Macedonia proved +that the resources of Greece were equal to fresh responsibilities; the +Turks of Asia Minor--after the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, +which he deemed inevitable--would become contented and law-abiding Greek +subjects, and at all events the local Greek population would in a very +short space of time supply all the forces needed to maintain order in +Asia, leaving the main Greek army free for the defence of the European +frontiers. During that brief period of transition, he thought it easy to +form an agreement with the Entente Powers for military assistance against +a Bulgarian attack, or, even without the Entente, "should the Bulgars be +so demented by the Lord as to attempt aggression, I have not the +slightest doubt that Servia, moved by her treaty obligations, her +interests, and her gratitude for our present aid, would again co-operate +with us to humble Bulgarian insolence." [7] + +Thus at a moment's notice M. Venizelos became an impassioned advocate of +the policy of which he had hitherto been an impassioned opponent, and he +would have us believe that the King, persuaded by his eloquence, +authorised him to carry out his new plan. Be that as it may, M. +Venizelos did not avail himself of this permission. {27} For almost +simultaneously came the news of a Bulgarian loan contracted in the +Austro-German market--an event which made him abandon all hopes of +conciliating Bulgaria and profiting by the British overture. During the +months when the revival of the Balkan League was perhaps still +practicable, he had combated the only expedient which might have given it +a chance of realization: by the time he became a convert, it was too late. + +The Balkan situation remained as it was before Sir Edward Grey's +suggestion: so much so that, when a few days later the Entente Powers +again asked Greece to go to Servia's relief, offering her as security +against the Bulgarian danger to transport to Macedonia a French and a +British division, M. Venizelos, considering such security insufficient, +again refused;[8] a refusal which, justified though it was, gave great +umbrage.[9] + +While the Greek Premier was going through these mental evolutions, the +scene of Entente activity shifted: and his flexible mind perforce veered +in a new direction. + +As far back as 3 November, the outer forts of the Dardanelles had been +subjected to a brief bombardment with the object of testing the range of +their guns; and by 25 November the idea of a serious attack on the +Straits had engaged the attention of the British War Council. But no +decision was arrived at until January, when Russia, hard pressed by the +Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a demonstration against them in some +other quarter. In compliance with this appeal, the British War Council +then decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy +alone. After the failure of the naval attack of 19 February, however, it +was realized that the operations would have to be supplemented by +military action;[10] and as the magnitude of the enterprise became +clearer and the troops at the disposal of England and France were very +limited, the need of securing Balkan allies became more obvious. + +From the first greater importance was attached to Bulgarian co-operation +than to Greek. Even the grant of {28} a loan to Sofia by the Central +Powers appears to have produced little or no impression upon those +concerned. Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposition +that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without being satisfied that +their money will not be used against themselves. But at the time, after +a momentary shock, the Entente Governments were deluded, either by +Bulgarian diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that +"Bulgaria would not commit the stupidity to refuse the advantages +offered." [11] Nor, in thus reckoning on enlightened bad faith, were +they alone. M. Venizelos, who a moment before had declared that the loan +had opened his eyes to the fact "that Bulgaria was definitely committed +to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that, "notwithstanding the +loan, Bulgaria was capable of betraying her then friends and turning +towards those who promised her greater profits." [12] Anxious, +therefore, to forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that he +had been obliged on three occasions to decline requests from the Entente, +he spontaneously proposed, on 1 March, to offer three Greek divisions for +the Dardanelles expedition, stating that this proposal was made with King +Constantine's assent.[13] + +As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General Staff approved of +M. Venizelos's strategy. Having made a systematic study of the +Dardanelles problem, they judged that the Allies' enterprise, even under +the most skilful handling, presented but few chances, and those chances +had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful handling: the +bombardment of the Straits in the previous November had given the Turks +warning of the blow and ample time to prepare against it--and the Turks +were no longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency one +might formerly have counted; they now mounted guard over the gates of +their capital equipped with German guns and commanded by German officers. +The enterprise was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the +jealousy of the Bulgars. If, therefore, Greece did join in, besides all +the other risks, she would expose herself to a {29} Bulgarian assault; +and with a considerable portion of her forces engaged in Gallipoli, and +no prospect either of Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to +face that assault? + +The King's disapproval was known to no one better than to M. Venizelos +himself. But, for all that, he felt entitled to tell the British +Minister at Athens that he had the King's assent. Here is his own +explanation: "The King was opposed to the enterprise. I sought another +interview in order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with me +a third memorandum"--which has never been published, and cannot yet be +published. "I asked him to let me read it to him, for in it were set +forth fully all the arguments which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation. +I read it. I saw that the King became agitated. For--I must do him that +justice--he rarely remained unconvinced when face to face with me. So +profound was the emotion with which I spoke, so powerful were the +arguments which I used that the King, greatly moved, said to me: 'Well, +then, in the name of God.' That is, he assented." [14] + +However, the General Staff remained unconvinced; and Colonel Metaxas, a +brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of the Staff, resigned as a protest +against military proposals being made by a Greek minister to other +countries without previous consultation with the military experts of his +own. M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers should +presume to meddle with the plans of statesmen; his view being that the +Staff's business was simply to carry out the policy of the Government. +Nevertheless, impressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of +a Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their opinions +might be heard. The Council met on 3 March and again on 5 March. At the +first sitting M. Venizelos admitted that the objections of the military +experts, without altering his own convictions, might still inspire doubt +as to which policy was preferable: neutrality or intervention. Should +the policy of neutrality be adopted, it must be carried on by a new +Cabinet, to which he would accord his parliamentary support. At the +second sitting he endeavoured to remove the objections of the military +experts by reducing his proposed contribution to the {30} Gallipoli +expedition from three divisions to one, which should be replaced in the +existing cadres by a division of reserves, so as to leave the Greek Army +practically intact against a possible attack from Bulgaria. And having +thus modified the conditions of intervention, he refused to entertain any +other policy or to support a Cabinet pledged to neutrality.[15] + +Momentarily infected by the Cretan's enthusiasm, nearly all present urged +upon the King the acceptance of his proposal; one of them, M. Rallis, +even going so far as to say: "Sire, pray consider that you have a +Government clothed with the full confidence of the nation. Let it carry +out its policy. Else, you will incur undue responsibility." The King's +answer was: "If you wish it, I will abdicate." [16] He would rather give +up his crown than assume the responsibility of sanctioning a policy which +his whole military training and experience told him was insane and +suicidal: how justly, the event soon showed. The losses of men and ships +which Gallipoli cost far exceeded the whole of Greece's military and +naval resources; and if that cost proved more than embarrassing to +England and France, it would have literally ruined Greece. M. Rallis and +the other ex-Premiers in less than a fortnight gratefully recognised the +justness of the King's opposition to their views,[17] and thenceforth +parted company with M. Venizelos. + +Meanwhile M. Venizelos hastened from the Palace to the British Legation, +and, "in order to save time till he could make an official _demarche_," +he made to the Entente Ministers there assembled a semi-official +communication to this effect: "Following the natural evolution of its +policy of solidarity with the Entente Powers, the Royal Government has +judged that the Dardanelles operations afford it a favourable occasion to +translate its sentiments into deeds by abandoning its neutrality and +offering its co-operation in that enterprise with the whole of its Fleet +and one division of its army." All this, "though the King {31} has not +yet given his adhesion." [18] His hurry arose from the belief that the +Allies would reach Constantinople in a few days. + +But the General Staff still remained unconvinced. Yes, they said, one +division to begin with; but what if the Allies get stuck in the Straits, +as we believe they will be, and call upon us for more? And, once we join +them, how can we refuse to supply their needs? We shall be incurring +unlimited liabilities. So the King, who had full confidence in his +military advisers, and who could not bring himself to look upon the +Gallipoli adventure as a "serious enterprise," [19] declined his adhesion +to M. Venizelos's plan; and M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March). + +Then came the Entente replies to his communication; from which it +appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now the impetuous Cretan ran ahead +of the Powers: that, whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would +not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even agreed as to +whether they desired her co-operation. + +England regarded the communication as a merely preliminary and +preparatory step, and waited for a definite proposal after the King's +decision, when she would consult with her allies. France and Russia +insisted on the impossibility of Greece limiting her participation to a +war against Turkey alone: to be an effective partner of the Entente, +Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and Germany also. France added +that the question of the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles +enterprise could not be a useful subject of discussion between the Allies +until a definite decision by the Greek Government was taken. Russia did +not even envisage the usefulness of such a discussion. M. Sazonow +pointedly declared that he did not consider Greek co-operation in the +Dardanelles at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of +Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers alone without +the intervention of third parties, and that Russia did not desire the +entry of a Greek army into Constantinople, though she had no objection to +its operating against Smyrna or elsewhere.[20] + +{32} + +Some days later, it is true, M. Delcasse affirmed that he had overcome +Russia's repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding +to pressure, would have accepted the participation of Greek troops, she +made no secret of her satisfaction at not having had to do so: "We +heartily consent to your receiving large compensations in Asia Minor," +said the Russian Minister at Athens, in the presence of his British +colleague, to a high official of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs. +"But as to Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there; it +would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable for everybody to +turn you out." [22] + +M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did not covet +Constantinople: what he coveted, so far as material gains went, were the +large compensations in Asia Minor.[23] There lay the chief objective of +his strategy, and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him and +those elements in the country which still believed that the policy of +Greece must be governed by the solid necessities of the Balkan situation, +not by nebulous visions of Imperialist expansion. + + + +[1] Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov.; Venizelos to Greek +Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./7 Nov., 1914. + +[2] Romanos, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914. + +[3] He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making his +offer of 18 Aug., 1914, he bore in mind "the impossibility of going to +Servia's assistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."--_Orations_, +p. 93. But precisely similar was the objection to going against Turkey +without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality: only the Bulgars, in the one +case, would have been on Greece's left flank and in the other on the +right. The truth seems to be that the vision of M. Venizelos lacked the +penetration which, in matters of this sort, can only come from long study +and reflection. + +[4] First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 21 March (O.S.), +1915. + +[5] Gennadius, London, 10 Aug. (O.S.), 1914. + +[6] _Orations_, p. 43. + +[7] Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), +1915. + +[8] See his own statement in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[9] Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 1915. + +[10] Dardanelles Commission, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final Report, +pp. 6-8. + +[11] Deville, pp. 163, 215. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 103, 104. + +[13] Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3. + +[14] _Orations_, pp. 105-6. + +[15] See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the _Balkan Review_, +Dec., 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos's very meagre +account of these proceedings in _Orations_, pp. 107-8. + +[16] _Orations_, pp. 266-7. + +[17] _Ibid_, pp. 267-8. + +[18] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20 Feb./5 +March, 1915. + +[19] _Orations_, p. 267. + +[20] Gennadius, London, 21 Feb.; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb.; Dragoumis, +Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915. + +[21] _White Book_, No. 37. + +[22] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, Athens. 25 Feb./10 March, +1915. + +[23] _Orations_, pp. 108, 113-14. + + + + +{33} + +CHAPTER IV + +Immediately after the resignation of M. Venizelos it was decided to +dissolve the Chamber and to have General Elections, in which for the +first time the territories conquered in 1912-13 would participate. +Meanwhile, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of +considerable ability, though with none of the versatility of mind and +audacity of character which distinguished his predecessor, to carry on +the Government and to preside over the elections. Under ordinary +circumstances these would have taken place at once. But owing to the +need of preparing electoral lists for the new provinces, they were +delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King +Constantine which supervened--causing intense anxiety throughout the +nation and bringing political life to a standstill--two more months +passed before the new Parliament met. The interval proved fruitful in +developments of far-reaching importance. + +On its accession to power, the new Government issued a _communique_, +announcing that it would pursue the policy adopted at the beginning of +the War: a policy of neutrality qualified by a recognition of the +obligations imposed by the Servian Alliance, and a determination to +serve the interests of Greece without endangering her territorial +integrity.[1] And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed a +certain disappointment at not finding in the _communique_ any allusion +to the Entente Powers,[2] M. Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, +in order to remove all uneasiness on that score, instructed the Greek +representatives in London, Paris, and Petrograd to assure the +respective Governments categorically that the new Ministry did not +intend to depart in any way from the pro-Entente attitude dictated by +hereditary sentiments and interests alike. The only {34} difference +between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets--the difference which +brought about the recent crisis and the change of Government--was one +regarding the danger of immediate action, but did not affect the basis +of Greek policy.[3] + +That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M. Gounaris +thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as, +indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international +affairs thought--namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest +and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the +Entente.[4] The only question was whether she should enter the field +then, and if so, on what conditions. + +M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition +presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "God grant +that Greece may not miss." [5] His successors had no wish to miss the +opportunity--if such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in +the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan's infinite +capacity for taking chances. Even in war, where chance plays so great +a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is +not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with +success. + +And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified +to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her +co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the +vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried +to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the +extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin" +offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point that, +having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for +the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the +Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of +January. On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a +substantial portion of the hinterland"--a definition with which his +Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said +that they had no instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked +whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective +Governments M. Venizelos's interpretation of Sir Edward Grey's offer +regarding its geographical limits. The British Minister replied that +he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard +of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had +received no answer. The Russian Minister replied that he had +transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had been +informed of it in but a vague way by the late Cabinet. The French +Minister stated that the subject had never been mentioned to him, and +consequently he had not been in a position to make any communication to +his Government.[6] Thus the grandiose Asiatic dominion of which M. +Venizelos spoke so eloquently dwindled to "Smyrna and a substantial +portion of the hinterland." + +However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet went on with +their work, and were joined by Prince George, King Constantine's +brother, who had come from Paris to Athens for the express purpose of +discussing with the Government the question of entering the war against +Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by negotiations of +which Paris might be the centre. In that order of ideas, they had +already indicated as the best guarantee the simultaneous entry of +Bulgaria, who, according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the +point of joining. But this condition having proved {36} +unrealisable--Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if at all, at a +price of Greek territory which Greece would on no account pay--they +dropped it and set about considering by what other combinations they +could come in without compromising their country's vital interests. +The upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated 14 April, to +the following effect: + +If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the +War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of +her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval +forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would +be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman +Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm. +It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial +compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war +material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do +her part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece would +assume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were +ready to combine their forces with hers. All military details were to +be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint +Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria +continued to stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be +placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory Note added a few +days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon +the ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was +expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces +which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and +Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited +to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the +Allies wished it, they should have the military assistance of Greece on +the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops +first.[7] + +Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as +a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take +any notice. Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on +approaching M. Delcasse, was told that, since the Hellenic Government +viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an +understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest, +that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the +Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no +longer the same as it was some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and +anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its +dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government assured M. +Delcasse that it continued always animated by the same desire to +co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it +wished to know what proposals would be acceptable. M. Delcasse replied +that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be +acceptable.[8] But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator and later +French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M. +Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies. + +This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed to offer to +enter the war against Turkey with her naval forces only, reserving her +army for her own protection against Bulgaria.[9] The Entente Powers +intimated through M. Delcasse that they would accept such an offer, +provided it was made without any conditions.[10] Before deciding, +Greece wanted to be assured that the integrity of her territory during +the War and in the treaty of peace would be respected, that all the +necessary money and material would be forthcoming, and that the +compensations in Asia Minor allotted to her would represent +approximately the area indicated by M. Venizelos. If it was found that +on these three points the Hellenic Government interpreted the +intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would immediately submit +a Note in which the three points would be mentioned as going of their +own accord, so that the official reply of the Entente might cover, not +only the offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.[11] {38} +M. Delcasse refused to listen to any points: Greece, he insisted +irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions, coupling her +offer simply with "hopes to have the benefit of full solidarity with +her allies, whence results a guarantee of her territorial integrity," +and "entrusting the full protection of her vital interests to the three +Entente Powers." The formula was not incompatible with the best +construction which one chose to put upon it; and Prince George--who had +returned to Paris directly after the first offer and acted as a +personal representative of King Constantine, together with the official +representative of the Hellenic Government--warmly advocated its +adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in without delay and +without conditions, she might safely trust the Allies.[12] + +Whether Prince George's plea sprang from blind faith or from +far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the sequel may throw some +light; for the present enough to state that it produced no effect. In +a matter concerning the integrity of national territory acquired so +dearly, King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any +ambiguity or uncertainty: he was willing to waive the other two points, +but not that. He therefore begged his brother to see M. Poincare and +solicit in his name the President's help to secure that indispensable +assurance. "The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente Powers +should give us a solemn promise that they will respect and make others +respect, until the re-establishment of peace, our territorial +integrity, and that they will not permit any damage to it by the future +Peace Treaty. Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished +that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally decline to explain +themselves clearly with her." [13] What was in the King's mind may be +seen from the President's answer: The Powers did not wish to give a +formal pledge in as many words lest the Bulgars should be stirred to +{39} hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to them.[14] + +Prince George, in reporting M. Poincare's reply, added that the fear of +any damage being inflicted on Greek territorial integrity by the future +Peace Treaty was completely devoid of foundation; that, having himself +expressed this fear, he had been answered: "How can you imagine that we +could dispose of any part whatever of the territory of an allied State +without its consent?" [15] + +These fair words failed to reassure the Hellenic Government, which, +after mature reflection, concluded that the formula suggested by M. +Delcasse did not sufficiently safeguard Greece against combinations +likely to affect her territorial integrity. Its misgivings, which +sprang in the first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise, +were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincare for that refusal. +Consequently, it regretted that the Entente Powers did not see their +way to come to an understanding for a collaboration which both sides +desired, and repeated the assurance of a most benevolent neutrality +towards them.[16] + +The Greek position was plain: Greece made proposals which constituted a +break with the policy pursued deliberately since the beginning of the +War--proposals for an active partnership, and in return put forward +conditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge that she +should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed of Cavalla. +There were certain things she could do and, therefore, wished to do. +There were certain things she could not do, and must be assured that +she would not be made to do them. The Entente Powers, on the other +hand, would bind themselves to nothing: which is preferable, they said +in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond, or the spirit of +spontaneous co-operation; a legal obligation or the natural union of +hearts? What Greece needs, rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a +signature, is the steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends. If you +come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the {40} liberation +of the world and righteousness, how could we fail to be with you in +every single question affecting compensations or the integrity of your +territories? That's all very fine, said the Greeks. But---- + +The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded. Although +Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed the free passage of +German munitions which enabled Turkey to carry on the defence of +Gallipoli, the Entente Powers, satisfied with her Premier's +explanations and professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of +seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M. +Poincare told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that +happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia, +being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced. + +About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments +that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the +Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual +safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the +Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon both Servia and +Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian +susceptibilities--and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers, +who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship--by +the unhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere the end +of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer +to Bulgaria. + +They received the intelligence as might have been expected. The +Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the +Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of +the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of +her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands: +the Constitution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction +of the National Assembly. He asked them to understand that this +decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be +counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present +Government embraced every political party.[18] + +Not less uncompromising was the attitude of Greece. When the news +reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic Government could hardly believe +it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty +proclaimed by the Entente Powers--it seems to us absolutely impossible +to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has +been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its +territories the help of a people which has hitherto done all it could +to help the enemies of the Entente. By what right, and on what ground +could they mutilate our country? The opinions once expressed by M. +Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not constitute +a sufficient ground for spoliation. The whole thing is an unthinkable +outrage: it shows that our fears were justified and our demand for a +guarantee was absolutely indispensable." [19] + +France, through M. Delcasse, and England, through Lord Crewe, sought to +dispel these fears by formally disclaiming any intention to press upon +Greece a mutilation to which she objected, and explaining that the +eventual cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she +should consent of her own accord. M. Zographos, however, who had done +his best to bring Greece in on reasonable terms, convinced of his +failure, resigned; and after his departure the Gounaris Government +would permit itself no further discussion upon the subject of +intervention. + +During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff once more, in +June, approached the Servian Government with detailed suggestions for a +common plan against Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a +preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the +Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian +advantage in rapidity of mobilization. These steps proved as barren as +all the preceding: while Servia would not try to conjure the Bulgarian +peril by the sacrifices which the Entente recommended, she could not +provide against it by entering into arrangements with Greece which the +Entente disapproved. + +{42} + +Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British Minister at Sofia +made to the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of Cavalla and an +undefined portion of its hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in +Macedonia, stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on +those countries, and make the cession to them of any compensations +elsewhere conditional on their consent to this transaction. + +The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long anticipated. M. +Passitch, the Servian Premier, in an interview with the Greek Minister +at Nish, expressed his profound dismay at the corner into which Servia +was driven; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that she was +entirely dependent on the Entente--whose high-handed methods he did not +fail to criticize--forced her to give it consideration. + +If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged. M. Gounaris addressed +a strongly-worded remonstrance to the British Minister at Athens, +reminding him that in May his Government had protested against the +offer of Greek territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M. +Delcasse had disavowed any intention to bring the least pressure to +bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to count on her independence +being respected. The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could +promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of +Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards. +But they were greatly mistaken. The Hellenic Government, voicing the +unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment, +repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an +object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the +courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most +energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to +inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of +international law. + +In reply, the British Government quietly informed the Hellenic +Government that the Entente Powers still hoped that Greece would come +into line with their policy, and that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted +their offer, they would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail +with {43} the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic +concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.[20] + +This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with M. Gounaris's +Government to an end. It is a strange record. We have, to begin with, +the curious reception of his first offer--the whole Greek Army, the +intervention of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a +victory. Doubtless, there were reasons for declining so considerable a +reinforcement. We know that, although Russia had modified her +objection to Greek participation, she still regarded the presence of a +large Greek force in European Turkey with disfavour; that the +dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France; that +the Allies could not at that time afford the military contingents +stipulated by the Greek General Staff. There will be no disposition to +underrate the complexities of the situation, or want of sympathy for +those upon whom fell the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all +the Powers concerned. But, though these complexities might be good +reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were hardly reasons +for not acknowledging it, even in the interest of ordinary courtesy. + +Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris. Here, again, +political difficulties explain without justifying the attitude of the +Entente Powers. Their refusal of the guarantee demanded by Greece as +an essential condition of her entry into the war was, of course, a +natural result of their Bulgarian policy--a policy for which very +little could be said. Time perhaps was, at the beginning of the War, +when Bulgaria might have been won; for it is not necessary to adopt the +Graeco-Servian view that she had from the first decided to join the +enemies of the Entente and that no amount of reasonable concessions +would have satisfied her ambition; the Bulgars are a practical people, +and there was at Sofia a pro-Entente party which might have prevailed, +if the Entente Powers had, without delay, defined the proposed +concessions and proceeded to press Greece and Servia to make them--to +expect from either {44} State a voluntary self-mutilation was to expect +a miracle. By not doing so, by shilly-shallying at Athens, Nish, and +Sofia, they only lost the confidence of Greeks and Serbs without +gaining the confidence of the Bulgars, who could hardly take seriously +proposals so vague in their formulation and so uncertain of their +fulfilment. If, on the other hand, the Allies were unable to define +the concessions or afraid to shock public opinion by forcing them upon +Greece and Servia, then they ought to have dropped their hopeless +scheme, without wasting valuable time, and worked on the lines of +Graeco-Servian co-operation against Bulgaria. Instead, they squashed, +as we saw, every attempt which the Greek General Staff made to that end. + +But it is not the only aberration with which history will charge our +statesmen and diplomats. + +Greece was going through an internal crisis; and those who know Greece +will know what that means. In private life no people is more +temperate, more moderate, than the Greek: a sense of measure always +seasons its pleasures, and even the warmest passions of the heart seem +to obey the cool reflections of the brain. In public life, by way of +compensation, the opposite qualities prevail; and as citizens the +Greeks display an astonishing lack of the very virtues which +distinguish them as men. The spirit of party burns so hot in them that +it needs but a breath to kindle a conflagration. That spirit, whose +excesses had, several times in the past, brought the fundamental +principles of the Constitution into question, and the country itself to +the brink of ruin, was once again at work. Former friends had become +deadly enemies: the community was rent with dissensions and poisoned +with suspicions. Preposterous falsehoods were freely scattered and +readily snatched at on both sides: the side of M. Venizelos and the +side of M. Gounaris. Politicians who had been eclipsed by the Cretan's +brilliance, came forth now to regain their lustre at his expense. For +like all men who have played leading parts on the world's stage, M. +Venizelos had gathered about him as much animosity as admiration; and +hate is more enterprising than love. + +M. Venizelos and his partisans were at least as resourceful as their +opponents. The Cretan had never been able to bear contradiction. If +his greatness had created him {45} many enemies, his pettiness had +created him more. His tone of prophetic and impeccable omniscience was +vexatious at all times, but particularly galling at this agitated +period. It was now his constant cry that the situation called for the +work of a statesman and not of an international lawyer or strategist. +There were times when he declaimed this thesis in so violent a fashion +that no self-respecting man could work with him. He had lost all the +able collaborators of the great Reconstruction era, and nothing could +make him forgive these "apostates." Everybody who could not see eye to +eye with him was to M. Venizelos a traitor. It was impossible for M. +Venizelos to admit that others besides himself might be actuated by +patriotic as well as by personal motives; that he did not possess an +exclusive patent of sincerity any more than of vanity. He found it +easier to believe that the alpha and the omega of their policy was to +undo him. He would undo them--even at the cost of the cause he had at +heart: to see Greece openly on the side of the Entente. It is not that +he thought less of the cause, but he thought more of himself. His +egoism was of that heroic stature which shrinks from nothing. His +nature impelled him to this labour; his privileged position as the +particular friend of the Entente supplied him with the means. + +M. Venizelos had taken a long stride towards that end when he +insinuated that King Constantine's disagreement with him was due to +German influence. Henceforth this calumny became the cardinal article +of his creed, and the "Court Clique" a society for the promotion of the +Kaiser's interests abroad and the adoption of the Kaiser's methods of +government at home. M. Streit, though no longer a member of the +Cabinet, was represented as its mainspring: a secret counsellor who +wielded the power, while he avoided the title, of Minister; M. +Gounaris, though in name a Prime Minister, was in reality a mere +instrument of the sovereign's personal policy--so were the members of +the General Staff--so was, in fact, everyone who held opinions at +variance with his own: they all were creatures of the Crown who tried +to hide their pro-Germanism under the mask of anti-Venizelism. Their +objections to his short-sighted and wrong-headed Asiatic +aspirations--objections the soundness of which has been amply {46} +demonstrated by experience--were dictated by regard for Germany, the +patron of Turkey. Their offers to fight for the dissolution of +Germany's protege were not genuine: the conditions which accompanied +them were only designed to make them unacceptable. The Entente should +beware of their bad faith and learn that M. Venizelos was the only +Greek statesman that could be trusted.[21] + +The Powers who had long since adopted M. Venizelos found it convenient +to adopt all his theories. M. Delcasse, when called upon to explain +why the Greek offer met with such scant ceremony, did so by saying that +it came from M. Gounaris, who was the instrument of the personal policy +of the sovereign, and who combated among the electors M. Venizelos, the +champion of rapprochement with the Entente; that the proposal for the +dispatch of large contingents to the East, involving as it did a +depletion of the Western Front, was calculated to please the imperial +brother-in-law of King Constantine; that the territorial guarantee +demanded by Greece would have become known to Bulgaria, thrown her into +the arms of Germany, and precipitated her against Servia, whom King +Constantine intended to leave to her fate; the trick was too gross to +deceive the Allies, and they gave it the reception it deserved. +Likewise in squashing the Greek efforts to concert with Servia measures +for mutual safety against Bulgaria, while there was yet time, the +Allies, said M. Delcasse, acted on the advice of M. Venizelos, who told +them that the Graeco-Servian Treaty was purely defensive: that it did +not provide for action unless Bulgaria attacked; and what a misfortune +if Servia, by such measures, should appear to take an initiative which +would give Bulgaria an excuse for the aggression she meditated. +Therefore, they bade Servia devote her whole attention to the security +of her Austrian frontier and not play Bulgaria's game by furnishing her +with a pretext for attack.[22] + +{47} + +On this side of the Channel the inventions of M. Venizelos, it would +seem, were accepted as discoveries with equal solemnity. During the +Paris pourparlers, according to the French Ambassador in London at all +events, England was much annoyed by the Greek Government's hesitations, +which she attributed to King Constantine's opposition, and asked +herself whether she could either then or in the future treat with a +country governed autocratically. She was persuaded that Greece lay +under the influence of Germany, and asked herself whether she could in +future support a country which let itself be guided by Powers whose +interests were absolutely contrary to her own.[23] + +The Entente Ministers at Athens, as was natural, had greater +opportunities of displaying their solidarity with M. Venizelos. They +would perhaps have been better advised had they followed the example of +their colleagues at Rome. It can hardly be questioned that the +discreet and decorous aloofness of the Entente diplomats from the +long-protracted struggle between the Italian advocates of war and +neutrality, assisted by Prince von Buelow's indiscreet and indecorous +participation in that struggle, facilitated a decision in our favour: +nothing does so much to alienate a high-spirited nation as an attempt +on the part of outsiders to direct its internal affairs. In Greece the +need for discretion was even more imperative. All controversy at such +a juncture was injudicious. But if preference had to be shown, it +would have been better to have taken the King's side, for all that was +valuable to us from the military point of view rallied round him; and, +in any case, since the hopes of the Venizelists for oversea expansion +depended on the goodwill of the Sea Powers, {48} they were tied to us +securely enough: so if the land school represented by the General Staff +could have been satisfied, the country would have remained united and +on our side. Instead of adopting this sane attitude, the local agents +of the Entente ostentatiously associated themselves with the +Venizelists and boycotted the others, thus gratuitously contributing to +a cleavage from which only our enemies could profit. + +And that was not all. Having begun by endeavouring to influence the +Greeks, they ended by being entirely influenced by them. Forgetting +that no correct perception of facts or estimate of motives is possible +without a certain mental detachment, they allowed themselves to be +swallowed up, as it were, in the atmosphere of suspicion and slander +generated by party friction: they ceased to have any eyes, ears, or +minds of their own; they saw and heard just what M. Venizelos willed +them to see and hear, and thought just as M. Venizelos willed them to +think. If the King refused to enter the War, his refusal was inspired +by the desire to serve the Kaiser; if he offered to do so, his offers +were prompted by the desire to dish M. Venizelos.[24] + +Hence, every proposal made to the Entente by M. Venizelos's successors +was rejected. Greece was kept out of the Allies' camp, and Servia was +sacrificed. For it should be clearly understood that the fate of +Servia was decided in the months of June and July, 1915, not only by +the development of the Germano-Bulgarian plan, but also by the failure +of all co-operative counter-measures on the part of the Serbs, Greeks, +and Entente Powers while time was still available. If only there had +been anyone of sufficient authority and independence of view to +correlate and compose the clashing interests of the moment, a gallant +ally might have been saved from destruction. But those best qualified +to judge of what was coming, and in a position to frame the +corresponding policy, had been driven into reserve by the storm of +calumny, whereby their motives were misconstrued, their counsels +derided, and their authority undermined; so that in the general uproar +their voices were scarcely heard. And there were none--or {49} very +few--to act as intermediaries; for the personnel of the Entente +Legations, "wholly believing a lie," had withdrawn in a body from all +intercourse with them, had nicknamed them "Boches," and were accustomed +to assess as concocted in Berlin every notion that emanated from them. +Even the few members of those Legations who had the moral courage to +walk the streets without blinkers were subjected to every form of +odious insinuation and attack. Venizelos in office, out of office, on +matters technical or lay, to him and to him only would anyone listen, +and as he knew rather less about the rudiments of the military art than +most people, and refrained from consulting those that did, the results +were not difficult to predict. + +Yet, as late as June, the elements of a good plan were ready to hand in +abundance. The General Staff was, as stated, continuing its efforts +for co-operation with the Serbs. The King, though too ill to conduct +business, would have assented to any military proposal put forward by +the General Staff. The people would have followed the King as one man. +And the enemy were not ready. All that was necessary was to study with +attention and sympathy the advice of the experts: to call the soldiers +of the countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint +campaign. It was not done--and it is difficult to say now to whom the +failure proved most disastrous--to Servia, to Greece, or to the Entente +Powers. But for this failure a proportionate share of blame must be +laid upon those who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece, +did everything they could to foment them. + + + +[1] _White Book_, No. 34. + +[2] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./10 March, 1915. + +[3] _White Book_, No. 35. + +[4] The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist _White Book_, No. +36,--an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the probabilities of the +War, dated 13/26 March, 1915. It is both striking and illuminating +that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria, the author +considers three alternatives: (1) Bulgaria in alliance with the +Entente. (2) Bulgaria as neutral. (3) Bulgaria as an enemy of the +Entente. In dealing with the attitude of Greece he does not for a +single moment contemplate more than two alternatives: (1) Greece as an +ally of the Entente. (2) Greece as neutral. Further, in the course of +the argument which follows, M. Streit discusses a possible +understanding between Greece on the one part and Rumania and Bulgaria +on the other, with the object either of a common neutrality or, failing +that, of a simultaneous entry into war in favour of the Entente, "on +whose side alone we can range ourselves." + +[5] See the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[6] _Conversation entre le President du Conseil et les Ministres des +Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 mars/12 avril, 1915_. + +[7] Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the Proposal +of same date; _Orations_, pp. 67-9. + +[8] Romanos, Paris, 17/30 April, 1915. + +[9] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 18 April/1 +May, 1915. + +[10] Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915. + +[11] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 1915. + +[12] Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915. + +[13] King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/10 May, 1915. From +this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincare had assured +the Prince that such a guarantee would certainly be given to Greece, +"_pour la periode de la guerre et durant la periode des negociations de +la paix_." + +[14] Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/11 May, 1915. + +[15] _Ibid._ + +[16] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 30 +April/13 May, 1915. + +[17] Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. +M. Delcasse, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain over +Bulgaria _coute que coute_, deploring the possession of Cavalla by +Greece. See Deville, pp. 163, 218. + +[18] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915. + +[19] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915. + +[20] Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/3 Aug.; +Greek Premier's reply (No. 8118); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 23 July/5 +Aug.; 25 July/7 Aug.; Communication by British Minister at Athens, 23 +July/5 Aug., 1915. + +[21] See the _Nea Hellas_, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915; _Orations, +passim_. + +[22] _Journal Officiel_, p. 76. To appreciate the community of +sentiments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcasse fully, one must compare +the above statement with that in _Orations_, pp. 68-9. The differences +are equally instructive. The Venizelist orator, prudently suppresses +from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated the General +Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia; he boldly surmises, on the +other hand, that behind the General Staff's stipulations as to the +sphere of Greek military action lurked the _arriere pensee_ to confront +the Allies with the risk of provoking Bulgaria, whom they still +regarded as a potential friend: so the stipulations were, as they were +intended to be, unacceptable. Again, while M. Delcasse, addressing a +French audience nervous about the Western Front, reckoned that the +Entente contingents demanded by the Greek General Staff would amount to +at least 600,000 or 800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically, +estimates them at 450,000 men: this force, which Greece deemed +necessary for success, it will be seen, was not far removed from that +which France and England eventually wasted in failure. + +[23]Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. + +[24] See M. Poincare's statement to the _Matin_, reproduced in the +_Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 386; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9. + + + + +{50} + +CHAPTER V + +On 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a result of the General +Elections held on June 13. The outcome of those elections proved how +great his popularity still was. True, in 1910 he had obtained 146 +seats out of 182, and now only 185 out of 314. But the majority, +though diminished, remained substantial enough to show that he still +was, for most people, the man who had cleansed Greece. Nor did M. +Venizelos imperil his popularity by revealing his differences with the +King. On the contrary, in his own country, his attacks were carefully +confined to the statesmen and soldiers opposed to him: the King, M. +Venizelos proclaimed, far from sharing their narrow, unpatriotic, +pro-German views, "did not exclude exit from neutrality under given +conditions, but accepted it in principle as imposed for the serving of +the national rights." [1] By his organs, too, the King was described +as "a worthy successor of the Constantines who created the mighty +Byzantine Empire--imbued with a sense of his great national +mission--Greek in heart and mind." [2] So anxious, indeed, was M. +Venizelos not to lose votes by any display of ill-feeling against the +popular sovereign that he even took some pains to have himself +photographed calling at the Palace to inquire after the King's health. + +As to policy, it is difficult to determine the part which it played in +the contest. M. Venizelos refrained from publishing any sort of +programme. His opponents asserted that a vote for Venizelos meant a +vote for war. But his most prominent supporters declared that such was +by no means the case: although, at a certain moment, he was ready to +participate in the Gallipoli enterprise, circumstances had changed, and +his future course would depend on the situation which he would find on +returning to {51} power. This vagueness, though not very helpful to +the voters, doubtless helped the voting; for there was hardly any +pro-war feeling among the masses. The noble ideals emblazoned upon the +Entente banners produced little impression on their minds. The +experience of two thousand years has taught the Greeks that Governments +never fight for noble ideals, and, if they relieve a small nation from +a foreign yoke, it is, as often as not, in order to impose a new one. +To them the War was a struggle for power and plunder between two +European groups. It was matter of common knowledge that Constantinople +had been allotted to the Russians, and the Greeks were not particularly +keen on shedding their blood in order to place a Tsar on the Byzantine +throne. Nor did the Smyrna bait attract them greatly, since it +involved parting with Cavalla. At the same time, the lurid accounts of +German frightfulness disseminated by the Entente propaganda, instead of +inflaming, damped still further their enthusiasm.[3] The Venizelist +candidates were, therefore, wise in repudiating the allegation that +their victory would inevitably mean intervention in the conflict; and, +on the whole, the people who voted for the Cretan statesman seem to +have paid a tribute to his personality rather than to his policy. + +Meanwhile, Servia, under pressure from the Entente, had decided to +promise Bulgaria territorial concessions, and the communication of this +decision to the Hellenic Government formed the occasion of M. +Venizelos's first official act. Greece, he wrote in reply, not wishing +to embarrass her friend and ally at a moment when imperative necessity +forced the latter to submit to painful sacrifices, abandoned her +objections. But she would be lacking in sincerity if she failed to +tell Servia straightway that "the _raison d'etre_ of the +Alliance--namely, the territorial equilibrium and the mutual guarantee +of their respective possessions--being profoundly affected by the +contemplated changes, the reciprocal obligations of the Alliance could +not survive except by virtue of a renewal." M. Passitch replied +verbally that he thought like M. Venizelos. But, as it happened, the +question did not arise; Servia's promise was coupled with so many +stipulations and reservations, that, in the opinion of the Entente +Powers, {52} it amounted almost to a refusal;[4] and the thread of the +negotiations was very soon broken by events. Destiny moved too fast +for diplomacy. + +Hardly had these dispatches been exchanged, when Colonel Vlachopoulos, +the emissary of the Greek General Staff to Servia, arrived in Athens, +bringing a report of the gravest nature. After twelve months' +evasions, the Servian Minister of War had at last mentioned to him the +need for an understanding between the two Staffs, and the Servian +Director of Military Operations stated that Servia, far from being able +to contribute to a common struggle against Bulgaria the 150,000 +combatants stipulated by the Graeco-Servian Convention, could not at +the moment transport to the northern parts of the Bulgarian frontier +more than one or two divisions, while as to the southern parts, which +most immediately concerned Greece, they would have to be left with the +eight regiments of 1915 conscripts--that is, raw recruits. +Simultaneously, the fear which the Greek military authorities had +expressed to their Servian colleagues in the previous spring--that +delay might prove fatal--was being realized: from all sides came +intelligence of the concentration of large Austro-German forces towards +the Danube. + +In the circumstances, after studying Colonel Vlachopoulos's report, the +Greek General Staff submitted to the Government (14 September) the +opinion that for Greece to embark on a war against Bulgaria, so long as +she was not assured of the co-operation of adequate Servian forces, was +tantamount to courting annihilation; and of such co-operation there was +no prospect: the moment the Serbs found themselves faced by a superior +Austro-German army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars as well +as, in all probability, the Turks alone. + +As if in confirmation of this forecast, a week later (21 September), +the Hellenic Government received from Sofia the official announcement +of the conclusion of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement and of Bulgarian +mobilization; the latter measure being, according to the Bulgarian +Premier, purely precautionary: as the Austro-German {53} armies had +just begun an attack on Servia, and the theatre of war approached the +Bulgarian frontiers, his country was obliged to take up an attitude of +armed neutrality.[5] + +The news threw M. Venizelos into a fever of excitement. He had, +meanwhile, become most solicitous about Greece-Servian co-operation, +and had not permitted his mind to be impressed by Colonel +Vlachopoulos's report. When Austria and Germany had their hands full +elsewhere, Servia's peril had left him cold; it set him on fire now +when they were ready to hurl their legions into the Balkan +Peninsula--when it was no longer for Greece a question of fighting +Bulgaria only, but Bulgaria and Turkey and the Central Empires. M. +Venizelos was a statesman of broad ideas, a hater of dry facts, and an +impenitent believer in his own star. For the matter of time he cared +very little; considerations of odds did not weigh with him unduly; and +he cherished a sovereign contempt for the cautious attitude of +professional soldiers and other uninspired persons. Never did these +qualities appear more vividly than on this 21st of September. + +At 5 p.m. M. Venizelos went to Tatoi, the King's country residence, to +confer with him, having previously arranged that a mobilization Order +should be drawn up and presented to his Majesty for signature at 6.30 +p.m., by which time he expected to have finished his conversation. The +following is a synopsis of that memorable interview based on a report +from M. Venizelos's own lips.[6] + +The King readily agreed to mobilize, but firmly resisted the proposal +to enter the war, on the ground that the odds were too heavy. M. +Venizelos argued that, even if Germany had five million men available +on other fronts, she could not bring them to the Balkans, and +consequently there was no cause for fear: he spoke learnedly and at +enormous length of geographical conditions and means of transport, of +victualling, of guns and bayonets, of _morale_--he had allowed himself +an hour and a half. How the King must have felt under this harangue, +any expert who has had to listen to an amateur laying down the law to +him on his own subject may imagine. On finding his military arguments +fruitless, M. Venizelos shifted his ground; though, the military habit +being too strong, he {54} could not get away from military phraseology: +"I was then obliged," he tells us, "to bring forward my heavy +artillery." + +"Majesty," I said, "I have not succeeded in persuading you. I am very +sorry; but it is my duty, as representing at this moment the +Sovereignty of the People, to tell you that you have no right to +disagree with me this time. The people by the last elections has +approved my policy and given me its confidence. It knew that the basis +of my policy was not to let Bulgaria, by crushing Servia, become too +big and crush us to-morrow. You cannot therefore at this moment depart +from this policy--unless you decide to set aside the Constitution; in +which case you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution by a +Decree and assuming the responsibility." + +The King replied: "You know I recognize that I am bound to obey the +popular verdict when it is a question of the internal affairs of the +country; but when it is a question of foreign affairs--the great +national questions--my view is that, so long as I consider a thing +right or wrong, I must insist that it shall or shall not be done, +because I feel responsible before God." + +At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, "I remember that a feeling of +distress came over me, and with clasped hands, I shook my head in a +melancholy manner, saying: 'Alas! we are before the theory of kingship +by the grace of God: poor Greece!'" [7] After a little, he told the +King that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake a +struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation. + +The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian +mobilization? In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay +even twenty-four hours. After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will +attack Servia? It is possible that she may maintain an armed +neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay +in power and carry on your policy." Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew +his resignation. + +Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55} +announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for +Bulgaria at once. But how? In his own mind, as he had already +demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked +the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking +their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the +King set such store. They objected Servia's inability to contribute, +as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants. +Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think +we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish +150,000 combatants of their own?" + +"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan +(European) troops, not Colonials." + +By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the +King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these +reinforcements, to depart from neutrality. He left Tatoi with a clear +perception of the divergence between their respective points of view: +while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was +for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon +appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means +or other. + +A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his +feet: + +"I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the curious record, +"and telephoned to the Entente Ministers to come and see me quickly. +When they came, I informed them that a mobilization Order was being +signed at that very moment and would be published that evening; but for +our further course I needed to know if the Powers were disposed to make +good the 150,000 combatants whom Servia was obliged by our Treaty to +contribute for joint action against Bulgaria. They promised to +telegraph, and immediately dispatched an extra urgent telegram, adding +that they would let me know the answer. This happened at about 8 p.m., +and at 8.15 there arrived M. Mercati (the Marshal of the Court) with a +message from the King, asking me not to make this _demarche_ to the +Entente. I replied that the _demarche_ had already been made." [8] + +{56} + +Forty-eight hours later arrived the Entente Powers' answer, that they +would send to Salonica the 150,000 men asked for. M. Venizelos, on +communicating this answer to the King, was requested by him to tell the +Entente Ministers that, so long as Bulgaria did not attack Servia, and +consequently the question of Greece going to Servia's assistance did +not arise, no troops should be sent, as their landing on Greek soil +would constitute a violation of Greek neutrality. M. Venizelos tells +us that he communicated the King's wish to the Entente Ministers, who +telegraphed it to their Governments. + +King Constantine, it would seem, was left under the impression that the +affair had ended; and the general belief was that the policy of +neutrality still held good; when suddenly the report came that Allied +troops were on their way to Salonica and that Greece was expected to +assist in their landing. + +The news would have astonished the Greeks in any circumstances; but the +circumstances in which it reached them were of a nature to heighten +astonishment into alarm. Just then (28 September) Sir Edward Grey +stated in the House of Commons, amid loud applause, "Not only is there +no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a +warm feeling of sympathy;" and he reiterated the Balkan policy of the +Entente--a Balkan {57} agreement on the basis of territorial +concessions. The inference which the Greeks drew from this coincidence +was that the Entente Powers were sending troops to despoil them on +behalf of the Bulgars--that they intended to bid for Bulgaria's +friendship at the twelfth hour by forcibly seizing the parts of +Macedonia which they had endeavoured in vain to persuade Greece to +yield.[9] + +M. Venizelos himself carried the report to the King, inveighing, it is +said, intemperately against the Allies: "I will protest with the +greatest energy," he cried, trembling with anger. "I will protest +against this unqualifiable violation of our soil." + +"Certainly," replied the King, "you must protest very energetically." +[10] + +{58} + +And M. Venizelos hurried off to his office and drew up the following +telegram, which, now printed for the first time, reveals many things: + +"A grave misunderstanding threatens to develop between Greece and the +Entente Powers on the subject of the despatch of international troops +through Salonica to Servia. When I suggested the dispatch of 150,000 +men destined to complete the Servian contingents in case of a common +struggle against Bulgaria, I did not ask this succour for Greece, but +for Servia in order to remove the objection raised against our +Alliance, said to have become null by Servia's inability to fulfil her +engagement. By accepting in principle to proceed to such dispatch the +Powers rendered above all a service to Servia and to their own cause in +the East. Likewise, I had clearly specified that, so long as Greece +was neutral, the landing of international troops at Salonica could not +have our official adhesion. Our neutrality imposed upon us to protest +for form's sake; after which matters would go on as at Moudros." [11] + +{59} + +"It remained for us to take all the necessary measures for facilitating +the landing and the direct passage to Servia of the international +troops, combining these operations with the needs of our own +mobilization. The Minister of Communications was to go at once to +Salonica with a number of engineers to arrange on the spot these +technical matters, very complicated from the paucity of means of +transport in Macedonia. It was understood that, before any dispatch of +troops to Salonica, we should have twenty-four hours' notice. + +"Things were at this point, when the Military Governor of Salonica--on +Wednesday--received a visit from the French Consul, the Commander of a +French man-of-war, and two French officers from the Dardanelles, who +told him that, in pursuance of a pretended understanding between the +Premier and the French Minister, they were going to start +reconnaissance work for the landing of French troops and the defence of +Salonica against enemy submarines. Furthermore, on Thursday there +arrived at Salonica General Hamilton with his Staff and notified the +Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the town and +port, and put them in a state of defence with a view to a landing of +troops. General Moschopoulos, very firmly though very politely, +declared to them that, without orders from his Government, it would be +his painful duty to oppose any seizure of national territory. + +"Such a misunderstanding inspires us with the liveliest alarm, for the +contemplated landing has not yet been definitely accepted, and after +being accepted it cannot be carried out, (1) without a preliminary +protest for form's sake, which the British Government has informed us +it does not want;[12] (2) without the absolute maintenance of the +powers of our authorities, who alone would decide the measures for the +use of the port and railways in such a manner as not to compromise the +transport and concentration of our own armies." + +{60} + +"Moreover, the great emotion caused in the public by the recent speech +of Sir Edward Grey compels the Royal Government to demand from the +Entente Powers certain preliminary assurances. While people here +expected to see the Powers, after the Bulgarian mobilization, proceed +to decisive acts, and at the very least to a declaration that the +territorial promises made to Bulgaria in August would be cancelled if +within a very short time she did not agree to co-operate with the +Entente, they were stupefied to see that to the most evident proof of +Bulgarian duplicity and disloyalty they replied by redoubling their +solicitude and goodwill. Sir Edward Grey's speech, followed closely by +the visits made without notice at Salonica by the representatives of +the French and British Staffs, gives birth to the fear that certain +Entente Powers may harbour the design of using the troops which would +be sent to Servia as the fittest instrument for giving practical effect +to the territorial ambitions of the Bulgars in Macedonia. Well or ill +founded, this fear exercises over people in Greece, and we have reason +to believe in Servia also, a demoralizing effect and threatens to +compromise the success of our mobilization. + +"The Royal Government finds itself confronted with a situation created +much against its will, which imposes upon it the duty, in order to calm +as soon as possible the alarms of the people now in arms, of asking the +Powers to dispel the fears inspired by their attitude towards Bulgaria +by declaring, if possible, that the offers made to her are henceforth +null, and that the eventual dispatch of international troops to Servia +would in no case be turned to the detriment of the territorial +integrity of Greece and Servia. Only formal assurances in this sense +could justify in the eyes of Greek public opinion the Government which, +while protesting for form's sake, would agree to facilitate the landing +at Salonica and the passage across its territory of international +troops destined for Servia. + +"Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this +telegram." [13] + +From the tenor of this interesting document we gather that, while fully +aware of the King's attitude, M. Venizelos {61} went on negotiating +with the Allies for immediate action; and that the Allies proceeded to +act before any agreement had been reached. To judge by its tone, M. +Venizelos seems to have been annoyed at the Allies' haste as at an +unwarrantable attempt to commit him irretrievably without heeding his +conditions or waiting for his definite consent: so grave a breach of +propriety could not but pain him. But, however annoyed he might be on +the surface, at bottom he was doubtless pleased: the move supplied the +best means for the conversion of his Sovereign--no argument is so +persuasive as an accomplished fact. That was what really mattered--the +manner was a detail; and it is impossible to suppose that he meant to +let his annoyance stand in the way of his high purpose.[14] +Themistocles, to whom the Cretan statesman bears some affinity, it will +be remembered, forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis by a similar +stratagem. + +This, of course, does not exculpate the Allies. Their conduct merits +at least the appellation of irregular. But when foreign diplomats and +native politicians become fused into a happy family, it would be +strange, indeed, if irregularities did not occur. The whole of the +Greek story is so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of old-fashioned +melodrama that no incident, however startling, seems out of place. + +What follows is something of an anticlimax. Next day, the French +Minister--from this point onwards France takes the lead and England +recedes into the second place--had the honour to announce to his +Excellency the Greek Premier the arrival at Salonica of a first +detachment of troops, declaring at the same time that the Entente +Powers sent it to assist their ally Servia, and that they counted on +Greece, who had already given them so many proofs of friendship, not to +oppose measures taken in the interest of a country to which she also +was allied.[15] + +{62} + +In reply, the Greek Premier had the honour to declare to his Excellency +the French Minister that, being neutral, Greece could not authorize +measures which violated her neutrality. The Hellenic Government was +therefore obliged to protest against the passage of foreign troops +through Greek territory. The circumstance that those troops were +destined solely to the assistance of Servia, who was Greece's ally, +nowise altered the case; for, before the _casus faederis_ was realized, +the neutrality of Greece could not be affected by the danger which +menaced Servia.[16] + +To return from formalities to realities. On the same day (2 Oct.), the +Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while the +Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube; and +on the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria. This rapid +fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the +highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the Entente had not yet +been extinguished. On the very day on which the Petrograd Government +delivered its tardy and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the +Chamber held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first +time proclaimed that the Graeco-Servian Treaty imposed an absolute +obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey; adding--in +answer to a question, what he would do if on going to Servia's +assistance he met the German and Austrian armies--that Germany and +Austria must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his thesis +with those appeals to honour which, whether pertinent or not, seldom +fail to move a popular audience. The debate lasted till four o'clock +in the morning and ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's +military policy--a policy which M. Venizelos, a civilian, expounded to +an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without waiting for the +consent of the King and in defiance of the technical advice of the +General Staff. In fairness to the Chamber, it should be added that the +motion was carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement.[17] + +{63} + +But we know King Constantine's attitude; and if M. Venizelos hoped by +these tactics to force his hand, he was speedily undeceived. No sooner +was the debate over than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked +him to modify his policy or to resign. Faced by such a dilemma, M. +Venizelos did the only thing he could do--he resigned; and his country +shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality. + +It was a narrow escape--how narrow became evident a few hours later. +The Allies had promised to send 150,000 combatants. Even if this +promise had been kept, the Allied force would not have been, in any +strategical sense, an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent. +For it was not in place for covering purposes or subsequent offensive +action; it was not trained to Balkan fighting; it was not equipped for +mountain warfare; and, coming to the same ports as the Greeks, it would +have delayed the process of concentration. But, be that as it may, the +promise was not kept. What is more, it could not possibly have been +kept. Politicians casting about for arguments wherewith to back their +views may leave their hearers to imagine that Great Powers keep armies +ready to be planked down at any point at a moment's notice; but the +fact is that an army, even if it can be spared from other tasks, is a +cumbrous affair to move about, requiring all sorts of tiresome +things--food, arms, ammunition--the provision of which requires, in its +turn, complicated processes, before the army is potentially effective +for the role assigned to it in the creative mind of an excited orator. +Something of the sort had, indeed, been intimated to the Hellenic +Government by the Entente Powers themselves when they wished both +Greeks and Serbs to avert Bulgarian hostility by territorial +concessions--namely, that, as after the commitment of troops to +Gallipoli, none remained to rescue Servia, there was nothing for it but +to conciliate Bulgaria. Of course, it may be asked, such being the +facts, what value had the promise of 150,000 men? This {64} is a +question which M. Venizelos would have done well to ponder, as King +Constantine and his military advisers pondered it. As it was, when +that afternoon the Allied forces turned up at Salonica, the Greek +people had the mortification to find that they amounted to 20,000. Nor +did they approach the stipulated figure for months after. + +The arguments which had prevailed with many some hours before were +suddenly exploded, and to the feeling of confidence which had prompted +the Chamber's vote immediately succeeded a feeling of panic. What! +cried everybody at Athens, are we to stake our liberty--our national +existence--on such a chance: 150,000 Greeks, _plus_ 200,000 +half-exhausted Serbs, _plus_ 20,000 Allies, against 200,000 +Austro-Germans, _plus_ 300,000 Bulgars, _plus_ 100,000 Turks? Nay, if +the French and the English love gambling, we don't: we cannot afford +the luxury. Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped, said some; +others, Venizelos has tried to dupe us. + +Such were the circumstances under which the Allies landed at Salonica. +Their action has been pronounced immoral and perfidious by some English +and even by some French critics; and as it was attended with ill +success, it brought double shame upon the contrivers.[18] Certainly, +it will not bear investigation from the standpoint of political tact: +it was the first of the many performances which little by little +alienated a friendly nation from them and discredited M. Venizelos with +his countrymen. + + + +[1] M. Venizelos in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915. + +[2] _Ibid._ + +[3] Deville, p. 174. + +[4] Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, +Nish, 19 Aug./1 Sept.; 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 22 Aug./4 Sept., 1915. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 41. + +[6] _Orations_, pp. 131-8. + +[7] This utterance, for the exactness of which we have to rely entirely +on M. Venizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge henceforth +brought against King Constantine that he claimed to reign by Divine +Right. + +[8] According to another and ampler version of these events, it had +been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while the latter +opened conversations with the British and French Ministers about the +possibility of sending 150,000 combatants, the former should +simultaneously open conversations with the German Emperor relating the +steps taken in regard to the Entente, and asking what Germany would +give for Greek neutrality. But when M. Venizelos returned to Athens, +he sent a letter to the King informing him that he had changed his mind +and that, as a responsible Minister, he could not sanction the +projected negotiations with Germany. Whereupon the King forwarded by +M. Mercati a reply that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to +approach the Entente with regard to reinforcements. See the _Balkan +Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 387-8. Yet another version supplies some +additional details: M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his _demarche_ +was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State in +the least; next day he repeated this assurance to the King himself and, +at the King's instance, promised to cancel the _demarche_; and two days +afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally declared to the +King that M. Venizelos's _demarche_ was considered as null and +void--_nulle et non avenue_.--See S. Cosmin's _Diplomatic et Presse +dans l'Affaire Grecque_ (Paris, 1921), pp. 123-4. + +[9] The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing their +Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops of the +territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria; and the suspicion that +a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have for its object +"really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion of peace, the +territories coveted by her," has been expressed even by a French +diplomat.--See Deville, p. 129, n. 1. + +[10] I venture to borrow this little scene from S. Cosmin, p. 125. M. +Venizelos at this stage of the proceedings is more eloquent than +coherent. He tells us (_Orations_, p. 139), that on informing the King +that the Allied troops were on their way to Salonica, his Majesty said: +"That's all right. Only please let your protest be in any case, +emphatic," and that he replied: "Emphatic--yes, but only up to a +certain point, considering what lies beneath." Now, as on M. +Venizelos's own showing, the King was no party to the Allies' step, it +is not very easy to see how he could have spoken to him as if the King +had a secret understanding with them. The episode is one on which more +light could be shed with advantage. The same may be said of an +allegation that King Constantine secretly informed Bulgaria that, even +in the event of an attack on Servia, she would meet with no opposition +from Greece. This allegation is supported chiefly by a telegraphic +dispatch from the Bulgarian Minister at Athens to Sofia (_White Book_, +No. 43), which somehow (it is not stated how) fell into the hands of M. +Venizelos's friends and was produced by them in the Skouloudis Inquiry. +The authenticity of this document was publicly denied by its alleged +author, and its portentous length (three large pages of close print), +as well as its unusual style render it very suspicious: it begins: +"To-day, 9th instant," and it is dated "23"--as if the author did not +know that the difference between the Old and New Calendar was 13 days. +In face of these difficulties, strong evidence would be required to +establish its genuineness: the more because that Inquiry witnessed a +number of similar curiosities--among them an alleged dispatch from the +Turkish Minister at Athens to the Grand Vizier, regarding the +conclusion of a secret Graeco-Turkish treaty. When challenged, M. +Skouloudis declared that such treaty never was even thought of and +denounced the dispatch as "from beginning to end a forgery," whereupon +nothing more was said. (See Skouloudis's _Apologia_, pp. 85-8). These +matters are of interest as illustrating the atmosphere of mistrust that +poisoned Greek politics at this period, and particularly the relations +between the King of Greece and her leading politician. + +[11] In pursuance of a decision taken by the War Council on 16 Feb., a +British force was sent to Lemnos to support the naval attack on the +Dardanelles, landing at Moudros on 6 March. Greece told the British +Government that she considered the action irreconcilable with her +position as a neutral. The British Government justified it by saying +that, as Turkey had not accepted the verdict of the Powers whereby +Lemnos and the other islands conquered in 1912 were assigned to Greece, +England had the right to treat them as Turkish territory: at the same +time declaring that this did not entail any diminution of Greek +sovereignty. Thus, whilst Turkey was a friend, the British Government +had decided that these islands did not belong to her; it recognized her +claim to them when she became an enemy; but not altogether--only for +the duration of the War: it was merely a temporary expedient to meet a +temporary exigency. By the same line of reasoning, England in the +following July justified the occupation of Mytilene. The Greek answer +was that "without consenting to the occupation of part of her territory +or admitting the arguments put forward by the British Government to +justify its action from the standpoint of International Law, Greece had +to bow before an accomplished fact."--Elliot to Greek Premier, Athens, +9 March, 25 July; Minister for Foreign Affairs to Greek Legations, +London and Paris, 16/29 July, 1915. + +[12] Sir Edward Grey objected to a protest because it would enable +Germany to say that we had violated Greek neutrality.--Gennadius, +London, 29 Sept., 1915. + +[13] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, Rome, 18 +Sept./1 Oct. 1915. (Confidential.) + +[14] "For my policy the arrival of the Anglo-French was a most material +asset. I went for war against Bulgaria and had made up my mind, if +Bulgaria attacked Servia, to fight. It was in my interest, besides the +150,000 Greek and the 200,000 Servian bayonets, to have 150,000 +Anglo-French, consequently it was a political move absolutely necessary +for the prosecution of my own policy."--_Orations_, p. 140. + +[15] Guillemin to Venizelos, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915. + +[17] Venizelos to Guillemin, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915. This +merely formal protest--quite distinct from the confidential dispatch +given above--is the only one of which the world has hitherto been +allowed to hear. + +[17] M. Venizelos had insisted that the reports spread through the +Press concerning the divergence of views between him and the Crown +should be contradicted, and, by telling the King that otherwise the +mobilization would have no effect on Bulgaria, had obtained the King's +permission to publish a _communique_ in which he stated that "the Crown +is in accord with the responsible Government not only as regards +mobilization but also as regards future policy."--_Orations_, p. 136. + +[18] See House of Commons Debate, in _The Times_, 19 April, 1916; +Chambre des Deputes, secret debate of 20 June, 1916, in the _Journal +Officiel_, p. 77. + + + + +{65} + +CHAPTER VI + +M. Zaimis formed a Government pledged to the policy which Greece had +pursued since the beginning of the European War: her future course +would be guided by the course of events: meanwhile, she would seek to +safeguard her vital interests by remaining armed.[1] + +As regards Servia, the new Premier had an opportunity of expressing his +views at length soon after his accession to office. The Servian +Government, judging that the imminent attack from Bulgaria realized the +_casus faederis_, asked him if, in conformity with her alliance, Greece +would be ready to take the field. M. Zaimis answered that the Hellenic +Government was very sorry not to be able to comply with the Servian +demand so formulated. It did not judge that in the present conjuncture +the _casus faederis_ came into play. The Alliance, concluded in 1913, +for the purpose of establishing an equilibrium of forces between the +Balkan States, had a purely Balkan character and nowise applied to a +general conflagration. Both the Treaty and the Military Convention +accompanying it showed that the contracting parties had in view only +the case of an isolated attack by Bulgaria against one of them. +Nowhere was there any allusion to a concerted attack by two or more +Powers. Nor could it be otherwise: it would have been an act of mad +presumption for either of the contracting parties to offer the other +the manifestly powerless and ridiculous assistance of its armed forces +in the case of a war with several States at once. And such was the +present case. If the Bulgarian attack apprehended by the Servian +Government took place, it would be in concert with Germany, Austria, +and Turkey: it would be combined with the attack already carried on by +the two Central Empires: it would be an episode of the European War. +{66} The Servian Government itself had recognized this in advance by +breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in imitation of the +Entente Powers, her European Allies, without a previous understanding +with Greece, her Balkan ally. In these circumstances, the Hellenic +Government was convinced that no obligation weighed upon it. + +Further, Greece was persuaded that her armed assistance freely offered +at such a moment would ill serve the common interest of the two +countries. Greece had remained neutral in the European War, judging +that the best service she could render Servia was to hold in check +Bulgaria by keeping her forces intact and her communications open. The +common interest demanded that the Greek forces should continue in +reserve for better use later on: that Greece should remain neutral and +armed, watching the course of events carefully with the resolution to +guard in the best possible way, not only her own vital interests, but +also those which she had in common with Servia. + +The Hellenic Government, while deeply and sincerely regretting that it +was materially impossible for it to do at present more for Servia, +wished to assure her that, faithful to their friendship, it would +continue to accord her every assistance and facility consistent with +its international position.[2] + +The Entente Powers took no exception to this attitude; which is not to +be wondered at, seeing that they had hitherto uniformly ignored the +Graeco-Servian Treaty, and, by their project of territorial concessions +to Bulgaria, had laboured, as much as in them lay, to annul a pact made +for the defence of the territorial _status quo_ against Bulgaria: not +until Bulgaria had been at open war with Servia for some days (14 +Oct.), could they bring themselves to declare that the promises of +Servian and Greek territory which they had made to her no longer held. +Unable, therefore, to tell Greece that she was under any obligation to +enter the War on Servia's behalf, Sir Edward Grey attempted to induce +her to do so for her own benefit by offering her the island of Cyprus. +This offer, made on 17 October, Greece felt compelled to decline: what +would it have profited her to gain Cyprus and lose Athens? And what +could an acceptance have profited Servia either? As {67} M. Zaimis +said, by intervening at that moment Greece would perish without saving +Servia. + +Servia could have been saved had an Anglo-French expedition on an +adequate scale taken place at any of the times which the Greek General +Staff proposed for Graeco-Servian co-operation--indeed, at any time +except only the particular time chosen by the Entente. When their +troops arrived at Salonica, the Servian army--what had been left of it +after fourteen months' fighting and typhus--was already falling back +before the Austro-Germans, who swarmed across the Drina, the Save, and +the Danube, occupied Belgrade and pushed south (6-10 Oct.), while the +Bulgars pressed towards Nish (11-12 Oct.). On the day on which the +English offer was made (17 Oct.), the Austro-Germans were fifteen miles +south of Belgrade, and by the 2nd of November there was no longer any +Servia to save, the Bulgars having on that day entered Monastir. + +The co-operation of Greece might still have been obtained if the Allies +could even then have sent to Salonica forces large enough to assure her +that the struggle would be waged on more equal terms.[3] There had +always been an influential group among the principal military leaders +at Athens who held that it was to the vital interest of their country +that Bulgaria should be attacked, and who, to secure the help of the +Entente Powers against Bulgarian pretensions in the future, were +prepared to run great immediate risks. As it was, the dilatoriness of +the Allies imposed upon M. Zaimis a policy of inaction. + +This policy, besides being imposed by circumstances, also accorded with +the new Premier's character. + +M. Zaimis stands out in the political world of Greece as a singular +anomaly: a politician who never made speeches and never gave +interviews: a silent man in a country where every citizen is a born +orator: an unambitious man in a country where ambition is an endemic +disease. To find a parallel to his position, one must go back to the +days when nations, in need of wise guidance, implored reluctant sages +to undertake the task of guiding them. This thankless task M. Zaimis +performed several times to everybody's temporary satisfaction. On the +present, as on other occasions, he enjoyed the confidence of the +Entente Powers, {68} as well as the confidence of the King and the +people of Greece. Even the journals of M. Venizelos, and the +Anglo-French Press which M. Venizelos inspired, paid the customary +tribute to M. Zaimis's integrity and sagacity. The homage was due to +the fact that M. Zaimis was neither a Venizelist nor an +anti-Venizelist, but simply a Zaimist. In domestic affairs he belonged +to no party; in foreign affairs to no school: he neither sought nor +shunned a change of course. + +That explains why he succeeded in ruling Greece for four weeks, and +also why he failed to rule her longer. + +M. Venizelos had not abandoned his standpoint. Of M. Zaimis's person +he spoke with much respect; but of his policy he spoke just as one +might have expected M. Venizelos to speak: M. Zaimis had broken the +Servian Treaty and would go down to history as a man who had +dishonoured the signature of Greece. With regard to the Entente +Powers, M. Venizelos thought that M. Zaimis meant honestly--the fact +that he was as well known to them as M. Venizelos himself, having +served as their High Commissioner in Crete for two years (1906-08), +exempted him from the imputation of duplicity--and since the Entente +Powers tolerated him, he would do likewise. He only taunted the Zaimis +Government in Parliament for not obtaining for its policy a price from +those whom that policy unintentionally helped: Greece, to be sure, did +not remain neutral to serve Germany's but her own interests, +nevertheless, as Germany benefited by that neutrality, she should be +asked to give a _quid pro quo_.[4] + +It was not the first time that M. Venizelos expressed this idea. At +the Crown Council of 3 March he had suggested, if his own policy of +intervention was not adopted, to ask from Germany compensations for the +continuance of neutrality; and he urged that the King should personally +bargain with the Kaiser's Minister. Again on 21 September, when +sounding the Entente Powers on the {69} possibility of sending troops +to Salonica, he advised the King simultaneously to sound the German +Emperor on the price of neutrality.[5] King Constantine had always +shrunk from entering into any understanding whatever with Germany. +And, although the advice may have been given in good faith, it is easy +to guess the use to which its acceptance might be turned by M. +Venizelos, who, even as it was, did not hesitate to whisper of +"pledges" given to Germany. So M. Zaimis endured the taunt and avoided +the trap. + +This state of truce lasted for a month. Then strife broke out afresh. +Early in November a member of the Government insulted the Opposition. +The Opposition demanded his dismissal. This was refused and matters +were pushed to a crisis--whether by the adversaries of M. Venizelos, +anxious to get rid of a Chamber with a hostile majority, or by M. +Venizelos himself, anxious to get rid of a Cabinet that had succeeded +in establishing friendly relations with the Entente, it is impossible +to say. Both conjectures found favour at the time, and both seem +probable.[6] In any case, M. Venizelos made of that incident an +occasion for an attack on the Government's foreign policy, which, +ending in an adverse vote, led to the resignation of M. Zaimis and the +formation of a new Ministry under M. Skouloudis (7 November). + +There ensued a dissolution of the Chamber (11 November) and a fresh +appeal to the people; the King, on the advice of M. Skouloudis, +inviting M. Venizelos to the polls, as who should say: When you got +your majority in June, the nation was with you; many things of the +gravest national concern have happened since; let us see if the nation +is with you now. M. Venizelos declined the invitation: "The +elections," he said, "will be a farce. All my supporters are detained +voteless under arms, and the only votes cast will be those of the older +and more timid men." How many supporters he had under arms the near +future was to show. Meanwhile, he and his partizans reinforced this +reason for abstention from the polls with other arguments. + +{70} King Constantine, they alleged, was guilty of unconstitutional +behaviour. He had twice disagreed with a Government supported by a +majority of the representatives of the people, and twice within a few +months had dissolved a Parliament duly chosen by the people. Was such +a thing ever heard in a constitutional State? The Constitution had +been violated: openly, insolently violated. + +In Greece this cry has always been among the Opposition's common +stock-in-trade: it is enough for a Minister to misapply fifty drachmas +to acquire the title of a violator of the Constitution, and nobody ever +is the wiser or the worse for it. M. Venizelos himself had often been +accused by his opponents of aiming at the subversion of Parliamentary +Government. But in this instance the cry was destined to have, as we +shall see, epoch-making results, and for this reason it merits serious +examination. + +The King's supporters denied that any violation of the Constitution had +taken place. The Constitution of Greece, they pointed out, gives the +Crown explicitly the right to dismiss Ministers and to dissolve +Chambers.[7] M. Venizelos himself had, no longer ago than 5 March, at +the second sitting of the Crown Council, declared himself an adversary +of the doctrine that the Parliamentary majority is absolute, and +recognized the right of the Crown to choose another Government; "On the +other hand," he said, "the necessary consequence of the formation of a +Cabinet not enjoying a majority in the Chamber is the dissolution of +the Chamber." [8] It was in pursuance {71} of this advice that the +King, who, as M. Venizelos on that occasion emphatically stated, "has +always absolutely respected the Constitution," [9] dissolved the +Chamber. + +The only question, therefore, is about the dissolution of the Chamber +elected on 13 June, 1915, which gave M. Venizelos a majority of 56. +This action, it was alleged, violated the spirit, though not the +letter, of Constitutional Law, because the dissolved Chamber +represented the will of the people. But, the other side retorted, it +was precisely because there was ground for believing that the +Parliamentary majority had ceased to represent the will of the people +that the King proceeded to a dissolution; and in so doing he had +excellent precedent. His father had dissolved several Chambers +(specifically in 1902 and 1910) on the same ground, not only without +incurring any censure, but earning much applause from the Venizelist +Party.[10] In fact, the last of those dissolutions had been carried +out by M. Venizelos himself under the following circumstances: The +General Elections of August, 1910, had given a majority to the old +parties: King George, however, in the belief that public opinion really +favoured M. Venizelos, called him to power, though he was only the +leader of a Parliamentary minority. M. Venizelos formed a Government, +but, as the majority in Parliament obstructed his policy, he persuaded +the Sovereign to dissolve it,[11] declaring in the House (11/24 +October, 1910): that "it is impossible to limit the prerogative of the +Crown to dissolve any Chamber." Obviously, what was {72} lawful for +King George could not be unlawful for King Constantine; and the fact +that M. Venizelos's majority of 56 had since the recent elections +dwindled to 16, was reason sufficient for the belief that he no longer +represented the will of the people, even if it were conceded that the +issue of war had been clearly put before the electors who had voted for +him in June, and that, at best, a majority of 56 in an assembly of 314 +was an adequate expression of the will of the people on so grave an +issue. Events had moved so fast in those months and the situation +changed so abruptly that King Constantine would have been guilty of a +dereliction of duty had he not, by exercising his indisputable +prerogative, given the nation an opportunity to reconsider its opinion. + +Sophisms suited to the fury of the times apart, the whole case of M. +Venizelos against his Sovereign rested, avowedly, on the theory, +improvised for the nonce, that the Greek Constitution is a replica of +the British--a monarchical democracy in which the monarch is nothing +more than a passive instrument in the hands of a Government with a +Parliamentary majority.[12] It is not so, and it was never meant to be +so. The Greek Constitution does invest the monarch with rights which +our Constitution, or rather the manner in which we have for a long time +chosen to interpret it, does not. Among these is the right to make, or +to refrain from making war. That was why M. Venizelos in March, 1915, +could not offer the co-operation of Greece in the Dardanelles +enterprise officially without the King's approval, and why the British +Government declined to consider his semi-official communication until +after the King's decision. Similarly M. Venizelos's proposals for the +dispatch of Entente troops to Salonica in September, so far as that +transaction was carried on above-board, were made subject to the King's +consent. Of course, if the King exercised this right without advice, +he would be playing the part of an autocrat; but King Constantine +always acted by the advice of the competent authority--namely, the +Chief of the General Staff. In truth, if anyone tried to play the part +of an autocrat, it was not the King, but M. Venizelos. His argument +seemed to be that the King should acquiesce in the view {73} which a +lay Minister took of matters military and in decisions which he arrived +at without or in defiance of technical advice. + +In this again, M. Venizelos appears to have been inspired by British +example. We saw during the War the responsibility for its conduct +scattered over twenty-three civil and semi-civil individuals who +consulted the naval and military staffs more or less as and when they +choose, and the result of it in the Gallipoli tragedy. We saw, too, as +a by-product of this system, experts holding back advice of immense +importance because they knew it would not be well received. The +Reports of the Dardanelles Commission condemned this method. But it is +to a precisely similar method that the Greek General Staff objected +with such determination. "Venizelos," they said, "does not know +anything about war. He approaches the King with proposals containing +in them the seeds of national disaster without consulting us, or in +defiance of our advice. Greece cannot afford to run the risk of +military annihilation; her resources are small, and, once exhausted, +cannot be replaced." The King, relying on the right unquestionably +given to him under the terms of the Constitution, demanded from his +chief military adviser such information as would enable him to judge +wisely from the military point of view any proposal involving +hostilities made by his Premier. It was this attitude that saved +Greece from the Gallipoli grave in March, and it was the same attitude +that saved her a second time at the present juncture. + +But, in fact, at the present juncture the King acted not so much on his +prerogative of deciding about war as on the extreme democratic +principle that such decision belongs to the people, and, finding that +the Party which pushed the country towards war had only a weak +majority, he preferred to place the question before the electorate, to +test beyond the possibility of doubt the attitude of public opinion +towards this new departure. + +From whatever point of view we may examine Constantine's behaviour, we +find that nothing could be more unfair than the charge of +unconstitutionalism brought against it. M. Venizelos himself a little +later, by declaring that he aimed at the "definite elucidation of the +obligations and rights of the royal authority," through a "new {74} +Constitution," [13] unwittingly confessed that the actual Constitution +could not bear his interpretation. As things stood, the charge might +with a better show of justice be brought against M. Venizelos, who, it +was pointed out, had violated the Constitution by inviting foreign +troops into Greek territory without the necessary Act of Parliament.[14] + +Nor should it be forgotten that King Constantine had suffered +grievously both as a Greek and as a general from too punctilious an +observance of parliamentary etiquette by his father in 1897. At that +date the policy of M. Delyannis was supported by the whole Chamber. It +was a policy which the late Lord Salisbury very aptly summed up at the +time in the one word, "strait-waistcoat." But, for lack of a man at +the top strong enough and courageous enough to take the responsibility +of opposing it, it was carried out: Greece rushed headlong into war +with a superior power and was smashed. Upon King Constantine, then +Crown Prince, had devolved the tragic duty of leading the Greek army to +self-destruction, and it was upon his devoted head that afterwards the +nation visited the criminal levity of M. Delyannis. Was he to suffer +calmly a repetition of the same catastrophe on an infinitely larger +scale--to see his country trampled under German and Bulgarian +heels--for M. Venizelos's sake? + +The practical wisdom and patriotism of the King's conduct cannot be +questioned; but we should guard ourselves against exaggerating its +moral courage. King Constantine, in turning an inattentive ear to the +warlike outpourings of the People's Chosen, knew perfectly well that he +ran no risk of wounding the people's conscience--just {75} as in +offering to lay the question before the tribunal of public opinion he +knew that he ran no risk of finding it at variance with his own. He +could afford to act as he did, because the country trusted him +implicitly. Writing about the middle of November, an English observer +described the situation as follows: "The people generally are afraid, +waiting and leaving everything to the King. . . . No one now counts in +Greece but the King." [15] And the absence of any popular murmur at +the rejection of the offer of Cyprus, to anyone who knows how deeply +popular feeling is committed to the ultimate union of that Greek island +with the mother country, speaks for itself. + +This does not mean that M. Venizelos had as yet lost caste altogether. +On that fateful 5th of October his reputation as a serious statesman +among his countrymen had received a severe blow. The idolatrous +admiration with which he had been surrounded until then gave way to +disenchantment, disenchantment to bewilderment, and bewilderment to +dismay: the national prophet from whom fresh miracles had been +expected, was no prophet at all, but a mere mortal--and an uncommonly +fallible mortal at that. Nevertheless, while many Greeks found it hard +to pardon the Cretan politician for the ruin into which he had so very +nearly precipitated them, there were many others who still remained +under the spell of his personality. Yet it may well be doubted +whether, had a plebiscite been taken at that moment, he would have got +anything more than a substantial minority. Fully conscious of the +position, M. Venizelos, in spite of advice from his Entente friends to +stand his ground, boycotted the polls, and the new Parliament, returned +by the elections of 19 December, was a Parliament without an +Opposition. M. Skouloudis remained at the helm. + + + +[1] _White Book_, No. 45. + +[2] _White Book_, No. 46. + +[3] See _The Times_, 1 Nov., 1915. + +[4] _Orations_, pp. 143-50. It would hardly be credited, did it not +come out of his own mouth, that the compensations and guarantees which +M. Venizelos thought, or at least said, that Greece could obtain from +Germany in return for her neutrality (a neutrality always benevolent +towards Germany's enemies) exceeded those which the Entente had refused +to grant Greece for her active alliance! + +[5] _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 384, 387; _Orations_, p. 266. + +[6] It may not be irrelevant to note that the end of the truce +coincided with the end of the Allies' uncertainty as to whether they +would persist in the Salonica enterprise or give it up. + +[7] Art. 31, 37. + +[8] Extracts from Minutes in _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 385. +Not for the first time had M. Venizelos expounded that thesis. Here is +a speech of his on 2/15 May, 1911. + +"We are accused of seeking the destruction of Parliamentary Government, +because we conceive that one of the foundations of the Government is +that those who represent the majority do everything, that it is enough +for them that they represent the majority to impose their will. But +we, the Liberal Party, entertain an entirely opposite conception both +of the State and the Laws and of the powers of majorities, because +modern progress has proved that humanity cannot prosper so long as the +action of those in authority is not subjected to rules and restrictions +preventing every transgression or violation of justice. We shall make +the Greeks truly free citizens, enjoying not only the rights which +emanate from the Constitutional ordinances, but also those which +emanate from all the laws. _We shall defend them against every +tyrannical exercise of Government power derived from a majority._" + +This report is taken from a panegyric on the speaker: _Eleutherios +Venizelos_, by K. K. Kosmides, D.Ph., Athens, 1915, pp. 56-7. On p. 58 +of the same work, occurs another reply by M. Venizelos to a charge of +anti-Parliamentarism, dated 14/27 Nov., 1913. + +[9] _The Balkan Review, loc. cit_. Cp. _The New Europe_, 29 March, +1917, where M. Venizelos expressly admits that "in February, 1915, the +King's action might be regarded as constitutional." + +[10] _Orations_, pp. 17-8. Cp. p. 217. + +[11] His opponents then acted as he did now: to avoid exposing their +weakness, they pronounced the dissolution unconstitutional and +boycotted the new elections. For a full account of these events see +another panegyric: _E. Venizelos: his life--his work_. By Costa +Kairophyla, Athens, 1915, pp. 73-82. + +[12] _Orations_, pp. 12-15. + +[13] _Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916; _Orations_, p. 102. + +[14] See Art. 90 of the Constitution. + +It was in order to defend himself against this grave charge that M. +Venizelos denied in the Chamber and out of it, that he had "invited" +the Allies to Salonica. Just as it was in order to avoid the charge of +violating International Law that Sir Edward Grey in the House of +Commons (18 April, 1916) and M. Briand in the Chamber of Deputies (20 +June, 1916), affirmed that the Allies had been "invited." From the +account of that affair already given, the reader will easily see that, +for forensic purposes, both the denial and the affirmation rest on +sufficient grounds. The discrepancy might be removed by the +substitution of "instigated" for "invited." + +[15] J. M. N. Jefferies, in the _Daily Mail_, 23 Nov., 1915. The +testimony is all the more notable because it comes from an avowed +partisan of M. Venizelos: "the only man in Greece with a policy." + + + + +{76} + +CHAPTER VII + +A momentous question--upon the answer to which depended, among other +things, the fate of Greece during the War--confronted the Allies as +soon as they realized that their Balkan campaign had come to an +untimely beginning. + +The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originally was based on the +agreement that M. Venizelos would get Greece to join. Once M. +Venizelos failed to do so, the plan fell to the ground. Again, the +object of the expedition was to rescue Servia; and Servia being already +conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose. Such were the +views of the British Government, and similar views were held in France +by many, including M. Delcasse, who resigned when Bulgaria's +"defection" sounded the knell of his Balkan policy. But other French +statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in Macedonia a field which +promised great glory and gain, if only the noble British nation could +be brought to understand that there were interests and sentiments at +stake higher than agreements.[1] + +The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand +and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister. "As regards +Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of +the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out. +They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go +on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece +in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2] + +Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly +that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la +noble nation britannique n'est pas restee sourde_. The truth is, +France was set on what {77} M. Delcasse now called the _mirage +balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly +for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near +East--and England could not leave her there alone. So the "_nous +resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of +Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to +abnormal relations with the Greek Government. + +The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the +safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the +earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one +group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The +little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one +triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the +German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser's legions were at +Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality +would bring them in a month to Athens. + +M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times +the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's +insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to +do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the +circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of +self-preservation. + +Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all +hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to +be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or +unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his +thoughts. + +On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical +assurances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of +neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them. The +new Ministry," he added, "adopts M. Zaimis's repeated declarations of +Greece's friendly attitude towards the Allied armies at Salonica, and +is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her debt to them +not to deviate for the whole world from this course, and hopes that the +friendly sentiments of those Powers towards Greece will never be +influenced by false {78} and malicious rumours deliberately put into +circulation with the object of cooling the good relations between +them." To Servia also he expressed "in the most categorical terms +sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady determination to continue +affording her every facility and support consistent with our vital +interests." [3] + +But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister that a Servian +army might probably, pressed by the enemy, enter Greek territory, he +replied that he wished and hoped such a thing would not happen--that +Greece might not find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of +applying the Hague Rules regarding the disarmament of a belligerent +taking refuge in neutral territory. And he repeated this statement to +the French Minister, adding, in answer to a question. What would +Greece do if the Allied forces retired into Greek territory? that it +would be necessary to apply the Hague Rules, but that he hoped very +much the contingency would not present itself. On being reminded of +the assurances given by his predecessor that no material pressure would +ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he replied that the Hellenic +Government nowise proposed to go back on those assurances, and hoped +that the Powers, taking into consideration the irreproachable attitude +of Greece, would be pleased to relieve her of complications and find a +solution safeguarding all interests concerned.[4] + +The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should re-embark; in +which case Greece was prepared to protect the parting guests "even by +her own forces, so as to afford them the most absolute security." [5] + +But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his explanation did +not satisfy the Allies. M. Skouloudis was therefore obliged to give +their representatives again and again to understand that in no case +would the Hellenic Government think of exerting the least pressure, and +that, if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrality, he had done +so because such ought to be the official language of a State which was +and wished to remain neutral. But from the very first he had clearly +indicated that Greece did not mean to apply those Rules: she would +confine {79} herself to a mere reminder of international principles +without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them. Greece being +and wishing to remain neutral, could not speak officially as if she +were not, nor trumpet abroad the assurances which she had not ceased +giving the Entente Powers. Surely they must perceive the most delicate +position in which Greece stood between the two belligerent groups, and, +given that they did not dispute, nor could dispute, her right to remain +neutral, it was reasonable and just that they should accept the natural +consequences and not demand from her impossibilities.[6] + +The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the reasonableness of +this plea; but neither could they ignore the inconveniences to +themselves that would arise from its frank recognition. Between their +base at Salonica and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak +interposed several Greek army corps; at Salonica also Greek camps lay +among the Franco-British camps scattered round the town: these +conditions impeded organized operations. General Sarrail, the +Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had nothing but praise for the +courtesy of the Greek authorities, both civil and military. Yet not a +day passed without incidents. He complained that obstacles were placed +in his action through a multitude of secondary details: the +Municipality claimed duties; the Railway Service did not assist as +liberally as could be wished in the work of getting off the stores +which arrived at the port. It was necessary that the Greek troops +should be moved out of the Allies' way and leave them in full control: +privileges which no State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral; +which no army could forgo and work efficiently. So the General, while +confessing that "we often place them in a difficult position by +demanding permissions which their virtual neutrality cannot allow them +to give," impressed on the Entente Governments the need of taking +strong measures with the Greeks.[6] + +Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting words--beyond a +casual "Necessity knows no law." But nations fighting for noble ideals +could not imitate Germany's cynicism. A case had to be made out to +{80} justify coercion. It was. Greece did not really wish to remain +neutral. Misled by a Germanophile Court, she only waited for a chance +of joining the enemy--of stabbing the Allies in the back. When this +amazing theory--widely popularized by the French and English Press--was +hinted to M. Rallis by "Our Special Correspondent," on 18 November, the +Greek Minister could hardly credit his collocutor's sanity: "It is +mad!" he cried out. "It is senseless to imagine such a thing--when you +could have the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities!" The answer, +however--an answer the conclusiveness of which a glance at the map is +enough to demonstrate to the dimmest intelligence--fell upon +deliberately deaf ears. The very journal which in one page recorded +it, in another wrote: "Bulgaria has gone; Greece is trembling in the +balance. Only a display of overwhelming force on our part can hold her +steady and prevent the accession of another 500,000 men to the enemy's +strength." + +That the publicists who argued thus and who, to give to their argument +greater cogency, generously added to the Greek army some 200,000 men, +were persuaded by their own reasoning, it is hard to believe without +libelling human sense. Apart from the ocular refutation supplied by +the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the enemies of the +Entente? That she would lose all her islands, have her coast towns +pulverized and her population starved, was certain. What she could get +in return, it needed a very robust imagination to suggest. The only +countries at whose cost the Hellenic Kingdom could possibly compensate +itself for these inevitable sacrifices were Turkey and Bulgaria; and +those countries were Germany's allies. A moment's reflection raises a +number of equally unanswerable questions: If the Greeks wanted to join +Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser invited them at the +very beginning of the War? Why did they not resist the landing of the +Allies? Why did they not attack them when they had them at their +mercy: 60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the Bulgars in +front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them and Salonica?[8] + +{81} + +In this connexion the evidence of an eminent English soldier and an +eminent French statesman who visited Athens at that time to study the +situation on the spot may be cited. To each King Constantine and M. +Skouloudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that the +Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece. Each was convinced of +their sincerity, and of the true motives of their attitude: "They +both," reported Lord Kitchener, "seem very determined to stick to their +neutrality." Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff, +and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente publics as +Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener of their genuine concern +about the British sphere in the East, and startled him by pressing upon +him a plan of action "almost exactly the same as detailed in my +telegrams, and based their conclusions on the same argument almost word +for word. They emphatically stated that there was no other way of +preventing the accomplishment of the German project." [9] M. Denys +Cochin even went so far as to publish to the whole world that the +suspicions entertained against King Constantine had no other source +than party rancour.[10] + +For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers themselves did +not believe the story of the Greek Government's hostile intentions is +afforded by the fact that, instead of demanding, they deprecated the +disbandment of the Greek army. When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skouloudis, +the latter said that the Allies' mistrust might well force Greece to +consider whether it would not be better for her to demobilize, leaving +to them all responsibility for the consequences. Lord Kitchener, in +the presence of the British Minister, replied that, "as to some partial +demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according to her interests, +but he did not think a general demobilization advisable." And again, a +little later on, when {82} M. Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh +exhibition of mistrust, told the French Minister that, in face of such +a state of things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to +order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente Powers do +what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out, "Ah, no. I am +decidedly against demobilization." Naturally: "the Greek Army," said +Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British Military Attache, to General +Moschopoulos. Military Governor of Salonica, "saves and secures the +flanks and rear of the Allies." [11] + +However, the story served the purpose of supplying a pretext for +pressure. All ships carrying foodstuffs and other commodities were +held up. In addition, Milo--an island not far from Athens--was +occupied, and the Allied Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things +should be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce, to destroy +the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, _en respectant les monuments +anciens_.[12] + +Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by which even the +ancient ruins might have suffered, did not arise. General Sarrail, who +at first urged that the naval demonstration against Athens should be +proceeded with immediately, on second thoughts, prompted by nervousness +as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action. At the same +time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade--Greece never has more +than a very limited food reserve--invited the Allies to state their +demands, saying that he would accede to them if it was possible to do +so.[13] + +Whereupon the Allies, "ever animated by the most benevolent intentions +towards Greece, and anxious that the equivocal situation in which +events had placed her towards them should come to an end and their +relations be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting +confidence," demanded first of all a formal assurance that in no +circumstances would the Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the +retiring Allied troops, but that the policy of benevolent neutrality +promised would be maintained with all its consequences. They disavowed +any wish or intention to compel the Hellenic Government to {83} +participate in the European War from which it had declared that it +meant to hold aloof. But it was a vital necessity for them not to let +it in any way hinder the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or +compromise the security of their troops throughout the field of their +operations. They therefore must be assured that they will obtain, +according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all the facilities +which they might require, notably in the port of Salonica and on the +roads and railways. It was understood that the Entente Powers would +restore in full at the end of the War all the parts of Greek territory +which they might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that +they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused by the +occupation.[14] + +M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for the benevolent +intentions with which they declared themselves to be animated towards +Greece, willingly repeated the assurances he had so many times already +given, that the Greek troops would in no circumstances seek to disarm +or intern the Allied troops, and that the Greek Government in its +relations with the Entente Powers would in everything hold fast to its +policy of benevolent neutrality. He once more noted the reiterated +disavowal by the Allied Governments of any wish or intention to force +Greece into the War, and on his part disavowed any wish or intention to +hinder in any way the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to +compromise in any way the security of their troops. The Hellenic +Government had always kept the promises made by M. Zaimis to the very +utmost of its ability, and had no difficulty in renewing the assurance +that the Allied Governments would continue to receive all the +facilities their troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on +the roads and railways.[15] + +These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement, +the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and +"not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the +occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to +protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not +as a mere form"--a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]--and +emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their +movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would +withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle +their differences." + +The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis +expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the +Greek Government's sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply +with its request for financial and commercial facilities. They +promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military +authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the +French Minister repeated his Government's declaration that it would be +happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon +as the situation cleared.[17] + + + +[1] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 61, 70, 75-8. + +[2] Sir George Arthur's _Life of Lord Kitchener_. Vol. III. p. 261. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 47, 48, 49. + +[4] Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. 43-5. + +[5] _White Book_, No. 52. + +[6] _White Book_, No. 51. + +[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 198. + +[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.--_Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, +p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above +questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness": +"Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's +interest that the Anglo-French should not land? Because, immersed in +politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"--Orations, p. +140. + +[9] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, pp. 202-3. + +[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the _Daily +Mail_, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. _Le Temps_, 25 Nov. + +[11] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 4-5; _Semeioseis_, p. 46. + +[12] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 71-2. + +[13] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 199-203. + +[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915. + +[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915. + +[16] "_Le Gouvernement Grec se reservait de protester; nous nous +reservions de ne pas repondre_. (_Rires_)." M. Briand in the _Journal +Officiel_, p. 72. + +[17] _White Book_, No. 54. + + + + +{85} + +CHAPTER VIII + +The situation did not clear--how could it? Of all diplomatic fictions +that of "benevolence" is perhaps the most incompatible with the grim +realities of war. + +General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered to take any measures +which he might judge necessary at his discretion. But fear of the +Greek army for a time compelled him to temper vigour with caution. +That fear decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in +Macedonia increased; and hence a series of acts which show how the +General used his discretion. + +First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of Demir-Hissar. +He blew it up--thus completely cutting off the Greek forces in Eastern +Macedonia, and, incidentally, letting the enemy know that no offensive +across the Struma was contemplated by the Allies. Next, he judged it +necessary to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which commands the entrance +to Salonica Harbour. He seized it--despite a solemn engagement to the +contrary.[1] Then he judged it necessary to occupy the town of +Florina. He occupied it. An appreciation of the efficacy or +expediency of these measures--beyond a passing allusion to the obvious +blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar bridge--would +be out of place here. For our present purpose their interest lies in +the light they throw upon the conditions, apart from the purely +military difficulties, created by the intrusion of foreign troops on +neutral soil. + +Afloat the Allies were not less vigorous than ashore. They judged it +necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to accommodate the remnants of the +Servian army that had escaped across Albania. They occupied Corfu. +They judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the coast +of Asia Minor. They occupied Castellorizo. They {86} judged it +necessary to occupy Suda Bay in Crete and Argostoli Bay in Cephalonia. +They occupied them. + +It is worthy of note that the occupation of Castellorizo was prepared +by a local revolt stirred up by the French Consular and Naval +authorities,[2] and that the occupation of Corfu constituted a flagrant +violation of international pacts (Treaties of London, 14 Nov., 1863, +and 29 March, 1864) to which the Entente Powers were signatories, and +by virtue of which the perpetual neutrality of the island was +guaranteed as strictly as that of Belgium--a circumstance that afforded +the Central Powers an opportunity to protest against Anglo-French +contempt for the sanctity of treaties.[3] + +Among other arbitrary proceedings may be mentioned numerous arrests and +deportations of enemy subjects and Consuls, and even the execution of +some Greek subjects, by the Allied military and naval authorities.[4] + +Against each of these encroachments upon its sovereignty the Greek +Government protested with ever-deepening bitterness. The Entente +Governments accepted its protests and disregarded them: International +Law is the will of the stronger. Besides, says M. Briand, "we were +there in a country where force is more effective than anywhere else." +[5] From this utterance, which was received by the French Chamber with +applause, we get a glimpse into the workings of the official Entente +mind, and more than a glimpse of the guiding principles of Entente +policy in Greece during that period. + +The reason for that policy publicly alleged was, as we have seen, the +Allies' need to do their own fighting in {87} peace and security. +Their real aim, M. Skouloudis believed, was to draw Greece gradually +into the War. In so believing he interpreted correctly the French +Government's views as the French Government itself had expounded them +to the British Government: "To bring Greece in." [6] With that as one +of its objects the Salonica expedition had been persisted in; and as +Greece persisted in standing out, the question resolved itself into one +of continuous pressure. + +M. Skouloudis was confirmed in his belief by the fact that the Allies +would not allow demobilization, and at the same time would not lend +Greece the 150 million francs which had been promised: they knew, +through the International Financial Commission, that the mobilized army +swallowed up every available resource, and they calculated that, when +the strain reached the breaking point, Greece would fall at their feet +and beg for relief at any price: the Ministry would have either to give +way or make place for one which favoured war. The Ministry, determined +to do neither, cast about for some means of making ends meet, when +Germany came forward with an offer to lend temporarily a portion of the +sum promised by France. This offer, though, of course, prompted by the +desire to enable Greece to maintain her neutrality, was free from any +political conditions, and M. Skouloudis accepted it thankfully. +Negotiations began on 20 November, 1915, and by 7 March, 1916, an +instalment of 40 million francs was actually paid. For obvious reasons +the transaction was carried through without the knowledge of the +Allies, from whom the Greek Premier still cherished some faint hopes of +receiving the 150 millions.[7] + +Whether he had any right to cherish such hopes, after accepting +financial assistance from their enemies, is a very nice ethical point; +but a nicer point still is, whether the Allies had any right left to +question the ethics of others. M. Skouloudis doubtless could plead in +self-justification that his remaining armed was admittedly a boon to +them, as much as his remaining neutral was a boon to their enemies; and +that both sides should therefore help to defray the cost. He was +impartial. However, his hopes were dashed to the ground. + +{88} + +On 5 April the French and British Ministers called on the Premier and +informed him that the Servian army at Corfu, having sufficiently rested +and recovered, the Entente proposed to transport it to Salonica through +Greece, and they had no doubt that Greece would readily consent. M. +Skouloudis replied that Greece could not possibly consent. The +transport of over 100,000 men across the country would mean +interruption of railway traffic and suspension of all economic life for +at least two months; it would expose the population to the danger of +infection by the epidemic diseases from which the Serbs had been +suffering; above all, it would be regarded by the Central Powers as a +breach of neutrality and might force Greece into the War against her +will. M. Skouloudis urged these reasons with all the firmness, and +more than all the plainness, that diplomacy allowed, ending up with an +emphatic: "No, gentlemen, such a thing we will not permit. I declare +this to you officially." + +"Our Governments," retorted the French Minister, "have not instructed +us to ask for your permission, but to notify to you their decision." + +M. Skouloudis was a proud old man, fiercely jealous of his country's +independence and inflexible in his defence of it. Of his iron +determination he had already given the Allies ample proof. But +hitherto he had kept his gathering indignation under control. He could +do so no longer: the Frenchman's speech and, more than the speech, the +manner in which it had been delivered, were too much for his feelings. + +"And I," he repeated, "declare to you that my Government's decision is +not to permit this overland passage--further, I declare to you that, in +the contrary event, I shall find myself under the necessity of blowing +up the railway,"--then, in a crescendo of rage, he went on: "You have +left us nothing sound in this country--neither self-respect, nor +dignity, nor liberty, nor the right to live as free men. But do not +forget that there is a limit to the most benevolent patience and to the +most willing compliance, that one last drop makes the cup +overflow. . . ." + +The British Minister, seeing that the conversation with his colleague +grew every moment more tempestuous, interposed by asking if Greece +would equally object to a {89} sea-passage of the Serbs by the Canal of +Corinth; and, the Cabinet having been consulted, a favourable answer +was given. But meanwhile the demand for an overland passage was +pressed by the Servian Minister, and was supported by all the Entente +representatives. Again M. Skouloudis gave a categorical refusal, and +in a telegraphic circular to the Greek Ministers in London, Rome, and +Petrograd--experience had taught him that it was worse than useless to +argue with Paris--he reiterated the reasons why Greece could not +consent, laying special stress on the now inflamed state of public +opinion, and pointing out that the dangers of the sea route were +greatly exaggerated since most of the journey would be through close +waters. He added that, in view of the absence of any real military +necessity for an overland transport, and of the international +consequences which compliance involved, the whole civilized world would +justify Greece in her refusal and condemn any coercion on the part of +the Entente as an outrage. He concluded by requesting the Greek +Ministers to place all these reasons before the respective Governments +in order that, on realizing the iniquity of the project, they might use +all their influence to dissuade the French Government from it. England +appreciated the force of M. Skouloudis's arguments and, thanks to her, +diplomatic pressure ceased. But there remained another form of +pressure, from which France would not desist. + +M. Briand angrily declared that, under the circumstances, there could +be no talk of a loan. M. Skouloudis pleaded that Greece had not asked +the loan as a price for the violation of her neutrality; she had asked +it on the supposition that the Entente Powers could not see with +indifference her military and economic paralysis.[8] + +The plea made no impression; and, rebuffed by Paris, M. Skouloudis's +Government once more turned to Berlin. It received another credit of +forty million marks; but, notwithstanding this supply, day by day it +saw its expenses increasing and its revenues diminishing. Besides the +men under arms, there were crowds of destitute refugees from Turkey, +Bulgaria and Servia to be provided for, and the native population, +owing to the rise in the cost of living {90} and to unemployment, also +stood in urgent need of relief. At the same time, customs and other +receipts became more and more precarious owing to the Allies' constant +interference with the freedom of commerce.[9] + +Truly, after the Allies' landing on her soil, the neutrality of Greece +became something unique in the annals of international jurisprudence: a +case defying all known maxims, except Machiavelli's maxim, that, when +placed between two warring powers, it is better for a state to join +even the losing side than try to remain neutral. By trying to do so, +Greece could not avoid, even with the utmost circumspection, exposing +herself to insult and injury. + +One more corollary of the Salonica Expedition deserves to be noted. +Since the beginning of the War, Athens, like other neutral capitals, +had become the centre of international intrigue and espionage; each +belligerent group establishing, beside their officially accredited +diplomatic missions, secret services and propagandas. In aim, both +establishments were alike. But their opportunities were not equal. +The Germans had to rely for procuring information and influencing +public opinion on the usual methods. The French and the British added +to those methods others of a more unusual character. + +From the riffraff of the Levant they had recruited a large detective +force which operated under the sanctuary of their Legations.[10] The +primary function of these gentry was to discover attempts at the +fuelling and victualling of German submarines; and, stimulated by a +permanent offer of a reward of 2,000 pounds from the British Minister, +they did their best to discharge this necessary function. Hardly a day +passed without their supplying information which, transmitted to the +Fleets, led to raids at all points of the Greek coasts and isles. Let +one or two examples suffice for many. + +{91} + +The French Intelligence Service reported that the Achilleion--the +Kaiser's summer palace at Corfu--was a thoroughly organized submarine +base, with a wharf, stores of petrol, and pipes for carrying it down to +the water's edge. On investigation, the wharf turned out to be an +ordinary landing stage for the palace, the stores a few tins of petrol +for the imperial motor cars, and the pipes water-closet drains.[11] + +In consequence of similar "information received from a trustworthy +source"--that a Greek steamer had by order of the Greek Government +transported to Gerakini and handed over to the Custom House authorities +for the use of German submarines a quantity of benzine--a French +detachment of marines landed, forced its way into the Custom House, and +proceeded to a minute perquisition, even digging up the ground. The +result was negative, and the officer commanding the detachment had to +apologize to the Chief of the Custom House. Whereupon the Greek +Government asked the French Minister for the source of the information, +adding that it was time the Allies ceased from putting faith in the +words of unscrupulous agents and proceeding to acts both fruitless and +insulting.[12] + +Were the Allies in the mood to use ordinary intelligence, they would +have seen the truth themselves; for not one discovery, after the most +rigorous search, was ever made anywhere to confirm the reports of the +Secret Services.[13] As it was, the spies were able to justify their +existence by continuing to create work for their employers; and the +{92} lengths to which they were prepared to go are well illustrated by +a case that formed the subject of some questions in the House of +Commons. M. Callimassiotis, a well-known Greek Deputy, was denounced +by the French Secret Service as directing an organization for the +supply of fuel and information about the movements of Allied shipping +to German submarines. A burglarious visit to his house at the Piraeus +yielded a rich harvest of compromising documents. The British Secret +Service joined in following up the clues, and two Mohammedan merchants +of Canea were arrested and deported to Malta on unimpeachable evidence +of complicity. Closer investigation proved the whole affair from +beginning to end a web of forgery and fraud. The hoax ended in the +British Minister at Athens apologizing to the Greek Deputy, and in the +Mohammedan merchants being brought back home as guests aboard a British +destroyer.[14] + +Thus a new field was opened up to those who wished to ruin business +competitors, to revenge themselves on personal enemies, or, above all, +to compromise political opponents. From the words of Admiral Dartige: +"The revelations of the Venizelist Press concerning the revictualling +of German submarines in Greece are a tissue of absurd legends," [15] we +learn the main source of these myths and also the principal motive. +For if M. Venizelos and his party had, by their voluntary abstention, +deprived themselves of a voice inside the Chamber, they more than made +amends by their agitation out of doors. The coercion of Greece came as +grist to their mill. The Liberal newspapers triumphantly pointed to it +as concrete proof of the wisdom of their Leader's policy, and held up +the names of the men who had thwarted him to obloquy and scorn. M. +Skouloudis and his colleagues were abused for drawing down upon the +country through their duplicity the wrath of the Powers which could +best help or harm it. The "revelations" served a twofold purpose: to +foster the belief that they promoted secretly the interests of Germany, +and to furnish the Allies with fresh excuses for coercion. And in the +Franco-British Intelligence organization the scheming brain of M. +Venizelos found a {93} ready-fashioned tool: men willingly shut their +eyes to the most evident truths that hinder their designs, and readily +accept any myth that furthers them. + +Nor did that organization assist M. Venizelos merely by traducing his +opponents' characters and wounding their _amour-propre_. In March, +1916, the Chief of the French Secret Service, at a conference of the +Allied admirals, proposed that they should lay hands on the internal +affairs of Greece: that they should stick at nothing--_qu' on devait +tout oser_. The motion was rejected with disgust by the honest +sailors. But the mover was in direct communication with political +headquarters in Paris; and his plan was only deferred. Meanwhile he +and his associates with the rogues in their pay made themselves useful +by collaborating in the Venizelist agitation, mixing themselves up in +party disturbances, carrying out open perquisitions and clandestine +arrests, and preparing the ground for graver troubles in the future.[16] + +The representatives of the Entente at Athens pursued these unedifying +tactics in the firm conviction that the cause of M. Venizelos was their +cause; which was true enough in the sense that on him alone they could +count to bring Greece into the War without conditions. As to the +Entente publics, M. Venizelos was their man in a less sober sense: he +kept repeating to them that his opponents under the guise of neutrality +followed a hostile policy, and that his own party's whole activity was +directed to preventing the King from ranging himself openly on the side +of the Central Powers. The Entente Governments, whatever they may have +thought of these tactics and slanders, did not dream of forbidding the +one or of contradicting the other, since the former aided their client +and the latter created an atmosphere which relieved them from all moral +restraints. + +They only upbraided M. Venizelos gently for keeping out of Parliament. +So M. Venizelos, seeing that he had gained nothing by abstention and +forgetting that he had {94} pronounced the Chamber unconstitutional, +obeyed. Early in May, two of his partisans carried two bye-elections +in Eastern Macedonia, and the leader himself was returned by the island +of Mytilene. Three seats in Parliament could not overturn M. +Skouloudis; and it cannot be said that his re-appearance on the scene +enhanced the credit of M. Venizelos with the nation. Ever since the +landing of the Allies, and largely through their own actions, his +prestige in Greece declined progressively. He was reproached more and +more bitterly for his "invitation" to them; and these reproaches grew +the louder, the closer he drew to the foreigners and the farther he +diverged from his own King. In a letter from Athens, dated 24 May, +occurs the following passage: "Venizelos becomes every day more and +more of a red republican. How that man has duped everybody! We all +thought him a genius, and he simply is an ambitious maniac." + +Later on M. Venizelos explained why he had not already revolted. A +revolution there and then, no doubt, would have saved a lot of trouble; +"But before the idea of revolution matures in the mind and soul of a +statesman, there is need for some evolution, which cannot be +accomplished in a few moments," he said. Since October, this idea had +had time to evolve in his mind and soul. But his hate of "tyranny" was +not blind. It was peculiarly clear-sighted, and he judged the +difficulties with precision: "Such a step would not have been favoured +by the Entente Powers, whose support would have been indispensable for +its success." Then again: "If before the Bulgarian invasion of +Macedonia I had kindled a civil war, public opinion would have held me +responsible for the invasion, and that would certainly have arrested my +movement." [17] + +It so chanced that, scarcely had a fortnight passed since his +reappearance in the Chamber, when the Bulgars provided M. Venizelos and +at least one of the Entente Powers with this requisite for their +evolution. + + + +[1] See the Agreement of 10 Dec., 1915 (Art. 5), _White Book_, No. 54; +Sarrail, pp. 94-6, 322-30. + +[2] Skouloudis to Greek Legation, Paris, 12, 14, 16 Dec. (O.S.); +Guillemin to Skouloudis, 16/29 Dec.; Skouloudis to Guillemin, 17/30 +Dec., 1915. + +[3] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 31 Dec., 1915/13 Jan., +1916; Gryparis, Vienna, 4/17 Jan., 1916. + +[4] Among the Greek State Papers there is a voluminous file labelled +"Violations of Hellenic Neutrality by the Entente Allies." It contains +a mass of complaints by the Central Powers to the Greek Government and +by the Greek Government to the Entente Governments. Special attention +is drawn to the case of two Greeks put to death by the French military +authorities in Macedonia for having been found in possession of German +proclamations dropped from aeroplanes: See Skouloudis to French +Legation, Athens, 13/26 April, 1916. + +[5] _Journal Officiel_, p. 70. + +[6] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 261. + +[7] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 3-11; _White Book_, Nos. 75-8, 82-3, +88, 91. + +[8] Skouloudis, _Semeioseis_, pp. 33-6; _White Book_, Nos. 57-63. + +[9] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 12-14. + +[10] Of the 162 individuals who, by the end of 1916, composed the +personnel of the Franco-British Secret Police at Athens, only about 60 +were natives of Old Greece; the rest came from Crete, Constantinople, +Smyrna, etc. An analysis of the official List, signed by the Prefect +of the Greek Police, reveals among them: 7 pickpockets, 8 murderers, 9 +ex-brigands, 10 smugglers, 11 thieves, 21 gamblers, 20 White Slave +traffickers. The balance is made up of men with no visible means of +subsistence. + +[11] Du Fournet, pp. 115-17; Skouloudis to Greek Legation, Paris, 19 +Feb./4 March, 1916. + +[12] Politis to Guillemin, 9/22 Feb., 1916. + +[13] Considering the extent of the coast-line of Greece and the poverty +of her inhabitants, this would be incredible, were it not attested by +the Allies' Naval Commander-in-Chief, whose task it was to verify every +report transmitted to him: "_Jamais un seul de ses avis n'a ete reconnu +exact; la plupart etaient visiblement absurdes._" "_Malgre les +verifications les plus repetees jamais un seul de ces avis n'a ete +reconnu exact. Un certain nombre de coquins, incompetents mais malins, +vivaient du commerce de ces fausses nouvelles._"--Du Fournet, pp. 115, +304. Cp. also pp. 85, 270. The French Admiral of Patrols, Faton, and +the British Admiral Kerr, are equally emphatic in testifying "that all +these stories about supplying the submarines were fabrications."--See +Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920. + +[14] J. C. Lawson, _Tales of Aegean Intrigue_, pp. 93-143. + +[15] Du Fournet, p. 304. + +[16] Du Fournet, pp. 112-16. In this work we find a full picture of +the French Secret Service. Unfortunately, or fortunately, no +authoritative record has been published of its British counterpart. +Mr. Lawson's account deals only with a provincial branch of the +establishment. + +[17] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _Orations_, pp. 142-3. + + + + +{95} + +CHAPTER IX + +When M. Venizelos taunted M. Skouloudis with forgetting that he had +promised the Allies "not only simple neutrality, nor simply benevolent +neutrality, but most sincerely benevolent neutrality," the aged Prime +Minister, who apparently had a sense of humour, replied: "I do not know +how there can be such a thing as benevolent neutrality. A neutrality +really benevolent towards one of the belligerents is really malevolent +towards the other, consequently it is more or less undisguised +partiality. Between benevolence and malevolence there is no room for +neutrality." He only knew, he said, one kind of neutrality--the +absolute neutrality towards both belligerents.[1] And he lived up to +his knowledge so conscientiously that he earned the gratitude of +neither, but saw himself the sport of both. + +No sooner had the Allies begun to fall back from Krivolak, than the +German Military Attache at Athens presented to King Constantine a +telegram from General von Falkenhayn, dated 29 November, 1915, in which +the Chief of the German General Staff intimated that, if Greece failed +to disarm the retreating Entente forces or to obtain their immediate +re-embarkation, the development of hostilities might very probably +compel the Germans and the Bulgars to cross her frontiers. After a +consultation, the Skouloudis Cabinet replied through the King that +Greece did not consent to a violation of her soil; but if the violation +bore no hostile character towards herself, she would refrain from +opposing it by force of arms on certain guarantees: that the Bulgars +should categorically renounce every claim to territories now in Greek +possession, that simultaneously with their entry into Macedonia Greece +should be allowed to occupy Monastir as a pledge for their exit, that +in no circumstance whatever should the King of Bulgaria or his sons +enter Salonica, {96} that all commands should be exclusively in German +hands, and so forth--altogether nineteen conditions, the principal +object of which was to ward off the danger of a permanent occupation, +but the effect of which would have been to hamper military operations +most seriously. + +The German Government, perturbed by the extent and nature of the +guarantees demanded, referred the matter to Falkenhayn, who would only +grant three comprehensive assurances: to respect the integrity of +Greece, to restore the occupied territories at the end of the campaign, +and to pay an indemnity for all damage caused. On those terms, he +invited Greece to remove her army from Macedonia so as to avoid the +possibility of an accidental collision. The King refused, giving among +other reasons that such a concession had been denied to the Entente. +Thereupon Falkenhayn asked, as an alternative to a total evacuation, +that Greece should pledge herself to resist Entente landings in the +Gulfs of Cavalla and Katerini. Again Greece refused, on the ground +that this would involve the use of force against the Entente, whereas +she was determined not to abandon her neutrality as long as her +interests, in her own opinion, did not compel her so to do.[2] + +After this answer, given on 27 January, 1916, conversations on the +subject ceased for about six weeks. + +Thus it appears that during the period when the Allies were, or +professed to be, most nervous about the intentions of Greece, it was +the fear of Greek hostility, carefully nursed by Greek diplomacy, that +checked the Germans and the Bulgars from following up their advantage +and sweeping the Franco-British troops into the sea. It was the same +attitude of Greece that made the enemy hesitate to break into Macedonia +during the following months, and gave the Allies time to fortify +themselves. + +On 14 March, Falkenhayn returned to the charge, and was once more met +with a list of exorbitant conditions. This time the conversations +assumed the character of recriminations; the Greek Government +complaining of Bulgarian encroachments on the neutral zone fixed along +the frontier, Falkenhayn retorting that the provocative movements of +the Entente Forces obliged the Central Powers to fortify their +positions and threatening a rupture {97} if the Greek soldiers +continued to hinder the Bulgars.[3] Then, after another interval, he +announced (7 May) that, owing to an English advance across the Struma, +he found it absolutely necessary to secure in self-defence the Rupel +Pass--key of the Struma Valley.[4] + +M. Skouloudis endeavoured to make the German Government dissuade the +General Staff from its project. Falkenhayn, he said, was misinformed +as to an English advance--only small mounted patrols had crossed the +Struma. He suspected that he was deceived and instigated by the +Bulgars who, under cover of military exigencies, sought to realize +their well-known ambitions at the expense of Greece. Their frequent +misdeeds had already irritated Greek public opinion to such a degree +that he could not answer for the consequences, should the project be +carried out. The appearance of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia would +create a national ferment of which Venizelos and the Entente Powers +would take advantage in order to overthrow the present Ministry and +force Greece into war.[5] + +Impressed by these arguments, the German Government did its utmost to +induce Falkenhayn to abandon his scheme; von Jagow even going so far as +to draw up, with the assistance of the Greek Minister at Berlin, a +remonstrance to the Chief of the General Staff. But it was all to no +purpose. The political department had very little influence over the +High Command. Falkenhayn insisted on the accuracy of his information, +and adhered to his own point of view. He could not understand, he +said, why a German move should cause any special excitement in Greece, +seeing that it was directed against the French and the English, who +paid no heed to Greek susceptibilities, and he irritably complained +that, while Greece allowed the Entente full liberty to improve its +position day by day, she raised the greatest obstacles to Germany's +least demand.[6] In brief, from being more or less pliant, the Chief +of the General Staff became rigid: he would no longer submit to rebuffs +and denials. Strategic reasons, perhaps, had brought about this +change; perhaps the Bulgars were the instigators. It is impossible to +say, {98} and it does not much matter. The essential fact is that the +man had power and meant to use it. + +There followed a formal communication from the German and Bulgarian +Ministers at Athens to M. Skouloudis, stating that their troops were +compelled in self-defence to push into Greek territory, and assuring +him that neither the integrity and sovereignty of Greece nor the +persons and property of the inhabitants would in any way suffer by this +temporary occupation. M. Skouloudis took note of this decision without +assenting to it, but also without protesting: he felt, he said, that a +premature protest could only lose Greece the guarantees of restoration +and reparation offered. Sufficient unto the day the evil thereof: +confronted with powerful Empires in the height of their military +strength, he had done all that was humanly possible to ward off their +advance, and, though unsuccessful in the end, he had at least obtained +a solemn pledge of their ultimate retreat. The protest came a few days +later, when the invasion actually took place.[7] + +On 26 May, a Germano-Bulgarian force appeared at Rupel. The garrison, +in accordance with its instructions of 27 April (O.S.) to resist any +advance beyond 500 metres from the frontier line, fired upon the +invaders and drove them back. But on fresh orders reaching it to +follow the instructions of 9 March (O.S.)--which prescribed that, in +the event of a foreign invasion, the Greek troops should withdraw--it +surrendered the fort.[8] + +In Entente circles it had long been assumed that, let the King and his +Government do what they liked, the instant a Bulgarian foot stepped +over the border, soldiers and civilians would fly to arms. Nothing of +the sort happened. However painful to their feelings their orders +might be, the soldiers obeyed them. Among the civilians also the +shock, severe as it was, produced no demoralization. The Greek people +generally understood that the surrender of Rupel was an inevitable +consequence of the landing at Salonica. Nevertheless, the fears of M. +Skouloudis that {99} a Bulgarian invasion would place a powerful weapon +in the hands of his opponents were abundantly fulfilled. + +By representing the event as the result of a treacherous collusion +between Athens and the Central Powers,[9] M. Venizelos roused the +Allied nations to fury. Their Governments, of course, knew better. +Even in France official persons recognized that the occupation of Rupel +was a defensive operation which Greece could not oppose by force. Yet +they had hoped that she would have averted it by diplomatic action. As +it was, they concluded that she must have received from the Central +Powers very strong assurances that the occupied territories would be +restored to her. In any case, they said, the Skouloudis Cabinet's +passivity in face of a move calculated to prejudice the Allies' +military position contradicted its oft-repeated protestations of a +benevolent neutrality towards them.[10] + +M. Skouloudis hastened to vindicate his conduct. He did not tell the +Entente Powers, as he might have done, that he had by diplomatic action +put off an invasion for six months, and thus enabled them to increase +their forces and consolidate their position. Neither did he tell them +another thing which in itself formed an ample refutation of the charge +of collusion--that on 27 April (10 May) General Sarrail had occupied +the frontier fort Dova-tepe with the tacit consent of the Hellenic +Government, which had deliberately excluded that fort from the +instructions of resistance issued that day to its troops, and that +Greek officers urged him at the same time to occupy Rupel, dwelling on +the military importance of the fort for the defence of Eastern +Macedonia; an advice which the French General had ignored on the ground +that Rupel lay altogether outside the Allies' zone of action, and he +could not spare the troops necessary for its occupation.[11] + +{100} + +The Greek Premier simply said that his Government's passivity was in +strict accord with the explicit declarations of its policy and +intentions, enunciated at the very outset, ratified by the Agreement of +10 December, 1915, and reiterated _ad nauseam_ to the Entente +Ministers--viz., that "should the Allied troops by their movements +bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so +as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle their +differences." Far from changing his attitude, he once more, in reply +to M. Briand's threat that, "if the Bulgarian advance continued without +resistance there might ensue the most serious consequences for the +Hellenic Government," emphatically declared: "Resistance is only +possible if we abandon our neutrality, and the demand that we should +resist is therefore in flagrant contradiction to the oft-repeated +protestations of the Entente Powers that they have neither the wish nor +the intention to force us into the War." Nor could he understand how +they could think of blaming Greece for receiving from the Central +Powers the same assurances of eventual restoration as those given by +themselves.[11] + +M. Skouloudis spoke in vain. Paris had made up its mind to treat the +incident as indicating a new and malevolent orientation against which +it behoved the Allies to protect themselves. Accordingly, on 1 June, +M. Briand authorized General Sarrail to proclaim a state of siege at +Salonica. + +General Sarrail, who had long sought to be freed from the trammels of +Greek sovereignty--"_et a etre maitre chez moi_"--but had hitherto been +denied his wish by the British Government, jumped at the permission, +and he improved upon it with a personal touch, trivial yet +characteristic. So far back as 27 April he had recommended that "we +must strike at the head, attack frankly and squarely the one enemy--the +King." Pending an opportunity to strike, he seized the occasion to +slight. He fixed the proclamation for 3 June, King Constantine's name +day, which was to be celebrated at Salonica as in every other town of +the kingdom with a solemn _Te Deum_. {101} The British General, Milne, +who had arranged to assist at the _Te Deum_, after vainly trying to +obtain at least a postponement of the date out of respect for the King, +found himself obliged to yield. And so on that festal morning martial +law was proclaimed. Allied detachments with machine guns occupied +various strategic points, the public offices were taken possession of, +the chiefs of the Macedonian gendarmerie and police were expelled, and +the local press was placed under a French censor. All this, without +any preliminary notification to the Hellenic Government, which +expressed its indignation that a French General, forgetting the most +elementary rules of courtesy and hospitality, thought fit to choose +such a moment for inaugurating a state of things that formed at once a +gratuitous affront to the sovereign of the country and a breach of the +terms of the Agreement of 10 December.[13] + +But this was only a prelude, followed on 6 June by a blockade of the +Greek coasts, established in pursuance of orders from Paris and +London--_pourpeser sur la Grece et lui montrer qu'elle etait a notre +merci_.[14] Even this measure, however, did not seem to M. Briand +sufficient. He advocated intervention of a nature calculated to disarm +our enemies and to encourage our friends. His views did not meet with +approval in London: Sir Edward Grey had "_des scrupules honorables_," +which M. Briand set himself to overcome by pen and tongue. The Entente +Powers, he argued, were protectors of Greece--guarantors of her +external independence and internal liberty. The Greek Government was +bound to defend its territories with them against all invaders, and it +had broken that obligation. Further, it had sinned by violating the +Constitution. On both counts the Entente Powers had not only the right +but the duty to intervene. Thus only could they justify, in the eyes +of the Greek people, the blockade by which the whole population +suffered, and which it would otherwise not understand. There was no +time to lose: the dignity of France demanded swift and drastic action: +the Athenians had gone so far as to ridicule in a cinema the {102} +uniform of the heroes of Verdun. If England would not join her, she +must act alone.[15] + +These arguments--particularly, one may surmise, the last--overcame Sir +Edward Grey's honourable scruples; and on 16 June a squadron was +ordered to be ready to bombard Athens, while a brigade was embarked at +Salonica for the same destination. Before the guns opened fire, +hydroplanes would drop bombs on the royal palace; then the troops would +land, occupy the town, and proceed to arrest, among others, the royal +family. Such were the plans elaborated under the direction of the +French Minister at Athens, much to the joy of General Sarrail, who had +said and written again and again that "nothing could be done unless the +King was put down." [16] + +All arrangements for this "demonstration" completed, on 21 June the +Entente Powers, "ever animated by the most benevolent and amicable +spirit towards Greece"--it is wonderful to what acts these words often +form the accompaniment--had the honour to deliver to her Government a +Note by which they demanded: + +1. The immediate and total demobilization of the Army. + +2. The immediate replacement of the present Cabinet by a business +Ministry. + +3. The immediate dissolution of the Chamber and fresh elections. + +4. The discharge of police officers obnoxious to them. + +They admitted neither discussion nor delay, but left to the Hellenic +Government the entire responsibility for the events that would ensue if +their just demands were not complied with at once. + +As M. Briand had anticipated, the sight of our warships' smoke +quickened the Greek Government's sense of justice. King Constantine +promptly complied, the "demonstration," to the intense disappointment +of M. Guillemin and General Sarrail, was adjourned, and a Ministry of a +non-political character, under the leadership of M. Zaimis, was +appointed to carry on the administration of the country until the +election of a new Chamber.[17] + +The event marked a new phase in the relations between {103} Greece and +the Entente Powers. Henceforth they appear not as trespassers on +neutral territory, but as protectors installed there, according to M. +Briand, by right--a right derived from treaties and confirmed by +precedents.[18] Concerning the treaties all comment must be postponed +till the question comes up in a final form. But as to the precedents, +it may be observed that the most pertinent and helpful of all was one +which M. Briand did not cite. + +At the time of the Crimean War, Greece, under King Otho, wanted to +fight Turkey, and realize some of her national aspirations with the +assistance of Russia. But France and England, who were in alliance +with Turkey against Russia, would not allow such a thing. Their +Ministers at Athens told King Otho that strict neutrality was the only +policy consonant with the honour and the interest of Greece: while +hostilities lasted her commerce, as a neutral nation, would flourish, +and by earning their goodwill she could, at the conclusion of peace, +hope not to be forgotten in the re-making of the map of Eastern Europe. +For refusing to listen to these admonitions King Otho was denounced as +a pro-Russian autocrat, and the Allies landed troops at the Piraeus to +compel obedience to their will. + +Once more a Greek sovereign had drawn down upon himself the wrath of +the Protecting Powers, with the traditional charges of hostile +tendencies in his foreign and autocratic tendencies in his domestic +conduct, for daring to adopt an independent Greek policy. + +This time the three Powers were united in a common cause, which +necessitated unity of action on all fronts. But it would be an error +to imagine that this unity of action rested everywhere upon a community +of views or of ulterior aims. Certainly such was not the case in +Greece. France had her own views and aims in that part of the world. +M. Briand was bent on bringing Greece into the War, not because he +thought her help could exercise a decisive influence over its course, +but because he wanted her to share in the spoils under French auspices: +he considered it France's interest to have in the Eastern Mediterranean +a strong Greece closely tied to her.[19] + +{104} + +That programme France intended to carry through at all costs and by all +means. England and Russia, for the sake of the paramount object of the +War, acquiesced and co-operated. But the acquiescence was compulsory +and the co-operation reluctant. The underlying disaccord between the +three Allies reflected itself in the demeanour of their representatives +at Athens. + +M. Guillemin, the French Minister, stood before the Greek Government +violently belligerent. Brute force, accentuated rather than concealed +by a certain irritating finesse, seemed to be his one idea of +diplomacy, and he missed no conceivable opportunity for giving it +expression: so much so that after a time the King found it impossible +to receive him. Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister, formed a +pleasing contrast to his French colleague: a scrupulous and courteous +gentleman, he did not disguise his repugnance to a policy involving at +every step a fresh infringement of a neutral nation's rights. As it +was, he endeavoured to moderate proceedings which he could neither +approve nor prevent. Prince Demidoff, a Russian diplomat of amiable +manners, seconded Sir Francis Elliot's counsels of moderation and +yielded to M. Guillemin's clamours for coercion.[20] + +It is important to bear this disaccord in mind in order to understand +what went before and what comes hereafter: for, though for the most +part latent, it was always present; and if it did not avert, it +retarded the climax. + + + +[1] _Orations_, p. 155; Skouloudis's _Semeioseis_, p. 36. + +[2] _White Book_, Nos. 70-4, 79, 81, 84, 86-90. + +[3] _White Book_, Nos. 92, 93, 96-102. + +[4] _White Book_, No. 104. + +[5] _White Book_, Nos. 106, 111, 113. + +[6] _White Book_, Nos. 110, 112, 116. + +[7] _White Book_, Nos. 117-20, 134, 135; Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. +25-6. + +[8] _White Book_, Nos. 95, 105, 126, 130-33, 137. The instructions of +27 April had been issued chiefly in consequence of information that +bands of Bulgarian irregulars (_Comitadjis_) were at that moment +preparing to cross the frontier. Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, p. 23. + +[9] The charge was supported by garbled "extracts" from the +instructions to the Greek troops (the full texts of which may now be +read in the _White Book_), published in Paris. See the _Saturday +Review_, 10 Sept., 1921, pp. 321-2, citing the _Petit Parisien_ of +Dec., 1916. + +[10] _White Book_, Nos. 140, 146. + +[11] _Sarrail_, p. 104. Anyone familiar with the political and +psychological atmosphere would have seen that the Greeks were anxious +to keep the Bulgars out by inducing the French to forestall them. But +Sarrail detected in their advice a subtle contrivance either to find +out his plans, or to cast the blame for the loss of Rupel on him! + +[12] _White Book_, No. 142. + +[13] _Journal Officiel_, p. 72; Sarrail, pp. 105-8, 112, 355-7; _White +Book_, Nos. 142, 145. + +[14] _Sarrail_, p. 113. + +[15] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 72-3. + +[16] Sarrail, pp. 115-24; Du Fournet, pp. 91-3. + +[17] _Journal Officiel_, p. 99; Sarrail, pp. 125-7; Du Fournet, p. 93. + +[18] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 72, 73. + +[19] Romanos to Zaimis, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916. + +[20] See Du Fournet, pp. 110-11. + + + + +{105} + +CHAPTER X + +In their Note of 21 June the Allies assured the Greek people that they +acted for its sake as much as for their own. One half of the preamble +was taken up by their grievances against the Skouloudis Government--its +toleration of foreign propagandists and its connivance at the entry of +enemies, which formed a fresh menace for their armies. The other half +was devoted to the violation of the Constitution by the dissolution of +two Chambers within less than a year and the subjection of the country +to a regime of tyranny. Their aim, they said, was to safeguard the +Greek people in the enjoyment of its rights and liberties.[1] + +These generous sentiments left the Greek people strangely cold. +Indeed, the absence of any manifestations of popular joy at the Allies' +success was as striking as had been the manifestations of resentment at +the means employed. The only persons who did applaud the action were +the persons whose party interests it served. The Venizelist Press +hailed the triumph of violence as a victory for legality. M. Venizelos +addressed to M. Briand his felicitations, and gave public utterance to +his gratitude as follows: "The Note solved a situation from which there +was no other issue. The just severity of its tone, the sincerity of +its motives, its expressly drawn distinction between the Greek people +and the ex-Government, give it more than anything else a paternal +character towards the people of this country. The Protecting Powers +have acted only like parents reclaiming a son's birthright." [2] + +Pared down to realities, the aim of the Protecting Powers was to bring +their protege to power and Greece into the War. The demobilization of +the army, which stood first on their list, was the first step to that +end. M. Venizelos {106} had been asserting that the people were still +with him, and, given a chance, would uphold his policy, but that chance +was denied them by the mobilization. With a pardonable ignorance of +the people's feelings, and also, it must be owned, with a too naive +confidence in the accuracy of the People's Chosen, the Allies had +decided to act on this assumption: an assumption on which M. Venizelos +himself was most reluctant to act. + +We have it on his own evidence that he looked for a solution of his +difficulties, not to an election, but to a revolution. Further, he has +told us that, eager as he might be for a revolutionary stroke, he could +not lose sight of the obstacles. To those who held up French +revolutions as a model, he pointed out that the analogy was fallacious: +in France "long years of tyranny had exasperated the people to its very +depths. In Greece the people had a king who, only two years earlier, +had headed his armies in two victorious campaigns." [3] So he scouted +the idea of intervention at Athens, convinced that any attack on the +Crown would spell destruction to himself.[4] His project was to steal +to Salonica and there, under General Sarrail's shield, to start a +separatist movement "directed against the Bulgars, but not against the +king," apparently hoping that the Greek troops in Macedonia, among whom +his apostles had been busy, fired by anti-Bulgar hate, would join him +and drag king and country after them. This project had been +communicated by the French Minister at Athens to General Sarrail on 31 +May:[5] but, as the British Government was not yet sufficiently +advanced to countenance sedition,[6] M. Venizelos and his French +confederate saw reason to abandon it for the present. + +Thus all concerned were committed to a test of the real desires of the +Greek people by a General Election, which they declared themselves +anxious to bring off without delay--early in August. This time there +would be no ambiguity about the issue: although the Allies in their +Note, as was proper and politic, had again disclaimed any {107} wish or +intention to make Greece depart from her neutrality, M. Venizelos +proclaimed that he still adhered to his bellicose programme, and that +he was more confident of victory than ever[7]: had not the Reservists +been set free to vote, and were not those ardent warriors his +enthusiastic supporters? With this cry--perhaps in this belief--he +entered the arena. + +It was a lively contest--rhetoric and corruption on both sides +reinforced by terrorism, to which the Allies' military authorities in +Macedonia, and their Secret Service at Athens, whose efficiency had +been greatly increased by the dismissal of many policemen obnoxious to +them, and by other changes brought about through the Note of 21 June, +contributed of their best. + +But even veteran politicians are liable to error. The Reservists left +their billets in Macedonia burning with anger and shame at the +indignities and hardships which they had endured. The Allies might +have had among those men as many friends as they pleased, and could +have no enemies unless they created them by treating them as such. And +this is just what they did: from first to last, the spirit displayed by +General Sarrail towards the Greek army was a spirit of insulting +distrust and utterly unscrupulous callousness. + +Unable to revenge themselves on the foreign trespasser, the Reservists +vowed to wreak their vengeance on his native abettor. They travelled +back to their villages shouting: "A black vote for Venizelos!" and +immediately formed leagues in the constituencies with a view to +combating his candidates. The latter did all they could to exploit the +national hate for the Bulgars and the alarm caused by their invasion. +But fresh animosities had blunted the edge of old feelings: besides, +had not the Bulgarian invasion been provoked by the Allies' occupation, +and who was responsible for that occupation? For the rest, the +question, as it presented itself to the masses, was no longer simply +one of neutrality or war. Despite M. Venizelos's efforts, and thanks +to the efforts of his adversaries, his breach with the King had become +public, and {108} the division of the nation had now attained to the +dimensions of a schism--Royalists against Venizelists. Nor could there +be any doubt as to the relative strength of the rival camps. + +Thus, by a sort of irony, the action which was designed to clothe +Venizelos with new power threatened to strip him of the last rags of +prestige that still clung to his name. Therefore, the elections +originally fixed for early in August were postponed by the Entente to +September. + +Such was the internal situation, when external events brought the +struggle to a head. + +With the accession of 120,000 Serbs, 23,000 Italians, and a Russian +brigade, the Allied army in Macedonia had reached a total of about +350,000 men, of whom, owing to the summer heats and the Vardar marshes, +some 210,000 were down with malaria.[8] Nevertheless, under pressure +from home and against his own better judgment,[9] General Sarrail began +an offensive (10 August). As might have been foreseen, this display of +energy afforded the Bulgars an excuse, and the demobilization of the +Greek forces an opportunity, for a fresh invasion. M. Zaimis, in view +of the contingency, imparted to General Sarrail his Government's +intention to disarm the forts in Eastern Macedonia, so that he might +forestall the Bulgars by occupying them. But again, as in May, the +Frenchman treated the friendly hint with scornful suspicion.[10] There +followed a formal notice from the German and Bulgarian Ministers at +Athens to the Premier, stating that their troops were compelled, by +military exigencies, to push further into Greek territory, and +repeating the assurances given to his predecessor on the occupation of +Fort Rupel.[11] + +The operation was conducted in a manner which belied these assurances. +Colonel Hatzopoulos, acting Commandant of the Fourth Army Corps, +reported from his headquarters at Cavalla that the Bulgarian troops +were accompanied by irregular bands which indulged in murder {109} and +pillage; that the inhabitants of the Serres and Drama districts were +fleeing panic-stricken; and that the object of the invaders clearly +was, after isolating the various Greek divisions, to occupy the whole +of Eastern Macedonia. He begged for permission to call up the +disbanded reservists, and for the immediate dispatch of the Greek +Fleet. But the Athens Government vetoed all resistance, and the +invasion went on unopposed.[12] By 24 August the Bulgars were on the +outskirts of Cavalla. + +Truth to tell, the real authors of the invasion were the Allies and M. +Venizelos, who, by forcing Greece to disarm before the assembled enemy, +practically invited him. But it was not to be expected that they +should see things in this light. They, as usual, saw in them a new +"felony"--yet another proof of King Constantine's desire to assist the +Kaiser and defeat M. Venizelos[13]--and acted accordingly. + +M. Venizelos opened the proceedings with a meeting outside his house on +Sunday, 27 August, when he delivered from his balcony a direct +apostrophe to the King--an oration which may have lost some of its +dramatic effect by being read out of a carefully prepared manuscript, +but which on that account possesses greater documentary value: + +"Thou, O King, hast become the victim of conscienceless counsellors who +have tried to destroy the work accomplished by the Revolution of 1909, +to bring back the previous maladministration, and to satisfy their +passionate hate for the People's Chosen Leader. Thou art the victim of +military advisers of limited perceptions and of oligarchic principles. +Thou hast become the victim of thy admiration for Germany, in whose +victory thou hast believed, hoping through that victory to elbow aside +our {110} free Constitution and to centre in thy hands the whole +authority of the State." After enumerating the disastrous results of +these errors--"instead of expansion in Asia Minor, Thrace, and Cyprus, +a Bulgarian invasion in Macedonia and the loss of valuable war +material"--the orator referred to the elections and warned the King +that persistence in his present attitude would involve danger to the +throne: "The use of the august name of Your Majesty in the contest +against the Liberal Party introduces the danger of an internal +revolution." The discourse ended with another scarcely veiled menace +to the King: "If we are not listened to, then we shall take counsel as +to what must be done to rescue all that can be rescued out of the +catastrophe which has overtaken us." [14] + +It was not an empty threat. The Chief spoke on Sunday, and on +Wednesday his followers at Salonica rose up in revolt and, supported by +General Sarrail, took possession of the public offices, set up a +revolutionary committee under a Cretan, and launched a war proclamation +for Macedonia on the side of the Entente. The Royalist troops, after +some fighting, were besieged in their barracks, starved into surrender, +and finally shipped off to the Piraeus, while many civil and +ecclesiastical personages were thrown into prison. The French General +received notice that M. Venizelos himself would arrive on 9 September +to take command of the movement.[15] + +Concurrently with this first product of the plot hatched between M. +Venizelos and M. Guillemin in May, was carried on the more orthodox +mode of action inaugurated by the Allied Governments in June. At the +news of the Bulgarian invasion, the French Minister at Athens felt or +feigned unbounded fear--_tout etait a redoubter_: even a raid by Uhlans +to the very gates of the capital--and asked Paris for a squadron to be +placed at his disposal. Paris did what it could. On 26 August Admiral +Dartige du Fournet was ordered to form a special squadron and proceed +against Athens according to the plans drawn up {111} in June. He +immediately left Malta at the head of thirty-four ships, and on the +28th arrived at Milo, where he found a British contingent of +thirty-nine ships awaiting him. The joint armada thus formed was +believed to be strong enough to preclude all danger of resistance. For +all that, every precaution was taken to secure to it the advantage of a +surprise, though in vain: its size and the proximity of its objective +rendered secrecy impossible. + +Four days were wasted in idleness--a delay due to England's scruples. +But at last all was ready; and on the morning of 1 September the Allied +Fleet stood out to sea: seventy-three units of every description, the +big ships in single file, flanked by torpedo-boats, steaming bravely at +the rate of fifteen knots, and leaving behind them a track of +white-crested waves that stretched to the very edge of the horizon: _le +coup d'oeil est impressionant_. + +All arrangements for battle had been made, and each contingent had its +special role assigned to it: only the Intelligence Services, being +otherwise occupied, had failed to furnish any information about Greek +mines and submarines. It was therefore necessary to be more than ever +careful. But the six hours' voyage was accomplished safely, and not +until the armada cast anchor at the mouth of the Salamis Strait did it +meet with a tangible token of hostility. The Greek Admiral commanding +the Royal Fleet before the arsenal of Salamis--a force composed of two +ironclads, one armoured cruiser, eighteen torpedo-boats and two +submarines--failed to bid the Allies welcome: a breach of international +rules which was duly resented and remedied. + +The expedition had for its objects: (1) To seize a dozen enemy +merchantmen which had taken refuge since the beginning of the War in +the harbours of Eleusis and the Piraeus; (2) to obtain the control of +Greek posts and telegraphs; (3) to procure the expulsion of enemy +propagandists, and the prosecution of such Greek subjects as had +rendered themselves guilty of complicity in corruption and espionage on +the wrong side. + +Of the first operation, which was conducted to a successful issue that +same evening "with remarkable activity" by one of Admiral Dartige's +subordinates, no justification was attempted: we needed tonnage and +took it. The {112} pretext for the second was that the Allies had +heard "from a sure source" that their enemies were furnished by the +Hellenic Government with military information. So serious a charge, if +made in good faith, should have been supported by the clearest proofs. +Yet even Admiral Dartige, whose disagreeable duty it was to prefer it, +bitterly complained that "he never received from Paris a single proof +which could enlighten him." On the other hand, he did receive abundant +enlightenment about the "sure source": the Russian Minister needed to +send a cipher message to the American Embassy at Constantinople which +was entrusted with Russian interests, and, the Hellenic Government +readily agreeing to transmit it through its Legation at Pera, Prince +Demidoff, with the consent of his Entente colleagues, proceeded to make +use of the Athens wireless for that purpose. Within forty-eight hours +the Admiral received from Paris an excited telegram asking him what +measures he had taken to prevent the Hellenic Government from +"violating its engagements." The rebuke, explains the Admiral, was the +result of a sensational report from the head of the French Secret +Intelligence at Athens, denouncing the above transaction as an example +of "the bad faith of the Greeks." On this pretext all the means by +which the Hellenic Government could communicate with its +representatives abroad and reply to the attacks of its enemies passed +under the Allies' control. + +Somewhat less neat were the methods adopted to secure the third object +of the expedition. The Secret Services had compiled a voluminous +register of undesirable persons out of which they drew up a select list +of candidates for expulsion and prosecution. Unfortunately, despite +their industry, it teemed with embarrassing errors: individuals put +down as Germans turned out to be Greeks; and the suspects of Greek +nationality included high personages, such as M. Streit, ex-Minister +for Foreign Affairs, General Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxas, ex-Chiefs +of the General Staff, and so on. At last an expurgated list was +approved and carried out summarily.[16] Some of the criminals escaped +punishment by transferring their services from the German to the French +and British propagandas; for, {113} while to intrigue with the former +was to commit a crime, to intrigue with the latter was to perform a +meritorious deed. + +There the Allies and M. Venizelos stopped for the moment, hoping that +Rumania's entry into the War, which had just taken place, would induce +Greece to do likewise. + + + +[1] _Journal Officiel_, p. 99. + +[2] The _Daily Mail_, 24 June, 1916. + +[3] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[4] Du Fournet, p. 91. + +[5] Sarrail, pp. 107, 354-5. + +[6] "_L'Angleterre avait mis son veto._"--Sarrail, p. 153. + +[7] See his statement to the Correspondent of the Paris _Journal_, in +the _Hesperia_, of London, 7 July, 1916. + +[8] Du Fournet, p. 99. + +[9] Caclamanos, Paris, 1/14 June, 1916. + +[10] M. Zaimis's deposition on oath at the judicial investigation +instituted by the Venizelos Government in 1919. Cp. Sarrail, p. 152. + +[11] _White Book_, Nos. 158-60. + +[12] _White Book_, Nos. 161-5. + +[13] "The King, having no illusions as to the result of an election," +says M. Venizelos, in the _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, "organized, in +connivance with the Germans and Bulgarians, the invasion of Western and +Eastern Macedonia. As the Liberals thus lost about sixty seats, the +King might hope . . . to secure at least some semblance of success at +the coming elections." On the first opportunity that the people of +Macedonia, Eastern and Western alike, had of expressing their +opinion--at the elections of 14 Nov., 1920--they did not return a +single Venizelist.--See Reuter, Athens, 15 Nov., 1920. + +[14] For the Greek original, see the _Hesperia_, 1 Sept., 1916. A much +longer text, apparently elaborated at leisure, with a colourless +English translation, was published by the Anglo-Hellenic League. + +[15] Sarrail, pp. 152-4; Official statement by the Revolutionary +Committee, Reuter, Salonica, 31 Aug., 1916. + +[16] Du Fournet, pp. 99-104, 122-4, 127, 129. + + + + +{114} + +CHAPTER XI + +Rumania's policy had always been regarded by the Greeks as of capital +importance for their own; and as soon as she took the field, King +Constantine, though suffering from a recrudescence of the malady that had +nearly killed him in the previous year, set to work to consider whether +her adhesion did not make such a difference in the military situation as +to enable him to abandon neutrality. Two or three days before the +arrival of the Allied Fleet he had initiated conversations in that sense +with the Allied Ministers.[1] + +Simultaneously the question of a war Government came up for discussion; +the actual Cabinet being, by order of the Allies, a mere business +Ministry charged only to carry on the administration until the election +of a new Parliament. + +Two alternatives were suggested. The first, which found warm favour in +Entente circles, was that M. Zaimis should lay down the cares of office +and make place for M. Venizelos. Constantine was advised to "bend his +stubborn will to the inevitable and remain King of the Hellenes"--that +is, to become an ornamental captain--by abandoning the ship of State to +the management of the wise Cretan. "It is now possible," the homily ran, +"that the precipitation of events will prevent the return of M. +Venizelos by the voice of the electorate." But that did not signify: "M. +Venizelos can count on the backing of nine-tenths of the nation, given a +semblance of Royal support." [1] In less trenchant language, the British +Minister at Athens expounded the same thesis. + +But Constantine showed little inclination to perform this noble act of +self-effacement. On no account would {115} he have a dictator imposed +upon him to shape the fortunes of Greece according to his caprice, +unfettered by "military advisers of limited perceptions." If Greece was +to have a dictator, the King had said long ago, he would rather be that +dictator; though he had no objection to a Cabinet with a Venizelist +admixture. In fact, he insisted on M. Venizelos accepting a share in the +responsibility of war, either by himself sitting in the Cabinet or by +permitting three of his friends to represent him in it. "It will not +do," he said frankly, "to have his crowd standing out, trying to break up +the army and making things difficult by criticizing the Government." [3] + +The other alternative was that M. Zaimis should be invested with +political functions; but for this the consent of the Allies and of their +protege was needed. The latter, in his oration of 27 August, had +magnanimously declared himself willing, provided his policy were adopted, +to leave the execution of it in the hands of M. Zaimis, whose honesty and +sincerity remained above all suspicion: "the Liberal Party," he had said, +"are prepared to back this Cabinet of Affairs with their political +authority." On being asked by M. Zaimis to explain precisely what he +meant, M. Venizelos broached the subject of elections. As already seen, +he and the Allies had reason to regret and to elude the test which they +had exacted. It was, therefore, not surprising that M. Venizelos should +stipulate, with the concurrence of the Entente Ministers, that the +elections now imminent be postponed to the Greek Kalends.[4] By +accepting this condition, M. Zaimis obtained a promise of support; and +straightway (2 Sept.) proceeded to sound London and Paris. + +Before making any formal proposal, he wanted to know if the Western +Powers would at least afford Greece the money and equipment which she +required in order to prepare with a view to eventual action. England +welcomed these overtures, convinced that thus all misunderstandings +between Greece and the Allies would vanish; {116} but, before giving a +definite reply, she had to communicate with France. France manifested +the greatest satisfaction; but M. Briand urged that there was no time for +negotiations: the vital interests of Greece demanded immediate action: +she should hasten to make a formal declaration without delay; after which +he would do all that was necessary to provide her, as soon as possible, +with money and material. M. Zaimis in his very first dispatch had said: +"Unfortunately the state of our finances and of our military organization +does not permit us to think of immediate action: we need a certain delay +for preparation"; and all the exhortations of M. Briand to leap first and +look afterwards failed to move him. Besides the matter of equipment--a +matter in which the Entente Powers, owing to their own necessities, had +been the reverse of liberal to their small allies, as Belgium and Servia +had already found, and Rumania was about to find to her cost--there was +another point Greek statesmen and strategists had to weigh very carefully +before committing themselves: would Rumania co-ordinate her military +action with theirs? Unless she were inclined and able to divert enough +forces from the Austro-Hungarian to the Bulgarian frontier, her entry +into the War could not be of any help to them. So, after nine days' +correspondence, we find M. Zaimis still writing: "When the English answer +arrives, the Royal Government will take account of it in the examination +in which it will engage before taking a definite decision--a decision +which will be subordinated to its military preparations and to the course +of war operations in the East." [5] + +Directly afterwards (11 Sept.) M. Zaimis resigned "for reasons of +health." These reasons convinced no one: everyone agreed in ascribing +his withdrawal to his discovery that he was the victim of duplicity; but +as to whose duplicity, opinions differed. According to M. Venizelos, +while the conversations about entering the War went on, King Constantine, +in consequence of a telegram from the {117} Kaiser assuring him that +within a month the Germans would have overrun Rumania and flung Sarrail's +army into the sea, and asking him to hold out, reverted to the policy of +neutrality; and M. Zaimis, realizing that he was being fooled, refused to +play the King's game and resigned.[6] For this statement we have M. +Venizelos's authority; and against it that of M. Zaimis, who, on hearing +from Paris that his resignation gave rise to the supposition that the old +policy had prevailed, replied: "My impression is that the Cabinet which +will succeed me will not quit the line of policy which I have pursued." +[7] + +Another account connected the fall of the Cabinet with an incident which +occurred at that critical moment and strained the situation to the +utmost. In the evening of 9 September, as the Entente Ministers held a +conference in the French Legation, a score of scallywags rushed into the +courtyard, shouting "Long live the King! Down with France and England!" +fired a few revolver shots in the air, and bolted. Immediately M. Zaimis +hastened to the Legation and expressed his regrets. But that did not +suffice to placate the outraged honour of the French Republic. Despite +the objections of his colleagues, M. Guillemin had a detachment of +bluejackets landed to guard the Legation; and next day a Note was +presented to the Greek Premier demanding that the perpetrators of this +grave breach of International Law should be discovered and punished, and +that all Reservists' leagues should instantly be broken up. It was even +proposed that the King should be asked to issue a Proclamation disavowing +and condemning the demonstration. Inquiry proved that the demonstration +was the work of _agents provocateurs_ in the pay of the French Secret +Service which acted in the interest of M. Venizelos. + +Whereupon, M. Zaimis, realizing that the negotiations he was trying to +conduct could not be sincere on the part of the French, begged to be +relieved of his mandate. The King was loth to let him go. The British +Minister was equally upset, and added his plea to that of the Sovereign. +M. Zaimis said that, if M. Guillemin disavowed {118} the intrigue and +displayed a willingness to continue the negotiations in a spirit of +candour, he would remain; but M. Guillemin could not bring himself to go +so far.[8] + +Whatever may be the truth in this matter--for, owing to lack of +documentary evidence, it is impossible fully to ascertain the truth--the +whole position, for a man of M. Zaimis's character, was untenable: if +sense of duty had prompted him to take up the burden, common-sense +counselled him to lay it down. So he resigned; and the fat was once more +in the fire--and the blaze and the stench were greater than ever; for his +resignation synchronized with another untoward event. + +Colonel Hatzopoulos with his own and the Serres Division had for some +time past been isolated at Cavalla--the Bulgars occupying the forts on +one side, while the British blockaded the harbour on the other. +Suddenly, upon a false report that King Constantine had fled to Larissa +and Venizelos was master at Athens, the demeanour of the Bulgars, which +had always been harsh, became thoroughly hostile. They strengthened +their outposts, cut off the food supplies that came from Drama and +Serres, and, on 6 September, demanded that the heights immediately above +the town still held by the Greeks should be abandoned to them, on the +plea that otherwise they would be unable to defend themselves in case of +an Entente landing: refusal would be considered an unfriendly act. As +his orders forbade resistance, Colonel Hatzopoulos had no choice but to +yield. Thus the Greeks were reduced to absolute helplessness; and their +isolation was completed on 9 September, when British sailors landed and +destroyed the wireless station. + +The worst was yet to come. Next morning (10 Sept.) a German officer +peremptorily notified Colonel Hatzopoulos on the part of Marshal von +Hindenburg that, as the Greek troops scattered over Eastern Macedonia +obstructed the operations of the Bulgarian army, they should all be +concentrated at Drama. Colonel Hatzopoulos, perceiving that compliance +meant captivity in the hands of the Bulgars, asked that, as his +instructions were that all the troops should concentrate at Cavalla, and +as he could not act otherwise without orders from the King, he might be +{119} allowed to send a messenger to Athens via Monastir. This being +refused on the ground that the journey would take too long, he pleaded +his inability to decide about so grave a matter on his own initiative, +but must call a council of the principal officers. Meanwhile, in order +to avoid capture by the Bulgars, he asked if, should they decide to +surrender, Hindenburg would guarantee their transportation to Germany +with their arms. The German promised to communicate with headquarters +and to let him know the answer on the following morning. + +Evidently the invaders, who would formerly have been more than content +with the withdrawal of the Greek forces, were now--in violation of the +pledges given to Athens by the German and Bulgarian Governments--resolved +on making such withdrawal impossible. It is not hard to account for this +change. The pledges were given in the belief that Greece would continue +neutral. This belief had been shaken not only by the Venizelist +movement, but more severely still by M. Zaimis's soundings of the Entente +Powders. The Greek Premier had from the first insisted on secrecy, +stating among the main reasons which rendered absolute discretion +imperative, "the presence in part of our territory of the eventual +adversary," and "the need to extricate two divisions and a large quantity +of material" from their grip.[9] Nevertheless, the Entente Press gloried +in the hope that the Allies would soon have the only non-belligerent +Balkan State fighting on their side, and the principal Entente news +agency trumpeted abroad M. Zaimis's confidential conversations.[10] +Hence the desire of the Germano-Bulgars to prevent the escape of men and +material that might at any moment be used against them. + +On the other hand, the Greek officers' council decided {120} to try first +every means of escape, and only if that proved impossible to comply with +the German demand on condition that they should be taken to Germany and +not be left in the hands of the Bulgars. Accordingly, Colonel +Hatzopoulos addressed a most earnest appeal to the British for vessels to +get his men away to Volo or the Piraeus, and, having received a promise +to that effect, he secretly arranged for flight. In the night of 10 +September all the men with their belongings gathered on the sea-front +ready to leave. But they reckoned without the partisans of M. Venizelos +in their midst. One of them, the Commandant of the Serres Division, a +month ago had informed General Sarrail that he would fight on the side of +the Allies,[11] and another on 5 September, in a nocturnal meeting on +board a British man-of-war, had proposed to kidnap Colonel Hatzopoulos, +arm volunteers, and attack the Bulgars with the aid of Allied detachments +landed at Cavalla. His proposal having been rejected, it was agreed that +all "patriotic" elements should be transported to Salonica. In pursuance +of this agreement, only those were allowed to embark who were willing to +rebel. Those who refused to break their oath of allegiance to their King +were turned adrift. Some tried to gain the island of Thasos, but their +boats were carried to the open sea and capsized, drowning many, the rest +got back to the shore in despair. + +As a last hope of escape, Colonel Hatzopoulos begged the British naval +authorities, who controlled all means of communication between Cavalla +and Athens, to transmit to his Government a message asking if he might +surrender to the British and be interned in the isle of Thasos. The +message was duly transmitted through the British Legation on 11 +September, and in reply the Greek Minister of War, after an understanding +with the British authorities, ordered him through the same channel to +embark at once with all his men and, if possible, material for Volo, on +Greek ships by preference, but if such were not available, on any other +ships. Whether these orders were never forwarded, or whether they +reached their destination too late, is not quite clear. It is certain, +however, that during the critical hours when the fate of the unhappy +soldiers hung in the balance, the British Fleet did not permit +embarkation {121} except to the few who joined the Rebellion.[12] For +the loyal majority there was nothing left but the way to Drama. + +Nor was any time allowed for vacillation. When, in the morning of 11 +September, Colonel Hatzopoulos met the German officer, the latter handed +to him a telegram from Hindenburg, guaranteeing the transport of the +Greeks to Germany with their arms, where they would be treated as guests. +He added that the departure from Cavalla would not be enforced for the +present. But in the afternoon he intimated that this was due to a +misunderstanding, and that they should leave the same night. Their +efforts to escape had obviously become known to the Germans, who, taking +no chances, imposed immediate departure under threat to cancel +Hindenburg's guarantee. Thus, the two Greek divisions were under +compulsion huddled off to Drama, whence, joined by the division stationed +there, they were taken to Germany and interned at Goerlitz.[13] + +Nothing that had hitherto happened served so well to blacken the rulers +of Greece in the eyes of the Entente publics, and the mystery which +enveloped the affair facilitated the propagation of fiction. It was +asserted that the surrendered troops amounted to 25,000--even to 40,000: +figures which were presently reduced to "some 8,000: three divisions, +each composed of three regiments of 800 men each." The surrender was +represented as made by order of the Athens Government: King Constantine, +out of affection for Germany and Bulgaria, and hate of {122} France and +England, had given up, not only rich territories he himself had +conquered, but also the soldiers he had twice led to victory. + +In point of fact, as soon as the Athens Government heard of the +catastrophe--and it did not hear of it until after the arrival of the +first detachment in Germany--it addressed to Berlin a remonstrance, +disavowing the step of Colonel Hatzopoulos as contrary to his orders, and +denying Germany's right to keep him as contrary to International Law: +"for Greece being in peaceful and friendly relations with Germany, the +Greek troops can neither be treated as prisoners of war nor be interned, +internment being only possible in a neutral country, and only with regard +to belligerent troops--not vice versa." The dispatch ended with a +request that "our troops with their arms and baggage be transported to +the Swiss frontier, whence they may go to some Mediterranean port and +return to Greece on ships which we shall send for the purpose." [14] + +Berlin answered that she "was ready to meet the desire of the Greek +Government, but actual and effective guarantees would have to be given +that the troops under German protection would not be prevented by the +Entente Powers from returning to their fatherland, and would not be +punished for their loyal and neutral feeling and action." [15] This +because the Entente press was angrily denouncing the step as a +"disgraceful desertion" and asking "with what ignominious penalty their +War Lord has visited so signal and so heinous an act of mutiny, perjury, +and treason on the part of his soldiers" [16]--the soldiers who went to +Germany precisely in order to avoid committing an act of mutiny, perjury, +and treason. Truly, in time of war words change their meaning. + + + +[1] See _Constantine I and the Greek People_. By Paxton Hibben, an +American journalist who took part in these diplomatic transactions, pp. +281-90. + +[2] See Crawfurd Price, Athens, 1 Sept., in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, 15 +Sept., 1916. + +[3] Paxton Hibben, p. 289. + +[4] "_La question de la dissolution de la Chambre fut ecartee. . . . De +plus tout faisait supposer que de nouvelles elections ne seraient pas +favorables an parti venizeliste, dont la cause etait si intimement liee a +la notre._"--Du Fournet, pp. 121-2; Paxton Hibben, pp. 278-9, 306-7. + +[5] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; Rome, +Bucharest, Petrograd, 29 Aug./11 Sept. Romanos, Paris, 20 Aug./2 Sept., +22 Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 26 Aug./8 Sept. Gennadius, London, 22 +Aug./4 Sept., 25 Aug./7 Sept., 1916. + +[6] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[7] Romanos, Paris, 31 Aug./13 Sept.; Zaimis, Athens, 1/14 Sept., 1916. + +[8] Paxton Hibben, pp. 313-19; Du Fournet, pp. 119-21, 129. + +[9] Zaimis to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 20 Aug./2 Sept., 1916. +All his dispatches are marked "strictly confidential and to be deciphered +by the Minister himself." The replies are to be addressed to him +personally, and for greater security, must be prefaced by some +meaningless groups of figures. + +[10] See messages from the Athens Correspondents of _The Times_ and the +_Daily Chronicle_, 3 Sept.; Reuter, Athens, 9 Sept., 1916. In view of +the strict censorship exercised during the war and in view of the +Franco-Venizelist anxiety to rush Greece into a rupture these +indiscretions can hardly be considered accidental. + +[11] Sarrail, p. 152. + +[12] King Constantine has publicly taxed the Allies with not forwarding +the orders (see _The Times_, 8 Nov., 1920). On the other hand, there is +on record a statement by Vice-Consul Knox that the orders were forwarded +from Athens and that he himself delivered them at Cavalla. Cp. Admiral +Dartige du Fournet: "_Au moment ou les Grecs virent les Bulgares en +marche sur Cavalla, Us voulurent embarquer lews troupes et leur materiel. +L'amiral anglais qui commandait en mer Egee leur refusa son concours, +esperant sans doute les deeterminer a se defendre. Quand, se rendant un +compte plus exact de la situation, il donna son assentiment a cette +evacuation, il etaii trop tard: les Bulgares entraient a Cavalla le jour +meme._"--Du Fournet, p. 151. + +[13] My chief sources of information concerning this event are a Report +by Col. Hatzopoulos to Marshal von Hindenburg, dated "Goerlitz, 13/26 +Oct., 1916," and another report drawn up at Athens in July, 1921, from +the records of the judicial investigation instituted by the Venizelos +Government in 1919, including the evidence of the British Vice-Consul G. +G. Knox. + +[14] _White Book_, No. 173. + +[15] Telegram from Berlin reported by Renter's Amsterdam Correspondent, +23 Sept., 1916. I find this confirmed by a dispatch from the Greek +Minister at Berlin (Theotokis, Berlin, 18/31 Oct., 1916), in which he +gives an account of his efforts to obtain from the German Government the +return of the troops and restitution of the war material, as well as the +Greek officers' protests to Hindenburg and Ludendorff against the +pressure under which they had been hurried from Cavalla. It is to be +regretted that M. Venizelos did not find room for this document and for +Col. Hatzopoulos's illuminating Report in his _White Book_. + +[16] Leading article in _The Times_, 19 Sept., 1916. + + + + +{123} + +CHAPTER XII + +Meanwhile the unfortunate King of Greece was faced by a state of things +which he himself describes with admirable lucidity in a dispatch to his +brother Andrew, then in London, labouring, vainly enough, to obtain a +fair hearing for the Royalist side, while another brother, Prince +Nicholas, was engaged on a similar mission at Petrograd. The document is +dated 3/16 September, 1916, and runs thus: + +"The resignation of the Cabinet of M. Zaimis, who enjoyed my absolute +confidence, as well as the unanimous confidence of the country, and whom +the Entente Governments declared to me that they surrounded with their +entire sympathy, has rendered the situation very difficult. + +"I charged M. Dimitracopoulos to form a new Cabinet. He declared himself +ready to continue the conversations opened recently by M. Zaimis in the +hope of bringing them to a happy conclusion. Before accepting +definitely, he thought it necessary to sound the views of the Powers on +important questions of an internal order, and went to the _doyen_ of the +Diplomatic Corps, the British Minister, whence he carried away a very +clear impression that, not only the coercive measures would not be raised +before mobilization, but that they might be intensified, notably by +direct interference in personal domestic questions, and that, even after +mobilization, the measures would be only relaxed. As to the question of +elections, after having demanded by the Note of 8 (21) June the +dissolution of the Chamber and new elections, which we accepted, now they +demand that the elections shall not take place, without, at the same +time, allowing the existing Chamber to meet. M. Dimitracopoulos has laid +down his mandate. + +"Under these conditions the situation becomes inextricable. The military +and naval authorities of the Entente foment and encourage in the country +a revolution and armed sedition, and they favour by every means the {124} +Salonica movement by continuing the vexatious measures and restricting +all freedom of thought and action. The Entente Ministers paralyze all +Government. Thus the country is pushed towards anarchy. + +"Such conduct not only conflicts with the assurances which they have +given us, but excludes all practical possibility of reconsidering our +policy freely to the end of taking a decision in a favourable direction. +For the rest, Greece divided would not be of any use as an ally. It is +necessary that there should return in the country comparative calm and +the feeling of independence, indispensable for taking extreme +resolutions. It is necessary that confidence in the sympathy of the +Entente should be restored. A resolution to participate in the war taken +under present circumstances would run the risk of being attributed to +violence and of being received with mistrust. More, that resolutions may +be taken without danger of disaster, there is need of circumspection and +discretion, so as not to provoke an attack from the Germano-Bulgars who +are in our territory, before we are ready to lend real assistance to the +Entente. A more definite declaration of principle, which would have to +be kept secret in the common interest, would be of no practical value. + +"Under certain circumstances, rendering the participation of Greece +useful and conformable to our interests, I have already declared that I +am ready to enter into the war on the side of the Entente. I am ready to +envisage negotiations in this sense. But, before all, I need, that I may +be able to occupy myself usefully and with a certain mental calmness with +foreign questions, to see comparative quiet restored at home, and so to +save the appearances of liberty of action. In this I ask, for the sake +of the common interest, the Powers to give me their help. + +"I have charged M. Calogeropoulos to form a Ministry: he is equally +animated by the best intentions towards the Entente." + +The new Premier, who had already held office with distinction as Minister +of the Interior and as Minister of Finance, possessed every qualification +for the delicate task entrusted to him. On the day of his accession _The +Times_ Correspondent wrote of him: "In the Chamber he is highly esteemed. +Although he is a Theotokist, and {125} therefore anti-Venizelist, M. +Calogeropoulos, who studied in France, declared to me that all his +personal sympathies are with the Entente. He is likewise a member of the +Franco-Greek League." [1] In harmony with this character was his +programme: "The new Cabinet, inspired by the same policy as M. Zaimis, is +resolved to pursue it with the sincere desire to tighten the bonds +between Greece and the Entente Powers." This declaration, made in every +Allied capital, was supplemented by a more intimate announcement in Paris +and London: "Sharing the views which inspired the negotiations opened by +its predecessor, the Royal Government is resolved to pursue them in the +same spirit." [2] + +No sooner had M. Calogeropoulos spoken than M. Venizelos set to work to +cast doubts on his sincerity, with remarkable success: "M. Venizelos does +not believe that the composition of the new Ministry permits of the hope +that a national policy will be adopted, since it springs from a party of +pro-German traditions," [3]--this ominous paragraph was added by the +_Times_ Correspondent to his report the same day. And next day the +British Minister, in an interview with the editor of a Venizelist +journal, said: "The situation is certainly not an agreeable one. I have +read in the papers the declaration of the new Premier. What has +surprised me is to find that M. Calogeropoulos characterized his Ministry +as a political one, whereas in their last Note the Allies required that +Greece should be governed by a business Cabinet. This, as you see, makes +a distinct difference." [4] Simultaneously, the Entente Press, under +similar inspiration, reviled the new Cabinet as pro-German, clamoured for +M. Venizelos, whom they still represented as the true exponent of the +national will, threatened King Constantine with the fate of King Otho, +and his country with "terrible and desperate things." [5] + +{126} + +It was in such an atmosphere that M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues +attempted to resume the conversations which M. Zaimis had opened. They +realized that, since elections and like legal methods no longer commended +themselves to the Allies, since they menaced the country with "terrible +and desperate things," Greece might drift into chaos at any moment. They +were anxious to avoid chaos. But how? A blind acceptance of the +Venizelist policy of an immediate rush into the War, without regard to +ways and means, might prove tantamount to burning one's blanket in order +to get rid of the fleas: while saving Greece from the coercion of the +French and the British, it might expose her to subjugation by the Germans +and the Bulgars: the plight of Rumania afforded a fresh warning. They +therefore adopted the only course open to sane men. + +On 19 September Greece formally offered to the Entente Powers "to come in +as soon as by their help she had accomplished the repair of her military +forces, within a period fixed by common accord." But, "as her armed +intervention could not, obviously, be in the interest of anyone +concerned, unless it took place with chances of success, the Royal +Government thinks that Greece should not be held to her engagement, if at +the time fixed the Balkan theatre of war presented, in the opinion of the +Allies' General Staffs themselves, such a disequilibrium of forces as the +military weight of Greece would be insufficient to redress." [6] + +Russia received these advances with cordiality, her Premier declaring to +the Greek Minister at Petrograd that she would be happy to have Greece +for an ally, and that the Tsar had full confidence in the sentiments of +King Constantine. He added that he would immediately communicate with +Paris and London.[7] There was the rub. French and British statesmen +affected to regard the offer as a ruse for gaining time: they could not +trust a Cabinet three members of which they considered to be ill-disposed +towards the Entente: a "national policy" {127} should be carried out by a +"national Cabinet"--that is, by M. Venizelos.[8] + +While frustrating his country's efforts to find a way out of the pass +into which he had intrigued it, the Cretan and his partisans did not +neglect other forms of activity. We have seen that rebellion had already +broken out at Salonica. In Athens itself the walls were pasted with +Venizelist newspapers in the form of placards displaying headlines such +as these: "A LAST APPEAL TO THE KING!" "DRAW THE SWORD, O KING, OR +ABDICATE!" It was no secret that arms and ammunition were stored in +private houses, that the French Intelligence Service had a depot of +explosives in a ship moored at the Piraeus, and a magazine of rifles and +grenades in its headquarters at the French School of Athens.[9] The +Royalist journals threatened the Venizelists with condign punishment for +their treasonable designs. The Venizelist journals, far from denying the +charge, replied that they would be fully justified in arming themselves +against the hostile Reservist Leagues. In short, the capital swarmed +with conspirators, but the guardians of public order were powerless, +owing to the proximity of the Allied naval guns, ready to enforce respect +for the Allied flags under whose protection the conspiracy was carried +on. By this time the French and British detectives had usurped the +powers and inverted the functions of the police organs;[10] and the +French and {128} British agents, after fomenting those fatal differences +which divide and degrade a people, had developed into directors of plots +and organizers of sedition. + +But, in spite of such encouragement, the capital--or, indeed, any part of +Old Greece--had never appealed to M. Venizelos as a starting-point of +sedition. He knew that only in the recently acquired and as yet +imperfectly assimilated regions--regions under the direct influence of +the Allies--he could hope to rebel with safety. His plan embraced, +besides Salonica, the islands conquered in 1912, particularly his native +Crete. In that home of immemorial turbulence his friends, seconded by +British Secret Service and Naval officers, had found many retired bandits +eager to resume work. Even there, it is true, public opinion was not +strikingly favourable to disloyalty; but the presence of the British +Fleet in Suda Bay had much of persuasion in it.[11] + +Our diplomacy did not openly commit itself. Sir Francis Elliot still +nursed the hope of effecting a reconciliation between the ex-Premier and +his King. When, in August, a conference was secretly held at Athens +between M. Venizelos and a number of Cretan conspirators, the latter +carried back the depressing intelligence that British official sympathy +with their project lacked the necessary degree of warmth. And again, on +11 September, when the British Consul of Canea went over to Athens with +some of those conspirators, he was ordered by the British Legation to +stay there, so as to avoid any suspicion of complicity. This attitude of +correct reserve on the part of the British Foreign Office, however, did +not prevent the British naval authorities on the spot from working out, +in concert with the insurgents, a plan of operations under which some +chieftains were to invest the coast towns on the land side, while our +men-of-war patrolled the sea in their interest.[12] + +{129} + +France, on the other hand, made no distinction between diplomatic and +naval action. On 18 September M. Guillemin informed Admiral Dartige du +Fournet that M. Venizelos was sailing for the islands, and orders were +given for a French escort. But at the last moment M. Venizelos did not +sail. He hesitated. The French Secret Service urged the National Leader +to lead, instead of being prodded from behind; but he resisted their +pressure and their plain speaking.[13] When questioned by the Associated +Press Correspondent if there was any truth in the reports that he was +going to put himself at the head of the revolutionary forces, he replied: +"I cannot answer now. I must wait a little while yet and see what the +Government propose to do." + +It is possible that this was the reason why M. Venizelos paused +irresolute on the brink. It is possible that he suffered, as the +disrespectful Frenchmen hinted, from one of those attacks of timidity to +which he was subject in a crisis. It is possible that the ambiguous +attitude of England damped his martial spirit. For the rest, to make a +revolution is a matter that may well give the strongest-minded pause. +What wonder if, reckless, obstinate, and unscrupulous as he was, M. +Venizelos, when faced with the irrevocable, felt the need to weigh his +position, to reconsider whether the momentous step he was taking was +necessary, was right, was prudent? + +However, events soon put an end to his hesitation. The decisive +event--the hair which turned the scale--according to M. Venizelos +himself, was supplied, appropriately enough, by a barber. One day, +whilst the Leader of the Liberals wrestled with his soul, a friend called +and reported to him a talk he had just had with his hairdresser, "a +terrible Venizelist, who spoke thus: 'We here, simple folk, say that +Venizelos bears a heavy responsibility: he tells us we are going to the +dogs. Eh, well then, why doesn't he stop us?' This conversation shook +me deeply. My friend gone, I said to myself: 'Indeed, this barber speaks +wisely, and my hesitations to discharge my duty to the end must vanish, +because they may possibly spring from purely egotistical motives. Sir, I +said to myself, having laid up from many struggles and many successes +{130} a capital above the average, you don't wish to risk it and think it +better to sit quiet, choosing to enjoy the moral satisfaction of seeing +the fulfilment of your prophecies rather than make an effort to prevent +it.'" [14] It is always interesting to trace mighty events to trifling +causes; and it would have been particularly pleasant to believe that the +destinies of Greece for once literally stood "on a razor's edge." [15] +But we will do M. Venizelos the credit of believing him less childish +than he represents himself. There were weightier things "to shake" him +into a decision. + +On 20 September, when, according to plan, he was due in Crete, the train +laid there exploded. His friends had come down from the hills thirsting +for the blood of Greek and Mohammedan victims: should the massacre they +meditated take place, M. Venizelos would never leave Athens alive.[16] +The news was of a nature to compel him at last to take the plunge; and in +the small hours of 25 September, the National Leader stole out of Greece +on a ship escorted by a French torpedo-boat. His flight had been +organized by the French Secret Service like a carnival masquerade, on the +painful details of which, says Admiral Dartige, it would be better not to +dwell.[17] + +His advent in Crete had been so efficiently prepared by the British +Secret Service and naval officers--without whom there would have been +neither mutiny nor insurrection--that, on landing, M. Venizelos had +nothing to do but instal himself in the best hotel at Canea and proclaim +himself with his confederate Admiral Coundouriotis the Provisional +Government.[18] + +Under the fostering care of the Allied men-of-war the movement spread to +Samos, Mytilene, Chios, Lemnos, and Thasos, where the constitutional +operations witnessed in Crete were duly repeated. But all the other +islands and the mainland--that is, the whole of the Hellenic Kingdom, +with the exception of the new territories--adhered {131} steadfastly to +the person and the policy of their King. As for the armed forces of the +Crown, Admiral Coundouriotis had hoped by his prestige, deservedly high +since the Balkan wars, to bring away with him the whole or a large part +of the Fleet: he brought away only two torpedo-boats and another small +unit, the desertion of which was effected by a trick, "for which," says +the French Admiral, "France would have cause to blush." [19] + +In itself the Venizelist movement, as a disruptive force, was +negligible.[20] But the co-operation of the French Republic and the +British Empire invested it with an alarming significance. + +M. Calogeropoulos and his colleagues who watched this rising tempest +anxiously did everything they could to conjure it. Although to their +offer no reply was given, on hearing informally that the Entente Powers +would not accept the proffered alliance unless Greece declared war on +Bulgaria at once, they signified their willingness so to do, if, content +with that, the Entente would accord Greece adequate military and +financial assistance during the struggle and support her territorial +claims at the conclusion of peace; if, in addition, M. Briand deemed the +Cabinet question of immediate importance, they were prepared to solve it +definitely for the sake of restoring complete harmony between Greece and +the Entente Powers.[21] + +The authors of this message were given to understand that the reply would +be handed to King Constantine himself, the Entente Governments declining +to recognize the actual Cabinet; that it would be in the form of an +ultimatum, demanding that Greece should declare war on Bulgaria within +forty-eight hours unconditionally, after which they promised to supply +her with money and munitions during the struggle and at the conclusion of +peace to take into account her territorial claims as far as {132} +circumstances would permit; meanwhile, they demanded the formation of a +new Ministry, and, failing compliance, they threatened "most energetic +measures." M. Briand kindly added that he delayed the presentation of +this ultimatum in order to give His Majesty the advantage of making a +spontaneous gesture without the appearance of compulsion.[22] + +Whereupon (3 Oct.) M. Venizelos at Canea was sounded whether, if the +Calogeropoulos Cabinet made place for one ready to declare war on +Bulgaria, he would insist on presiding over such a Cabinet or would be +satisfied with being represented in it by some of his partisans. + +These overtures may be regarded as a last attempt on the part of Athens +to take the Cretan at his word. For M. Venizelos had never tired of +professing his willingness to support any Government which would adopt +his policy of prompt action: it was not personal power he hungered after, +but national prosperity. Even at the moment of going to head a +rebellion, he had not ceased to proclaim his patriotic unselfishness.[23] +We have seen to what extent hitherto his actions had accorded with his +professions: how adroitly he had maintained abroad the reputation, +without incurring the sacrifices, of magnanimity. Once more he gave +proof of the same adroitness: + +"True to his previous declarations, M. Venizelos replied that he was +ready to give his support and that of his party to a Government which +would declare war on Bulgaria, and that he asked neither to preside over +such a Government nor to be represented in it by his partisans. As a +patriot and a statesman, seeking only his country's welfare," etc., etc., +etc. But--"the principal followers of M. Venizelos do not believe that +this new step taken by the authorities at Athens indicates a change in +the right direction in the councils of the Palace. They maintain that +the idea behind this _demarche_ is simply to gain time. I have pressed +M. Venizelos on this, and, although he did not wish to appear to be as +emphatic as his followers, he had to admit to me that he had no illusions +and that he remained sceptical. If King Constantine is really {133} +sincere, he can give a proof which will allay all doubts. Let him order +a mobilization at once . . . and call in M. Venizelos to form a new +Government." [24] + +King Constantine, instead of treating the Cretan as a rebel, still wished +to treat him as a responsible citizen, and by his moderation to give him +an opportunity of a decent return to legal order. But he could not, even +if he wished, call to power a man in open revolt: by so doing he would +alienate the loyal majority without conciliating the disloyal minority. + +After thus burning the last boat that might have carried him back to +legality, M. Venizelos took the first boat that travelled in the opposite +direction. He left Suda Bay on 5 October, amidst the cheers of the +Allied squadrons, bound for Salonica by way of Samos and Mytilene. At +Samos he received a fresh token of the approval with which the Entente +viewed his operations: the commander of a British man-of-war, acting on +instructions, officially called on him and paid his respects.[25] + +And so he reached Salonica, took up his abode at the royal residence, and +with Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis composed a Triumvirate +which, having appointed a Ministry, began to levy taxes and troops, and +to negotiate for a loan. + +The metamorphosis of a Prime Minister into an insurgent chief, though a +remarkable phenomenon, is no matter for surprise. M. Venizelos sprang +from people among whom insurrection formed the traditional method of +asserting political opinions. His father was a veteran of the Greek +Revolution of 1821, and passed most of his life plotting. His +grandfather is supposed to have been a refugee of the earlier Greek +revolt of 1770.[26] He himself had grown up amidst vivid echoes of the +Cretan Rebellion of 1866. While contact with the frock-coated world of +{134} modern Europe during the latter period of his career had clothed +him with a statesman's proper external circumstance, it had not +eradicated the primitive instincts implanted in him by heredity and +fostered by environment. Sedition was in his blood, which perhaps +explains the _flair_--the almost uncanny _flair_--he had for the business. + +Nor did he lack experience. After sharing in one Cretan insurrection +against the Sultan in 1896, he led another against Prince George in 1905. +This exploit--known as the Therisos Movement--deserves special notice, +for it bears a curious and most instructive analogy to the enterprise +with which we are now dealing. + +In 1899 M. Venizelos became a member of the first Cretan Administration +appointed by the High Commissioner, Prince George--King Constantine's +brother. The status of the island was provisional, and the fulfilment of +the national desire for union with Greece depended partly on the policy +of the Powers which had combined to act as its Protectors, partly on the +prudence of the islanders themselves and of their continental kinsmen. +Such was the situation when, in 1901, M. Venizelos suddenly conceived +the idea of turning Crete into an autonomous principality. Prince George +objected to the proposal, arguing that neither in Crete nor in Greece +would public opinion approve it. M. Venizelos sounded the Hellenic +Government and the Opposition, and was told by both that, from the +standpoint of national interest and sentiment, his scheme was absolutely +unacceptable. Nevertheless, he persevered and succeeded in forming a +party to support his views. It may be, as he affirmed, that his scheme +was a merely temporary expedient intended to pave the way to ultimate +union. But the Greeks, interpreting it as a proposal for perpetual +separation, remained bitterly hostile, and the fact that autonomy was +known to be favoured in certain foreign quarters deepened their +resentment. M. Venizelos was roundly denounced as a tool of foreign +Powers, and Prince George was accused of complicity, and threatened with +the lot of a traitor unless he dismissed him. The High Commissioner made +use of the right which the Constitution of the island gave him, and M. +Venizelos was dismissed (March, 1901). + +A truceless war against the Administration and everyone {135} connected +with it ensued. Prince George was attacked--not directly, but through +his entourage--as a born autocrat holding in scorn the rights of the +people, tyrannizing over the Press, persecuting all those who refused to +bow to his will, aiming at the subversion of free institutions. At first +this campaign met with more success abroad than at home. The Cretan +people expressed its opinion by its vote: among the sixty-four deputies +elected to the Chamber in 1903 there were only four Venizelists. + +His defeat did not daunt M. Venizelos, who, after a brief repose, resumed +operations. He hesitated at no calumny, at no outrageous invention, to +get even with his adversaries. Charges of all kinds poured in upon the +Prince. Speeches which he had never made were attributed to him, and +speeches which he did make were systematically misreported and +misinterpreted. At last, in 1904, when Prince George decided to visit +the Governments of the Protecting Powers in order to beg them to bring +about the union of Crete with Greece by stages, M. Venizelos, dropping +the scheme which had lost him his popularity, rushed in with an +uncompromising demand for immediate union, though he knew perfectly well +that such a solution was impracticable. The Cretans knew it, too. On +finding that they looked upon his change of creed with suspicion, he +resolved to seize by violence what he could not gain by his eloquence. +With some 600 armed partisans (out of a population of 300,000) he took to +the hills (March, 1905), called for the convocation of a National +Assembly to revise the Constitution, and meanwhile urged the people to +boycott the impending elections. Despite his speeches and his bravoes, +only 9,000 out of the 64,000 electors abstained from voting; and most of +them abstained for other reasons than the wish to show sympathy with the +insurgents. + +The High Commissioner wrote to the Powers at the time: "If M. Venizelos +was truly animated by the desire to defend constitutional institutions, +he would have come before the electors with his programme and, whatever +the result, he would certainly have earned more respect as a politician. +But, instead of choosing the legal road to power, he preferred to stir up +an insurrection, disguising his motives under the mask of 'The National +Idea,' but, {136} as is proved by his own declarations, really inspired +by personal animus and party interest. It mattered little to him how +disastrous an effect this upheaval might have on the national cause by +plunging the country into civil war or into fresh anarchy. Can anyone +recognize in this way of acting the conduct of a genuine and serious +patriot?" + +M. Venizelos repelled these imputations, protesting that his movement was +no way directed against the Prince. Yet it resulted in the departure of +the Prince: the Powers who went to Crete to restore order entered into +relations with the rebels; the manner in which these intimacies were +carried on and the decisions to which they led made the Prince's position +untenable, and he gave up his Commissionership in 1906. Likewise M. +Venizelos affirmed that he had not stirred up an insurrection, but only +headed a spontaneous outbreak of popular discontent. Yet even after his +triumph he failed, in the elections of 1907, to obtain a majority.[27] + +The Therisos performance in every point--plot and staging, methods and +motives--was a rehearsal for the Salonica performance. Would the +denouement be the same? This question taxed M. Venizelos's dialectical +dexterity very severely. + +At the outset he repudiated as a monstrous and malicious calumny the +common view that his programme was to march on Athens and to dethrone the +King. His movement was directed against the Bulgars, not against the +King or the Dynasty: "We are neither anti-royalist nor anti-dynastic," he +declared, "we are simply patriots." Only, after the liberation of Greece +from the foreign invaders, her democratic freedom should be assured by a +thorough elucidation of the duties and rights of the Crown--a revision of +the Constitution to be effected through a National Assembly.[28] + +So spoke M. Venizelos at the outset, partly because the {137} Allies, who +did not want to have civil war in the rear of their armies, bade him to +speak so,[29] and partly because he wished to give his cause currency by +stamping upon it the legend of loyalty. He realized that for the present +any suspicion that he wished to embark on a campaign against King +Constantine would be fatal, and by declaring war only against the Bulgars +he hoped to entice patriotic citizens anxious to help their country +without hurting their sovereign. But when time proved the futility of +these tactics, the same M. Venizelos avowed that his programme was, first +to consolidate his position in Macedonia by breaking down resistance +wherever it might be encountered, and then, "when we had gathered our +forces, we meant to follow up our work, if need be by arms, on the +remainder of Greek territory." If he had not given an anti-dynastic +character to his enterprise, that, he naively explained, was "because the +Entente had been good enough to promise me their indispensable aid under +the express stipulation that the movement should _not_ be anti-dynastic." +However, the error was not irreparable: "After victory, grave internal +questions will have to be solved," he said. "King Constantine, who has +stepped down from the throne of a constitutional king to become a mere +party chief, must accept the consequences of the defeat of his policy, +just as every other defeated party chief." [30] + +In other words, the Salonica sedition, though not solely revolutionary, +involved a revolution within certain limits. M. Venizelos was far too +astute to countenance the republican chimeras cherished by some of his +followers. Republicanism, he knew well, found no favour in Greece and +could expect no support from England. Therefore, with the monarchical +principle he had no quarrel: his hostility was directed wholly against +the person of the reigning monarch. A prince pliant to his hand would +suit M. Venizelos. If he got the best of it, his avowed intention was to +treat King Constantine precisely as he had treated King Constantine's +brother in days gone by. + +We now understand Prince George's earnestness in urging his brother, as +long ago as May, 1915, to run before {138} the gale: he spoke from bitter +experience of the Protecting Powers and their protege. + +It is seldom that history repeats itself so accurately; and it is more +seldom still that the historian has the means of tracing so surely a +rebel's progress. In most cases it is hard to decide whether the hero +was guided by events which he could not have foreseen, or whether he had +from the first a clear and definite goal in view. In the case of M. +Venizelos this difficulty does not exist. Each of his actions, as +illuminated by his past, was a step to an end; and he has himself defined +that end. + + + +[1] _The Times_, 18 Sept., 1916. + +[2] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16 +Sept., 1916. + +[3] _The Times, loc. cit._ + +[4] Exchange Tel., Athens, 17 Sept., 1916. Cp. Romanos, Paris, 5/18 Sept. + +[5] See leading articles in _The Times_, 19 Sept., and the _Morning +Post_, 20 Sept., 1916. + +[6] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 6/19 Sept., 1916. + +[7] Panas, Petrograd, 14/27 Sept., 1916. + +[8] Romanos, Paris, 10/23 Sept. Cp. Reuter statement, London, 26 Sept., +1916. This view is crystallized in a personal dispatch from the Greek +Minister at Paris to the Director of Political Affairs, at Athens: +"_L'appel au pouvoir par S.M. le Roi de M. Venizelos parait au +Gouvernement francais le seul moyen de dissiper la mefiance que +l'attitude des conseillers de S.M. le Roi ont fait naitre dans l'esprit +des cercles dirigeants a Paris et a Londres. . . . L'opinion publique en +France n' approuveraii une alliance avec la Grece et les avantages qui en +decouleraient pour nous, que si l'homme politique qui incarne l'idee de +la solidarite des interets francais et grecs etait appele au +pouvoir._"--Romanos to Politis, Paris, 29 Sept./12 Oct., 1916. + +[9] Du Fournet, p. 116. Small wonder that the honest sailor's gorge rose +at such proceedings: "Could I associate myself with manoeuvres of this +sort?" he asks in disgust. "When German arms and bombs were seized in +the bag from Berlin to Christiania, when similar things were discovered +at Bucharest, and were detected in the United States under Bernstorf's +protection, the Allies manifested their indignation. They were a hundred +times right; but what was odious in America, was it not odious in Greece?" + +[10] The British Intelligence Service demonstrated its sense of humour +and shame by furnishing its secret agents with a formal certificate of +their identity to be presented at the central office of the Greek Police: +one such patent of British protection was issued to an ex-spy of Sultan +Abdul Hamid who had also spent six months in German pay. Besides the +certificate, was issued a brassard, which the rogue might wear to protect +him from arrest when breaking the Greek Law on British account. +Incredible, yet true. See J. C. Lawson's _Tales of Aegean Intrigue_, p. +233. + +[11] Lawson, pp. 143-66. + +[12] Lawson, pp. 168-78. + +[13] Du Fournet, pp. 130-1. + +[14] Orations, p. 190. + +[15] "Now, to all of us it stands on a razor's edge: either pitiful ruin +for the Achaians or life." Homer, _Iliad_, X, 173. + +[16] Lawson, pp. 180-9. + +[17] Du Fournet, p. 131. + +[18] Lawson, pp. 198-226. + +[19] Du Fournet, p. 136. + +[20] A paragraph of the Debierre Report, adopted by the French Senate on +21 Oct., 1916, may be quoted in this connexion: "_La revolution +Salonicienne vue de pres, n' est rien. Elle est sans racine, sans +lendemain probable. Venizelos est tres amoindri. La Grece, dont les +officiers et les soldats ne veulent pas se battre, est avec +Constantin._"--Mermeix, _Le Commandement Unique_, Part II, p. 60. + +[21] Romanos, Paris, 14/27, 15/28 Sept.; Carapanos to Greek Legation, +Paris, 15/28 Sept., 1916. + +[22] Romanos, Paris, 16/29, 17/30 Sept.; Gennadius, London, 17/30 Sept., +1916. + +[23] See "Message from M. Venizelos," in _The Times_, 27 Sept., 1916. + +[24] The _Daily Telegraph_, 5 Oct., 1916. + +[25] The _Daily Telegraph_, 7 Oct., 1916. + +[26] The authentic history of the Venizelos family begins with our hero's +father; his grandfather is a probable hypothesis: the remoter ancestors +with whom, since his rise to fame, he has been endowed by enthusiastic +admirers in Western Europe, are purely romantic. In Greece, where nearly +everyone's origin is involved in obscurity, matters of this sort possess +little interest, and M. Venizelos's Greek biographers dwell only on his +ascent. + +[27] For one side of this affair see _Memorandum de S.A.R. Le Prince +Georges de Grece, Haut Commissaire en Crete, aux Quatre Grandes +Puissances Protectrices de la Crete_, 1905. The other side has been +expounded in many publications: among them, _E. Venizelos: His Life, His +Work_. By Costa Kairophyla, pp. 37-65; _Eleutherios Venizelos_. By K. +K. Kosmides, pp. 14-16. + +[28] See _The Times_, 27 Sept.; _The Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct. (O.S.), +1916. + +[29] Du Fournet, p. 176. + +[30] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + + + + +{139} + +CHAPTER XIII + +M. Venizelos had unfurled the standard of rebellion in the true spirit +of his temperament and traditions. To him civil war had nothing +repulsive about it: it was a normal procedure--a ladder to power. +Naturally, he persuaded others, and perhaps himself, that he acted +purely with the patriotic intention of devoting to the public benefit +the power which, for that purpose only, it became his duty to usurp. +Moved by the ambition to aggrandize Greece, he felt at liberty to use +whatever means might conduce to so desirable an end. The sole question +that troubled him was, whether this old ladder would serve him as +faithfully as in the past. And once again the answer depended on the +attitude of the "Protecting Powers." + +Those Powers had hitherto blundered in all their Balkan dealings with +depressing uniformity. First came the mistake about Bulgaria. The +hate of the Greeks for the Bulgars was a psychological force which, +properly estimated and utilized, could without any difficulty have been +made to do our work for us. But that force was never properly +estimated by our diplomacy. The Entente Governments, instead of +enlisting it on their side, ranged it against them; thereby sacrificing +Servia and estranging Greece. To that initial error was added a +second. Until the truth could no longer be ignored, the Allies +persisted in the egregrious [Transcriber's note: egregious?] fallacy +that the popularity of King Constantine was as nothing compared with +the popularity of M. Venizelos--to our detriment. "Two years before," +observes Admiral Dartige du Fournet, "all the Greeks were the friends +of France; in October, 1916, two-thirds of them were her enemies." +That was the fact; and, according to the same witness--who described +himself, not without reason, as "a Venizelist by profession"--the cause +was this: "The mass of the people of continental {140} Greece was +hostile to the Chief of the Liberals. When that mass saw that M. +Venizelos started a sedition and that we supported him, it became +plainly hostile to us." [1] + +The Admiral mentions also German pressure, but he rightly regards it as +a subsidiary cause. The Germans did little more than "blow on the fire +kindled by our own clumsiness and violences." Baron Schenck, the +director of the German propaganda at Athens, watched our coercion of +King Constantine with that apparent indignation and secret joy which +the faults of an enemy inspire, and when expelled by the Allies, said +that he did not mind going: the Allies could be trusted to carry on his +mission. They did. + +What their plan was will appear from their actions. We cannot +penetrate into the minds of men, and we cannot always believe their +words; but their actions are open to observation and speak more truly +than their lips. + +As soon as he settled at Salonica, M. Venizelos applied to the Entente +Powers for official recognition of his Provisional Government. They +refused him this recognition: but instructed their Consuls to treat +with the Provisional Government "on a _de facto_ footing";[2] and, +while pouring cold water upon him with one hand, with the other they +gave him money. This mode of action was the result of a compromise, +achieved at the Boulogne Conference, between France and her partners. +A feeble and inconsequent way of doing things, no doubt. But to be +consequent and powerful, a partnership must be bottomed on some common +interest or sentiment; and such in the Greek question, as already +explained, did not exist. + +At Athens the action of the Allies was less open to the criticism of +tameness. + +After a life of three weeks passed in fruitless efforts to enter into +relations with the Entente Powers, even by proposing to discard the +Ministers obnoxious to them, the Calogeropoulos Cabinet resigned (4 +Oct.), and King Constantine, having exhausted his stock of politicians, +sought a candidate for the Premiership in circles which, remote from +party intrigue, might have been thought immune from suspicion. +Professor Lambros, who accepted the {141} mandate (8 Oct.), was known +as a grave savant, generally esteemed for his kindly nature as much as +for his intellectual eminence and administrative capacity. But +Professor Lambros laboured under the universal disability of not being +a Venizelist. Therefore, he was "believed to be Germanophile," and it +was "questionable whether his Cabinet will be recognized by the Entente +Powers." [3] However, in less than a week, he "established contact" +with their representatives. It was "contact" in a sense of the term +more familiar to soldiers than to statesmen. + +On 10 October Admiral Dartige de Fournet resumed his activities by +launching on the Hellenic Government an Ultimatum. Greece was +summoned, within twenty-four hours, to disarm her big ships, to hand +over to him all her light ships intact, and to disarm all her coast +batteries, except three which were to be occupied by the Allies. In +addition, the port of the Piraeus, the railways, and the police were to +be placed under Allied control. + +The demand for her Fleet, Greece was told, arose from uneasiness about +the safety of the Allied armada--a pretext that exposed itself: the +Greek Fleet consisted of only five battleships dating from 1891-2, +except one whose date was 1908; two cruisers, dating from 1911 and +1914; and a microscopic light flotilla. "To see there a serious +danger, it would be puerile," says Admiral Dartige himself; and far +from feeling elated at the success of the operation, he tells us that +he "suffered at being constrained by events to use force against a +neutral and weak nation." But he had to do it: though not a matter to +be proud of, it was a precaution not altogether unjustifiable. He +could, however, neither justify nor qualify the other measures. They +involved, he says, a high-handed encroachment on the internal affairs +of the country--an abuse of power pure and simple: "We admitted +officially the right of Greece to neutrality, and yet we laid hands +upon part of her national life, even upon the secrets of the private +life of every Greek. It was the execution of the plan which the +admirals assembled at Malta had repelled in March, 1916. Well might +the Germanophiles point out that Germany did not act thus in Denmark, +in Sweden, in Holland; that a victor would not have imposed {142} +harder terms of armistice." These measures were entirely the work of +the French Government: the French Admiral himself disapproved of them +as much as did the Ministers of England and Russia.[4] + +The Hellenic Government could not be deceived by pretexts which their +very authors despised. But neither could it argue with persons +accustomed to + + "Decide all controversies by + Infallible artillery, + And prove their doctrine orthodox + By apostolic blows and knocks." + +It could only protest and submit. + +The Hellenic people proved less discreet. What could be the motive of +such measures? they asked. Were they intended to prevent or to provoke +troubles? The answer lay under their very eyes. From the moment when +M. Venizelos left Athens, the Allies did everything they could to +assist his partisans in following the Leader to Salonica. Their +warships patrolled the coast picking up rebels, and giving them a free +passage: even entertaining the more important among them as the +personal guests of the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship. But now +they took the movement openly under their direction. With an excess of +zeal which the British Minister deplored and the French Admiral himself +condemned, the French Secret Service at Athens organized convoys of +insurgents which defiled through the streets of the capital escorted by +French marines under French officers in uniform.[5] + +The resentment of the Greeks was intense; but the consciousness of +impotence served as a curb on their emotions. It is true that one day, +as Allied aeroplanes flew over Athens, they were greeted with derisive +shouts: "Not here; to Berlin!" another day, as a band of rebels were +convoyed through the principal streets by the French, the crowds gave +vent to lively protests; and every day the newspapers told the +champions of Liberty and Justice what they thought of them so frankly +that the French Chief of the Police Control had to warn their editors +to desist on pain of suspension. But of active hostility, such as any +western capital would have manifested in similar circumstances, there +was no sign at Athens. The only impressive manifestations were +manifestations of {143} loyalty to the King, who set his subjects the +example of self-restraint. At a review of the crews of the warships +taken by the French, he thanked them for their fidelity and expressed +the hope that they would soon be able to return to their vessels. +After this quiet ceremony, bodies of citizens paraded the streets +carrying portraits of their sovereign.[6] + +Had there been no popular demonstrations at all, one can fancy M. +Venizelos and the Allies pointing to that fact as proof of their +contention that the great majority of the people remained Venizelist. +As it was, they derived what profit they could from the opposite fact. +The various incidents were attributed by the Anglo-French and +Venizelist journals to German intrigue. The consolation which the King +administered to his sailors--men who had so brilliantly disappointed +the rebels' expectations by not deserting--was twisted into a defiance +of the Entente. The bodies of peaceful demonstrators were exaggerated +into crowds of rioters. And so, "in the interests of public order," +Admiral Dartige proceeded to land reinforcements for the police: 1,200 +bluejackets. Some occupied the town hall at the Piraeus and the +railway stations; some went to the forts on the heights; others were +posted about the harbour, or were told off to patrol the streets (16 +Oct.), while a detachment was quartered at Athens itself, in the +Zappeion--a large exhibition building within a few hundred yards of the +Royal Palace.[7] + +Under such circumstances the diplomatic intercourse between the Entente +and the new Greek Government went on. M. Lambros declared that he +intended to continue his predecessor's policy of friendly relations +with all the belligerents and of benevolent neutrality towards the +Allies, dwelling on the fact that nearly everyone of his predecessors +had plainly stated Greece's willingness to co-operate with the Entente +on terms not contrary to her own interests, and recalling that the +Calogeropoulos Ministry had set forth the conditions of co-operation, +but the Entente Governments had given no reply. So the Premier spoke +to the Entente representatives and asked that the coercive measures +might be brought to an end, {144} expressing the fear lest, should +these measures go beyond a certain limit, their acceptance by Greece +might become very difficult, and emphasizing the sorrow which the Greek +people felt at seeing its independence fettered.[8] + +England found this declaration satisfactory; but before answering it +definitely, she must take counsel with her allies.[9] France, by the +mouth of M. Briand, pronounced the allusion to friendly relations with +all the belligerents unfortunate: she was unable to understand how +Greece could maintain friendly relations with Germany and even with +Bulgaria after the occupation of Eastern Macedonia.[10] And so, having +taken counsel together, the Allies set forth their views in a tardy +reply to King Constantine's last offer. The gist of it was contained +in this phrase: "The Greek Government has several times since the +beginning of the War offered to come in on our side; but its offers, +and particularly the last one, were accompanied by conditions which +rendered them unacceptable." The Entente Powers added that they did +not want Greece, unless she declared, on her own initiative, war +against Bulgaria. It was the only way to gain their confidence.[11] + +In other words, Greece should take the field without any agreement, so +that she should have no claims either to adequate support during the +war or to compensations at the conclusion of peace: nay, it was even +hoped in Paris and London that Bulgaria might yet be seduced from the +Central Powers, and in that case not only would Greece gain nothing in +Thrace, but might very likely lose a portion of Macedonia.[12] It was +the old story--to which King Constantine could never listen. He would +suffer anything rather than plunge his country into war without even an +assurance of its territorial integrity. When at this juncture a +well-intentioned adviser warned him that his policy might cost him his +throne, he answered promptly: "I do not care about my throne. I only +think of Greece." [13] + +{145} + +At the same time, there was little he would not do to remove those +fears and suspicions which were perpetually pleaded as reasons for +coercion. The surrender of the Fleet had allayed once for all the +Allies' uneasiness about their forces at sea. There remained their +uneasiness about their forces on land. In spite of his repeated +declarations that under no circumstances would Greece take up a hostile +attitude, the King was credited with a treacherous design--to mass in +Thessaly 80,000 men, lay up munitions and provisions, wait until the +Allied Army should march on Monastir, and then attack it from +behind.[14] After reading M. Venizelos's own avowal of his intention +to follow up the conversion of Macedonia with an attack on the rest of +Greece, particularly Thessaly,[15] one hardly needs to be told at whom +King Constantine's precautions were aimed. + +Yet, wishing to prove his good faith in a practical manner, the King +called the British Minister and offered to reduce his army to less than +half by disbanding about 35,000 men and to withdraw certain units from +Thessaly. The British Minister, delighted by this spontaneous offer, +thanked the King, expressing the hope that his action would be greatly +appreciated, that all mistrust would vanish, and that the Powers would +moderate their coercions. With a remark from the King, that the one +thing he would not tolerate was a descent of rebels on Thessaly and the +rest of Old Greece, and that he would attack them if they appeared, Sir +Francis Elliot fully concurred. + +Instead of the return which the King expected to this spontaneous proof +of his sincerity, he received (20 October) an intimation that the +Powers not only demanded what he had already granted, but in addition +things which he could not possibly grant--the internment of the small +remnant of his army in the Peloponnesus and a surrender of arms and war +material equivalent to a complete disarmament. These measures, while +exceeding all requirements for the security of the Allies, put the +security of Greece in danger by leaving her a prey to revolutionary +agitation. The King, therefore, begged the Powers not {146} to insist +on concessions which neither could he make nor would his people let him +make.[16] + +Nothing, indeed, was better calculated to excite to the highest degree +the passions fermenting against the Allies than an insistence on total +disarmament at a moment when M. Venizelos at Salonica and his partisans +at Athens were arming. Fortunately a mediator appeared in the person +of M. Benazet, a French Deputy and Reporter of the War Budget, who was +passing through Athens on his way to Salonica to inspect the sanitary +condition of the Army. His connexions had brought him into touch with +the most influential leaders of both Greek parties; and with the +sanction of M. Briand, procured through M. Guillemin, who, himself no +longer received at Court, saw an advantage in reaching it by proxy, he +undertook to negotiate an amicable arrangement between King Constantine +and the Entente. + +M. Benazet's idea was to obtain from the King not only tangible pledges +which would eliminate all possibility of danger from the Allies' path, +but also positive reinforcements for them in arms and men; and as a +price he was prepared to guarantee to Old Greece her neutrality, her +liberty in the management of her internal affairs, and her immunity +from aggression on the part of M. Venizelos. Young, eloquent, and +refined, the spokesman brought into an environment corrupted by +diplomatic chicanery a breath of candour. His manner inspired and +evoked confidence. The King readily agreed, besides the reduction +which he had already offered, to transfer the remainder of his army to +the Peloponnesus, to hand over to the Allies a considerable stock of +guns, rifles, and other war material, and to allow all men who were +released from their military obligations, and all officers who first +resigned their commissions, to volunteer for service in Macedonia. M. +Benazet, on his part, made himself guarantor for the French Government +as to the pledges which the King required in exchange.[17] + +This agreement met, at least in appearance, with the approval of M. +Briand, who sent a telegram of congratulations {127} to M. Benazet,[18] +and with that of M. Guillemin, who was at last received by the King. +Both the French Premier and his representative at Athens expressed +themselves enchanted with the new turn of affairs, and even the +fire-breathing Head of the French Secret Service declared that the +result of the negotiation surpassed all hopes. As to Admiral Dartige, +he could not but rejoice at an arrangement so consonant with his own +ideas.[19] Thus all outstanding differences seemed happily settled, +and the removal of mutual misunderstandings was celebrated by inspired +pens in Paris and London.[20] + +The only discordant note was struck by the Venizelist Press, which made +no attempt to conceal its disappointment. And suddenly, just as the +withdrawal of the royal troops from the north was about to begin, the +troops of the Provisional Government attacked Katerini on the southern +frontier of Macedonia. M. Venizelos had dropped the pose that his +movement was directed solely against the Bulgars: he marched on Old +Greece. Did he by this move try to force the hand of the Allies, as +formerly by bringing them to Salonica he had tried to force the hand of +the King? And was he encouraged in this move by those who were +secretly opposed to an accommodation with the King? Admiral Dartige +did not know. What he did know was that this _coup de force_ was +designed to compromise the arrangement with Athens; and as he could +neither play nor appear to play a double game, he immediately +telegraphed to Salonica demanding the retreat of the Venizelists. At +the same time the King informed the French and British Ministers that +he could not withdraw his troops from Thessaly until all danger was +removed, and asked them to do everything that depended on them to +remedy this state of things. Whereupon General Roques, the French +Minister of War then at Salonica, disavowed the Venizelist action, and +to prevent similar exploits in future decided to create a neutral zone +under French occupation and administration. The Athens Government was +not pleased to see part of its territory passing into French hands; +but, after some demur, bowed to the decision.[21] + +{148} + +Not so the Salonica Government. M. Venizelos keenly resented this +barrier to his impetuosity. The neutral zone, he complained, by +blocking off his access to Thessaly, forbade all extension of his +movement and prevented him from "carrying with him three-fifths of +Greece and levying important contingents such as would have made him +the absolute master of the country." [22] But the Allies were no +longer to be deluded. They had discovered that "the mass of the people +of continental Greece was hostile to the Chief of the Liberals." An +extension of his movement could only be effected by overwhelming force, +and as M. Venizelos had neither the men nor the arms required for the +enterprise, the Allies would have to provide both. In other words, +civil war in the rear of their armies would not only jeopardise their +security but entangle them in a campaign for the conquest of Greece: a +thing which they could not afford to do even to oblige M. Venizelos. +They preferred a subtler and safer, if slower, way to the success of +their common cause. + +Baulked in his design on continental Greece, M. Venizelos demanded from +Admiral Dartige the light flotilla in order to promote his cause in the +islands. But here, also, he met with a check. The Admiral had a +different use for those vessels in view. Many months back he felt the +want of patrol and torpedo-boats to cope with the growing submarine +peril, and had suggested asking Greece for the cession of her light +flotilla. The matter was postponed in the expectation that the vessels +would go over to the Allies spontaneously as a result of the Venizelist +movement, and on this expectation being disappointed they were, as we +have seen, sequestered under the pretence of security for the Allied +armada. Another excuse was needed for their appropriation; and it came +in the nick of time: two Greek steamers at that moment struck mines, +presumably sown by an enemy submarine, in the Gulf of Athens. With the +promptitude that comes of practice, Admiral Dartige announced to the +Hellenic Government his decision to employ, at a valuation, its light +flotilla in the submarine {149} warfare, and to use the Salamis arsenal +for repairs (3 November.)[23] + +M. Lambros replied that compliance with the Admiral's request involved +a breach of International Law, which forbade the sale of naval units by +a neutral State to a belligerent, as well as a breach of a Greek law +which forbade the alienation of ships possessing military value. +Besides, public opinion would never endure to see the country stripped +of its naval means of defence and exposed to possible aggression. He +was, therefore, regretfully obliged to refuse the Hellenic Government's +consent.[24] + +The Admiral could not let a refusal stand in his way: "It would be +unpardonable," he wrote in answer, "to leave these vessels unutilized +whilst German submarines, heedless of the neutrality of Greece, came +and sank her merchant ships in her waters, thus stopping maritime +traffic and seriously prejudicing the life of the country." [25] + +Having got over these little formalities, he hoisted the French flag on +the vessels and seized the arsenal (7 November). The Hellenic +Government's protest against this fresh outrage,[26] naturally, had no +effect. Only the British Minister made it clear that the act was +exclusively the work of France.[27] + +Nothing done by one group of belligerents, needless to say, escaped the +attention of the other; and the representatives of the enemy Powers, +besides fulminating against a step which, "in flagrant contravention of +the principles of neutrality came to augment the armed forces of their +adversaries," improved the occasion by reciting all the proofs of "a +benevolent neutrality without parallel," which Greece had been giving +those adversaries since the beginning of the War: the free passage of +munitions and provisions for Servia; the facilities accorded to Entente +shipping; the toleration of recruiting bureaux and wireless stations in +Greek territory; the use of isles and ports as naval bases. Then the +landing of the Allies in Macedonia {150} had inaugurated a period of +continuous violations of neutrality and the establishment of a regime +of terror towards them: their Consuls were arrested, members of their +Legations were assaulted, great numbers of their nationals were led +into captivity or driven into exile, their merchant ships were seized, +and the Ministers themselves were deprived of all means of +communicating with their Governments. Last of all came the +installation of Allied troops in Athens itself and the sequestration of +the Greek navy, now transformed into a definite cession; and, +according to trustworthy intelligence, the Entente Powers meant to +exact shortly the disarmament of the Greek army also. They ended with +a hint that the indulgence of their Governments might reach its +limit.[28] + +A more painful position for a free people and its rulers could not be +imagined. But King Constantine comforted himself with the thought that +the "pledges of friendship" exacted from him by the Allies would be +followed by corresponding pledges from them. His negotiation with M. +Benazet had received its finishing touches in the evening of 7 +November: the Entente Powers would present to the Greek Government a +Note setting forth their demands in the form of a "Summons," the terms +of which were, word for word, agreed upon between the two parties. By +this document the Allies bound themselves "to repeal the coercive +measures taken up to now and never to tolerate that armed Greek bodies +which had declared to have as their sole aim a struggle for the +vindication of national ideas should turn aside from that aim in order +to engage in acts of sedition." [29] + +This clause formed the corner-stone of the whole pact. "It is clear," +telegraphs M. Benazet to Paris, "that some sort of compensation is +admitted in principle,"--for very good reasons: "The King's sole +fear--and a very intelligible one--is lest his own arms should be +handed over to Greeks who would use them to march on Athens and +overthrow his dynasty." Moreover, without such guarantees it will be +impossible for the King and his Premier "to make disarmament acceptable +by the Royalist Party, {151} which constitutes the great majority of +the nation." He added that neither the King nor his Premier was +unaware of the hostility with which these efforts for conciliation were +viewed by certain personalities: but both were resolved to show the +greatest patience until the agreement had produced all its effects. +The negotiator himself, equally aware of the hostile forces at work, +left Athens with a heart full of misgivings.[30] + + + +[1] Du Fournet, pp. 132, 171. + +[2] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _The Times_, 17 Oct., 1916. + +[3] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 8 Oct., 1916. + +[4] Du Fournet, pp. 138-9, 141-3. + +[5] Du Fournet, pp. 133-5, 146. + +[6] _The Times_, dispatch from Athens, 16 Oct., 1916. + +[7] Du Fournet, pp. 146-8. + +[8] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16 +Oct., 1916. + +[9] Gennadius, London, 6/19 Oct., 1916. + +[10] Romanos, Paris, 7/20 Oct., 1916. + +[11] Gennadius, London, 10/23 Oct., 1916. + +[12] Romanos, Paris, 26 Aug./8 Sept., 1916; Cp. Deville, pp. 221. +foll.; Du Fournet, p. 171. + +[13] P. E. Drakoulis, in _The Times_, 30 Nov., 1920. + +[14] Du Fournet, p. 149. + +[15] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[16] Zalocostas to Greek Legations. Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, +7/20 Oct., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 149-50. + +[17] Du Fournet, pp. 152-4, and Appendix 5. + +[18] Du Fournet, p. 316. + +[19] Du Fournet, pp. 155-6. + +[20] _The Times_, 28 Oct., 1 Nov., 1916. + +[21] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 12 Oct./3 Nov.; +General Roques to Greek Premier, Athens, 2/15 Nov.; Zalocostas to Greek +Legation, Paris, 4/17 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du Fournet, pp. 169-70, 182. + +[22] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[23] Du Fournet, pp. 135-6, 165, 167, 183. + +[24] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916. + +[25] Dartige du Fournet to Lambros, on board the _Provence_, 7 Nov., +1916. + +[26] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 25 Oct./7 Nov., 1916. + +[27] Du Fournet, p. 168. + +[28] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 26 Oct./8 +Nov., 1916. + +[29] Du Fournet, p. 177. + +[30] Du Fournet, pp. 174-8. + + + + +{152} + +CHAPTER XIV + +A week had hardly elapsed since the conclusion of the agreement between +the King of Greece and the French Deputy, when (16 November) Admiral +Dartige du Fournet addressed to the Hellenic Premier a letter, claiming +18 batteries of field and 16 of mountain artillery with 1,000 shells for +each gun; 40,000 rifles with 220 cartridges for each rifle; 140 +machine-guns with ammunition; and 50 motor-vans. The claim was presented +as "compensation" for the war material abandoned to the Germano-Bulgars +in Cavalla: about guarantees not a word.[1] + +The King called the Admiral (19 November) and, with perfect courtesy, yet +with a visible change in his attitude, expressed his astonishment at so +unexpected a version of the "Summons" agreed upon. The Admiral had no +explanation to give to the King. But to us he explains everything. The +French Minister at Athens was hostile to M. Benazet's amicable +arrangement, and repudiated his pledges, notably the one concerning the +spread of sedition. "We are not made to defend kings against their +peoples," he said. The French Government likewise completely ignored the +agreement, and the French Minister of War had dictated the lines on which +the claim was drafted. Admiral Dartige's comments on this volte-face are +interesting: "Without wanting to give the Greek Government the two +guarantees which it demanded, they claimed from it the fulfilment of the +engagements of which those guarantees were the counter-part. It was a +truly draconian and unexpected pretension," he says, and to base that +pretension on the Cavalla affair was "to misconstrue in part the reality +of facts." [2] + +Why, then, was M. Benazet encouraged to negotiate? Probably there were +in France moderate elements strong enough to make it necessary to throw a +sop to them. But the extremists were the stronger party; and when it +came {153} to a decision they carried the day. However, be the motive of +the mission what it may, its repudiation meant that the old policy still +held the field. It was an essential part of that policy not to allow +Greece any attitude other than that of a belligerent. So, while the +Entente Cabinets continued disclaiming all desire to drag an unwilling +country into war and declaring that the only thing they asked for was the +observance of a benevolent neutrality, the practical exponents of their +policy on the spot continued to take steps in which Greece could +acquiesce only if she contemplated a rupture with the Central Powers. + +In the evening of the same day (19 November) Admiral Dartige, at the +instance of the Entente Ministers, ordered their German, Austrian, +Turkish, and Bulgarian colleagues to quit the country in three days.[3] +The Hellenic Government, to whom the Admiral communicated his decree, +protested against this blow at the representatives of Powers with whom +Greece, in virtue of her neutrality recognized by the Entente, was on +terms of friendship and peace; pointing out that the step was a breach +not only of the inviolability assured to diplomats by International Law, +but also of a formal promise given by the French and British Ministers to +Premier Zaimis when the Allied Fleet arrived at the Piraeus--viz. that +the missions of the Powers at war with the Entente had absolutely nothing +to fear. It asked that the decision might be revoked.[4] + +Our representatives experienced no difficulty in disposing of this +protest. The promise given was merely "an act of spontaneous +courtesy"--it had not "any character of a definite, irrevocable +engagement"--"and could not, in any case, have for effect to guarantee +the Ministers of countries at war with the Entente against the +consequences of hostile acts foreign to their diplomatic functions and +contrary to the neutrality of Greece"--acts of espionage and intrigue +which, as a matter of fact, form an integral part of a diplomat's +functions. They did not, therefore, "deem it possible to ask Admiral +Dartige du Fournet to revoke the decision taken by him in virtue of the +powers with which he was invested." [5] + +{154} + +Thus the Ministers of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria were bundled +off (22 November), protesting vigorously "against the outrages committed +on four diplomatic representatives in neutral territory," characterising +the things which took place at Athens as "beyond all comment," and +wondering "whether a firmer attitude would not have spared the country +these affronts on its sovereignty." [6] + +This unprecedented measure added still further to the irritation of the +Greeks, and the manner in which it was executed--without even a show of +the courtesies prescribed between diplomats by the tradition of +centuries--shocked the very man who acted as the executioner. Not for +the first time had Admiral Dartige been made to serve ends which he did +not understand, by means which he did not approve, in association with +persons whom he could not respect. But the worst was yet to come. + +The Greek Premier delivered his answer to the Admiral's claim on 22 +November. In that answer M. Lambros showed that the Allies had already +"compensated themselves" amply: the war material which they had +appropriated--not to mention the light flotilla--being superior both in +quantity and in quality to anything that had been abandoned to their +enemies. Then he went on to state that the surrender of any more +material would be equivalent to a departure from neutrality; and the +Central Powers, which had already protested against the light flotilla's +passing into the hands of the Entente, would so regard it. Lastly, +public opinion would never tolerate that Greece should so denude herself +of arms as to be unable to defend herself in case of need. For all these +reasons, the Hellenic Government categorically refused the Admiral's +claim.[7] + +The Admiral felt keenly the iniquity of compelling a neutral country to +give up, without conditions, the arms which constituted its safeguard at +once against invasion and against insurrection. But what could he do? +He had his orders, and it was his duty to carry them out as soon as +possible.[8] So, making use of the plenary authority {155} thrust upon +him, he retorted (24 Nov.) with an Ultimatum: ten mountain batteries +should be handed over to him by 1 December at the latest, and the +remainder by 15 December. Failing obedience to his command, suitable +steps would be taken on 1 December to enforce it. He declined to believe +that "the public opinion of a country so enlightened as Greece could +regard as intolerable the idea of handing over to Powers towards whom it +professed a benevolent neutrality a stock of arms and munitions destined +for the liberation of territory saturated with the noblest Greek blood: +their place was, not at the bottom of magazines, but at the front." [9] + +There is always a limit beyond which human intelligence cannot be +insulted with success, or human patience tried with impunity. France had +long since overstepped that limit. Across all the self-contradictory +subtleties of her statesmen, the Greeks, thanks to the self-revealing +acts of her soldiers, sailors, and agents, had discerned the real object +of her diplomacy: to force upon them M. Venizelos and to rule them +through him: she had already helped M. Venizelos to establish his sway +over New Greece, and was now attempting to extend it over Old Greece. +The creation of a "neutral zone" did not blind them: they had only too +much reason to know what neutrality meant in the vocabulary of the +Allies: they had taken the King's ships: all that remained was to take +his arms and to hand them over to their protege. Such was the true +significance of the fresh "pledges of friendship" claimed from them; and +the claim aroused unanimous indignation: we will not submit to any +further robbery, they cried. What have we gained by submission so far? +Our conciliatory attitude towards the Allies and our efforts for a +friendly settlement of the questions daily raised by them are regarded as +signs of fear and rewarded accordingly: their arrogance increases with +our compliance. No more compliance. The indignation was, naturally, +most pronounced in military circles, and the officers of the Athens +garrison took a vow to lay down their lives in defence of the King's and +country's honour. + +Before pushing matters to extremes, Admiral Dartige called on the King +(27 Nov.) and tried to intimidate him {156} by telling him that the +Allied armada had Greece at its mercy, and that by simply cutting off the +supplies of corn and coal it could break all resistance. The King agreed +that the Allies possessed all-powerful means of persuasion, but did not +seem as much impressed as was expected. He reminded the Admiral that he +had done everything possible to prove his goodwill by spontaneously +reducing his active army. He could do no more: the people and the army +were so excited over this last demand that to make them accept it was +beyond his power. The measure might be accepted, if the quantity claimed +was lessened: he would take steps in that sense with the French +Government through his brother, Prince George. It was clear that the +King's change of tone arose from the absence of the guarantees which he +had asked and hoped for: not having received those guarantees he +considered himself released from the promises he had given. The Admiral +understood the position perfectly, and in his heart did not blame the +King for rejecting the "draconian pretension" that he should disarm while +not secure that his arms would not be used against himself. But he had +his orders and could only say that he meant to carry them out: on Friday +morning, 1 December, he would impose the will of the Entente Governments. +He still thought that the King would not resist "energetic pressure." [10] + +Proportionate to their loyalty was the Athenians' animosity against the +Venizelists in their midst, who had long been plotting and arming in +conjunction with the French, and preparing for one of those _coups_ for +which Paris had set the fashion during a hundred years. Admiral Dartige +had expressed his concern for these unhappy patriots to the King at his +last interview, and on going from the Palace to the French Legation he +found there the British Minister greatly alarmed because several +important Venizelists had prayed him to obtain for them the Admiral's +protection; but no sooner had the Admiral acted on their prayer, than the +panic-stricken patriots implored him not to protect them, lest the +measures taken for their safety should cause their destruction.[11] +However, next day, the King assured the Admiral through his Marshal of +the Court, that neither the persons nor the {157} property of the +Venizelists should suffer, on condition that neither the Entente Powers' +detectives nor the detachments he was going to land indulged in arrests, +deportations, or disappearances of Greek subjects, and that the +Venizelists themselves abstained from acts calculated to provoke +reprisals.[12] + +Such was the state of things created by the Admiral's Ultimatum. What +would happen when the time-limit expired? The inhabitants of Athens +debated this question anxiously, and their anxiety was deepened by the +sight of many disquieting symptoms: day after day Allied aeroplanes and +automobiles carried out reconnaissances over the capital, paying special +attention to the Royal Palace, intensifying the irritation of civilians +and soldiers, and stiffening their resolution to resist, come what might. + +The Hellenic Government endeavoured to ward off the storm by +remonstrating with the Governments of the Entente direct. As the +Admiral's claim was presented exclusively in the name of France, it began +with Paris. The answer was that King Constantine had promised to the +French Government the war material demanded, and the French Government +had promised in exchange to relax the coercive measures: since the Greek +Government declared that it could not fulfil this promise, it must suffer +the consequences. Paris, in Admiral Dartige's words, "wanted to reap the +fruit of the Benazet negotiation without paying the price agreed to." +[13] Whatever London may have thought of this manoeuvre, it said that +the British Government was in full knowledge of the French Admiral's +steps and supported them. Petrograd was equally cognizant of the affair, +and, as it was a question of military measures with which Russia could +not interfere, advised Greece to comply, assuring her that "what was done +was for her good." [14] + +As a last resource, Greece appealed to neutral countries, describing the +condition in which she had long found herself, because she was not strong +enough to impose respect for her neutrality, and protesting against this +latest demand as most injurious to her honour and {158} subversive of all +her rights.[15] The solicitation remained fruitless. The great American +Republic was too intimately connected with France and England to +intervene on behalf of Greece. The small states knew too well from their +own experience how frail are the foundations upon which rest the honour +and the rights of weak neutrals in a world war. + +Nevertheless, firm in the knowledge that he had the vast majority of the +nation behind him, M. Lambros, on 30 November, by a final letter, +declared to the French Admiral that his claim was utterly unacceptable. +"I do not wish to believe," he concluded, "that, after examining in a +spirit of goodwill and equity the reasons which render it impossible for +the Greek people and its Government to give you satisfaction, you will +proceed to measures which would be incompatible with the traditional +friendship between France and Greece, and which the people would justly +regard as hostile acts." [16] + +In face of Greece's unequivocal determination not to yield, the Admiral +would have been well advised to insist with his Government on an amicable +accommodation. He had not the means of carrying out his threats. It is +true, his ships dominated the sea and their guns the capital; but, since +the Greeks were determined to stand another blockade and to risk the +bombardment of their capital rather than surrender their arms, how could +he take them without an army? The problem had not escaped the worthy +sailor. So grave a claim, he tells us, could not be enforced without +war; and the Entente Powers were not thinking of going to war with +Greece. Therefore, he had hit on the expedient of giving to his action +the name and, so far as the nature of the thing permitted, the character +of a "pacific demonstration." Not one shot would be fired except in +self-defence: the troops would not seek to seize the material by +violence: they would simply occupy certain points of vantage until they +received satisfaction. He admits that his confidence in the success of +these tactics, since his last interview with the King, had suffered some +diminution. But he still {159} nourished a hope--based on the fact "that +the Athens Government had always hitherto ended by bowing to our will." +[17] He overlooked the inflamed minds of the people. + +Before break of day, on 1 December, a body of marines some 3,000 weak +landed at the Piraeus with machine-guns and marched on Athens in three +columns, driving back the Greek patrols, which retired at their approach, +and occupied some of the strategic positions aimed at without +encountering any resistance. So far the pacific demonstration lived up +to its name. Both sides conformed to their respective orders, which were +to avoid all provocation, and on no account to fire first. But for all +that the situation teemed with the elements of an explosion. Admiral +Dartige, on landing, had noted the faces of the people: sullen and +defiant, they faithfully reflected the anger which seethed in their +hearts. And, about 11 o'clock, at one point the smouldering embers burst +into flame. How, it is not known: as usually happens in such cases, each +side accused the other of beginning. Once begun, the fight spread along +the whole line to the French headquarters in the Zappeion. + +At the sound of shots, King Constantine caused a telephone message to be +sent through the French Legation to the French flagship, asking for +Admiral Dartige, to beg him to stop the bloodshed. The officer at the +other end of the wire hesitated to disclose the Admiral's whereabouts, +fearing a trap; but at last he replied that his Chief had gone to the +Zappeion, where indeed he was found shut up. A parley between that +building and the Palace led to an armistice, during which negotiations +for a peace were initiated by the Entente Ministers. In the middle of +these, fighting broke out afresh; according to the Royalists, through the +action of the Venizelists who, desirous to profit by the foreign invasion +in order to promote a domestic revolution, opened rifle fire from the +windows, balconies, and roofs of certain houses upon the royal troops +patrolling the streets: a statement more than probable, seeing that arms +had long been stored in Venizelist houses with a view to such an +enterprise. At the same time, Admiral Dartige, who seems to have +completely lost his head, {160} considering the armistice at an end, +ordered the warships to start a bombardment. + +While shells fell upon the outlying quarters of the town, and even into +the courtyard of the Royal Palace itself, forcing the Queen to put her +children in the cellar, the Entente Ministers arrived to conclude the +treaty: + +"Are these your arguments, gentlemen?" asked the King, as he received +them. Amid the general consternation, he alone maintained his calmness. + +The conference went on to the accompaniment of whistling and bursting +shells, and at 7 o'clock ended in an agreement, whereby Admiral Dartige +consented to stop hostilities and accept the King's offer of six mountain +batteries, in lieu of the ten he had demanded; the Entente Ministers +undertaking to recommend to their Governments the abandonment of his +other demands. + +There ensued an exchange of prisoners, and the retreat of the Allies to +their ships during the night, followed next day by the detachment +quartered at the Zappeion, and all the controllers of police, posts, +telegraphs, telephones, and railways. Many of the ruffians in the pay of +the Franco-British Secret Services anticipated this evacuation by +slipping out of the capital which they had terrorized for nearly a year. + +And so the pacific demonstration was over, having cost the Greeks 4 +officers and 26 men killed, and 4 officers and 51 men wounded. The +Allied casualties were 60 killed, including 6 officers, and 167 wounded. + +For the rest, no epithet was less applicable to the affair than that of +"Athenian Vespers," with which the Parisian press christened it. Admiral +Dartige protests indignantly against the grotesque exaggerations of his +imaginative compatriots. Apart from the tragic features natural to a +pacific demonstration, he declares that the whole drama passed off as +pleasantly as a drama could. Not a single Allied subject was +ill-treated. Not one shot was fired on the Legations of the Entente +Powers, whose Ministers and nationals, in the midst of it all, incurred +only such danger as came from their own shells--shells showered upon an +open town. Even the French bluejackets, who had long been a thorn in the +very heart of Athens, were conducted back to their proper place under a +Greek escort, ingloriously {161} but safely. A like spirit, to a still +higher degree, marked the treatment in Greek hospitals of the Allies' +wounded, whose rapid recovery, says the Admiral, testified to the care +which they received. "We assisted in a civil war: the Royalists struck +in our marines the protectors of their political enemies." [18] + +It was upon those enemies that Royalist wrath satiated itself. On 2 +December, veritable battles took place in many parts of Athens; suspect +houses, hotels, offices, and shops being assailed and defended with +murderous fury. The house of M. Venizelos, as was fitting, formed the +centre of the conflict. Twenty Cretan stalwarts had barricaded +themselves in it and held out until machine-guns persuaded them to +surrender. Within was discovered a small arsenal of rifles, revolvers, +hand-grenades, dynamite cartridges, fuses: among them a bundle of weapons +still wrapped in the French canvas in which it had arrived. Tell-tale +articles of a similar nature were discovered on the premises of other +conspirators, who were led off to prison, pursued by crowds hooting, +cursing, spitting at them, so that their escorts had the greatest +difficulty in saving them from being lynched. Although not comparable to +parallel scenes witnessed by many a Western city under analogous +circumstances, the event was an exhibition of human savagery sufficiently +ugly in itself: it did not require the legends of massacre and torture +with which it was embellished by pious journalists anxious to excite in +the Allied publics sympathy for persons whom the Allies' own advance had +instigated to violence and their precipitate retreat had exposed to a not +unmerited vengeance.[19] + + + +[1] Du Fournet, pp. 188-9. + +[2] Du Fournet, pp. 151, 179-80, 182-3, 190-1. + +[3] Du Fournet, pp. 195-7. + +[4] Zalocostas to the Entente Legations, Athens, 7/20 Nov, 1916. + +[5] Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdani, Demidoff, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916. + +[6] Mirbach, Szilassy, Passaroff, Ghalib Kemaly, Athens, 8/21 Nov., 1916. + +[7] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 9/22 Nov., 1916. Cp. Du +Fournet, pp. 192-4. + +[8] Du Fournet, p. 187. + +[9] Du Fournet, pp. 197-9. + +[10] Du Fournet, pp. 201-4. + +[11] Du Fournet, pp. 202-3. + +[12] Du Fournet, pp. 208-9. + +[13] Du Fournet, p. 205. + +[14] Romanos, Paris, 15/28, 16/29 Nov.; Gennadius, London, 16/29 Nov.; +Panas, Petrograd, 17/30 Nov., 1916. + +[15] Zalocostas to Ministers of the United States, etc., Athens, 14/27 +Nov. + +[16] Lambros to Dartige du Fournet, Athens, 17/30 Nov., 1916. + +[17] Du Fournet, p. 204. + +[18] Du Fournet, pp. 210-51; Paxton Hibben, pp. 440-80; _Resume du +Rapport Official sur les Evenements du 18 novembre/1 decembre_, 1916. + +[19] According to the Hellenic Government, the losses of the Royalists in +this civil strife amounted to 13 soldiers killed and 24 wounded, 6 +civilians killed and 6 wounded, besides 5 killed (including 3 women) and +6 wounded (including 4 women) by the insurgents accidentally; the +Venizelist losses were limited to 3 killed and 2 wounded.--Zalocostas to +Greek Legations abroad, Athens, 27 Nov./10 Dec. 1916. + + + + +{162} + +CHAPTER XV + +By 3 December calm had descended on Athens. But echoes of the storm +continued reverberating in Paris and London. In Paris it was asserted, +and in London repeated, that the French Admiral had fallen into a +cunningly laid trap: King Constantine had promised to hand over his war +material; but when the Allies landed to receive it, he caused them to +be treacherously attacked and murdered.[1] On the strength of this +assertion, the Entente newspapers demanded punishment swift and +drastic: a prince who broke faith deserved no pity. His offer of six +batteries was "an atonement" both cynical and inadequate for the +"ambush" by which French and English blood had been spilt. Similarly +the internecine strife of 2 December and the subsequent proceedings +against the Venizelists were depicted as a wanton hunt of harmless and +law-abiding citizens. Day by day the stream of calumny, assiduously +fed from the fountain-head at Salonica, grew in volume and virulence; +and King Constantine was branded with every opprobrious epithet of +liar, traitor, and assassin. + +These were weapons against which the King of Greece and his Government +had nothing to oppose. They tried to explain the true nature of the +abortive Benazet negotiation, showing that, if there was any breach of +faith, it was not on their part; they denounced the falsehoods and the +exaggerations relating to the suppression of the seditious outbreak; +they asked that a mixed Commission should be appointed to conduct an +impartial inquiry on the spot while the events were still fresh and +evidence abundant. The French and British Press Censors took care that +not a whisper of their defence should reach the French and British +publics.[2] Frenchmen and Englishmen {163} might hear of M. +Venizelos's deeds through his friends. They were allowed to hear of +the King's only through his enemies. It was clear that the policy +which had prompted the disastrous enterprise of 1 December had not yet +worked itself out to its full issue. + +Admiral Dartige could not very well endorse the breach of faith legend. +He knew that the engagement about the delivery of arms was reciprocal, +and that, as France had failed to ratify it on her part, King +Constantine rightly considered himself free from all obligations on his +part. He also knew that, far from being lured into landing by false +assurances of surrender, he had been emphatically warned against it by +categorical refusals and intimations of resistance. Yet, human nature +being what it is, the honest sailor, maddened by his discomfiture, +called the inevitable collision a "_guet-apens_" and, even whilst +negotiating for release, he meditated revenge. + +To him the peace arranged through the instrumentality of the Entente +Ministers was but a "_sorte d'armistice_." He had agreed to it only in +order to extricate himself from his present difficulties and to gain +time for resuming hostilities under more favourable conditions. He and +his men, he tells us with an engaging candour, were at the mercy of the +Greeks: had he not accepted the King's offer--outnumbered, surrounded, +and without food or water for more than twenty-four hours--they would +have been ignominiously arrested. Besides, the configuration of the +ground sheltered the Greek troops from the naval fire, while the +Legations both of the Entente and of neutral Powers lay exposed to it. +Lastly, a continued bombardment might have driven the Greeks to +exasperation and perhaps to a massacre of Entente Ministers and +subjects. It was imperative to give the Allies and neutrals time for +flight and himself for serious war preparations. The delivery of the +whole stock of arms had been fixed by his Ultimatum for 15 December. +In that fortnight he proposed to obtain from his Government the forces +necessary {164} for a battle, and permission to bombard Athens in +earnest--with or without notice to its inhabitants, but, of course, +always with due regard for its _monuments historiques_. + +Such was his plan. General Sarrail embraced it with ardour; the Paris +Government sanctioned it; troops began to arrive and French and British +residents to flee (3-5 Dec.). But very soon difficulties became +manifest. The transports had brought men and mules, but no provisions +for either. Greek volunteers and regulars mustered in defence of their +capital. The British Admiral declined to take part in any war +operations. The French Minister dreaded open hostilities. In the +circumstances, Admiral Dartige found it expedient to "give proof of his +spirit of self-denial," by renouncing his heroic dream of vengeance +"_immediate, retentissante,_" and by advising Paris not to set up a new +front at Athens: after all, the matter was not really worth a war. He +now proposed, instead, a pacific blockade; and, Paris assenting, he +proclaimed the blockade as from 8 December.[3] + +With this act Admiral Dartige du Fournet's career came to a sudden end. +A few days later the French Government deprived him of his command and +placed him on the retired list. After a decent interval, the British +Government decorated him with the Grand Cross of the Bath.[4] Whether +his conduct entitled him to a decoration, his character should +certainly have saved him from disgrace; for of all the men engaged in +these transactions, he seems to have been the most respectable. No +impartial reader of his book can fail to see that he blundered because +he moved in the dark: it was never explained to him what political +designs lay beneath the pretended military necessities; and the +constant incongruity between the avowed aims of his employers and the +steps dictated by his instructions tended to bewilder a mind devoid of +all aptitude or appetite for diplomacy. + +Admiral Dartige gone, the blockade was carried on by his successor, +Admiral Gauchet. The Greeks took it as an accustomed evil. "This +measure," wrote one of their {165} leading journals, "cannot terrify a +population which has faced with serenity and fortitude much greater +dangers. The Hellenic people did not hesitate, when the need arose, to +come into collision with four Great Powers in defence of its +independence and honour. It did so without hate, without perturbation, +but calmly, as one performs an imposed and unavoidable duty. It +deliberately chose to risk annihilation rather than see its fatherland +disarmed and enslaved. It preferred a hopeless struggle to +degradation. To-day it is threatened with the spectre of famine. It +will face that spectre with serenity and fortitude. The menace is +aimed at its stomach: very well, the people will tighten its belt." [5] + +At the same time, Paris, London, and Petrograd were vigorously +discussing the demands which were to be enforced by the blockade; but, +owing to the wide divergences of opinion existing between the various +Cabinets, decisions could only be reached by degrees and dealt out by +doses. Not until 14 December did the Entente Governments deliver +themselves of the first-fruit of their travail: Greece was to keep the +arms of which she could not be despoiled, but she should remove them, +as well as her army, from the northern regions bordering on Macedonia. +The Hellenic Government was given twenty-four hours in which to comply; +refusal would constitute an act of hostility, and the Allied Ministers +would forthwith leave Athens.[6] + +To show that they were in earnest, the French and British Ministers +embarked on two ships moored at the Piraeus, where they awaited the +Hellenic Government's reply; and, before the time-limit expired, the +French Admiral, by a notice put up at the Piraeus town-hall, warned the +inhabitants to close their shops and retire to their homes by 4 p.m. in +view of an impending bombardment of Athens. + +The Hellenic Government acceded to the contents of the Ultimatum, and +immediately gave orders for the removal of troops and war material.[7] +This prompt compliance was received by the people of Greece with {166} +loud disapproval. They criticized vehemently their rulers' readiness +to yield as pusillanimous and injudicious. The Government, they said, +instead of profiting by the events of 1 December to clear up the +situation, drifts back into the path of concessions which led to those +fatal events: it encourages the Entente Powers to put forward +increasingly exorbitant pretensions, and, forgetting that it is for us +to complain and claim better treatment, it creates the impression that +they are in the right and we in the wrong. For some time past such had +been the tone even of moderate critics; and upon this fresh submission +there was a general outcry of alarm. It is true, the Allies in their +Note averred that they demanded the removal of troops and guns simply +and solely "in order to secure their forces against an attack." But +the Greeks were less inclined than ever to treat the alleged danger to +the Allied army in Macedonia as anything more than a pretext: the true +object, they maintained, was to secure M. Venizelos's return and the +expulsion of King Constantine. + +The conduct of the Entente representatives hitherto had given only too +much ground for such bitter suspicions, and the search of Venizelist +houses had recently produced concrete evidence, in the form of a letter +from the Leader to one of his adherents stating, among other things, +that a definite agreement concluded between him and the representatives +of the Entente Powers assured his speedy domination of Athens through +the whole strength of the Entente. The publication of this document, +with a photographic facsimile,[8] had confirmed the apprehensions which +had long haunted the popular mind. Nor did M. Venizelos's indignant +denial of its authenticity, or the Entente Ministers' emphatic +protestation that never, since the Cretan's departure from Athens, had +they done anything to facilitate his return, shake the conviction that +the big coup was planned for 1 December. + +If any doubts as to the Allies' ulterior aims still lingered, they were +dispelled by their Press, the most serious organs of which, on the eve +of Admiral Dartige's landing, pointedly referred to the great error +committed by the Powers in allowing King Constantine to dismiss M. +Venizelos in September, 1915, and urged that the time had come to {167} +remedy that error, informing their readers that England, France and +Russia were not bound to guarantee the possession of the Greek throne +to any individual sovereign, irrespective of his constitutional +behaviour. The coup having failed, the same organs, in commenting on +the Allies' present Ultimatum, still declared that the true remedy for +Greece was to place her under the control of M. Venizelos; but, as such +a course was not possible in the presence of a hostile King and an +over-excited army, the first necessity was to eliminate the Greek +army.[9] + +However, the Greeks submitted to it all with sullen resignation: they +had learned that the wisest thing for the weak is to control themselves. + +The next step remained with the Entente Governments, who were exhorted +by their Press organs not to be deluded by King Constantine's +concessions. For it was one of the ironies of the situation that, +while his own subjects blamed the King for his conciliatory attitude, +that attitude was denounced by his enemies as a fresh instance of +duplicity. They affirmed--with what amount of accuracy will appear in +the sequel--that this great deceiver was making, in concert with the +Kaiser, stealthy preparations for war against the Allies, and that +meanwhile he intended by a semblance of submission to lull them into a +false security. Extreme measures were, therefore, needed, not only to +punish him for his past crimes, but also to prevent Greece from +becoming a base of hostile operations in the near future. + +Thus certain in advance of public support, the Allies, on 31 December, +served upon the Hellenic Government a series of demands divided into +guarantees and reparations. Under the first heading, Greece was +required to transfer all her arms and munitions to the Peloponnesus, +which, being practically an island, could be guarded by the Allied +Fleet; to forbid all Reservist meetings north of the Peloponnesus; to +enforce rigorously the law prohibiting civilians from carrying arms; to +admit the re-establishment of the foreign controls over her police, +telegraphs, telephones, and railways. Under the second, all persons +detained on charges of high-treason, conspiracy, and sedition, should +be immediately released, and those who {168} had suffered indemnified; +the General commanding the Athens garrison on 1 December should be +cashiered; formal apologies should be tendered to the Allied Ministers +and their flags publicly saluted in the presence of the assembled +garrison. On their part, the Powers gave Greece a formal undertaking +that they would not allow the forces of the Salonica Government to take +advantage of the withdrawal of the Royal troops from Thessaly in order +to cross the neutral zone. They ended with the announcement that the +blockade would be maintained until satisfaction had been accorded on +all the above points, and that they reserved to themselves full liberty +of further action should the attitude of the King's Government give +them fresh cause for complaint.[10] + +Before returning a definite answer to this Note, the Hellenic +Government submitted a Memorandum by which it promised forthwith the +reparations demanded, except the wholesale release without trial of +political prisoners; and accepted in principle the demand for +guarantees on condition that the Powers, on their part, should give an +absolute and irrevocable guarantee against the extension of the +revolutionary movement, not only across the neutral zone, but over any +territories which had not been annexed by the Salonica Committee before +1 December, pointing out that this was an indispensable requisite to +reassure the nation and induce it to acquiesce in total disarmament. +In conclusion, the Hellenic Government expressed the hope that, as +total disarmament would put Greece out of all possibility of hurting +the Allies, they would renounce the liberty of further action which +they had reserved to themselves, and that they would, in justice to the +people, raise the blockade.[11] + +In reply, the Allies launched another Ultimatum: insisting upon the +definite acceptance of their demands. If such acceptance were not +forthcoming within forty-eight hours, or if, after an undertaking was +given, any obstacles were wilfully placed in its execution, they +threatened to have recourse to their military and naval weapons. On +the other hand, they promised to respect Greece's resolution {169} to +keep out of the War, and pledged themselves not to allow the adherents +of the Salonica Government to take advantage of the withdrawal of the +Greek troops into the Peloponnesus in order to invade by land or by sea +any part whatever of Greek territory thus left defenceless, or to +permit the installation of Venizelist authorities in any territories +actually in the possession of the Royal Government which they might see +fit to occupy hereafter for military reasons. Lastly, they signified +their readiness to raise the blockade as soon as special delegates +should judge that the evacuation of troops and material had been partly +carried out, and that its completion was assured.[12] + +These pledges, which had been the subject of acute discussion between +the Allies at the Rome Conference, and were carried in face of strong +opposition from France, marked another victory of moderation over +consistency. That they lessened the alarm of the Greek people may be +doubted; but the Greek people had by this time found that if it wanted, +not only to live at peace, but to exist at all, it had to accept the +situation on the Allies' own terms. + +As to the rulers, they understood the popular feeling, sympathized with +it, shared it. But their powerlessness prevented them from refusing +terms which their pride compelled them to resent. They could not +entertain seriously thoughts of active resistance, unless the Allies +were attacked by the Germans; but how little prospect of this there was +has been revealed by a number of messages exchanged at that period +between Athens and Berlin. From these documents it appears that on 6 +December the Queen, whose indignation at the long-sustained persecution +had been brought to a head by the bombardment of her home and the +narrow escape of her children, telegraphed to her brother, anxiously +inquiring when the Germans would be ready for a decisive offensive in +Macedonia. On 16 December the Kaiser replied to his sister, condoling +with her on the ordeal she and her husband had gone through, +congratulating them on the courage they had displayed, pointing out +that the Entente had once more {170} shown clearly what its real aims +were, and expressing the opinion that no other course was left to King +Constantine but "to turn openly on his executioners: Tino's +intervention with his main forces against Sarrail's left wing would be +decisive," he said. The Queen answered, on 26 December, that the +solution the Kaiser advised would be possible only if Sarrail, attacked +by the Germans, were forced to retire into the parts of Greece occupied +by the Royalists: as it was, the distance which separated his left wing +from them was too great and their lines of communication would be too +much exposed: besides, their provisions and munitions were not +sufficient for a prolonged struggle. Under these conditions, she +added, only a speedy attack by the Germans could afford Greece the +opportunity of fighting for deliverance from a frightful situation. +But Von Hindenburg did not see his way to promise an attack. +Meanwhile, the pressure of the blockade increased. By 2 January, the +Queen, as her indignation cooled, prepared to resign herself to the +situation: "We have bread only for a few days more, other provisions +are also running short," she telegraphed, "consequently war against the +Entente is out of the question now. I consider the game lost." Her +husband concurred.[13] + +The King and his Ministers also knew that, unless they accepted the +Allies' terms, worse would be forced upon them by starvation. Clearly, +the first thing to be done was to have the blockade raised. So far the +little ship had contended with the gale hardily--in fact, +foolhardily--coming out of the contest with scarce a sail. Captain and +crew at last decided to give up the unequal struggle: the gale appeared +to have almost spent itself: conversations for peace were at that +moment in progress between the belligerents: at the worst, things would +go on much as they had been going on, until the end of the War put an +end to the sorry drama. So, on 10 January, after an all-night sitting +of the Crown Council, Greece made her {171} unconditional surrender: +she would drain the cup of humiliation to its bitterest dregs.[14] + +To all seeming, the pledges given by both sides formed a solid basis +for a _modus vivendi_: the King gave guarantees thoroughly safeguarding +the Allies against any danger, real or imaginary; and the Allies gave +guarantees equally safeguarding the King against seditious intrigues. +All that remained was that the Allies should exact from the King a +fulfilment of his engagements, and fulfil their own. They did not fail +in the first part of the programme. The transfer of troops and +armaments to the Peloponnesus was scrupulously carried out under the +supervision of an Allied Military Commission, which counted and +examined every man, every gun, every rifle and cartridge both at the +point of departure and at the point of arrival. The Reservists' +leagues were dissolved, and the people, in so far as such a measure is +possible, were compelled to give up the firearms, mostly obsolete, in +their possession. The foreign Controls, so far as the Hellenic +Government was concerned, might be re-established at the Allies' +discretion. The Venizelist prisoners were set free, and a mixed +Commission was in due course appointed to deal with the question of +indemnities. The General commanding the Athens garrison was cashiered. +Formal apologies were tendered to the Allies' Ministers, and their +flags were saluted with all the solemnities prescribed by themselves. +In brief, on the unanimous testimony of Entente diplomatists and +publicists, Greece loyally fulfilled every one of her obligations, +serious and frivolous.[15] Yet, despite her Government's reiterated +prayers that the blockade should in accordance with the promise given, +be raised, the blockade was not only continued, but, as the months +dragged on, was intensified. + + + +[1] See _Le Temps_ and _The Times_, 4 Dec., 1916. + +[2] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, Rome, 24 +Nov./7 Dec.; 25 Nov./8 Dec.; 26 Nov./9 Dec. 28 Nov./11 Dec.; Metaxas, +Paris, 24 Nov./7 Dec; 2/15 Dec. Delyannis, London, 3/16 Dec., 1916. +The documents containing the King's promises to M. Benazet were not +published until 1918 (see _The Times_, April 22, 1918); while those +containing M. Benazet's promises to the King became known only through +the publication of Admiral Dartige du Fournet's book in 1920. + +[3] Du Fournet, pp. 226-9, 234, 256-7, 260-2, 266, 269-72. + +[4] Du Fournet, pp. 272-4, 284-5. He complains bitterly of the +injustice of his treatment: he was condemned unheard--like King +Constantine; and for a similar reason: "_un debat large et public await +etabli toutes les responsabilites_." + +[5] The _Nea Himera_, 25 Nov./8 Dec., 1916. + +[6] Guillemin, Elliot, Bosdari, Demidoff, Athens, 1/14 Dec., 1916. + +[7] Zalocostas to the Legations of France, England, Italy, and Russia. +Athens, 2/15 Dec., 1916. + +[8] The _Nea Himera_, 21 Nov./4 Dec., 1916. + +[9] See leading articles in _The Times_, 30 Nov., 16 Dec., 1916. + +[10] Guillemin, Elliot, Demidoff, Piraeus, 18/31 Dec., 1916. + +[11] Zalocostas to Legations of France, England and Russia, Athens, 23 +Dec,/5 Jan., 1917. + +[12] Guillemin, Bosdani, Demidoff, Erskine, Salamis Strait, 26 Dec./8 +Jan., 1917. + +[13] In his one message (6 January) he dwelt on Greece's critical +condition, asking if a German attack was intended, and when it would +probably take place. Such is the gist of these famous telegrams. For +the rest, they consist of allusions by the Queen to her sufferings and +appropriate epithets applied to the authors of them. See _White Book_, +Nos. 177 foll. + +[14] Zalocostas to Legations of France, England, Italy and Russia, 28 +Dec./10 Jan., 1917. + +[15] See _The Times_, 20, 23, 24, 30 Jan., 1917. + + + + +{172} + +CHAPTER XVI + +Among the acts sanctioned by International Law, none is more worthy of +a philosopher's or a philanthropist's attention than the "pacific +blockade." The credit for the institution belongs to all the great +civilised communities, but for its pleasant designation the world is +indebted to the eminent jurist M. Hautefeuille--a countryman of the +ingenious Dr. Guillotin. It denotes "a blockade exercised by a great +Power for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on a weaker State, +without actual war. That it is an act of violence, and therefore in +the nature of war, is undeniable";[1] but, besides its name, it +possesses certain features which distinguish it advantageously from +ordinary war. + +First, instead of the barbarous effusion of blood and swift destruction +which open hostilities entail, the pacific blockade achieves its ends +by more refined and leisurely means: one is not shocked by the unseemly +sights of a battlefield, and the wielder of the weapon has time to +watch its effects as they develop: he can see the victim going through +the successive stages of misery--debility, languor, exhaustion--until +the final point is reached; and as his scientific curiosity is +gratified by the gradual manifestation of the various symptoms, so his +moral sense is fortified by the struggle between a proud spirit and an +empty stomach--than which life can offer no more ennobling spectacle. +Then, unlike crude war, the pacific blockade automatically strikes the +nation at which it is aimed on its weakest side first: instead of +having to begin with its manhood, one begins with its old men, its +women, and its infants. The merits of this form of attack are evident: +many a man who would boldly face starvation himself, may be reasonably +expected to flinch at the prospect of a starving mother, {173} wife, or +child. Lastly, whilst in war the assailant must inevitably suffer as +well as inflict losses, the pacific blockade renders him absolutely +exempt from all risk. For "it can only be employed as a measure of +coercion by maritime Powers able to bring into action such vastly +superior forces to those the resisting State can dispose of, that +resistance is out of the question." [2] + +In brief, the pacific blockade is not war, but a kind of sport, as safe +as coursing, and to the educated mind much more interesting. The +interest largely depends on the duration of the blockade, and its +duration on the victims' physical and moral resources. + +When the blockade was proclaimed on the 8th of December, Allied +journalists predicted that its persuasive force would be felt very +soon. The country, they reasoned, owing to the manifold restrictions +imposed upon its overseas trade by the Anglo-French Fleet, had been on +short commons for some time past. The total stoppage of maritime +traffic would bring it to the verge of famine within a week. And, in +fact, before the end of the month Greece was feeling the pinch.[3] As +might have been expected, the first to feel it were the poor. Both the +authorities and private societies did their utmost to protect them by +keeping prices down, and to relieve them by the free distribution of +food and other necessaries.[4] But, although the achievement was +great, it could not prove equal to the dimensions of the need. The +stoppage of all maritime traffic caused a cessation of industry and +threw out of employment thousands of working-people. As the factories +grew empty of labourers, the streets grew full of beggars. The +necessary adulteration of the flour produced epidemics of dysentery and +poisoning, especially among children and old people, while numerous +deaths among infants were attributed by the doctors to want of milk in +their mothers' breasts. Presently bread, the staple food of the +Greeks, disappeared, and all classes took {174} to carob-beans and +herbs.[5] On 23 February a lady of the highest Athenian society wrote +to a friend in London: "If we were in England, we should all be fined +for cruelty to animals. As there is no flour, our tiny portions of +bread are made of oats, and rather rotten ones, that had been reserved +for the cab-horses. Now the poor things have nothing to eat and have +become a collection of Apocalyptic beasts. We go on foot as much as we +can, as they really could not carry us." + +Next to bread, the most prominent article of Greek diet is fish. The +French, who in their treatment of this neutral nation gave evidence of +a thoroughness and efficiency such as they did not always display in +their operations against the enemy, saw to it that this source of +subsistence also should, within the measure of their ability, fail +their victims. French cruisers stopped the fishing-smacks and asked if +their community had joined the Rebellion. When the answer was in the +negative, they sank the vessel and confiscated the tackle, often +accompanying the robbery of property with violence on the persons of +the owners and abuse of their sovereign. To the wretched fishermen's +protests, the French commanders replied: "If you want to be left alone, +you have only to drive out your King." [6] + +These speeches confirmed the general suspicion that the ultimate object +of the blockade was to propagate rebellion. Other things spoke even +more eloquently. The few cargoes of flour that arrived in Greece now +and then were sequestered by the Allies and sent to the Salonica +Government, which used them as a bait, inviting the King's subjects +through its agents to sell their allegiance for a loaf of bread. +Generally the reply was: "We prefer to die." [7] Of this stubborn +endurance, the women of modern Greece gave instances that recall the +days of ancient Sparta. In a village near Eleusis, on the Sunday +preceding Lent, the matrons and maidens set up a dance, and while +dancing they improvised songs in praise of Hunger. At the end, {175} +the men who stood round listening with tears in their eyes, burst into +frenetic cheers for the King.[8] + +Never, indeed, in the hour of his triumphs had King Constantine been so +near the hearts of his people as he was in this period of their common +affliction. Although the operation-wounds in his ribs were still open, +he met the emergency with dauntless fortitude, and never for a moment +forgot his part, either as a prince or as a man. "The King is +wonderful," wrote the correspondent already quoted. "He never +complains, and gives us all courage." Many a time, as the weary months +dragged on, he went over his past course, asking himself: "Could he +have been mistaken, after all?" No; the more he pondered, the more +convinced he felt that what he had done was the best for Greece. Now, +if the worst came to the worst, his sincerity at least could not be +questioned. When his friends ventured to express their admiration of +his stoicism, he answered simply: "I know that I am doing right." The +great source whence he derived consolation amidst all his calamities +was undoubtedly this consciousness of rectitude: a sense which in him +seems to have been as free from arrogance as it was from rancour. + +The people who had formerly admired their sovereign as a hero, now +revered him as a martyr; and the man upon whom they visited their anger +was he whom they regarded as the true cause of their misery. After his +flight to Salonica M. Venizelos was never mentioned except by the name +of The Traitor; after the events of 1 December he was formally +impeached as one; and after the blockade had been in force for some +weeks, he was solemnly anathematized: on 26 December, the Archbishop of +Athens, from a cairn of stones in the midst of a great multitude, +pronounced the curse of the Church upon "the traitor, Venizelos." The +Government had forbidden the demonstration, but that did not prevent +myriads of people from going to add their own stone to the monument.[9] +One old woman was heard, as she cast her contribution, crying: "We made +him Premier; but he was not content. He would make himself king. +Anathema!" Subsequently, every village and hamlet repeated the +ceremony. "These {176} spontaneous ceremonies," observes an +eye-witness, "were vastly more indicative than any elections could ever +have been of the place to which the great Cretan had fallen in the +esteem of his countrymen." [10] + +Appeals from the Holy Synod of the Greek Church to the Pope and the +heads of other Christian Churches availed as little as the appeals of +the Greek Government to Allied and neutral Governments. Month after +month the blockade went on, and each month produced its own tale of +suffering: deaths due directly to starvation; diseases due to the +indirect effects of inanition; a whole nation wasting for want of food; +horses starved to provide it; mothers praying to God for their daily +bread with babes drooping at their desiccated bosoms.[11] Yet of +yielding there was no sign: "Give in?" said a woman outside a +soup-kitchen at the Piraeus, in March. "We will eat our children +first!" + +In such a manner this ancient race, which has lived so long, done so +much, and suffered so much, bore its martyrdom. By such an exercise of +self-discipline it defied the Powers of Civilisation to do their worst. +In spite of the licence given to brute force, in spite of the removal +of the machinery of civil control, in spite of the internment of the +army and its arms, in spite of the ostentatiously paraded support to +the Rebel, in spite of actual famine and the threat of imminent ruin, +the people held to the institutions of their country, rallied to their +King; and expressed their scorn for the usurper of his authority by +inscribing over the graves of their babies: "Here lies my child, +starved to death by Venizelos." + + + +[1] See the article on "Pacific Blockade" in the _Encyclopaedia +Britannica_ (10th Ed.), Vol. XXXI, p. 401. + +[2] _Ibid._ + +[3] _The Times_, 9, 19, 21, 30 Dec., 1916. + +[4] Among these charitable organizations the foremost place belongs to +the "Patriotic League of Greek Women," which, under the competent +management of the Queen, was able to distribute 10,000 meals a day, as +well as clothes, blankets, medicine, milk for infants, etc. + +[5] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 Jan./7 Feb.; 3/16 Feb.; +12/25 March, 1917. + +[6] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 3/16 Feb.; to French Minister +at Athens, 16/29 March, 1917. + +[7] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 25 Jan./7 Feb.; 15/28 Feb.; +12/25 March. + +[8] The _Nea Himera_, 15/28 Feb., 1917. + +[9] Zalocostas to Greek Legations abroad, 14/27 Dec., 1916. + +[10] Paxton Hibben, p. 522. + +[11] The Censorship succeeded in keeping these facts, as it kept many +others, from the British public; they were not suitable subjects for +war propaganda. + + + + +{177} + +CHAPTER XVII + +It seems now proper to return to M. Venizelos and to consider in some +detail the other measures which he and his patrons at this time adopted +for the purpose of consolidating and extending his dominion. + +As we have seen, shortly after the Cretan's installation at Salonica, +the Entente Powers, by a diplomatic fiction, decided to treat his +Committee as a _de facto_ Government. It was not until his countrymen +impeached him as a traitor that the recognition assumed a _de jure_ +character, by the appointment of duly accredited diplomatic agents to +his capital. These steps were accompanied by other marks of sympathy. +While the Allies negotiated with the King, their naval commanders +canvassed for M. Venizelos--sweeping islands under his sway: Syra was +first shepherded into the fold, and a little later the rest of the +Cyclades. + +A brief suspension of operations supervened as a result of the solemn +promise given to Athens that the Allies would neither by land nor by +sea allow the extension of the revolutionary movement. For an instant +the Entente respected its own pledges. Just before the surrender of +the Lambros Cabinet, on 10 January, the Cretan had rushed to establish +another accomplished fact by liberating the island of Cerigo; but, on +the Government's protest, the Allies obliged him to undo his +accomplishment; though, on the plea that the island would resent being +replaced under King Constantine's yoke, it was made temporarily +autonomous.[1] + +Soon, however, these pledges went the way of all words. Between +February and May, Cephalonia, Zante, and Corfu {178} were converted one +by one: everywhere the apostles from Salonica preaching, "Be our +brethren or die of hunger"; and everywhere having behind them the guns +of France and England to enforce respect for their gospel. The +instance of Leucas, the last of the Ionian Isles to be gathered into +the fold, will suffice as an illustration. In the middle of March a +French vessel, carrying a consignment of maize, rice, and Venizelist +missionaries, called at the island and invited the inhabitants to come, +buy, and be saved: they answered that they would never touch food +brought by traitors. Towards the end of May, the French Admiral +commanding the Ionian Reserve was able to announce that the Leucadian +population had joined the National Movement.[2] + +To secure his authority over these maritime possessions, the Cretan +obtained from his patrons some of the warships of which they had robbed +the King. + +A similar propaganda was simultaneously going on in the "neutral zone" +and in the lands to the south of it--particularly Thessaly--whose +immunity from emancipation the Allies had also guaranteed. Only, as +this region lay nearer to the base of the Franco-Venizelist Mission, it +benefited more severely from its influence. General Sarrail's patrols +raided the villages, harrying the peasants and sparing not even the +honour of their women. Anyone who knows the Greek peasant's fierce +views on feminine chastity can imagine the indignation which such an +outrage would have aroused in any case; but in this case their horror +was deepened by the circumstance that the assailants sometimes were +African semi-savages--the Senegalese whom France brought to Greece, as +to other parts of Europe, oblivious of the most rudimentary dictates of +decency and sound policy. On one occasion (22 Feb.) the coloured +libertines paid for their lust with their lives: a patrol of a dozen of +them was surprised and massacred.[3] + +Summary executions were among the methods of {179} military tyranny in +which General Sarrail rejoiced without scruple and with a certain +brutal pride. When once he found himself obliged to justify his +conduct, he wrote: "The six inhabitants of Dianitza, who were shot, +were _Comitadjis_. There is no doubt in that respect. Doubt still +exists about eight others. If they are proved to be in the same case +as the former, they will be shot in the same way. The two men shot at +Lourani were put to death because they were known to be _Comitadjis_. +The other two, whose houses were burnt down, are likewise _Comitadjis_: +they would have been shot, if they were not away: they shall be, if +they are caught. If a church has been burnt down, it was because it +had been transformed into a magazine for arms. If barley has been +carried away, it has been paid for or requisitioned." After some more +statements of the same enlightening kind, the gallant soldier +concludes: "To sum up, the Greek Government organizes bands and +maintains them. The security of our Army in the Orient exacts their +suppression. I have given orders to put to death all irregulars. +These orders have been carried out: they shall continue to be carried +out." [4] + +It was by precisely similar arguments that General von Bissing +justified his severities in Belgium: with this difference, that in +Greece the danger never existed. Comitadjis--bands of irregulars--did +exist; it would have been strange if the adherents of the King had not +done everything to counter the efforts of his enemies. Long before +this period the French Secret Service, Admiral Dartige du Fournet tells +us, had been busy equipping guerillas on the frontier.[5] Further, in +the mainland, as in the islands, the Venizelist recruiting sergeants +sought "volunteers" by force: "How many villages had to be surrounded +by constabulary. . . . How much shooting had to be done to keep the +men of military age from escaping. . . . How many deserters or those +unwilling to serve had to be rounded up from hiding places!" exclaims +General Sarrail.[6] Some of the recruits thus enlisted snatched at the +earliest opportunity of regaining {180} their freedom: they fell in +during the day, and at night they fled with their arms. + +The assertion that these bands were organized and maintained by the +Greek Government to harass the Allies and keep the line of +communication with Albania open, with a view to an eventual junction +between the forces of King Constantine and those of the German Emperor, +rested on evidence which, for some obscure reason, was not produced.[7] +But it supplied pretexts for action the true objects of which were not +obscure. + +Despite his press-gangs, in six months M. Venizelos had only succeeded +in sending to the front some 10,000 men. He explained to his Western +friends that he had failed to fulfil their expectations better because +the neutral zone barred the extension of his movement into Thessaly.[8] +He had respected that zone until now; but now that the Allies gave him +a free hand over the sea, he saw no longer any reason why they should +restrain him on land. Therefore, while the agents from Macedonia +goaded the inhabitants to seek rest in apostacy and provoked incidents +supplying an excuse for intervention, the advocates of M. Venizelos in +Paris and London laboured to clear his way by publishing reports which +told how the people of Thessaly prayed for liberation from the yoke of +King Constantine,[9] and exhausted their ingenuity in endeavours to +show the Entente publics how to break faith with honour and decency, as +well as with advantage. + +The victualling of the Allied army in Macedonia, always difficult, had +become distressingly precarious with its own growth and the growth of +the enemy's submarine activity. Were the Allies to go on transporting +food and fodder from distant lands across dangerous seas, with the rich +cornfields of Thessaly within short and safe reach of their trenches? +The seizure of the Thessalian granary, besides {181} helping to keep +the Allies in plenty, would help to reduce the Royalists to despair by +robbing them of the harvest to which they looked forward with strained +eyes and tightened belts. In this wise both military and political +problems could be solved by one masterly stroke. + +In April, General Sarrail obtained from his Government the orders he +had been soliciting since January, to go to Thessaly and seize the +crops; only, as the offensive against the Bulgars deprived him of +adequate means for the moment, he decided to put off the stroke until +the middle of May.[10] + +Alarmed by these sudden, though not wholly unexpected, developments, +King Constantine dismissed Professor Lambros, and had once more +recourse to M. Zaimis; hoping that this statesman, the only +non-Venizelist Greek whom the slander of Germanophilism had left +untouched, might prove able to placate the Allies. M. Zaimis, as in +all previous crises, so now obeyed the call and set himself to discover +some path out of the wood (2 May). On the one hand, he opened +negotiations with the Entente Ministers; on the other, he tried to +bring about a reconciliation with M. Venizelos--the King being +understood to be willing to meet the Cretan half-way. + +M. Venizelos, on his part, alarmed by the prospect of a _rapprochement_ +between Athens and the Entente Powers, set himself, as on all similar +occasions, to impugn the Hellenic Government's sincerity. At a signal +from the Conductor, all the instruments of the orchestra broke into the +familiar chorus. The whole Press of France and England rang again with +calumny and fairy-tale. Out they came again in regular sequence and +with unvarying monotony: plots and secret letters, weird stories of +German intrigue, constant repetition of names compromised or +compromising; all ready, cut and dried, for burking any attempt at +accommodation that did not include the return and domination of the +Great Cretan. + +It was maintained that the formation of a Government under M. Zaimis +was but a new artifice of King Constantine, adopted at the Kaiser's +suggestion, to temporize by ostensibly throwing over a few of his +Germanophile favourites. During more than five months he had contrived +{182} to checkmate the blockade by drawing on the reserves of food he +had laid up at his depots. Now those reserves were exhausted: he +needed the Thessalian corn to replenish his magazines, to feed and +increase his army, so that in the fullness of time he might bring it +out of the Peloponnesus against the Allies.[11] + +Even more sinister were the motives which prompted the King's advances +to the Cretan. While holding out the right hand to M. Venizelos, +Constantine with the left aimed a dagger at his heart: a band of eleven +assassins had just been arrested at Salonica on a charge of conspiring +to murder him--to murder him in the very midst of his own and his +allies' military forces, and under circumstances which made detection +certain and escape impossible. Even thus: "their plan was to arrange a +banquet to which M. Venizelos would have been invited. _They are said_ +to have confessed that they were sent from Athens to kill the Head of +the National Government and were promised 4,000 pounds for the murder." +[12] + +Day by day it became increasingly clear that the question of Thessaly +formed only part of the larger question of Greece; that behind the +campaign for the crops lurked the conspiracy against the King. A +"radical solution" was demanded, on the ground that so long as he +reigned at Athens we could not consider Greece a friendly neutral. The +Greek organ of M. Venizelos in London now openly described the Cretan +as a man sent to heal Hellas of the "dynastic canker," and expressed +the opinion that the healing could only be effected by "Prussian +methods." [13] + +During the whole of May this concert of sophistry and calumny went on: +now sinking into low, deadly whispers; now swelling into an uproar that +rolled like a mighty, muddy river in flood through every Allied +capital, ministering to the inarticulate craving of the public for +fresh sensations, thrilling its nerves, and feeding its hate and fear +of King Constantine. At the end of the month the curtain went up, and +M. Venizelos stepped forward to {188} make the declaration for which +his instrumental music had prepared our minds: "I reject all idea of +reconciliation firmly, flatly, and finally!" + +His confederates and subordinates, as usual, went further: Admiral +Coundouriotis: "Neither in this world nor in the next will I have +anything to do with King Constantine or his dynasty." + +Minister Politis: "No compromise is possible between Liberal Greece and +the reigning dynasty." + +Minister Averoff: "The one and most important thing is that the dynasty +of Constantine should, like the Turks, be turned bag and baggage out of +Greece." [14] + +So the Great Cretan and his company had given up at last pretending +that their plot was not directed against their King, or that they +intended to postpone the settlement of their accounts with him till +after the War. Their relief must have been proportionate to the +strain: it is not hypocrisy, but the need of consistency that harasses +a hypocrite. But their outburst of candour was chiefly interesting as +an index to the attitude of the Powers from whom they derived their +significance. + +France had long since made up her mind on the deposition of +Constantine, if not indeed on the subversion of the Greek throne. +Apart from the hold upon Greece which they would gain by placing her +under a ruler created by and consequently dependent on them, French +politicians did not lose sight of the popularity which the sacrifice of +a king--and that king, too, the Kaiser's brother-in-law--would earn +them among their own compatriots. Further, a triumph of French policy +over Greece was calculated to obscure in the eyes of the French public +the failure of French strategy against Bulgaria: "For me the +destruction of Athens the Germanic came second to the struggle against +Sofia," wrote General Sarrail[15]; and there were those who believed +that his expedition had for its primary objective Athens rather than +Sofia. + +For a time French politicians had flattered themselves that their aim +would be attained by an explosion from within. But it was gradually +borne in upon them that the National Movement represented but a small +minority {184} of the nation. That truth first became manifest in the +summer of 1916, when the demobilization set the Reservists loose--the +Reservists upon whom M. Venizelos had miscounted: their verdict was +conclusive; for they were drawn from all districts and all classes of +the community: the tillers of the plains, the shepherds of the hills, +the fishermen who lived by the sea, the traders, the teachers, the +lawyers--they represented, in one word, the whole population of +military age. The disillusion was furthered by the swift suppression +of the seditious attempt on 1 December, and was completed by the +Blockade, which demonstrated the solidarity of the nation in a manner +that utterly upset the calculations and disconcerted the plans of its +authors. Instead of a people ready, after a week or two of privation, +to sue for mercy--to revolt against their sovereign and succumb to his +rival--the French found in every bit of Old Greece--from Mount Pindus +to Cape Malea--a nation nerved to the highest pitch of endurance: +prepared to suffer hunger and disease without a murmur, and when the +hour should come, to die as those die who possess things they value +more than life. This was not what the inventors of the Pacific +Blockade contemplated: this was not sport: this was strife--strife of +strength with strength. + +There was nothing left but force--the danger of creating a new front +had been eliminated by the internment of the army, and by the blockade +which had succeeded, if not in breaking the spirit of the people, in +reducing it to such a state of misery that it now offered a safe +subject for attack. M. Ribot, who had replaced M. Briand as Premier +and Minister for Foreign Affairs, adopted this "radical solution." He +proposed to dispatch to Athens a plenipotentiary charged with the +mission of deposing King Constantine, raising M. Venizelos to +dictatorial power, and thus establishing the influence of France +throughout Greece. + +There remained some difficulties of a diplomatic character. Russia had +never viewed her ally's uncompromising hostility to King Constantine +with enthusiasm. But the French thought that this attitude was due to +dynastic ties and monarchic sympathies, and expected the downfall of +the Tsar to change it: they could hardly {185} imagine that the Russian +Republic would withdraw even that reluctant co-operation in the +coercion of Greece which the Russian Empire had accorded; and, at any +rate, the voice of a country in the throes of internal disintegration +could have little effect upon the march of external events. + +The decision really lay between France and England. England's, like +Russia's, co-operation hitherto had been but a concession to France. +Neither the Foreign Office nor the War Office had ever taken the +Salonica Expedition seriously; and both departments would gladly have +washed their hands of a business barren of profit and credit alike. +But the motives which had impelled London to keep Paris company so far +were as potent as ever, and English politicians had hitherto proved +themselves so pliant that, provided French pressure continued, the +utmost which could be apprehended from them was a feeble show of +resistance followed by abject acquiescence. Notwithstanding the +moderation England had insisted upon at the Boulogne and Rome +Conferences, France had managed to lead her from violence to violence, +till this last iniquity, to the logical French mind, seemed inevitable. + + + +[1] Zalocostas to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 30 +Dec./12 Jan.; to Entente Legations, Athens, 19 Jan./1 Feb.; 8/21 March, +1917. For a full and intimate account of this intrigue, somewhat +ambitiously styled "The Conquest of Cerigo," see Lawson, pp. 241 foll. + +[2] Zalocostas to Greek Ministers abroad, 12/25 March; The _Nea +Himera_, 8/21 March; Exchange Tel., Athens, 16 April, 28 May, 1917. + +[3] General Sarrail mentions the punishment (Sarrail, p. 235), but not +the provocation. This, together with other atrocities, is the subject +of a Note from M. Zalocostas to the French Minister at Athens, 9/22 +March, 1917. + +[4] Le Temps, 11 April, 1917; Sarrail, pp. 236-7. + +[5] Du Fournet, p. 116. + +[6] "La Grece Venizeliste," in the _Revue de Paris_, 15 Dec., 1919. + +[7] Such a project is only discussed in some of the messages exchanged +between Athens and Berlin in December, 1916 (_White Book_, Nos. 177, +183, 186)--before the definite acceptance of the Allies' terms by the +Lambros Cabinet. But there is absolutely nothing to show that the idea +ever materialised. + +[8] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917. + +[9] See telegrams, dated Salonica, 29 March, published in the London +Press by the Anglo-Hellenic League; letter from _The Times_ +correspondent, dated Syra, 23 April, 1917, etc., etc. + +[10] Sarrail, p. 238. + +[11] For details of this apocryphal scheme see a report from Salonica, +dated 16 May, disseminated by the Anglo-Hellenic League; _The Times_, 8 +and 30 May; the _Daily Mail_, 9 and 30 May, 1917. + +[12] _The Times_, 14 May, 1917, dispatch dated Salonica 11 May. + +[13] _The Hesperia_, 11, 18, 25 May, 1917. + +[14] _The Times_, 30 May, 1917. + +[15] Sarrail, p. 234. + + + + +{186} + +CHAPTER XVIII + +At the end of May, M. Ribot, accompanied by M. Painleve, Minister of +War, came to London and laid before the British Government his +solution. Again our allies found on this side of the Channel "_des +scrupules_"; and again they set themselves to demonstrate that "_des +scrupules, si legitimes soient-ils_," weigh light against interests. +Even when the principle was conceded, there still lingered some +disquietude regarding the practicability of bringing about the King's +dethronement without bloodshed. But the French did not share this +disquietude, and, after three days' hard talking, they converted the +English Ministers to their point of view. It was agreed that the +operation should be carried out without war. The only measures of a +military nature to which the British Government consented were the +establishment in Thessaly of outposts for the control of the crops, and +the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, should King Constantine +attempt to move his army out of the Peloponnesus: unless the King +committed acts of hostility, no violence should be used. Having thus +satisfied their conscience, the British Ministers abstained from any +closer scrutiny.[1] + +The task was entrusted to M. Jonnart, a Senator of large African +experience, who, armed with the title of High Commissioner of the +Protecting Powers of Greece, set out at once "to re-establish the +constitutional verity"--such was the formula. "His Majesty King +Constantine, having manifestly violated, on his own initiative, the +Constitution of which France, Great Britain, and Russia are the +guarantors, has lost the confidence of the Protecting Powers, and they +consider themselves released from the obligations to him resulting from +their rights of protection." [2] + +With the violation of the Constitution by King Constantine we have +already dealt exhaustively. We must here {187} deal as exhaustively +with the three Powers' claim to act as its "guarantors" and their +"rights of protection." + +The claim rested on a phrase in the Treaty of 13 July, 1863, between +them and Denmark, concerning the accession to the Hellenic throne of +the late King: "Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of +Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts, forms a monarchical, +independent, and constitutional State." [3] That guarantee was no +innovation, and had no reference to the Constitution. The Protocol of +the Conference held on 26 June, 1863, explains that "as regards the +guarantee of the political existence of the Kingdom of Greece, the +three Protecting Powers maintain simply the terms in which it is +enunciated in Article IV of the Convention of 7 May, 1832," [4]--that +is, the Convention between the three Powers and Bavaria concerning the +accession to the Hellenic throne of her first King. Turning to that +document, we find Article IV running as follows: "Greece, under the +sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of +the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent State, +according to the terms of the Protocol signed between the said Courts +on the 3rd of February, 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the +Ottoman Porte." And above it, in Article I, we read: "The Courts of +Great Britain, France and Russia, duly authorized for the purpose by +the Greek Nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece to the +Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria." [5] Nothing could be plainer than +that the guarantee referred to the "political existence of Greece," not +to her constitutional form of government, and that the three Powers in +disposing of her throne acted, not by their own authority, but by the +authority of the Greek Nation, which alone had the right to do so, and +which exercised that right directly in choosing its last king. But +this is not all. Turning to the Protocol of the 3rd of February, 1830, +we read in its very first article: "Greece shall form an independent +State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative and +commercial, pertaining to complete independence." [6] + +{188} + +As to the term "protection" occasionally employed by the three Powers, +and by the Greeks themselves, its true sense can be shown beyond +ambiguity. "Greece," wrote the Duke of Wellington, "once established +and her boundaries guaranteed as proposed, she will have the same right +to assistance and protection against foreign aggression as any other +State in Europe, of which there are many, which exercise an independent +action in all their concerns, external as well as internal." Far from +claiming to limit her independence in any way, the British Foreign +Secretary emphatically declared "that the permanent policy of this +country towards Greece must be friendly, if Greece should be really +independent and conduct herself as an independent Power." [7] + +Likewise, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, tracing the history +of events and negotiations which culminated in the establishment of +Greek freedom, dwelt on France's successful desire "not only to +liberate Greece from the Ottoman yoke, but to make of Greece a real +State, a State independent in right and in fact, a State that should +not be put officially under the tutelage of anyone, a State that should +not need any perpetual semi-official intervention." By thus making +Greece "free to choose her friends and allies," and "not under anyone's +protection," the French expected that she would "look towards France, +who can promise her, in need, her assistance without menacing her with +her protection." The Minister concluded by boasting that "the success +is complete. Greece exists, she is independent. All Europe recognizes +her: she depends on no Power either as sovereign or as guarantor." [8] + +Since the date of these documents and statements, practice had +confirmed the principles enunciated in them. As a completely +independent Power Greece had waged wars and concluded treaties with +other Powers. It is true that on certain occasions she was prevented +from fighting by coercive measures; but these measures were not taken +by the three Powers--sometimes they were {189} taken by two alone; +sometimes by the whole Concert of Europe--nor were they taken in virtue +of any right other than the right of the stronger. Likewise, Greece +had framed and revised her Constitution, dethroned and enthroned Kings +without asking anyone's permission or sanction. It is true that in her +domestic revolutions the influence of the three Powers could be plainly +detected, but it was wholly in the nature of backstairs +intrigue--carried on by each against the others--such as even the +greatest Empires experience on the part of interested outsiders. In +short, since its birth until 1916, no one had dreamt of questioning the +status of the Hellenic Kingdom as a completely independent Power, or +attempted to give to "the guarantee of the political existence of +Greece," which aimed at securing her against external aggression, the +interpretation that it referred to her form of government and conferred +a right of interference in her internal affairs. + +The present interference, clearly, had no more legal basis than all the +other invasions to which Greece had submitted during the War under +protest. Casuistry was merely called in to cloak the exigencies of +policy: King Constantine's dethronement was decreed, not because it was +lawful, but because France required it, and England, for good reasons, +could not let France bring it about alone: what Russia thought of the +transaction, she soon let the whole world know with disconcerting +bluntness. Petrograd not only withdrew her troops from the +performance, but made short work of the "guarantee" and "protection" +quibbles by roundly declaring that "the choice of the form of +government in Greece, as well as its administrative organization, +appertains exclusively to the Greek people." [9] + +Meanwhile M. Jonnart sped eastward, eager and determined to serve the +Imperialist ambitions of the French Republic in the Orient. His +mandate gave him unlimited choice of means, diplomatic and military, +and he fully justified the trust placed in his tact. On the maxim +that, the more prompt the display of force, the less likely the +occasion to use it, he decided, contrary to the instructions he had +received in London, not to wait and see whether {190} King Constantine +meditated hostile acts or not; he arranged for the necessary naval +measures with Admiral Gauchet, whom he met off Corfu, and, after a +brief stop in the Road of Salamis, he hastened to Salonica, where he +arranged with General Sarrail for the military measures: a simultaneous +invasion of Thessaly, occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, and a +landing at Athens. At the same time he conferred with M. Venizelos, +who pronounced all these arrangements excellent, and suggested that, +after the removal of the King, he must give the public mind time to +calm down before returning to Athens: in the interval M. Zaimis might +be left in power. The period of transition should perhaps last several +months: a prudent counsel with which M. Jonnart fully concurred: both +he and M. Ribot recognized the danger of hurrying the return of the +Cretan to a city which he had been describing as ready to embrace him. +The programme settled in all its details, M. Jonnart left Salonica with +General Regnault, who was put in command of the divisions told off for +Corinth and Athens, and in the evening of 9 June arrived in the Road of +Salamis, where he took up his abode on board the ironclad _Justice_.[19] + +Here the most delicate part of his mission, and the one in which he +displayed most of his tact, commenced. On the following evening (10 +June) he met M. Zaimis on board the _Bruix_ at the Piraeus. It was, as +we know, essential that M. Zaimis should be induced to remain in power +for a while, to bridge over the gap between the deposition of the King +and the elevation of M. Venizelos. But it was most unlikely that M. +Zaimis would consent to play the part assigned to him, if he knew what +he was doing. Therefore, at this first interview M. Jonnart did not +think fit to demand anything more than the control of the Thessalian +crops and the occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth. Agreeably +surprised at demands which fell so far short of the objects with which +rumour had credited the High Commissioner, the Premier raised no +difficulties; and M. Jonnart, in order "to gain his confidence," spoke +to him with his usual "accent of loyalty and frankness" about the +magnificent future the Protecting Powers had in store for Greece. +Then, under the pretence that he was awaiting {191} fresh instructions +that night, he made another appointment for the following morning.[11] + +The Greek left, and next morning (11 June) returned to hear more. At +this second interview M. Jonnart handed to him an Ultimatum with a +twenty-four hours' limit, demanding that the King should abdicate and +go, after naming as his successor, not the legitimate Heir, but his +second son--a young man who, having no will of his own, was highly +recommended by M. Venizelos. Thus the re-establishment of +constitutional verity was to begin with the violation of a fundamental +article of the Constitution--the succession by order of +primogeniture.[12] M. Zaimis stood aghast--"wrung with emotion." M. +Jonnart spoke eloquently and urgently: the Powers only sought the unity +and liberty of Greece--the greatness of Greece, now divided, partly +dismembered, in a state of anarchy, on the eve of civil war. The High +Commissioner would do all that in him lay that the change of reign +might be accomplished in the most pacific manner. He appealed warmly +to the Premier's patriotism.[13] + +According to some accounts, he added two more instances of his "loyalty +and frankness" by stating that, when the War was over, the Powers would +have no objection to the restoration of King Constantine, if such +should be the wish of the Greek people--a statement which he authorized +M. Zaimis to publish;[14] and that they had no intention to bring M. +Venizelos back: as soon as the unity of Greece was achieved, the +Salonica Government would disappear; only later on M. Venizelos might +return to office by the legal way and after new elections. On the +other hand, if the Ultimatum was not executed, he threatened the +downfall of the whole dynasty, the forcible establishment of a +Republic, and the immediate return of M. Venizelos.[15] + +The interview ended with a grim declaration by M. Jonnart that, unless +his decree was obeyed to the letter, he would do to Athens what the +Germans had done to his native Arras--reduce it to a heap of ruins.[16] + +{192} + +There could be no doubt that M. Jonnart meant business: he was an +ex-Governor of Algeria; his mentality and his methods had been formed +in the African school of International Law. Remonstrance was futile +and resistance would be fatal: a column was already marching into +Thessaly; part of an army corps had landed at Corinth; a powerful +squadron rode off Salamis with its guns trained on Athens; troops were +in the ports of Piraeus and Phaleron ready at a signal to land and +march on the capital. Confronted with the choice either to help in the +pacific liberation of his country or to witness its devastation, M. +Zaimis chose the lesser evil; and M. Jonnart was able to report, with +pardonable complacency: "I persuaded him to continue in office, to take +the message demanding his abdication to the King, and to advise the +King to accept." [17] + +With this message the Premier hurried off to Athens and straightway +communicated it to his sovereign. Immediately a Crown Council was +called at the Palace. Besides M. Zaimis, all the ex-Premiers and +leaders of parties were present: Rallis, Dragoumis, Skouloudis, +Gounaris, Lambros, Calogeropoulos, Dimitracopoulos, Stratos. From the +first the King announced that he had decided to accept the Ultimatum +and leave Greece with the Crown Prince, in order to spare her greater +calamities, such as would result from a conflict with the Entente +Powers. + +Whether Constantine would not have been better advised to have opposed +the landing of the Allies at Salonica; or interned their army when he +had it at his mercy; or arrested Admiral Dartige du Fournet and his +marines and held them, together with the Entente Ministers and +subjects, as hostages: whether by any of those acts he might not have +escaped this final blow, was now of small account: though the point +provides matter for very interesting speculation. Now, with his troops +and arms bottled up in the Peloponnesus and his people reduced by +starvation to helplessness, all chance of escape was cut off. A +pitiful situation, no doubt, but more pitiful had he attempted +resistance. In such event, the Powers would immediately declare that a +state of war existed {193} and France might acquire a permanent footing +by right of conquest.[18] + +Nevertheless, two only of the statesmen assembled, M. Zaimis and M. +Stratos, pronounced in favour of submission. The rest were against it. +True, they argued, Greece completely disarmed could offer no effective +resistance to the armies and fleets which hemmed her in on every side. +Yet it were better that the King should let violence be used against +him, better that he should be made the Powers' prisoner, than yield. +His hopes of sparing Greece greater calamities by his abnegation were +vain. No calamity could be greater than that which would be produced +by an acceptance of M. Jonnart's Ultimatum. They recalled all the +encroachments upon her neutrality, all the infringements of her +sovereignty, to which Greece had submitted unresistingly, trusting to +the Allies' solemn promises. And how had they kept those promises? +After the violation of so many pledges, how was it possible to put +faith in M. Jonnart's assurances? If the French troops pursued their +march into the country, imposed upon it Venizelos by force, dragged it +into the war, who could stop them? Better perish without dishonour. + +Such, in substance, were the arguments used. The King remained +unshaken. "We have no right to doubt the good faith of M. Jonnart," he +said. Despite past experience, the man who was perpetually accused of +having no scruple about breaking his word, was still slow to believe +that others could break theirs. He made all present promise that they +would use their utmost endeavours to have his decision accepted by the +people, so that no disturbance might aggravate a situation already +sufficiently menacing. They all left the Council Chamber in tears.[19] + +In the afternoon a Cabinet meeting took place under the presidency of +the King, who, quite unmoved by the objections and entreaties of his +Ministers, persisted in his resolution. It was then decided that M. +Zaimis should draw up the reply, and that the draft, after receiving +the {194} King's approval, should be communicated to M. Jonnart. This +was done, and M. Jonnart having declared himself satisfied, the +document was handed to him next morning. By that reply the Greek +Premier, after noting the three Powers' demand for the abdication of +King Constantine and the designation of his successor, briefly stated +that "His Majesty, solicitous as always only for the interest of +Greece, has decided to quit the country" (_not_ to abdicate) "with the +Crown Prince, and designates as his successor Prince Alexander." [10] + +Thus far the High Commissioner's enterprise had prospered beyond the +anticipations of the most sanguine. And now his anxieties began. From +the moment of his arrival the populace, which two years of contact with +the Allies had made suspicious, became very uneasy and excited. +Throughout the night of 10 June rumours circulated that an ultimatum of +an extreme nature had been presented to the Government. Groups were +formed in the streets and squares, discussing the situation, +criticizing the Government bitterly, and inveighing against M. Zaimis, +who, it was said, was ready to accept still more rigorous demands. The +crowds grew in numbers and vehemence as the night advanced; and, in the +morning of the 11th, while M. Zaimis was still with M. Jonnart, the +Government, to avert disturbances, issued a _communique_, stating that +all the rumours of fresh demands were devoid of foundation. The +Premier in his first conversation with the representative of the three +Powers had not detected any danger whatever either to the independence +of the country or to the dynasty or to the regime. On the contrary, M. +Jonnart had expressed the will of the Powers to see Greece great, +strong, and absolutely independent. Consequently the Greek people +ought to remain quiet, certain that by its peaceful conduct it would +contribute to the success of the King's and the Government's +efforts.[21] + +This declaration had calmed the public for a few hours. But after the +return of M. Zaimis from his second interview with the High +Commissioner, the object of M. Jonnart's mission began to leak out: the +whisper went round that the King's abdication was demanded. The hasty +{195} convocation of a Crown Council intensified the public uneasiness. +The special measures for the maintenance of order taken by the +authorities, the advice to keep calm whatever happened, which emanated +from every influential quarter, the haggard faces of all those who came +out of the Palace, left no doubt that something very serious was afoot. +More, it became known that during the night the Isthmus of Corinth had +been occupied by large numbers of French troops which had taken up the +rails of the line joining the Peloponnesus to the capital, that the +French fleet in Salamis Strait had been reinforced, that the three +Powers' Ministers had quitted their Legations and nobody knew where +they had slept. Hour by hour the popular distress increased, until +late in the afternoon the news spread through the town that the King +had decided to go; and as it spread, the shops closed, the church bells +began to toll as for a funeral, and masses of people rushed from every +side towards the Palace, to prevent the King from going. Soon all +approaches to the Palace were blocked and the building itself was +completely besieged by a crowd of agitated men and sobbing women, all +demanding to see their sovereign, and shouting: "Don't go! Don't go!" + +Numerous deputations appeared before the King and implored him to +change his mind--in vain. To one of them, sent by the officers of the +Athens garrison, he spoke as follows: "You know my decision. The +interest of our country demands that all, be they civilians or +soldiers, should submit to discipline. Keep calm and preserve your +prudence." To a delegation composed of the heads of the city guilds he +replied: "In the interests of the State, gentlemen, I am obliged to +leave the country. The people must have confidence in my advisers. +God will always be with us, and Greece will become happy again. I +adjure you, gentlemen, in the name of the Almighty, to offer no +opposition. Any reaction would be in the highest degree dangerous to +the State. If I, born and bred in Athens and Greek to the marrow of my +bones, decide to go, I don't do so, you understand well, except in +order to save my people and my country. Pray go to your corporations +and our fellow-citizens and tell them to cease from gathering: to be +calm and sensible, {196} because the King, at this moment, is +performing a sacred duty." [22] + +The same delegation succeeded in reaching M. Zaimis, and on coming out +it published through a special edition of a journal the result: "The +Premier, with tears in his eyes, and the other three Ministers present +at the audience, after relating the sequence of political events which +have led to this cruel decision about our beloved King, begged us to +advise the people in his name to face the crisis with sang-froid, and +to assure it that the abdication of the King is but temporary, since, +according to M. Jonnart's declaration, it rests with the people to call +him back after the War; that all resistance on the part of the people +will result in the abolition of the dynasty and the establishment of a +Republic under Venizelos; that the Allies would not recoil from a +bombardment of the capital and a military occupation; but if the people +keep quiet, there will be no military occupation of Athens, only some +soldiers may land at the Piraeus to stretch their legs--and so on." [23] + +Nothing, however, could allay the popular agony. As darkness fell, +Athens presented a strange sight--silent figures marching, one after +another, towards where King Constantine was spending his last night in +his capital. They made their forlorn pilgrimage without the least +noise, and as they went they passed other groups returning with equal +noiselessness. "It was," says an eye-witness, "as if the people of +Athens were visiting a tomb or a lying-in-state." [24] + +A crowd remained on guard all night long. About 4.30 a.m. a motor car +was seen drawing up at a side entrance of the Palace. The crowd +recognized the King's chauffeur and guessed that he had come for the +King and the royal family, who presently appeared at the door. The +guardsmen threw themselves on the ground as much as to say that the +vehicle must pass over their bodies. The King and royal family +withdrew, and the car went away empty. Two other attempts to leave the +Palace proved equally unsuccessful. The crowd would not let any door +be opened. Compact and silent, it mounted guard. + +{197} + +So passed the night; and the morning (12 June) dawned on the faithful +men and women who watched by the Palace. The churches again began to +toll funeral peals, and again thousands began flowing in the same +direction: the whole town through all its streets--mournful groups, +soon waxing to mournful multitudes, and other multitudes, streamed on. +From an early hour the Palace was again entirely surrounded: + +"We will not let you go," they shouted. "We want our King!" + +This was the answer the people made to the farewell message which the +King had caused to be posted at the street corners: "Obeying necessity, +and performing my duty towards Greece, I am departing from my beloved +country with my heir, leaving my son Alexander on the throne. I beg +you to accept my decision with serenity, trusting to God, whose +blessing I invoke on the nation. And that this sacrifice may not be in +vain, I adjure all of you, if you love God, if you love your country, +if, lastly, you love me, not to make any disturbance, but to remain +submissive. The least disorder, even if prompted by a lofty sentiment, +may to-day lead to the most terrible disasters. At this moment the +greatest solace for the Queen and myself lies in the affection and +devotion which you have always shown to us, in the happy days as in the +unhappy. May God protect Greece.--Constantine R." [25] Motionless and +silent groups read this message; but the crowd outside the Palace went +on crying, monotonously: "No! No!" and "He mustn't go!" + +These things began to fill the emissary of the Protecting Powers with +uneasiness. He felt that a clear manifestation of the fact that the +King had been superseded must be given to the populace.[26] A +proclamation in King Alexander's name was accordingly issued. +Simultaneously, a notice, the text of which, it is affirmed, had been +settled between the Government and M. Jonnart, was published. It ran: +"To-day at noon, after the administration of the oath to King +Alexander, M. Jonnart by a special messenger announced to the Greek +Government that it could send at once authorities to Salonica, since +the Provisional {198} Government is henceforward dissolved. It is +equally well-known that M. Venizelos shall not by any means come to +Athens, and that the Powers have no ulterior design to establish him in +power. Greece is nowise bound to pursue the policy of the Triumvirate, +but is free to adhere to her neutrality." [27] + +For all that, the people continued restive. The King's departure had +been fixed for noon; but in face of the popular unwillingness to let +him go, the departure seemed impossible. It became evident that the +methods of persuasion which sufficed for the Premier did not suffice +for the people. Something more effective than the march into distant +Thessaly and the landing at remote Corinth was needed. Accordingly, +the destroyers came into Phaleron Bay, and French troops began to +disembark.[28] The Athenians, however, did not seem to be cowed even +when they saw that the French troops advanced close to Athens. What +was to be done? Was M. Jonnart, after all, to succeed no better than +Admiral Dartige du Fournet? The ex-Governor of Algeria, put on his +mettle, acted promptly. He sent word to M. Zaimis that the King's +departure should not be any longer delayed: if the Greek police were +unable to disperse the crowd, the High Commissioner was ready to send +from the Piraeus some companies of machine-guns.[29] + +Then, at 5 p.m., a last attempt was made by the royal family to leave +the Palace. It succeeded, thanks to a feint which decoyed the crowd to +a side door, while the fugitives escaped by the main entrance. + +The day, in spite of all forebodings, ended without a disturbance. The +parade of overwhelming force by M. Jonnart and his unmistakable +determination to use it mercilessly had, no doubt, convinced a populace +quick to grasp a situation that opposition spelt suicide. But it was +mainly the example and exhortations of their King that compelled them +to suppress their rage and resign themselves to the inevitable. +For--Greece is a land of paradoxes--no full-blooded Greek, whether +statesman or soldier, was ever clothed with the same amplitude of +authority over his countrymen as this simple, upright, {199} kindly son +of a Danish father and a Russian mother, in whom the subtle Hellenes +found their ideal _Basileus_. + +And so the drama which had been staged for more than a year by French +diplomacy was satisfactorily wound up; and the curtain fell, amid the +applause of the spectators.[30] + + + +[1] Jonnart, pp. 60-67. + +[2] _Ibid_, pp. 109-10. + +[3] Nouveau Recueil General des Traites. By Ch. Samwer, Vol. XVII, +Part ii. + +[4] _Ibid._ + +[5] _Papers re Affairs of Greece_, 1830-32. + +[6] _Papers re Affairs of Greece_, 1826-30. + +[7] Wellington to Prince Leopold, 10 Feb., 1830. _State Papers_, +1820-30. + +[8] Duc de Broglie's Speech, 18 May, 1833. _Ecrits et Discours_, Vol. +II, pp. 415 foll. + +[9] Communique of the Russian Government, Reuter, Petrograd, 7 July, +1917. + +[10] Jonnart, pp. 70-95. + +[11] Jonnart, pp. 102-4. + +[12] See Art. 45. + +[13] Jonnart, pp. 109-12. + +[14] When the Greek Premier did so, M. Jonnart repudiated it as "a +mistake of M. Zaimis."--See _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[15] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, Geneva, 1917, pp. 13, 14. + +[16] Jonnart, p. 113. + +[17] _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[18] Even as it was, General Sarrail lamented the advent of M. +Venizelos at Salonica as "a Greek master-stroke" calculated "to keep +'the coveted city' Greek."--Sarrail, pp. 153, 154. He evidently +preferred not to have even a portion of Greece as an ally, that he +might treat the whole of it as an enemy. + +[19] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, pp. 14-18. + +[20] Jonnart, pp. 116-7. + +[21] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, p. 11. + +[22] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, pp. 28-9. + +[23] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, pp. 26-7. + +[24] _The Weekly Dispatch_, 17 June, 1917. + +[25] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, pp. 30-1. + +[26] M. Jonnart, in _The Times_, 11 July, 1917. + +[27] _Le Depart du Roi Constantin_, p. 34. + +[28] _The Weekly Dispatch_, 17 June, 1917. + +[29] Jonnart, p. 128. + +[30] Of all English newspapers the _Weekly Dispatch_ (17 June, 1917) +alone gave some account of this last scene of the drama. The rest +atoned for their self-denial in narrative by proportionate +self-indulgence in comment. One of them described the _coup_ as "a +distinct gain both to _our_ interests in the East and to our _moral_ +position in the world." British agents on the spot must have been +strangely blind to this aspect of the business; for General Sarrail +complains that the _coup_ succeeded in spite of the obstacles raised +"by our allies, the English. It was _a contre-coeur_ that 500 of their +men were furnished me for the descent on Thessaly. The Chief of the +British Staff, no doubt by order, sought to learn my plans that he +might telegraph them and ruin our action, etc."--Sarrail, p. 242. +Without for a moment accepting the French General's suggestions of +British double-dealing, we have every reason to believe that he was +right in the view that the disgraceful affair did not enjoy British +official sympathy. + + + + +{200} + +CHAPTER XIX + +M. Jonnart celebrated his triumph with yet another proclamation by +which he assured the Greek people that the "guaranteeing" Powers were +there to restore Constitutional Verity and the regular working of +constitutional institutions; that all reprisals against Greeks, to +whatever party they might belong, would be ruthlessly repressed; that +the liberty of everybody would be safeguarded; that the "protecting" +Powers, respectful of the people's sovereignty, had no intention of +imposing a mobilization upon it.[1] + +The sincerity of these professions was soon brought to the test. While +penning them, M. Jonnart had before him two lists of persons marked +down for reprisals. The first contained thirty victims, foremost among +them M. Gounaris, General Dousmanis, and Colonel Metaxas--M. Streit had +anticipated his doom by accompanying his sovereign into exile; these +were deported to Corsica. The second list comprised one hundred and +thirty persons--two ex-Premiers, MM. Skouloudis and Lambros, six +ex-Ministers of State, one General, one Admiral, other officers of high +rank, lawyers, publicists--who were to be placed under surveillance. +The King's three brothers--Princes Nicholas, Andrew, and +Christopher--were banished with their families to Switzerland. In +addition, certain individuals of lower class who had participated in +the events of 1 and 2 December, and whose culpability was vouched for +by the French Secret Service, were to be arrested and brought to +book.[2] + +M. Jonnart, forbidden by his diplomatic art from meddling openly in the +internal affairs of the country, caused this _epuration_ to be carried +out through M. Zaimis. It was hard for the poor Premier to expel +fellow-citizens {201} who had occupied eminent positions and with whom +he had been in close relations--not to mention the flagrant illegality +of such a proceeding.[3] But how could he hope to argue successfully +against a man who, under the appearances of a scrupulous conscience, +recognized no law? So it came that, after a long interview on board +the _Justice_ (16 June), M. Zaimis fell in with M. Jonnart's wish.[4] + +This rapid fulfilment of the "no reprisals" pledge was declared +necessary to make Athens safe for the Allies.[5] It certainly was +indispensable to make it safe for M. Venizelos, whose immediate return, +by a modification of the original plan, had been resolved upon. The +French, finding things composed into tranquility much sooner than they +anticipated, saw no cause for delay. Was it not a fact that whenever +the High Commissioner visited the capital, he met with nothing but +respect, sympathy, and cries of "_Vive la France_"?[6] It was: in all +ages, from the time of the Roman Consul Flamininus onwards, there have +been found Greeks loving liberators more than liberty. + +But M. Venizelos knew better. Whilst at Salonica, he used to assure +his Western friends that "the great majority at Athens remained +Venizelist. If proof be desired, it is only necessary to organize a +referendum, subject, of course, to guarantees of impartiality. Let the +King and his satellites be put aside for the moment, let controllers be +appointed from all countries . . . and let the people be asked to vote +freely. . . . I am sure of a great majority. Let them take me at my +word!" [7] When, however, the King and his satellites were about to be +put aside, M. Venizelos, as we have seen, had stipulated for some +months of delay; and now that they had been put aside, he still felt +that the partial _epuration_ did not suffice for his safety. No doubt, +the bayonets which had pulled the King down were able to set him up. +But M. Venizelos, for reasons both personal and patriotic, shrank from +leaning on foreign bayonets more than was unavoidable. He had no +desire to justify the nickname, bestowed upon him months ago, {202} of +"Archisenegalesos" ("Chief of the Senegalese")--an epithet conveying +the suggestion that he aimed at turning Greece into a dependency of +France. M. Jonnart seemed to share this laudable delicacy.[8] + +General Sarrail, however, cared nothing for appearances, but itched to +get M. Venizelos out of Salonica at the earliest possible moment. His +first favourable impression of the Cretan as "somebody" had not +survived closer acquaintance. He considered him wanting in courage. +He had no patience with his hesitations. He felt, in short, no more +respect for him than men usually feel for their tools; and since he had +never learned to put any restraint on his tongue, he expressed his +opinion of this "ex-revolutionary transformed into a Government man" +freely. The Greek was too discreet to say what he thought of the +Frenchman; but as he was not less vain and domineering, their +intercourse at Salonica had been the reverse of harmonious.[9] Thus +the Leader of the Liberals found himself prodded back to the city from +which he had been prodded nine months before. + +He arrived on board a French warship off the Piraeus on 21 June. But +he gave out that he did not intend to come to Athens, or to call +himself to power. An agreement, he said, had been reached between M. +Jonnart and M. Zaimis to the effect that a mixed Ministerial Commission +should be formed to negotiate the unification of the country.[10] That +was true. With his usual sense of propriety, the High Commissioner +would not dream of usurping the place of the acknowledged chiefs of the +Greek people. It was for them to take the initiative. The +"guaranteeing" Powers which he represented respected the national will +too much to dictate the terms of the fusion between the two sections +into which Greece had been so unfortunately divided. Therefore, he +invited the heads of the two Governments, M. Zaimis and M. Venizelos, +to enter into direct conversations: he offering to act as a simple +{203} adviser, mediator, at most arbitrator. Both seized on the +invitation.[11] + +The main question had already been settled between M. Jonnart and M. +Venizelos: the latter should return to power at once. But, legally he +could only return by a parliamentary election, and, as he could not +hope for a majority, neither he nor M. Jonnart wanted an election. It +was accordingly decided that, since no reliance could be placed on the +popular will of the present, an appeal should be made to the popular +will of the past: the Chamber of 13 June, 1915, in which M. Venizelos +had a majority, should be recalled to life, on the ground that its +dissolution, in their opinion, was illegal. This decision--so well +calculated to preserve externals with all the reverence which +expediency permitted--was, on 24 June, formally conveyed by the High +Commissioner to M. Zaimis, who, doing what was expected of him, +tendered his resignation. The High Commissioner thanked him and +promptly obtained from King Alexander a declaration that he was ready +to entrust the Government to M. Venizelos, who only asked for a delay +of two days to fetch his Cabinet from Salonica.[12] + +Meanwhile, the news that M. Venizelos was coming had spread, and the +return at that delicate moment of the yacht _Sphacteria_ which had +carried King Constantine away added fuel to the flame. In the evening +(24 June), the crew of the boat, joined by students and reservists, +paraded the streets with a portrait of the King and cried "Long live +Constantine!" The column of demonstrators grew as it went along--the +police being unable or unwilling to check it. Without a doubt, M. +Venizelos was right: the _epuration_ of the capital had not gone far +enough. To prevent surprises, General Regnault, commander of the +landing forces, immediately took the measures which he had carefully +planned in advance. By dawn of 25 June, French troops with artillery +had occupied all the heights round the town: they were to stay there as +long as M. Venizelos wanted them--and, perhaps, even longer.[13] + +{204} + +Under such conditions the People's Chosen formed his Ministry (26 +June), and nerved himself to face the people. Every preparation for +his entry into the capital had been made. Nothing remained but to fix +the hour. But this he evaded doing in a manner which puzzled and +exasperated the French General. It was the goal towards which they had +moved steadily and methodically, step tracing step, through so many +weary months--the crown of their joint adventure. Why, then, did he +not seize it? Why did he shrink from possession? What did he mean by +it? The General did not know. But he felt that it would not do. "M. +le President," he said to him, incisively, "Here you are in power; it +is up to you to assume the responsibility. I have the force in my +hands, and it is my business to secure your installation in Athens. +But I must have your instructions. Tell me what measures you want me +to take." The request was a command. M. Venizelos thanked the General +effusively, pressing his hands. "After all," he said, "it is certain +that people will always say that I did not return to Athens but with +the support of the Allies." Finally it was arranged that he should +land in the forenoon of 27 June. An ordeal which could not be avoided +ought not to be postponed. + +At the appointed hour the French troops entered Athens with their +machine-guns and occupied the principal points along the route by which +M. Venizelos was to proceed, while the vicinity of the Royal Palace +where he was to take the oath of office and the interior of it were +watched by 400 Cretan gendarmes, his faithful bodyguard, come from +Salonica. Notwithstanding all these precautions, M. Venizelos and his +Ministers, modestly averse from exposing themselves to the enthusiasm +of their fellow-citizens, motored at top speed straight to the Palace, +eschewing the central thoroughfares, and thence to the Hotel Grande +Bretagne, in the corridors of which also Cretan stalwarts mounted +guard. Thanks to this vigilance, as General Regnault observes, the +assassins whom the Premier and his friends feared to see rise from +every street corner, and even in the passages of the Palace and hotel, +had not materialized. But M. Venizelos, where his own life was +concerned, took no chances: a Cretan regiment {205} from Salonica +landed that afternoon to replace the foreign battalions.[14] + +Towards evening a demonstration organized in the square before the +hotel gave M. Venizelos an opportunity of appearing on the balcony and +making an eloquent speech. He reminded his hearers how the last +warning he had addressed to King Constantine from the balcony of his +house ten months ago had been disregarded, and how, in consequence, the +part of the nation still healthy had risen to save the rest. The cure +thus begun would go on until it had wrought out its accomplishment. In +due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to revise the +Constitution so as to place beyond peradventure the sovereignty of the +people. Meanwhile, the national system had been singularly enfeebled +and corrupted by the late autocratic regime: the public services did +not do their work as they ought; impurities had crept into the blood; +the body politic needed purging. He would put all this right. He +would restore the system to vigorous activity. Every impurity would be +cleansed from it, and pure, refreshed blood would circulate all over +the body politic, giving health to every fibre of the State. As to +matters external, he thought it needless to say that the place of +Greece was by the side of the Powers who fought for democracy.[15] + +The next two days saw this programme at work. + +A rupture of relations with the Central Empires, to be followed by a +mobilization, marked the end of Greek neutrality. King Alexander, as +yet a novice in statecraft, expressed surprise at the inconsistency +between these acts and the repeated assurances given to the Greek +people. He was told that the accession of M. Venizelos could mean +nothing else but war: his Majesty knew it: having accepted Venizelos, +he must accept his foreign policy.[16] + +Not less was the young king's shock at another act of the new +Government--the suspension, by a Royal Decree, of the irremovability of +judges which is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. "They +accused my father of {206} violating the Constitution," he said to M. +Jonnart, "and the first thing they ask me to do is to violate it." So +acute an interpreter of Constitutional Law could have small difficulty +in disposing of these scruples. He explained to the young monarch that +he could sign the decree without any compunction: the Constituent +Assembly which would be elected by and by to revise the Constitution +would legitimatize everything. He went on to give him a little, simple +lecture on the elements of Constitutional Verity, its theory and its +practice: "In a short time," he concluded suavely, "Your Majesty will +know on this subject as much as any of your Ministers,"--whenever he +experienced the need of further instruction, he only had to call the +High Commissioner, who promised to come and solve his perplexities in a +trice.[17] + +The soundness of the instruction might be questionable. But the source +from which it came gave it unquestionable weight. + +By the time M. Jonnart left Athens (7 July), he had every reason to +feel gratified at the complete success of his efforts. France's +protege was installed at the head of the Hellenic Nation, ready to lead +it forth by her side; the regular working of Constitutional +institutions was assured; and the foundations of a democratic +government were well and truly laid. In all history it would be +difficult to find a more signal instance of brute force and bad faith +triumphing in the name of Law and Verity. + + + +[1] Reuter, Athens, 16 June, 1917; Jonnart, pp. 137-40. + +[2] Jonnart, pp. 147-51, 179-80. + +[3] See Art. 4 of the Greek Constitution. + +[4] Jonnart, p. 147. + +[5] _Ibid_, p. 160. + +[6] _Ibid_, p. 170. + +[7] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327. + +[8] Jonnart, p. 159. + +[9] Sarrail, pp. 102, 153, 234-5. One of their quarrels arose from the +fact that General Sarrail claimed entire jurisdiction over the +inhabitants of the country, many of whom he had deported to France as +suspects and refused to give them up to the courts competent to deal +with them. + +[10] Reuter, Athens, 21 June, 1917. + +[11] Jonnart, p. 161. + +[12] Jonnart, pp. 162-73, 180-1. + +[13] Jonnart, pp. 176-8, 199-201. The Italians, who had stepped into +Epirus, only evacuated it when they made sure that their allies were +quitting Thessaly and Attica. + +[14] Regnault, pp. 100-2; Jonnart, p. 184; The _Morning Post_, 29 June, +1917. + +[15] Jonnart, pp. 185-90. + +[16] _Ibid_, pp.191-3, 195-6. + +[17] Jonnart, pp. 194-5. + + + + +{207} + +CHAPTER XX + +It is not my intention to give a minute and consecutive account of the +abnormal state which prevailed in Greece during a period of more than +three years. I will, for once, flatter its authors by imitating their +summary methods. + +M. Venizelos, hating monarchy, yet unable to dispense with it; +despising democracy, yet obliged to render it lip-homage; maintained +his own unlimited power by the same system of apparent liberty and real +violence by which he had attained it. The semblance of a free +Constitution was preserved in all its forms: Crown, Parliament, Press, +continued to figure as heretofore. But each only served to clothe the +skeleton of a dictatorship as absolute as that of any Caesar. King +Alexander, without experience or character, weak, frivolous and +plastic, obediently signed every decree presented to him. When +recourse to the Legislature was thought necessary, the Chamber +perfunctorily passed every Bill submitted to it. The newspapers were +tolerated as long as they refrained from touching on essentials. + +At the very opening of Parliament, for so we must call this +illegitimate assembly, the King, in a Speech from the Throne written by +M. Venizelos, expounded his master's policy, external and internal. +Externally, Greece had "spontaneously offered her feeble forces to that +belligerent group whose war aims were to defend the rights of +nationalities and the liberties of peoples." [1] Internally, she would +have to be purified by the removal of the staunchest adherents of the +old regime from positions of trust and influence. But neither of these +operations could be carried out save under the reign of terror known as +martial law. Parliament, therefore, voted martial law; and M. +Venizelos, "irritated by the arbitrary proceedings" {208} of the +Opposition, which protested against the restrictions on public opinion, +"emphasised the fact that the Government was determined to act with an +iron hand and to crush any attempt at reaction." [2] + +Never was promise more faithfully kept. Within the Chamber it soon +became a parliamentary custom to refute by main force. Sometimes +Liberal Deputies volunteered for this service; sometimes it was +performed by the Captain of the Premier's Cretan Guard, who of course +had no seat in the House, but who held a revolver in his hand. + +Out of Parliament the iron hand made itself felt through the length and +breadth of the country. + +With a view to "purging and uplifting the judiciary body" and "securing +Justice from political interference," [3] all the courts were swept +clean of Royalist magistrates, whose places were filled with members of +the Liberal Party. In this way the pernicious connexion between the +judicial and political powers, abolished in 1909--perhaps the most +beneficial achievement of the Reconstruction era--was re-established, +and Venizelism became an indispensable qualification for going to law +with any chance of obtaining justice. + +An equally violent passion for purity led at the same time, and by a +process as unconstitutional as it was uncanonical, to ecclesiastical +reforms, whereby the Holy Synod was deposed and an extraordinary +disciplinary court was erected to deal with the clerical enemies of the +new regime, especially with the prelates who took part in the +anathematization of M. Venizelos. Only five bishops were found in Old +Greece competent or compliant enough to sit on this tribunal; the other +seven came from Macedonia, Crete, and Mytilene, though those dioceses +were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose +sanction was neither asked nor given. With the exception of six, five +of whom belonged to the disciplinary court, all the prelates of the +Kingdom were struck by it: some were degraded and turned out to subsist +as they might, on charity or by the sale of their holy vestments; +others were sentenced to humiliating punishments; and {209} where no +plausible excuse for a trial could be discovered, exile or confinement +was inflicted arbitrarily. On the other hand, as many as repented +received plenary absolution. For instance, the Bishops of Demetrias +and Gytheion were deprived for having cursed M. Venizelos; but on +promising in future to preach the gospel according to him, they were +not only pardoned, but nominated members of the second disciplinary +court created to continue the purification of the Church. Even more +instructive was the case of the Metropolitan of Castoria who was tried, +convicted, and confined in a monastery, but after recanting his +political heresies was retried, unanimously acquitted, and reinstated. +All this, in the words of the Speech from the Throne, "to restore the +prestige of the Church." + +Side by side went on the reform of every branch of the Administration. +All the Prefects, and many lesser functionaries, were discharged. +Schoolmasters and schoolmistresses were dismissed by the hundred. The +National University, the National Library, the National Museum, the +National Bank, underwent a careful disinfection. In every Department +the worst traditions of the spoils system prevalent before 1909 were +revived and reinvigorated. Other measures marked an improvement on +tradition. Some two thousand Army and Navy officers, from generals and +admirals downwards, were put on the retired list or under arrest. And +an almost hysterical desire manifested itself to strike terror into +every civilian whom his opinions rendered objectionable and his +position dangerous to the new order: tactics the full brutality of +which was revealed in the treatment of M. Venizelos's principal +adversaries. + +M. Rufos, a former Cabinet Minister, languished in the Averoff gaol +from 1917 until the spring of 1920, when the Athenian newspapers +announced his release. About the same time M. Esslin, an ex-President +of the Chamber, who had been imprisoned at the age of seventy-eight in +the Syngros gaol, was released by death. + +All the members of the Skouloudis Cabinet, with the exception of +Admiral Coundouriotis, Minister of Marine who had afterwards proved his +patriotism by enlisting under the Cretan's banner, were arraigned for +high treason, {210} referring mainly to the surrender of Fort Rupel. +The preliminary examination dragged on from year to year and produced +only evidence which established the innocence of the accused.[4] One +of them, ex-Premier Rallis, in April 1920, after being for years +libelled as a traitor, suddenly found himself exempted by Royal Decree +from further persecution, because at that time M. Venizelos conceived +the hope that this statesman might be induced to undertake the +leadership of an Opposition accepting his regime. The rest, +particularly M. Skouloudis and M. Dragoumis, one aged eighty-two and +the other seventy-seven, after a long confinement in the Evangelismos +Hospital, remained to the end under strict surveillance, with gendarmes +guarding their houses and dogging their footsteps. + +The Lambros Cabinet was similarly harassed, until one of its members +turned Venizelist and three others died; among the latter M. Lambros +himself and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Zalocostas. Both +these gentlemen, though in poor health, had been confined on desolate +islets of the Archipelago, where they were kept without proper medical +attendance or any of the comforts which their condition required, and +were only brought home to expire. + +In each case--as also in that of the soldiers responsible for the +surrender of the Cavalla garrison, whose "treasonable" conduct became +likewise the subject of judicial investigation--trial was sedulously +deferred by a variety of ingenious contrivances; nothing being more +remote from the Government's mind than an intention to draw the truth +into the light. The motive of these proceedings doubtless was one of +policy chiefly--to ruin the enemies of the regime in public esteem by +branding them as traitors, even if no conviction could be obtained. +But policy was not the only element. To judge by the harshness +displayed, there was the personal factor, too. M. Venizelos had had a +feud with these men and had vanquished them. They were men whom, all +things considered, it was more a shame to fight than an honour to +vanquish--and they were humbled: they were in his power. For a proud +spirit that would have been enough; it was not enough for {211} M. +Venizelos. He acted as if he wanted to enjoy their humiliation, and +because he had them down to profit by their helplessness. + +Identical treatment could not be meted out to those in Corsica and +Switzerland, though some of them were sentenced to death by default for +conspiring against M. Venizelos. But all that could be done from a +distance to embitter their lot was done. Whilst at home the blackest +calumnies were thrown upon them: in exile they were pursued by the same +blight. Special attention was directed to the "arch-traitor." He had +been dethroned and expatriated; but this was not enough. His pension +was cut off. He and all the members of his family, with the exception +of Prince George, who stayed in Paris, were forbidden to visit Entente +countries, even for the purpose of attending the death-bed of a +relative. Entente subjects visiting Switzerland were forbidden to go +near them: lest any particle of the truth should percolate. Until the +end of the War they lived segregated, shunned, and spied upon like +malefactors. During the Liberal regime in Greece, while Italian and +Swiss hotels flourished all the year round on Royalist refugees, +Royalist exiles populated the semi-desert islands of the Archipelago: +they were gathered in batches and shipped off--persons of every degree, +from general officers whose guilt was attachment to their King, down to +poor people convicted of owning the King's portrait. For the +possession of a portrait of Constantine supplied one of the most common +proofs of "ill-will towards the established order" (_dysmeneia kafa tou +kathestotos_)--a new crime invented to meet a new constitutional +situation. It extended to the utmost confines of the kingdom. As the +farmers were at work in the fields, gendarmes raided and ransacked +their cottages for such portraits; butchers and fishmongers were haled +before courts-martial for like indications of ill-will; and--matter for +laughter and matter for tears are inseparable in modern Greek history +(perhaps in all history)--one met a cabman beaten again and again for +calling his horse "Cotso" (diminutive of "Constantine"), or a woman +dragged to the police-station because her parrot was heard whistling +the Constantine March. Volumes would be needed to record the petty +persecutions which arose from {212} the use of that popular name: +suffice it to say that prudent parents refrained from giving it to +their children. + +If enemies had to be frightened by every exhibition of severity, it was +not less imperative to gratify friends by every mark of generosity. As +already noted, a Mixed Commission had been appointed under the old +regime to indemnify out of the public purse the Venizelists who +suffered during the Athens disturbances of 1 and 2 December, 1916. +This body, after the expulsion of the King, was remodelled by the +substitution of a Venizelist for the Royalist Greek member; was +authorized to enlarge its purview so as to cover all losses occasioned, +directly or indirectly, by Royalist resentment throughout the Kingdom +throughout the six months' blockade--including even the cases of +persons who, compelled to flee the country, were torpedoed in the +course of their voyage; and was invested with powers of deciding +unfettered by any legislation or by any obligation to give reasons for +its decisions. Thanks to their unlimited scope and discretion, the +Commissioners, after rejecting some 2,500 claims as fraudulent, were +still able to admit 3,350 claims and to allot damages representing a +total sum of just under seven million drachmas.[5] + +The number of old adherents confirmed in the faith through this +expedient, however, was as nothing to the legions of proselytes won by +the creation of new Government posts of every grade in every part of +the Kingdom, by the facilities afforded in the transaction of all +business over which the State had any control--which under existing +conditions meant all important business--and by the favours of various +sorts that were certain to reward devotion to the cause. Beside the +steadily growing swarm of native parasites, profiteers, jobbers and +adventurers who throve on the spoils of the public, marched a less +numerous, but not less ravenous, host of foreign financiers, concession +and contract hunters, to whom the interests of the State were freely +bartered for support to the party in the Entente capitals. + +The economic exhaustion caused by this reckless waste of national +wealth, in addition to the necessary war {213} expenditure, was +concealed at the time partly by credits furnished to M. Venizelos in +Paris and London, and partly by an artificial manipulation of the +exchange for his sake. It became apparent when these political +influences ceased to interfere with the normal working of financial +laws. Then the Greek exchange, which at the outbreak of the European +War stood at 26 or 27 drachmas to the pound sterling, and later was +actually against London, dropped to 65, and by a rapid descent reached +the level of 155. Thus in the domain of finance, as in every other, +the valuable reconstructive achievement of 1909--which had led to the +transformation of a deficit of from ten to twelve millions into a +surplus of fifteen millions and to the accumulation of deposits that +enabled the Greek exchange to withstand the shock of several +conflicts--was demolished by its own architect. + +The illusion that M. Venizelos had the nation behind him was diligently +kept up by periodical demonstrations organized on his behalf: joy bells +announced to the Athenians his home-comings from abroad, the destitute +refugees harboured at the Piraeus were given some pocket money and a +free ticket to attend him up to the capital, the cafes at the bidding +of the police disgorged their loafers into the streets, and the army of +genuine partisans thus augmented with auxiliaries, accorded their Chief +a reception calculated to impress newspaper readers in France and +England. But observers on the spot knew that the "national enthusiasm" +was as hollow as a drum, which under the manipulation of an energetic +minority could be made to emit a considerable amount of noise; that the +demonstrators to a large extent were a stage crowd which could be moved +rapidly from place to place and round the same place repeatedly; that +since the schism the great Cretan had loomed small in his own country +and that he had grown less by his elevation. + +Such terrorism of opponents and favouritism of adherents; such +encouragement of oppression and connivance at corruption; such a +prostitution of justice; such a cynical indifference to all moral +principle--unparalleled even in the history of Greece--could not but +make the Cretan's rule both odious and despicable. What made it more +hateful still in the eyes of the people was the fact {214} that it had +been imposed upon them by foreign arms, and what made it more +contemptible still was the fact that it functioned under false +pretences. As free men, the Greeks resented the violence done to their +liberty; but as intelligent men they would have resented open violence +less than a profanation of the name of liberty that added mockery to +injury and administered a daily affront to their intelligence. There +was yet a spirit of resistance in the country which would not be +crushed, and a fund of good sense which could not be deceived. If they +formerly anathematized M. Venizelos as a traitor, the masses now +execrated him as a tyrant: a mean and crafty bully without bowels of +mercy who gave licence to his followers to commit every species of +oppression and exploitation in the interest of party. + +Such were the feelings with which the very name of Venizelos inspired +the mass of the people. And that the mass of the people was in the +main right can scarcely be contested. It would, of course, be absurd +to hold M. Venizelos directly responsible for every individual act of +oppression and corruption, most of which occurred during his absences +from the country and of which he was not cognizant. But it was he who +had initiated both oppression and corruption. M. Jonnart's +prescriptive lists were really M. Venizelos's, who had long since made +his own enemies pass for enemies to the Entente. The "purification" of +the public services, as well as the prosecutions, the imprisonments and +deportations of eminent personages, some of whom died of the hardships +and privations they underwent, were his own doing. The multiplication +of offices and officials began with his creation, at the very outset, +of two new Ministries; a measure to which even King Alexander demurred +when the list of M. Venizelos's Cabinet was presented to him.[6] Nor +is there upon record a single case in which the Chief seriously +attempted either to restrain or to punish his subordinates. In truth, +he was not free to do so. He was bound to the system he had brought +into being and was irretrievably committed to all its works. + +A man who gains supreme power against the wishes of {215} the majority, +and only with the consent of a faction, cannot maintain himself in it +except by force and bribery. He must coerce and corrupt. Moreover, to +rule without a rival, he must surround himself with men vastly inferior +to him both in talent and in virtue: men who, in return for their +obsequious servility, must be humoured and satisfied. Whenever such a +usurpation occurs, all the maxims upon which the welfare and freedom of +a community normally rest are annihilated, and the reign of profligacy +and of tyranny inevitably supervenes: a regime born in party passion +must live for purely party ends. + +We may break or circumvent all laws, save the eternal and immutable law +of cause and effect.[7] + +The best of M. Venizelos's followers sincerely regretted the unceasing +persecution of their adversaries: they saw that stability could not be +attained without conciliation and co-operation; but they did not see +how clemency could be combined with safety. The thousands of officers +and officials who had been turned out of their posts, and the +politicians who were kept out of office found employment, and the +private individuals who had suffered for their "ill-will towards the +established order" relief in plotting and intriguing: there was so much +unrest that the authorities had to use severe measures. + +M. Venizelos himself wished to make his administration milder and +cleaner and to broaden its basis--he was even credited with the one +joke of his life in this connexion: "I will yet head anti-Venizelism." +But the thing was beyond his power: he had not a sufficient following +in the country to replace armed force; and he dared not trust the +Royalists with a share in the government for fear lest they should use +it against him. None, indeed, was more painfully conscious of the hate +for him which every month increased in the breasts of his countrymen +than M. Venizelos himself. From the very beginning of the schism he +had assumed a prophylactic in the form of a cuirass;[8] and since his +installation he neglected none of {216} the precautions requisite for +his personal security. During his rare sojourns in Athens he always +went about escorted by his Cretan guards; while on the roof of a +building facing his house stood two machine-guns, "for," as a witty +Athenian informed an inquisitive stranger, "the protection of +minorities." + +In general, it is true, the plotting and intriguing which permeated the +country were too fatuous to be dangerous. But every now and then they +took on formidable shape. In November, 1919, a carefully organized +military conspiracy at Athens only miscarried through the indiscretion +of a trusty but tipsy sergeant. Among the letters intercepted and +produced at the trial was one from a Royalist exile in Italy to another +at home. The writer, a lady, reported her brother as wondering how +anybody in Greece could fail to understand that there no longer existed +such things as a Government and an Opposition, but only tyrants and +tyrannized over, who worked, the former to maintain their arbitrary +authority, the latter to shake it off and recover their liberty. The +work of neither could, in the nature of things, be carried on according +to any constitutional rule or law. He went on to argue that, under +such conditions, deeds which would otherwise be crimes were justified +and even glorified by history as unavoidable fulfilments of a patriotic +duty: force must be met by force.[9] + +So the national demoralization inaugurated by foreign pressure went on +being promoted by domestic tyranny; and of cure there was no hope. +Good men would not associate themselves with the Venizelist regime, +because it was bad; and even men by no means notorious for goodness +shunned it, not because it was bad, but because they were shrewd enough +to perceive it was too bad to last. + + + +[1] For the full text of the Speech, see _The Hesperia_, 10 Aug., 1917. + +[2] The _Morning Post_, 9 Aug., 1917. + +[3] Speech from the Throne. + +[4] It also brought to light documents of real historic value, such as +the dispatches included in the _White Book_ (Nos. 70 foll.). + +[5] _Rapport officiel de la Commission mixte des indemnites_, Paris, +1919. + +[6] Jonnart, p. 183: "A clean sweep in Greece."--The _Daily Chronicle_, +2 July, 1917--an outline of M. Venizelos's programme. + +[7] There have been usurpers, like Oliver Cromwell, who managed to +temper tyranny with probity; but their cases are exceptional and their +success only a matter of degree. + +[8] An article of this kind was found in his house after the fighting +of 2 Dec., 1916. + +[9] _The Hestia_, 27 Dec. (O.S.), 1919. + + + + +{217} + +CHAPTER XXI + +The Liberal regime, having few roots in the soil and those rotten, could +not but be ephemeral, unless the external force that had planted +continued to uphold it: in which case M. Venizelos might have lived to +weep over the triumph of his cause and the ruin of his country. This +contingency, however, was eliminated in advance by the clashing ambitions +of the Allies--the real guarantee of Greek independence. Foreign +interference, made possible by the War, had to cease with it. And that +was not all. M. Ribot, on 16 July, 1917, had declared in the French +Senate that the changes brought about in Greece would have to be ratified +by a Greek National Assembly. M. Venizelos also had, as we saw, stated +on his advent that the 1915 Chamber was but a temporary solution: that in +due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to settle matters--a +statement which he repeated shortly afterwards in Parliament: "The +representatives of the Nation," he said, "watch with perfect calmness the +internal evolution of the political life of the country and wait for the +removal of the obstacles which do not permit the immediate convocation of +the National Assembly that will lay definitely the basis of the State." + +After nearly three years of "internal evolution," the time for the +redemption of these pledges seemed to the people overdue. In vain did M. +Venizelos endeavour to put off the day of trial by arguing that it was +advisable to avoid the agitation inseparable from an election whilst +Greece was still at war with Turkey, and by promising that the elections +would follow close upon the signature of peace. It was natural that he +should adopt this course: he could not but hope that the fruits of his +foreign policy--fruits never even dreamt of a few years before--would +reconcile the people to his domestic administration. It was equally +natural that the people should be impatient: {218} Turkey may not sign +peace for ages, they protested; meanwhile are we to go on living under +martial law? They demanded the dissolution of the illegal and, at best, +long superannuated Chamber, and fresh elections. The call for freedom +grew louder, more insistent, more imperious and dangerous, until M. +Venizelos took a first tentative step towards a return to normality. + +On 6 May, 1920--the day of the publication of the Turkish Peace terms +granted by the Allies at San Remo--a Royal Decree was issued at Athens +abolishing martial law. As at a signal, the Press turned its +search-lights on the inroads made into the Constitution. Abuses and +excesses hitherto held back by the Censorship gained publicity. +Political groups started organizing themselves for the electoral contest, +with every grievance of the past as an incitement to action in the +future. Most disturbing manifestation of all--though one that might have +been foretold--streets and taverns resounded again with the song in which +King Constantine was referred to as "The Son of the Eagle" leading his +army to glory. Evidently the efforts to root up loyalism had not +succeeded: far from it. + +While M. Venizelos grew less by his elevation, King Constantine was +raised by his humiliation to a condition, if not actually divine, +half-way towards divinity. In many a house his portrait stood among the +holy icons, with a light burning before it, and the peasants worshipped +it much as their pagan ancestors would have done. It was but the +culmination of a process long at work--a process in which the historical +element was strangely mingled with the mythical.[1] Since the Balkan +Wars, King Constantine had been identified in the peasant mind with the +last Byzantine _Basileus_--his namesake, Constantine Palaeologus, slain +by the Turks in 1453; who, according to a widely believed legend, lay in +an enchanted sleep waiting for the hour when he should wake, break with +his sword the chains of slavery, and replant the cross {219} on the dome +of Saint Sophia. This singular fancy--whether a case of resurrection or +of reincarnation, is not clear--was strengthened by the fact that his +fall occurred on the very anniversary (29 May/11 June) of the day on +which that unfortunate Emperor fell in the ramparts of Constantinople. +The coincidence completed the association between the monarch who +sacrificed his life to save his people from subjection and the monarch +who, after leading his army in two victorious campaigns and doubling the +extent of his country, did not hesitate to sacrifice his crown to save +his people from disaster. Henceforth, even in minds not prone to +superstition, the two events were linked by the same date, the mourning +for the one rekindled the memory of the other, and King Constantine +acquired a new and imperishable title to the gratitude of the nation. If +all the efforts made in the past to blast his glory or to belittle his +services had only heightened his popularity, all the efforts made since +to blot out his image could only engrave it still deeper on the hearts of +the people. His very exile was interpreted, symbolically, as the +enchanted sleep whence he would arise to fulfil the ancient prophecies. + +Mysticism apart, during the sad period preceding his departure, the +affection of the masses for their sovereign, intensified by compassion, +had assumed the quality of veneration. Now that he was gone, they +brooded over the wrongs which had driven him, a lawful and popular king, +into exile: wrongs which suffered for their sakes enhanced his claims on +their loyalty. They remembered wistfully the splendour of his victories, +his manly courage, his saintly patience, and perhaps most of all his +unfailing kindness to the humble and the weak. This was the quality +which drew men most strongly to Constantine, and the absence of which +repelled them most from M. Venizelos.[2] The experience of the last +three years had helped to emphasize the contrast: when the Eagle's Son +was up above, there were few vultures in the land; now there were +vultures only. So the name of Constantine became a synonym for orderly +government, loyalty to his person was identified with the principle of +liberty, and the people who had never regarded Alexander as anything more +than {220} a regent, who cried after the departing monarch from the shore +at Oropus: "You shall come back to us soon," hailed the return to +normality as presaging the return of the legitimate sovereign as well as +of a legal Constitution. + +This, however, was the very last thing the powers that were contemplated +even as a remote potentiality. For them the monarch in exile was dead; +and the sooner his memory was buried the better. Accordingly, a police +circular, issued on 26 May, prohibited conversations favourable to the +ex-king, pictures of the ex-king, songs in honour of the ex-king, cheers +for the ex-king. And, these regulations having been found insufficient +to curb royalist fervour, five days later M. Venizelos demanded and +obtained from Parliament the re-establishment of martial law, on the +ground that "talk about the return of the ex-king was calculated to +excite public feeling; and then the Opposition might have cause to blame +the Government for not respecting the freedom of elections." The +question of the ex-king, he argued, was utterly irrelevant to the +forthcoming contest: the people would not be called upon to elect a +Constituent, but merely a Revisionist Assembly: "Who has said there is to +be a Constituent Assembly?" he asked. + +The answer, of course, was easy: he himself had said so, on his +installation in 1917. But lapses of memory are permissible to statesmen +who mean business. M. Venizelos wanted a National Assembly which would +have powers to ratify the dethronement of the King, the suspension of the +irremovability of judges, and all other revolutionary illegalities, +besides perhaps altering fundamental articles of the Constitution--such +as the right of the Crown to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to +dissolve Parliaments--powers which essentially belong to a Constituent +Assembly. But he wanted it to be merely Revisionist. The paradox made +havoc of his logic; but it no way affected his purpose; which was that, +while as Constituent in its nature the Assembly should effect any +alterations in the government of the country that he desired, as +Revisionist in name it would not be competent to discuss the restoration +of the King, and, if it proved recalcitrant, would be subject to +dissolution by the {221} executive. Consistency and M. Venizelos had +been divorced long ago, and the decree was now to be made absolute. + +While these eccentricities prevailed at home, abroad the gamester-spirit +of the Cretan scored its crowning triumph. By the Treaty of Sevres (10 +Aug., 1920), which embodied the territorial arrangements already made at +San Remo, Greece obtained practically the whole of Thrace outside the +enclave of Constantinople, and a mandate over Smyrna and its hinterland. +No doubt, this enormous extension of the kingdom, though still largely +problematical, appealed to that compound of idealism and greed (mostly +greed) which constitutes Hellenic, as it does all other, Imperialism. +But it did not fully compensate for the suppression of popular liberties +within its frontiers. Except among the followers of M. Venizelos the +national aggrandisement evoked but little enthusiasm: "What is a man +profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" wrote +one of the Opposition leaders, voicing a widespread sentiment--a +sentiment which, only two days after the publication of the Treaty (12 +Aug.), found sinister expression. As he was about to leave Paris, M. +Venizelos was shot at and slightly wounded by two Greek ex-officers. The +assailants, on being arrested, declared that their object had been "to +free Greece from its oppressor and to ensure freedom for their +fellow-citizens." [3] + +The Paris outrage had a sequel at Athens, as significant and more tragic. +The followers of M. Venizelos, like those of King Constantine, included a +set of fanatics who preached that the salvation of the country demanded +the extirpation of their adversaries. To these zealots the moment seemed +propitious for putting their doctrine into practice. "Hellenes!" cried +one of their journals, "our great Chief, our great patriot, the man who +has made Greece great and prosperous, the man who has made us proud to be +called Greeks, has been murdered by the instruments of the ex-King. +Hellenes, rise up all of you, and drive the murderers out of the +fatherland." The Hellenes in general remained unmoved. But some gangs +of hooligans did rise up (13 Aug.) and, under the eyes of the police and +the _gendarmerie_, wrecked a number of Royalist newspaper {222} offices, +clubs, cafes, and sacked the houses of four prominent anti-Venizelist +statesmen. The authorities, on their side, had a dozen leaders of +Opposition groups thrown into prison and, pending their conviction, M. +Repoulis, a Minister who in the absence of M. Venizelos acted as his +Deputy, declared that the attempt on the Premier formed part of a plot +long-planned for the overthrow of the regime: it had failed, but the +heads of the culprits would fall without fail. In fact, one of the +Opposition leaders--Ion Dragoumis, son of the ex-Premier of that +name--was assassinated by the Cretan guards who had arrested him. The +others, after being kept in solitary confinement for twenty-four days, +had to be released for want of any incriminating evidence. + +M. Venizelos in Paris, when he heard of the riots, was reported as being +beside himself with righteous indignation; and he sent a strongly-worded +telegram to the Government, expressing the fear that part of the +responsibility for the disorders rested upon its organs, and assuring it +that he should exact full account from everyone concerned.[4] But when +he returned home he publicly embraced M. Repoulis, who explained in the +Chamber to the entire satisfaction of his Chief that the Government had +been overawed and very nearly overthrown by the extremists in its own +ranks (8 Sept.). + +Everything that could be done--short of a massacre--to disorganize and to +intimidate the Opposition having been done, martial law was suspended (7 +Sept.), and the question of Elections began to engage M. Venizelos's +attention seriously. It was a trial which involved his political life or +death, and therefore required the utmost care and vigilance: one +ill-considered step, one omission on his part might send him to his doom. + +He began with the enfranchisement of Thrace (9 Sept.). This province, +still under military occupation and martial law, was to vote: further, a +political frontier was erected between it and the rest of Greece, which +only those possessing a special pass could cross, whilst a rigorous +censorship kept all anti-Venizelist newspapers out of it; and, lastly, it +was enacted, for the benefit of an electorate alien in its majority and +unable to read or write Greek, that the {223} Thracian votes, contrary to +the general rule, should be polled by ballot paper, instead of by a ball. + +Another Bill enabled the army on active service, for the first time in +the history of Greece, to participate in elections, the assumption being +that among the soldiers Venizelist feeling predominated, or that, at all +events, they would be controlled by their officers. + +As exceptional importance has always attached to the district and city of +Athens--"which," M. Venizelos said, "symbolizes the very soul of the +country," [5]--it was incumbent upon him to pay special attention to this +area. The difficulty was that the actual population was notoriously +unsympathetic. M. Venizelos hastened to overcome this difficulty by +three strokes of the pen: 18,000 refugees from all parts who lived on the +Ministry of Public Relief were enrolled as Athenian citizens; to these +were added some 6,000 Cretan gendarmes and policemen; and, to make up the +deficiency, 15,000 natives of Smyrna, supposed to have earned Greek +citizenship by volunteering in the war, had their names inscribed on the +electoral lists of Attica. + +There followed promises and warnings. On the one hand, the people were +promised fresh labour legislation, the conversion of the great landed +estates into small holdings, and public works on a large scale. On the +other hand, they were warned that an adverse vote from them would have +disastrous consequences for the country: Greece had been aggrandized by +the Allies for the sake of M. Venizelos; if she discarded him, she would +forfeit their goodwill and her territorial acquisitions. But M. +Venizelos and his partisans did not trust altogether to the practical +sense and the Imperialist sensibilities of the people. + +For months past the extremists among his followers openly threatened +that, if by any mishap Venizelos did not win the day after all, they +would make a _coup d'etat_ and strike terror into the hearts of their +adversaries. This threat, which primarily presented itself as an +extravagance of irresponsible fanaticism, was on 7 September officially +espoused by M. Venizelos, who declared in Parliament that, should +perchance his adversaries obtain a majority in the new Assembly, and +should that Assembly decide {224} to convoke a Constituent Assembly, and +should this Constituent Assembly invite King Constantine back, the +"Reaction" would find itself confronted with the hostility of a large +political party which had become the mortal enemy of the ex-king; and he +went on to foreshadow a fresh schism in the army: that is, civil war. +Encouraged by so solemn a sanction, Venizelist candidates--notably at +Tyrnavo in Thessaly and Dervenion in Argolis--told their constituents +without any circumlocution that, in the event of a defeat at the polls, +the Government would not surrender its power, but would maintain it +through the Army of National Defence, which was pledged to a new +Revolution: the Parliamentary system would cease to function even in +name, and many a malignant would swing. + +These appeals to the sovereign people, published in the Royalist and not +contradicted by the Venizelist Press, will doubtless seem startling for a +Government whose mission was to establish democratic liberties. But they +were justified by necessity. M. Venizelos and his partisans could not +afford to be very fastidious: their political existence was at stake: +they must make every effort, and summon every resource at their command. +Anyone who was in Athens at that time and saw the Cretan guards, often +with the Premier's photograph pinned on their breasts, assault such +citizens as displayed the olive-twig (emblem of the Opposition), or saw +the gendarmes, who patrolled the streets with fixed bayonets, protect the +excesses of Venizelist bravoes, would appreciate how far the Government +was prepared to stoop in order to survive. + +In the midst of these electoral activities, King Alexander died--of blood +poisoning caused by the bite of a pet monkey. Alive he had neither +exercised nor been wanted to exercise any influence over the destinies of +his country: he had simply played the part required by the cast in which +a whimsical fortune had placed him. His death proved of more importance, +inasmuch as it forced the question of the throne upon M. Venizelos +irresistibly: the vacancy had to be filled. Anxious to perpetuate the +comedy, M. Venizelos sought a successor in a still younger and +less-experienced scion of the dynasty: Prince Paul, a lad in his teens, +who refused the offer on the ground that, until his father and his eldest +brother renounced their rights, {225} he could not lawfully ascend the +throne. After threatening to change the dynasty rather than admit any +discussion on the restoration of King Constantine, M. Venizelos, by one +of those swift turns characteristic of him, suddenly made that +restoration the main issue of the Elections. He challenged the +Opposition to this test of the real wishes of the Greek people. The +Greek people, he said, should be given the chance of deciding whether it +will have Constantine back; and if it so decided, he himself would go. + +The Opposition, which consisted of no fewer than sixteen different groups +united only by a common desire to get rid of the Cretan Dictator, would +fain decline the challenge. Some of the leaders were ardent Royalists; +others were very lukewarm ones; and others still could hardly be +described as Royalists at all. Generally speaking, the politicians out +of office had found in the cause of Constantine a national badge for a +party feud. Moreover, they realized that the question of Constantine +possessed an international as well as a national aspect, and they did not +wish to compromise the future of Greece and their own; which would have +been nothing else than stepping into the very pit M. Venizelos had dug +for them. But neither could they repudiate Constantine without losing +popular support: to the Greek people the main issue of the fight was +indeed what M. Venizelos made it. + +At length the day of trial arrived: a Sunday (14 Nov.)--a day of leisure +in a land of universal suffrage. From an early hour people of all +classes thronged the polling-stations quietly. They had clamoured for a +chance of expressing their sentiments; yet now that the chance had come, +they took it with an extraordinary composure. Even to the most expert +eye the electors' demeanour gave no indication of their sentiments: the +olive-twig had very curiously withered out of sight. Nor did the +behaviour of the voters in the last three years afford any clue to the +use they would make of their present opportunity. Greeks are past +masters of simulation and dissimulation. Openly some might have +pretended friendship to the Venizelist regime from hopes of favour, +others again dissembled hostility through fear; but the voting was secret. + +Both Government and Opposition shared the suspense, {226} though the +Government anticipated an overwhelming majority;[6] which was natural +enough, since all the advantage seemed on its side. + +Presently the votes were counted--and "it was officially announced that +the Government had been mistaken in its anticipations." The magnitude of +the mistake appeared on the publication of the figures: 250 seats to 118: +the Royalists had swept the polls, to the astonishment of all parties, +including their own.[7] The very men who had fought at the bidding of M. +Venizelos had pronounced themselves against him: having fulfilled their +duty as soldiers, they vindicated their right to live as free citizens. +His own constituency had rejected him. And would the rout stop there? +Among the millions who had submitted to his rule with sullen irritation +there were many whose hearts swelled with rage, in whom old wounds +rankled and festered: might not these men now have recourse to other +weapons than the vote in order to get even with the bully? + +For a moment M. Venizelos felt stupefied: the edifice that had seemed so +solid was collapsing about him, and he was in danger of being buried +under the ruins. Then he wisely stole out of the country he had done his +best to aggrandize and to disintegrate.[8] + +The result of the elections was virtually an invitation to King +Constantine to return and resume his crown. But the King, not content +with an indirect verdict, wanted an explicit plebiscite _ad hoc_, clear +of all other issues. The Allies, after a conference in London, +telegraphed (2 Dec.) {227} to M. Rallis, the new Greek Premier, that they +"had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, but they +felt bound to declare publicly that the restoration of the throne to a +king whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the +War caused them great embarrassment and loss could only be regarded by +them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts." [9] This +message--yet another fruit of Franco-British compromise--was followed up +(6 Dec.) by a second Note, enumerating the consequences, political and +financial, of the Powers' displeasure. But it produced little effect: +out of the 1,013,724 electors who took part in the plebiscite (7 Dec.), +only 10,383 voted against the King.[10] M. Rallis, in acquainting him +with the result, stated that he considered it tantamount to a formal +request from the country to the Sovereign to come into his own again, and +invited him to respond to the clearly expressed wish of the nation. +Which King Constantine did, nothing loth. + +Few of those who witnessed the event will ever forget it. On the eve of +the King's return (18 Dec.) Athens could scarcely contain her emotion. +All day long her beflagged streets rang with the cry: "_Erchetai! +Erchetai!_" ("He is coming! He is coming!")--hardly anybody failed to +utter it, and nobody dared to say "_Then erchetai_" ("He is not coming"), +even if referring to an unpunctual friend. At night the song in which +Constantine was alluded to as "The Son of the Eagle" echoed from one end +of the illuminated city to the other. But this was only a preparation +for next morning's welcome. + +Owing to stress of weather the cruiser carrying the King and Queen of the +Hellenes was compelled to put in at Corinth, where the exiles landed. +From that point to the capital their journey was a triumphal progress. +The train moved slowly between lines of peasants who, their hands linked, +accompanied it, shouting: "We have wanted him! We have brought him +back!" [3] When {228} the King stepped out at the station, officers +fought a way to the carriage with blue and silver dressed postillions +which waited for him and the Queen. He had to keep tossing from one hand +to the other his baton, as men and women pressed upon him for a +handshake. The carriage struggled forward, men and women clinging to its +steps and running with it, trying to kiss the hands and feet of the royal +pair, and baulked of this, kissing even the horses and the carriage +itself. All the way dense masses of people pressed round the carriage, +shouting: "He has come!" or singing the chorus, "Again our King will draw +the sword." An eye-witness had a vision of a soldier who, amid cries of +"We will die for you, Godfather!" clambered into the carriage head first +and fell to kissing the knees of the King and Queen, while around people +fainted and stretchers pressed through the crowd.[12] + +And so the fight for the soul of Greece ended in a victory for +Constantine. + +The character of this prince has been painted in the most opposite +colours, as must always be the case when a man becomes the object of +fervent worship and bitter enmity. But the bare record of what he did +and endured reveals him sufficiently. His qualities speak through his +actions, so that he who runs may read. His most conspicuous defect was a +want of suppleness--a certain rigidity of spirit which, when he +succeeded, was called firmness, and when he failed, obstinacy. Yet the +charge so often brought against him, that he allowed himself to be misled +by evil counsellors, shows that this persistence in his own opinion did +not spring from egoism nor was incompatible with deference to the +opinions of others. It arose from a deep sense of responsibility: he +stubbornly refused to deviate from his course when he believed that his +duty to his country forbade deviation, and he readily laid down his crown +when duty to his country dictated renunciation. For the rest, a man who +never posed to his contemporaries may confidently leave his character to +the judgment of posterity. + +As for M. Venizelos, history will probably say of him {229} what it has +said of Themistocles: Though he sincerely aimed at the aggrandizement of +his country, and proved on some most critical occasions of great value to +it, yet on the whole his intelligence was higher than his morality--a man +of many talents and few principles, ready to employ the most tortuous and +unscrupulous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves patriotic, +but often merely for aggrandizing himself. By nature he was more fitted +to rule in a despotic than to lead in a constitutional State. Had he +been born an emperor, his fertile genius might, unless betrayed by his +restless ambition, have rendered his reign prosperous and his memory +precious. As it is, in his career, with all its brilliance, posterity +will find not so much a pattern to imitate as an example to deter. + + + +[1] There is always so much of mystery surrounding the peasant mind, that +its workings must often be accepted rather than understood. But those +who wish to understand somewhat the psychological process which led in +antiquity to the deification of kings during their life-time could not do +better than study the cult of Constantine among the modern Greek +peasantry. + +[2] See Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920. + +[3] The _Daily Mail_, Aug. 13, 1920. + +[4] _Eleutheros Typos_, 5/18 Aug., 1920. + +[5] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327. + +[6] "Even if the Opposition sweeps the Peloponnese and gains a majority +in Acarnania and Corfu, it is still doubtful whether it will have 120 +seats in the new Chamber, which will contain 369 Deputies; and the +Venizelists anticipate that their opponents will emerge from the struggle +with less than 100 Deputies."--_The Times_, 15 Nov., 1920. + +[7] The _Daily Mail_; The _Evening News_, 16 Nov, 1920; Reuter, Athens, +15 Nov.: "Not a single Venizelist was returned for Macedonia and Old +Greece, except in Epirus and Aegean Islands." + +[8] We learn that his followers "urged upon him the advisability of a +_coup d'etat_. It would have been the easiest thing in the world to +carry out, and with so much at stake for Greece and for democratic +principles generally, it seemed justifiable."--"M. Venizelos at Nice," in +_The Times_, 29 Nov., 1920. But, "fears are entertained, it is said, +that the regular Army--which is strongly anti-Venizelist--may get out of +hand."--The _Daily Mail_, 17 Nov. + +[9] The terms of the Note were communicated to the House of Commons by +Mr. Bonar Law the same night. + +[10] Reuter, Athens, 9 Dec., 1920. + +[11] Another version of this refrain, which might be seen in crude +lettering over a cafe at Phaleron, is: "So we willed it, and we brought +him back" (_Etsi to ethelame, kai ton epherame_)--a distinct expression +of the feeling that the people, by bringing back its sovereign in the +face of foreign opposition, asserted its own sovereignty. + +[12] See _The Times_, 20 Dec.; The _Daily Mail_, 21 Dec., 1920. + + + + +{230} + +AFTERWORD + +In default of a Providence whose intervention in human affairs is no +longer recognized, there still is a Nemesis of history whose operations +can scarcely be denied. International morality, strange as the +juxtaposition of the two words may seem, exists no less than the law of +gravity; and a statesman who offends against the one must expect much +the same catastrophe as an engineer who ignores the other. But it is +not often that this law of retribution asserts itself so swiftly as it +has done in the drama for which Greece supplied the stage to French +statesmen during the last few years; for it is not often that a +Government in the pursuit of practical interests overlooks so +completely moral principles, flouts so openly national sentiments, and, +while priding itself on realism, shuts its eyes so consistently to +realities. + +The logic of French action is as above reproach, as its motives are +beyond dispute. + +Nine decades ago the Duc de Broglie clearly explained that the aim of +France in assisting to liberate Greece from the Turkish yoke was to +have in the Eastern Mediterranean an instrument of her own ambition: "a +State disposed to turn her eyes constantly towards that Power who has +made her free--to watch for us over the ports of the Levant, to guard +with us the mouth of the Black Sea and the keys of the Bosphorus +[Transcriber's note: Bosporus?]";--it followed that the greater the +client, the better for the patron's purpose. After undergoing many +fluctuations and modifications, this idea was revived at the time of +the Balkan wars, when France, together with Germany, supported the +Greek claim to Cavalla, and it was fostered to an unhealthy growth +during the European War. Hence the identification of France with M. +Venizelos, who stood for a policy of expansion at all hazards, and her +hostility to King Constantine who, preferring safety to hazardous +ventures, stood for Greece's right to shape her course without +dictation from Paris any more than from Berlin. + +{231} + +By the methods which she employed, France succeeded in gaining Greece +and losing the Greeks. Nothing else could have been expected: friends +are sometimes to be won by good offices; sometimes by the promise of +good offices; and sometimes by good words. They are seldom won by +injuries, and by insults never. It is curious that so elementary a +lesson in human nature should have been unknown to the able men who +guided the policy and diplomacy of France during the War, who raised +her military prestige and re-established her position in the first rank +of the European Powers. Yet it is a fact--a fact which can be easily +verified by a reference to their utterances: they are upon record. +Brute force, and brute force, and again brute force: such is the burden +that runs through them all; and it embodies a doctrine: the Greeks are +Orientals and must be wooed with terror: on the notion, enunciated by +an English humorist as a paradox, and adopted by French statesmen as an +axiom, that terror sown in the Oriental heart will yield a harvest of +esteem--even of affection. With this mad dogma nailed to her mast, +France set out upon her voyage for the conquest of the Hellenic heart. +It was the first of her mistakes--and it was accompanied by another. + +Even if Greece were willing to play the part of a French satellite, she +could not do so; for her geographical situation exposes her to the +influence of more than one Power. Italy, who has her own ambitions in +the Eastern Mediterranean, opposed during the War a policy the object +of which was Greek expansion over territories coveted by herself and a +readjustment of the balance of forces in favour of France; and it was +partly in order not to alienate Italy during the War that French +statesmen wanted Greece to come in without any specified conditions, +leaving the matter of territorial compensations for the time of +settlement. Russia showed herself not less suspicious of French +diplomacy for similar reasons. But it was with England chiefly that +France had to reckon. In the past the rivalry between France and +England in the Eastern Mediterranean, though often overshadowed by +their common antagonism, first to Russia and subsequently to Germany, +was a perennial cause of discord which kept Greece oscillating between +the two Powers. + +{232} + +During the War England, of necessity, lent France her acquiescence and +even assistance in a work which she would rather not have seen done. +But, once done, she endeavoured to secure such profit as was to be +derived therefrom. The Greeks in Asia Minor--it was thought--could +serve to check the Turks from troubling us in Mesopotamia and other +parts of the Near and Middle East. Hence the Treaty of Sevres, which +provided for the aggrandizement of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman +Empire in Asia as well as in Europe, to the seeming satisfaction of +both French and British interests. But the adjustment--even if it had +been forced upon Turkey--could, by the nature of things, be only +temporary. Owing to her geographical situation, Greece must inevitably +move within the orbit of the Power who dominates the sea. + +Psychology accelerated a movement imposed by geography. While France +based her action upon an English humorist's paradox, England based hers +upon a French thinker's maxim: _Lorsqu'on veut redoubler de force, il +faut redoubles de grace_. Although her diplomatic, military, and naval +representatives did participate in every measure of coercion and +intimidation as a matter of policy, they (if we except the Secret +Service gentry) never forgot the dictates of decency: they never, +figuratively, kicked the person whom they deemed it necessary to knock +down. The ordinary British soldiers, too, for all the relaxation of +moral rules natural in war, maintained throughout the campaign a +standard of behaviour which contrasted so favourably with their +comrades' that it earned them among the inhabitants of Macedonia the +honourable nickname of "the maids." It was particularly noted during +the fire which devastated Salonica that, while others took advantage of +the turmoil to loot, the British soldier devoted himself wholly to +rescuing. Some of these things were perhaps resented by our allies as +weak, and some were ridiculed as naive; but they must be judged by +their effect. At the end of the War one nation was respected by the +Greeks as much as the other was hated and despised. British prestige +rose exactly in proportion as French prestige sank. And the object +which France elected to seek, and sought in vain, by {233} means of +violence and terror, England attained by a conduct which, if not more +lawful, was much more graceful. + +Still, French statesmen counted on M. Venizelos--"_l'homme politique +qui incarne l'idee de la solidarite des interets francais et +grecs_"--to keep his country on their side. And as in the first +instance they had made the alliance conditional on his being placed in +control, so now they made the benefits accruing from it to Greece +dependent on his remaining in control. That M. Venizelos could not +always remain in control does not seem to have occurred to them. Nor +that he might not always be content to be a mere puppet in their hands. +Murmurs at his pro-British leanings were indeed heard occasionally. +But on the whole the Cretan possessed in an adequate measure the +faculty of adapting himself to rival points of view, of making each +Power feel that her interests were supreme in his regard, and of using +the ambitions of both to promote his own. As long as he remained in +control, France, with whatever reservations, felt sure of her share of +influence. + +The collapse of M. Venizelos and the demand of the Greek people for +King Constantine's return, came to French statesmen as a painful +surprise. That they had for several years been laboriously building on +illusions could not be disguised, and being made to look absurd before +those of their own compatriots who had all along advocated a policy +based on the preservation and exploitation of Turkey, rendered the +situation doubly awkward. Unable to rise above personal pique, they +would fain veto the return of a prince whom they hated and whom they +had wronged beyond hope of conciliation. England, however, free from +petty animosities, and sensible that, under whatever ruler, Greece +would be with her, refused to sanction lawlessness in the midst of +peace; and her view that, if the Greeks wanted Constantine, it was +their business and not ours, prevailed. But, on the other hand, by way +of compromise, France obtained that he should return to an empty +treasury, with foreign credits cut off, and the loans made by the +Allies to the Venizelist Government, to facilitate the waging of a +common war against Turkey, revoked. + +It was an impossible position which King Constantine was called upon to +face: a position none of his own making, {234} yet one from which there +was no retreat. The Greek people's imperialism had been roused. The +leaders who once criticized M. Venizelos's Asiatic policy as a +dangerous dream, opposed to economic, strategic, and ethnic realities, +might still hold those views and mutter in secret that Smyrna would +prove the grave of Greece; but they no longer dared express them, out +of deference to public opinion. To the masses M. Venizelos's wild game +of chance seemed vindicated by its results, and while they rejected the +man they clung to his work. + +The Greek Government had no choice but to carry on the conflict under +enormous disadvantages. As France anticipated, with foreign credits +cut off and a progressive fall in the exchange, the expense of +maintaining a large army on a war footing proved too heavy for the +National Exchequer. And that was not the worst. France, who since the +Armistice had betrayed a keen jealousy of England's place in a part of +the world in which she claims special rights, presently concluded a +separate agreement with Turkey--an example in which she was followed by +Italy--and gave the Turks her moral and material support in their +struggle with the Greeks; while England, though refusing to reverse her +policy in favour of their enemies, contented herself with giving the +Greeks only a platonic encouragement, which they were unwise enough to +take for more than it was worth. + +Everyone knows the melancholy sequel: our unhappy "allies," left to +their own exhausted resources, were driven from the Asiatic territories +which in common prudence they should never have entered; and the +overseas Empire which M. Venizelos had conjured up vanished in smoke. + +The rout in Asia Minor had its repercussion in Greece. For nearly two +years the people, though war-worn and on the edge of bankruptcy, bore +the financial as they had borne the famine blockade, trusting that +England would at any moment come forth to counter the vindictiveness of +France, and sturdily resisted all the efforts of the Venizelist party +to shake the stability of the Royalist regime: Constantine again +appeared in their eyes as a victim of the Cretan's intrigues. But the +loss of Ionia and the danger of the loss of Thrace; the horror and +{235} despair arising from the sack of Smyrna, whence shiploads of +broken refugees fled to the Greek ports; all this, reinforced by an +idea that the maintenance of the King on the throne prevented the +effective expression of British friendship and his fall would remove +French hostility, created conditions before which questions of +personalities for once faded into insignificance, and put into the +hands of M. Venizelos's partisans an irresistible lever. + +On 26 September an army of 15,000 insurgent soldiers landed near Athens +and demanded the abdication of the King. The loyal troops were ready +to meet force by force. But the King, in order to avert a fratricidal +struggle which would have dealt Greece the finishing stroke, forbade +opposition and immediately abdicated, "happy," as he said, "that +another opportunity has been given me to sacrifice myself once more for +Greece." In fact, once more Constantine was made the scape-goat for +disasters for which he was in no way responsible--disasters from which +he would undoubtedly have saved his country, had he been allowed to +pursue his own sober course. + +M. Venizelos would not go back to Athens until the excitement subsided, +lest people should think, he said, that he had had any part in the +revolution: but undertook the defence of the national interests in the +Entente capitals. His mission was to obtain such support as would +enable him to save Greece something out of the ruin which his insane +imperialism had brought upon her, so that he might be in a position to +point out to his countrymen that he alone, after the disastrous failure +of Constantine, had been able to secure their partial rehabilitation. +That accomplished, he might then hope to become a perpetual Prime +Minister or President. + +France made it quite clear that no changes in Greece could alter her +policy: however satisfied she might be at the second disappearance of +the antipathetic monarch, it should not be supposed that, even were a +Republic to be set up, presided over by the Great Cretan, her attitude +on territorial questions would be transformed: Thrace, after Ionia, +must revert to Turkey. French statesmen longed for the complete +demolition of their own handiwork. M. Poincare, in 1922, was proud to +do what the Duc de Broglie ninety years before scoffed at as an {236} +unthinkable folly: "_Abandonner la Grece aujourd'hui, detruire de nos +propres mains l'ouvrage que nos propres mains ont presque acheve!_" + +England's expressed attitude was not characterized by a like precision. +It is true that after the Greek debacle she dispatched ships and troops +to prevent the Straits from falling into the hands of the Turks; but in +the matter of Thrace she had already yielded to France: and how the +restoration of Turkish rule in Europe can be reconciled with the +freedom of the Straits remains to be seen. + +What the future may have in store for Greece and Turkey is a matter of +comparatively small account. What is of great and permanent importance +is the divergence between the paths of France and England revealed by +the preceding analysis of events. + +From this analysis have been carefully excluded such superficial +dissensions as always arise between allies after a war, and were +especially to be expected after a war in which every national +susceptibility was quickened to a morbid degree: they belong to a +different category from the profound antagonisms under consideration. +These--whatever the philosopher may think of a struggle for +domination--present a problem which British statesmen must face +frankly. It is not a new problem; but it now appears under a new form +and in a more acute phase than it has ever possessed in the +past--thanks to the success of the "knock-out blow" policy which +governed the latter stages of the War. + +With the German power replaced by the French, the Russian for the +moment in abeyance, French and Italian influences competing in Turkey, +French and British aims clashing in the Arab regions wrested from +Turkey--while indignation at Occidental interference surges in the +minds of all the peoples of the Orient--the Eastern Mediterranean +offers a situation which tempts one to ask whether the authors of that +policy have not succeeded too well? Whether in pursuing the success of +the day--to which their personal reputations were attached--they did +not lose sight of the morrow? Whether they have not scattered the seed +without sufficiently heeding the crop? However that may be, unless +this situation was clearly foreseen by its creators and provided for--a +hypothesis {237} which, with the utmost goodwill towards them, does not +appear very probable--they have an anxious task--a task that, under +these conditions, demands from British statesmanship more thinking +about the Near Eastern question and the Greek factor in it than was +necessary before 1914. + +As a first aid to an appreciation of the problem by the public--which +the present crisis found utterly unprepared--it would have been well if +the fundamental differences between the respective attitudes of France +and England towards each other and towards the peoples concerned had +been candidly acknowledged, and all pretence of Franco-British +co-operation in the Near East abandoned. Lasting co-operation cannot +be where there is neither community of interests nor consonance of +ideas: where the loss of one party is welcomed as gain by the other, +and the wisdom of the one in the eyes of the other is folly. Pious +talk of a common Allied mission in the Near East has only served to +obscure issues and to render confusion in the public mind worse +confounded. It was idle to make a mystery of the support given by +France to the Turks and of her insistence on the revision of the Sevres +Treaty--preliminary steps to her demand for the evacuation of Chanak +and the consequent elimination of British sea-power. The object of +these tactics was evident to every serious student of history: France +pursues now the plan laid down by Louis XIV, continued by Napoleon, +fitfully carried on throughout the nineteenth century, and facilitated +by her installation in Syria--the equivalent of the German _Drang nach +Osten_: a plan incompatible with the safety of the British Empire in +the East. This is the truth of the matter, and nothing has been gained +by hiding it. + +The people who fought a ruinous war without quite knowing the ends +aimed at, had a right to know at least the results obtained; and after +France's separate agreement with Turkey, the denial to them of any part +of that knowledge could not be justified on any principle of honour or +plea of expediency. + + + + +{239} + + INDEX + + + Achilleion, 92 + Albania, Suggested partition of, 19 + Alexander, King, 197, 203, 205-7, 219, 224 + Andrew, Prince, 123, 200 + Asia Minor, Concessions to Greece in, 19, 22-26, 32, 34, 35, 37, + 221, 232. + ---- ----, Greeks driven from, 234 + Athens, Naval demonstrations against, 82, 102, 110, 111 + ----, Fighting at, 159-161 + ----, Bombardment of, 160 + ----, Occupation of, 204 + ----, Conspiracy at, 216 + ----, Riots at, 221, 222 + ---- electorate, 223 + Austria and Greece, 9 + ---- and Servia, 7, 17, 22 + Averoff, M., 183 + ---- gaol, 209 + + Balkan League, 4, 19, 20, 24, 27 + Benazet, M., Negotiation of, 146, 147, 150-152 + Blockades, 82, 101, 164, 172-176, 184 + Boulogne, Conference at, 140, 185 + Bratiano, M., 22 + Briand, M., 76, 86, 89, 100-103, 105, 116, 131, 132, 146 + Broglie, Due de, 188, 230, 235 + Bucharest Treaty, 7-9, 18 + ----, Conference at, 18 + Bulgaria and Greece, 7, 8, 21, 23, 67 + ---- ---- Servia, 7, 17, 21, 62 + ---- ---- Turkey, 21, 52 + ---- ---- Central Powers, 27, 40 + ---- ---- Entente, 21, 28, 38, 40, 43, 57, 60, 66, 144 + Buelow, Prince von, 47 + + Callimassiotis, M., 92 + Calogeropoulos, M., Premier, 124-132, 140, 192 + Canea, 92, 128, 130, 132 + Castellorizo, 85, 86 + Castoria, Metropolitan of, 209 + Cavalla allotted to Greece, 10, 230 + ----, Proposed cession of, to Bulgaria. 20, 23-25, 39, 41-42 + ---- surrendered to Germano-Bulgars, 118-21 + Cephalonia, 86, 177 + Cerigo, 177 + Chanak, 237 + Chios, 130 + Church, Greek, 175, 176, 208, 209 + Churchill, Mr. Winston, 13 + Cochin, M. Denys, 81 + Constantine, King: his popularity, 1, 2, 75, 131, 175, 198, 218-220 + ----, ----; policy, 5, 8-12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 34, 35, 38, 55, 81, + 114, 124, 144, 146, 150, 156, 181, 230 + ----, ----: defeat in 1897, 1, 74 + ----, ----, and M. Venizelos, 5, 14, 15, 53-57, 115, 133, 145, 181 + ----, ----, and the Kaiser, 9, 10, 56, 69, 95, 96, 170 + ----, ----, Agitation against, 70, 121, 127, 143, 145, 167, 181, 182 + ----, ----: dethronement, 186, 191-199 + ----, ----: restoration, 227, 228 + ----, ----: character, 198, 199, 228 + ----, ----: abdication, 235 + Constantinople, Russia and, 31, 32 + Constitution, Greek, 70-74, 191, 201, 205, 220 + Corfu, 85, 86, 91, 177 + Corinth, 186, 190, 192, 195, 227 + Coundouriotis, Admiral, 103, 131, 133, 183, 209 +{240} + + Crete, 2, 86, 128, 130, 133-136, 208 + Crewe, Lord, 41, 42 + Crimean War, 103 + Crown Councils, 29, 68, 170, 192 + Cuninghame, Sir Thomas, 82 + Cyprus, 66, 75 + + Danglis, General, 133 + Dardanelles, 14, 15, 27-31, 34, 59, 72. _See also_ "Gallipoli" + Dartige du Fournet, Admiral, 91, 92, 110, 112, 129, 130, + 131, 139, 141, 143, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153-160, 163-164 + Delcasse, M., 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 76 + Delyannis, M., 74 + Demidoff, Prince, Russian Minister at Athens, 32, 35, 104, 112 + Demir-Hissar, Bridge of, 85 + Deville, M., quoted, 13, 28, 40, 51, 57 + Dimitracopoulos, M., 123, 192 + Dousmanis, General, 81, 112, 200 + Dova-tepe, Fort, 99 + Dragoumis, Ex-Premier, 192, 210 + ----, Ion, 222 + Drama, 109, 118, 121 + + Elections of June, 1915, 33, 50 + ---- ---- December, 1915, 75 + ---- demanded and eluded (June-September, 1916), 102, 106-108, + 114, 115, 123 + ---- of November, 1920, 222-226 + Eleusis, 111, 174 + Elliot, Sir Francis, British Minister at Athens, 35, 88, 104, + 114, 117, 123, 125, 128, 142, 145, 149, 156, 165 + England, Policy of, 13, 20, 22, 31, 42, 56, 77, 102, 104, 106, + 128, 144, 185, 186, 232-234, 236 + Esslin, M., 209 + Evangelismos hospital, 210 + + Falkenhayn, General von, 95-97 + Fleet, Greek, 131, 141, 148, 149 + Florina, 85 + France, Policy of, 13, 31, 46, 77, 87, 103, 129, 144, 153, 155, + 183-185, 230, 231, 233-235, 237 + + Gallipoli, 14, 30, 31, 36, 43, 50, 63, 73. _See also_ + "Dardanelles" + Gauchet, Admiral, 164, 190 + George, King of Greece, 71 + ----, Prince, 35, 38-40, 134-137, 156, 211 + Gerakini, 91 + Germany and Greece, 11, 87, 89, 95-98, 121, 122 + Goerlitz, Greek troops interned at, 121 + Gounaris, M., Premier, 33-46, 200 + Grey, Sir Edward, 22, 23, 25, 35, 56, 59, 60, 66, 101, 102 + "Guarantee" of Greek constitution, 187-189 + Guillemin, M., French Minister at Athens, 37, 56, 61, 82, 88, + 102, 104, 106, 110, 117, 118, 129, 146, 152, 164 + + Hamilton, General, 59 + Hatzopoulos, Colonel, 108, 118-121 + Hautefeuille, M., 172 + Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von, 118, 119, 121, 170 + Holy Synod, Appeals from, 176 + ---- ---- deposed, 208 + + Ionia, 234, 235 + Italian troops in Macedonia, 108 + ---- ---- ---- Epirus, 203 + ---- policy, 231, 234 + + Jagow, Von, 97 + Jonnart, M., his mission to Greece, 186, 189-206 + + Kaiser, The, and King Constantine, 9, 10, 117, 180, 181 + ----, ----, ---- Queen Sophie, 169, 170 + Kara-Burnu, 85 +{241} + + Katerini, 96, 147 + Kerr, Admiral Mark, 10, 14, 15, 219 + Kitchener, Lord, 13 + ----, ----, on French policy, 76 + ----, ----, in Greece, 81 + Krivolak, 79, 95 + + Lambros, Prof., Premier, 141, 143, 149, 154, 158, 181, 200, 210 + Larissa, 118 + Lemnos, 58, 130 + Leucas, 178 + London, Treaties of (1863 and 1864), 86 + ----, Conference in, 186 + + Macedonia, Allies in, 76-80, 82-85, 108 + ----, Germano-Bulgarian invasion of, 94, 97, 98, 108, 109 + ----, Elections in, 94, 109 + ----, British soldiers' conduct in, 232 + Mercati, M., 55, 56 + Metaxas, Colonel, 29, 8l, 112, 200 + Milne, General, 101 + Milo, 82, 111 + Monastir, 67, 77, 95, 145 + Moschopoulos, General, 59, 82 + Moudros, 58 + Mytilene, 58, 94, 130, 133, 208 + + Near East, Franco-British rivalry in, 231, 237 + Neutral zone, 147, 148, 168, 178, 180 + Nicholas, Prince, 123, 200 + + Oropus, 220 + Otho, King, 103, 125, 187 + + Painleve, M., 186 + Palaeologus, Emperor Constantine, Legend of, 218 + Passitch, M., 18, 40, 42, 51 + Paul, Prince, 224 + Peloponnesus, 146, 167, 169, 171, 192, 195 + Phaleron, 198 + Piraeus, 103, 110, 120, 127, 141, 143, 159, 165, 176, 190, 202, 213 + Poincare, M., 38, 40, 235 + Politis, M., 47, 183 + + Rallis, M., 30, 80, 210, 227 + Regnault, General, 190, 203, 204 + Repoulis, M., 222 + Reservists, 107, 117, 127, 171, 184, 203 + Ribot, M., 184, 186, 190, 217 + Rome, Conference at, 169, 185 + Roques, General, 147, 152 + Rufos, M., 209 + Rumania, 9, 10, 18, 21-24, 113, 116 + Rupel, 97, 98, 99, 210 + Russia and Greece, 31, 32, 43, 104, 126, 157, 184, 185, 189 + ---- ---- Bulgaria, 62 + ---- ---- Servia, 18 + ---- ---- Turkey, 19, 27 + + Salamis, 111, 149, 190, 195 + Salisbury, Lord, on Greek policy in 1897, 74 + Salonica, Allies' landing at, 56, 58-62, 64, 74 + ---- in state of siege, 100 + ----, Revolt at, 110 + ----, Fire at, 232 + Samos, 130, 133 + San Remo, 218 + Sarrail, General, 79, 82, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 108, 110, 164, + 178, 179, 181, 183, 202 + Sazonow, M., 18, 19, 31 + Schenck, Baron, 140 + Secret Services, French and British, 90-93, 107, 112, 117, + 127-130, 179 + Serres, 109, 118, 120 + Servia, Greek alliance with, 7, 8, 17, 33, 51, 52, 55, 58, 65, 66 + ----, Entente and, 18, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 51 + Sevres, Treaty of, 221, 232, 237 + Skouloudis, M., Premier, 69 + ---- and Entente, 77-79, 8l-84, 88, 89, 99, 100 + ---- ---- Germany, 87, 89, 95-98 +{242} + + Skouloudis, M., Premier, placed under surveillance, 200 + ---- impeached, 209, 210 + Smyrna, 35, 36, 221, 223, 234, 235 + Sophie, Queen, 160, 169, 170, 173 + Staff, Greek General: Dardanelles, Plans of, 15, 16 + ----, ---- ----, and Servia, 17, 40, 41, 49, 52 + ----, ---- ----, ---- King Constantine, 13, 31, 35, 72, 73 + ----, ---- ----, ---- M. Venizelos, 25, 28, 29, 45, 55, 62, 73, 81 + ----, ---- ----, ---- Lord Kitchener, 81 + ----, ---- ----, on Gallipoli enterprise, 28, 29, 31, 36, 47 + ----, ---- ----, opposed to Asiatic expansion, 25, 26 + Straits, Russia and the, 31 + ----, France and the, 230 + ----, England and the, 236 + Stratos, M., 192, 193 + Streit, M., 8, 12, 13, 15, 34, 45, 112, 200 + Struma, 85, 97 + Submarines, German, Alleged fuelling of, 90-92 + Suda Bay, 86, 128, 133 + Syngros gaol, 209 + Syra, 177 + Syria, 237 + + Talaat Bey, 18 + Tatoi, 53, 55 + Thasos, 120, 130 + Therisos movement, 134, 136 + Thessaly, 145, 147, 168, 178, 180, 181, 186, 190, 192 + Thrace, 19, 221, 222, 234, 235, 236 + Turkey and Entente, 4, 13, 19, 232, 233, 235, 236 + Turkey and Germany, 10, 13, 18, 19 + ---- ---- Bulgaria, 19, 52 + ---- ---- Greece, 13, 18, 19, 217, 218, 232, 233, 234 + + Venizelos, Eleutherios: early career, 2-5, 133-136 + ----, and King Constantine, 5, 14, 15, 29, 50, 53-57, 109, 110, + 136, 137, 183, 220, 225. + ----: policy, 7, 8, 12-14, 20, 21-27, 28-32, 51, 53, 55, 61, 68, + 127, 205, 207, 221, 230 + ----: first resignation, 31 + ----: return to power, 50 + ----: popularity, 5, 50 + ----: second resignation, 63 + ----: unpopularity, 75, 94, 107, 108, 175, 176 + ----: agitation, 44-48, 70-74, 92-94, 99, 127 + ----: rebellion, 106, 110, 128-131, 133, 136-138 + ----: Salonica Government, 133, 140, 147, 148, 168, 169, 174, + 177, 178 + ----: anathematization, 175 + ----: elevation, 202-206 + ----: rule, 207-216 + ----: attempt on his life, 221 + ----: fall, 226 + ----: character, 229 + ----: representative of Greece in Entente capitals, 235 + Vlachopoulos, Colonel, 52, 53 + Volo, 120 + + Wellington, Duke of, 188 + + Zaimis, M., Premier, 65-69, 102, 108, 114-119, 181, 190-203 + Zalocostas, M., 210 + Zante, 177 + Zappeion, 143, 159, 160 + Zographos, M., 33, 37, 41 + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Greece and the Allies 1914-1922, by G. 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