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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings + +Author: John Abercrombie + +Release Date: August 21, 2007 [EBook #22364] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL FEELINGS *** + + + + +Produced by Thierry Alberto, Janet Blenkinship and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + +<h1>THE<br /><br /> + +PHILOSOPHY<br /><br /> + +OF THE<br /><br /> + +MORAL FEELINGS.</h1> + +<h4>BY</h4> + +<h2>JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M.D. <span class="smcap">Oxon. & Edin.</span></h2> + +<h4>V. P. R. S. E.</h4> + +<h3>FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF EDINBURGH;<br /> +MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF MEDICINE OF FRANCE;<br /> +AND FIRST PHYSICIAN TO HER MAJESTY IN SCOTLAND.</h3> + +<p class="center">FIFTH EDITION.<br /><br /> + +LONDON:<br /> +JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.<br /> +MDCCCXXXIX.<br /> +EDINBURGH:<br /><br /> + +Printed by Balfour and Jack, Niddry Street.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>In a former work, the Author endeavoured to delineate, in a simple and +popular form, the leading facts relating to the Intellectual Powers, and +to trace the principles which ought to guide us in the Investigation of +Truth. The volume which he now offers to the public attention, is +intended as a sequel to these Inquiries; and his object in it is to +investigate, in the same unpretending manner, the Moral Feelings of the +Human Mind, and the principles which ought to regulate our volitions and +our conduct as moral and responsible beings. The two branches of +investigation are, in many respects, closely connected; and, on this +account, it may often happen, that, in the present work, principles are +assumed as admitted or proved, which, in the former, were stated at +length, with the evidence by which they are supported.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p>In presenting a fifth edition of this volume, the Author feels most +deeply the favourable manner in which it has been received, and the +notice which has been bestowed upon it by those whose approbation he +regards as a distinction of the most gratifying kind. He had two objects +chiefly in view when he ventured upon this investigation. The one was to +divest his inquiry of all unprofitable speculation, and to shew that the +philosophy of the moral feelings bears directly upon a practical purpose +of the highest moment,—the mental and moral culture of every rational +being. The other was to shew the close and important relation which +exists between this science and the doctrines of revealed religion, and +the powerful evidence which is derived, for the truth of both, from the +manner in which they confirm and illustrate each other. These two +sources of knowledge cannot be separated, in the estimation of any one +who feels the deep interest of the inquiry, and seriously prosecutes the +important question,—what is truth. If we attempt to erect the +philosophy of morals into an independent science, we shall soon find +that its highest inductions only lead us to a point beyond<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span> which we are +condemned to wander in doubt and in darkness. But, on the other hand, by +depreciating philosophy, or the light which is derived from the moral +impressions of the mind, we deprive ourselves of a most important source +of evidence in support of revelation. For it is from these impressions, +viewed in connexion with the actual state of man, that we learn the +necessity, and the moral probability, of a revelation; and it is by +principles existing in the mind that we are enabled to feel the power of +that varied and incontrovertible evidence, by which revelation comes to +the candid inquirer with all the authority of truth.</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap" style="margin-left: 2em;">Edinburgh</span>, <i>November 1838.</i><br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> + + + +<h2>PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.</h2> + +<h3>SECTION I.</h3> + +<h3>NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF THE<br /> +MORAL FEELINGS.</h3> + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><td align='left'>Division of the Mental Powers into Intellectual and Moral</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_1'><b>1</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Harmony which ought to exist between these classes</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_3'><b>3</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Causes by which this harmony is interrupted,—and means of counteracting them</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_3'><b>3</b></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>Interest of the science of the Moral Feelings</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_5'><b>5</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Peculiar sources of Knowledge bearing upon it, from the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span>light of Conscience, and of Divine Revelation</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_7'><b>7</b></a></td></tr> + +</table></div> + +<h3>SECTION II.</h3> + +<h3>FIRST TRUTHS IN THE SCIENCE OF THE MORAL<br /> +FEELINGS.</h3> + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align='left'>Analogy between First Truths, or Intuitive Principles of Belief, in Intellectual, and in Moral Science</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_11'><b>11</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Classification of First Truths in Moral Science, as impressions arising out of each other, by an obvious chain of relations</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_16'><b>16</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. Perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust,—right</span><br /><span style="margin-left: 3em;">or wrong;—and a conviction of duties which a man owes to other men.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. Conviction of the existence and attributes of a Great First Cause, and Moral Governor.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. Conviction of Moral Responsibility.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">4. Impression of Future Existence.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Importance of these convictions, as intuitive articles of belief</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_18'><b>18</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + + + + +<h2>THE PHILOSOPHY<br /> +OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.</h2> + + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><td align='left' colspan="2">Analysis of Man as a Moral Being</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_27'><b>27</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>I.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Desires</span>—<span class="smcap">The Affections</span>—and <span class="smcap">Self-love</span>.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>II.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Will.</span></td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>III.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Moral Principle</span>, or <span class="smcap">Conscience</span>.</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'>IV.</td><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Moral relation of Man Towards the Deity</span>.</td></tr> +</table></div> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> + + +<h2>PART I.</h2> + +<h3>THE DESIRES—THE AFFECTIONS—AND SELF-LOVE.</h3> + +<h3>SECTION I.</h3> + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">THE DESIRES</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_36'><b>36</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>1. Desire of the Animal Propensities</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_37'><b>37</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>2. Desire of Wealth—Avarice</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_38'><b>38</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>3. Desire of Power—Ambition</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_39'><b>39</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>4. Desire of Superiority—Emulation</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_40'><b>40</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>5. Desire of Society</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_41'><b>41</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>6. Desire of Esteem or Approbation</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_42'><b>42</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>7. Desire of Knowledge</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_46'><b>46</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>8. Desire of Moral Improvement</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_47'><b>47</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>— Desire of Action</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_49'><b>49</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Importance of a Due Regulation of the Desires</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_50'><b>50</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<h3>SECTION II.</h3> + + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">THE AFFECTIONS</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_53'><b>53</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>I. <span class="smcap">Justice</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_55'><b>55</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. Justice to the Interests of others—Integrity</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_59'><b>59</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. Justice to the Freedom of Action of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_59'><b>59</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. Justice to the Reputation of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_60'><b>60</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">4. Justice in estimating the Conduct and Character of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_61'><b>61</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">5. Justice to the Opinions of others—Candour</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_62'><b>62</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">6. Justice to the Feelings of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_63'><b>63</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">7. Justice to the Moral Condition of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_64'><b>64</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>II. <span class="smcap">Compassion and Benevolence</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_66'><b>66</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. Benevolence towards the Distresses of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_69'><b>69</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. Benevolence towards the Reputation of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_70'><b>70</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. Benevolence towards the Character and Conduct of others,—including Forgiveness of Injuries</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_71'><b>71</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">4. Benevolence towards the Feelings of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_71'><b>71</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">5. Benevolence towards improving the Moral Condition of others</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_73'><b>73</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>III.<span class="smcap">Veracity</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_74'><b>74</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. The Love of Truth, in the Reception of it</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_76'><b>76</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. Veracity in delivering statements,—including Sincerity</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_78'><b>78</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. Truth of Purpose, or Correct fulfilment of Promises</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_82'><b>82</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>IV. <span class="smcap">Friendship, Love, and Gratitude</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_83'><b>83</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>V. <span class="smcap">Patriotism</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_84'><b>84</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span><span class="smcap">The Domestic Affections</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_85'><b>85</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span class="smcap">The Defensive Affections, Anger, Jealousy, Resentment</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_89'><b>89</b></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>Important Influence produced upon the Exercise of the Affections,</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">By Attention</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_92'><b>92</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">By Habit</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_97'><b>97</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Feeling of Moral Approbation attached to the Exercise of the Affections</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_100'><b>100</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Happiness arising from a due Exercise of the Affections;—Influence of Temper</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_106'><b>106</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<h3>SECTION III.</h3> + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="65%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">SELF-LOVE</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_110'><b>110</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Sense in which the term is employed</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_111'><b>111</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Tendency of a true and Rational Self-love</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_111'><b>111</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Morbid Exercise of it,—Selfishness</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_116'><b>116</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span>Disinterested Conduct and Self-denial</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_117'><b>117</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> +<h2>PART II</h2> + + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">OF THE WILL</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_119'><b>119</b></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>Simple Volition, its Origin from one of the Desires or Affections</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_119'><b>119</b></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>Operation of Moral Causes on the Will</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_120'><b>120</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Nature of these Causes, and Source of the Diversity of their operation in different individuals</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_123'><b>123</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Circumstances required for the Uniformity of their Operation:—</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>1. Knowledge<br /><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Truths of Natural and Revealed Religion.</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_128'><b>128</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>2. Attention<br /><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Its influence on Moral Decisions</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_132'><b>132</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>3. Moral Habits<br /><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Origin and Progress of Derangement of Moral Harmony.</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_137'><b>137</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Influence of Habits upon Character</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_142'><b>142</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Means of Correcting Injurious Moral Habits</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_143'><b>143</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Practical Conclusions from these Principles. Important</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Influence of Moral Habits</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_145'><b>145</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Necessity and Probability of Divine Aid in correcting</td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Moral Derangement</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_149'><b>149</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span>Influence of the Mental operation called Faith</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_152'><b>152</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<h2>PART III.</h2> + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR CONSCIENCE</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_155'><b>155</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Proofs of the Existence of Conscience as a Distinct Principle of the mind</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_156'><b>156</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Nature of its Operation as the Regulating Principle</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_157'><b>157</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Analogy between it and Reason</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_158'><b>158</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Its Influence in conveying an Impression of the Moral Attributes of the Deity</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_163'><b>163</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Knowledge derived from this Source</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_164'><b>164</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Comparison of the Divine Attributes with the Actual State of Man</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_167'><b>167</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Difficulties arising from this Comparison removed only by the Christian Revelation</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_169'><b>169</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Mental Process by which the Regulating Power of Conscience is Impaired or Lost</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_172'><b>172</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Influence of this Condition upon the Judgment in regard to Moral Truth</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_176'><b>176</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Influence of Attention in Moral Decisions</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_179'><b>179</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Man's responsibility for his belief</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_182'><b>182</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Important relation between Moral Emotions and voluntary Intellectual Processes</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_183'><b>183</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span></p> + + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<h3>APPENDIX TO PART III.</h3> + + +<div class='centered'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">§ 1.—<span class="smcap">Of the Origin and Immutability of Moral Distinctions and Theories of Morals</span></span></th><td align='left'><a href='#Page_190'><b>190</b></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='left'>Origin of Our Idea of Virtue and Vice</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_193'><b>193</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>System of Mandeville</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_195'><b>195</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>System of Clarke and Wollaston</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_197'><b>197</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>System of Utility</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_198'><b>198</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Selfish System</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_199'><b>199</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>System of Paley</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_201'><b>201</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Defect of these Systems in not acknowledging the Supreme Authority of Conscience</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_206'><b>206</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Objections to the belief of a uniformity of Moral Feeling which have been founded on the practices of barbarous nations</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_216'><b>216</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>System of Dr. Smith, or Theory of Sympathy</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_219'><b>219</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Province of Reason in Moral Decisions</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_222'><b>222</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Remarks on the Observations of some late Writers respecting the Corruption of Conscience</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_227'><b>227</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left' colspan="2"> </td></tr> +<tr><th align='left'>§ 2.—<span class="smcap">Of the Harmony of the Moral Feelings</span></th><td align='left'><a href='#Page_231'><b>231</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Consistency of Character arising from this Harmony,—and Defects of Character to which it is opposed</td><td align='left'><a href='#Page_237'><b>237</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<h2>PART IV.</h2> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="3" width="95%" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> +<tr><th align='left'><span style="margin-left: 4em;">OF THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN TOWARDS THE DEITY</span></th><td align='right'><a href='#Page_243'><b>243</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>View of the Divine Character in reference to this Regulation</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_244'><b>244</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Regulation of the Moral Feelings which ought to arise out of it</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_245'><b>245</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. Habitual effort to cultivate a Sense of the Divine Presence, and to regulate the Moral Feelings and Character by it</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_245'><b>245</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. Submission to the appointments of Providence</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_252'><b>252</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. Sense of Moral Imperfection and Guilt, and Supplication for Mercy, with Reliance on Divine Aid</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_254'><b>254</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><span style="margin-left: 2em;">4. Sense of Gratitude, Affection, and Love</span></td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_255'><b>255</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Conduct and Character arising out of this Condition of the Moral Feelings</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_256'><b>256</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Means of Cultivating it</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_262'><b>262</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Nature and Operation of Faith</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_264'><b>264</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Province of Faith in the Philosophy of the Moral Feelings</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_269'><b>269</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Truths which are its more Immediate Object</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_273'><b>273</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Its Influence on the Moral Condition</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_276'><b>276</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Province of Faith in the Scheme of Christianity</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_282'><b>282</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Certain Errors regarding Faith</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_287'><b>287</b></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>Harmony of Christian Truth with the Philosophy of the Moral Feelings</td><td align='right'><a href='#Page_290'><b>290</b></a></td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="PRELIMINARY_OBSERVATIONS" id="PRELIMINARY_OBSERVATIONS"></a>PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.<br /><br /></h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="SECT_I" id="SECT_I"></a>SECT. I.</h2> + +<h2>NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE<br />OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.</h2> + + +<p>Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being. By +his intellectual powers, he acquires the knowledge of facts, observes +their connexions, and traces the conclusions which arise out of them. +These mental operations, however, even in a high state of cultivation, +may be directed entirely to truths of an extrinsic kind,—that is, to +such as do not exert any influence either on the moral condition of the +individual, or on his relations to other sentient beings. They may exist +in an eminent degree in the man who lives only for himself, and feels +little beyond the personal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hour +that is passing over him.</p> + +<p>But, when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on our +view, and these are of mightier import. We find him occupying a place in +a great system of moral government, in which he has an important station +to fill and high duties to perform. We find him placed in certain +relations to a great moral Governor, who presides over this system of +things, and to a future state of being for which the present scene is +intended to prepare him. We find him possessed of powers which qualify +him to feel these relations, and of principles calculated to guide him +through the solemn responsibilities which attend his state of moral +discipline.</p> + +<p>These two parts of his mental constitution we perceive to be remarkably +distinct from each other. The former may be in vigorous exercise in him +who has little feeling of his moral condition,—and the latter may be in +a high state of culture in the man, who, in point of intellectual +acquirement, knows little beyond the truths which it most concerns him +to know,—those great but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> simple principles which guide his conduct as +a responsible being.</p> + +<p>In a well-regulated mind, there is an intimate harmony and co-operation +between these two departments of the mental economy. Knowledge, received +through the powers of sensation and simple intellect, whether relating +to external things, or to mental phenomena,—and conclusions derived +from these through the powers of reasoning, ought all to contribute to +that which is the highest state of man,—his purity as a moral being. +They ought all to lend their aid towards the cultivation of those +principles of his nature which bind him to his fellow-men;—and those +higher principles still, which raise his feeble powers to the Eternal +Incomprehensible One, the first great cause of all things, and the moral +Governor of the universe.</p> + +<p>A slight degree of observation is sufficient to convince us, that such a +regulated condition of the mental constitution does not exist in the +generality of mankind. It is not my present purpose to inquire into the +causes by which this is primarily deranged; but it may be interesting to +trace some of the circumstances which bear a part in produc<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>ing the +derangement. In our present state of being, we are surrounded with +objects of sense; and the mind is kept, in a great degree, under the +influence of external things. In this manner it often happens, that +facts and considerations elude our attention, and deeds escape from our +memory, in a manner which would not occur, were the mind left at liberty +to recall its own associations, and to feel the influence of principles +which are really part of the mental constitution. It is thus that, amid +the bustle of life, the attention is apt to be engrossed by +considerations of a local and an inferior character;—while facts and +motives of the highest moment are overlooked, and deeds of our own, long +gone by, escape from our remembrance. We thus lose a correct sense of +our moral condition, and yield to the agency of present and external +things, in a manner disproportioned to their real value. For our highest +concern as moral beings is with things future, and things unseen, and +often with circumstances in our own moral history, long past, and +perhaps forgotten. Hence the benefit of retirement and calm reflection, +and of every thing that tends to withdraw us from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> impression of +sensible objects, and lends us to feel the superiority of things which +are not seen. Under such influence, the mind displays an astonishing +power of recalling the past and grasping the future,—and of viewing +objects in their true relations, to itself and to each other. The first +of these, indeed, we see exemplified in many affections, in which the +mind is cut off, in a greater or less degree, from its intercourse with +the external world, by causes acting upon the bodily organization. In +another work I have described many remarkable examples of the mind, in +this condition, recalling its old impressions respecting things long +past and entirely forgotten; and the facts there stated call our +attention in a very striking manner to its inherent powers and its +independent existence.</p> + +<p>This subject is one of intense interest, and suggests reflections of the +most important kind, respecting the powers and properties of the +thinking principle. In particular, it leads us to a period, which we are +taught to anticipate even by the inductions of intellectual science, +when, the bodily frame being dissolved, the thinking and reasoning +essence shall<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> exercise its peculiar faculties in a higher state of +being. There are facts in the mental phenomena which give a high degree +of probability to the conjecture, that the whole transactions of life, +with the motives and moral history of each individual, may then be +recalled by a process of the mind itself, and placed, as at a single +glance, distinctly before him. Were we to realize such a mental +condition, we should not fail to contemplate the impressions so +recalled, with feelings very different from those by which we are apt to +be misled amid the influence of present and external things.—The tumult +of life is over;—pursuits, principles, and motives, which once bore an +aspect of importance, are viewed with feelings more adapted to their +true value.—The moral principle recovers that authority, which, amid +the contests of passion, had been obscured or lost;—each act and each +emotion is seen in its relations to the great dictates of truth, and +each pursuit of life in its real bearing on the great concerns of a +moral being;—and the whole assumes a character of new and wondrous +import, when viewed in relation to that Incomprehensible One, who is +then disclosed in all his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> attributes as a moral governor.—Time past is +contracted into a point, and that the infancy of being;—time to come is +seen expanding into eternal existence.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Such are the views which open on him who would inquire into the essence +by which man is distinguished as a rational and moral being. Compared +with it, what are all the phenomena of nature,—what is all the history +of the world,—the rise and fall of empires,—or the fate of those who +rule them. These derive their interest from local and transient +relations,—but this is to exist for ever. That science, therefore, must +be considered as the highest of all human pursuits, which contemplates +man in his relation to eternal things. With its importance we must feel +its difficulties; and, did we confine the investigation to the mere +principles of natural science, we should feel these difficulties to be +insurmountable. But, in this great inquiry, we have two sources of +knowledge, to which nothing analogous is to be found in the history of +physical science, and which will prove infallible guides, if we resign +ourselves to their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> direction with sincere desire to discover the truth. +These are,—the light of conscience,—and the light of divine +revelation. In making this statement, I am aware that I tread on +delicate ground,—and that some will consider an appeal to the sacred +writings as a departure from the strict course of philosophical inquiry. +This opinion, I am satisfied, is entirely at variance with truth,—and, +in every moral investigation, if we take the inductions of sound +philosophy, along with the dictates of conscience, and the light of +revealed truth, we shall find them to constitute one uniform and +harmonious whole, the various parts of which tend, in a remarkable +manner, to establish and illustrate each other. If, indeed, in any +investigation of moral science, we disregard the light which is +furnished by the sacred writings, we resemble an astronomer who should +rely entirely on his unaided sight, and reject those optical inventions +which extend so remarkably the field of his vision, as to be to him the +revelation of things not seen. Could we suppose a person thus +entertaining doubts respecting the knowledge supplied by the telescope, +yet proceeding in a candid manner to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> investigate its truth, he would +perceive, in the telescopic observations themselves, principles +developed which are calculated to remove his suspicions. For, in the +limited knowledge which is furnished by vision alone, he finds +difficulties which he cannot explain, apparent inconsistencies which he +cannot reconcile, and insulated facts which he cannot refer to any known +principle. But, in the more extended knowledge which the telescope +yields, these difficulties disappear, facts are brought together which +seemed unconnected or discordant, and the universe appears one beautiful +system of order and consistency. It is the same in the experience of the +moral inquirer, when he extends his views beyond the inductions of +reason, and corrects his conclusions by the testimony of God. Discordant +principles are brought together, doubts and difficulties disappear, and +beauty, order, and harmony are seen to pervade the government of the +Deity. In this manner there also arises a species of evidence for the +doctrines of revelation, which is entirely independent of the external +proofs of its divine origin; and which, to the candid<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> mind, invests it +with all the characters of authenticity and truth.</p> + +<p>From these combined sources of knowledge, thus illustrating and +confirming each other, we are enabled to attain, in moral inquiries, a +degree of certainty adapted to their high importance. We do so when, +with sincere desire to discover the truth, we resign ourselves to the +guidance of the light which is within, aided as it is by that light from +heaven which shines upon the path of the humble inquirer. Cultivated on +these principles, the science is fitted to engage the most powerful +mind; while it will impart strength to the most common understanding. It +terminates in no barren speculations, but tends directly to promote +peace on earth, and good-will among men. It is calculated both to +enlarge the understanding, and to elevate and purify the feelings, and +thus to cultivate the moral being for the life which is to come. It +spreads forth to the view, becoming smoother and brighter the farther it +is pursued; and the rays which illuminate the path converge in the +throne of Him who is Eternal.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="SECT_II" id="SECT_II"></a>SECT. II.</h2> + +<h2>OF FIRST TRUTHS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.</h2> + + +<p>The knowledge which we receive through our intellectual powers is +referable to two classes. These may be distinguished by the names of +acquired knowledge, and intuitive or fundamental articles of belief. The +former is procured by the active use of our mental powers, in collecting +facts, tracing their relations, and observing the deductions which arise +out of particular combinations of them. These constitute the operations +which I have referred to in another work, under the heads of processes +of investigation, and processes of reasoning. The full exercise of them +requires a certain culture of the mental faculties, and consequently is +confined to a comparatively small number of men. We perceive, however, +that such culture is not essential to every individual,—for many are +very deficient in it who yet are considered as persons of sound<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> mind, +and capable of discharging their duties in various situations of life in +a creditable and useful manner.</p> + +<p>But the knowledge which we derive from the other source is of immediate +and essential importance to men of every degree; and, without it, no +individual could engage, with confidence, in any of the common +transactions of life, or make any provision for his protection or +comfort, or even for the continuance of his existence. These are the +principles also treated of, in a former work, under the name of First +Truths. They are not, like our knowledge of the other kind, the result +of any process either of investigation or of reasoning, and, for the +possession of them, no man either depends upon his own observation, or +has recourse to that of other men. They are a part of his mental +constitution, arising, with a feeling of absolute certainty, in every +sound mind; and, while they admit of no proof by processes of reasoning, +sophistical objections brought against them can be combated only by an +appeal to the consciousness of every man, and to the absolute conviction +which forces itself upon the whole mass of mankind.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<p>If the Creator has thus implanted in the mind of man principles to guide +him in his intellectual and physical relations, independently of any +acquired knowledge, we might naturally expect to find him endowed, in +the same manner, with principles adapted to his more important relations +as a moral being. We might naturally expect, that, in these high +concerns, he would not be left to the knowledge which he might casually +acquire, either through his own powers of investigation or reasoning, or +through instruction received from other men. Impressions adapted to this +important end we accordingly find developed in a remarkable manner,—and +they are referable to that part of our constitution, which holds so +important a place in the philosophy of the mind, by which we perceive +differences in the moral aspect of actions, and approve or disapprove of +them as right or wrong. The convictions derived from this source seem to +occupy the same place in the moral system, that first truths, or +intuitive articles of belief, do in the intellectual. Like them, also, +they admit of no direct proofs by processes of reasoning; and, when +sophistical arguments are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> brought against them, the only true answer +consists in an appeal to the conscience of every uncontaminated +mind;—by which we mean chiefly the consciousness of its own moral +impressions, in a mind which has not been degraded in its moral +perceptions by a course of personal depravity. This is a consideration +of the utmost practical importance; and it will probably appear that +many well-intended arguments, respecting the first principles of moral +truth, have been inconclusive, in the same manner as were attempts to +establish first truths by processes of reasoning,—because the line of +argument adopted in regard to them was one of which they are not +susceptible. The force of this analogy is in no degree weakened by the +fact, that there is, in many cases, an apparent difference between that +part of our mental constitution, on which is founded our conviction of +first truths, and that principle from which is derived our impression of +moral truth:—For the former continues the same in every mind which is +neither obscured by idiocy nor distorted by insanity; but the moral +feelings become vitiated by a process of the mind itself, by which it +has gradually gone astray from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> rectitude. Hence the difference we find +in the decisions of different men, respecting moral truth, arising from +peculiarities in their own mental condition;—and hence that remarkable +obscuration of mind, at which some men at length arrive, by which the +judgment is entirely perverted respecting the first great principles of +moral purity. When, therefore, we appeal to certain principles in the +mental constitution, as the source of our first impressions of moral +truth, our appeal is made chiefly to a mind which is neither obscured by +depravity, nor bewildered by the refinements of a false philosophy:—it +is made to a mind in which conscience still holds some degree of its +rightful authority, and in which there is a sincere and honest desire to +discover the truth. These two elements of character must go together in +every correct inquiry in moral science; and, to a man in an opposite +condition, we should no more appeal, in regard to the principles of +moral truth, than we should take from the fatuous person or the maniac +our test of those first principles of intellectual truth, which are +allowed to be original elements of belief in every sound mind.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span></p> + +<p>To remedy the evils arising from this diversity and distortion of moral +perception, is one of the objects of divine revelation. By means of it +there is introduced a fixed and uniform standard of moral truth; but, it +is of importance to remark, that, for the authority of this, an appeal +is made to principles in the mind itself, and that every part of it +challenges the assent of the man in whom conscience has not lost its +power in the mental economy.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Keeping in view the distinction which has now been referred to, it would +appear, that there are certain first principles of moral truth, which +arise in the mind by the most simple process of reflection,—either as +constituting its own primary moral convictions, or as following from its +consciousness of these convictions by a plain and obvious chain of +relations. These are chiefly the following.</p> + +<p>I. A perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or +unjust,—right or wrong;—and a conviction of certain duties, as of +justice, veracity, and benevolence, which every man owes to his +fellow-men. Every man, in his own case, again, ex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>pects the same offices +from others; and, on this reciprocity of feeling, is founded the +precept, which is felt to be one of universal obligation, to do to +others as we would that they should do to us.</p> + +<p>II. From this primary moral impression, there arises, by a most natural +sequence, a conviction of the existence and superintendence of a great +moral Governor of the universe,—a being of infinite perfection and +infinite purity. A belief in this Being, as the first great cause, is +derived, as we have formerly seen, by a simple step of reasoning, from a +survey of the works of nature, taken in connexion with the First Truth, +that every event must have an adequate cause. Our sense of his moral +attributes arises, with a feeling of equal certainty, when, from the +moral impressions of our own minds, we infer the moral attributes of him +who thus formed us.</p> + +<p>III. From these combined impressions, there naturally springs a sense of +moral responsibility;—or a conviction, that, for the due performance of +the duties which are indicated by the conscience, or moral +consciousness, man is responsible to the Governor of the universe;—and +farther,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> that to this Being he owes, more immediately, a certain homage +of the moral feelings, entirely distinct from the duties which he owes +to his fellow-men.</p> + +<p>IV. From this chain of moral convictions, it is impossible to separate a +deep impression of continued existence, or of a state of being beyond +the present life,—and of that as a state of moral retribution.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>The consideration of these important objects of belief will afterwards +occur to us in various parts of our inquiry. They are briefly stated +here, in reference to the place which they hold as First Truths, or +primary articles of moral belief, which arise by a natural and obvious +chain of sequence, in the moral conviction of every sound understanding. +For the truth of them we appeal not to any process of reasoning, +properly so called, but to the conviction which forces itself upon every +regulated mind. Neither do we go abroad among savage nations, to inquire +whether the impression of them be universal; for this may be obscured in +communities, as it is in individuals, by a course of moral<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> degradation. +We appeal to the casuist himself, whether, in the calm moment of +reflection, he can divest himself of their power. We appeal to the +feelings of the man who, under the consciousness of guilt, shrinks from +the dread of a present Deity and the anticipation of a future reckoning. +But chiefly we appeal to the conviction of him, in whom conscience +retains its rightful supremacy, and who habitually cherishes these +momentous truths, as his guides in this life in its relation to the life +that is to come.</p> + +<p>In applying to these important articles of belief the name of First +Truths, or primary principles of moral conviction, I do not mean to +ascribe to them any thing of the nature of innate ideas. I mean only +that they arise, with a rapid or instantaneous conviction entirely +distinct from what we call a process of reasoning, in every regulated +mind, when it is directed, by the most simple course of reflection, to +the phenomena of nature without, and to the moral feelings of which it +is conscious within. It appears to be a point of the utmost practical +importance, that we should consider them as thus arising out of +principles which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> form a part of our moral constitution; as it is in +this way only that we can consider them as calculated to influence the +mass of mankind. For, if we do not believe them to arise, in this +manner, by the spontaneous exercise of every uncorrupted mind, there are +only two methods by which we can suppose them to originate;—the one is +a direct revelation from the Deity,—the other is a process of reasoning +or of investigation, properly so called, analogous to that by which we +acquire the knowledge of any principle in natural science. We cannot +believe that they are derived entirely from revelation, because we find +the belief existing where no revelation is known, and because we find +the sacred writers appealing to them as sources of conviction existing +in the mental constitution of every man. There is an obvious absurdity, +again, in supposing that principles, which are to regulate the conduct +of responsible beings, should be left to the chance of being unfolded by +processes of reasoning, in which different minds may arrive at different +conclusions, and in regard to which many are incapable of following out +any argument at all. What is called the argument <i>a priori</i> for the +ex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>istence and attributes of the Deity, for instance, conveys little +that is conclusive to most minds, and to many is entirely +incomprehensible. The same observation may be applied to those +well-intended and able arguments, by which the probability of a future +state is shewn from analogy and from the constitution of the mind. These +are founded chiefly on three considerations,—the tendency of virtue to +produce happiness, and of vice to be followed by misery,—the unequal +distribution of good and evil in the present life,—and the adaptation +of our moral faculties to a state of being very different from that in +which we are at present placed. There is much in these arguments +calculated to elevate our conceptions of our condition as moral beings, +and of that future state of existence for which we are destined; and +there is much scope for the highest powers of reasoning, in shewing the +accordance of these truths with the soundest inductions of true +philosophy. But, notwithstanding all their truth and all their utility, +it may be doubted whether they are to any one the foundation of his +faith in another state of being. It must be admitted, at least, that +their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> force is felt by those only whose minds have been in some degree +trained to habits of reasoning, and that they are therefore not adapted +to the mass of mankind. But the truths which they are intended to +establish are of eternal importance to men of every degree, and we +should therefore expect them to rest upon evidence which finds its way +with unerring aim to the hearts of the unlearned. The unanswerable +reasonings of Butler never reached the ear of the gray-haired pious +peasant, but he needs not their powerful aid to establish his sure and +certain hope of a blessed immortality. It is no induction of logic that +has transfixed the heart of the victim of deep remorse, when he withers +beneath an influence unseen by human eye, and shrinks from the +anticipation of a reckoning to come. In both, the evidence is within,—a +part of the original constitution of every rational mind, planted there +by him who framed the wondrous fabric. This is the power of +conscience;—with an authority, which no man can put away from him, it +pleads at once for his own future existence, and for the moral +attributes of an omnipotent and ever-present Deity. In a healthy state +of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> moral feelings, the man recognises its claim to supreme +dominion. Amid the degradation of guilt, it still raises its voice and +asserts its right to govern the whole man; and, though its warnings are +disregarded, and its claims disallowed, it proves within his inmost soul +an accuser that cannot be stilled, and an avenging spirit that never is +quenched.</p> + +<p>Similar observations apply to the uniformity of moral distinctions, or +the conviction of a certain line of conduct which man owes to his +fellow-men. There have been many controversies and various contending +systems in reference to this subject, but I submit that the question may +be disposed of in the same manner as the one now mentioned. Certain +fixed and defined principles of relative duty appear to be recognised by +the consent of mankind, as an essential part of their moral +constitution, by as absolute a conviction as that by which are +recognised our bodily qualities. The hardened criminal, whose life has +been a course of injustice and fraud, when at length brought into +circumstances which expose him to the knowledge or the retribution of +his fellow-men, expects from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> them veracity and justice, or perhaps even +throws himself upon their mercy. He thus recognises such principles as a +part of the moral constitution, just as the blind man, when he has +missed his way, asks direction of the first person he meets,—presuming +upon the latter possessing a sense which, though lost to him, he still +considers as belonging to every sound man. In defending himself, also, +the criminal shews the same recognition. For, his object is to disprove +the alleged facts, or to frame excuses for his conduct;—he never +attempts to question those universal principles by which he feels that +his actions must be condemned, if the facts are proved against him. +Without such principles, indeed, thus universally recognised, it is +evident that the whole system of human things would go into confusion +and ruin. Human laws may restrain or punish gross acts of violence and +injustice; but they can never provide for numberless methods by which a +man may injure his neighbour, or promote his own interest at the expense +of others. There are, in fact, but a very few cases which can be +provided for by any human institution; it is a principle within that +regulates the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> whole moral economy. In its extent and importance, when +compared with all the devices of man, it may be likened to those great +principles which guide the movements of the universe, contrasted with +the contrivances by which men produce particular results for their own +convenience; and one might as well expect to move a planet by machinery, +or propel a comet by the power of steam, as to preserve the semblance of +order in the moral world, without those fundamental principles of +rectitude which form a part of the original constitution of every +rational being.</p> + +<p>Farther, as each man has the consciousness of these principles in +himself, he has the conviction that similar principles exist in others. +Hence arises the impression, that, as he judges of their conduct by his +own moral feelings, so will they judge of him by corresponding feelings +in themselves. In this manner is produced that reciprocity of moral +impression, by which a man feels the opinion of his fellow-men to be +either a reward or a punishment; and hence also springs that great rule +of relative duty, which teaches us to do to others as we would that they +should do to us.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> This uniformity of moral feeling and affection even +proves a check upon those who have subdued the influence of these +feelings in themselves. Thus, a man who has thrown off all sense of +justice, compassion, or benevolence, is still kept under a certain +degree of control by the conviction of these impressions existing in +those by whom he is surrounded. There are indeed men in the world, as +has been remarked by Butler, in whom this appears to be the only +restraint to which their conduct is subjected.</p> + +<p>Upon the whole, therefore, there seems to be ground for assuming, that +the articles of belief, which have been the subject of the preceding +observations, are primary principles arising with an immediate feeling +of conviction in our moral constitution; and that they correspond with +those elements in our intellectual economy, which are commonly called +First Truths,—principles which are now universally admitted to require +no other evidence than the conviction which forces itself upon every +sound understanding.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PHILOSOPHY" id="PHILOSOPHY"></a>PHILOSOPHY</h2> + +<h2>OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.</h2> + + +<p>When we analyze the principles which distinguish man as a moral being, +our attention is first directed to his actions, as the external +phenomena by which we judge of his internal principles. It is familiar +to every one, however, that the same action may proceed from very +different motives, and that, when we have the means of estimating +motives or principles, it is from these that we form our judgment +respecting the moral condition of the individual, and not from his +actions alone. When we consider separately the elements which enter into +the economy of an intelligent and responsible<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> agent, they seem to +resolve themselves into the following:—</p> + +<p>I. His actual conduct, or actions.</p> + +<p>II. In determining his conduct, the immediate principle is his will, or +simple volition. He wills some act,—and the act follows of course, +unless it be prevented by restraint from without, or by physical +inability to perform it. These alone can interfere with a man following +the determination of his will, or simple volition.</p> + +<p>III. The objects of will or simple volition are referable to two +classes,—objects to be obtained,—and actions to be performed to +others;—and these are connected with two distinct mental conditions, +which exist previously to the act of volition. In regard to objects to +be obtained, this mental condition is <i>Desire</i>;—in regard to actions +towards others, it is <i>Affection</i>. The Desires and Affections, +therefore, hold a place in the mind previous to volition. From one of +them originates the mental state which, under certain regulations, +leads<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> to volition, or to our willing a certain act. The act, which is +then the result of the volition, consists either in certain efforts +towards attaining the object desired,—or in certain conduct towards +other men, amusing out of our affections or mental feelings towards +them. The Desires and Affections, therefore, may be considered as the +primary or moving powers, from which our actions proceed. In connection +with them we have to keep in view another principle, which has an +extensive influence on our conduct in regard to both these classes of +emotions. This is <i>Self-love</i>;—which leads us to seek our own +protection, comfort, and advantage. It is a sound and legitimate +principle of action when kept in its proper place;—when allowed to +usurp an undue influence, it degenerates into selfishness; and it then +interferes in a material degree with the exercise of the affections, or, +in other words, with our duty to other men.</p> + +<p>IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that every desire is not +followed by actual volition towards obtaining the object;—and that +every affection does not lead to the conduct which might<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> flow from it. +Thus a man may feel a desire which, after consideration, he determines +not to gratify. Another may experience an affection, and not act upon +it;—he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet act, in the +particular case, with cold selfishness;—or he may feel the impulse of +anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, we go +another step backwards in the chain of moral sequences, our attention is +directed to certain principles by which the determination is actually +decided,—either according to the desire or affection which is present +to the mind, or in opposition to it. This brings us to a subject of the +utmost practical importance:—and the principles, which thus decide the +determination of the mind, are referable to two heads.</p> + +<p>(1.) The determination or decision may arise out of a certain state of +arrangement of the moving powers themselves, in consequence of which +some one of them has acquired a predominating influence in the moral +system. This usually results from habit, or frequent indulgence, as we +shall see in a subsequent part of our inquiry. A man, for example, may +desire an object, but perceive that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> the attainment would require a +degree of exertion greater than he is disposed to devote to it. This is +the preponderating love of ease, a branch of self-love. Another may +perceive that the gratification would impair his good name, or the +estimation in which he is anxious to stand in the eyes of other +men;—this is the predominating love of approbation, or regard to +character. In the same manner, a third may feel that it would interfere +with his schemes of avarice or ambition,—and so in regard to the other +desires. On a similar principle, a man may experience a strong impulse +of anger, but perceive that there would be danger in gratifying it, or +that he would promote his reputation or his interest by not acting upon +it;—he may experience a benevolent affection, but feel that the +exercise would interfere too much with his personal interest or comfort.</p> + +<p>(2.) The determination may arise from a sense of duty, or an impression +of moral rectitude, apart from every consideration of a personal nature. +This is the <i>Moral Principle</i> or <i>Conscience</i>;—in every mind in a state +of moral health, it is the supreme and regulating principle, preserving +among<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> the moving powers a certain harmony to each other, and to the +principles of moral rectitude. It often excites to conduct which +requires a sacrifice of self-love, and so prevents this principle from +interfering with the sound exercise of the affections. It regulates the +desires, and restrains them by the simple rule of purity;—it directs +and regulates the affections in the same manner by the high sense of +moral responsibility; and it thus maintains order and harmony in the +whole moral system.</p> + +<p>One of the chief diversities of human character, indeed, arises from the +circumstance of one man being habitually influenced by the simple and +straight-forward principle of duty, and another merely by a kind of +contest between desires and motives of a very inferior or selfish +nature. Thus also we acquire a knowledge of the moral temperament of +different men, and learn to adapt our measures accordingly in our +transactions with them. In endeavouring, for example, to excite three +individuals to some act of usefulness, we come to know, that in one we +have only to appeal to his sense of duty; in another to his vanity or +love of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> approbation; while we have no hope of making any impression on +the third, unless we can make it appear to bear upon his interest.</p> + +<p>V. The principles referred to under the preceding heads are chiefly +those which regulate the connexion of man with his fellow-men. But there +is another class of emotions, in their nature distinct from these; +though, in a practical point of view, they are much connected. These are +the emotions which arise out of his relation to the Deity. The +regulation of the moral feelings, in reference to this relation, will +therefore come to be considered in a department of the inquiry devoted +to themselves, in connexion with the views of the character and +attributes of God, which we obtain from the light of reason and +conscience.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>This analysis of the principles which constitute the moral feelings +indicates the farther division of our inquiry in the following manner:—</p> + +<p> +I. The Desires,—the Affections,—and Self-love.<br /> +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>II. The Will.<br /> +<br /> +III. The Moral Principle, or Conscience.<br /> +<br /> +IV. The moral relation of man towards the<br /> +Deity.<br /> +</p> + +<p>These constitute what may be called the active principles of man, or +those which are calculated to decide his conduct as a moral and +responsible being. In connexion with them, there is another class of +feelings, which may be called passive or connecting emotions. They exert +a considerable influence of a secondary kind; but, in an Essay which is +meant to be essentially practical, it perhaps will not be necessary to +do more than enumerate them in such a manner as to point out their +relation to the active principles.</p> + +<p>When an object presents qualities on account of which we wish to obtain +it, we feel <i>desire</i>. If we have reason to think that it is within our +reach, we experience <i>hope</i>; and the effect of this is to encourage us +in our exertions. If we arrive at such a conviction as leaves no doubt +of the attainment, this is <i>confidence</i>, one of the forms of that state +of mind which we call <i>faith</i>. If we see no prospect<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> of attaining it, +we give way to <i>despair</i>,—and this leads us to abandon all exertion for +the attainment. When we obtain the object we experience <i>pleasure</i> or +<i>joy</i>; if we are disappointed, we feel <i>regret</i>. If, again, we have the +prospect of some evil which threatens us, we experience <i>fear</i>, and are +thereby excited to exertions for averting it. If we succeed in doing so, +we experience <i>joy</i>; if not, we feel <i>sorrow</i>. If the evil seem +unavoidable, we again give way to <i>despair</i>, and are thus led to +relinquish all attempts to avert it.—Similar emotions attend on the +affections. When we experience an affection, we <i>desire</i> to be able to +act upon it. When we see a prospect of doing so, we <i>hope</i>; if there +seem to be none, we <i>despair</i> of accomplishing our object. When we have +acted upon a benevolent affection, or according to the dictates of the +moral principle, we experience <i>self-approbation</i>; when the contrary, we +feel <i>remorse</i>. When either a desire or an affection has acquired an +undue influence, so as to carry us forward in a manner disproportioned +to its real and proper tendencies, it becomes a <i>passion</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I"></a>PART I.</h2> + +<h2>OF THE DESIRES, THE AFFECTIONS, AND SELF-LOVE.<br /><br /></h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>SECT. I.</h2> + +<h2>THE DESIRES.</h2> + +<p>Desire is the immediate movement or act of the mind towards an object +which presents some quality on account of which we wish to obtain it. +The objects of desire, therefore, embrace all those attainments and +gratifications, which mankind consider worthy of being sought after. The +object pursued in each particular case, is determined by the views, +habits, and moral dispositions of the individual. In this manner, one +person may regard an object, as above every other worthy of being sought +after, which to another appears insignificant or worthless. The +principles which regulate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> these diversities, and consequently form one +of the great differences in human character, belong to a subsequent part +of our inquiry.</p> + +<p>In forming a classification of the desires, we must be guided simply by +the nature of the various objects which are desired. Those which may be +specified as the most prevalent, and the most clearly to be +distinguished as separate, may be referred to the following heads.</p> + +<p>I. The gratification of the animal propensities,—commonly called the +appetites. These, which we possess in common with the lower animals, are +implanted in us for important purposes; but they require to be kept +under the most rigid control, both of reason and of the moral principle. +When they are allowed to break through these restraints, and become +leading principles of action, they form a character the lowest in the +scale, whether intellectual or moral; and it is impossible to +contemplate a more degraded condition of a rational and moral being. The +consequences to society are also of the most baneful nature. Without +alluding to the glutton or to the drunkard, what accu<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>mulated guilt, +degradation, and wretchedness follow the course of the +libertine,—blasting whatever comes within the reach of his influence, +and extending a demoralizing power alike to him who inflicts and to +those who suffer the wrong. Thus is constituted a class of evils, of +which no human law can take any adequate cognizance, and which therefore +raise our views, in a special and peculiar manner, to a supreme Moral +Governor.</p> + +<p>II. The Desire of Wealth, commonly called Avarice;—though avarice is +perhaps justly to be regarded as the morbid excess or abuse of the +propensity. This is properly to be considered as originating in the +desire to possess the means of procuring other gratifications. But, by +the influence of habit, the desire is transferred to the thing itself, +and it often becomes a kind of mania, in which there is the pure love of +gain, without the application of it to any other kind of enjoyment. It +is a propensity which may, in a remarkable manner, engross the whole +character, acquiring strength by continuance, and it is then generally +accompanied by a contracted selfishness, which considers no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>thing as +mean or unworthy that can be made to contribute to the ruling passion. +This may be the case even when the propensity is regulated by the rules +of justice;—if it break through this restraint, it leads to fraud, +extortion, deceit, and injustice,—and, under another form, to theft or +robbery. It is therefore always in danger of being opposed to the +exercise of the benevolent affections, leading a man to live for +himself, and to study only the means calculated to promote his own +interest.</p> + +<p>III. The Desire of Power, or Ambition. This is the love of ruling,—or +giving the law to a circle whether more or less extensive. When it +becomes the governing propensity, the strongest principles of human +nature give way before it,—even those of personal comfort and safety. +This we see in the conqueror, who braves every danger, difficulty, and +privation, for the attainment of power; and in the statesman, who +sacrifices for it every personal advantage, perhaps health and peace. +The principle, however, assumes another form, which, according to its +direction, may aim at a higher object. Such is the desire of exer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>cising +power over the minds of men; of persuading a multitude, by arguments or +eloquence, to deeds of usefulness; of pleading the cause of the +oppressed;—a power of influencing the opinions of others, and of +guiding them into sound sentiments and virtuous conduct. This is a +species of power, the most gratifying by far to an exalted and virtuous +mind, and one calculated to carry benefit to others wherever it is +exerted.</p> + +<p>IV. The Desire of Superiority, or Emulation. This is allied to the +former, except that it does not include any direct wish to rule, but +aims simply at the acquirement of pre-eminence. It is a propensity of +extensive influence, and not easily confined within the bounds of +correct principle. It is apt to lead to undue means for the +accomplishment of its object; and every real or imagined failure tends +to excite hatred and envy. Hence it requires the most careful regulation +and, when much encouraged in the young, is not free from the danger of +generating malignant passions. Its influence and tendency, as in other +desires, depend in a great measure on the objects to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> which it is +directed. It may be seen in the man who seeks to excel his associates in +the gaiety of his apparel, the splendour of his equipage, or the luxury +of his table. It is found in him whose proud distinction is to be the +most fearless rider at a steeple-chase or a fox-hunt,—or to perform +some other exploit, the only claim of which to admiration consists in +its never having been performed before. The same principle, directed to +more worthy objects, may influence him who seeks to be distinguished in +some high pursuit, calculated to confer a lasting benefit upon his +country or on human kind.</p> + +<p>V. The Desire of Society. This has been considered by most writers on +the subject as a prominent principle of human nature, shewing itself at +all periods of life, and in all conditions of civilization. In persons +shut up from intercourse with their fellow-men, it has manifested itself +in the closest attachment to animals; as if the human mind could not +exist without some object on which to exercise the feelings intended to +bind man to his fellows. It is found in the union of men in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> civil +society and social intercourse,—in the ties of friendship, and the +still closer union of the domestic circle. It is necessary for the +exercise of all the affections; and even our weaknesses require the +presence of other men. There would be no enjoyment of rank or wealth, if +there were none to admire;—and even the misanthrope requires the +presence of another to whom his spleen may be uttered. The abuse of this +principle leads to the contracted spirit of party.</p> + +<p>VI. The Desire of Esteem and Approbation. This is a principle of most +extensive influence, and is in many instances the source of worthy and +useful displays of human character. Though inferior to the high sense of +moral obligation, it may yet be considered a laudable principle,—as +when a man seeks the approbation of others by deeds of benevolence, +public spirit, or patriotism,—by actions calculated to promote the +advantage or the comfort either of communities or individuals. In the +healthy exercise of it, a man desires the approbation of the good;—in +the distorted use of it, he seeks merely the praise of a party, or +perhaps,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> by deeds of a frivolous or even vicious character, aims at the +applause of associates whose praise is worthless. According to the +object to which it is directed, therefore, the desire of approbation may +be the attribute either of a virtuous or a perverted mind. But it is a +principle, which, in general, we expect to find operating in every +well-regulated mind, under certain restrictions. Thus a man who is +totally regardless of character,—that is, of the opinion of all others +respecting his conduct, we commonly consider as a person lost to correct +virtuous feeling. On the other hand, however, there may be instances in +which it is the quality of a man of the greatest mind to pursue some +course to which from adequate motives, he has devoted himself, +regardless alike of the praise or the disapprobation of other men. The +character in which the love of approbation is a ruling principle is +therefore modified by the direction of it. To desire the approbation of +the virtuous, leads to conduct of a corresponding kind, and to +steadiness and consistency in such conduct. To seek the approbation of +the vicious, leads, of course, to an opposite character. But there is a +third modifi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>cation, presenting a subject of some interest, in which the +prevailing principle of the man is a general love of approbation, +without any discrimination of the characters of those whose praise is +sought, or of the value of the qualities on account of which he seeks +it. This is vanity; and it produces a conduct wavering and +inconsistent,—perpetually changing with the circumstances in which the +individual is placed. It often leads him to aim at admiration for +distinctions of a very trivial character,—or even for qualities which +he does not really possess. It thus includes the love of flattery. +Pride, on the other hand, as opposed to vanity, seems to consist in a +man entertaining a high opinion of himself, while he is indifferent to +the opinion of others;—thus we speak of a man who is too proud to be +vain.</p> + +<p>Our regard to the opinion of others is the origin of our respect to +character, in matters which do not come under the higher principle of +morals; and is of extensive influence in promoting the harmonies, +proprieties, and decencies of society. It is thus the foundation of good +breeding, and leads to kindness and accommodation in little matters<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +which do not belong to the class of duties. It is also the source of +what we usually call decorum and propriety, which lead a man to conduct +himself in a manner becoming his character and circumstances, in regard +to things which do not involve any higher principle. For, apart entirely +from any consideration either of morality or benevolence, there is a +certain line of conduct which is unbecoming in all men; and there is +conduct which is becoming in some, though it might not in other +men,—and in some circumstances, though it might not be so in others. It +is unnecessary to add, how much of a man's respectability in life often +depends upon finding his way, with proper discrimination, through the +relations of society which are amenable to this principle; or, by how +many actions, which are not really wrong, a man may render himself +despised and ridiculous. The love of esteem and approbation is also of +extensive influence in the young,—both in the conduct of education and +the cultivation of general character; and it is not liable to the +objections, formerly referred to, which apply to the principle of +Emulation. It leads also to those numerous expedients by which per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>sons +of various character seek for themselves notoriety or a name: or desire +to leave a reputation behind them, when they are no more. This is the +love of posthumous fame, a subject which has afforded an extensive theme +both for the philosopher and the humorist.</p> + +<p>VII. The Desire of Knowledge, or of Intellectual Improvement,—including +the principle of Curiosity. The tendency of this high principle must +depend, as in the former cases, on its regulation, and the objects to +which it is directed. These may vary from the idle tattle of the day, to +the highest attainments in literature or science. The principle may be +applied to pursuits of a frivolous or useless kind, and to such +acquirements as lead only to pedantry or sophism;—or it may be directed +to a desultory application, which leads to a superficial acquaintance +with a variety of subjects, without a correct knowledge of any of them. +On the other hand, the pursuit of knowledge may be allowed to interfere +with important duties which we owe to others, in the particular +situation in which we are placed. A well-regulated judg<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>ment conducts +the propensity to worthy objects; and directs it in such a manner as to +make it most useful to others. With such due regulation, the principle +ought to be carefully cultivated in the young. It is closely connected +with that activity of mind which seeks for knowledge on every subject +that comes within its reach, and which is ever on the watch to make its +knowledge more correct and more extensive.</p> + +<p>VIII. The Desire of Moral Improvement. This leads to the highest state +of man: and it bears this peculiar character, that it is adapted to men +in every scale of society, and tends to diffuse a beneficial influence +around the circle with which the individual is connected. The desire of +power may exist in many, but its gratification is limited to a few:—he +who fails may become a discontented misanthrope; and he who succeeds may +be a scourge to his species. The desire of superiority or of praise may +be misdirected in the same manner, leading to insolent triumph on the +one hand, and envy on the other. Even the thirst for knowledge may be +abused, and many are placed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> in circumstances in which it cannot be +gratified. But the desire of moral improvement commends itself to every +class of society, and its object is attainable by all. In proportion to +its intensity and its steadiness, it tends to make the possessor both a +happier and a better man, and to render him the instrument of diffusing +happiness and usefulness to all who come within the reach of his +influence. If he be in a superior station, these results will be felt +more extensively; if he be in a humble sphere, they may be more limited; +but their nature is the same, and their tendency is equally to elevate +the character of man. This mental condition consists, as we shall +afterwards have occasion to shew more particularly, in a habitual +recognition of the supreme authority of conscience over the whole +intellectual and moral system, and in a habitual effort to have every +desire and every affection regulated by the moral principle, and by a +sense of the divine will. It leads to a uniformity of character which +can never flow from any lower source, and to a conduct distinguished by +the anxious discharge of every duty, and the practice of the most active +benevolence.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Emotions which have been now briefly mentioned seem to include the +more important of those which pertain to the class of Desires. There is, +however, another principle which ought to be mentioned as a leading +peculiarity of human nature, though it may be somewhat difficult to +determine the class to which it belongs. This is the Desire of +Action,—the restless activity of mind, which leads it to require some +object on which its powers must be exercised, and without which it preys +upon itself and becomes miserable. On this principle we are to explain +several facts which are of frequent observation. A person accustomed to +a life of activity longs for ease and retirement, and, when he has +accomplished his purpose, finds himself wretched. The frivolous +engagements of the unoccupied are referable to the same principle. They +arise, not from any interest which such occupations really possess, but +simply from the desire of mental excitement,—the felicity of having +something to do. The pleasure of relaxation, indeed, is known to those +only who have regular and interesting employment. Continued relaxation +soon becomes a weariness; and, on this ground, we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> may safely assert, +that the greatest degree of real enjoyment belongs, not to the luxurious +man of wealth, or the listless votary of fashion, but to the middle +classes of society, who, along with the comforts of life, have constant +and important occupation. Apart, indeed, from actual suffering, I +believe there is nothing in the external circumstances of individuals, +of greater or more habitual importance for promoting personal happiness, +than stated, rational, and interesting employment.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>The mental condition which we call Desire appears to lie in a great +measure at the foundation of character;—and, for a sound moral +condition, it is required that the desires be directed to worthy +objects,—and that the degree or strength of them be accommodated to the +true and relative value of each of these objects. If the desires are +thus directed, worthy conduct will be likely to follow in a steady and +uniform manner. If they are allowed to break from the restraints of +reason, and the moral principle, the man is left at the mercy of +unhallowed passion, and is liable to those irregularities which +naturally result from such a derange<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>ment of the moral feelings. If, +indeed, we would see the evils produced by desire, when not thus +controlled, we have only to look at the whole history of human kind. +What accumulated miseries arise from the want of due regulation of the +animal propensities, in the various forms in which it degrades the +character of rational and moral beings.—What evils spring from the love +of money, and from the desire of power;—from the contests of rivals, +and the tumults of party,—what envy, hatred, malignity, and +revenge.—What complicated wretchedness follows the train of +ambition,—contempt of human suffering, countries depopulated, and +fields deluged with blood. Such are the results of desire, when not +directed to objects worthy of a moral being, and not kept under the +rigid control of conscience, and the immutable laws of moral rectitude. +When, in any of these forms, a sensual or selfish propensity is allowed +to pass the due boundary which is fixed for it by reason and the moral +principle, the mental harmony is destroyed, and even the judgment itself +comes to be impaired and distorted in that highest of all inquiries, the +search after moral truth.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span></p> + +<p>The desires, indeed, may exist in an ill-regulated state, while the +conduct is yet restrained by various principles, such as submission to +human laws, a regard to character, or even a certain feeling of what is +morally right, contending with the vitiated principle within. But this +cannot be considered as the healthy condition of a moral being. It is +only when the desire itself is sound, that we can say the man is in +moral health. "He who grieves at his abstinence," says Aristotle, "is a +voluptuary;"—and this also is the great principle so often and so +strikingly enforced in the sacred writings; "Keep thy heart with all +diligence, because out of it are the issues of life." "Blessed are the +pure in heart, for they shall see God." Thus, there are desires which +are folly, and there are desires which are vice, even though they should +not be followed by indulgence; and there are desires which tend to +purify and elevate the moral nature, though their objects should be +beyond the reach of our full attainment in the present state of being. +Perfect moral purity is not the lot of man in this transient state, and +is not to be attained by his own unaided efforts. But,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> subservient to +it is that warfare within, that earnest and habitual desire after the +perfection of a moral being, which is felt to be the great object of +life, when it is viewed in relation to the life which is to come. For +this attainment, however, man must feel his total inadequacy,—and the +utmost efforts of human reason have failed in unfolding the requisite +aid. The conviction is thus forced upon us, that a higher influence is +necessary, and this influence is fully disclosed by the light of +revealed truth. We are there taught to look for a power from on high, +capable of effecting what human efforts cannot accomplish,—the +purification of the heart.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>Sect. II.</h2> + +<h2>The Affections.</h2> + + +<p>As the desires are calculated to bring some gratification to ourselves, +the Affections lead us to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> our relations to other men, and to a certain +line of conduct which arises out of these relations. They are to be +viewed as original principles of our nature, planted in us for wise +purposes, and the operation of them is to be considered as distinct, +both from that of the moral principle and of reason,—that is, from any +sense of duty or the moral rectitude of the conduct to which they lead, +and from any calculation of its propriety and utility. Thus, when the +mother devotes her attention by day and night to her infant, if from +sickness or helplessness in want of her special care, and perseveres in +doing so, with total disregard to her own ease, health, or comfort, she +is not influenced either by a sense of duty, or by any feeling of the +utility of her conduct: she acts upon an impulse within, which she feels +to be a part of her constitution, and which carries her forward in a +particular course of anxious and protracted exertion by the power of +itself alone. This distinction appears to be of the utmost practical +importance, and we shall have occasion to refer to it more particularly +in the sequel.</p> + +<p>An Affection, therefore, maybe considered as an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> original feeling or +emotion existing in ourselves, which leads us to a particular conduct +towards other men, without reference to any principle except the +intuitive impulse of the emotion itself. The Affections have been +divided into the Benevolent and Malevolent; but these titles appear to +be incorrect, especially the latter,—as the due exercise of the +emotions to which it refers does not properly include what is called +malevolence. They only tend to guard us against certain conduct in other +men; and, when they are allowed to go beyond this, that is, to actual +malevolence or revenge, the application is morbid. It will therefore +accord better with the nature of these emotions, to give them the names +of Uniting, and Defensive Affections;—the former including justice, +benevolence, veracity, friendship, love, gratitude, patriotism, and the +domestic affections;—the latter, jealousy, disapprobation, and anger.</p> + + +<h2>I. JUSTICE.</h2> + +<p>There may be some difference of opinion in regard to the propriety of +including justice among<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> the affections; but it seems to be more nearly +allied to them than to any of the other classes of moral emotions which +have been mentioned, and it may, therefore, as a mere matter of +arrangement, be conveniently introduced here. Strictly speaking, it +might perhaps be considered as a combined operation of an affection and +the moral principle; but this is matter of speculation alone. The +important consideration relating to it is,—that, in whatever manner it +arises, the sense of Justice is a primary and essential part of our +moral constitution, conveying the distinct impression of certain conduct +which a man owes to his fellow-men, without regard to any considerations +of a personal nature, and apart from all positive enactments or laws, +either divine or human. The requirements of Justice embrace certain +points in which every man has an absolute right, and in regard to which +it is the absolute duty of every other man not to interfere with him. +These rights have usually been divided into three classes;—what I have +a right to possess, and no man has any right to take from me,—what I +have a right to do, and no man has any title to prevent me from +do<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>ing,—what I have a right to expect from other men, and it is their +absolute duty to perform. These principles form the basis of what is +called Natural Jurisprudence, a code of relative duty deriving its +authority from impressions which are found in the moral feelings of all +mankind, without regard to the enactments of any particular civil +society. In the actual arrangements of civil communities, these great +principles of justice are combined with others which are derived merely +from utility or expediency, as calculated to promote the peace or the +advantage of the community. These may differ in different countries, and +they cease to be binding when the enactments on which they rest are +abrogated or changed. But no difference of place can alter, and no laws +can destroy, the essential requirements of justice.</p> + +<p>In these observations, it will be remarked, the word Justice is used as +expressing a principle of individual character; and it is in this sense +that it is to be properly classed with the affections. The term is +employed in another sense, namely, that of distributive and corrective +justice, which regulates the claims of individuals in a community,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +requires restitution or compensation for any deviation from such claims, +or punishes those who have violated them. It is in the former sense that +justice is properly to be considered as a branch of the philosophy of +the moral feelings; but the same general principles apply to both.</p> + +<p>The sense of Justice, therefore, consists in a feeling experienced by +every man, of a certain line of conduct which he owes to other men in +given circumstances; and this seems to be referable to the following +heads,—attending to their interest,—not interfering with their freedom +of action,—preserving their reputation,—estimating their character and +motives,—judging of their opinions,—consulting their feelings,—and +preserving or improving their moral condition. As a guide for his +conduct in particular instances, a man has usually a distinct impression +of what he thinks due by other men towards himself; justice requires +that he rigidly extend to others the same feelings and conduct which, in +similar circumstances, he expects from them.</p> + + +<p>(1.) Justice is due to the persons, property, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> interest of others. +This constitutes Integrity or Honesty. It, of course, implies abstaining +from every kind of injury, and preserving a conscientious regard to +their rights. In this last respect, it allows us to exercise a prudent +attention to our own interest, provided the means be fair and +honourable, and that we carefully abstain from injuring others by the +measures we employ for this purpose. The great rule for our guidance, in +all such cases, is found in the immutable principles of moral rectitude; +the test of our conduct in regard to individual instances is, that it be +such as, were our own interest concerned, we should think fair and +honourable in other men.</p> + + +<p>(2.) Justice requires us not to interfere with the freedom of action of +others. This constitutes personal liberty;—but in all civil communities +the right is liable to certain restrictions;—as when a man uses his +freedom of action to the danger or injury of other men. The principles +of justice may also recognise a man's surrendering, to a certain extent, +his personal liberty, by mutual and voluntary compact, as in the case of +servants, ap<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span>prentices, soldiers, &c.; but they are opposed to slavery, +in which the individual concerned is not a party to the arrangement.</p> + + +<p>(3.) Justice enjoins a regard to the reputation of others. This consists +in avoiding every thing that could be injurious to their good name, +either by direct evil speaking, or such insinuations as might give rise +to suspicion or prejudice against them. It must extend also to the +counteracting of such insinuations, when we hear them made by others, +especially in circumstances in which the individual injured has no +opportunity of defending himself. It includes, farther, that we do not +deny to others, even to rivals, any praise or credit which is justly due +to them. There is, however, one modification, equally consistent with +justice, to which the former of these rules is liable; namely, that, in +certain cases, we may be required to make a statement prejudicial to an +individual, when duty to a third party or to the public makes it +incumbent on us to do so. In such a case, a person guided by the rules +of justice will go no farther than is actually required by the +circumstances;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> and will at all times beware of propagating a report +injurious to another, though he should know it to be strictly true, +unless he is called upon by special duty to communicate it.</p> + + +<p>(4.) Justice requires us not only to avoid injuring an individual in the +estimation of other men, but to exercise the same fairness in forming +our own opinion of his character, without being misled or biased by +passion or prejudice. This consists in estimating his conduct and +motives with calmness and impartiality; in regard to particular +instances, making full allowance for the circumstances in which he was +placed, and the feelings by which he was, or might be, at the time, +naturally influenced. When an action admits of being referred to +different motives, justice consists in taking the more favourable view, +if we can do so with strict regard to truth, instead of harshly and +hastily assigning a motive which is unworthy. Such justice in regard to +character and motives we require to exercise with peculiar care, when +the conduct referred to has been in any way opposed to our own +self-love. In these cases we must be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> especially on our guard against +the influence of the selfish principle, which might lead to partial and +distorted views of actions and motives, less favourable to others, and +more favourable to ourselves, than justice warrants. When viewed in this +manner, we may often perceive, that conduct, which gave rise to emotions +of displeasure as injurious to us, was fully warranted by some conduct +on our own part, or was required by some higher duty which the +individual owed to another.</p> + + +<p>(5.) Justice is to be exercised in judging of the opinions and +statements of others. This constitutes Candour. It consists in giving a +fair and deliberate hearing to opinions, statements, and arguments, and +weighing fairly and honestly their tendency. It is, therefore, opposed +to prejudice, blind attachment to preconceived opinions, and that narrow +disputatious spirit which delights in captious criticism, and will hear +nothing with calmness that is opposed to its own views; which distorts +or misrepresents the sentiments of its opponents, ascribing them to +unworthy motives, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> deducing from them conclusions which they do not +warrant. Candour, accordingly, may be considered as a compound of +justice and the love of truth. It leads us to give due attention to the +opinions and statements of others,—in all cases to be chiefly +solicitous to discover truth, and, in statements of a mixed character, +containing perhaps much error and fallacy, anxiously to discover and +separate what is true. It has accordingly been remarked, that a turn for +acute disputation, and minute and rigid criticism, is often the +characteristic of a contracted and prejudiced mind; and that the most +enlarged understandings are always the most indulgent to the statements +of others,—their leading object being to discover truth.</p> + + +<p>(6.) Justice is due to the feelings of others; and this applies to many +circumstances which do not affect either their interest or their +reputation. Without injuring them in any of these respects, or in our +own good opinion, we may behave to them in such a manner as to wound +their feelings. There are minds of an extreme delicacy, which, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> this +respect, are peculiarly sensitive;—towards these a person of correct +feelings strives to conduct himself with suitable tenderness. We may +find, however, persons of honest and upright minds, who would shrink +from the least approach to real injury, but yet neglect the necessary +attention to the feelings; and may even confer a real benefit in such a +manner as to wound the individual to whom they intended kindness. The +lower degrees of this principle pertain to what is called mere good +breeding, which has been defined "benevolence in trifles;" but the +higher degrees may restrain from conduct which, without any real injury, +inflicts permanent pain. To this head we may perhaps also refer a due +regard to the estimate which we lead a man to form of himself. This is +opposed to flattery on the one hand, and on the other to any unnecessary +depreciation of his character. Flattery indeed is also to be considered +as a violation of veracity.</p> + + +<p>(7.) While, upon the principles which have been referred to, we abstain +from injuring the interests, the reputation, or the feelings of others, +there is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> another class of injuries, of still higher magnitude, which +the conscientious mind will avoid with peculiar anxiety, namely, +injuries done to the moral principles of other men. These form a class +of offences of which no human law takes any adequate cognizance, but we +know that they possess a character of the deepest malignity. Deep guilt +attaches to the man who, by persuasion or ridicule, has unhinged the +moral feelings of another, or has been the means of leading him astray +from the paths of virtue. Of equal, or even greater malignity, is the +aspect of the writer, whose works have contributed to violate the +principles of truth and rectitude,—to pollute the imagination, or +corrupt the heart. Inferior offenders are promptly seized by public +authority, and suffer the award of public justice; but the destroyer of +the moral being often walks securely through his own scene of moral +discipline, as if no power could reach the measure of his guilt but the +hand of the Eternal.</p> + +<p>To the same head we are to assign the extensive and important influence +of example. There are few men who have not in this respect some<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> power, +but it belongs more particularly to persons in situations of rank and +public eminence. It is matter of deep regret, both to the friend of +virtue and the friend of his country, when any of these are found +manifesting disregard to sacred things, or giving an air of fashion to +what is calculated to corrupt the moral principles of the unthinking +classes of society. If they are restrained by no higher motive, the +feelings of patriotism, and even of personal safety, ought to produce a +solemn caution; and it becomes them seriously to consider, whether they +may not thus be sowing among the ignorant multitude the seeds of tumult, +revolution, and anarchy.</p> + + +<h2>II. COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE.</h2> + +<p>Great diversity exists in the condition of different individuals in the +present state,—some being in circumstances of ease, wealth, and +comfort,—others of pain, deprivation, and sorrow. Such diversities we +must consider as an arrangement established by the great Disposer of all +things, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> calculated to promote important purposes in his moral +government. Many of these purposes are entirely beyond the reach of our +faculties; but, as holding a prominent place among them, we may safely +reckon the cultivation of our moral feelings, especially the affections +of compassion and benevolence. The due exercise of these is, therefore, +calculated to promote a double object, namely, the alleviation of +distress in others,—and the cultivation in ourselves of a mental +condition peculiarly adapted to a state of moral discipline. By bringing +us into contact with individuals in various forms and degrees of +suffering, they tend continually to remind us, that the present scene is +but the infancy of our existence,—that the beings whom we thus +contemplate are the children of the same Almighty Father with ourselves, +inheriting the same nature, possessed of the same feelings, and soon to +enter upon another state of existence, when all the distinctions which +are to be found in this world shall cease for ever. They tend thus to +withdraw us from the power of self-love, and the deluding influence of +present things; and habitually to raise our views to that future life, +for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> which the present is intended to prepare us. The due cultivation of +the benevolent affections, therefore, is not properly to be considered +as the object of moral approbation, but rather as a process of moral +culture. They may enable us in some degree to benefit others, but their +chief benefit is to ourselves. By neglecting them, we both incur much +guilt, and deprive ourselves of an important mean of improvement. The +diligent exercise of them, besides being a source of moral advantage, is +accompanied with a degree of mental enjoyment which carries with it its +own reward. Such appears to be the correct view which we ought to take +of the arrangement established by the Creator in this part of our +constitution. It is calculated to correct a misconception of an +important kind, which considers the exercise of the benevolent +affections as possessing a character of merit. To this subject we shall +have occasion to refer more particularly in the sequel.</p> + +<p>The exercise of the benevolent affections may be briefly treated of, +under nearly the same heads as those referred to when considering the +principle of Justice;—keeping in mind that they lead to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> greater +exertion for the benefit of others, and thus often demand a greater +sacrifice of self love, than is included under the mere requirements of +justice. On the other hand, benevolence is not to be exercised at the +expense of Justice; as would be the case, if a man were found relieving +distress by such expedients as involve the necessity of withholding the +payment of just debts, or imply the neglect or infringement of some duty +which he owes to another.</p> + + +<p>(1.) Compassion and benevolent exertion are due towards alleviating the +distresses of others. This exercise of them, in many instances, calls +for a decided sacrifice of personal interest, and, in others, for +considerable personal exertion. We feel our way to the proper measure of +these sacrifices, by the high principle of moral duty, along with that +mental exercise which places us in the situation of others, and, by a +kind of reflected self-love, judges of the conduct due by us to them in +our respective circumstances.—The details of this subject would lead us +into a field too extensive for our present purpose. Pecuniary aid, by +those who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> have the means, is the most easy form in which benevolence +can be gratified, and that which often requires the least, if any, +sacrifice of personal comfort or self-love. The same affection maybe +exercised in a degree much higher in itself, and often much more useful +to others, by personal exertion and personal kindness. The former, +compared with the means of the individual, may present a mere mockery of +mercy; while the latter, even in the lowest walks of life, often exhibit +the brightest displays of active usefulness that can adorn the human +character. This high and pure benevolence not only is dispensed with +willingness, when occasions present themselves; but seeks out +opportunities for itself, and feels in want of its natural and healthy +exercise when deprived of an object on which it may be bestowed.</p> + + +<p>(2.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the reputation of others. +This consists not only in avoiding any injury to their characters, but +in exertions to protect them against the injustice of others,—to +correct misrepresentations,—to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> check the course of slander, and to +obviate the efforts of those who would poison the confidence of friends, +or disturb the harmony of society.</p> + + +<p>(3.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the character and conduct of +others; especially when these have been in opposition to our personal +interest or self-love. This consists in viewing their conduct with +indulgence and forbearance, assigning the most favourable motives,—and +making every allowance for their feelings, and the circumstances in +which they were placed. It leads us also to avoid all suspicions and +jealousies which are not clearly justified by fact; and to abstain to +the utmost from taking offence,—by putting upon the conduct of others +the best construction of which it will possibly admit. It extends still +farther to the actual forgiveness of injuries, and the repaying of evil +with good,—a conduct represented in the sacred writings as one of the +highest attainments the human character can reach, in so far as regards +its relation to other men.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p> + + +<p>(4.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the feelings of others; and +this applies to many situations in which neither their interest nor +their character is concerned. It includes those exercises of the kindly +affections which produce so powerful an influence in all the relations +of life, but which it is impossible for any description to delineate. It +comprehends all our social and civil connexions, but seems peculiarly to +belong to our intercourse with inferiors and dependents. Its most +anxious exercise may often relate merely to trifles, but it extends to +innumerable circumstances in which we may surrender our own feelings to +those of others, and our own convenience or gratification to theirs. It +implies solicitude to avoid wounding the feelings by pride, selfishness, +or fretfulness,—by suspicions, imputations, and jealousies,—or by +allowing insignificant things to ruffle the temper and derange the +social comfort. Many, who are not deficient in what we usually call +deeds of benevolence, are too apt to forget, that a most important +exercise of true benevolence consists in the habitual cultivation of +courtesy, gentleness, and kindness; and that on these dispositions often +depends our in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>fluence upon the comfort and happiness of others, in a +greater degree than on any deeds of actual beneficence.—To this +department, also, we may refer the high character of the peace-maker, +whose delight it is to allay angry feelings, even when he is in no +degree personally interested, and to bring together as friends and +brethren, those who have assumed the attitude of hatred and revenge.</p> + + +<p>(5.) Benevolence is to be exercised in regard to the moral degradation +of others, including their ignorance and vice. This prevents us from +deriving satisfaction from moral evil, even though it should contribute +to our advantage, as might often happen from the misconduct of rivals or +enemies. It implies also that highest species of usefulness which aims +at raising the moral condition of man,—by instructing the ignorant, +rescuing the unwary, and reclaiming the vicious. This exalted +benevolence will therefore also seek to extend the light of divine truth +to nations that sit in moral darkness; and looks anxiously for the +period when the knowledge of Christianity shall dispel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> every false +faith, and put an end to the horrors of superstition.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="III_Veracity" id="III_Veracity"></a>III. Veracity.</h2> + + +<p>In our mental impressions relating to veracity, we have a striking +illustration of the manner in which we rely on this class of moral +feelings, as instinctive in the constitution of the mind. On a certain +confidence in the veracity of mankind is founded so much of the +knowledge on which we constantly depend, that, without it, the whole +system of human things would go into confusion. It relates to all the +intelligence which we derive from any other source than our own personal +observation:—for example, to all that we receive through the historian, +the traveller, the naturalist, or the astronomer. Even in regard to the +most common events of a single day, we often proceed on a confidence in +the veracity of a great variety of individuals. There is, indeed, a +natural tendency to truth in all men, unless where this principle is +overcome by some strong selfish purpose<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> to be answered by departing +from it:—and there is an equally strong tendency to rely on the +veracity of others, until we have learnt certain cautions by our actual +experience of mankind. Hence children and inexperienced persons are +easily imposed upon by unfounded statements:—and the most practised +liar confides in the credulity of those whom he attempts to deceive. +Deception, indeed, would never accomplish its purpose, if it were not +from the impression that men generally speak truth. It is obvious also, +that the mutual confidence which men have in each other, both in regard +to veracity of statement, and to sincerity of intention respecting +engagements, is that which keeps together the whole of civil society. In +the transactions of commerce it is indispensable, and without it all the +relations of civil life would go into disorder. When treating of the +intellectual powers in another work, I considered the principles which +regulate our confidence in human testimony; and it is unnecessary to +recur to them in this place. Our present object is briefly to analyze +the elements which are essential to veracity, when we view it as a moral +emotion, or a branch<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> of individual character. These appear to be +three,—correctness in ascertaining facts,—accuracy in relating +them,—and truth of purpose, or fidelity in the fulfilment of promises.</p> + +<p>(1.) An important element of veracity is correctness in ascertaining +facts. This is essential to the <i>Love of Truth</i>. It requires us to +exercise the most anxious care respecting every statement which we +receive as true; and not to receive it as such, until we are satisfied +that the authority on which it is asserted is of a nature on which we +can fully rely, and that the statement contains all the facts to which +our attention ought to be directed. It consequently guards us against +those limited views, by which party spirit or a love of favourite dogmas +leads a man to receive the facts which favour a particular opinion, and +neglect those which are opposed to it. The sound exercise of judgment, +which is connected with this love of truth, differs therefore from the +art of ingenious disputation, and is often found directly at variance +with it. The same principle is applicable to the truths which are +derived as deductions from pro<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>cesses of reasoning. It is thus opposed +to all sophistical arguments, and partial or distorted reasonings, by +which disputants strive to establish particular systems, instead of +engaging in an honest and simple inquiry after truth. The love of truth, +therefore, is of equal importance in the reception of facts, and in the +formation of opinions; and it includes also a readiness to relinquish +our own opinions, when new facts or arguments are presented to us which +are calculated to overturn them. The practice of this sincere and candid +search after truth, on every subject to which the mind may be directed, +ought to be cultivated in early life with the most assiduous care. It is +a habit of the mind which must exercise a most important influence in +the culture both of moral and intellectual character.</p> + +<p>In the reception of truth, especially on the evidence of testimony, we +acquire by experience a degree of caution, arising from having been +sometimes deceived. In minds of a certain description, this may be +allowed to produce a suspicion with regard to all evidence,—in other +words, <i>Scepticism</i>. The want of the necessary and proper caution,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +again, leads to <i>Credulity</i>. It is the part of a well-regulated mind to +avoid both these extremes, by attentively weighing the evidence and the +character of the witnesses, and giving to each circumstance its due +influence in the conclusion.</p> + +<p>(2.) Closely connected with the love of truth in receiving, is the +exercise of veracity in the statement of facts, whether derived from our +personal observation or received by testimony from others. It consists +not only in the most scrupulous accuracy of relation, but also in giving +it in such a manner as to convey a correct impression to the hearer. It +is consequently opposed to all those methods by which either a false +statement may be made to assume the appearance of truth, or one +essentially true may be so related as to convey a false impression.</p> + +<p>Direct fallacy may consist in the alleged facts being absolutely false, +or in some of them being so,—in facts being wanting or kept out of view +which would give a different import to the whole state<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>ment,—or in some +of the facts being disguised, distorted, or coloured, so as to alter +materially the impression conveyed by them. But, besides such actual +fallacy, there are various methods by which a statement literally true +may be so related as to convey an erroneous impression. Facts may be +connected together in such a manner as to give the appearance of a +relation of cause and effect, when they are in truth entirely +unconnected;—or an event may be represented as common which has +occurred only in one or two instances. The character of an individual +may be assumed from a single act, which, if the truth were known, might +be seen to be opposed to his real disposition, and accounted for by the +circumstances in which he happened at the time to be placed. Events may +be connected together, which were entirely disjoined, and conclusions +deduced from this fictitious connexion, which are of course unfounded. +Several of these sources of fallacy may be illustrated by a ludicrous +example. A traveller from the continent has represented the venality of +the British House of Commons to be such, that, whenever the minister of +the Crown enters<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> the house, there is a general cry for "places." It may +be true that a cry of "places" has gone round the house at certain +times, when business was about to commence, or to be resumed after an +interval,—meaning, of course, that members were to take their seats. It +is very probable, that, on some occasion, this may have occurred at the +moment when the minister entered,—so that the statement of the +traveller might, in point of fact, be strictly true. The erroneous +impression which he endeavours to convey by it, arises from three +sources of fallacy, which the anecdote will serve to illustrate, +namely,—the false meaning he gives to the word employed,—connecting it +with the entrance of the minister as cause and effect,—and representing +the connexion as uniform which happened to occur in that particular +instance. In the same manner it will appear, that a false impression may +be conveyed respecting the conduct of an individual,—by assigning +motives which are entirely imaginary,—by connecting things together +which have no relation,—by keeping out of view circumstances which +would afford an explanation or palliation of his conduct,—or by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> +attaching to his words a different meaning from that which he intended +to convey by them. The common saying, that there are two ways of telling +a story, does not therefore refer to what is strictly to be called +fabrication or falsehood; but to those distortions or colourings of +circumstances, which, however slight in themselves, have the effect of +essentially changing the impression made by the whole.</p> + +<p>To veracity, under this department, we are also to refer the rule,—of +giving to others an honest and fair impression of our views, motives, +and intentions. This is <i>Sincerity</i>. It is opposed to hypocrisy, that +unworthy display of human character, in which a man disguises his real +sentiments, and, on the contrary, professes principles which he neither +feels nor values, merely for the purpose of promoting his selfish +interests. Such a character exhibits a singular combination of moral +delinquencies. It is founded on the lowest selfishness, and includes a +departure from veracity and honesty. But besides, it implies a knowledge +of virtuous principles, and of their proper tendencies, while there is a +practical denial of their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> influence. Sincerity is also opposed to +flattery, which tends to give a man a false impression of our opinion, +and of our feelings towards him, and likewise leads him to form a false +estimate of his own character. It is opposed also to simulation or +double dealing, by which a man, for certain purposes professes +sentiments towards another which he does not feel, or intentions which +he does not entertain.</p> + +<p>(3.) The third element of veracity is Truth of Purpose, or fidelity in +the fulfilment of promises. This is opposed to actual departure from +what was distinctly promised; likewise to all those evasions by which +one may convey an impression, or excite the hope of an intention which +he does not mean to fulfil,—or avoid the performance of a real or +implied engagement on any other ground than inability to perform it. By +this straight-forward integrity of purpose, an individual gives a clear +impression of what he honestly intends to perform; and performs it, +though circumstances may have occurred to make the fulfilment +disagreeable or even injurious to himself:—"he sweareth to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> his own +hurt," says a sacred writer, "and changeth not."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="IV_FRIENDSHIP_LOVE_AND_GRATITUDE" id="IV_FRIENDSHIP_LOVE_AND_GRATITUDE"></a>IV. FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND GRATITUDE.</h2> + + +<p>These affections are so nearly allied, that, in this slight analysis, +they may be taken together. They consist in a personal and peculiar +attachment to an individual, founded either upon some qualities in +himself, or some benefits he has conferred on us, or on some one in whom +we are interested. The feelings and conduct to which they give rise +correspond with those referred to under the preceding affections, with +this difference, that, in many instances, they lead to a much greater +sacrifice of personal interest and comfort, than usually proceeds either +from justice or simple benevolence. The exertions arising out of them +are directed, according to the division formerly given, to promoting the +interest or comfort of the object of our regard,—preserving, defending, +or advancing his reputation,—treating his feelings with peculiar +tenderness,—and his failings with peculiar<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> indulgence,—receiving his +opinions with peculiar favour,—and anxiously endeavouring to improve +his intellectual and moral condition. This last consideration is justly +reckoned the highest office of friendship;—it is to be regretted that +its operation is sometimes impeded by another feeling, which leads us to +be blind to the failings and deficiencies of those whom we love.—In +exercising simple love and friendship, we rejoice in the advantage and +happiness of the object, though they should be accomplished by +others,—but, in exercising gratitude, we are not satisfied unless they +be effected in some measure by ourselves.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="V_PATRIOTISM" id="V_PATRIOTISM"></a>V. PATRIOTISM.</h2> + + +<p>Patriotism is, perhaps, not properly to be considered as a distinct +principle of our nature; but rather as a result of a combination of the +other affections. It leads us, by every means in our power, to promote +the peace and the prosperity of our country,—and to discourage, to the +utmost<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> of our ability, whatever tends to the contrary. Every member of +the community has something in his power in this respect. He may set an +example, in his own person, of dutiful and loyal respect to the first +authority, of strict obedience to the laws, and respectful submission to +the institutions of his country. He may oppose the attempts of factious +individuals to sow among the ignorant the seeds of discontent, tumult, +or discord. He may oppose and repress attempts to injure the revenue of +the state; may aid in the preservation of public tranquillity, and in +the execution of public justice. Finally, he may zealously exert himself +in increasing the knowledge and improving the moral habits of the +people,—two of the most important means by which the conscientious man, +in any rank of life, may aid in conferring a high and permanent benefit +on his country.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="VI_THE_DOMESTIC_AFFECTIONS" id="VI_THE_DOMESTIC_AFFECTIONS"></a>VI. THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS.</h2> + + +<p>In this extensive and interesting class are included, conjugal +affection,—the parental feelings,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>—filial reverence,—and the ties of +brothers and sisters.—These call forth, in a still higher degree, the +feelings and exertions already referred to, and a still greater +sacrifice of personal ease, advantage, and comfort, in the anxious and +diligent discharge of the duties resulting from them. In the conjugal +relation, they lead us to the tenderness, the confidence, the mutual +forbearance, the united exertions of those, who have one hope, one +interest, and one course of duty. The parental relation implies the +highest possible degree of that feeling which studies the advantage of +the object of our care,—the promotion of his happiness,—the +improvement of his mind,—the culture of his affections,—the formation +of his habits; the anxious watching over the development of his +character, both as an intellectual and a moral being. The filial +relation requires, in an equal degree, respect, affection, submission, +and confidence,—a deference to parental opinion and control; and an +impression that those parts of parental management, which may often be +disagreeable, are guided by a sincere desire to promote the highest +interests of the object of this affectionate regard.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span></p> + +<p>Among the feelings of our nature "which have less of earth in them than +heaven," are those which bind together the domestic circle in the +various sympathies, affections, and duties, which belong to this class +of tender relations. It is beautiful also to observe, how these +affections arise out of each other, and how the right exercise of them +tends to their mutual cultivation.—The father ought to consider the son +as, of all earthly concerns, the highest object of his anxious +care;—and should watch over the development of his intellectual +character, and the culture of his moral feelings. In the zealous +prosecution of this great purpose, he should study to convey a clear +impression, that he is influenced purely by a feeling of solemn +responsibility, and an anxious desire to promote the highest interests. +When parental watchfulness is thus mingled with confidence and kindness, +the son will naturally learn to estimate alike the conduct itself, and +the principles from which it sprung, and will look to the faithful +parent as his safest guide and counsellor, and most valued earthly +friend. If we extend the same principles to the relation between the +mother and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> the daughter, they apply with equal or even greater force. +In the arrangements of society, these are thrown more constantly into +each other's company; and that watchful superintendence may be still +more habitually exercised, which, along with the great concern of +cultivating the intellectual and moral being, neglects not those graces +and delicacies which belong peculiarly to the female character. It is +not by direct instruction alone, that, in such a domestic circle, the +highest principles and best feelings of our nature are cultivated in the +minds of the young. It is by the actual exhibition of the principles +themselves, and a uniform recognition of their supreme importance;—it +is by a parental conduct, steadily manifesting the conviction, that, +with every proper attention to the acquirements, the accomplishments, +and the comforts of life, the chief concern of moral beings relates to +the life which is to come. A domestic society, bound together by these +principles, can retire, as it were, from the haunts of men, and retreat +within a sanctuary where the storms of the world cannot enter.—When +thus met together in the interchange of mutual affection and mutual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> +confidence, they present the anticipation of that period, when, after +the tumults of life are over, they shall meet again, "no wanderer lost, +a family in heaven".</p> + + +<h2>THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS.</h2> + +<p>The feelings of jealousy, anger, and resentment, are, not less than the +other affections, to be considered as part of our moral constitution; +and they are calculated to answer important purposes, provided they are +kept under the strict control of reason and the moral principle. Their +proper object is primarily a sense of blameable conduct in others; and +they lead us to use proper measures for protecting ourselves against +such conduct. While we thus disapprove of the character and conduct of +men in certain circumstances, we are led, by our feelings of justice and +benevolence, to take part with the injured and oppressed against the +oppressors,—or to protect those who are threatened with injuries, by +measures for defeating the schemes of their enemies. A still more +refined exercise of this class<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> of feelings leads us to seek the +reformation of the offender, and to convert him from an enemy into a +friend.</p> + +<p>Resentment, in cases which concern the public peace, naturally leads to +the infliction of punishment; the object of which is to prevent similar +conduct in others, not to gratify personal vengeance. Hence it is +required to be done in a public manner,—with proper deliberation and +coolness,—and with an exact adaptation of the penalty to the offence, +and to the object to be attained. The person injured is not likely to do +this with the requisite impartiality and candour; for we are apt to feel +too deeply injuries offered to ourselves, and not to make the propel +allowance for the feelings of others, and the circumstances which led to +the offence. The higher degrees, indeed, of these tendencies usually go +together,—they, who are most susceptible of offences, and most +irritable under them, being generally least inclined to make allowances +for others. Hence, in all cases, our disapprobation of personal +vengeance, or of a man taking the law into his own hands; and our +perfect sympathy with the protectors of the public<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> peace, when they +dispassionately investigate a case of injury, and calmly adapt their +measures to the real object to be attained by them,—the protection of +the community.</p> + +<p>The defensive affections are exercised in an unwarranted manner, when +they are allowed to be excited by trifling causes; when they are, in +degree, disproportioned to the offence, or prolonged in a manner which +it did not require; and when they lead, in any measure, to retaliation +or revenge. The sound exercise of them, therefore, is opposed to that +irascibility which takes fire on trivial occasions, or without due +consideration of the intentions of the agent, or the circumstances in +which he was placed,—to a disposition to resentment on occasions which +do not warrant it,—and, on all occasions, to harbouring the feeling +after the offence and all its consequences have passed over.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Before concluding the subject of the affections, there are three points +respecting them which remain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> to be mentioned as briefly as +possible,—the influence of Attention, combined with a certain act of +Imagination,—the influence of Habit,—and the estimate of the feeling +of Moral Approbation which the exercise of the affections is calculated +to produce.</p> + + +<p>I. In every exercise of the affections, a most important influence is +produced by Attention, aided by a certain act of imagination. This +consists of directing the mind intensely and habitually to all the +considerations which ought to guide us in the particular relation to +which the affection refers. It leads us to place ourselves in the +situation of others, and, with a kind of personal, or almost selfish +interest, to enter into their wants, their anxieties, and their +feelings; and thus, in their place, to judge of the emotions and the +conduct which are due from us to them. Such is the exercise of one who +wishes to follow the great rule of doing to others as he would that they +should do to him. He is not satisfied with the merely decent discharge +of the duties which arise from the affections, but studies intensely the +requirements which attach to his par<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>ticular situation,—searches out +the individuals, towards whom they ought to be exercised, and enters +into their condition and their feelings with minute and tender interest. +Many who shew no want of friendly and benevolent affection, when an +individual case is strongly brought before them, are deficient in the +kind of exercise which would lead them, in this manner, to find their +way to that correct exercise of the affections which really belongs to a +scene of moral discipline. Such an exercise is adapted to every +situation in life, and tends to guard a man, in his various relations, +against the hindrances which indolence, self-love, and pure inattention +are apt to bring in the way of his peculiar duties,—and of his +discharging them with due regard to the feelings of others.</p> + +<p>This mental exercise, of extensive application to the benevolent +affections, constitutes what is usually called <i>Sympathy</i>. It is +composed of an act of Imagination and Self-love, by which we transfer +ourselves, as it were, into the situation of other men, and thereby +regulate our conduct towards them. It is however to be kept in mind,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +that the principle of self-love, thus brought into action, is the test, +not the rule of our conduct. This is a point on which there has been +much vague and useless speculation; and from not attending to the +distinction, some have referred our ideas of benevolence entirely to the +principle of selfishness. Such discussions are equally unsound and +unprofitable, and are to be placed on a footing with the speculations of +the scholastic philosophy, which we now look back upon merely as matters +of historical curiosity. The application of self-love, in the manner +which has been referred to, is chiefly useful in enabling us fully to +appreciate the facts of the individual case, as we would do if we were +personally interested. The rule of our conduct is quite distinct from +this, and rests on those fundamental principles of justice and +compassion which form a part of our moral constitution. In the practical +application of them, they are very much aided by the moral principle or +conscience.</p> + +<p>The man, who acts habitually under the influence of these rules, learns +to question himself rigidly respecting the claims and duties which +result from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> his moral relations; and the feelings and circumstances of +those with whom they bring him into contact. What, (he asks himself) is +the line of action which belongs to me in regard to that +individual,—what are his feelings in his present situation,—what are +the feelings and conduct which he expects from me,—and what are those +which I would expect from him were I in his circumstances and he in +mine? It is not a due regulation of the affections alone that arises +from this wholesome state of mental discipline. It is a moral culture to +the mind itself, which may often be fraught with the most important +results. For the man who exercises it realizes to himself the feelings +of poverty,—the agonies of bereavement, the impressions of the bed of +death;—and thus, without the pain of suffering, he may reap a portion +of those important moral benefits which suffering is calculated to +yield.</p> + +<p>There is another view still to be taken of the advantages derived from +that mental discipline which consists in attention to all the relations +included under the affections. When habitually exercised, it may often +bring before the mind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> important circumstances in our moral relations, +which are apt to make an inadequate impression amid the distractions of +present things. When the parent, for example, looks around the objects +of his tender affection, what a new impulse is communicated by the +thought, that the present life is but the infancy of their being; and +that his chief and highest concern is to train them for immortality. A +similar impulse must be given to the philanthropist, when he considers +that the individuals, who share his benevolent attentions, are, like +himself, passing through a scene of discipline to a higher state of +existence, where they will assume a place corresponding to their rank in +the scale of moral beings. The refined philanthropy thus arising, while +it neglects no proper attention to the distresses of the present life, +will seek chiefly to contend with those greater evils which degrade the +moral nature, and sever the immortal spirit from its God. He, who judges +upon this extended principle, will learn to form a new estimate of the +condition of man. Amid the pride of wealth and the splendour of power, +he may mourn over a being lost to every feeling of his high destiny; +and,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> by the death-bed of the peasant, amid discomfort and suffering, he +may contemplate with interest a purified spirit rising to immortality.</p> + + +<p>II. Next to the power of attention, we have to notice the influence +produced upon the affections by Habit. This is founded upon a principle +of our nature, by which a remarkable relation exists between the +affections and the actions which arise out of them. The tendency of all +emotions is to become weaker by repetition, or to be less acutely felt +the oftener they are experienced. The tendency of actions, again, as we +have seen when treating of the Intellectual Powers, is to become easier +by repetition,—so that those, which at first require close and +continued attention, come to be performed without effort, and almost +without consciousness. Now an affection properly consists of an emotion +leading to an action; and the natural progress of the mind, in the +proper exercise of the affection, is, that the emotion becomes less +acutely felt, as the action becomes easier and more familiar.—Thus, a +scene of wretchedness, or a tale of sorrow, will produce in the +inexperienced an intensity of emotion<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> not felt by him whose life has +been devoted to deeds of mercy; and a superficial observer is apt to +consider the condition of the latter as one of insensibility, produced +by familiarity with scenes of distress. It is, on the contrary, that +healthy and natural progress of the mind, in which the emotion is +gradually diminished in force as it is followed by its proper +actions,—that is, as the mere intensity of feeling is exchanged for the +habit of active benevolence. But that this may take place in the sound +and healthy manner, the emotion must be steadily followed by the action +which belongs to it. If this be neglected, the harmony of the moral +process is destroyed, and, as the emotion becomes weakened, it is +succeeded by cold insensibility or barren selfishness.</p> + +<p>This is a subject of much importance,—and there are two conclusions +which arise out of it respecting the cultivation of the benevolent +affections. The one relates to the bad effects of fictitious scenes of +sorrow, as represented on the stage, or in works of fancy. The evil +arising from these appears to be that which has now been referred +to;—the emotion is produced without the correspond<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span>ing action, and the +consequence is likely to be a cold and useless sentimentalism, instead +of a sound cultivation of the benevolent affections.—The second +is,—that, in cultivating the benevolent affections in the young, we +should be careful to observe the process so clearly pointed out by the +philosophy of the moral feelings. They should be familiarized with +actual scenes of suffering, but this ought to be accompanied by deeds of +minute and active kindness, so as to produce a full and lively +impression of the wants and feelings of the sufferer. On this ground, +also, I think we should at first even abstain, in a great measure, from +giving young persons the cautions they will afterwards find so +requisite, respecting the character of the objects of their benevolence, +and the impositions so frequently practised by the poor. Suspicions of +this kind might tend to interfere with the important moral process which +ought to be our first object,—the necessary cautions will afterwards be +learned with little difficulty.</p> + +<p>The best mode of contending with the evils of pauperism, on the +principles of political economy, is a problem on which I presume not to +enter.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> But, on the principles of moral science, a consideration of the +utmost importance should never be forgotten,—the great end to be +answered by the varieties of human condition in the cultivation of the +benevolent affections. Political science passes its proper boundary when +it is permitted in any degree to interfere with this high +principle;—and, on the other hand, it is not to be denied, that this +important purpose is in a great measure frustrated by many of those +institutions, which cut off the direct intercourse of the prosperous and +the wealthy with those whom providence has committed to them, in this +scene of moral discipline, as the objects of their benevolent care.</p> + + +<p>III. The third point, which remains to be briefly mentioned, is the +feeling of moral approbation, or rather the impression of merit, which +is frequently attached to the exercise of the affections. This important +subject has been already referred to. When the mother, with total +disregard to her health and comfort, devotes herself to watching over +her child, she is not influenced by any sense of duty, nor do we attach +to her conduct the feel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>ing of moral approbation. She acts simply upon +an impulse within, which she perceives to be a part of her constitution, +and which carries her forward with unshrinking firmness in a particular +course of laborious and anxious service. She may, indeed, be sensible +that the violation of these feelings would expose her to the reprobation +of her kind; but she does not imagine that the zealous fulfilment of +them entitles her to any special praise. The same principle applies to +all the affections. They are a part of our moral constitution, intended +to bind men together by certain offices of justice, friendship, and +compassion; and have been well named by a distinguished writer, "the +voice of God within us." They serve a purpose in our moral economy, +analogous to that which the appetites answer in our physical system. The +appetite of hunger, for example, ensures a regular supply of +nourishment, in a manner which could never have been provided for by any +process of reasoning; though an exercise of reason is still applicable +to preserving over it a certain regulation and control. In the same +manner, the various feelings of our moral nature have each a defined +pur<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>pose to answer, both in respect to our own mental economy and our +relations to our fellow-men; and in the due exercise of them they ought +to be controlled and regulated by the moral principle. The violation of +these feelings, therefore, places man below the level of a moral being; +but the performance of them does not entitle him to assume the claim of +merit. He is merely bearing his part in a certain arrangement, from +which he is himself to derive benefit, as a being holding a place in +that system of things which these feelings are intended to keep together +in harmony and order. In regard to the great principles of veracity and +justice, every one perceives this to be true. In all mercantile +transactions, for example, a character for high honour and integrity +leads not only to respect, but to that confidence which is closely +connected with prosperity.—These qualities, indeed, are as essential to +a man's own interest as they are to his duty to other men; and if he +does gain an advantage by fraud and deceit, it is only when he escapes +detection;—that is, while he preserves the reputation of the very +qualities which he has violated. But this truth applies equally to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> the +affections more strictly benevolent. The man who lives in the habitual +exercise of a cold and barren selfishness, and seeks only his own +gratification or interest, has indeed, in some sense, his punishment in +the contempt and aversion with which he is viewed by his fellow-men. +Much more than this, however, attaches to such a character;—he has +violated the principles given him for his guidance in the social +system;—he has fallen from his sound condition as a moral being; and +incurs actual guilt in the eye of a righteous Governor, whose will the +order of this lower world is intended to obey. But it by no means +follows, that the man, who performs in a certain manner the relations of +justice, friendship, and compassion, is thereby entitled to claim merit +in the view of the Almighty Governor of the universe. He merely acts his +part in the present system of moral economy, for which he has been +adapted. He is so constituted as to derive satisfaction from the +exercise of these affections; and, on the other hand, he receives an +appropriate reward in the reciprocal exercise of similar affections by +other men, and in the general harmony of society which results from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> +them. An extensive culture of the affections, therefore, may go on +without the recognition of the moral principle, or that state of mind +which habitually feels the presence of the Deity, and desires to have +the whole character in subjection to his will. We are not entitled to +acknowledge the operation of that great principle, unless when the +affections are exercised in circumstances which imply a strong and +decided sacrifice of self-love to the authority of God. This appears to +correspond with the distinction so strikingly stated in the sacred +writings—"If ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not +even the publicans the same?"—"I say unto you, love your +enemies,—bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, pray +for them which despitefully use you and persecute you."</p> + +<p>On this branch of the subject it is also to be observed, that there is a +kind of compensating power among the affections themselves, by which, in +the intercourse of men, they act as checks upon each other. Thus +resentment acts as a check upon injustice; and the dread of exciting +anger in others has probably an influence, in preserving the peace<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> and +harmonies of society, which we often ascribe to a higher principle. In +regard to the affections more strictly benevolent, these are also +influenced, in a similar manner, by the feeling of disapprobation which +attends any remarkable departure from their requirements. When we keep +in mind, along with this consideration, the manner in which all men are +influenced, in one degree or another, by the love of approbation or +regard to character, we perceive in the moral system a beautiful +principle of compensation, tending to promote in it a certain degree of +harmony. This is remarkably illustrated, for example, in the general +feeling of disapprobation which is attached to ingratitude, and to +violation of filial affection or parental duty, and even to any marked +neglect of the common calls of humanity. Along with this we are also to +keep in mind, that a man is universally considered as in the lowest +state of human nature, who, in these respects, has become regardless of +character,—that is, of the estimation with which his conduct is viewed +by his fellow-men.</p> + +<p>In regard to both the affections and the desires, we are farther to +remember that deep and exten<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>sive influence, upon the happiness of the +individual himself, which results from a due regulation of these +feelings;—the pure mental enjoyment of him whose affections are under +sound regulation, and whose desires are habitually directed to those +objects which are in the highest degree worthy of being sought after. +This mental tranquillity is also represented to us, in a very striking +manner, by the influence of those dispositions which we usually refer to +the head of Temper. What a constant source of pure enjoyment is a meek +and placid spirit, the desires of which are moderate and under due +regulation,—which puts upon every thing the best construction it will +admit of,—is slow to take offence,—seeks no distinction,—but views +itself with humility, and others with candour, benevolence, and +indulgence. Such a disposition makes the man happy in himself, and a +source of happiness and peace to all around him. On the other hand, what +an unceasing source of mental disquiet and turbulence is the opposite +disposition,—jealous, envious, and censorious,—ready to take offence +at trifles, and often to construe incidental occurrences into intended +and premedi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>tated insults,—prone to put unfavourable constructions upon +the conduct of others, and thus continually to surround itself with +imaginary enemies, and imaginary neglects and injuries. Such a temper is +a continual torment to the individual himself, and the cause of disputes +and jealousies among those with whom he is connected. We cannot fail, +also, to perceive that the man of ill-regulated passions injures his own +true interest and happiness, as much as he violates his duty to others, +and that his course of life is often productive of degradation, disease, +and wretchedness. In all this we see a beautiful example of the wise +arrangements of the Creator, who, in the structure of our moral nature, +has connected our own peace and happiness with a state of feeling +calculated to promote the happiness and peace of all around us. We +cannot be at a loss to conclude what a different scene the world would +present, if such feelings were universally cultivated; and, on the other +hand, we must observe how much of the actual misery that exists in the +world arises from derangement of moral feeling, and the various +consequences which result from it both to individuals and com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span>munities. +We find also, by innumerable examples, the remarkable influence +produced, by a due cultivation of these feelings, in alleviating, both +in ourselves and others, the physical evils which are inseparable from +the present state. It is farther to be remarked, as a fact worthy of the +deepest attention, that the only distinct information conveyed to us in +Scripture, respecting the happiness of the righteous in a future state, +is,—that it will consist chiefly in a perfect knowledge of the divine +character, and a conformity of the soul to the moral perfections of the +Deity. "It doth not yet appear," says the sacred writer, "what we shall +be; but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we +shall see him as he is."</p> + +<p>In concluding the whole subject of the affections, I have only farther +to remark,—that the regulated state of the moral feelings, which has +been the subject of the preceding observations, seems to correspond with +the quality so emphatically described in the sacred writings under the +name of Charity. It is there uniformly represented as the great test of +the moral condition; and we find exposed, in the most striking manner, +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> worthlessness of all endowments which are not accompanied by this +regulation of the whole character. We cannot, therefore, conclude this +subject in a more appropriate manner, than by a passage in which, by a +few most powerful expressions, a code of ethical science is laid before +us with a clearness and a force, which put to nought all human +composition:—"Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and +have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. +And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, +and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove +mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all +my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and +have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and +is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed +up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily +provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in +the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, +endureth all things. Charity never faileth;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> but whether there be +prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; +whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in part, +and we prophecy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then +that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as +a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I +became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a +glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall +I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, charity, +these three,—but the greatest of these is charity."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="SECT_III" id="SECT_III"></a>SECT. III.</h2> + +<h2>SELF-LOVE.</h2> + + +<p>There has been some dispute respecting the term Self-love, both as to +its general propriety, and as to the mental feelings which ought to be +referred<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> to it. There can be no doubt that there is, in our +constitution, a principle or propensity which leads us to study our own +interest, gratification, and comfort; and that, in many instances, it +becomes the ruling principle of the character. It is in this sense that +I use the term self-love, without entering into any discussion regarding +the strict logical propriety of it. Like the other mental feelings, it +is to be considered as part of our moral constitution, and calculated to +answer important purposes, provided it be kept in its proper place, and +do not encroach upon the duties and affections which we owe to other +men. When thus regulated, it constitutes prudence, or a just regard to +our own interest, safety, and happiness; when it becomes morbid in its +exercise, it degenerates into selfishness.</p> + +<p>A sound and rational self-love ought to lead us to seek our own true +happiness, and should prove a check upon those appetites and passions +which interfere with this; for many of them, it must be allowed, may be +not less adverse to our own real interest and comfort, than they are to +our duty to other men. It should lead us, therefore, to avoid<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> every +thing, not only that is opposed to our interest, but that is calculated +to impair our peace of mind, and that harmony of the moral feelings +without which there can be no real happiness. This includes a due +regulation of the desires, and a due exercise of the affections, as a +moral condition which promotes our own welfare and comfort. Self-love, +viewed in this manner, appears to be placed as a regulating principle +among the other powers,—much inferior indeed to the great principle of +conscience, so far as regards the moral condition of the +individual,—but calculated to answer important purposes in promoting +the harmonies of society. The impression, on which its influence rests, +appears to be simply the comfort and satisfaction which arise to +ourselves from a certain regulation of the desires, and a certain +exercise of the affections, while feelings of an opposite kind follow a +different conduct. These sources of satisfaction are manifold. We may +reckon among them the pleasure attached to the exercise of the +affections themselves, a feature of our moral constitution of the most +interesting kind,—the true mental peace and enjoyment which spring +from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> benevolence, friendship, meekness, forgiveness, and the whole +train of the kindly feelings,—the gratitude of those who have +experienced the effects of our kindness,—the respect and approbation of +those whose esteem we feel to be valuable,—and the return of similar +affections and good offices from other men. On the other hand, we have +to keep in mind the mental agony and distraction which arise from +jealousy, envy, hatred, and resentment,—the sense of shame and disgrace +which follow a certain line of conduct,—and the distress which often +arises purely from the contempt and disapprobation of our fellow-men. +"Disgrace," says Butler, "is as much avoided as bodily pain;" we may +safely say that it is much more avoided, and that it inflicts a +suffering of a much more severe and permanent nature. It must likewise +accord with the observation of every one, that among the circumstances, +which most frequently injure our peace and impair our comfort, are those +which ruffle the mind by mortifying our self-love. There is also a +feeling of dissatisfaction and self-reproach which follows any neglect +of a due exercise of the affections, and which, in a well regulated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +mind, disturbs the mental tranquillity fully as much as the +disapprobation of other men. It is farther evident, that the man of +ungoverned passions, and ill-regulated affections, impairs his own peace +and happiness as much as he violates his duties to others,—for his +course of life is productive, not only of degradation in the eyes of his +fellow-men, but often of mental anguish, misery, disease, and premature +death. There is not, perhaps, a state of more intense suffering, than +when the depraved heart, disappointed of those gratifications to which +it is enslaved, and shut up from the excitements by which it seeks to +escape from the horrors of reflection, is thrown back upon itself to be +its own tormentor. To run the risk of such consequences, for the +gratification of a present appetite or passion, is clearly opposed to +the dictates of a sound self-love, as has been distinctly shewn by +Bishop Butler; and when in such a case, self-love prevails over an +appetite or passion, we perceive it operating as a regulating principle +in the moral system. It does so, indeed, merely by the impression, that +a certain regulation of the moral feelings is conducive to our own true +and present<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> happiness; and thus shews a wonderful power of compensation +among these feelings, referable entirely to this source. But it is quite +distinct from the great principle of conscience, which directs us to a +certain line of conduct on the pure and high principle of moral duty, +apart from all considerations of a personal nature,—which leads a man +to act upon nobler motives than those which result from the most refined +self-love, and calls for the mortification of all personal feelings, +when these interfere, in the smallest degree, with the requirements of +duty. This distinction I conceive to be of the utmost practical +importance; as it shews a principle of regulation among the moral +feelings themselves, by which a certain exercise of the affections is +carried on in a manner which contributes in a high degree to the +harmonies of society, but which does not convey any impression of moral +approbation or merit that can be applied to the agent.</p> + +<p>Self-love, then, leads us to consult our own feelings, and to seek +directly our own interest and happiness. The affections lead us to allow +for the feelings, and consider the advantage and comfort<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> of other men; +and a certain balance between these principles is essential to the +healthy state of the moral being. It is seldom that the affections are +likely to acquire an undue influence, but there is great danger of +self-love degenerating into selfishness, which interferes with the +duties we owe to others. We have formerly alluded to the means, +referable to the due exercise of the affections, and even to a sound and +rational self-love, by which this should be in part prevented. When +these are not sufficient, the appeal is to conscience; or a distinct +reference of individual cases is made to the great principle of moral +rectitude. We find, accordingly, this principle called into action, when +a man has become sensible of important defects in his moral habits. +Thus, we may see a man, who has long given way to a peevish or irascible +disposition, that is, to selfish acting upon his own feelings, without +due regard to the feelings of others, setting himself to contend with +this propensity upon the score of moral duty; while another, of a placid +disposition, has no need of bringing the principle into action for such +a purpose. In the same manner, a person who has indulged a cold +contracted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> selfishness may, under the influence of the same great +principle, perform deeds of benevolence and kindness. Thus we perceive +that the moral principle or sense of duty, when it is made the +regulating motive of action, is calculated to control self-love, and +preserve the proper harmony between it and the exercise of the +affections.</p> + +<p>When the principle of self-love becomes deranged in its exercise and +objects, it leads to those habits by which a man seeks his own +gratification, in a way which interferes with his duties to other men. +This he may do by an undue pursuit of any of the desires,—whether +avarice, ambition, love of eminence, or love of fame;—and the desire of +knowledge itself may be so indulged as to assume the same character. +Even deeds of benevolence and kindness may be performed on this +principle,—as when a man, by such actions, seeks only the applause of +the public, or the approbation of certain individuals from whom, it may +be, he expects to derive advantage.—Hence the value we attach, in the +exercise of all the affections, to what we call disinterested +conduct,—to him who does good by stealth, or who performs acts of +ex<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>alted justice, generosity, or forbearance, under circumstances which +exclude every idea of a selfish motive,—or when self-interest and +personal feeling are strongly and obviously opposed to them. Such +conduct commands the cordial approbation of all classes of men; and it +is striking to remark how, in the highest conception of such a character +that fancy can delineate, we are met by the sublime morality of the +sacred writings, impressed upon us by the purest of all motives, the +imitation of Him who is the giver of all good;—"love your +enemies,—bless them that curse you;—do good to them that hate +you,—and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute +you;—that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for +he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain +on the just and on the unjust."—"If any man will be my disciple," says +the same great author of Christianity,—"let him deny himself."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II.<br /><br /></h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>OF THE WILL.</h2> + + +<p>Will or Simple Volition is that state of mind which immediately precedes +action;—We will a certain act; and the act follows, unless it be +prevented either by external restraint, or by physical inability to +perform it.</p> + +<p>The actions thus produced arise out of the mental emotions formerly +treated of,—the desires, and the affections.—We desire an object, or +we experience one of the affections;—the next mental act, according to +the regular course of a reflecting mind, is proposing to ourselves the +question,—shall we gratify the desire,—shall we exercise the +affection. Then follows the process of consider<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>ing or deliberating.—We +perceive, perhaps, a variety of considerations or inducements,—some of +which are in favour of gratifying the desire or exercising the +affection, others opposed to it. We therefore proceed to weigh the +relative force of these opposing motives, with the view of determining +which of them we shall allow to regulate our decision. We, at length, +make up our mind on this, and resolve, we shall suppose, to do the +act;—this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple +volition.</p> + +<p>In the chain of mental operations which, in such a case, intervene +between the desire and the volition, a class of agents is brought into +view which act upon the mind as moral causes of its volitions;—these +are usually called motives,—or principles of action. When treating of +this subject as a branch of the philosophy of the intellectual powers, I +endeavoured to shew the grounds on which we believe, that there are +facts, truths, motives, or moral causes, which have a tendency thus to +influence the determinations of the mind, with a uniformity similar to +that which we observe in the operation of physical causes. For the due<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> +operation of moral causes, indeed, certain circumstances are required in +the individual on whom they are expected to operate, and, without these, +they may fail in their operation. It is necessary that he should be +fully informed in regard to them as truths addressed to his +understanding,—that he direct his attention to them with suitable +intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers upon their tendencies,—and +that he be himself in a certain healthy state of moral feeling. In all +our intercourse with mankind, accordingly, we proceed upon an absolute +confidence in the uniformity of the operation of these causes, provided +we are acquainted with the moral condition of the individual. We can +foretel, for example, the respective effects which a tale of distress +will have upon a cold-hearted miser, and a man of active benevolence, +with the same confidence with which we can predict the different actions +of an acid upon an alkali and upon a metal;—and there are individuals +in regard to whose integrity and veracity, in any situation in which +they can be placed, we have a confidence similar to that with which we +rely on the course of nature. In this manner we gra<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>dually acquire, by +experience, a knowledge of mankind; precisely as, by observation or +experiment, we acquire a knowledge of the operation of physical agents. +Thus we come to know that one man is absolutely to be relied on, in +regard to a particular line of conduct in given circumstances;—and that +another is not to be relied on, if any thing should come in the way, +affecting his own pleasure or interest. In endeavouring to excite +various individuals to the same conduct in a particular case, we learn, +that in one, we have to appeal only to his sense of duty,—in another, +to his love of approbation;—while, on a third, nothing will make any +impression except what bears upon his interest or his pleasure. Again, +when we find that, in a particular individual, certain motives or truths +fail of the effects which we have observed them to produce in others, we +endeavour to impress them upon his mind, and to rouse his attention to +their bearings and tendencies;—and this we do from the conviction, that +these truths have a certain uniform tendency to influence the volitions +of a moral being, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to +them, and provided he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> is in that moral condition which is required for +their efficiency.</p> + +<p>In all such cases, which are familiar to every one, we recognise, +therefore, a uniform relation between certain moral causes or motives, +and the determinations of the human mind in willing certain acts. It is +no objection to this, that men act in very different ways with the same +motives before them;—for this depends upon their own moral condition. +When treating of the intellectual powers, I alluded to the metaphysical +controversies connected with this subject, and I do not mean to recur to +them here. Our present object is entirely of a practical +nature,—namely, to investigate the circumstances which are required for +the due operation of motives or moral causes, and the manner in which +the moral feelings may be so deranged, that these fail of producing +their natural or proper effects.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Let us, then, suppose an individual deliberating in regard to the line +of conduct he shall pursue in a particular case;—the circumstances or +impressions which are calculated to act upon him as moral causes in +determining his volition,—that is,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> in deciding his conduct, are +chiefly the following: (1.) Self-love, which prompts him to seek his own +ease, interest, or gratification. (2.) Certain affections which lead him +to take into view duties which he owes to other men; such as, justice, +benevolence, &c. (3.) The impression of moral rectitude or moral +responsibility. This is derived from the great principle of conscience, +aided by the truths of religious belief. (4.) We ought to add reason of +judgment, which leads him to perceive certain tendencies of actions, +apart from their moral aspect. Now, in deciding on his conduct in any +particular instance, one man makes every thing bend to his own interest +or pleasure,—with little regard to the interests of others;—unless in +so far as the absolute requirements of justice are concerned, the +infringement of which might expose him to loss of reputation, or even to +punishment.—Another surrenders a certain portion of his personal +gratification to the advantage or comfort of others, purely as an +exercise of feeling from which he experiences satisfaction;—influenced, +also, probably, in some measure, by a regard to character, or the love +of approbation. In such a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> man, it becomes, in individual instances, a +matter of calculation, what degree of the sacrifice of personal ease, +interest, of feeling, is to be made to this principle of action. A third +contemplates the case purely as one of duty of moral responsibility, and +acts upon this principle, though it may involve a degree of personal +exertion, or a sacrifice of personal feeling, in itself disagreeable or +even injurious to him; that is, though the strongest personal motives +would lead to a different conduct. Let the case, again, refer to one of +the desires, bearing no immediate relation to the interests of other +men. One man goes directly into the gratification of it, without any +consideration. Another, who feels the same desire, considers the +influence which the indulgence would be likely to have on his health, +interest, or reputation.—This may be considered as simply an exercise +of judgment, combined with a certain operation of self-love. A third +views the aspect of the deed purely as a question of moral +responsibility,—and, if he sees cause, decides against it on this +ground alone;—though he should perceive that it might be gratified +without any danger to his health, interest, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> reputation, or even that +it might contribute to his advantage.</p> + +<p>We have thus presented to us three characters;—one who acts upon the +high and pure ground of moral principle;—one who acts from motives of a +more contracted and personal nature, though, in certain instances, his +conduct may be the same;—and one who goes straight forward to the +gratification of a ruling desire or governing propensity, without +attending to motives of either class. The first is a uniform character, +on whose conduct we depend in any given circumstances, with a confidence +similar to that with which we rely on the operation of physical agents. +For we know the uniform tendencies of the motives or moral causes by +which he is habitually influenced, and we know his moral temperament. We +have nearly the same kind of knowledge respecting him, which we have of +the tendencies of chemical agents towards each other, and which enables +us with perfect confidence to foretel their actions. The third has also +a uniformity of conduct, though of a very different kind. We know, +likewise, his moral condition, and, to predict his conduct, we require +only to learn<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> the particular inducements or temptations to which he is +exposed in a given instance. The second we cannot rely or calculate +upon; for we have not the means of tracing the conflicting views by +which he may be influenced in a particular case, or the principle on +which he may ultimately decide between them. They involve the strength +of the inclination,—and the degree of power exerted over it by the +class of personal or selfish motives by which he is influenced.—In +regard to various instances of ill-regulated desire, we must add his +hope of evading detection,—as on this depends, in a great measure, the +kind of evils dreaded by him in reference to the indulgence. These taken +together imply a complicated moral calculation, of which it is +impossible for another man to trace the result.</p> + +<p>There cannot be an inquiry of more intense interest than to investigate +the causes in which originate the differences among these three +characters; or, in other words, the principles on which we can explain +the fact, that the will of individuals may be influenced so differently +with the same motives before them. These appear to be referable to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> +three heads,—Knowledge,—Attention,—and Moral Habits.</p> + + +<p>I. A primary and essential element, in the due regulation of the will, +is a correct knowledge of the truths and motives which tend to influence +its determinations. The highest class of these comprehends the truths of +religious belief,—a series of moral causes, the tendencies of which are +of the most important kind, and calculated to exert a uniform power over +every man who surrenders himself to their guidance. For this purpose, a +correct knowledge of them is required, and, to all who have this +knowledge within their reach, the careful acquisition involves a point +of the deepest moral responsibility. The sacred writers speak in the +strongest terms of the guilt attached to voluntary ignorance: and this +must be obvious to every one who considers the clearness with which the +highest truths are disclosed, and the incontrovertible evidence by which +they are supported. This applies equally to the principles both of +natural and of revealed religion. The important truths of natural<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> +religion are partly matters of the most simple induction from the +phenomena of nature which are continually before us; and partly +impressed upon our own moral constitution in the clearest and most +forcible manner. From the planet revolving in its appointed orbit, to +the economy of the insect on which we tread, all nature demonstrates, +with a power which we cannot put away from us, the great +incomprehensible One, a being of boundless perfections and infinite +wisdom. In regard to his moral attributes, also, he has not left himself +without a witness; for a sense of these he has impressed upon us in the +clearest manner in that wondrous part of our constitution,—the moral +principle or conscience. From these two sources may be derived a +knowledge of the character of the Deity, and of our relation to him as +moral beings;—and the man is left entirely without excuse who fails to +direct to them his most earnest attention, and to make the impressions +derived from them the habitual rule of his volitions, and the guide of +his whole character. "He hath the rule of right within," says Butler, +"all that is wanting is,—that he honestly attend to it."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p> + +<p>Similar observations apply with equal or greater force to the truths of +revealed religion. These are supported by a weight of miraculous +evidence, and are transmitted to us by a chain of testimony, carrying +absolute conviction to the mind of every candid inquirer. They are +farther confirmed by a probability, and a force of internal evidence, +which fix themselves upon the moral feelings of every sound +understanding with a power which is irresistible. The whole is addressed +to us as rational beings; it is pressed upon our attention as creatures +destined for another state of existence; and the duty is imposed upon +every individual seriously to examine and to consider. Every man is in +the highest degree responsible for the care with which he has informed +himself of these evidences, and for the attention with which he has +given to every part of them its due weight in the solemn inquiry. He is +farther responsible for the influence of previously formed prejudice, or +that vitiated state of his moral feelings, which prevents him from +approaching the subject with the simplicity of a mind which is seriously +desirous of the truth. From the want of these essential elements of +cha<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>racter, it may very often happen, that a man may fancy he has formed +his opinions after much examination, while the result of his prejudiced +or frivolous inquiry has been only to fix him in delusion and falsehood. +Among the singular sophistries, indeed, by which some men shut their +minds against inquiries of the highest import, is a kind of impression, +not perhaps distinctly avowed in words, but clearly recognised in +practice, that these subjects of belief are in great measure matters of +opinion,—instead of being felt to rest upon the basis of immutable and +eternal truth. Can any thing be more striking than the manner in which a +late distinguished poet expresses himself on the subject of a future +life,—as if this truth were a mere opinion which could be taken up or +laid down at pleasure, to suit the taste of the individual +inquirer;—"Of the two, I should think the long sleep better than the +agonized vigil. But men, miserable as they are, cling so to any thing +like life, that they probably would prefer damnation to quiet. Besides, +they think themselves so important in the creation, that nothing less +can<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> satisfy then pride,—the insects!"<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Such is the frivolous +sophistry by which one, who holds a high rank in the literature of his +country, could put away from him the most momentous inquiry that can +engage the attention of a rational being.</p> + + +<p>II. Next to the acquisition of knowledge, and the formation of opinions, +calculated to act upon us as moral beings, is the important rule of +habitually attending to them, so as to bring their influence to bear +upon our volitions. He, who honestly attends to what is passing within, +will perceive that this is a voluntary exercise of his thinking and +reasoning faculties. When a particular desire is present to his mind, he +has the power to act upon the first impulse, or upon a very partial and +limited, perhaps a distorted, view of the considerations and motives by +which he ought to be influenced;—and he has the power to suspend +acting, and direct his attention deliberately and fully to the facts and +principles which are calculat<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>ed to guide his determination. This is the +first great step in that remarkable chain of sequences which belong to +the regulation of the will. It is what every one is conscious of; and, +putting aside all those metaphysical subtleties in which the subject has +been involved, this constitutes man a free and responsible agent. In +this important process, the first mental state is a certain movement of +one of the desires or one of the affections;—we may use the term +Inclination as including both. The second is a reference of the +inclination to the moral causes or motives which more peculiarly apply +to it,—especially the indications of conscience, and the principles of +moral rectitude.—If these be found to harmonize with the inclination, +volition and action follow, with the full concurrence of every moral +feeling. If the inclination be condemned by these, it is, in a +well-regulated mind, instantly dismissed, and the healthy condition of +the moral being is preserved. But this voluntary and most important +mental process may be neglected;—the inclination may be suffered to +engross the mind and occupy fully the attention:—the power<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> may not be +exercised of directing it to moral causes and motives, and of comparing +with them the inclination which is present. The consequence may be, that +the man runs heedlessly into volition and action, from which the due +exercise of this process of the mind might have preserved him.</p> + +<p>But a third condition may take place which presents a subject of the +highest interest. The moral causes may be so far attended to, as to +prevent the inclination from being followed by action; while the +inclination is still cherished, and the mind is allowed to dwell, with a +certain feeling of regret, on the object which it had been obliged to +deny itself. Though the actual deed be thus prevented, the harmony of +the moral feelings is destroyed;—and that mental condition is lost +which is strictly to be called purity of heart. For this consists in the +desires and affections, as well as the conduct, being in strict +subjection to the indications of conscience and the principles of moral +rectitude. The inclination, thus cherished, gradually acquires greater +ascendency over the moral feelings;—at each succeeding contest, it more +and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> more occupies the mind; the attention is less and less directed to +the moral truths and motives which are opposed to it; the inclination at +length acquires the predominance, and is followed by volition. This is +what we mean by a man being carried away by passion, in opposition to +his moral conviction; for passion consists in a desire or an affection +which has been allowed to engross the mind, until it gradually +overpowers the moral causes which are calculated to counteract its +influence. Now in the whole of this course each single movement of the +mind is felt to be entirely voluntary. From that step, which constitutes +the first departure from moral purity, the process consists in a desire +being cherished which the moral feelings condemn; while, at each +succeeding step, the influence of these feelings is gradually weakened, +and finally destroyed. Such is the economy of the human heart, and such +the chain of sequences to be traced in the moral history of every man, +who, with a conviction upon his mind of what is right, has followed the +downward course which gradually led him astray from virtue. When we +trace such a process backwards in a phi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span>losophical point of view, the +question still recurs,—what was the first step, or that by which the +mind was led into the course which thus terminated in favour of vice. In +the wonderful chain of sequences, which has been established in the +mental constitution, it would appear that a very slight movement only is +required for deranging the delicate harmony which ought to exist among +the moral feelings; but this each individual feels to be entirely +voluntary. It may consist in a desire being cherished which the moral +feelings disapprove;—and, though the effect at first may be small, a +morbid influence has arisen, which gains strength by continuance, and at +last acquires the power of a moral habit. The more the desire is +cherished, the less is the attention directed to the considerations or +moral causes by which it might be counteracted. In this manner, +according to the mental economy, these causes gradually lose their power +over the volitions or determinations of the mind, and, at a certain +period of this progress, the judgment itself comes to be changed +respecting the moral aspect of the deed.</p> + +<p>There is still another mental condition to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> mentioned in connexion +with this subject; in which the harmony of the moral feelings may be +destroyed, without the action following. This takes places when the +inclination is cherished, as in the former case, in opposition to the +indications of conscience; while the action is opposed by some inferior +motives,—as a regard to reputation or interest. The deed may thus be +prevented, and the interests of society may benefit by the difference; +but, so far as regards the individual himself, the disruption of moral +harmony is the same; and his moral aspect must be similar in the eye of +the Almighty One, who regards not the outward appearance alone, but who +looketh into the heart. In this manner it may very often happen, that +strong inducements to vice are resisted from motives referring merely to +health, or to character. But this is not to overcome temptation,—it is +only to balance one selfish feeling against another.</p> + + +<p>III. From the state of mind which has now been referred to, there +gradually results a <i>Moral Habit</i>. This is a mental condition, in which +a desire or an affection, repeatedly acted upon, is,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> after each +repetition, acted upon with less and less effort,—and, on the other +hand, a truth or moral principle, which has been repeatedly passed over +without adequate attention, after every such act makes less and less +impression, until at length it ceases to exert any influence over the +moral feelings or the conduct. I had occasion to illustrate this +remarkable principle in another point of view, when treating of the +connexion between the emotions of sympathy and benevolence, and the +conduct which naturally arises out of them. This conduct at first may +require a certain effort, and is accompanied by a strong feeling of the +emotion which leads to it. But, after each repetition, the acts go on +with less feeling of the emotion, and less reference to the principle +from which they spring, while there is progressively forming the habit +of active benevolence. It is precisely the same with habits of vice. At +first a deed requires an effort,—and a powerful contest with moral +principles, and it is speedily followed by that feeling of regret, to +which superficial observers give the name of repentance. This is the +voice of conscience, but its power is more and more diminish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>ed after +each repetition of the deed;—even the judgment becomes perverted +respecting the first great principles of moral rectitude; and acts, +which at first occasioned a violent conflict, are gone into without +remorse, or almost without perception of their moral aspect. A man in +this situation may still retain the knowledge of truths and principles +which at one time exerted an influence over his conduct; but they are +now matters of memory alone. Their power as moral causes is gone, and +even the judgment is altered respecting their moral tendencies. He views +them now perhaps as the superstitions of the vulgar, or the prejudices +of a contracted education; and rejoices, it may be, in his emancipation +from their authority. He knows not,—for he has not the moral perception +now to know, that he has been pursuing a downward course, and that the +issue, on which he congratulates himself, consists in his last +degradation as a moral being. Even in this state of moral destitution, +indeed, the same warning principle may still raise its voice,—unheeded +but not subdued,—repelled as an enemy, not admitted as a friendly +monitor and guide. "I have not the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> smallest influence over Lord Byron, +in this particular," writes one of the chosen friends of that +distinguished individual,—"if I had, I certainly should employ it to +eradicate from his great mind the delusions of Christianity, which, in +spite of his reason, seem perpetually to recur, and to lay in ambush for +the hours of sickness and distress." It would be interesting to know +what the particular impressions were, from which this sympathizing +friend was anxious to rescue the poet. They were probably the +suggestions of a power within, which, in certain seasons of reflection, +compelled his attention in spite of his attempts to reason against +it,—pleading with authority for a present Deity, and a life to come.</p> + +<p>The principle of Habit, therefore, holds a most important place in the +moral condition of every man; and it applies equally to any species of +conduct, or any train of mental operations, which, by frequent +repetition, have become so familiar, as not to be accompanied by a +recognition of the principles in which they originated. In this manner +good habits are continued without any immediate sense of the right +principles by which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> they were formed; but they arose from a frequent +and uniform acting upon these principles, and on this is founded the +moral approbation which we attach to habits of this description. In the +same manner, habits of vice, and habits of inattention to any class of +duties, are perpetuated without a sense of the principles and affections +which they violate; but this arose from a frequent violation of these +principles, and a frequent repulsion of these affections, until they +gradually lost their power over the conduct; and in this consists the +guilt of habits. Thus, one person acquires habits of benevolence, +veracity, and kindness,—of minute attention to his various duties,—of +correct mental discipline,—and active direction of his thoughts to all +those objects of attention which ought to engage a well regulated +mind:—Another sinks into habits of listless vacuity or frivolity of +mind,—of vicious indulgence and contracted selfishness,—of neglect of +important duties, disregard to the feelings of others, and total +indifference to all those considerations and pursuits which claim the +highest regard of every responsible being; and the striking fact is, +that, after a certain period, all this may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> go on without a feeling that +aught is wrong either in the moral condition, or the state of mental +discipline; such is the power of a moral habit.</p> + +<p>The important truth, therefore, is deserving of the deepest and most +habitual attention, that character consists in a great measure in +habits, and that habits arise out of individual actions and individual +operations of the mind. Hence the importance of carefully weighing every +action of our lives, and every train of thought that we encourage in our +minds; for we never can determine the effect of a single act, or a +single mental process, in giving that influence to the character, or to +the moral condition, the result of which shall be decisive and +permanent. In the whole history of habits, indeed, we see a wondrous +display of that remarkable order of sequences which has been established +in our mental constitution, and by which every man becomes, in an +important sense, the master of his own moral destiny. For each act of +virtue tends to make him more virtuous; and each act of vice gives new +strength to an influence within, which will certainly render him more +more vicious.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span></p> + +<p>These considerations have a practical tendency of the utmost interest. +In subduing habits of an injurious character, the laws of mental +sequences, which have now been referred to, must be carefully acted +upon. When the judgment, influenced by the indications of conscience, is +convinced of the injurious nature of the habit, the attention must be +steadily and habitually directed to the truths which produced this +impression. There will thus arise desire to be delivered from the +habit,—or, in other words, to cultivate the course of action that is +opposed to it. This desire, being cherished in the mind, is then made to +bear upon every individual case in which a propensity is felt towards +particular actions, or particular mental processes, referable to the +habit. The new inclination is at first acted upon with an effort, but, +after every instance of success, less effort is required, until at +length the new course of action is confirmed, and overpowers the habit +to which it was opposed. But that this result may take place, it is +necessary that the mental process be followed, in the manner distinctly +indicated by the philosophy of the moral feelings;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> for if this is not +attended to, the expected effect may not follow, even under +circumstances which appear, at first sight, most likely to produce it. +On this principle we are to explain the fact, that bad habits may be +long suspended by some powerful extrinsic influence, while they are in +no degree broken. Thus, a person addicted to intemperance will bind +himself by an oath to abstain, for a certain time, from intoxicating +liquors. In an instance which has been related to me, an individual +under this process observed the most rigid sobriety for five years, but +was found in a state of intoxication the very day after the period of +abstinence expired. In such a case, the habit is suspended by the mere +influence of the oath; but the desire continues unsubdued, and resumes +all its former power whenever this artificial restraint is withdrawn. +The effect is the same as if the man had been in confinement during the +period, or had been kept from his favourite indulgence by some other +restraint entirely of an external kind; the gratification was prevented, +but his moral nature continued unchanged.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p> + +<p>These principles may be confidently stated as facts in the moral +constitution of man, challenging the assent of every candid observer of +human nature. Several conclusions seem to arise out of them, of the +utmost practical importance. We perceive, in the first place, a state +which the mind may attain, in which there is such a disruption of its +moral harmony, that no power appeals in the mind itself capable of +restoring it to a healthy condition. This important fact in the +philosophy of human nature has been clearly recognised, from the +earliest ages, on the mere principles of human science. It is distinctly +stated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, where he draws a striking +comparison between a man who, being first misled by sophistical +reasonings, has gone into a life of voluptuousness, under an impression +that he was doing no wrong,—and one who has followed the same course in +opposition to his own moral convictions. The former he contends might be +reclaimed by argument; but the latter he considers as incurable. In such +a state of mind, therefore, it follows, by an induction which cannot be +controverted, either that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> the evil is irremediable and hopeless, or +that we must look for a power from without the mind which may afford an +adequate remedy. We are thus led to perceive the adaptation and the +probability of the provisions of Christianity, where an influence is +indeed disclosed to us, capable of restoring the harmony which has been +lost, and raising man anew to his place as a moral being. We cannot +hesitate to believe that the Power, who framed the wondrous fabric, may +thus hold intercourse with it, and redeem it from disorder and ruin. On +the contrary, it accords with the highest conceptions we can form of the +benevolence of the Deity, that he should thus look upon his creatures in +their hour of need; and the system disclosing such communication +appears, upon every principle of sound philosophy, to be one of harmony, +consistency, and truth. The subject, therefore, leads our attention to +that inward change, so often the scoff of the profane, but to which so +prominent a place is assigned in the sacred writings, in which a man is +said to be created anew by a power from Heaven, and elevated in his +whole views and feelings as a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> moral being. Sound philosophy teaches us, +that there is a state in which nothing less than such a complete +transformation can restore the man to a healthy moral condition, and +that, for producing it, nothing will avail but an influence from without +the mind,—a might and a power from the same Almighty One who originally +framed it. Philosophy teaches, in the clearest manner, that a portion of +mankind require such a transformation; Christianity informs us that it +is required by all. When the inductions of science and the dictates of +revelation harmonize to this extent, who shall dare to assert that the +latter are not truth. Who, that places himself in the presence of a +being of infinite purity, will say, he requires not such a change; or +that, for the production of it, he needs no agency, beyond the resources +of his own mind. If none be found who is entitled to believe he forms +the exception, we are forced into the acknowledgement of the truth, so +powerfully impressed upon us in the sacred writings, that, in the eye of +the Almighty One, no man in himself is righteous; and that his own power +avails not for restoring him to a state of moral purity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span></p> + +<p>From the whole of this inquiry, we see the deep influence of habits, and +the fearful power which they may acquire over the whole moral system; +considerations of the highest practical interest to those who would +prevent the formation of habits of an injurious nature, or who, feeling +their influence, strive to be delivered from them. There is indeed a +point in this downward course, where the habit has acquired undisputed +power, and the whole moral feelings yield to it unresisting submission. +Peace may then be within, but that peace is the stillness of death; and, +unless a voice from heaven shall wake the dead, the moral being is lost. +But, in the progress towards this fearful issue, there maybe a tumult, +and a contest, and a strife, and the voice of conscience may still +command a certain attention to its warnings. While there are these +indications of life, there is yet hope of the man; but on each moment is +now suspended his moral existence. Let him retire from the influence of +external things; and listen to that voice within, which, though often +unheeded, still pleads for God. Let him call to aid those high truths +which relate to the presence and inspection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> of this being of infinite +purity, and the solemnities of a life which is to come. Above all, let +him look up in humble supplication to that pure and holy One, who is the +witness of this warfare,—who will regard it with compassion, and impart +his powerful aid. But let him not presumptuously rely on this aid, as if +the victory were already secured. The contest is but begun; and there +must be a continued effort, and unceasing watchfulness,—a habitual +direction of the attention to those truths which, as moral causes, are +calculated to act upon the mind,—and a constant reliance upon the power +from on high which is felt to be real and indispensable. With all this +provision, his progress may be slow; for the opposing principle, and the +influence of established moral habits, may be felt contending for their +former dominion; but by each advantage that is achieved over them, their +power will be broken, and finally destroyed. Now in all this contest +towards the purity of the moral being, each step is no less a process of +the mind itself than the downward course by which it was preceded. It +consists in a surrender of the will to the suggestions of conscience, +and a habitual direction<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> of the attention to those truths which are +calculated to act upon the moral volitions. In this course, the man +feels that he is authorized to look for a might and an influence not his +own. This is no imaginary or mysterious impression, which one may fancy +that he feels, and then pass on contented with the vision; but a power +which acts through the healthy operations of his own mind; it is in his +own earnest exertions, as a rational being, to regulate these +operations, that he is encouraged to expect its communication; and it is +in feeling these assuming the characters of moral health, that he has +the proof of its actual presence.</p> + +<p>And where is the improbability that the pure and holy One, who framed +the wondrous moral being, may thus hold intercourse with it, and impart +an influence in its hour of deepest need. According to the utmost of our +conceptions, it is the highest of his works,—for he has endowed it with +the power of rising to the contemplation of himself, and with the +capacity of aspiring to the imitation of his own moral perfections. We +cannot, for a moment, doubt, that his eye must reach its inmost +movements, and that all its emotions, and desires,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> and volitions, are +exposed to his view. We must believe that he looks with displeasure when +he perceives them wandering from himself; and contemplates with +approbation the contest, when the spirit strives to throw off its moral +bondage, and to fight its way upwards to a conformity to his will. Upon +every principle of sound philosophy, all this must be open to his +inspection; and we can perceive nothing opposed to the soundest +inductions of reason in the belief, that he should impart an influence +to the feeble being in this high design, and conduct him to its +accomplishment. In all this, in fact, there is so little improbability, +that we find it impossible to suppose it could be otherwise. We find it +impossible to believe, that such a mental process could go on without +the knowledge of him whose presence is in every place,—or that, looking +upon it, he should want either the power or the willingness to impart +his effectual aid.</p> + +<p>But, independently of our conviction of an actual communication from the +Deity, there is a power in the mind itself, which is calculated to draw +down upon it an influence of the most efficient<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> kind. This is produced +by the mental process which we call Faith: and it may be illustrated by +an impression which many must have experienced. Let us suppose that we +have a friend of exalted intelligence and virtue, who has often +exercised over us a commanding influence,—restraining us from pursuits +to which we felt an inclination,—exciting us to virtuous conduct,—and +elevating, by his intercourse with us, our impressions of a character on +which we wished to form our own. Let us suppose that we are removed to a +distance from this friend, and that circumstances of difficulty or +danger occur, in which we feel the want of a guide and counsellor. In +the reflections which the situation naturally gives rise to, the image +of our friend is brought before us; an influence is conveyed analogous +to that which was often produced by his presence and his counsel;—and +we feel as if he were actually present, to tender his advice and watch +our conduct. How much would this impression be increased, could we +farther entertain the thought, that this absent friend was able, in some +way, to communicate with us, so far as to be aware of our present +circumstances, and to perceive our efforts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> to recall the influence of +his character upon our own.—Such is the intercourse of the soul with +God.—Every movement of the mind is known to him; his eye is present +with it, when, in any situation of duty, distress, or mental discipline, +the man, under this exercise of faith, realizes the presence and +character of the Deity, and solemnly inquires how, in the particular +instance, his moral feelings and his conduct will appear in the eye of +him who seeth in secret. This is no vision of the imagination, but a +fact supported by every principle of sound reason,—the influence which +a man brings down upon himself, when, by an effort of his own mind, he +thus places himself in the immediate presence of the Almighty. The man +who does so in every decision of life is he who lives by faith;—and, +whether we regard the inductions of reason, or the dictates of sacred +truth, such a man is taught to expect an influence greater and more +effectual still. This is a power immediately from God, which shall be to +him direction in every doubt,—light in every darkness,—strength in his +utmost weakness,—and comfort in all distress;—a power which shall bear +upon all the principles of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> his moral nature, when he carries on the +mighty conflict of bringing every desire and every volition under a +conformity to the divine will. We again hazard with confidence the +assertion, that in all this there is no improbability;—but that, on the +contrary, the improbability is entirely on the other side,—in supposing +that any such mental process could take place, without the knowledge and +the interposition of that incomprehensible One, whose eye is upon all +his works.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="PART_III" id="PART_III"></a>PART III.<br /><br /></h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR CONSCIENCE.</h2> + + +<p>There has been much dispute respecting the nature and even the existence +of the Moral Principle, as a distinct element of our mental +constitution; but this controversy may probably be considered as allied +to other speculations of a metaphysical nature, in regard to which a +kind of evidence was sought of which the subjects are not susceptible. +Without arguing respecting the propriety of speaking of a separate power +or principle, we simply contend for the fact, that there is a mental +exercise, by which we <i>feel</i> certain actions to be right and certain +others wrong. It is an element or a movement of our moral nature which +admits of no ana<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>lysis, and no explanation; and is referable to no other +principle than a simple recognition of the fact, which forces itself +upon the conviction of every man who looks into the processes of his own +mind. Of the existence and the nature of this most important principle, +therefore, the evidence is entirely within. We appeal to the +consciousness of every man, that he perceives a power which, in +particular cases, warns him of the conduct which he ought to pursue, and +administers a solemn admonition when he has departed from it. For, while +his judgment conveys to him an impression, both of the tendencies and +certain of the qualities of actions, he has, besides this, a feeling by +which he views the actions with approbation or disapprobation, in +reference purely to their moral aspect, and without any regard to their +consequences. When we refer to the sacred writings, we find the +principle of conscience represented as a power of such +importance,—that, without any acquired knowledge, or any actual +precepts, it is sufficient to establish, in every man, such an +impression of his duty as leaves him without excuse in the neglect of +it:—"For when the Gentiles, which have not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> the law, do by nature the +things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto +themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, then +conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile +accusing or else excusing one another." We even find a power assigned to +the decisions of conscience, differing in extent only, but not in kind, +from the judgment of the Almighty;—"If our heart condemn us, God is +greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."</p> + +<p>The province of conscience then appears to be, to convey to man a +certain conviction of what is morally right and wrong, in regard to +conduct in individual cases,—and to the general exercise of the desires +or affections. This it does independently of any acquired knowledge, and +without reference to any other standard of duty. It does, so, by a rule +of right which it carries within itself,—and by applying this to the +primary moral feelings, that is, the desires and affections, so as to +indicate among them a just and healthy balance towards each other. The +desires direct us to certain gratifications which we feel to be worthy +of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> acquirement, and the affections lead us to a certain course of +conduct which we feel to be agreeable to ourselves, or useful to others. +But, to act under the influence of conscience is to perform actions, +simply because we feel them to be right, and to abstain from others, +simply because we feel them to be wrong,—without regard to any other +impression, or to the consequences of the actions either to ourselves or +others. He, who on this principle performs an action, though it may be +highly disagreeable to him, or abstains from another though it may be +highly desirable, is a conscientious man. Such a man, under the +influence of habit, comes to act more and more easily under the +suggestions of conscience, and to be more and more set free from every +feeling and propensity that is opposed to it. Conscience seems therefore +to hold a place among the moral powers, analogous to that which reason +holds among the intellectual;—and, when we view it in this relation, +there appears a beautiful harmony pervading the whole economy of the +mind.</p> + +<p>By certain intellectual operations, man acquires the knowledge of a +series of facts,—he remem<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span>bers them,—he separates and classifies +them,—and forms them into new combinations. But, with the most active +exercise of all these operations, his mind might present an accumulation +of facts, without order, harmony, or utility;—without any principle of +combination, or combined only in those fantastic and extravagant forms +which appear in the conceptions of the maniac. It is Reason that reduces +the whole into order and harmony,—by comparing, distinguishing, and +tracing their true analogies and relations,—and then by deducing truths +as conclusions from the whole. It is in this manner particularly, that a +man acquires a knowledge of the uniform actions of bodies on each +other,—and, confiding in the uniformity of these actions, learns to +direct his means to the ends which he has in view. He knows also his own +relations to other sentient beings,—and adapts his conduct to them, +according to the circumstances in which he is placed,—the persons with +whom he is connected,—and the objects which he wishes to accomplish. He +learns to accommodate his measures to new circumstances as they +arise,—and thus is guided and directed through his physical relations.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> +When reason is suspended, all this harmony is destroyed. The visions of +the mind are acted upon as facts; things are combined into fantastic +forms, entirely apart from their true relations;—conduct is widely at +variance with what circumstances require;—ends are attempted by means +which have no relation to them;—and the ends themselves are equally at +variance with those which are suitable to the circumstances of the +individual. Such is the maniac, whom accordingly we shut up, to prevent +him from being dangerous to the public;—for he has been known to +mistake so remarkably the relation of things, and the conduct adapted to +his circumstances, as to murder his most valuable friend, or his own +helpless infant.</p> + +<p>In all this process there is a striking analogy to certain conditions of +the moral feelings, and to the control which is exercised over them by +the principle of Conscience. By self-love, a man is led to seek his own +gratification or advantage;—and the desires direct him to certain +objects by which these propensities may be gratified. But the affections +carry forth his views to other men with whom he is connected by various +relations, and to the offices<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> of justice, veracity, and benevolence, +which arise out of them. Conscience is the regulating power, which, +acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of +facts, preserves among them harmony and order. It does so by repressing +the propensity of selfishness, and reminding the man of the true +relation between regard to his own interest and the duties he owes to +other men. It regulates his senses and pursuits, by carrying his views +beyond present feelings and present gratifications, to future times and +future consequences,—and by raising his attention to his relation to +the great moral Governor of the universe. He thus learns to adapt his +conduct and pursuits, not to present and transient feelings, but to an +extended view of his great and true interests as a moral being. Such is +conscience,—still, like reason, pointing out the moral ends a man ought +to pursue, and guiding him in the means by which he ought to pursue +them;—and the man does not act in conformity with the constitution of +his nature, who does not yield to conscience the supremacy and direction +over all his other feelings and principles of action. But the analogy +does not stop here;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span>—for we can also trace a condition in which this +controlling influence of conscience is suspended or lost. I formerly +endeavoured to trace the manner in which this derangement arises, and +have now only to allude to its influence on the harmony of the moral +feelings. Self-love degenerates into low selfish gratification: the +desires are indulged without any other restraint than that which arises +from a mere selfish principle,—as a regard to health, perhaps in some +degree to reputation; the affections are exercised only in so far as +similar principles impose a certain degree of attention to them: present +and momentary impulses are acted upon, without any regard to future +results: conduct is adapted to present gratification, without the +perception either of its moral aspect, or its consequences to the man +himself as a responsible being; and without regard to the means by which +these feelings are gratified. In all this violation of moral harmony, +there is no derangement of the ordinary exercise of judgment. In the +most remarkable example that can be furnished by the history of human +depravity, the man may be as acute as ever in the details of business or +the pursuits of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> science. There is no diminution of his sound estimate +of physical relations,—for this is the province of reason. But there is +a total derangement of his sense and approbation of moral +relations,—for this is conscience. Such a condition of mind, then, +appears to be, in reference to the moral feelings, what insanity is in +regard to the intellectual. The intellectual maniac fancies himself a +king, surrounded by every form of earthly splendour,—and this +hallucination is not corrected even by the sight of his bed of straw and +all the horrors of his cell. The moral maniac pursues his way, and +thinks himself a wise and a happy man:—- but feels not that he is +treading a downward course, and is lost as a moral being.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>In the preceding observations respecting the moral principle or +conscience, I have alluded chiefly to its influence in preserving a +certain harmony among the other feelings,—in regulating the desires by +the indications of moral purity,—and presenting self-love from +interfering with the duties and affections which we owe to other men. +But there is another and a most important pur<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span>pose which is answered by +this faculty, and that is to make us acquainted with the moral +attributes of the Deity. In strict philosophical language we ought +perhaps to say, that this high purpose is accomplished by a combined +operation of conscience and reason; but, however this may be, the +process appeals clear and intelligible in its nature, and fully adapted +to the end now assigned to it. From a simple exercise of mind, directed +to the great phenomena of nature, we acquire the knowledge of a First +Cause,—a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom; and this +conclusion is impressed upon us in a peculiar manner, when, from our own +bodily and mental endowments, we infer the attributes of him who framed +us:—"he that planted the ear," says a sacred writer, "shall he not +hear;—he that formed the eye, shall he not see;—he that teacheth man +knowledge, shall not he know?" When we trace backwards a series of +finite yet intelligent beings, we must arrive at one of two +conclusions:—We must either trace the series through an infinite and +eternal succession of finite beings, each the cause of the one which +succeeded it;—or we must refer the com<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>mencement of the series to one +great intelligent being, himself uncaused, infinite, and eternal. To +trace the series to one being, finite, yet uncaused, is totally +inadmissible; and not less so is the conception of finite beings in an +infinite and eternal series. The belief of one infinite being, +self-existent and eternal, is, therefore, the only conclusion at which +we can arrive, as presenting any characters of credibility or truth. The +superintending care, the goodness, and benevolence of the Deity, we +learn, with a feeling of equal certainty, from the ample provision he +has made for supplying the wants and ministering to the comfort of all +the creatures whom he has made. This part of the argument, also, is in +the clearest manner insisted upon in the sacred writings; when the +apostle Paul, in calling upon the people of Lystra to worship the true +God, who made heaven and earth, adds, as a source of knowledge from +which they ought to learn his character;—"he left not himself without a +witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful +seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness."</p> + +<p>A being, thus endowed with infinite power, wis<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>dom, and goodness, we +cannot conceive to exist without moral feelings; and, by a process +equally obvious, we arrive at a distinct knowledge of these, when, from +the moral perceptions of our own minds, we infer the moral attributes of +him who thus formed us. We have certain impressions of justice, +veracity, compassion, and moral purity, in regard to our own +conduct,—we have a distinct approbation of these qualities in +others,—and we attach a feeling of disapprobation to the infringement +of them. By a simple step of reasoning, which conveys an impression of +absolute conviction, we conclude, that he, who formed us with these +feelings, possesses, in his own character, corresponding moral +attributes, which, while they resemble in kind, must infinitely exceed +in degree, those qualities in the wisest and the best of men. In our +actual observation of mankind, we perceive these attributes impaired in +their exercise by human weakness, distorted by human passion,—and +impeded in their operation by personal wants, personal feelings, and +selfish interests. But, apart from such deteriorating causes, we have a +certain abstract idea of the full and perfect exercise of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> those +qualities; and it is in this pure and perfect form that we ascribe them +to the Almighty. In him, they can be impeded by no weakness,—distorted +by no passion, and impaired in their operation by no personal interest. +We therefore conclude him to be perfect in the exercise of all these +moral attributes, and to take the most rigid estimate of any +infringement of them by man:—this is what we call the holiness of God. +Even the man, who has himself departed from moral rectitude, still feels +a power within, which points with irresistible force to what is purity, +and fixes upon him a conviction that God is pure.</p> + +<p>When we view such a Being, apart from any inferior creature, all seems +harmony and consistency;—we have only to contemplate him as high and +holy, and enjoying perfect happiness in his own spotless attributes. +But, when we view him in relation to man in a state of moral discipline, +and, in that state, tainted deeply with moral evil, a difficulty arises +of an appalling magnitude. There is ample scope now, we perceive, for +the exercise of his holiness, veracity, and justice; and he appeals in +sublime and terrible majesty, in his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> exalted character as a moral +governor. But, amid such a display, there is an obvious interruption to +the exercise of compassion,—especially in that essential department of +it,—mercy or forgiveness. This attribute may be exercised without +restraint by an individual, where his own interests alone are concerned, +because in him it involves only a sacrifice of self-love. But +forgiveness in a moral governor either implies an actual change of +purpose, or supposes a former decision to have been made without +sufficient knowledge of, or due attention to, all the facts by which he +ought to have been influenced;—it denotes either undue rigour in the +law, or ignorance or inattention in him who administers it, and it may +very often interfere with the essential requisites of justice. But, in a +moral governor of infinite perfection, there can be neither ignorance of +facts nor change of purpose;—the requirements of his justice must stand +unshaken; and his law, written on the hearts of all his rational +creatures, must be upheld, in the face of the universe, as holy, and +just, and good. Is, then, the exercise of mercy to be excluded from our +conception of the divine character,—and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> is there no forgiveness with +God.—The soundest inductions of philosophy, applied to the actual state +of man, bring us to this momentous question; but the highest efforts of +human science fail to answer it. It is in this our utmost need, that we +are met by the dictates of revelation, and are called to humble the +pride of our reason before that display of the harmony and integrity of +the divine character. We there learn the truths, far beyond the +inductions of human science, and the utmost conceptions of human +thought,—that an atonement is made, a sacrifice offered;—and that the +exercise of forgiveness is consistent with the perfections of the Deity. +Thus, by a process of the mind itself, which seems to present every +element of fair and logical reasoning, we arrive at a full conviction of +the necessity, and the moral probability, of that truth which forms the +great peculiarity of the Christian revelation. More than any other in +the whole circle of religious belief it rises above the inductions of +science, while reason, in its soundest conclusions, recognises its +probability, and receives its truth; and it stands forth alone, simply +proposed to our belief, and offered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> to our acceptance, on that high but +peculiar evidence by which is supported the testimony of God.</p> + +<p>The truth of these considerations is impressed upon us in the strangest +manner, when we turn our attention to the actual moral condition of +mankind. When we contemplate man, as he is displayed to us by the +soundest inductions of philosophy,—his capacity for distinguishing +truth from falsehood, and evil from good; the feelings and affections +which bind him to his fellow men, and the powers which enable him to +rise to intercourse with God:—when we consider the power, which sits +among his other principles and feelings, as a faithful monitor and +guide, carrying in itself a rule of rectitude without any other +knowledge, and a right to govern without reference to any other +authority; we behold a fabric complete and harmonious in all its parts, +and eminently worthy of its Almighty Maker;—we behold an ample +provision for peace, and order, and harmony, in the whole moral world. +But, when we compare with these inductions the actual state of man, as +displayed to us in the page of history, and in our own daily +observation, the conviction is forced<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> upon us, that some mighty change +has taken place in this beauteous system, some marvellous disruption of +its moral harmony. The manner in which this condition arose,—or the +origin of moral evil under the government of God, is a question entirely +beyond the reach of the human faculties.—It is one of those, however, +on which it is simply our duty to keep in mind, that our business is, +not with the explanation, but with the facts;—for, even by the +conclusions of philosophy, we are compelled to believe, that man has +fallen from his high estate,—and that a pestilence has gone abroad over +the face of the moral creation.</p> + +<p>In arriving at this conclusion, it is not with the inductions of moral +science alone, that we compare or contrast the actual state of man. For +one bright example has appeared in our world, in whom was exhibited +human nature in its highest state of order and harmony. In regard to the +mighty purposes which he came to accomplish, indeed, philosophy fails +us, and we are called to submit the inductions of our reason to the +testimony of God. But, when we contemplate his whole character purely as +a matter of historical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> truth,—the conviction is forced upon us, that +this was the highest state of man;—and the inductions of true science +harmonize with the impression of the Roman Centurion, when, on +witnessing the conclusion of the earthly sufferings of the Messiah, he +exclaimed—"truly this was the Son of God."</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>When we endeavour to trace the manner, in which mankind have departed so +widely from this high pattern, we arrive at moral phenomena of which we +can offer no explanation. But an inquiry of much greater importance is +to mark the process by which, in individual instances, conscience ceases +to be the regulating principle of the character; and this is a simple +and legitimate object of philosophical observation. There cannot, +indeed, be an inquiry of more intense and solemn interest, than to trace +the chain of sequences which has been established in the mind of man as +a moral being. We can view it only as a matter of fact, without being +able to refer it to any other principle than the will of Him who framed +us;—but the facts which are before us claim the serious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> attention of +every man, who would cultivate that most important of all pursuits,—the +knowledge of his own moral condition. The fact to which I chiefly allude +is a certain relation, formerly referred to, between the truths which +are calculated to act upon us as moral causes, and the mental emotions +which ought to result from them;—and between these emotions and a +certain conduct which they tend to produce. If the due harmony between +these be carefully cultivated, the result is a sound moral condition; +but by every instance in which this harmony is violated, a morbid +influence is introduced, which gains strength in each succeeding +volition, and carries disorder through the moral economy. We have +formerly illustrated this important moral process, by the relation +between the emotion of compassion, and the conduct which ought to arise +from it. If this tendency of the emotion be diligently cultivated, the +result is the habit of active benevolence;—but, if the emotion be +violated, its influence is progressively diminished, and a character is +produced of cold and barren selfishness.</p> + +<p>A similar chain of sequences is to be observed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> respecting the operation +of those great truths, which, under the regulating power of conscience, +are calculated to act as moral causes in our mental economy;—we may +take, for example, the truths relating to the character and perfections +of the Deity, and the influence which these ought to produce upon every +rational being. We have seen the knowledge which we derive from the +light of nature respecting the attributes of God, when, from his works +around us, we discover him as a being of infinite power, wisdom, and +goodness; and when, from the moral impressions of our own minds, we +infer his perfections as a moral Governor of infinite holiness, justice, +and truth. By a proper direction of the mind to the truths which are +thus conveyed to us respecting the Deity, there would naturally arise a +corresponding chain of emotions of which he is the object. These are a +sense of veneration towards him, as infinitely great, wise, and +powerful,—of love and thankfulness, as infinitely good,—and of +habitual regard to his authority and will, as a moral governor of purity +and justice, and as requiring a corresponding character in all his +creatures. A close and constant relation ought to be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> preserved between +these truths and these emotions, and on this depends the moral harmony +of the mind. The preservation of this harmony, again, is intimately +connected with a mental process which every man feels to be +voluntary,—or in his power to perform, if he wills. It consists in a +careful direction of the mind to such truths, so as to enable them to +act as moral causes in the mental economy:—by the established order of +moral sequences, the emotions naturally follow:—these are then to be +cherished with satisfaction and reverence; and a corresponding influence +upon the character and conduct is the farther consequence. But the first +step in this important process may be neglected;—the mind may not be +directed with due care to the truths which thus claim its highest +regard,—and the natural result is a corresponding deficiency in the +emotions and conduct which ought to flow from them. This will be the +case in a still higher degree, if there has been formed any actual +derangement of the moral condition,—if deeds have been committed, or +even desires cherished, and mental habits acquired, by which the +indications of conscience have been violated. The moral har<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span>mony of the +mind is then lost, and, however slight may be the first impression, a +morbid influence has begun to operate in the mental economy, which tends +gradually to gain strength, until it becomes a ruling principle in the +whole character. The truths connected with the divine perfections are +now neither invited nor cherished, but are felt to be intruders which +disturb the mental tranquillity. The attention ceases to be directed to +them, and the corresponding emotions vanish from the mind. Such appears +to be the moral history of those, who, in the striking language of the +sacred writings, "do not like to retain God in their knowledge."</p> + +<p>When the harmony of the mind has been impaired to this extent, another +mental condition arises, according to the wondrous system of moral +sequences. This consists in a distortion of the understanding itself, +regarding the first great principles of moral truth. For, a fearless +contemplation of the truth, respecting the divine perfections, having +become inconsistent with the moral condition of the mind, there next +arises a desire to discover a view of them more in accordance with its +own feelings. This is followed, in due course,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> by a corresponding train +of its own speculations; and these, by a mind so prepared, are received +as truth. The inventions of the mind itself thus become the regulating +principles of its emotions, and this mental process, advancing from step +to step, terminates in moral degradation and anarchy.</p> + +<p>Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which these great +principles of ethical science are laid down in the sacred +writings;—"the invisible things of him from the creation of the world +are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his +eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse: Because +that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were +thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart +was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and +changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to +corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping +things."—"And even as they did not like to retain God in their +knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things +which are not convenient." The various steps, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> this course of moral +degradation, are here represented as a judicial infliction by the Deity. +But this solemn view of the subject is in no degree inconsistent with +the principle, that it takes place according to a chain of sequences +existing in the mind itself. For the Almighty One, who is said to +inflict as a judgment this state of moral ruin, is the same who +established it as the uniform result of a process in the mental economy, +to be traced in the history of every man who has followed the downward +course which led him astray from virtue.</p> + +<p>To the principles which have now been stated, we are also to refer a +point in the philosophy of human nature which presents a subject of most +interesting reflection. I allude to the fact, that the great truths of +religious belief are so often rejected, by men who have acquired a +reputation for exalted powers of understanding in other departments of +intellectual inquiry. The fact is one of intense interest; and we can +scarcely wonder that superficial observers should have deduced from it +an impression, that it implies something defective in the evidence by +which these truths are proposed to our reception. But the conclusion is +entirely unwar<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>ranted, and the important principle cannot be too often +repeated, that the attainment of truth in moral inquiries is essentially +connected with the moral condition of the inquirer. On this depends the +anxious care with which he has directed his mind to the high pursuit, +under a deep and solemn feeling of its supreme importance. On this +depends the sincere and humble and candid love of truth with which he +has conducted it, apart alike from prejudice and frivolity. For without +these essential elements of character, the most exalted intellect may +fail of reaching the truth,—the most acute understanding may only +wander into delusion and falsehood.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Before concluding this subject, there is another point which deserves to +be alluded to;—namely, the influence produced upon all our moral +judgments and decisions by Attention. This important process of the mind +we have had occasion to mention in various parts of our inquiry. It +consists, as we have seen, in directing the thoughts, calmly and +deliberately, to all the facts and considerations by which we ought to +be influenced in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> the particular case which is under our view; and it +should be accompanied by an anxious and sincere desire to be guided, +both in our opinions and conduct, by the true and relative tendency of +each of them. It is a voluntary process of the mind which every man has +the power to perform; and on the degree in which it is habitually +exercised, depend some of the great differences between one man and +another in their moral condition. We have repeatedly had occasion to +mention that morbid state of the mind, in which moral causes seem to +have lost their proper influence, both on the volitions of the will, and +even on the conclusions of the judgment:—But it is a truth which cannot +be too often referred to, how much this condition is influenced by the +mental process which we are now considering. It originates, indeed, in +some degree of that distortion of moral feeling, in consequence of which +the inclinations wander from the strict path of rectitude;—but the +primary effect of this loss of mental harmony, and that by which it is +perpetuated, appears to be chiefly a habitual misdirection of the +attention,—or a total want of consideration of the truths and motives, +by which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> the moral judgments and decisions ought to be influenced. +Apart from this condition of the mind, indeed, there is reason to +believe, that the actual differences in moral judgment are in different +men less than we are apt to imagine. "Let any honest man," says Butler, +"before he engages in any course of action, ask himself,—is this I am +going to do right, or is it wrong,—is it good, or is it evil:—I do not +in the least doubt but that these questions would be answered agreeably +to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any +circumstances." It is in a great measure from the want of this simple +exercise of attention, or of what in common language we call calm +reflection, that men are led away, by passion, prejudice, and distorted +moral habits, into courses of action which their own sober judgment +would condemn;—and when a man, who has thus departed from rectitude, +begins to retrace his way, the first great point is that where he pauses +in his downward career, and seriously proposes to himself the question, +whether the course he has followed be worthy of a moral being. I allude +not here to the means by which a man is led to take this momentous step +in his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> moral history, but only to the mental process of which it +consists. It is primarily nothing more than an exercise of attention, +calmly and deliberately directed to the truths and considerations by +which his moral decisions ought to be influenced; but, when a man has +once been brought into this attitude of deep and serious thought, +conscience comes to bear its part in the solemn process; and the +inquirer is likely to arrive at just conclusions on those great +questions of which he feels the importance to his moral condition.</p> + +<p>It is on the principles now referred to, that, according to a doctrine +which has been often and keenly controverted, we hold a man to be +responsible for his belief. The state of mind which constitutes belief +is, indeed, one over which the will has no direct power. But belief +depends upon evidence;—the result of even the best evidence is entirely +dependant on attention;—and attention is a voluntary intellectual state +over which we have a direct and absolute control. As it is, therefore, +by prolonged and continued attention that evidence produces belief, a +man may incur the deepest guilt by his disbelief of truths which he has +failed to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> examine with the care which is due to them. This exercise is +entirely under the control of the will; but the will to exercise it +respecting moral truth is closely connected with the love of that truth; +and this is intimately dependent on the state of moral feeling of the +mind. It is thus that a man's moral condition influences the conclusions +of his judgment;—and it is thus, that on the great questions of moral +truth, there may be guilt attached to a process of the understanding, +while there is both guilt and moral degradation in that mental condition +from which it springs.</p> + +<p>A similar relation exists, as was formerly stated, between all our moral +emotions, and processes which are felt to be entirely voluntary. These +emotions are, properly speaking, not the objects of volition, nor do +they arise directly at our bidding; but, according to the constitution +of the mind, they are the natural or established result of certain +intellectual processes, and, in some sense, even of bodily action, both +of which are entirely voluntary. The emotions of compassion and +benevolence, for example, are the natural result of the sight or even +the description of scenes of distress;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> and the primary steps in this +process are entirely within our power to perform, if we will. We can +visit the afflicted family, listen to their tale of distress, and +consider their circumstances,—that is, give our attention to them in +such a manner that the natural and proper effect may be produced upon +our moral feelings. We can give the same kind of attention, and with a +similar result, to a case which is only described to us by another; or +we may neglect all this mental process. Engrossed with the business or +the frivolities of life, we may keep ourselves at a distance from the +persons and the scenes that might operate in this manner on our moral +feelings;—we may refuse to listen to the tale of sorrow, or, if +compelled to hear it, we may give it little attention and no +consideration. The moral feeling does not follow, and this course, after +a certain repetition, terminates in confirmed and barren selfishness. We +see many instances in which we distinctly recognise this course of +mental or moral sequence. If, in regard to a particular case of +distress, for example, we have come to a deliberate conviction of the +worthlessness of the individual, and have determined to withhold our +aid,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> we refuse to see him, and we decline hearing from another any +thing more of his history;—we say, we have made up our mind not to +allow our compassion to be any more worked upon in his favour. We thus +recognise the natural relation between the sight or even the description +of distress, and the production of certain feelings in ourselves:—and +we recognise also the legitimate means for preventing this influence in +certain cases, in which, by a deliberate act of judgment, we have +determined against having these feelings excited. If, notwithstanding +this determination, we happen to be brought within the influence of the +distress which we wished to avoid, we consider this as a sufficient +ground for acting, in the instance, against our sober judgment. We had +determined against it, we say, but what can you do when you see people +starving. We thus recognise as legitimate that process by which, in +certain cases, we keep ourselves beyond this influence; but we attach no +feeling of approbation to the moral condition of him who, being +subjected to the influence, can resist it; that is, who can really come +into contact with distress, and shut his heart against it.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> And even +with regard to the course which we here recognise as legitimate, much +caution is required, before we allow a process of the judgment to +interfere with the natural and healthy course of the moral feelings. If +the interference arises, not from a sound process of the understanding, +but from a course in which selfishness bears a considerable part, an +injurious influence upon the moral condition of the mind is the +necessary consequence. We thus perceive that, in the chain of sequences +relating to the benevolent feelings, there are three distinct +steps,—two of which are entirely under the control of the will. A man +has it entirely in his power to place himself in contact with objects of +distress, and to follow out the call of duty in considering their +circumstances, and entering into their feelings. The natural result is a +train of emotions which arise in his own mind, prompting him to a +particular line of conduct. To act upon these emotions is again under +the power of his will; and if the whole of this chain of sequences be +duly followed, the result is a sound condition of this part of the moral +economy. If either of the voluntary steps be neglected or violated, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> +mental harmony is lost, and a habit is formed of unfeeling selfishness.</p> + +<p>The principle, which has thus been illustrated by the benevolent +affections, is equally true of our other moral emotions. These emotions +are closely connected with certain truths, which are calculated to give +use to them, according to the constitution of our moral economy. Now, +the careful acquisition of the knowledge of these truths, and a serious +direction of the attention to their tendencies, are intellectual +processes which are as much under the power of our will, as are the acts +of visiting and giving attention to scenes of distress; and the due +cultivation of them involves an equal degree of moral responsibility. +This again is connected with the remarkable power which we possess over +the succession of our thoughts. We can direct the mind into a particular +train; we can continue it and dwell upon it with calm and deliberate +attention, so that the truths, which it brings before us, may produce +their natural and proper effect on our moral feelings. The emotions thus +excited lead to a certain line of conduct, which also is voluntary; and +on the due cultivation of this chain of sequen<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>ces depends a healthy +moral condition. But we may neglect those parts of the sequence which +are under the control of our will. We may abstain from directing our +attention to such truths; we may view them in a slight, frivolous, or +distorted manner, or we may dismiss them altogether; and if any degree +of the emotions should be excited, we may make no effort towards the +cultivation of the conduct to which they would lead us. The due +cultivation of this power over the succession of our thoughts, is that +which constitutes one of the great differences between one man and +another, both as intellectual and moral beings;—and, though correct +moral emotions are not properly the objects of volition, it is thus that +a man may incur the deepest moral guilt in the want of them.</p> + +<p>The subject also leads to conclusions of the greatest importance +respecting the principles on which we ought to conduct religious +instruction, particularly in regard to the cultivation of religious +emotions. It reminds us of the important law of our nature, that all +true cultivation of religious emotion must be founded upon a sound +culture of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> the understanding in the knowledge of religious truth, and a +careful direction of the powers of reasoning and judging, both to its +evidences and its tendencies. All impulse that does not arise in this +manner can be nothing more than an artificial excitement of feeling, +widely different from the emotion of a regulated mind. Such a system +generates wild enthusiasm;—and the principle is of peculiar and +essential importance in the education of the young. In then susceptible +minds religious emotion is easily produced, and, by a particular +management, may be fostered for a time. But those who have been trained +in this manner are little qualified to meet the collisions of active +life, and we need not wonder if they should make shipwreck of a faith +which has not been founded in knowledge.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Before leaving the subject of the Moral Principle, there are two points +closely connected with it which remain to be noticed. The one relates +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> the origin and immutability of moral distinctions, and, in connexion +with this, a class of speculations which hold a conspicuous place in the +history of Ethical science, under the name of Theories of Morals. The +other refers to a certain harmony or principle of arrangement, which the +different moral feelings ought to preserve towards each other in a +well-regulated mind.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="I_OF_THE_ORIGIN_AND_IMMUTABILITY_OF_MORAL_DISTINCTIONS_AND_THEORIES" id="I_OF_THE_ORIGIN_AND_IMMUTABILITY_OF_MORAL_DISTINCTIONS_AND_THEORIES"></a>§ I.—OF THE ORIGIN AND IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS<br />AND THEORIES OF MORALS.</h2> + + + +<p>In treating of the moral powers, I have considered various feelings as +distinct parts of our constitution, each intended to answer a specific +purpose in the present scene of moral discipline. I am aware of an +objection that may be urged against this mode of viewing the +subject,—namely, that it is an unnecessary multiplication of original +principles. I am not inclined to dispute respecting the term, <i>original +principles</i>. I only contend for the fact, that there are certain +feelings or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> propensities which are found to operate in the whole of +mankind; and, with regard to these, I consider our object to be, simply +to view man as he is. In his physical relations, we find him endowed +with a variety of senses, and a great variety of bodily functions,—each +adapted to its proper purpose, and all distinct from each other; and the +physiologist is content to view them simply as they are. Were he to +exercise his ingenuity upon them, he might contend with much +plausibility, that it is highly incorrect to speak of five distinct and +separate senses;—for that they are all merely modifications of +sensation, differing only in the various kinds of the external +impression. Thus, what is vulgarly called sight is the simple sensation +of light,—and hearing is merely the sensation of sound. This would be +all very true,—but it does not appear to elucidate the subject; nor, by +any ingenuity of such speculation, could we be enabled to know more +concerning these senses than when we called them sight and hearing. In +the same manner it would appear, that the course of inquiry, respecting +our moral feelings, is simply to observe what these feelings really are, +and what are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> their obvious tendencies. When we have done so on adequate +foundation, I conceive we have every reason for considering them as +principles implanted in us by the Creator, for guidance in our present +relations; and, like the functions of our bodies, so the powers and +feelings of our minds shew a wonderful adaptation and design, worthy of +their Omnipotent Cause. But we can know nothing of them beyond the +facts,—and nothing is to be gained by any attempt, however ingenious, +to simplify or explain them. We have formerly had occasion to allude to +various speculations of a similar character, respecting the powers of +perception and simple intellect,—all of which have now given way before +the general admission of the truth, that, on the questions to which they +refer, no human sagacity can carry us one step beyond the simple +knowledge of the facts.</p> + +<p>It will probably be admitted, that there have been many similar +unprofitable speculations in the philosophy of the moral feelings; and +that these speculations, instead of throwing any light upon the subject, +have tended rather to withdraw the attention of inquirers from the +questions of deep<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> and serious importance connected with the +investigation. Among these, perhaps, we may reckon some of the doctrines +which hold a prominent place in the history of this branch of +science,—under the name of <i>Theories of Morals</i>. These doctrines agree +in admitting the fact, that there are among mankind certain notions +respecting right and wrong,—moral and immoral actions; and they then +profess to account for these impressions,—or to explain how men come to +think one action right and another wrong. A brief view of these theories +may properly belong to an outline of this department of science.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>In contemplating the conduct of men as placed in certain relations +towards each other, we perceive some actions which we pronounce to be +right, and others which we pronounce to be wrong. In forming our opinion +of them in this manner, we refer to the intentions of the actor, and, if +we are satisfied that he really intended what we see to be the effect or +the tendency of his conduct, or even that he purposed something which he +was prevented from accomplishing, we view him with feel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>ings of moral +approbation or disapprobation,—or, in other words, apply to him the +award of praise or blame. Such is our simple idea of virtue or vice, as +applied either to the act or the agent. We have a conviction that there +is a line of conduct to which ourselves and others are bound by a +certain kind of obligation;—a departure from this constitutes moral +demerit or vice;—a correct observance of it constitutes virtue.</p> + +<p>This appears to be our primary impression of vice and virtue. The next +question is, what is the origin of the impression, or on what ground is +it that we conclude certain actions to be right and others wrong. Is it +merely from a view of their consequences to ourselves or others; or do +we proceed upon an absolute conviction of certain conduct being right, +and certain other wrong, without carrying the mind farther than the +simple act, or the simple intention of the actor,—without any +consideration of the effects or the tendencies of the action. This is +the question which has been so keenly agitated in the speculations of +Ethical science, namely, respecting the origin and nature of moral +distinctions. On the one hand, it is con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span>tended, that these moral +impressions are in themselves immutable, and that an absolute conviction +of their immutability is fixed upon us in that part of our constitution +which we call Conscience, in other words, there is a certain conduct to +which we are bound by a feeling of obligation, apart from all other +considerations whatever, and we have an impression that a departure from +this in ourselves or others constitutes vice. On the other hand, it is +maintained, that these distinctions are entirely arbitrary, or arise out +of circumstances, so that what is vice in one case may be virtue in +another. Those who have adopted the latter hypothesis have next to +explain, what the circumstances are which give rise, in this manner, to +our impressions of vice and virtue, moral approbation or disapprobation. +The various modes of explaining this impression have led to the +<i>Theories of Morals</i>.</p> + +<p>The system of Mandeville ascribes our impressions of moral rectitude +entirely to the enactments of legislators. Man, he says, naturally seeks +only his own gratification, without any regard to the happiness of other +men. But legislators found<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> that it would be necessary to induce him, in +some way, to surrender a position of his personal gratification for the +good of others, and so to promote the peace and harmony of society. To +accomplish this with such a selfish being, it was necessary to give him +some equivalent for the sacrifice he thus made; and the principle of his +nature which they fixed upon, for this purpose, was his love of praise. +They made certain laws for the general good, and then flattered mankind +into the belief that it was praiseworthy to observe them, and noble to +sacrifice a certain degree of their own gratification for the good of +others. What we call virtue thus resolves itself into the love of +praise. In regard to such a system as this, it has been thought +sufficient to point out the distinction between the immutable principles +of morality and those arrangements which are dependent upon mere +enactment. Such are many of the regulations and restrictions of +commerce. They are intended for the public good, and, while they are in +force, it is the duty of every good citizen to obey them. A change of +the law, however, changes their character, for they possess in +themselves none of the qualities of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> merit or demerit. But no laws can +alter, and no statutes modify, those great principles of moral conduct +which are graved indelibly on the conscience of all classes of men. +Kings, it has been said, may make laws, but cannot create a virtue.</p> + +<p>By another modification of this system, our impressions of virtue and +vice are said to be derived entirely from mutual compact. Men, finding +that there was a certain course of action which would contribute to +their mutual advantage, and <i>vice versa</i>, entered into an agreement to +observe certain conduct, and abstain from certain other. The violation +of this compact constituted vice, the observance of it virtue.</p> + +<p>By a theory, supported by some eminent men, as Clark and Wollaston, +virtue was considered to depend on a conformity of the conduct to a +certain sense of the fitness of things,—or the truth of things. The +meaning of this, it must be confessed, is rather obscure. It however +evidently refers the essence of virtue to a relation perceived by a +process of reason; and therefore may be held as at variance with the +belief of the impression being universal.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span></p> + +<p>According to the <i>Theory of Utility</i>, as warmly supported by Mr. Hume, +we estimate the virtue of an action and an agent entirely by their +usefulness. He seems to refer all our mental impressions to two +principles, reason and taste. Reason gives us simply the knowledge of +truth or falsehood, and is no motive of action. Taste gives an +impression of pleasure or pain,—so constitutes happiness or misery, and +becomes a motive of action. To this he refers our impressions of beauty +and deformity, vice and virtue. He has, accordingly, distinctly asserted +that the words right and wrong signify nothing more than sweet or sour, +pleasant or painful, being only effects upon the mind of the spectator +produced by the contemplation of certain conduct,—and this, as we have +already seen, resolves itself into the impression of its usefulness. An +obvious objection to the system of utility was, that it might be applied +to the effects of inanimate matter as correctly as to the deeds of a +voluntary agent. A printing-press or a steam-engine might be as +meritorious as a man of extensive virtue. To obviate this, Mr. Hume was +driven to a distinction, which in fact amounted to giving up the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> +doctrine, namely, that the sense of utility must be combined with a +feeling of approbation. This leads us back to the previous question, on +what this feeling of approbation is founded, and at once recognises a +principle, distinct from the mere perception of utility. Virtuous +conduct may indeed always contribute to general utility, or general +happiness, but this is an effect only, not the cause or the principle +which constitutes it virtuous. This important distinction has been well +stated by Professor Mills of Oxford. He defines morality to be,—"an +obedience to the law and constitution of man's nature, assigned him by +the Deity in conformity to his own essential and unchangeable +attributes, the effect of which is the general happiness of his +creatures."<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>—We may safely assert, that whatever is right is also +expedient for man; but the converse by no means follows,—that what is +expedient, that is what mankind think would be expedient, comes to be +right.</p> + +<p>We now come to the <i>Selfish System</i> of morals, according to which the +fundamental principle of the conduct of mankind is a desire to promote +their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> own gratification or interest. This theory has appeared in +various forms, from a very early period in the history of Ethical +science; but the most remarkable promoter of it in more modern times was +Mr. Hobbes. According to him, man is influenced entirely by what seems +calculated, more immediately, or more remotely, to promote his own +interest; whatever does so, he considers as right,—the opposite as +wrong. He is driven to society by necessity, and then, whatever promotes +the general good, he considers as ultimately calculated to promote his +own. This system is founded upon a fallacy, similar to that referred to +under the former head. Virtuous conduct does impart gratification, and +that of the highest kind; and, in the strictest sense of the word, it +promotes the true interest of the agent, but this tendency is the +effect, not the cause; and never can be considered as the principle +which imparts to conduct its character of virtue; nor do we perform it +merely because it affords us gratification, or promotes our interest. +The hypothesis, indeed, may be considered as distinctly contradicted by +facts,—for, even in our own expe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span>rience, it is clear, that the pleasure +attending an act of generosity or virtue in ourselves, as well as our +approbation of it in others, is diminished or destroyed by the +impression that there was a selfish purpose to answer by it.</p> + +<p>There is a modification of the selfish system which attempts to get rid +of its more offensive aspect by a singular and circuitous chain of moral +emotions. We have experienced, it is said, that a certain attention to +the comfort or advantage of others contributes to our own. A kind of +habit is thus formed, by which we come at last to seek the happiness of +others for their own sake;—so that, by this process, actions, which at +first were considered only as inexpedient, from being opposed to +self-love, at length and insensibly come to be considered as immoral. +This can be considered as nothing more than an ingenious play upon +words, and deserves only to be mentioned as a historical fact, in a view +of those speculations by which this important subject has been obscured +and bewildered.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Another modification of the theories of morals<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> remains to be +mentioned;—namely, that of the distinguished Paley. This eminent writer +is decidedly opposed to the doctrine of a moral sense or moral +principle; but the system which he proposes to substitute in its place +must be acknowledged to be liable to considerable objections. He +commences with the proposition that virtue is doing good to mankind, in +obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness. +The good of mankind, therefore, is the subject,—the will of God, the +rule,—and everlasting happiness, the motive of human virtue. The will +of God, he subsequently goes on to shew, is made known to us, partly by +revelation, and partly by what we discover of his designs and +dispositions from his works, or, as we usually call it, the light of +nature. From this last source he thinks it is clearly to be inferred, +that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; consequently, +actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him, and +the contrary. The method of ascertaining the will of God concerning any +action, by the light of nature, therefore, is to inquire into the +tendency of the action to promote<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> or diminish general happiness. +Proceeding on those grounds, he then arrives at the conclusion, that +whatever is expedient is right; and that it is the utility of any moral +rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it. In his further +elucidation of this theory, Dr. Paley admits, that an action may be +useful, in an individual case, which is not right. To constitute it +right, it is necessary that it shall be "expedient upon the whole,—at +the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as +those which are immediate and direct."</p> + +<p>In presuming to offer a criticism upon Paley, I readily concede to the +defenders of his system, that it is not to be classed with the +utilitarianism of Hume and Godwin; and that it is not, correctly +speaking, chargeable with selfishness, in holding out the happiness of a +future state as a motive to virtue. The latter part of his system is +clearly countenanced by the sacred writings; and it does appear to be a +stretch of language, to apply the term selfishness to the longing which +the sincere Christian feels for the full enjoyment of God. In regard to +the former part of his doctrine, again,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> it appears that Paley meant to +propose the will of God as the rule or obligation of morals, and utility +only as a criterion or guide; though it must be confessed that his +language is liable to much misconstruction, and is somewhat at variance +with itself. The real objection to the doctrine of Paley, I apprehend, +lies in his unqualified rejection of the supreme authority of +conscience, and in the mental operation which he substitutes in its +place, namely, a circuitous process of reasoning, in each individual, +respecting the entire and ultimate expediency of actions. There are two +considerations which appear to present serious objections to this part +of the system as a doctrine to be applied to practical purposes. (1.) If +we suppose a man deliberating respecting an action, which he perceives +would be eminently expedient and useful in an individual case, and which +he feels to be highly desirable in its immediate reference to that +case,—we may naturally ask, whether he is in a likely condition to find +his way to a sound conclusion respecting the consequences of the action +"upon the whole, at the long run, in all its consequences, remote and +collateral."—It may certainly be doubted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> whether, in any case, there +is not great danger of differences of opinion arising, respecting this +extended and ultimate expediency:—and it must be admitted that, in the +man now referred to, the very circumstances of his perception of great +and immediate utility, and the state of desire connected with it, would +constitute a moral condition which might interfere, in a very material +degree, with his calculation as to its ultimate expediency. Upon +whatever system we proceed, I fear it must be conceded as a fact, that +there is a singular propensity in the mass of mankind to consider their +own pains and pleasures before those of other men; and that this +propensity must interfere with the cool course of moral calculation +which the system of utility must consider as indispensable. (2.) +Independently of this consideration, we may be allowed to doubt, whether +any human being can arrive at such an extensive knowledge, as this +theory seems to render necessary, of all the consequences of an action, +remote and collateral. This would appear to constitute a kind and degree +of knowledge to be found only in the Omniscience of the Deity. It is, in +fact, by giving its full weight to this dif<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>ficulty, that the doctrine +of utility has been employed by some foreign writers, in their attempts +to undermine the whole foundation of morals. "The goodness of actions," +says Beausobre, in his Pyrrhonisme Raisonable, "depends upon their +consequences, which man cannot foresee, nor accurately ascertain." What +harmony, indeed, or what consistency of moral sentiment can we expect +from a system, by which man himself is made the judge of the code of +morals to which he is to be subject, and by which his decisions, on a +question so momentous, are made to lest on those remote consequences of +actions which he must feel to be beyond the reach of his limited +faculties.</p> + +<p>If these observations be well-founded, I think we cannot hesitate to +maintain, that, on such a nice calculation of consequences, it is +impossible to found a rule of morals in any degree adapted to the +necessities of man. The same objection applies to every doctrine, which +does not recognise the supreme authority of conscience as an original +part of our moral constitution, warning us of certain conduct as +immutably right, and certain other conduct as immutably wrong, without +any regard either to our own ad<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>vantage, or to our judgment of the +tendency of the deeds. Whenever we depart from this great principle, we +reduce every moral decision to what must primarily be a process of +reasoning, and in which, from the intricate calculation of consequences +which necessarily arises, there can scarcely fail to be differences of +opinion respecting the tendency of actions, instead of that absolute +conviction which the deep importance of the subject renders +indispensable. It may, farther, be confidently stated, as a matter of +fact, that a conscientious man, in considering an action which involves +a point of moral duty, does not enter upon any such calculation of its +consequences. He simply asks himself,—is it right?—and so decides, +according to an impulse within, which he feels to be a part of his moral +constitution, susceptible of no explanation, and not admitting of being +referred to any other principle. I confess, indeed, that I cannot +perceive, how the doctrine of utility, in any of its forms, can be +reconciled with the principle of moral responsibility. For what we +commonly call vice and virtue, must resolve themselves merely into +differences of opinion respecting what is most<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> expedient in all its +consequences, remote and collateral. We have already alluded to the +considerations which must make this decision one of extreme +difficulty;—and how can we ascribe moral guilt to that, which, though +in vulgar language we may call it vice, must very often be nothing more +than an error in judgment respecting this ultimate good.</p> + +<p>In regard to the whole of this important subject, I cannot see the +necessity for the circuitous mental operations which have been made to +apply to it; nor can I enter into the repugnance, shewn by various +classes of moralists, against the belief of a process or a principle in +our constitution, given us for a guide in our moral relations. It is +unnecessary to dispute about its name, or even about its origin;—for +the former is of no importance, and of the latter we know nothing. The +question relates simply to its existence as a mental exercise distinct +from any process of reasoning, and the only criterion, to which the +question can be referred, is an appeal to the moral feelings of every +individual. Is there not a mental movement or feeling, call it what we +may, by which we have a perception of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> actions as just or unjust, right +or wrong; and by which we experience shame or remorse respecting our own +conduct in particular instances, and indignation against the conduct of +others. Every one is conscious of such a mental exercise, and there are +two considerations which, I think, may be referred to as moral facts, +shewing a clear and decided difference between it and any simple process +of reasoning. (1.) I would ask whether, in deciding on his conduct, +every man is not conscious of two classes of actions, in regard to which +the processes of his mind differ widely from each other. In deciding +respecting actions of the one class, he carefully and anxiously +deliberates on their tendencies,—that is, their utility towards +himself, or to others whose welfare he has in view; and he reflects on +what was the result of his conduct in similar cases, on former +occasions. In deciding respecting actions of the other class, he enters +into no such calculations;—he feels an immediate impression, that a +certain course is right, and a certain other wrong, without looking a +single step into their tendencies. Every one is conscious of this +difference, between acting from a perception of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> utility and from a +feeling of obligation or a sense of duty; and it would be difficult to +prove that any perception of utility alone ever amounts to a sense of +obligation. (2.) In that class of actions to which is properly applied a +calculation of utility, we see the most remarkable differences in +judgment manifested by men, whom we regard as holding a high place in +respect both of integrity and talent. Let us take for example the +measures of political economy. A conscientious statesman feels that he +is bound to pursue measures calculated to promote the good of his +country; but the individual measures are often questions of expediency +or utility. And what an endless diversity of judgment do we observe +respecting them; and how often do we find measures proposed by able men, +as calculated to produce important public benefit, which others, of no +inferior name, with equal confidence, condemn as frivolous, or even +dangerous. If there can be such a difference of opinion respecting one +class of actions, we cannot avoid the impression that there may be +similar differences respecting others, whenever the decision is left to +a simple process of reason; and we cannot<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> but feel some misgivings, as +to what the state of human society would be, if men, in their moral +decisions were kept together by no other ties than the speculations of +each individual respecting general utility. In any such process, we can +see no provision for that uniformity of feeling required for the class +of actions in which are concerned our moral decisions;—and I can see +nothing unphilosophical in the belief, that the Creator has provided, in +reference to these, a part or a process in our moral constitution, which +is incapable of analysis,—but which proves, as Butler has termed it, "a +rule of right within, to every man who honestly attends to it."</p> + +<p>To this view of the subject I would add only one consideration, which +alone appears to present an insurmountable objection to the doctrine of +utility in all its modifications; namely, that any correct ideas of the +utility of an action can be derived only from experience. The study of +the principles of morality, therefore, would consist of a series of +observations or experiments, by which valid conclusions might be +ascertained; and an individual, entering upon the momentous question,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> +would require either to trust to the conclusions of others, or to make +the observations and experiments for himself. In the former case, he +could not fail to perceive the precarious nature of the basis on which +he was receiving principles of such weighty importance. He could not +fail to remark, that, in other sciences, unsound and premature +deductions had been brought forward, even on high authority, and allowed +to usurp the place of truth. How is he to be satisfied, that, in this +highest of all inquiries, similar errors had not been committed. To +avoid such uncertainty, he may resolve to make the observations or +experiments for himself, and to trust only to his own conclusions. But +here he is met by another difficulty of appalling magnitude. For a +lifetime may not suffice to bring the experiments to a close; and, +during this, he must remain in the same uncertainty on the great +principles of morals, as respecting the periods of a comet, which, +having been seen for a day, darts off into its eccentric orbit, and may +not return for a century. How can it accord with our convictions of the +wisdom of Him who made us, that he should have made us thus.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span></p> + +<p>The foundation of all these <i>Theories of Morals</i>, then, seems to be the +impression, that there is nothing right or wrong, just or unjust in +itself; but that our ideas of right and wrong, justice and injustice, +arise either from actual law or mutual compact, or from our view of the +tendencies of actions. Another modification of these theories, liable, +as it is sometimes stated, to similar objection, ascribes the origin of +right and wrong directly to the will of the Deity, and holds that there +is nothing wrong which might not have been right, if he had so ordained +it.</p> + +<p>By the immutability of moral distinctions, as opposed to these theories, +we mean,—that there are certain actions which are immutably right, and +which we are bound in duty to perform, and certain actions which are +immutably wrong, apart from any other consideration whatever;—and that +an absolute conviction of this is fixed upon us, in the moral principle +or conscience, independently of knowledge derived from any other source +respecting the will or laws of the Almighty. This important distinction +has been sometimes not unaptly expressed by saying of such +actions,—not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> that they are right because the Deity has commanded +them,—but that he has commanded them because they are right. By this +system, therefore, which refers our moral impressions to the supreme +authority of conscience, a principle is disclosed, which, independently +even of revelation, not only establishes an absolute conviction of the +laws of moral rectitude, but leads us to the impression of moral +responsibility and a moral Governor; and as immediately flowing from +this, a state of future retribution. We have already shewn this to +accord with the declarations of the sacred writings, and it is evidently +the only system on which we can account for that uniformity of moral +sentiment which is absolutely required for the harmonies of society. For +it is, in fact, on a conviction of this feeling in ourselves, and of the +existence of a similar and universal principle in others, that is +founded all the mutual confidence which keeps mankind together. It is +this reciprocity of moral feeling that proves a constant check upon the +conduct of men in the daily transactions of life; but, to answer this +purpose, there is evidently required an impression of its +uniformity,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>—or a conviction that the actions, which we disapprove in +others will be condemned in us by the unanimous decision of other men. +It is equally clear that we have no such impression of a uniformity of +sentiment on any other subject, except on those referable to the class +of first truths; and this immediately indicates a marked distinction +between our moral impressions, and any of those conclusions at which we +arrive by a process of the understanding. It is clear, also, that this +uniformity can arise from no system, which either refers us directly to +the will of God, or is liable to be affected by the differences which +may exist in the judgment, the moral taste, the personal feelings, or +the interests of different individuals. It must be, in itself, fixed and +immutable, conveying an absolute conviction which admits of no doubt and +no difference of opinion. Such is the great principle of conscience. +However its warnings may be neglected, and its influence obscured by +passion and moral degradation, it still asserts its claim to govern the +whole man. "Had it strength," says Butler, "as it had right; had it +power, as it had<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the +world."</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>In opposition to this belief of a uniformity of moral feeling, much +importance has been attached to the practices of certain ancient and +some barbarous nations, as the encouragement of theft in Sparta, and the +exposure of the aged among certain tribes in India. Such instances prove +no diversity of moral feeling; but a difference of practice, arising +from certain specialities, real or supposed, by which, in the particular +cases, the influence of the primary moral feeling is, for the time, set +aside. It is of no importance to the argument, whether the disturbing +principle thus operating be the result of an absurd local policy or a +barbarous superstition. It is enough that we see a principle, which, in +point of fact, does thus operate, suspending, in the particular +instances, the primary moral impression. It was not that, in Sparta, +there was any absence of the usual moral feeling in regard to theft in +the abstract,—but that the cultivation of habits of activity and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> +enterprise, which arose from the practice, was considered as a national +object of the highest importance, in a small and warlike state, +surrounded by powerful enemies. It is precisely in the same manner, +that, in individual conduct, a man may be misled by passion or by +interest to do things which his sober judgment condemns. In doing so, +there is no want of the ordinary moral feeling which influences other +men; but he has brought himself to violate this feeling, for certain +purposes which he finds to be highly desirable; and then, probably, +seeks to defend his conduct to the satisfaction of his own mind, and of +the minds of others. He has a distinct perception of what is right, +while he does what is wrong. There are numerous facts which illustrate +the same principle, and shew the recognition of correct moral feelings, +even in those who habitually and daringly violate them;—as the laws of +honour and honesty which robbers observe towards each other,—and the +remarkable fidelity of smugglers towards their associates. In some of +the tribes in the South Seas, also, most remarkable for their +dishonesty, it was found, that while they encouraged each other in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> +pillaging strangers, theft was most severely punished among themselves. +Need I farther refer, on this subject, to the line of argument adopted +in the great question of slavery. It is directed to the palliating +circumstances in the actual state of slavery, not to a broad defence of +slavery itself. Its object is to shew, that slavery, under all its +present circumstances, may be reconciled with the principles of humanity +and justice:—no attempt is ever made to prove, that it is consistent +with these principles to tear a human being from his country and his +kindred, and make him a slave.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + + +<p>On this subject we are sometimes triumphantly asked, where is the +conscience of the Inquisitor,—as if the moral condition of such an +individual incontestably proved, that there can be no such power as we +consider conscience to be. But I think it cannot be doubted, that, as in +the more common cases which have been mentioned, the conscience of the +Inquisitor comes gradually to be accommodated to the circumstances in +which he has voluntarily placed himself. This remarkable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> moral process +has been repeatedly referred to. It may originate in various causes. It +may arise from passion, or an ill-regulated state of the desires or +affections of the mind; it may arise from motives of interest, leading a +man by small and gradual steps into actions which his sober judgment +condemns; or false opinions, however received, may be allowed to fasten +on the mind, until, from want of candid examination, they come to be +invested with the authority of truth. In the moral process which +follows, each single step is slight, and its influence almost +imperceptible; but this influence is perpetuated, and gains strength in +each succeeding step, until the result is a total derangement of the +moral harmony of the mind.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>It remains only that we briefly notice the system of Dr. Adam Smith, +commonly called the theory of Sympathy. According to this ingenious +writer, it is required for our moral sentiments respecting an action, +that we enter into the feelings both of the agent, and of him to whom +the action relates. If we sympathize with the feelings and intentions of +the agent, we approve of his conduct as right,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>—if not, we consider it +as wrong. If, in the individual to whom the action refers, we sympathize +with a feeling of gratitude, we regard the agent as worthy of +praise,—if with a feeling of resentment, the contrary. We thus observe +our feelings respecting the conduct of others, in cases in which we are +not personally concerned,—then apply these rules to ourselves, and thus +judge of our own conduct. This very obvious statement, however, of what +every man feels, does not supply the place of a fundamental rule of +right and wrong; and indeed Dr. Smith does not appear to contend that it +does so. It applies only to the application of a principle, not to the +origin of it. Our sympathy can never be supposed to constitute an action +right or wrong; but it enables us to apply to individual cases a +principle of right and wrong derived from another source;—and to clear +our judgment in doing so, from the blinding influence of those selfish +feelings by which we are so apt to be misled when we apply it directly +to ourselves. In estimating our own conduct, we then apply to it those +conclusions which we have made with regard to the conduct of others,—or +we imagine others applying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> the same process in regard to us, and +consider how our conduct would appeal to an impartial observer.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>This, however, is a most important principle in regard to our moral +decisions,—namely, the process by which we view an action, or a course +of conduct, in another, and then apply the decision to ourselves. When +the power of moral judgment is obscured or deadened in regard to our own +conduct, by self-love or deranged moral habits, all the correctness of +judgment is often preserved respecting the actions of others. It is thus +that men are led on by interest or passion into courses of action, +which, if viewed calmly and dispassionately, they would not deliberately +defend even in themselves, and which, when viewed in others, they +promptly condemn. This principle is beautifully illustrated in the +sacred writings, when the prophet went to the king of Israel, and laid +before him the hypothetical case of a rich man, who had committed an act +of gross and unfeeling injustice against a poor neighbour. The monarch +was instantly roused to indignation, and pronounced a sentence of +severe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> but righteous vengeance against the oppressor,—when the prophet +turned upon him with the solemn denunciation, "Thou art the man." His +moral feeling in regard to his own conduct was dead; but his power of +correct moral decision when applied to another was undiminished.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>In regard to the whole of this subject, an important distinction is to +be made between the fundamental principle, from which actions derive +their character of right and wrong,—and the application of reason in +judging of their tendencies. Before concluding this part of the subject, +therefore, we have to add a very few observations on the influence +exerted on our moral decisions by reason,—always however in +subserviency to the great principle of conscience. The office of reason +appears to be, in the first place, to judge of the expediency, +propriety, and consequences of actions, which do not involve any feeling +of moral duty. In regard to the affections, again, a process of reason +is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising +them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether we shall exercise +them at all. Thus,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> we may feel compassion in a particular instance, but +perceive the individual to be so unworthy, that what we could do would +be of no benefit to him. In such a case we may feel it to be a matter +not only of prudence, but of duty, to resist the affection, and to +reserve the aid we have to bestow for persons more deserving.</p> + +<p>In cases in which an impression of moral duty is concerned, an exercise +of reason is still in many instances, necessary, for enabling us to +adapt our means to the end which we desire to accomplish. We may feel an +anxious wish to promote the interest or relieve the distress of another, +or to perform some high and important duty,—but call reason to our aid +respecting the most effectual and the most judicious means of doing so. +Conscience, in such cases, produces the intention,—reason suggests the +means;—and it is familiar to every one that these do not always +harmonize. Thus a man may be sound in his intentions, who errs in +judgment respecting the means for carrying them into effect. In such +cases, we attach our feeling of moral approbation to the intention +only,—we say the man meant well, but erred<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> in judgment;—and to this +error we affix no feeling of moral disapprobation,—unless, perhaps, in +some cases, we may blame him for acting precipitately on his own +judgment, instead of taking the advice of those qualified to direct him. +We expect such a man to acquire wisdom from experience, by observing the +deficiency of his judgment in reference to his intentions; and, in +future instances, to learn to take advice. There are other circumstances +in which an exercise of reason is frequently brought into action in +regard to moral decisions;—as in some cases in which one duty appears +to interfere with another;—likewise in judging whether, in particular +instances, any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we are at liberty +to take up the case simply as one of expediency or utility. In making +their decisions in doubtful cases of this description, we observe great +differences in the habits of judging in different individuals. One shews +the most minute and scrupulous anxiety, to discover whether the case +involves any principle of duty,—and a similar anxiety in acting +suitably when he has discovered it. This is what we call a strictly +conscientious man. An<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>other, who shews no want of a proper sense of duty +when the line is clearly drawn, has less anxiety in such cases as these, +and may sacrifice minute or doubtful points to some other feeling,—as +self-interest or even friendship,—where the former individual might +have discovered a principle of duty.</p> + +<p>Reason is also concerned in judging of a description of cases, in which +a modification of moral feeling arises from the complexity of +actions,—or, in other words, from the circumstances in which the +individual is placed. This may be illustrated by the difference of moral +sentiment which we attach to the act of taking away the life of +another,—when this is done by an individual under the impulse of +revenge,—by the same individual in self-defence,—or by a judge in the +discharge of his public duty.</p> + +<p>There is still another office frequently assigned to Reason in moral +decisions,—as when we speak of a man acting upon Reason as opposed to +passion. This however is, correctly speaking, only a different use of +the term; and it means that he acts upon a calm consideration of the +motives by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> which he ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried +away by a desire or an affection which has been allowed to usurp undue +influence.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>The important distinction, therefore, which these observations have been +intended to illustrate, may be briefly recapitulated in the following +manner. Our impression of the aspect of actions, as right or wrong, is +conveyed by a principle in the human mind entirely distinct from a +simple exercise of reason,—and the standard of moral rectitude derived +from this source is, in its own nature, fixed and immutable. But there +are many cases in which an exercise of reason may be employed, in +referring particular actions to this standard, or trying them, as it +were, by means of it. Any such mental process, however, is only to be +considered as a kind of test applied to individual instances, and must +not be confounded with the standard to which it is the office of this +test to refer them. Right or virtuous conduct does, in point of fact, +contribute to general utility, as well as to the advantage of the +individual, in the true and extended sense of that term, and these +tendencies are per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>ceived by Reason. But it is neither of these that +constitutes it right. This is founded entirely on a different +principle,—the immutable rule of moral rectitude; it is perceived by a +different part of our constitution,—the moral principle, or conscience; +and, by the operation of this principle, we pronounce it right, without +any reference to its consequences either to ourselves or others.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>The preceding observations, on Conscience, I leave nearly as they stood +in the second edition of this volume. Since the publication of that +edition, I have seen various discussions of this important question, but +have found nothing to alter the opinion I have expressed, respecting the +nature and the authority of conscience as an original principle in our +moral constitution; and I see no system by which we can escape from the +numerous difficulties surrounding every other view of the subject. In +particular, I cannot perceive what is gained by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> those who refer our +moral decisions to a process of reason or judgment alone. For by +judgment, in the ordinary and recognised acceptation of the term, I can +understand nothing more than a power of comparing two or more facts or +impressions together, and tracing their relations. When we apply such a +mental process to a question of morals, it can amount to nothing more +than a comparison of our conduct with some standard. If those who hold +the doctrine referred to, mean any thing more than this,—if they allow +the mind a power of moral decision independently of any such standard, +then this is precisely what we mean by conscience, and the controversy +resolves itself, like not a few that have gone before it, into a dispute +about a name. If they do not allow the mind such a power, it then +becomes them to say, what is the standard by which its moral judgments +are to be formed, and whence it is derived. It appears, I think, +distinctly, that it can be derived only from one of two sources. It must +either be received through divine revelation; or it must be the result +of our speculations respecting utility, in one or other of the forms in +which that doctrine is pre<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span>sented to us. There does not appear to be any +middle course; and accordingly some late writers, who reject the latter +system, while they do not admit the authority of conscience, seem to +refer our moral impressions entirely to the will of the Deity as made +known to us by revelation. I have formerly stated what seem to me to be +insuperable objections to this doctrine. It appears, indeed, to be +distinctly opposed by the very words of Scripture, which clearly +recognise a power, or a process in the mind by which "those who are +without law," that is, without a revelation, "are a law unto themselves, +their consciences bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else +excusing one another."</p> + +<p>It does, I confess, appear to me, that some late excellent and +respectable writers, in their apprehension of not giving sufficient +prominence to the doctrine of human depravity, have greatly under-rated +the actual power of conscience, and have thus injured in a most +essential manner the important argument which is derived from the moral +impressions of the mind. True it is, indeed, that the nature of man is +degenerate, and that the effect<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> of this appears in his disregarding and +disobeying that monitor within. I am not disposed to differ from the +writers referred to, respecting the existence and the extent of this +degeneracy, but rather as to the manner in which it operates in the +actual moral condition of mankind. I do not say that there is in human +nature more good than they assign to it, but that there is more +knowledge of what is good; not that men do better than these writers +allege, but that they have a greater sense of what they ought to do. +Those who maintain the absolute and unusual corruption of conscience may +also be reminded of the remarkable differences which are admitted to +exist in different men, and the manner in which moral feeling is +gradually obscured or overpowered by a course of personal depravity. The +facts are universally admitted respecting the contest with moral +principle which attends the first stages of vice, and the remorse which +follows. But after each departure from virtue, this opposing influence +is progressively weakened, and at length destroyed. In this progress, +then, we must admit two distinct conditions of the moral feelings,—one +in which conscience distinctly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> points at what is right, however its +warnings may be disregarded,—and another in which its warning influence +is weakened or lost. In the former condition, I think we may affirm that +it asserts its right and its authority, though its strength and its +power are departed; and it does not appear to be saying too much, if we +say in the striking language of Butler, "had it strength as it had +right,—had it power as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely +govern the world."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="II_OF_THE_HARMONY_OF_THE_MORAL_FEELINGS" id="II_OF_THE_HARMONY_OF_THE_MORAL_FEELINGS"></a>§ II.—OF THE HARMONY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.</h2> + + +<p>On whatever system we may consider the moral feelings, we perceive that +there are various classes of them,—each answering a special purpose in +our relations as accountable beings. Some of them, we have seen, refer +to objects of desire, the attainment of which appears likely to bring +satisfaction. Others lead us to those relations which we bear to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> our +fellow-men. A third class, which remains to be considered, calls our +attention to the relation in which we stand to the moral Governor of the +universe, and to a certain regulation of the moral feelings arising out +of this relation. But this is still another inquiry of the deepest +interest, connected with this subject, namely, regarding the harmony or +principle of arrangement, which these various classes of moral emotions +ought to bear towards each other. They all form parts of our +constitution, and deserve a certain degree of attention, which must be +carefully adapted to the relative importance of each; and the correct +adjustment of this harmony is one of the objects to be answered by the +moral principle, combined with a sound exercise of judgment. The rules +which apply to it may be stated in the following manner.</p> + +<p>When we consider man as an immortal being, passing through a course of +discipline to another state of existence, it is obvious that his highest +consideration is his own moral condition, and the aspect in which he +stands towards the Deity. In immediate connexion with this first of all +concerns are the great and general principles of justice and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> veracity, +as referring to our connexion with all mankind, and a class of private +responsibilities which peculiarly regard each individual in his domestic +relations; such as the duties of children to then parents, and parents +to their children;—the latter, particularly, presenting a class of the +most solemn kind, as it embraces the concerns of the present life, and +of that which is to come. Then follow the duties of benevolence, +friendship, and patriotism; after these, the ordinary avocations of +life, as the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuits of business; and +finally, those personal recreations and enjoyments, which, when kept in +their proper place, are legitimate and necessary to every human being. +These are all proper and laudable, provided they are kept in a proper +subserviency to each other. But the important consideration is, that a +man maybe acting unworthily of his moral nature, when he devotes himself +to any one of them in a manner which encroaches upon the harmony of the +whole.</p> + +<p>To begin with the lowest of them, it is unnecessary to state how this +remark applies to the man whose life is devoted to pursuits which rank +no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> higher than recreation or amusement. It must be obvious to every one +of the smallest degree of reflection, that such a man is living only for +the present life. What cannot be denied of mere amusement, must also be +admitted respecting a life of business, however important in themselves +the concerns may be which engross the mind. They still refer only to +present things, and carry not the thoughts beyond the moment which +bounds the period of moral discipline. Even the engagements of +benevolence and public usefulness, estimable as they are, may be allowed +to usurp an improper place; and they do so, if they withdraw the +attention from responsibilities and duties which belong more +particularly to ourselves as individuals,—such as the duties of parents +and of children,—and the other claims which arise out of the relations +of domestic life. Finally, it is ever to be kept in mind, that no +engagements of any description must be allowed to interfere with +obligations, of the highest interest to every man,—those which relate +to his own moral condition, in the sight of Him who is now his witness, +and will soon be his Judge. From want of due attention to this +con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span>sideration, year after year glides over us, and life hastens to its +close, amid cares and toils and anxieties which relate only to the +present world. Thus, fame may be acquired, or wealth accumulated; or, +after a laborious ascent, a man may have gained the height of +ambition,—when the truth bursts upon him that life is nearly over, +while its great business is yet to begin,—the preparation of the moral +being for an eternal existence.</p> + +<p>It is scarcely necessary to add, on the other hand, that attention to +this first of all concerns must not be allowed to estrange the mind from +the various duties and responsibilities of active life. It is only, +indeed, when the conduct is regulated by partial and unsound motives, +that some of these objects of attention are allowed to usurp the place +of others. He who acts, not from the high principles of moral duty, but +from a desire of notoriety, or the applause of men, may devote himself +to much benevolence and usefulness of a public and ostensible kind; +while he neglects duties of a higher, though more private nature,—and +overlooks entirely, it may be, his own moral condition. The ascetic, on +the contrary, shuts<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> himself up in his cell, and imagines that he +pleases God by meditation and voluntary austerities. But this is not the +part of him who truly feels his varied relations, and correctly +estimates his true responsibilities.—It is striking, also, to remark, +how the highest principles lead to a character of harmony and +consistency, which all inferior motives fail entirely in producing. The +man, who estimates most deeply and correctly his own moral relations to +an ever-present and presiding Deity, will also feel his way through the +various duties of life, with a degree of attention adapted to each of +them. In the retirements of domestic life, he is found in the anxious +discharge of the high responsibilities which arise out of its relations. +He is found in the path of private benevolence and public usefulness, +manifesting the kind and brotherly interest of one who acts on the +purest of all motives,—the love of God, and a principle of devotedness +to his service. Whether exposed to the view of his fellow-men, or seen +only by Him who seeth in secret, his conduct is the same,—for the +principles on which he acts have, in both situations, equal influence. +In the ordinary con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>cerns of life, the power of these principles is +equally obvious. Whether he engage in its business, or partake of its +enjoyments;—whether he encounter its difficulties, or meet its pains, +disappointments, and sorrows,—he walks through the whole with the calm +dignity of one who views all the events of the present life, in then +immediate reference to a life which is to come.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>The high consistency of character, which results from this regulated +condition of the moral feelings, tends thus to promote a due attention +to the various responsibilities connected with the situation in which +the individual is placed. It does so, by leading him, with anxious +consideration, to feel his way through these requirements, and to +recognise the supreme authority of conscience over his whole moral +system. It does so, especially, by habitually raising his views to the +eternal One, who is the witness of all his conduct, and to whom he is +responsible for his actions in each relation of life. It thus tends to +preserve him from all those partial and inconsistent courses, into which +men are led by the mere desire of approbation, or love<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> of distinction, +or by any other of those inferior motives which are really resolvable +into self-love.</p> + +<p>Such uniformity of moral feeling is equally opposed to another +distortion of character, not less at variance with a sound condition of +the mind. This is what may be called religious pretension, showing +itself by much zeal for particular opinions and certain external +observances, while there is no corresponding influence upon the moral +feelings and the character. The truths, which form the great object of +religious belief, are of so momentous a kind, that, when they are really +believed, they cannot fail to produce effects of the most decided and +most extensive nature;—and, where this influence is not steadily +exhibited, there is a fatal error in the moral economy,—there is either +self-deception, or an intention to deceive others. From such +inconsistency of character arises an evil, which has a most injurious +influence upon two descriptions of persons. Those of one class are led +to assign an undue importance to the profession of a peculiar creed and +the mere externals of religion,—to certain observations which are +considered as characteristic of a particular party, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> to abstinence +from certain indulgences or pursuits which that party disapprove. Those +of the other class, finding, in many instances, much zeal for these +peculiarities, without a state of moral feeling adapted to the truths +which are professed, are apt to consider the whole as either pretence or +delusion.</p> + +<p>In their mutual error there is to both matter of important warning. It +becomes the latter to beware, lest, misled by the failings of weak or +inconsistent men, they withdraw their attention from truths of solemn +import to themselves as moral beings. There may be much pretension where +there is no real feeling; but are they from this entitled to infer, +there is not a reality in that which these pretenders counterfeit. By a +slight gilding, articles of trifling value are made to assume the +appearance of gold; but would it be reasonable to contend, that there +are no articles of intrinsic worth which these are made to imitate. The +fair induction is, in both instances, the opposite. Were there no such +articles of pure gold, this ingenuity would not be employed in +fabricating base imitations; and the hypocrite would not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> assume +qualities he does not possess, where there not real virtues, from a +resemblance to which he hopes to procure for his character that +ostensible value which may enable it to deceive. But let those who have +detected this deception beware of founding upon it conclusions which it +does not warrant. They have not found the reality here, but there is not +the less a pure and high standard which claims their utmost regard. If +they search for it either among inconsistent or among designing men, +they seek the living among the dead. Let them contemplate it especially +as it is displayed in the character of the Messiah: in him it was +exhibited in a manner which demands the imitation of every rational man, +while it challenges the cordial assent of the most acute understanding, +that this is the perfection of a moral being.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, let those, who profess to be influenced by the +highest of all motives, study to exhibit their habitual influence in a +consistent uniformity of the whole character. It is easy to acquire a +peculiar phraseology, to show much zeal for peculiar opinions, and rigid +attention to pecu<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span>liar observances; and, among a party, it is not +difficult to procure a name, by condemning certain other compliances +which by them are technically styled the manners of the world. But all +this, it is evident, may be assumed; it may be, and probably often is, +no better than a name; it often amounts to nothing more than +substituting one kind of excitement for another, while the moral being +continues unchanged. True religion is seated in the heart, and sends out +from thence a purifying influence over the whole character. In its +essential nature it is a contest within, open only to the eye of Him who +seeth in secret. It seeks not, therefore, the applause of men; and it +shrinks from that spurious religionism whose prominent characters are +talk, and pretension, and external observance, often accompanied by +uncharitable censure. Like its divine pattern, it is meek and +lowly,—"it is pure and peaceable, gentle and easy to be intreated, full +of mercy and of good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy." +It aims not at an ostentatious display of principles, but at a steady +exhibition of fruits. Qualities, which it cultivates with especial care, +are humility,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> and charity, and mercy,—the mortification of every +selfish passion, and the denial of every selfish indulgence. When thus +exhibited in its true and genuine characters, it commands the respect of +every sound understanding, and challenges the assent of all to its +reality and its truth, as the highest principle that can regulate the +conduct of a moral being.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><br /><br /><a name="PART_IV" id="PART_IV"></a>PART IV.<br /><br /></h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>OF THE MORAL RELATION OF MAN TOWARDS THE DEITY.</h2> + + +<p>The healthy state of a moral being is strikingly referred, in the sacred +writings, to three great heads,—justice,—benevolence,—and a +conformity of the moral feelings to a reverential sense of the presence +and perfections of the Deity;—"to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk +humbly with thy God." The two former of these considerations lead us to +the duties which a man owes to his fellow-men;—the latter calls our +attention to that homage of the mind and of the heart which he owes +peculiarly to God. For the duties of the former class we are equally +responsible to him, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> the moral Governor of the universe, but their +immediate reference is to our connexions with other men;—those of the +latter class respect our relation to the Deity himself, and consequently +consist, in a great measure, in the purity and devotedness of the mind. +In human systems of ethics, attention has been chiefly directed to the +obligations of social and relative morality;—but the two classes are +closely associated in the sacred writings; and the sound condition of +the moral feelings is pointed out as that acquirement which, along with +a corresponding integrity of character, qualifies man, in an especial +manner, for intercourse with the Deity. "Who shall ascend unto the hill +of the Lord, or who shall stand in his holy place. He that hath clean +hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor +sworn, deceitfully."—"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see +God."</p> + +<p>Such declarations challenge the assent and absolute conviction of every +sound understanding. Are we, as responsible creatures, placed in +immediate relation to a great moral Governor, a being of infinite purity +and boundless perfections:—Is the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> structure of our bodies, and the +still more wonderful fabric of our minds, alike the work of his +hand:—Then it is impossible to put away from us the impression,—that +each movement of these minds must be fully exposed to his inspection. It +is equally impossible to repel from us the solemn truth,—that it is by +the desires, the feelings, and the motives of action which exist there, +that our condition is to be estimated in his sight,—and that a man, +whose conduct to his fellow-men does not violate propriety and justice, +may be in a state of moral degradation in the eyes of him who seeth in +secret;—"for," says the sacred writer, "man looketh on the outward +appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart."</p> + +<p>There cannot, therefore, be an inquiry of more intense interest, than +what is that condition of the heart and of the mind which every man +ought to seek after, when he considers himself as exposed to the +continual inspection of the Almighty. It may, perhaps, be briefly +referred to the following heads.</p> + + +<p>I. A habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> divine presence,—and +a habitual desire to have the whole moral condition regulated by this +impression. It implies, therefore, sacred respect to the character of +the Deity, and is opposed to every kind of profaneness, or aught by +which one might weaken, in himself or others, the reverential feeling +due towards the character, and even the name of the Almighty. This must +be extended, not to the outward conduct alone, but to the desires and +affections of the heart. There is a state of mind formerly referred to, +in which a desire, which the moral feelings disapprove, may not be +followed by volition; while the desire is still indulged, and the mind +is allowed to cherish it with some feeling of regret, or even to +luxuriate with a sense of pleasure in the imaginary gratification. In +the same manner, a malevolent affection to our fellow-men may be checked +from producing injurious conduct, while the feeling still rankles in the +heart, in the form of envy or hatred. These mental conditions, while +they are widely at variance with the healthy state of a rational and +responsible being, must be regarded by the Deity as constituting moral +guilt and moral degradation. Nor is it only on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> mind, which +cherishes malevolent passions and impure desires and imaginations, that +the Holy One must look with a feeling of condemnation. There may be +another mental condition, in which the thoughts and desires are directed +to transient and frivolous objects, and thus run to waste amid the +trifles of the passing hour, without any feeling of the truths and +motives which demand the attention of moral beings. The pursuits of such +a man may have nothing in them that is referable either to impure desire +or malevolent affection. They may be the acquisition of wealth,—the +grasp after power,—the love of distinction,—or a devotedness to merely +trivial occupations;—while there is a total neglect of those great +concerns which really demand our chief and highest regard. Amid the +legitimate and even the laudable pursuits of ordinary life, we are too +apt to lose sight of those duties and responsibilities which attend a +state of moral discipline,—and that culture of the soul required as a +preparation for the future state of existence to which we are hastening. +But we cannot doubt that these considerations bear an important aspect +in the eye of the Deity; and that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> the mind in which they hold not a +habitual influence is contemplated by him as in a state of moral +destitution.</p> + +<p>There are, accordingly, two classes of characters clearly pointed out in +the sacred writings,—namely, one in whom the conduct indicates the +depravity within,—and another, in whom the external character preserves +a respectable aspect in the estimation of men, while the moral feelings +are in a corrupted condition in the sight of God. We have formerly +endeavoured to trace the laws to which this fact is to be referred, on +the principles of the philosophy of the human mind:—they are chiefly +two: (1.) We have seen that there are original principles in our nature +which lead to a certain exercise of justice, veracity, and benevolence, +independently of any recognition of divine authority. They are a part of +our moral constitution, and calculated to promote important purposes in +the harmony of human society; and they carry along with them a certain +principle of reciprocal compensation, which is entirely distinct from +any impression of their moral aspect. The man who is deficient in them, +indeed, incurs guilt;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> but a certain discharge of them may arise from +mere natural, or even selfish feeling, unconnected with any sense of +responsibility; and this consequently conveys no impression of moral +approbation. In the very exercise of them a man receives his reward, +partly by a feeling of satisfaction, which from the constitution of his +nature, they are calculated to yield, and partly as a member of that +community where they promote peace, and order, and harmony; and he is +not entitled to look farther, or to claim from them any feeling of merit +in the sight of the Deity. (2.) A second principle, which bears an +important relation to this subject, is the manner in which a man's +character is influenced by the particular motive or pursuit to which he +has resigned the guidance of his conduct. One surrenders himself to the +animal propensities, and becomes a selfish profligate, insensible to +every right principle of action, while his depraved condition is obvious +to all around him. A second devotes himself to ambition;—and a third to +avarice:—These ruling passions, it may be, are found to be adverse to +the selfish indulgence and open profligacy of the former; and a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> +character may arise out of them distinguished by much that is decent, +and respectable, and worthy of approbation in the eye of man. In a +fourth, the ruling motive may be the desire of esteem and approbation; +and this may, and often does, become a principle of such influence, as +to overpower, in a great measure, the selfish propensities, and to +produce a character estimable not only for justice and veracity, but a +high degree of active benevolence. Such a man sacrifices to his ruling +passion much that might be turned to the purposes of ambition, avarice, +or selfish indulgence, by those who are guided by these propensities; +and, in doing so, he has his reward. He finds it in the gratification of +that principle which in him has become predominant; and, rather than +forfeit the esteem of those whose approbation he values, he will submit +to much personal exertion, and sacrifice much selfish advantage, which +others might deem highly worthy of attainment. But all this may go on +without any recognition of divine authority; and may all exist in a man +in whom there is much impurity of desire, and much deficiency of moral +feeling. It is all referable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> to a motive of a personal nature, and, in +the gratification of this, his ruling principle is satisfied.</p> + +<p>The state of mind which is under the influence of a habitual sense of +the divine presence may, therefore, be considered under two +relations,—the one referring more immediately to the Deity,—the other +to our fellow-men. The former seems chiefly to include an effort to have +every desire, thought, and imagination of the heart, regulated by a +sense of the presence and the purity of God, and in conformity to his +will. Amid much feeling of deficiency in these respects, it leads our +attention to that interesting mental condition, in which there is a +contest and a warfare within,—and a prevailing opposition to every +thing that is at variance with the purity of a moral being. The second +division includes the cultivation of feelings of kindness and +benevolence towards all men;—the love of justice,—the love of +truth,—the love of peace,—the forgiveness of injuries,—the +mortification of selfishness;—in a word, the earnest and habitual +desire to promote the comfort and alleviate the distresses of others. +From these two<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> mental conditions must spring a character, distinguished +alike by piety towards God, and by high integrity, benevolence, and +active usefulness towards man. He who earnestly cultivates this purity +within, feels that he requires continual watchfulness, and a constant +direction of the mind to those truths and moral causes which are +calculated to influence his volitions. He feels farther that he is in +need of a might not his own in this high design; but for this he knows +also he can look, with humble confidence and hope, when, under a sense +of moral weakness, he asks its powerful aid.</p> + + +<p>II. A humble and dutiful submission to the appointments of +Providence,—as part of a great system which is regulated by infinite +wisdom. The man, who bears upon his mind this sublime impression, has +learnt to contemplate the Almighty One as disposing of the events of the +lower world, and assigning to each of his rational creatures the place +which he occupies. That place, whatever it may be, he perceives has +attached to it special duties and responsibilities,—and calls for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> the +cultivation of moral qualities peculiarly adapted to it. Is it one of +comfort, wealth, or influence,—solemn obligations arise out of the +means of usefulness which these command. Is it one of humble life, +privation, or actual suffering,—each of these also has its peculiar +duties, and each is to be contemplated as belonging to a great system of +moral discipline, in which no part can be wanting in consistency with +the harmony of the whole. Such a submission of the soul to the +appointments of God does not preclude the use of all legitimate means +for bettering our condition, or for preventing or removing sources of +distress. But when, under the proper use of such means, these are not +removed, it leads us habitually to that higher power, to whose will all +such attempts must be subservient;—and, while it elevates our thoughts +above present events and second causes, it reminds us of that great +scheme of discipline through which we are passing, and the purposes +which these events are calculated to promote in our own moral +improvement. Viewed under such feelings, the ills of life lose that +aspect in which we are too apt to contemplate them; and will be +considered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> with new and peculiar interest, as essential to that system, +the great object of which is to prepare and purify us for a higher state +of being.</p> + + +<p>III. A sense of moral imperfection and guilt,—and that humility and +devout self-abasement which arise out of it. This must be a prominent +feeling in every one who views his own conduct, and his mental emotions, +in reference to the purity of God. It naturally leads to supplication +for his mercy and forgiveness; and, in the wondrous display of his +character, given in the sacred writings, a provision is disclosed, in +virtue of which the exercise of mercy is made consistent with the truth +and justice of a moral governor. This dispensation of peace we find +habitually represented as adapted to man in a state of spiritual +destitution: and no mental condition is more frequently referred to, as +acceptable with the Deity, than that which consists of contrition and +lowliness of mind.—"Thus sayeth the high and lofty One that inhabiteth +eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, with +him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit,—to revive the spirit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> +of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." With this +state of mind is very naturally associated a sense of moral +weakness,—and a constant reliance on divine aid, both for direction +through life, and for the culture of the moral being.</p> + + +<p>IV. It is only necessary to add,—a profound sense of gratitude and love +towards the Deity as the giver of all good,—as our daily preserver and +benefactor. These feelings will have a special reference to the display +which he has given of his character, as merciful, gracious, and slow to +anger; and to the provision which he has made for the recovery and +restoration of his fallen creatures, through "God manifest in the +flesh." Of this divine person, and the work which he came to accomplish, +philosophy presumes not to speculate;—but we have seen the light +afforded, by the inductions of moral science, respecting the probability +of this revelation,—and its adaptation to the actual state of man in +his relation to the Deity. We have seen the impression conveyed by the +character of the Messiah, considered merely as matter of histo<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span>rical +truth,—exhibiting such a pattern, as never appeared in our world, +except in him, of a pure and perfect moral being. We have seen, farther, +the incontrovertible nature of that evidence, transmitted by testimony, +and confirmed, as it is, in a very peculiar manner, by periodical +observances, on which the whole revelation is supported;—and the +inductions of sound philosophy harmonize with the impressions of the +man, who, feeling his own moral necessities, yields his cordial assent +to this mystery of God, and seeks in its provisions his peace in the +life that now is, and his hope for the life that is to come.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>From the whole mental condition, thus slightly delineated, there will +naturally arise a character and conduct adapted to the feelings and +principles which rule within. This implies, as we have seen, a due +regulation of the desires, and a habitual direction of them to objects +of real and adequate importance,—a diligent cultivation and exercise of +all the affections,—and a conduct distinguished, in the highest degree, +by purity, integrity, veracity, and active benevolence. It im<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span>plies a +profound submission to the will of the Almighty, which puts to silence +every murmuring or repining thought under any dispensation of his +providence. It comprehends the habitual suppression of every selfish +principle, and the constant aspiration after a state of moral feeling, +which proposes to itself no lower standard than that which will bear the +inspection of a being of infinite purity. This character seems to +correspond with that high tone of morals enjoined in the sacred +writings. Its elements are defined and clear;—would we seek to estimate +its sublimity and its truth, we have only to compare it with those +distorted and temporizing systems which have resulted from the +inventions of men. A feeling of dissatisfaction, the same in kind, +though it may differ in degree, will attach to them all; and there is +none in which we can confidently rest, until we rise to the sublime +morality of the gospel. That great system of ethical purity comes to us +under the sanction of divine revelation, and established by the +miraculous evidence by which the proof of this is conveyed; but it is +independent of any other support than that which it carries in +itself,—con<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span>sistency with the character of God,—and harmony with the +best feelings of man. In yielding an absolute consent to its supreme +authority, we require no external evidence. We have only to look at the +record in its own majestic simplicity, tried by the highest inductions +of the philosophy of the moral feelings, to enable us to point to the +morality of the gospel, and to say with unshrinking confidence,—this is +truth.</p> + +<p>If we would seek for that, which must be of all conceivable things of +the highest moment both for the peace and the improvement of the moral +being, it is to be found in the habit of mind, in which there is the +uniform contemplation of the divine character, with a constant reliance +on the guidance of the Almighty in every action of life. "One thing," +says an inspired writer, "have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek +after; that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my +life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in his +temple."—The man, who thus cultivates the habitual impression of the +divine presence, lives in an atmosphere peculiarly his own. The storms +which agitate the lower world may blow around or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> beneath, but they +touch not him;—as the traveller has seen from the mountain's top the +war of elements below, while he stood in unclouded sunshine. In the +works, and ways, and perfections of the Eternal One, he finds a subject +of exalted contemplation, in comparison with which the highest inquiries +of human science sink into insignificance. It is an exercise, also, +which tends at once to elevate and to purify the mind. It raises us from +the minor concerns and transient interests which are so apt to occupy +us,—to that wondrous field in which "worlds on worlds compose one +universe,"—and to that mind which bade them move in their appointed +orbits, and maintains them all in undeviating harmony. While it thus +teaches us to bend in humble adoration before a wisdom which we cannot +fathom, and a power which we cannot comprehend, it directs our attention +to a display of moral attributes which at once challenge our reverence +and demand our imitation. By thus leading us to compare ourselves with +the supreme excellence, it tends to produce true humility, and, at the +same time, that habitual aspiration after moral improvement which +constitutes the highest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> state of man. "The proud," says an eloquent +writer, "look down upon the earth, and see nothing that creeps upon its +surface more noble than themselves;—the humble look upwards to their +God." This disposition of mind, so far from being opposed to the +acquirements of philosophy, sits with peculiar grace upon the man who, +through the most zealous cultivation of human science, ascends to the +Eternal Cause. The farther he advances in the wonders of nature, the +higher he rises in his adoration of the power and the wisdom which guide +the whole;—"Where others see a sun, he sees a Deity." And then, in +every step of life, whether of danger, distress, or difficulty, the man +who cultivates this intercourse with the incomprehensible One "inquires +in his temple." He inquires for the guidance of divine wisdom, and the +strength of divine aid, in his progress through the state of moral +discipline;—he inquires, in a peculiar manner, for this aid in the +culture of his moral being, when he views this mighty undertaking in its +important reference to the life which is to come;—he inquires for a +discernment of the ways of Divine Providence, as he either feels it in +his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> own concerns, or views it in the chain of events which are going on +in the world around him. He learns to trace the whole to the same +unerring hand which guides the planet in its course; and thus rests in +the absolute conviction that the economy of Providence is one great and +magnificent system of design and order and harmony. These, we repeat +with confidence, are no visions of the imagination, but the sound +inductions of a calm and rational philosophy. They are conclusions which +compel the assent of every candid inquirer, when he follows out that +investigation of mighty import,—what is God,—and what is that essence +in man which he has endowed with the power of rising to himself.</p> + +<p>To enlarge upon these important subjects would lead us away from the +proper design of a work, which is intended chiefly to investigate the +light we derive from the phenomena of the mind itself. The points which +have been stated, as arising out of the impressions of every sound +understanding, challenge the assent of all who believe in a present and +presiding Deity,—a being of infinite power and wisdom, and of perfect +purity. With him<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> who calls in question this sublime truth, we have no +common feeling, and no mutual premises on which an argument can be +founded. We must therefore leave him to sit in solitary pride, while he +views the chaos which his fancy has framed, and strives to reconcile the +discordant elements of a system, in which there are effects without a +cause, and harmony without a regulating power; and in which the mind can +perceive no element of credibility, consistency, or truth.</p> + +<p>With this slight outline, therefore, we must quit a subject of the +deepest interest, but which belongs rather to the theologian than to the +inquirer in mental science;—and proceed briefly to investigate the +means by which the condition of the moral feelings, which has been the +subject of the preceding observations, may be promoted and cultivated as +the regulating principle of the whole character. Two views may be taken +of this point, which, though they harmonize with each other in practice, +are to be considered in their philosophical aspect as distinct.</p> + +<p>The restoration of man from a state of estrangement, anarchy, or moral +death, we are taught in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> the sacred writings to refer to a power from +without the mind,—an influence directly from God. We have seen the +various considerations derived from the phenomena of the mind, and our +impressions of the divine character, giving to this great doctrine a +probability which claims the assent of every correct understanding. But, +without in any degree losing sight of the truth and the importance of +this principle, the immediate object of our attention, as a branch of +mental science, is rather the process of the mind itself, by means of +which a habitual influence is produced upon the whole character. This is +a compound operation which may probably be analysed in the following +manner. It seems to be composed of reason,—attention,—and a +modification of conception. The province of Reason is to examine the +truth of the statements or doctrines, which are proposed to the mind, as +calculated to act upon its moral feelings;—and, upon this being done in +a correct manner, must depend the validity of the subsequent parts of +the mental process. This being premised, it is the office of Attention, +aided by reason, to direct the mind assiduously to the truths, so as +fully to per<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span>ceive their relations and tendencies. By the farther +process, analogous to Conception, they are then placed before us, in +such a manner as to give them the effect of real and present existence. +By these means, truths relating to things for which we have not the +evidence of our senses, or referring to events which are future, but +fully expected to happen, are kept before the mind, and influence the +moral feelings and the character, in the same manner as if the facts +believed were actually seen, or the events expected were taking place in +our view. This mental operation is <i>Faith</i>;—and, for the sound exercise +of it, the constituent elements now mentioned are essentially necessary. +The truth must be received by the judgment upon adequate evidence; and, +by the other parts of the process, it must be so kept before the mind, +that it may exercise such a moral influence as might arise from the +actual vision or present existence, of the things believed.</p> + +<p>Attention to these considerations will probably enable us to discover +some of the fallacies which have obscured and bewildered this important +subject. When the impression, which is thus allowed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> to influence the +mind, is one which has not been received by the judgment, upon due +examination, and adequate evidence of its truth,—this is enthusiasm, +not faith.—Our present course of inquiry does not lead us to treat of +the notions which have, in various individuals, been thus allowed to +usurp the place of truth. To those who would preserve themselves from +the influence of such, the first great inquiry, respecting their own +mental impressions, ought to be,—are they facts,—and on what evidence +do they rest which can satisfy a sound understanding that they are so. +On the other hand is to be avoided an error, not less dangerous than the +wildest fancies of the enthusiast, and not less unworthy of a regulated +mind. This consists in treating real and important truths as if they +were visions of the imagination, and thus dismissing them, without +examination, from the influence which they ought to produce upon the +moral feelings. It is singular also to remark, how these two +modifications of character may be traced to a condition of the reasoning +powers, essentially the same. The former receives a fiction of the +imagination, and rests upon it as truth. The latter, acting<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> upon some +prejudice or mental impression, which has probably no better foundation, +puts away real and important truths without any examination of the +evidence on which they are founded. The misapplication of the reasoning +powers is the same in both. It consists in proceeding upon mere +impression, without exercising the judgment on the question of its +evidence,—or on the facts and considerations which are opposed to it. +Two characters of a very opposite description thus meet in that mental +condition, which draws them equally, though in different directions, +astray from the truth.</p> + +<p>When a truth has fully received the sanction of the judgment, the second +office of faith is, by attention and conception, to keep it habitually +before the mind, so that it may produce its proper influence upon the +character. This is to live by faith;—and in this consists that +operation of the great principle, which effectually distinguishes it +from all pretended feelings and impressions assuming its name. We speak, +in common language, of a head-knowledge which does not affect the +heart;—and of a man who is sound in his creed, while he shews little of +its influence upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> his conduct. The mental condition of such a man +presents a subject of intense interest. His alleged belief, it is +probable, consists merely in words, or in arguing ingeniously on points +to which he attaches no real value. These may have been impressed upon +him by education;—they may constitute the creed of a party to which he +has devoted himself; and he may argue in support of them with all the +energy of party zeal. In the same manner, a man may contend warmly in +favour of compassion, whose conduct shows a cold and barren +selfishness;—but this is not benevolence;—and the other is not faith. +Both are empty professions of a belief in certain truths, which have +never fixed themselves in the mind, so as to become regulating +principles or moral causes in the mental constitution. We may indeed +suppose another character, slightly removed from this, in which the +truths have really received the approbation of the judgment, and yet +fail to produce their proper influence. This arises from distorted moral +habits, and a vitiated state of the moral faculties, which have +destroyed the healthy balance of the whole economy of the mind. The +consequence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> is, that the man perceives and approves of truths, without +feeling their tendencies, and without manifesting their power.</p> + +<p>Intimately connected with this subject, also, is a remarkable principle +in our mental constitution, formerly referred to,—the relation between +certain facts or truths, and certain moral emotions, which naturally +arise from them, according to the chain of sequences which has been +established in the economy of the mind. A close connexion thus exists +between our intellectual habits and our moral feelings, which leads to +consequences of the utmost practical moment. Though we have little +immediate voluntary power over our moral emotions, we have a power over +the intellectual processes with which these are associated. We can +direct the mind to truths, and we can cherish trains of thought, which +are calculated to produce correct moral feelings;—and we can avoid or +banish mental images or trains of thought, which have an opposite +tendency. This is the power over the succession of our thoughts, the due +exercise of which forms so important a feature of a well-regulated mind, +in regard to in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>tellectual culture;—its influence upon us as moral +beings is of still higher and more vital importance.</p> + +<p>The sound exercise of that mental condition which we call Faith +consists, therefore, in the reception of certain truths by the +judgment,—the proper direction of the attention to their moral +tendencies,—and the habitual influence of them upon the feelings and +the conduct. When the sacred writers tell us that, without faith, it is +impossible to please God,—and when they speak of a man being saved by +faith,—it is not to a mere admission of certain truths as part of his +creed, that they ascribe consequences so important; but to a state in +which these truths are uniformly followed out to certain results, which +they are calculated to produce, according to the usual course of +sequences in every sound mind. This principle is strikingly illustrated +by one of these writers, by reference to a simple narrative. During the +invasion of Canaan by the armies of Israel, two men were sent forward as +spies to bring a report concerning the city of Jericho. The persons +engaged in this mission were received in a friendly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> manner, by a woman +whose house was upon the wall of the city;—when their presence was +discovered, she hid them from their pursuers; and finally enabled them +to escape, by letting them down by a cord from a window. Before taking +leave of them, she expressed her firm conviction, that the army to which +they belonged was soon to take possession of Jericho, and of the whole +country, and she made them swear to her that, when this should take +place, they would shew mercy to her father's house. The engagement was +strictly fulfilled. When the city was taken, and the other inhabitants +destroyed, the woman was preserved, with all her kindred. In this very +simple occurrence, the woman is represented, by the sacred writer, as +having been saved by faith. The object of her faith was the event which +she confidently expected,—that the city of Jericho was to be destroyed. +The ground of her faith was the rapid manner in which the most powerful +nations had already fallen before the armies of Israel,—led, as she +believed, by a divine power. Acting upon this conviction, in the manner +in which a belief so deeply affecting her personal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> safety was likely to +influence any sound mind, she took means for her preservation, by making +friends of the spies. Her faith saved her, because without it she would +not have made this provision; but, unless she had followed out her +belief to the measure which was calculated to effect this object, the +mere belief of the event would have availed her nothing. When we +therefore ascribe important results to faith, or to any other mental +operation, we ascribe them not to the operation itself, but to this +followed out to the consequences which it naturally produces, according +to the constitution of the human mind. In the same manner, we may speak +of one man, in a certain state of danger or difficulty, being saved by +his wisdom, and another by his strength. In doing so, we ascribe such +results, not to the mere possession of these qualities, but to the +efforts which naturally arose from them, in the circumstances in which +the individual was placed. And, when the inspired writer says, that +without faith it is impossible to please God,—he certainly refers to no +mere mental impression, and to no barren system of opinions; but to the +reception of cer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>tain truths, which in our present state of being are +entirely the objects of faith, and to all that influence, upon the moral +feelings and the character, which these must produce upon every mind +that really believes them.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>On this great subject, much misconception appears to have arisen from +not sufficiently attending to the condition in which, as moral beings, +we are placed in the present state of existence, and the important part +which must be performed by the mental exercise called faith. As physical +and intellectual beings, we have certain relations to the objects by +which we are surrounded, and with these we communicate by means of our +bodily senses. But, as moral beings, our relations are entirely of a +different nature; and the facts and motives, which are calculated to act +upon us in these relations, are chiefly the objects of faith: that is, +they are not cognizable by any of our senses, but are to be received by +a different part of our constitution, and upon a separate kind of +evidence. This, accordingly, is the simple but important distinction, +referred to by the sacred writer,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> when, in allusion to our condition as +moral beings, he says,—"we walk by faith, not by sight." The objects of +sight, here intended to express all the objects of sense, exercise over +us a habitual and powerful influence. They constantly obtrude themselves +upon our notice without any exertion of our own; and it requires a +peculiar exercise of mind to withdraw our attention from them, and to +feel the power of events which are future, and of things which are not +seen. This mental exercise is Faith. Its special province, as we have +seen, is to receive truths which are presented directly to the mind,—to +place them before us with all the vividness of actual and present +existence,—and to make them exert upon us an agency analogous to that +which is produced by objects of sight. The next great point in our +inquiry, therefore, is, what are the truths which are calculated thus to +operate upon us as moral beings, and which it is the object of faith to +bring habitually before us.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>When we withdraw our minds from the influence of sensible things, and +send forth our atten<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>tion to those truths which are the province of +faith, the first great object which meets our view is the eternal +incomprehensible One, the moral governor of the universe,—a being of +infinite perfections and infinite purity. From the stupendous works of +nature, we trace his operation as the great First Cause,—and infer, +with absolute certainty, his boundless power and wisdom, and his +independent existence. The impress of his moral attributes he has fixed +with indelible certainty, upon our moral perceptions,—where, in the +light of conscience, co-operating with a simple process of reason, we +perceive him to be a being of infinite holiness, and of unerring truth +and justice. Our knowledge of these attributes is not the result of any +process of reasoning which can admit of deliberation or doubt. They +force themselves upon our conviction by the most simple principles of +induction, when, from our own mental and moral endowments, we infer the +perfections of him who formed us.</p> + +<p>From every conception we can form of such a being, we have an equally +insuperable conviction of his universal presence,—that he is the +witness<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> not only of our conduct, but of the thoughts and imaginations +of the heart;—and that from these, as indicating our real condition, +and not from our conduct alone, our moral aspect is estimated by +him,—the pure and holy One who seeth in secret. Each moment, as it +passes rapidly over us, we know is bringing us nearer to that period, +when all our hopes and fears for this world shall lie with us in the +grave. But we feel also that this is the entrance to another state of +being,—a state of moral retribution, where the eternal One is to be +disclosed in all his attributes as a moral governor. These +considerations fix themselves upon the mind, with a feeling of yet new +and more tremendous interest, when we farther take into view that this +future existence stretches out before us into endless duration. This is +the truth so powerfully expressed by the sacred writer, in terms which +by their brevity convey, in the most adequate manner, their overwhelming +import,—"The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which +are not seen are eternal."</p> + +<p>These truths are not the visions of enthusiasm; neither are they the +result of any process of rea<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span>soning, by which different men may arrive +at different conclusions. They force themselves upon our conviction with +a power which we cannot put away from us, when we turn our attention to +the solemn inquiry, what we are, and what is God. In the sacred writings +they are detailed and illustrated, in a connected and harmonious manner; +and are impressed upon us with the force of a revelation from the Deity +himself. But the principles there disclosed meet with an impression, in +our moral constitution, which pleads with authority for their truth. It +is the province of faith to keep these habitually before the mind, and +to cause them to influence the feelings and the conduct, as if they were +objects of sense,—as if the Deity, in all the purity of his character +were actually disclosed to our view,—or as if we were present at that +dread hour which shall witness his righteous retribution. The man who +thus feels their power, and exhibits their influence upon his character, +is he who lives by faith.</p> + +<p>When, under this mental exercise, a man brings himself into the +immediate presence of the eternal One;—when he arraigns himself, as it +were,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> before the bar of the omniscient Judge;—when he places before +him that future state which stretches forth into endless existence,—a +train of feelings must arise in his mind, to which he was a stranger, so +long as he placidly resigned himself to the influence of sensible +things. He views this being of infinite purity, as one who has been all +his life the daily witness of his conduct; and feels that even the +secrets of the heart have been at all times open to divine inspection. +Each day, as it passed unheeded over him, was a portion gone by of his +period of moral discipline; and each, as it glided amid the frivolities +of life, or the active pursuit of temporal good, had its moral aspect +assigned to it in the judgment of the eternal mind. Along with these +impressions, which no reflecting man can put away from him, a voice +within forces upon him the conviction, that, were his whole history +disclosed to his fellow-men, he would, even in their estimation, be +found wanting. How much more deeply must this be fixed upon his inmost +soul, when he feels that the whole is, at one glance, exposed to the eye +of omniscience; and that an hour is rapidly approaching, when<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> a strict +account must be rendered, and a righteous sentence pronounced, the +result of which will extend into eternal existence. With these truths +upon his mind, what reflecting man can view, without awe, the moment +which is to close his state of moral discipline,—when, disencumbered +from his earthly tenement, he shall find himself alone with God,—and +there shall burst upon his astonished faculties the blaze of an endless +day. These are not speculations of fancy, but eternal truth. The man who +habitually acts under their influence, knows that his faith rests upon a +conviction which cannot be shaken, when he recognises in all his ways +the presence and the inspection of the Deity,—when he feels the +obligation to have even the desires and affections under subjection to +his will,—and when he resigns himself to his guidance and asks his +powerful aid, both for the conduct of this life, and the preparation for +the life which is to come.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Solemn is the hour when a man thus retires from the tumult of life, and +seriously proposes to himself the question,—what is his condition as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> a +moral being; what have been his leading pursuits in this life which is +hastening to a close; what is his aspect in the view of that +incomprehensible One, who perceives at a single glance the whole details +of his moral history. Is he safe to meet the full splendour of that +eye;—has he no apprehension, that, when called to account in the +immediate presence of unerring purity, he may not be able to answer. The +man lives not, who can appeal to his own heart and say, after serious +inquiry, that he can thus meet the penetrating search of him, whose +knowledge is perfect, as his purity is infinite: The man lives not, who +can look back upon his whole life, without feeling, that, in the sight +of this unspotted One, he is polluted with guilt: And, if his heart +condemn him, with all its partiality for his own views and feelings, and +all its forgetfulness of many points in his moral history, he must feel +that God is greater than his heart, and knoweth all things. Under such +an impression, to what refuge shall he betake himself. Does he appeal to +an indefinite idea of the mercy of the Deity;—it must be evident that +this conveys no distinct principle,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> and will not bear the confidence +which is essential to hope and peace. For we cannot go to the extent of +supposing a mercy so indiscriminate, that the Deity will depart from all +the laws which he has made, and which he has impressed upon us as a part +of our moral constitution. This would be ascribing, to infinite wisdom, +an indecision and a change of purpose, unworthy of the weakest human +lawgiver. If, then, we do not boldly assume this position, how are we to +draw the line where such mercy is to terminate;—and where the Almighty +is to appear in his character of justice, as a righteous moral governor. +If we find that each individual fixes a different standard, and that +each extends it so as to favour his own condition, it is clear that the +system presents no character of truth, and that it is incapable of +ministering to the consolation of him who feels his own necessities, and +seriously contemplates the character of God. He must perceive that to +apply such reasoning to human enactments, would be to represent them as +a mockery of justice; and that it is impossible thus to argue, +respecting the laws of him who is infinite in holiness and boundless in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> +wisdom. He cannot but acknowledge that a universe governed in such a +manner would run into irremediable confusion and anarchy; and will find +it impossible, on any principle which human reasoning can furnish, to +arrive at any other decision than this,—that the Judge of all the earth +must be unchanging in his purposes, and impartial in his justice.</p> + +<p>To this conclusion we are led by the clearest inductions of moral +science;—but, at this momentous point, philosophy fails us. No human +power can find a refuge, to which the mind can betake itself under a +sense of guilt;—no human wisdom can answer the inquiry of mighty +import, can God be just and yet justify the ungodly. But here we are met +by a light from heaven, which has burst upon the scene of doubt and of +darkness; and are called to bring down the pride of our reason, in +humble submission to the testimony of God. It comes supported by a +weight of evidence, which challenges the cordial assent of the most +acute understanding, and the power of which will be best appreciated by +those, who, with sincere desire for truth, have made the high<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span>est +attainments in the laws of rigid inquiry. It discloses an atonement made +for sin,—and an influence from heaven, calculated to restore the moral +being to the purity in which it was formed. It thus meets alike the +necessities of man, as in a state of actual guilt, and a state of moral +degradation. For the one, it displays a scheme of mercy in which the +integrity of the divine character is vindicated, while pardon is +extended to transgressors. To the other, it offers power from heaven, +which will correct the disorders of the moral constitution, and raise +the man anew to the likeness of God. It thus forms a harmonious whole, +uniform and consistent in itself,—worthy of the character of God,—and +adapted to the condition of man; and, to every one who feels his own +moral necessities, and estimates the purity of the Deity, it brings an +absolute conviction of its truth.</p> + +<p>A participation in the benefits of this revelation of divine mercy is +said, in the sacred writings, to be received by Faith; and this +expression has given rise to controversies and contending systems, which +have involved the subject in much perplexity. While some have restricted +the opera<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span>tion of Faith to the mere belief of a certain system of +opinions, others have referred to it a series of mysterious impressions, +and enthusiastic feelings, at variance with every dictate of sound +reasoning. The principle of faith, however, holds so prominent a place +in the scheme of Christian truth, that some clear notions respecting its +nature must be felt to be of the highest interest. It holds also, as we +have formerly seen, a most important position in the philosophy of the +moral feelings,—being that mental operation, by which we receive a +certain class of truths, of the utmost consequence to us as responsible +beings. It is a process which every one feels, but which cannot be +defined;—and it can be illustrated only by tracing its influence, in +regard to those objects to which it is more particularly directed.</p> + +<p>The objects of faith are twofold,—truths addressed to the +understanding,—and benefits offered or promised. We have formerly had +occasion to trace the action of faith in regard to truth,—especially a +class of truths which are calculated, when really believed, to exert a +powerful effect upon our moral feelings and conduct. Its opera<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span>tion, we +have seen, is to bring these truths before us in such a manner, that +they exert the same kind of influence as if the facts or events were +objects of sense. The man who believes these truths, so as thus +habitually to feel then power, is he who receives them in faith. This is +the province of faith in regard to truth;—we have next to analyze its +operation in regard to offered or promised benefits,—and this we can +best do by means of an example.</p> + +<p>Let us take the illustration of a man affected with a disease supposed +to be mortal;—he is told that a remedy has been discovered of +infallible efficacy; and that a person is at hand who is ready to +administer it. Does he perceive his danger;—does he believe the virtue +of the remedy;—does he confide in the sincerity of the individual who +offers it;—this is faith. The immediate and natural result of his faith +is, that he asks for the remedy which is offered;—and this result is +inseparable from such belief, according to the uniform sequence of +volitions in every sound mind. The man who professes to admit the facts, +and does not shew such a result of belief, professes what he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> does not +actually feel. If he perceives not the extent of his danger, he asks not +the remedy, because he values it not;—and the same effect may follow, +if he doubts either its efficacy, or the sincerity of him who offers it. +In this case, it is also to be observed, that a reflection is thrown +upon the character of this individual, by imputing to him an offer of +what he has either not the power or the intention to perform. But if the +man really believes the truths, he applies for the remedy; and he +receives it. Thus his faith saves him, because by means of it he bought +the offered aid. Could we suppose him merely to admit the facts, without +asking the remedy, his belief would avail him nothing.</p> + +<p>Such appeals to be the simple view we are to take of Faith, when we +apply it to the great benefits which are presented to us in the +Christian revelation. This is addressed to us as beings in a state both +of guilt and of depravity; and as having no means of our own, by which +we can rescue ourselves from condemnation and impurity. It unfolds a +dispensation of peace, by which, in perfect consistency with the harmony +of his char<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span>acter, the Deity offers mercy and forgiveness,—and an +influence from himself which has power to purify the moral being. These +benefits are conferred on every one who believes; and who is he that +believes:—the man who is convinced of his guilt, and perceives his +impurity;—who feels his inability to rescue himself;—who admits the +efficacy of the remedy, and confides in the sincerity with which it is +offered;—this is he who believes. His faith saves him; because, acting +on his conviction, according to the uniform sequence of volitions in +every sound mind, he asks the promised aid, and asking receives it. Much +of the confusion, in which the subject has been involved, appears to +have arisen from metaphysical refinements, by which the various parts of +this mental process are separated from each other. They form one +harmonious whole, which cannot be broken. The man will not seek the +remedy, who believes not its efficacy, and perceives not his moral +necessities; but, however he may profess to admit these facts, if he +follows not out his belief to its natural result, by applying for the +remedy, his mere belief will not profit him. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> grounds, on which +these truths are addressed to us, are contained in that chain of +evidence on which is founded the whole system of Christianity,—taken +along with the conviction, which every man receives of his actual moral +condition, from the voice of conscience within. A sense of the sincerity +of the offer we derive from our impression of the unchangeable +attributes of the Deity. Accordingly, he who believes is said to give +glory to God,—that is, to receive his statements with absolute +confidence, and to form an honourable conception of the sincerity of his +intentions. He who believes not, rejects the statements of the Almighty +as false,—and treats him with the contempt which we apply to one whom +we suppose to promise what he has no intention to bestow. The man who +comes to God, with the hope of acceptance, is therefore required to come +in the assurance of faith, or an implicit conviction that he is sincere +in his intentions of bestowing the blessings which he offers; and +whosoever has not this assurance does dishonour to the divine +character,—or "maketh God a liar."</p> + +<p>It were vain to enter upon the various systems<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> and opinions, in which +this important doctrine has been misrepresented by its enemies, and +often perverted by those who profess to be its friends. Two of these may +be briefly noticed. Some have maintained that the doctrine of an +unconditional pardon sets aside the obligations of morality,—because it +has no regard to the personal character of the individual,—or holds out +the offer of acceptance to faith, without obedience. Others contend that +an essential part of faith is an immediate and absolute assurance of a +man's own acceptance in the sight of the Deity; and that he who has not +this is in a state of unbelief. These two opinions, so different from +each other, are equally founded upon misconception of the nature and +provisions of the Christian economy.</p> + +<p>In regard to the former, it is only necessary to remark, that the +revelation of Christian truth is not confined to an offer of pardon to +the guilty;—its great object is the recovery and purification of the +moral being; and there is an essential and inviolable union between +these two parts of the great scheme of redemption. It provides in the +most effectual manner for the interests of morality, by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> the +purification of the desires and affections, the springs of action;—it +is the morality of the heart. It proclaims a system of morals, more pure +and more exalted far than ever was contemplated by the wisest of +men;—it exhibits an example of the perfect state of a moral being, in +the character of the Messiah;—and it enforces the imitation of this +example as indispensable in every one who professes to be his disciple. +These different parts of the scheme can never be separated, and there +cannot be a greater perversion of reasoning, or a greater misconception +of the prominent features of the gospel of peace, than to allege that it +does not provide, in the most effectual manner, for the highest +interests of morality.</p> + +<p>The other opinion is equally founded upon error,—namely, that which +considers it essential to faith, that a man be assured of his personal +acceptance in the sight of the Deity. It is obvious that this is a +sophism clearly opposed to sound reasoning, and to the first principles +of the philosophy of the moral feelings. For faith, viewed as a mental +process, must always have for its object facts; and these facts must +rest upon such evidence, as is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> sufficient to convince the understanding +of their truth. To talk of faith, without such facts and such evidence, +is a mere logical fallacy, or an absurdity in terms. But there is no +disclosure of the personal acceptance of any individual, and +consequently, on no principle of sound reasoning can this ever be +considered as the object of faith. This doctrine, therefore, applies a +most important principle of the mind, not to facts, which alone can +warrant the exercise of faith, but to a vision of the imagination, which +admits of no evidence, and cannot be subjected to any test of its truth.</p> + +<p>Widely different from all such flimsy and imaginary hypotheses is the +great system of Christian truth,—harmonious and consistent in itself, +and challenging the approbation of the soundest understanding. It +reveals, as we have seen, a dispensation of mercy, in accordance with +the highest ideas we can form of the divine perfections. It is supported +by a chain of evidence, which carries conviction to the mind of the most +rigid inquirer; and thus it is a sound and legitimate object of faith. +It reveals also a provision for purifying the moral nature; and this in +every case<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> accompanies the dispensation of mercy to those who receive +it. The effects of this powerful agency, therefore, become the test and +the evidence of the reality of faith. Does a man seek a proof of his +acceptance,—the reference is to facts in his own moral condition. He is +to look for it in a change which is taking place in his character,—a +new direction of his desires,—a new regulation of his affections,—a +habitual impression, to which he was a stranger before, of the presence +and the perfections of the Deity—and a new light which has burst upon +his view, respecting his relations to this life and to that which is to +come. He is to seek this evidence in a mind, which aims at no lower +standard than that which will bear the constant inspection of infinite +purity;—he is to seek it, and to manifest it to others, in a spirit +which takes no lower pattern than that model of perfection,—the +character of the Messiah. These acquirements, indeed, are looked upon, +not as a ground of acceptance, but a test of moral condition; not as, in +any degree, usurping the place of the great principle of faith, but as +its fruits and evidences. As these, then, are the only proofs of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> +reality of this principle, so they are the only basis on which a man can +rest any sound conviction of his moral aspect in the sight of the +Deity;—and that system is founded on delusion and falsehood, which, in +this respect, holds out any other ground of confidence than the +purification of the heart, and a corresponding harmony of the whole +character. Such attainment, indeed, is not made at once, nor is it ever +made in a full and perfect manner in the present state of being; but, +where the great principle has been fixed within, there is a persevering +effort, and a uniform contest, and a continual aspiration after +conformity to the great model of perfection. Each step that a man gains +in this progress serves to extend his view of the high pattern to which +his eye is steadily directed; and, as his knowledge of it is thus +enlarged, he is led by comparison to feel more and more deeply his own +deficiency. It thus produces increasing humility, and an increasing +sense of his own imperfection, and causes him continually to feel, that, +in this warfare, he requires a power which is not in man. But he knows +also that this is provided, as an essential part of the great system on +which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> his hope is established. Amid much weakness, therefore, and many +infirmities, his moral improvement goes forward. Faint and feeble at +first, as the earliest dawn of the morning, it becomes brighter and +steadier as it proceeds in its course, and, "as the shining light, +shineth more and more unto the perfect day."</p> + + +<h4>THE END.</h4> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Byron's Letters, Moore's Life, Vol. II, p. 581.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Lecture on the Theory of Moral Obligation. Oxford, 1830.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See this subject eloquently argued in Dr. Chalmers' +Bridgewater Treatise.</p></div></div> + +<p class="center">EDINBURGH: Printed by Balfour and Jack, Niddry Street.</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, by +John Abercrombie + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL FEELINGS *** + +***** This file should be named 22364-h.htm or 22364-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/2/3/6/22364/ + +Produced by Thierry Alberto, Janet Blenkinship and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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