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diff --git a/22021.txt b/22021.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e3f840 --- /dev/null +++ b/22021.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12140 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2, by Ian Hamilton + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2 + +Author: Ian Hamilton + +Release Date: July 9, 2007 [EBook #22021] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GALLIPOLI DIARY, VOLUME 2 *** + + + + +Produced by Suzanne Shell, Janet Blenkinship and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + GALLIPOLI DIARY + + BY GENERAL + + SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B. + + AUTHOR OF "A STAFF OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK," ETC. + + WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS + + IN TWO VOLUMES + VOL. II + + NEW YORK + GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY + 1920 + + PRINTED BY + UNWIN BROTHERS, LTD.--WOKING--ENGLAND + + + * * * * * + + +[Illustration: _"Central News" phot._ + +BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN AND FREDDIE MAITLAND] + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + XIII. K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 1 + + XIV. THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY 25 + + XV. SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 52 + + XVI. KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 86 + + XVII. THE LAST BATTLE 120 + + XVIII. MISUNDERSTANDINGS 144 + + XIX. THE FRENCH PLAN 163 + + XX. LOOS AND SALONIKA 196 + + XXI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 234 + + APPENDIX I. STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL + SIR H. S. BAIKIE 279 + + APPENDIX II. NOTES BY LIEUT.-COL. C. ROSENTHAL RELATING + TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC 292 + + APPENDIX III. SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS RELATING + TO THE SUVLA OPERATIONS 298 + + APPENDIX IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GEN. H. DE LISLE 335 + + INDEX 339 + + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + + + BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN, AND FREDDIE MAITLAND _Frontispiece_ + + FACING PAGE + + MAJOR-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. 6 + + LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. G. HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O 22 + + SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR 54 + + GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, BART., G.C.M.G., K.C.B. 80 + + LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. 84 + + GENERAL BAILLOUD 146 + + FISH FROM THE ENEMY 170 + + MARSHAL LIMAN VON SANDERS 182 + + CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD 256 + + + MAP + + SUVLA AND ANZAC _At end of Volume_ + + + * * * * * + + ++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +|Transcriber's Note: Some tables were too wide to place as in the | +|original. They have been split, with the right hand side positioned| +|directly below the left hand side. | ++-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + * * * * * + + +GALLIPOLI DIARY + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY + + +_11th July, 1915._ Worked in my office from early morning till 12.45. +The whole scheme for to-morrow's attack is cut and dried, according to +our cloth: time tables fixed and every round counted. + +Freddy Stopford and his Staff turned up from Mudros. Stopford in very +good form. The first thing he did was to deliver himself of a personal +message from Lord K. He (Stopford) wrote it down, in the ante-room, the +moment he left the presence and I may take it as being as good as +verbatim. Here it is:-- + + "Lord Kitchener told me to tell you he had no wish to interfere + with the man on the spot, but from closely watching our actions + here, as well as those of General French in Flanders, he is certain + that the only way to make a real success of an attack is by + surprise. Also, that when the surprise ceases to be operative, in + so far that the advance is checked and the enemy begin to collect + from all sides to oppose the attackers, then, perseverance becomes + merely a useless waste of life. In every attack there seems to be a + moment when success is in the assailant's grasp. Both the French + and ourselves at Arras and Neuve Chapelle lost the opportunity." + +Well said! K. has made Stopford bring me in his pocket the very text for +what I wanted to say to him. Only my grumbling thoughts find expression +by my pen but I have plenty of others and my heart has its warm corner +for K. whenever he cares to come in. + +As I told Stopford, K. has not only anticipated my advice but has dived +right down into this muddle of twentieth century war and finds lying at +the bottom of it only the old original idea of war in the year 1. At our +first landing the way was open to us for just so long as the _surprise_ +to the Turks lasted. That period here, at the Dardanelles, might be +taken as being perhaps twice as long as it would be on the Western front +which gave us a great pull. The reason was that land communications were +bad and our troops on the sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on +their one or two bad roads. Yet, even so, there was no margin for +dawdling. Hunter-Weston and d'Amade had tried their best to use their +brief _surprise_ breathing space in seizing the Key to the opening of +the Narrows--Achi Baba, and had failed through lack of small craft, lack +of water, lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our 10 per +cent. reserves to fill casualties. At that crucial moment when we had +beaten the local enemy troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet +come up, we could not get the men or the stuff quick enough to shore. +Still, we had gained three or four miles and there were spots on the +Peninsula where, to-day, three or four miles would be enough. Also, +supposing he had to run a landing, his (Stopford's) action would take +place under much easier conditions than Hunter-Weston's on April 25th. + +First and foremost, in our "beetles" or barges, conveying 500 men under +their own engines, we had an instrument which reduced the physical +effort three quarters. This meant half the battle. When we made our +original landing at Anzac we could only put 1,500 men ashore, per trip, +at a speed of 2-1/2 miles per hour, in open cutters. Were a Commander to +repeat that landing now, he would be able to run 5,000 men ashore, per +trip, at a speed of five miles per hour with no trouble about oars, +tows, etc., and with protection against shrapnel and rifle bullets. As +to the actual landing on the beach, that could be done--we had proved +it--in less than one quarter of the time. Each beetle had a "brow" fixed +on to her bows; a thing to be let down like a drawbridge over which the +men could pour ashore by fours; the same with mules, guns, supplies, +they could all be rushed on land as fast as they could be handled on the +beaches. Secondly, we had already been for some time at work to fix up +the wherewithal to meet our chronic nightmare, the water trouble. +Thirdly, the system of bringing up food and ammunition from the beaches +to the firing line had now been practically worked out into a science at +Helles and Anzac where Stopford would be given a chance of studying it +at first hand. + +As to place, date, command, and distribution of forces, these were still +being considered; still undetermined; and I could say no more at +present. Braithwaite was away at Helles but, if he would go over to the +General Staff, he would find Aspinall, my G.S. (1), and the Q. Staff who +would give him the hang of our methods and post him in matters which +would be applicable to any date or place. + +There was more in this message as taken down by Stopford. After going +into some details of trench warfare, K.'s message went on:-- + + * * * * * + +"It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian Hamilton should make +partial attacks. They (the Cabinet) consider it preferable that he +should await the arrival of his reinforcements to make one great effort, +which, if successful, will give them the ridge commanding the Narrows. +It is not intended, however, that Sir Ian should do nothing in the +meantime and if he gets a really good opportunity he is to seize it." + +There is something in this reminds me of Kuropatkin's orders to +Stakelberg, yet I am glad to find that our spontaneously generated +scheme jumps with the views of the Cabinet, for, there is only one +"ridge commanding the Narrows" (Kilid Bahr is a plateau), and it is that +ridge we mean to try for by "one great effort." + +In my reply I shall merely acknowledge. Sari Bair is my secret; my Open +Sesame to the cave where the forty thieves of the Committee of Union +and Progress have their Headquarters. It makes me uneasy to think the +Cabinet are talking about Sari Bair. + +A battle is a swirl of "ifs" and "ands." The Commander who enters upon +it possessed by some just and clear principle is like a sailing ship +entering a typhoon on the right tack. After that he lives from hand to +mouth. How far will wise saws cut ice? How much nearer do you get to +shooting a snipe by being _told_ how not to take your aim? Well thought +out plans and preparations deserve to win; order and punctuality on the +part of subordinates tend to make the reality correspond to the General +Staff conception; surprise, if the Commander can bring it off, is worth +all K. can say of it; the energy and rapidity of the chosen troops will +exploit that surprise for its full value--bar, always, Luck--the Joker; +and Wish to Fight and Will to Win are the surest victory getters in the +pack. The more these factors are examined, the more sure it is that +everything must in the last resort depend upon the _executive_ +Commander; and here, of course, I am referring to an _enterprise_, not +to a huge, mechanically organized dead-lock like the western front. + +Stopford was away in G.H.Q. Staff tents all afternoon; afterwards both +he and Adderley, his A.D.C., dined. Stopford likes Reed who is, indeed, +a very pleasant fellow to work with. Still, I stick to what I wrote +Wolfe Murray:--the _combination_ of Stopford and Reed is not good; not +for this sort of job. + +_12th July, 1915. Imbros._ Had meant to start for Helles an hour before +daylight to witness the opening of the attack by the French Corps and +the Lowland Division. But am too bad with the universal complaint to +venture many yards from camp. + +Stopford and Staff breakfasted. He has fallen in love with our ideas. +After lunch he and his party left for Mudros. Am forcing myself to write +so as to ease the strain of waiting: the battle is going on: backwards +and forwards--backwards and forwards--I travel between my tent; the +signal station, and the G.S. map tent. + +A delightful message from K., thanking me for my letters: patting me on +the back; telling me that Altham is coming out to run the +communications, and Ellison to serve on my Staff. + +Thank heavens we are at last to have a business man at the head of our +business! As to Ellison, K.'s conscience has for long been smiting him +for not having let me take my own C.G.S. with me in the first instance. +But Braithwaite has won his spurs now in many a hair-raising crisis, so +K. may let his mind rest at ease. + +[Illustration: MAJ.-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. _F.A. Swaine phot._] + +Freddie Maitland and I dined with the Vice-Admiral who kept a signaller +on special watch for my messages from the shore--but nothing came in. +He, the Admiral, wants to take all the 600 stokers serving in the Royal +Naval Division back to the ships. This will be the last straw to the +Division. We had the treat of being taken off the _Triad_ in the +Admiral's racing motor boat and when we got ashore found good news which +I have just cabled home:-- + + * * * * * + +"In the southern section we attacked at daylight to-day with our right +and right centre. After heavy fighting lasting all day the troops +engaged, namely, the French Corps and the LIInd Lowland Division, have +succeeded in carrying the two strongly held and fortified lines of +Turkish trenches opposite to them. The ground covered by the advance +varies in depth from 200 to 400 yards, and if we can maintain our gains +against to-night's counter-attacks the effect of the action will be not +only to advance but greatly to strengthen our line. Full details +to-morrow." + +_13th July, 1915. Imbros._ Still feeling very slack. Nothing clear from +Helles. My cable best explains:-- + + * * * * * + +"Troops have been continuously engaged since my last cable, but +situation is still too confused to admit of definition, especially as +telephone wires all cut by shell or rifle fire. + +"So far as can be gathered the sum total of the engagements taking place +in a labyrinth of trenches is satisfactory up to the hour of cabling and +we have taken some 200 prisoners. I hope I shall be able to send +definite news to-morrow morning." + +Oh, energy, to what distant clime have you flown? I used to be +energetic; not perhaps according to Evelyn Wood's standards--but +still--energetic! Yet, see me to-day, when a poor cousin to the +cholera--this cursed enteritis--lays me by the heels; fills me with +desperate longing to lie down and do nothing but rest. More than half my +Staff and troops are in the same state of indescribable slackness and +this, I think, must be the reason the Greeks were ten long years taking +Troy. + +Some newspaper correspondents have arrived. I have told them they may do +whatever they d--d well please. Ashmead-Bartlett is vexed at his +monopoly being spoiled. Charlie Burn, who came with the King's bag, +lunched. The Vice-Admiral, Roger Keyes, and Flag-Lieutenant Bowlby +dined; very good of them to leave their own perfectly appointed table +for our rough and ready fare. The A.D.C.s between them managed to get +some partridges, opulent birds which lent quite a Ritzian tone to our +banquet. + +As was expected, the Turks counter-attacked heavily last night but were +unable to drive us out except in one small section on our right. To-day, +fighting is still going on and the Naval Division are in it now. We have +made a good gain and taken over 400 prisoners and a machine gun. We are +still on the rack, though, as there are a lot of Turks not yet cleared +out from holes and corners of our new holding, and ammunition is running +very short. If our ammunition does not run out altogether and we can +hold what we have, our total gain will be 500 yards depth. + +Since June 4th, when we had to whang off the whole of our priceless 600 +rounds of H.E., we have had _none_ for 18-prs. on the Peninsula--not one +solitary demnition round; nor do we seem in the least likely to get one +solitary demnition round. Hunter-Weston and his C.R.A. explain forcibly, +not to say explosively, that on the 28th June the right attack would +have scored a success equally brilliant to that achieved by the 29th +Division on our left, had we been able to allot as many shell to the +Turkish trenches assaulted by the 156th Brigade--Lowland Division--as we +did to the sector by the sea. But we could not, because, once we had +given a fair quota to the left, there was not enough stuff in our +lockers for the right. Such is war! No use splitting the difference and +trying to win everywhere like high brows halting between Flanders and +Gallipoli. But I _am_ sick at heart, I must say, to think my brother +Scots should have had to catch hold of the hot end of the poker. Also to +think that, with another couple of hundred rounds, we should have got +and held H. 12. H. 12 which dominates--so prisoners say--the wells +whence the enemy draws water for the whole of his right wing. + +To-day the old trouble is a-foot once again. Hunter-Weston tells us the +Turkish counter-attacks are being pressed with utmost fury and are +beginning to look ugly, as we can give our infantry no support from our +guns although the enemy offer excellent artillery targets. When K. is +extra accommodating it is doubly hard to be importunate, but it's got to +be done:-- + + * * * * * + +_General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener._ + +"With reference to my telegrams No. M.F. 328 of 13th June and No. M.F. +381 of 28th June. Each successive fight shows more clearly than the last +how much may hang on an ample supply of ammunition, more especially high +explosive howitzer ammunition. In my telegram No. M.F. 381 I said that I +hoped we might be able to achieve success with the ammunition already +promised, and I adhere to that opinion; but every additional 100 rounds +means some reduction of risks and greater assurance of success. I raise +this question again because I gather from what I hear that matters in +the other theatre of operations may possibly be at a standstill without +much prospect of any vital alteration before the autumn fairly sets in. +If this should be the case it is for you to consider whether a larger +and more regular supply of ammunition should be sent to me in order to +give this force the utmost chance of gaining an early success. Judging +from the increased effect of the bombardments before the last two +attacks on facilitating the Infantry advance I am led to hope that this +success would not be long delayed under the cumulative effect of +unremitting bombardment. If, therefore, any change in the general +situation should make it possible to allow me temporary preferential +claim to all the ammunition I should like, I would ask for the following +amounts to be here by 1st August, in addition to those accompanying the +troops and already promised, namely, 4.5-inch howitzer, 3,000 rounds; +5-inch howitzer, 7,000 rounds; 6-inch howitzer, 5,000, and 9.3-inch +howitzer, 500 rounds, all high explosive. I should also ask for a +monthly supply on the following scale, first consignment to arrive +before 15th August:-- + + "18-pr. 300,000 + "4.5-inch howitzer 30,000 + "5-inch howitzer 30,000 + "6-inch howitzer 24,000 + "60-pr. 15,000 + "9.2-inch howitzer 6,000 + +"The howitzer ammunition to be all high explosive, the 60-pr. to be +one-third shrapnel and two-thirds high explosive, and the 18-pr. to be +half of each. + +"The above monthly scale includes ammunition for the following +additional ordnance which I should like to get, namely, two batteries of +4.5-inch howitzers for each of the Xth and XIth Divisions (since 5-inch +howitzers are found to be too inaccurate to bombard the enemy trenches +even in close proximity to our own), one battery of 6-inch howitzers and +four 9.2-inch howitzers. + +"On the assumption already made it might be possible for you to arrange +to forward to Ordnance Stores, Marseilles, the ammunition asked for to +be here by 1st August. Time would thus be gained to accumulate the +supply required, and I could arrange with the Vice-Admiral to send a +fast steamer of 1,000 tons hold capacity to bring the consignment of +high explosives from Marseilles. To get the steamer coaled, to arrive at +Marseilles, coal again and be ready to receive the ammunition, would +take seven days. + +"Please understand that this suggestion is only prompted for the +following reasons: (1) My growing belief that ample artillery might, +within a limited period, lead to quite a considerable success in this +theatre, and (2) because the reports which reach me seem to indicate +that an offensive is not likely to be undertaken elsewhere at present +(and I have mainly asked for offensive ammunition). + +"The monthly supply above detailed I should not expect would be required +for more than two months." + +If our Government really--whole-heartedly--_will_ that there should be a +complete success in the East, they must, equally, with whole hearts and +braced-up _will_, resist (for a while) the idea of any offensive in the +West. In saying this I speak of the A.B.C. of war. The main theatre is +where the amphibious power wishes to make it so. This cable of mine sent +to a man like Lord K. is a very strong order. But now is the time to +speak up and let him realize that he must let the fields of France lie +fallow for the summer if he wishes to plough the Black Sea waves in +autumn. + +_14th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote letters in the morning, and in the +evening went for a ride to the Salt Lake and there inspected the new +aeroplane camp on the far side of the water. + +Last night more counter-attacks, all driven off. The French right is now +actually on the mouth of the Kereves Dere where it runs into the sea. We +have made about 500 prisoners and have captured a machine gun. +Hunter-Weston had to transfer the command of the 52nd Division, +temporarily, to Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division. + +Baikie is crying out to us for shells as if _we_ were bottling them up! +There are none. + + +_15th July, 1915. Imbros._ The answer has come in from the War +Office:--the answer, I mean, to mine of the day before yesterday in +which it is suggested that _if_ our rich brethren were off their feed +for the moment, some crumbs of high explosive might be spared:-- + + * * * * * + +"We have great difficulty in sending you the amounts of ammunition +mentioned in our No. 5770, cipher, and even now the proportion of 18-pr. +high explosive will be less than stated therein. In response, however, +to your No. M.F. 444, we are adding 1,000 rounds 4.5-inch, 500--5-inch, +500--6-inch and 75--9.2-inch. It will be quite impossible to continue to +send you ammunition at this rate, as we have reduced the supply to +France in order to send what we have to you, and the amounts asked for +in the second part of your telegram could not be spared without stopping +all operations in France. This, of course, is out of the question." + +"This, of course, is out of the question." "Stopping all operations in +France" is the very kernel of the question. If half the things we hear +about the Bosche forces and our own are half true, we have no prospect +of dealing any decisive blow in the West till next spring. And an +indecisive blow is worse than no blow. But we can _hold on_ there till +all's blue. Now H.E. is offensive and shrapnel is defensive. I ought to +attack at once; French mustn't. Therefore, we should be given, _now_, +dollops of H.E. + +This talk does not come through my hat. Some of the best brains on the +Western field are in touch with those of some of my following here. The +winning post stares us in the face; my old Chief gallops off the course; +how can I resist calling out? And then I get this "of course" cable (not +written by K. I feel sure) which shows, if it shows anything, that "of +course" we ought never to have come here at all! Simple, is it not? In +war all is simple--that's why it's so complex. Never mind; my cable has +not been wasted. We reckon the 1,100 extra rounds it has produced may +save us 100 British casualties. + +Rode over to "K" Beach and inspected the 25th Casualty Clearing Station, +Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie. Walked through the different +hospital wards talking to some twenty officers and two hundred men; +mostly medical cases. Did not think things at all up to the mark. Made +special note of the lack of mosquito nets, beds, pyjamas and other +comforts. For weeks past Jean has been toiling to get mosquito nets +bought and made up, which was simple, and to get them out to us, which +seems impossible. Too bad when so much money is being spent to see men +lying on the ground in their thick cord breeches in this sweltering +heat, a prey to flies and mosquitoes. + +Discussing the landing of the New Divisions in Suvla Bay and the +diversion to be made by Legge on the right by storming Lone Pine, +Birdwood makes it clear in a letter just to hand, that he has told his +two Divisional Generals everything. I had not yet gone into some of +these details with Hunter-Weston, Stopford or Bailloud, all Corps +Commanders, for I am afraid of the news filtering down to the juniors +and from them, in the mysterious way news does pass, to the rank and +file of both services. Thence to the Turks is but a step. Were the Turks +to get wind of our plan, there would be nothing for it but to change the +whole thing, even now, at the eleventh hour. + +Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Fuller, my late G.S.O. (1) in the Central +Force, came over to lunch. He is now G.S.O. (2) of the 9th Corps. + +At 5.30 p.m. rode over to "K" Beach for the second time and inspected +the Indian Brigade under Brigadier-General Cox. They had to be pulled +out some time ago and given a rest. On parade were the 5th, 6th and 10th +Gurkha Battalions with the 14th Sikhs. Walked down both lines and +chatted with the British and Indian Officers. The men looked cheerful +and much recovered. In the evening Charlie Burn, King's Messenger, and +Captain Glyn came to dinner. Glyn has been sent out as a sort of +emissary, but whether by K. or by the Intelligence or by the Admiralty +neither Braithwaite nor I are quite able to understand. + +Cabled the War Office _insisting_ that the lack of ammunition is +"disturbing." Also, that "half my anxieties would vanish" if only the +Master-General of Ordnance would see to it himself that the fortnightly +allowance could be despatched regularly. I could hardly put it stronger. + +_Midnight._--Just back from G.S. tent with the latest. So far, so good. +Bailloud and Hunter-Weston have carried two lines of Turkish trenches, +an advance of two to four hundred yards. But the ammunition question has +reached a crisis, and has become dangerous--very dangerous. On the whole +Southern theatre of operations, counting shell in limbers and shell +loaded in guns, we have 5,000 rounds of shrapnel. No high explosive--and +fighting is still going on! + + _Hi jaculis illi certant defendere saxis._ + +To whomsoever of my ancestors bequeathed me my power of detachment deep +salaams! How many much better men than myself would not close their eyes +to-night with a battle on the balance and 5,000 rounds wherewith to +fight it? But I shall sleep--D.V.; I can't create shell by taking +thought any more than Gouraud could retake the _Haricot_ by not drinking +his coffee. + +_16th July, 1915. Imbros._ Forcing myself to work though I feel +unspeakably slack; wrangling with the War Office about doctors, nurses, +orderlies and ships for our August battles. A few days ago I sent the +following cable and they want to cut us down:-- + + * * * * * + +"It seems likely that during the first week of August we may have 80,000 +rifles in the firing line striving for a decisive result, and therefore +certain that we shall then need more medical assistance. Quite +impossible to foresee casualties, but suppose, for example, we suffered +a loss of 20,000 men; though the figure seems alarming when put down in +cold blood, it is not an extravagant proportion when calculated on basis +of Dardanelles fighting up to date. If this figure is translated into +terms of requirements such a battle would involve conversion of, say, 30 +transports into temporary hospital ships, and necessitate something like +200 extra medical officers, with Royal Army Medical Corps rank and file +and nurses in proportion. If my prognosis is concurred in, these should +reach Mudros on or about 1st August. Some would D.V., prove superfluous, +and could be sent back at once, and in any case they could return as +soon as possible after operations, say, 1st September. Medical and +surgical equipment, drugs, mattresses in due proportion. In a separate +message I will deal with the deficiencies in ordinary establishment, but +I think it best to keep this cable as to specified and exceptional +demands distinct." + +_17th July, 1915. Imbros._ After lunch felt so sick of scribble, +scribble, scribble whilst adventure sat seductive upon my doorstep that +I fluttered forth. At 2 o'clock boarded H.M.S. _Savage_ +(Lieutenant-Commander Homer) and, with Aspinall and Freddie, steered for +Gully Beach. We didn't cast anchor but got into a cockleshell of a small +dinghy and rowed ashore under the cliffs, where we were met by de Lisle. +Along the beach men were either bathing or basking mother-naked on the +hot sand--enjoying themselves thoroughly. I walked on the edge of the +sea, as far as the point which hides the gully's mouth from the Turkish +gunners, and was specially struck by the physique and class of the 6th +East Lancashires under Colonel Cole Hamilton. Then mounted and rode to +the Headquarters of General Shaw, commanding the 13th (new) Division. +Shaw was feeling his wounds; he had already been once round his lines; +so I would not let him come again. But Colonel Gillivan, G.S.O.1, Major +Hillyard, G.S.O.2, Captain Jackson, G.S.O.3, Colonel Burton, A.A. and +Q.M.G., joined us. First we went to the Headquarters of the 39th Brigade +commanded by Brigadier-General Cayley (the Brigade Major is Captain +Simpson). Then I went and looked at the trenches J.11-12-13, where I met +Colonel Palmer of the 9th Warwicks, Colonel Jordan, D.S.O., of the 7th +Gloucesters, Colonel Nunn of the 9th Worcesters, Colonel Andrews of the +7th North Staffordshires. We tramped through miles of trenches. The men +were very fit and cheery. It was the day when they were relieving one +another by companies from the reserve and there was a big crowd in the +Ravine. De Lisle told me that one week had made the most astonishing +difference to the savvy of these first arrivals of the New Army. At +first there was confusion, loss of energy and time; by the end of the +week they had picked up the wrinkles of the veterans. There was a good +lot of shelling from the Turks but, humanly speaking, we were all quite +snug and safe in the big gully or moving down the deep communication +trenches. No one, not even the new 13th Division, paid the smallest +deference to the projectiles. + +Now began one of these semi-comic, semi-serious adventures which seem to +dog my footsteps. Just as I got into the little dinghy, two bluejackets +pulling and a Petty Officer steering, the Turks began to shell H.M.S. +_Savage_ as she lay about a hundred yards out. She did not like it, and, +instead of waiting to let us get aboard, Commander Homer thought it +wiser to sheer off about half a mile. When she quitted the Turks turned +their guns on to our cockleshell, and although none of the shot came +near us they still came quite near enough to interest the whole gallery +of some thousands of bathing Tommies who, themselves safe in the dead +ground under the cliff, were hugely amused to see their C.-in-C. having +a hot time of it. After ten minutes hard rowing we got close to the +destroyer and she, making a big circle at fairly high speed, came along +fast as if she was going to run us down, with the idea of baffling the +aim of the enemy. Not a bad notion as far as the destroyer was concerned +but one demanding acrobatic qualities of a very high order on the part +of the Commander-in-Chief. Anyway just as she was drawing abreast and I +was standing up to make my spring a shell hit her plump and burst in one +of her coal bunkers, sending up a big cloud of mixed smoke and black +coal dust. The Commander was beside himself. He waved us off furiously; +cracked on full steam and again left us in the lurch. We laughed till +the tears ran down our cheeks. Soon, we had reason to be more serious, +not to say pensive. The _Savage_ showed a pair of clean heels this time +and ran right away to Helles. So there we were, marooned, half a mile +out to sea, in a tiny dinghy on which the Turks again switched their +blarsted guns. The two bluejackets pulled themselves purple. They were +both of them fat reservists and the mingling of anxiety and exertion, +emotion and motion, made the sweat pour in torrents down their cheeks. +Each time a shell plunked into the water we brightened up; then, +gradually, until the next one splashed, our faces grew longer and +longer. At last we got so far away that the Turks gave us up in disgust. +How much I should like to see that battery commander's diary. +Altogether, by the time we had boarded the _Savage_, we had been in that +cursed little dinghy for just exactly one hour, of which I should think +we were being gently shelled for three quarters of an hour. On board the +destroyer no harm to speak of: only one man wounded. + +Cast anchor at Imbros at 9 p.m. General Legge and Captain H. Lloyd came +over to stay the night. Mail from England. + +Have cabled again to stir them up about the hospital ships. + +_18th July, 1915._ Church Parade. Inspected troops. Wrote in camp all +the afternoon. Walked out to the lighthouse in the evening and watched +the shells bursting over Gully Beach where we were yesterday. How often +have I felt anxious seeing these shrapnel through the telescope. On the +spot, as I know from yesterday's experience, their bark is worse than +their bite. Colonel Ward of the Intelligence came to dinner and Captain +Doughtie, commanding H.M.S. _Abercrombie_, paid me a visit. + +_19th July, 1915._ Too much office work. Mr. Schuler, an Australian +journalist and war correspondent, turned up. Seems a highly intelligent +young fellow. He had met me on tour in Australia. Gave him leave to go +anywhere and see everything. The Staff shake their heads, but the future +is locked away in our heads, and the more the past is known the better +for us. + +Braithwaite has heard from the War Office that the Brigade of Russians +which had started from Vladivostock to join us here has been +counter-ordered. The War Office seem rather pleased than otherwise that +this reinforcement has fallen through. Why, I can't imagine. As they are +sending us a big fresh force of Britishers, they probably persuade +themselves that 5,000 Russians would be more trouble than they are +worth, but they forget the many thousands of shortage in my present +formations. Since they fixed up to send me the new Divisions I must have +lost ten thousand rifles, but as all my old Divisions remain at the +Dardanelles _in name_, they are being regarded at home, we strongly +suspect, as a sort of widow's cruse, kept full by miracles instead of +men and still, therefore,--Divisions! + +In the evening the Vice-Admiral came over and we rode together down to +the Naval Seaplane Camp. The King's Messenger left at 5 p.m. + +_20th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote double quick, then galloped over to +Kephalos to see the New Army, _sub rosa_. The men we struck were A.1. +They belong to the 32nd and 34th Brigades of the 11th Division. The 33rd +has gone to Helles to get salted. + +Hunter-Weston is still staying with the Admiral. He has had a hard time +and a heavy responsibility and is quite worn out. I devoutly trust he +may be on his legs again ere long. Have put in Stopford to act for him +at Helles. This should teach the young idea how to shoot. With every +aspect of the command and administration of the Southern theatre of +operations thus under his immediate orders he has a rare chance of +learning how to do it and how not to do it. + +_21st July, 1915._--Just signed a letter to the Chief of the Imperial +General Staff and as it gives the run of my thoughts at the moment I +spatchcock the opening and final paras:-- + + * * * * * + +"My dear Wolfe Murray, + +"How do you manage to find time to write these charming letters of yours +with your own hand? They come like a gift from some oriental potentate +and carry with them the same moral obligations; i.e., that they ought to +be returned in kind. But to-day the time limit interposes, and I know +you will pardon me for once if I dictate. + +[Illustration: _F. A. Swaine phot._ LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. HUNTER-WESTON, +K.C.B., D.S.O.] + +"I am immensely interested in what you say with reference to the 29th +Division being below strength, namely, that we are getting short of men. +Well,--though one of the keenest voluntary service people existing, I +have always envisaged the fact that during a war we might be driven +to compulsion. Also in writing out fully my views on this subject (views +which I was not permitted by late Chiefs of the General Staff to +publish) I have always, for that reason, pressed for National +Registration. It does no one any harm, and rubs into the mind of the +young man that, under certain conditions, the State has first pull on +his pocket, labour, life and everything else. But, of course, if your +own wish that the 29th Division should take out 10 per cent. extra for +drafts (like the regiments do in France), had been carried into effect, +they would never have fallen as low as they actually did. + + * * * * * + +"Freddy Stopford and Reed have been staying with me for 24 hours, and +the former is now in command of the 8th Corps on the Peninsula, +Hunter-Weston having gone sick. He asked to stay with the Admiral for a +couple of days' rest, and the very moment he got safe on board ship the +overstrain of the past month told on him and he went down with a sharp +go of fever. I earnestly pray he will get right again quickly for there +are not many Commanders of his calibre. Freddy Stopford will now have a +good chance of getting the hang of this sort of fighting generally, +surrounded as he will be by Hunter-Weston's experienced Staff. After +sending my last letter I rather repented of one or two harsh things I +said about Reed. There is some truth in them, but I need not have said +them. I hope he will do very well out here." + +Now since that letter was written (yesterday) in comes a cable from K. +saying Winston can't leave England but that Hankey starts in his place. + +K. says he is sure I will give him every facility. + +A pretty stuffy cable in from the War Office on the Hospital ships and +medical personnel and material wrangle which is still going on. I, +personally, have checked every item of my estimate with closest personal +attention, although it took me hours in the midst of other very pressing +duties. This is not Braithwaite's pidgin but Woodward's and there was no +help for it. Our first landing found out a number of chinks in our +arrangements, and now, my Director of Medical Services is (quite +naturally) inclined to open his mouth as wide as if ships were drugs in +the market. So I have tried very hard, without too much help, to hit the +mean between extravagance and sufficiency. Now the War Office, who would +be the first to round on me if anything went wrong with my wounded, +query my demands as if we had just splashed off a cable asking for the +first things that came into our heads! + +I am all for thrift in ships, but thrift in the lives of my wounded +comes first; my conscience is clear and I have answered sticking to my +point,--firmly! They say the thing is impossible; I have retaliated by +saying it is imperative. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY + + +_22nd July, 1915. Imbros._ Had a jolly outing to-day. Left for Cape +Helles by trawler just before 10 o'clock. Aspinall, Bertier and young +Brodrick came with me. Lunched at 8th Army Corps Headquarters with +Stopford and handed him a first outline scheme of the impending +operations. We read it through together and he seems to take all the +points and to be in general agreement. Left Aspinall behind to explain +any questions of detail which might not seem clear, whilst I went a tour +of inspection through the Eski Lines of trenches held by the 6th and 7th +Manchesters of the 42nd Division. These Eski Lines were first held about +the 7th or 8th May and have since been worked up, mainly by the energy +of de Lisle, into fortifications, humanly speaking, impregnable. General +Douglas, Commander of the Division, came round with me. He reminds me +greatly of his brother, the late Chief of the Imperial General Staff; +excellent at detail; a conscientious, very hard worker. When I had seen +my Manchester friends I passed on into the Royal Naval Division Lines. +There General Paris convoyed me through his section as far as +Zimmerman's Farm, where I was joined by Bailloud with his Chief of Staff +and Chief of Operations. Together we made our way round the whole of +the French trenches winding up at de Tott's Battery. + +After this whopping walk, we left by pinnace from below de Tott's +wondering whether the Asiatic Batteries would think us game worth their +powder and shot. They did not and so we safely boarded our trawler at +Cape Helles. Didn't get back to Imbros Harbour till 9 p.m. Being so +late, boarded the ever hospitable _Triad_ on chance and struck, as +usual--hospitality. Hunter-Weston is really quite ill with fever. He did +not want to see anyone. As we were sitting at dinner I saw him through +the half open door staggering along on his way to get into a launch to +go aboard a Hospital ship. He is suffering very much from his head. The +doctors prophesy that he will pull round in about a week. I hope so +indeed, but I have my doubts. Aspinall reports that Stopford is entirely +in accord with our project and keen. + +_23rd July, 1915. Imbros._ Spent day in camp trying to straighten things +out: (1) the personal, (2) the strategical and (3) the administrative +arrangements. + +(1) Hunter-Weston has to go home and I have begged for Bruce Hamilton in +his place, and have told them I would have a great champion in him. He +and Smith-Dorrien were my best Brigadiers in South Africa. They stood on +my right hand and on my left all the way between Bloemfontein and +Pretoria, and I never quite made up my mind as to which was the better. +Bruce is a fighting man with an iron frame, and, in Gallipoli, his +chief crab, his deafness, will be rather a gain to him. + +(2) Bailloud, with his own War Minister in the background, is doing all +he knows to get 20,000 of my new troops allotted to a side show, not for +strategy's sake, but for the tactical relief of his troops from the +shelling. I quite sympathize with his reason as, after all, he is +responsible for his own troops and not for the larger issue. But, to +take one objection only, the Navy could not land a force at Besika Bay +and at the same time carry out landings at Suvla and Anzac. Again, since +Bailloud urged these views, the guns fixed up at de Tott's Battery have +already begun to gain mastery over the fire from the site of Troy. When +we have one of the new 14-inch gunned monitors moored off Rabbit Island +we shall get cross fire observations and give the Turkish Asiatic guns +the clean knock out. Amphibious operations are ticklish things: allied +operations are ticklish things: but the two together are like skating on +thin ice arm in arm with two friends who each want to cut a figure of +his own. + +(3) Slovenly bills of lading. Bertie Lawrence, who was sent to Mudros in +June when things were growing desperate, was here yesterday and has made +a report on the present business situation which, though less chaotic, +is still serious. There are not launches enough to enable people to get +about. There are not lighters enough to work the daily transhipment of +300 tons. But the worst trouble lies in the bills of lading. Sometimes +they arrive a week after their ships. Usually cargo shipped at Malta or +Alexandria is omitted. Half the time we can't lay hands on vital plant, +tackle, supplies, munitions, because we have no means of knowing what +is, or is not, on board some ship in the harbour. The trouble is of old +date but has reached its climax owing to our shortage of rounds for our +18-pounders. + +We were notified a new fuse key would be required for the new shells on +the 12th June. The shells arrived but the keys were not despatched till +the 15th July! The vouchers are all wrong, and there, in idleness, lies +the stuff that spells success. A soldier is not a conjurer that he +should be handed over a fully laden ship and told to ferret out a fuse +key. + +_24th July, 1915._ Last night the Turkish Commander drove his troops +into their tenth attack upon our extreme left where they were beaten off +as usual with a loss of several hundreds--this time we only suffered +about a dozen casualties. Together with Braithwaite, I rode over to "K" +Beach at 11 a.m. to inspect part of the 11th Division there encamped. +General Hammersley, Divisional Commander, met me. Also Colonel Malcolm, +his General Staff Officer and Major Duncan. The first Brigade I looked +at was Sitwell's--the 34th. A fine looking lot of men:-- + + 8th Northumberland Fusiliers, + 5th Dorsets, + 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, + 1 Coy. 11th Manchester Fusilers. + +Next I passed on to Haggard's Brigade--the 32nd. On parade were-- + + 9th West Yorkshires, + 6th Yorkshires, + 8th West Riding Regiment, + 6th York and Lancashires. + +Lastly I inspected the 67th and 68th Companies R.E. of the 134th +Fortress Company, as well as the Field Ambulance. Officers and men +looked splendid. I was glad indeed to be able to congratulate Hammersley +on his command. The doctors tell me, that, short as has been their stay, +a large number of the men are already infected by the prevalent disease. +Well, they don't look like that,--and it won't kill them that's certain, +for I have had it on me strong for the best part of two months. But it +knocks out the starch from its victims, and if fair play existed in +moonlit lands, every white man here should be credited with 25 per cent. +extra kudos for everything that he does with his brains or his body +under the shadow of this pestilence. + +Have got a reply from the War Office (Q.M.G.2) making light of my +shipping troubles and saying the War Office has always cabled full +advices. What can I say to that? As the lamb thought to himself when the +wolf began to growl. + +_25th July, 1915._ Spent most of the day in camp. Church Parade at 9 +a.m. Charles Lister came over from "K" Beach to lunch. He is a +fascinating creature and has made a name for himself with the Naval +Division, where standards are high, as being the keenest of the keen +and the bravest of the brave. Hammersley, Malcolm and Aitkin called in +the evening, but I had gone for a stroll and missed them. + +The great Turkish attack timed by all our spies for the 23rd has never +come off but, as showing the fine spirit which animates the Anzacs, it +is worth noting that on that day not one soul reported sick. They would +not go near the doctors for fear they might be made to miss a battle. + +Last night the French took a small trench, and though the Turks had a +dash at it in the morning, they were easily beaten off. Twice out of +three times we gain something when we fight and the third time we lose +no ground. + +Given, therefore, the factors of the problem, men, munitions and the +distance to be covered (two to three miles), the result pans out like a +proposition by Euclid. No question of breaking through is involved as in +any other theatre, but merely a question of pushing back a very clearly +limited number of yards. The men have in their hearts a reservoir of +patience which will never run dry so long as they are sure of the Will +to Win at their backs. They need have no qualms about G.H.Q. here, but +politicians are more--shall we say, mercurial? And the experts from +France are throwing cold water on our cause by day and night. Therefore, +as the Fleet is not going to have a dash, it is just as well we are +about to try the one great effort and get it done quickly. We will gain +a lot of ground; so much is certain, and it's as sure as anything can +be in war that somewhere we shall make good a key to the position. + +_26th July, 1915._ Stifling. Am sticking out about the lack of proper +advices of shipments. Ammunition _makes_ itself scarce enough without +being _made_ scarce. Rare and curious articles are worth careful +booking; that's the text of my cable. + +_27th July, 1915. Imbros._ Hard at it. Altham came in to see me and +spent an hour and a half. A man of business! Mahon arrived at mid-day. +Very cheery but he feels that he is the only Lieutenant-General +executively employed with troops who has so small a command as a +Division. He says that either he should be given a Corps, or that +his Lieutenant-General's rank should be reverted to that of +Major-General. I quite agreed. I feel as strongly as he does that, as a +Lieutenant-General, he is clean out of his setting in a Major-General's +appointment and has blocked the way to a go-ahead young Corps Commander, +because that Corps Commander must, by K.'s decision, be his senior. +Still, there didn't seem to be anything to be done, so after my telling +him how things stood here, and hearing with great pleasure the fine +account he gave me of his Irish Division, we adjourned to lunch. Colonel +King, his G.S.O. (1), also lunched and seemed to be a very nice fellow. +After lunch they both went off to the G.S. to be posted. + +Admiral Wemyss came over from Mudros and saw me. He is senior to de +Robeck but has waived that accident of rank seeing we are at war. An +interesting man and a Keyesite; i.e., he'd go right through the Straits +to-morrow,--or go under. He is one of those men, none too common in the +Services, whose mind has gained breadth in the great world without +losing its keenness. These rival tenets are straining the fabric of the +Fleet, but, as I constantly tell our General Staff, my course is as +clear to me as a pikestaff. I back the policy of the _de facto_ Naval +Commander-in-Chief--my own coadjutor. There is a temptation to do wrong, +but I resist it. What would it not be to me were the whole Fleet to +attack as we land at Suvla! But obviously I cannot go out of my own +element to urge the Fleet to actions, the perils of which I am +professionally incompetent to gauge. + +At 5.30 p.m. I went off riding with de Robeck, Ormsby Johnson and +Freddie Maitland. We cantered over to Seaplane Camp; passed the time of +day to the men there and over-hauled some of the machines. Coming back, +we passed through part of the 11th Division Camp; all very ship-shape +and clean. Freddie Maitland and I dined on board the _Beryl_ with Sir +Douglas Gamble. He seems highly pleased with everyone and everything; I +wouldn't go quite so far! There we met de Robeck, Keyes, Altham, Ellison +and Captain Stephens. Got back at 11. + +_28th July, 1915._ A cable from K. about Hunter-Weston's breakdown, +telling me the Prime Minister thinks that Bruce Hamilton is too old for +active work and heavy strain. Instead I am to have Davies. I know Joey +Davies--everyone does. But I also know Bruce Hamilton. There is no +tougher man or more resolute fighter in the Army. In my letter to K. I +said, "The only man I can think of who would really inspire me with full +confidence in these emergencies, excursions and alarms, would be Bruce +Hamilton. Bruce Hamilton is a real fighting man, and his deafness here +would be a great asset as he would be able to sleep through the shell +and rifle fire at night." + +The older Officers will be sorry indeed to hear Bruce Hamilton is +barred. Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division, will be especially +disappointed. + +Admiral Gamble came off to see me and afterwards dined. I was very +careful as I don't want to be quoted about the Sister Service. Gamble +sings praise of our outfit, but I can't help wondering how, when and +where he has got it into his head that we have small craft in abundance! + +_29th July, 1915. Imbros._ Stuck to camp, and lucky I did so, for the +cipher of a queer cable from S. of S. for War came in and called for as +much thought as is compatible with prompt handling. The message begins +with a ripe sugar plum:-- + + * * * * * + +"At this stage of the operations which you have conducted with so much +ability and in which your troops have so greatly distinguished +themselves, we" (this "we" is a new expression; the S. of S. always says +"I") "consider it advisable to summarize what we are placing at your +disposal for the effort which we hope will bring your operations to a +successful termination. + +"We have sent you out" and then the cable launches out into an inventory +of the forces entrusted to me which, though very detailed, is yet +largely based on what we call the widow's cruse principle. As to the +demnition total, "we" tells "me," categorically, (as the Lawyers say +when they describe the whiteness of soot) that I have "a total of about +205,000 men for the forthcoming operations." The A.G. who brought me the +cable could make nothing of it. Braithwaite then came over and he could +make nothing of it. We can none of us see the point of pretending to +_us_ that my force has been kept up to the strength all the time, or of +adding bayonets to the French or of assuming to _us_ that _we_ possess +troops which Maxwell has told me time and again he requires for Egyptian +defence. Were these figures going to the enemy Chief they might +intimidate him--coming here they alarm me. There is a "We" at the other +end of the cable which knows so little that it tells me, who know every +gun, rifle and round of ammunition I have at my disposal, that I have +double that number to handle. We won't defeat the enemy by paper +strengths. As far as sentiments go, the cable is by chalks the heartiest +handshake we poor relations to the West have had since we started. From +the outset we've been kicked by phrases such as, if you don't hurry up +we will have to "reconsider the position," etc., etc. Now, the "Wees" +wind up with a really wonderful paragraph:-- + + * * * * * + +"We should like to hear from you after considering your plans whether +there is anything further in the way of personnel, guns or ammunition we +can send you, as we are most anxious to give you everything you can +possibly require and use. You will realize that as regards ammunition we +have had to stop supplying France to give you the full output, which +will be continued as long as possible; in the short time available +before the bad weather intervenes the Dardanelles operations are now of +the highest importance." + +The position seems now, to me, extraordinarily delicate. Are we to let +the mistakes in this flattering cable slide, and build upon its +promises, or, are we to pull whoever believes these figures out of their +fool's paradise? Well, I feel we must have it out and although deeply +grateful for the nice words and for the splendid effort actually being +made, we _cannot_ let it be assumed by _anyone_ that our vanishing Naval +and Territorial Divisions are complete and up to strength. As to +ammunition, I asked plainly over a fortnight ago, for what I thought was +necessary to rapid success. I was told in so many words that France +would not spare it; though it would have been a small affair to them. +Now; as if these cables had no existence, they ask if there is "anything +in the way of _personnel, guns or ammunition you can possibly require +and use_." The truth is, I don't like this cable; in spite of its +flowery opening I don't like it at all. As to personnel, I ask for young +and energetic commanders, Byng and Rawlinson, and am turned down. Next I +ask for an old and experienced Commander, Bruce Hamilton, and am turned +down. Next I say that Reed, who would be a good staff officer to some +Generals, is not well suited to Stopford; I am turned down. I try to get +a business man to run Mudros and have been turned down till just the +other day. In all these points the War Office are supreme and are acting +well within their rights. But they show some want of consistency in +talking to me all of a sudden, as if it was a matter of course I should +be met half way in my wishes. + +So there and then we roughed out this reply:-- + + * * * * * + +"Your Nos. 6583 and 6588. Your appreciation of our efforts will afford +intense gratification and encouragement to everyone. + +"In regard to what we should like if it is available in the shape of +guns and ammunition, please see my No. M.F. 444, of 13th July, which +still holds good. As to the final paragraph of your No. 6583, I did not +realize that you were stopping supplies to France in order to give us +full output, since a fortnight ago your No. 6234 stated that it was then +impossible for you to send the ammunition I asked for, and that it would +be impossible to continue supplies even on a much lower scale, since it +would involve the reduction of supplies to France. Naturally, I have +always realized that you, and not I, must judge of the comparative +importance of the demands from the Dardanelles and from France. + +"With regard to numbers, the grand total you mention does not take into +account non-effectives or casualties; it includes reinforcements such as +LIVth and part of the LIIIrd Divisions, etc., which cannot be here in +time for my operation, and it also includes Yeomanry and Indian troops +which, until this morning, I was unaware were at my unreserved disposal. +For the coming operation, the number of rifles available is about half +the figure you quote, viz., 120,000. I am only anxious, in emphasizing +this point, to place the statement regarding my strength on the correct +basis, and one which gives a true view of the position. + +"What I want in a hurry is as much additional high explosive shell as +you can send me up to amounts asked for in my No. M.F. 444, and as many +of the 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers asked for in that telegram as there +is ammunition for. I am despatching a ship immediately, and its time of +arrival at Marseilles will be telegraphed later. + +"With regard to sending the IInd Mounted Division unmounted, I am at +once telegraphing Maxwell to obtain his views." + +The Mail bag went out this morning. + +Hankey is now busy going over the Peninsula. I have not seen much of +him. A G.S. Officer has been told off to help him along and to see that +he does not get into trouble. I am not going to dry nurse him. He showed +me of his own free will a copy of a personal cable he had sent to Lord +Kitchener in which he says, speaking of his first visit to Anzac, +"Australians are superbly confident and spoiling for a fight." This is +exactly true and I feel it is good that one who has the ear of the +insiders should say it. I wrote Wolfe Murray a week ago that he was a +successor to those Commissioners who were sent out by the French +Republic in its early days. Actually, I am very glad to have him. Lies +are on the wing, and he, armed with the truth, will be able to knock +some of them out hereafter when he meets them in high places. + +I have been bothered as to how to answer a letter from a statesman for +whom I cherish great respect, who has always been very kind to me and +whom I like very much. He writes:-- + + * * * * * + +"It may interest you to know the Cabinet has entrusted the +superintendence of the Dardanelles business to a comparatively small and +really strong committee drawn equally from the two parties. We most +thoroughly understand the extreme difficulty of your task and the +special conditions of the problem in front of you and the Admiral. All +we ask from you is complete confidence and the exact truth. We are not +babes and we can digest strong meat. Do not think that we ever want +anything unpleasant concealed from us, nor do we want you ever to swerve +one hair's breadth from your own exact judgment in putting the case +before us, certainly never on the pleasant side; if you ever swerve pray +do so on the unpleasant side.... If you want more ammunition say so...." + +"Could you eat a bun, my boy?" said the old gentleman to the little boy +looking in at the shop window. "Could I eat ten thousand b ... buns and +the baker who baked them?" So the dear little fellow answered. If I want +more ammunition indeed? If ...? I fear the "comparatively small and +really strong committee." They fairly frighten me. There they sit, all +wishing us well, all evidently completely bamboozled. "If you want more +ammunition, say so!" Anyway, my friend means me well but my path is +perfectly clear; I have only one Chief--K.--and I correspond with no one +but him, or his Staff, whether on the subject of ammunition or anything +else.... + +As to the letter, I know it is entirely kind, genuine and inspired by +the one idea of helping me. But I've got to say no thank you in some +unmistakable manner. So I have replied:-- + + * * * * * + +"I am grateful for your reassuring remarks about your Committee having +confidence in my humble self. For my part I have confidence in the +_moral_ of my troops and in the devotion of the Navy which are the two +great and splendid assets amidst this shifting kaleidoscope of the +factors and possibilities of war. + +"I am not quite sure that I clearly understand your meaning about +cabling home the exact truth. Is there any occasion on which I have +failed to do so? I should be very sorry indeed to think I had +consciously or unconsciously misled anyone by my cables. There is +always, of course, the broad spirit of a cable which depends on the +temperament of the sender. It is either tinged with hope or it has been +dictated by one who fears the worst. If you mean that you would prefer a +pessimistic tone given to my appreciations, then I am afraid you will +have to get another General." + +_30th July, 1915._ Gascoigne of "Q" branch lunched. On getting news of +the decisive victory on the Euphrates I caused a _feu de joie_ to be +fired precisely at 5 p.m. by all the troops on the Peninsula. At the +appointed hour I walked up the cliff's edge whence I clearly heard the +roll of fire. The question of whether musketry sounds will carry so far +is settled. Evidently the Turks have taken up the challenge for it was +quite a long time before the distant rumbling died away. In the cool of +the evening took a walk. Commandant Bertier and la Borde dined. + +Stopford, now commanding at Helles, has endorsed a report from the +Commander of the 42nd East Lancs Division saying that out of a draft of +45 recruits just come from home three have been cast as totally unfit +and nine as permanently unfit through blindness. Stopford says that he +can't understand this, as the second line Battalion, from which these +poor fellows were selected, contained good soldiers and tall fellows +quite lately when they were under his command in England. Have cabled +the facts home; also the following, showing the result of the +Admiralty's attitude towards their own Naval Division now Winston has +departed:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 505). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. The +effective strength of the Marine Brigade is now reduced to 50 officers +and 1,890 rank and file. In addition, only five battalions, Royal Naval +Volunteer Reserve Battalions, are now remaining in the Division, as the +Anson Battalion has been withdrawn for special work in connection with +the forthcoming operations. Moreover, 300 men, stokers, from this +division have been handed over to the Navy for work in auxiliary +vessels, see my telegram No. M.F.A. 1377, of 11th July. I have +consequently decided to reduce the division to eight battalions and to +reorganize it into two brigades as a temporary measure. Can you give me +any idea when the reinforcements for this division are likely to be +despatched and when they may be expected here? I should like to see the +division again at its strength of 12 battalions, and do not want to lose +it, as it contains a very valuable war-trained nucleus, but unless it is +brought under army administration, it does not appear likely that it can +be maintained." + +_31st July, 1915. Imbros._ Quiet day spent in trying to clear my table +before sailing for Mitylene to see the new Irish Division. The grand +army with which some War Office genius credited us appear to have served +their purpose. At our challenge they have now taken to their heels like +Falstaff's eleven rogues in buckram suits. The S. of S. (cabling this +time as "I" and not as "We,") says, "it is not worth while trying to +reconcile numbers by cable and it is difficult to make up accurate +states." + +Do not let me forget, though, that a slice of solid stuff is sandwiched +into this cable--we are to get some 4.5 shell _via_ Marseilles; H.E. we +hope: also, two batteries of 4.5 howitzers: also that the A.G. has been +trying hard to feed the 29th Division. The Territorials are the people +who are being allowed to go to pot--not a word of hope even, and before +the eyes of everyone. + +_1st August, 1915. Imbros._ The usual rush before leaving. No time to +write. Sent two cables, copies attached. The first to the War Office, in +answer to one from the A.G. wherein he plumes himself upon the +completeness of the 29th Division. That completeness, alas, is only so +relatively; i.e., in comparison with the sinking condition of the +Territorial Divisions:-- + + * * * * * + +"We are deeply grateful to you for the drafts you have despatched for +the XXIXth Division as the fighting existence of that fine formation has +been prolonged by their timely arrival, but I fear that you are very +wide of the mark in your assumption that these drafts have completed the +Division. + +"As I have ventured to point out incessantly since my arrival here, +constant large numbers of casualties must occur between the demands for +and the arrival of drafts owing to the length of the sea voyage. It was +for this very plain reason that it was doubly necessary to have here the +10 per cent. margin granted in the case of battalions going to France. +We must always be considerably under establishment in the absence of +some such margin. + +"I fully realize, in saying this, that it may be quite impossible to +meet such demands as I suggest, but I feel bound to let you know the +only possible terms on which any unit in this force can ever be up to +establishment. + +"At the present moment, excluding 1,700 drafts coming on _Simla_ and +_Themistocles_, the actual infantry strength of the XXIXth Division is +219 officers and 8,424 other ranks." + +The second cable is to K. The War Office Army has melted into thin air +and it only remains to express my heartfelt thanks for the real Army:-- + + * * * * * + +"With reference to your No. 6645. Very many thanks. You have done +everything for us that man can do. The ship will probably not reach me +in time but since I know that the ammunition is actually _en route_ for +me, and that it will (D.V.) arrive, I need not husband what we have, but +can fire freely if I see great results thus obtainable. The Turk, at any +rate, where he knows that he is fighting for Constantinople, is a +stubborn fighter, and the difficulty is not so much in the taking of +positions as in the maintaining of them. + +"Hence the extra ammunition you are sending me will come in the nick of +time. The ship will arrive at Marseilles 7 p.m. 4th August, as I +telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General yesterday. Many thanks for the +two batteries of 4.5-inch howitzers, they are worth their weight in gold +to us." + +At 5 p.m. embarked on H.M.S. _Chatham_ (Captain Drury Lowe) with George +Lloyd of the General Staff and young Brodrick. At 6 p.m. sailed for +Mitylene. + +_2nd August, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham," Mitylene._ We opened Mitylene +Harbour at 5.30 a.m. So narrow was the entrance, and so hidden, that at +first it looked as if the _Chatham_ was charging the cliffs; next as if +her long guns must entangle themselves in the flowering bushes on either +side of the channel; then, as we sailed out over a bay like a big +turquoise, I felt as though we were at peace with all men, making a +pilgrimage to the home of Sappho, and that we had left far behind us +these giant wars. But only for a moment! + +After early breakfast, where I met Captain Grant of H.M.S. _Canopus_, +left in a steam pinnace to inspect the 30th Brigade under +Brigadier-General Hill. + +Inspected:-- + + H.M.T. _Alaudia_, 9.30 a.m. + 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, + 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, + Col G. Downing, 7th R.D.F., in command. + + H.M.T. _Andania_, 10.30 a.m. + 6th R. Inniskilling Fusiliers, + 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers, + Lt.-Col. M. Pike, 5th R.I.F., in command. + + H.M.T. _Canada_, 11.30 a.m. + 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, + Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer in command. + + H.M.T. _Novian_, 12 p.m. + 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, + Lt.-Col. H. Vanrennan in command. + +The Royal Irish Fusiliers and Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had not got +back on board ship by the time I was ready for them, so I hurried off +by motor launch to a landing in another part of the Bay and, walking +through a village, caught them resting by their piled arms after a route +march. All of these men looked very well and cheery. The villagers were +most friendly and had turned out in numbers, bringing presents of +flowers and fruit. Not more than 60 per cent. of the men are Irish, the +rest being either North of England miners or from Somerset. + +In the evening, crossed the glassy bay and motored to pay a +double-barrelled visit to the Military and Civil Governors. Topping the +watershed, yet another pleasure shock. Through the sea haze Mitylene +shines out like an iridescent bubble of light. Never had I seen anything +so vivid in its colour and setting as this very ancient, very small, +very brilliant city of Mitylene. Rio de Janeiro, Sydney, the Golden Horn +are sprawling daubs to flawless Mitylene. + +Hesketh Smith and Compton Mackenzie were with us. The Governors very +polite. The soldier man is a Cretan and seemed a good sort. We took tea +at the Hotel and then made our way back to the _Chatham_. Found messages +from G.H.Q. to say all's well and stuff being smuggled in without hitch +at Anzac. At 7 p.m. we sailed for Imbros; a breeze from the West +whipping up little waves into cover for enemy periscopes. So the moment +we left the harbour we took on a corkscrew course, dodging and twisting +like snipe in an Irish bog, to avoid winding up our trip in the dark +belly of a German submarine. Soon emerged from the sea a huge piled up +white cloud, white and clear cut at first as the breast of a swan upon +a blue lake, slowly turning to deep rose colour flecked here and there +with gold. As it swallowed up the last lingering colours of the sunset, +the world grew grey, then black, and we were, humanly speaking, safe. + +_3rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Anchored at Imbros roadstead 5.30 a.m. +Braithwaite not up yet so Altham got first innings about transport and +supply. + +Next the G.S. All our preliminaries are working on quite smoothly +towards the climax and, so far, it seems likely the Turks have no notion +of the scheme. + +Girodon steamed over from Helles to see me and went back again in the +evening. He is the mirror of French chivalry, modesty and good form, +besides being an extraordinary fine soldier. + +The 33rd Brigade, sent by me to gain wisdom at Helles, have now been +brought here so that the whole 11th Division can start off together. + +Just as the peculiar foggy air of Lancashire is essential to the weaving +of the finer sorts of tissues, so an atmosphere of misunderstandings +would really seem to suit the War Office. + +In the cable telling me I would have 205,000 troops for my push, the S. +of S. had informed me categorically that the 8,500 Yeomanry and mounted +troops in Egypt, as well as 11,500 Indian troops and the Artillery +stationed there _were mine_. + +As the present garrison of Egypt numbers over 70,000 and as the old +peace garrison of Egypt was 5,000 and as, further, there is no question +of serious attack on Egypt from outside, it seemed to us there might be +men in this part of the message. Leaving the Indian troops out of the +account, for the moment, I therefore wired to Maxwell and asked him if +he thought he would be able to organize a _portion_ of the 8,500 mounted +men, in order that, at a pinch, they might be able to come and reinforce +us here. So the matter stood when I got another cable from the S. of S. +telling me 5,000 drafts are "_en route_ or under orders" to join the +29th Division and that the War Office are "unable to carry out your +views about additional marginal drafts." S. of S. then goes on:-- + + * * * * * + +"Maxwell wires that you are taking 300 officers and 5,000 men of his +mounted troops. I do not quite understand why you require Egyptian +Garrison troops while you have the LIIIrd Division at Alexandria, and +the LIVth, the last six battalions of which are arriving in five or six +days, on the _Aquitania_. + +"When I placed the Egyptian Garrison at your disposal to reinforce at +the Dardanelles in case of necessity, Maxwell pointed out that Egypt +would be left very short, and I replied that you would only require them +in case of emergency for a short time, and that the risk must be run. I +did not contemplate, however, that you would take troops from the +Egyptian Garrison until those sent specially for you were exhausted. How +long will you require Maxwell's troops, and where do you intend to send +them? They should only be removed from Egypt for actual operations and +for the shortest possible time." + +We may read this cable wrong but it seems to us to embody a topsy-turvy +tactic! To wait till one part of your forces are killed off (for that is +the plain English of "exhausted") before you bring up the other part of +your forces. + +It is not easy to know what to do. The very best we can do, it sometimes +seems to me, is to keep quiet rather than add one iota to the anxieties +of people staggering under a load of responsibilities and cares. In the +good old days the Gordons fought in two decisive battles in two +Continents within a few months and no one worried the War Office about +drafts! The 92nd carried on--had to carry on; they fell to quarter +strength--still they were the Gordons and they carried on, just as if +they counted a thousand rifles in their ranks. Now, I am quite prepared +to do that to-day--_if that is the policy_. If that _were_ the policy; +not one grouse or grumble should ever cross my lips. But that is _not_ +the policy. Press and People believe a Division is a unit made up in +scientific proportions of different branches and numbering a certain +number of rifles. They are told so; the War Office keep telling them so; +they believe it, and, in fact, it is an absolute necessity of this +modern trench war that it should be so. Although the Gordons got no +_drafts_ between the battle of Kandahar and the battle of Majuba Hill, +they got six months' _rest_; which was even better. In those days, apart +from sieges, a battle was an event, here it is the rest or respite that +is an event. Even British soldiers can't stick day and night fighting +for ever. The attack spirit begins to ebb _unless_ it is fed with fresh +blood. Whether K.'s mind, big with broad views, grasps this new factor +with which he has never himself come into personal contact, God knows. +But for his sake, every bit as much as for my own, it is up to me to +keep hammering, hammering, hammering at drafts, drafts, drafts. + +Dined with the ever hospitable and kind hearted de Robeck on _Triad_. +The Navy are still divided. Some there are who would wish me to urge the +Admiral to play first fiddle in the coming attack. This _I will not do_. +I have neither the data nor the technical knowledge which would justify +me to my conscience in doing so. + +_4th August, 1915. Imbros._ Have been out seeing the New Army at work. +Some of the XIth Division were practising boat work in the evening and +afterwards a Brigade started upon a night march into the mountains. The +men are fit, although just beginning to be infected with the Eastern +Mediterranean stomach trouble; i.e., the so-called cholera, which saved +Constantinople from the Bulgarians in the last war. + +_5th August, 1915. Imbros._ The day so longed for is very near now. O +that it had come at the period of our victories! But there is time +enough still, and the first moves of the plan are working smooth as +oiled machinery. For the past few nights there has been steady flow +into Anzac of troops, including a Division of the New Army. This has +taken place, without any kind of hitch, under the very noses of the +Turkish Army who have no inkling of the manoeuvre--as yet! The Navy +are helping us admirably here with their organization and good sea +discipline. Also, from what they tell me, Shaw and the 13th Division of +the New Army are playing up with the clockwork regularity of veterans. +All this marks us up many points to the good, before even the flag +drops. For, given the fine troops we have, the prime factors of the +whole conception; the factors by which it stands or falls; are:-- + + * * * * * + +(1) Our success in hoodwinking the Turks; i.e., surprise. + +(2) Our success in getting the 13th Division and the Indian Brigade +unnoticed into Anzac. + +(3) Our success in landing the Divisions from Imbros, Lemnos and +Mitylene, at moments fixed beforehand, upon an unknown, unsurveyed, +uncharted shore of Suvla. Of these three factors (1) and (2) may already +be entered to our credit; (3) is on the knees of the Navy. + +The day before the start is the worst day for a Commander. The operation +overhangs him as the thought of another sort of operation troubles the +minds of sick men in hospitals. There is nothing to distract him; he has +made his last will and testament; his affairs are quite in order; he has +said _au revoir_ to his friends with what cheeriness he can muster. +Looking back, it seems to me that during two months every conceivable +contingency has been anticipated and weighed and that the means of +dealing with it as it may arise is now either:--embodied in our +instructions to Corps Commanders, or else, set aside as pertaining to my +own jurisdiction and responsibility. To my thinking, in fact, these +instructions of ours illustrate the domain of G.H.Q. on the one hand and +the province of the Corps Commander on the other very typically. The +General Staff are proud of their work. Nothing; not a nosebag nor a +bicycle has been left to chance.[1] + +Davies and Diggle, his A.D.C., lunched and the Admiral came to haul me +out for a walk about 6 p.m. + +Have written K. by this evening's Mail bag about the sickness of the +Australians, and indeed of all the troops here, excepting only the +native Indian troops, and also about our Medical _band-o-bast_ for the +battle. No question about it, the Dardanelles was the theatre of all +others for our Indian troops. + +Have now seen all the New Army units except six Battalions of the 10th +Division. + +French has written me a very delightful letter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: See Appendix III containing actual instructions, together +with a brief explanatory heading.--IAN H., 1920.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +SARI BAIR AND SUVLA + + +_6th August, 1915. Imbros._ O! God of Bethel, by whose hand thy people +still are fed,--I am wishing the very rare wish,--that it was the day +after to-morrow. Men or mice we will be by then, but I'd like to know +which. K.'s New Army, too! How will they do? What do they think? They +speak--and with justice--of the spirit of the Commander colouring the +_moral_ of his men, but I have hardly seen them, much less taken their +measure. One more week and we would have known something at first hand. +Now, except that the 13th Division and the 33rd Brigade gained good +opinions at Helles, all is guess work. + +Went down to "K" Beach to see the 11th Division go off. Young Brodrick, +who was with us, proved himself much all there on the crowded pier and +foreshore; very observant; telling me who or what I had not noticed, +etc. First the destroyers were filling up and then the lighters. The +young Naval Officers in charge of the lighters were very keen to show me +how they had fixed up their reserves of ammunition and water. Spent +quite a time at this and talking to Hammersley and Malcolm, his G.S.O. +(1); also to Coleridge, G.S.O. (2), and to no end of Regimental +Officers and men. Hammersley has been working too hard; at least he +looked it; also, for the occasion, rather glum. Quite natural; but I +always remember Wolseley's remark about the moral stimulus exerted by +the gay staff officer and his large cigar. The occasion! Yes, each man +to his own temperament. Some pray before battle; others dance and drink. +The memory of Cromwell prevails over that of Prince Rupert with most +Englishmen but Prince Rupert, _per se_, usually prevailed over Cromwell. +To your adventurous soldier; to our heroes, Bobs, Sir Evelyn, Garnet +Wolseley, Charles Gordon (great psalm-singer though he was) an occasion +like to-night's holds the same intoxicating mixture of danger and desire +as fills the glass of the boy bridegroom when he raises it to the health +of his enigma in a veil. But I don't know how it is; I used to feel like +that; now I too am terribly anxious. Disappointed not to see Stopford +nor Reed. They were to have been there. Besides the men on the beetles +there are men packed like herrings upon the decks of the destroyers. I +had half a mind to cruise round in the motor launch and say a few words +to them Elandslaagte fashion, but was held back by feeling that the rank +and file don't know me and that there was too long an interval before +the entry into the danger zone. + +The sea was like glass--melted; blue green with a dull red glow in it: +the air seemed to have been boiled. Officers and men gave me the "feel" +of being "for it" though over serious for British soldiers who always, +in my previous experience, have been extraordinarily animated and gay +when they are advancing "on a Koppje day." These new men seem subdued +when I recall the blaze of enthusiasm in which the old lot started out +of Mudros harbour on that April afternoon. + +The _moral_ of troops about to enter into battle supplies a splendid +field of research for students of the human soul, for then the blind +wall set in everyday intercourse between Commander and commanded seems +to become brittle as crystal and as transparent. Only for a few +moments--last moments for so many? But, during those moments, the +gesture of the General means so much--it strikes the attitude of his +troops. It is up to Stopford and Hammersley to make those gestures. +Stopford was not there, and is not the type; Hammersley is not that type +either. How true it is that age, experience, wisdom count for less than +youth, magnetism and love of danger when inexperience has to be +heartened for the struggle. + +Strolled back slowly along the beach, and, at 8.30, in the gathering +dusk, saw the whole flotilla glide away and disappear ghostlike to the +Northwards. The empty harbour frightens me. Nothing in legend stranger +or more terrible than the silent departure of this silent Army, K.'s new +Corps, every mother's son of them, face to face with their fate. + +But it will never do to begin the night's vigil in this low key. Capital +news from the aeroplanes. Samson has sent in photographs taken +yesterday, showing the Suvla Bay area. Not more than 100 to 150 yards +of trenches in all; half a dozen gun emplacements and, the attached +report adds, no Turks anywhere on the move. + +[Illustration: SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR] + +_7th August, 1915. Imbros._ Sitting in my hut after a night in the G.S. +tent. One A.D.C. remains over there. As the cables come in he runs +across with them. Freddie Maitland runs fast. I am watching to see his +helmet top the ridge of sand that lies between. The 9th Corps has got +ashore; some scrapping along the beaches but no wire or hold-up like +there was at Sedd-el-Bahr: that in itself is worth fifty million golden +sovereigns. The surprise has come off! + +I'd sooner storm a hundred bloody trenches than dangle at the end of +this wire. But now, thank God, the deadliest of the perils is past. The +New Army are fairly ashore. That worst horror of searchlights and of the +new troops being machine gunned in their boats has lifted its dark +shadow. + +At Anzac, the most formidable entrenchment of the Turks, "Lone Pine," +was stormed yesterday evening by the Australian 1st Brigade; a desperate +fine feat. At midnight Birdie cabled, "All going on well on right where +men confident of repelling counter-attack now evidently being prepared: +on left have taken Old No. 3 Post and first ridge of Walden Point, +capturing machine gun: progress satisfactory, though appallingly +difficult: casualties uncertain but on right about 100 killed; 400 +wounded." + +At Helles a temporary success was scored, but, during the early part of +the night, counter-attacks have brought us back to "as you were." +Fighting is going on and we ought to be pinning the enemy to the South +which is the main thing. + +From Suvla we have no direct news since the "All landings successful" +cable but we have the repetition of a wireless from G.H.Q. IXth Corps to +the Vice-Admiral at 7.58 a.m. saying, "Prisoners captured state no fresh +troops have arrived recently and forces opposed to us appear to be as +estimated by G.H.Q. Apparently one Regiment only was opposed to our +advance on left." + +I have caused this cable to be sent to Stopford:-- + + * * * * * + +"4.20 p.m. G.H.Q. to 9th Corps. Have only received one telegram from +you. Chief glad to hear enemy opposition weakening and knows you will +take advantage of this to push on rapidly. Prisoners state landing a +surprise so take every advantage before you are forestalled." + +_8th August, 1915. Imbros._ Another night on tenter hooks: great news: a +wireless from a warship to tell us the Suvla troops are up on the +foothills: two cables from Stopford: many messages from Anzac and +Helles. + +"2.12 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. As far as can be ascertained 33rd +Brigade hold line the sea about 91.I.9 to Suvla East corner[2] of Salt +Lake to Lala Baba inclusive. North of Salt Lake 31st and 32nd Brigade +extended East of Asmak 117.U. preparatory. 34th Brigade advancing having +followed retreating enemy towards line diagonally across 117.X. and +117.D. One battalion latter Brigade occupy high ground about square +135.X." + +"5.10 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. Yilghin Burnu is in our hands. No +further information." + +Awful work at Lone Pine. Desperate counter-attacks by enemy, but now +Birdie thinks we are there to stay. Bulk of Turkish reserves engaged +there whilst Godley's New Zealanders and the new 13th Division under +Shaw are well up the heights and have carried Chunuk Bair. Koja Chemen +Tepe not yet; but Chunuk Bair will do: with that, we win! + +At Helles we have pushed out again and the East Lancs Division have +gallantly stormed the Vineyard which they hold. The Turks are making +mighty counter-attacks but their columns have been cut to pieces by the +thin lines of the Lancashire Fusiliers. Neither from Helles nor from the +Southern area of Anzac are the enemy likely to spare men to reinforce +Sari Bair or Suvla. + +At 11.30 I ordered the _Arno_ for mid-day sharp. Then happened one of +those aquatic incidents which lend an atmosphere all their own to +amphibious war. Rear-Admiral Nicholson, in local naval command here, had +ordered the _Arno_ to fill up her boilers. Some hitch arose, some d--d +amphibious hitch. Thereupon, without telling me, he ordered the +Commander of the _Arno_ to draw fires, so that, when my signal was sent, +a reply came from the Rear-Admiral saying he was sorry I should be +inconvenienced, but he thought it best to order the fires to be drawn; +otherwise the boilers might have suffered. When, at a crisis, a boiler +walks into the middle of his calculations, a soldier is simply--boiled! +I could not altogether master my irritation, and I wrote out a reply +saying this was not a question of convenience or inconvenience but one +of preventing a Commander-in-Chief from exercising his functions during +battle. I sent the signal down to the signal tent and about an hour +later Braithwaite came over and said he had taken it upon himself to +tone it down.[3] Just as well, perhaps, but here I was, marooned upon an +island! + +No other ship could be signalled. As a rule there was a destroyer on +patrol about Helles which could be called up by wireless, but to-day +there was no getting hold of it. I began to be afraid we should not get +away till dark when, at about 3.30 p.m. Nicholson signalled that the +_Triad_ was sailing for Suvla at 4.15 p.m., and would I care to go in +her, the _Arno_ following after she had watered. We were off like a +shot, young Brodrick, Captain Anstey and myself for Suvla. Braithwaite +remained to carry on with Anzac and Helles. The moment I quit my post I +drop out and he takes up the reins. His hands are capable--fortunately! +To-day's cables before I left were right from Helles; splendid from +Anzac and nothing further from Suvla.[4] + +As we sailed in, that bay, always till now so preternaturally deserted +and silent, was alive and bustling with ships and small craft. A launch +came along from the _Chatham_ and I jumped in whilst we were still going +pretty fast and shot off to see de Robeck. He seemed to think things +naval were going pretty well and that Rear-Admiral Christian had been +coping quite well with his share, but suggested that, as he was under a +severe strain, I had better leave him alone. As to the soldiers' show, +he said what Turks were on the ground, and there weren't many, had been +well beaten--but--but--_but_; and all I could get him to say was that +although he was well aware the fighting at Helles and Anzac demanded my +closest attention; still, that was in practised hands and he had felt +bound to wireless to beg me to come up to Suvla and see things for +myself. + +Roger Keyes said then that the landings had come off, on the whole, A.1. +Our G.H.Q. idea, which the Navy had shared, that the whole of the troops +should be landed South of Lala Baba had been sound. The 33rd Brigade had +landed there without shot fired; the 32nd had been sharply, but not +very seriously opposed; the Brigade (the 34th) which we, to meet the +wish of the Corps, had tried to land for them opposite Hill 10 inside +the Bay, instead of with the others as we had originally arranged, had +only been able to find depth at the mouth of the Salt Lake; had suffered +loss from rifle fire and had been thrown into disorder by the grounding +of some lighters. The long wade through the water and mud had upset the +cohesion of the Brigade. + +Aspinall now turned up. He was in a fever; said our chances were being +thrown away with both hands and that he had already cabled me strongly +to that effect. Neither the Admiral's message nor Aspinall's had reached +me.[5] + +Not another moment was to be lost, so Keyes took us both in his motor +boat to H.M.S. _Jonquil_ to see Stopford. He (Stopford) seemed happy and +said that everything was quite all right and going well. Mahon with some +of his troops was pressing back the Turks along Kiretch Tepe Sirt. There +had been a very stiff fight in the darkness at Lala Baba and next +morning the Turks had fought so hard on a little mound called Hill 10 +that he (Stopford) had been afraid we were not going to be able to take +it at all. However, it had been taken, but there was great confusion and +hours of delay in deploying for the attack of the foothills. They were +easily carried in the end but by that time the men were so thirsty and +tired that they did not follow up the beaten enemy. + +"And where are they now?" I asked. + +"There," he replied, "along the foot of the hills," and he pointed out +the line, north to south. + +"But they held that line, more or less, yesterday," I said. + +"Yes," said Stopford, and he went on to explain that the Brigadiers had +been called upon to gain what ground they could without serious fighting +but that, actually, they had not yet occupied any dominating tactical +point. The men had been very tired; he had not been able to get water up +to them or land his guns as quickly as he had hoped. Therefore, he had +decided to postpone the occupation of the ridge (which might lead to a +regular battle) until next morning. + +"A regular battle is just exactly what we are here for" was what I was +inclined to say, but what I did say was that most of this was news to +me; that he should have instantly informed me of his decision that he +could not obey my cabled order of yesterday afternoon to "push on +rapidly." Stopford replied that he had only made up his mind within the +past hour or so; that he had just got back from the shore and was going +to send me a full message when I arrived. + +Now, what was to be done? The Turks were so quiet it seemed to me +certain they must have taken the knock-out. All along the beaches, and +inland too, no end of our men were on the move, offering fine targets. +The artillery which had so long annoyed Anzac used to fire from behind +Ismail Oglu Tepe; i.e., within point blank range of where our men were +now strolling about in crowds. Yet not a single shell was being fired. +Either, the enemy's guns had been run back over the main ridge to save +them; or, the garrison of Ismail Oglu Tepe was so weak and shaken that +they were avoiding any move which might precipitate a conflict. + +I said to Stopford, "We must occupy the heights at once. It is +imperative we get Ismail Oglu Tepe and Tekke Tepe _now_!" To this he +raised objections. He doubted whether the troops had got their water +yet; he and Reed were agreed we ought to get more guns ashore; the +combination of naval and military artillery was being worked out for the +morning; orders would all have to be re-written. He added that, whilst +agreeing with me on principle as to the necessity for pushing on, there +were many tactical reasons against it, especially the attitude of his +Generals who had told him their men were too tired. I thought to myself +of the many, many times Lord Bobs, French, every leader of note has had +to fight that same _non possumus_; of the old days when half the victory +lay in the moral effort which could impel men half dead with hunger, +thirst and sleeplessness to push along. A cruel, pitiless business, but +so is war itself. Was it not the greatest of soldiers who said his +Marshals could always find ten good reasons for putting off an attack +till next day! + +So I said I would like to see the G.O.C. Division and the Brigadiers +personally so as to get a better grip of things than we could on board +ship in harbour. Stopford agreed; nothing, he said, would please him +more than if I could succeed where he had failed, but would I excuse him +from accompanying me; he had not been very fit; he had just returned +from a visit to the shore and he wanted to give his leg a chance. He +pointed out Hammersley's Headquarters about 400 yards off and said he, +Hammersley, would be able to direct me to the Brigades. + +So I nipped down the _Jonquil's_ ladder; tumbled into Roger Keyes' +racing motor boat and with him and Aspinall we simply shot across the +water to Lala Baba. Every moment was priceless. I had not been five +minutes on the _Jonquil_ and in another two I was with Hammersley. + +Under the low cliffs by the sea was a small half-moon of beach about 100 +by 40 yards. At the North end of the half-moon was Hammersley. Asked to +give me an idea of the situation he gave me much the same story as +Stopford. The 9th West Yorks and 6th Yorks had done A.1 storming Lala +Baba in the dark. There had been marching and counter-marching in the +move on Hill 10. The Brigadier had not been able to get a grip of his +Battalions to throw them at it in proper unison and form. A delay of +precious hours had been caused in the attack on Yilghin Burnu by a +Brigadier who wanted to go forward finding himself at cross purposes +with a Brigadier who thought it better to hold back. At present all was +peaceful and he expected a Staff Officer at any moment with a sketch +showing the exact disposition of his troops. He could not, he feared, +point me out the Brigade Headquarters on the ground. The general line +held followed the under features of the hills. + +Malcolm, G.S.O.1, was then called and came up from the far end of the +little beach. He was in the act of fixing up orders for next morning's +attack. I told both Officers that there had never been a greater crisis +in any battle than the one taking place as we spoke. They were naturally +pleased at having got ashore and to have defeated the Turks on the +shore, but they must not fly away with the idea that with time and +patience everything would pan out very nicely. On the contrary, it was +imperative, absolutely imperative, we should occupy the heights before +the enemy brought back the guns they had carried off and before they +received the reinforcements which were marching at that very moment to +their aid. This was no guess: it _was_ so: our aeroplanes had spotted +Turks marching upon us from the North. We might be too late now; anyway +our margin was of the narrowest. + +Hammersley assured me that sheer thirst, and the exhaustion of the +troops owing to thirst, had been the only reason why he had not walked +on to Ismail Oglu Tepe last night. After Yilghin Burnu had been +carried, there was nothing to prevent the occupation of the heights as +the Turks had been beat, but no one could fight against thirst. + +I asked him how the water question stood. He said it had been solved by +the landing of more mules; there was no longer any serious supply +trouble. All the troops were now watered, fed and rested. They had been +told they should gain as much ground as they could without committing +themselves to a general action, but they had not, in fact, made much +progress. Thereupon, I pressed again my view that the Division should +get on to the ridge forthwith. Let the Brigade-Majors, I said, pick out +a few of their freshest companies and get on to the crest right now. +Hammersley still clung to the view that he could not get any of his +troops under weigh before daylight next morning. The units were +scattered; no reconnaissance had been made of the ground to their front; +that ground was jungly and blind; it would be impossible to get orders +round the whole Division in time to let the junior ranks study them. +Hammersley's points were made in a proper and soldierly manner. Every +General of experience would be with him in each of them, but there was +one huge danger rapidly approaching us; already casting its shadow upon +us, which, to me as Commander-in-Chief, outweighed every secondary +objection. We might have the hills at the cost of walking up them +to-day; the Lord only knew what would be the price of them to-morrow. +Helles and Anzac were both holding the Turks to their own front, but +from Asia and Bulair the enemy were on the march. Once our troops dug +themselves in on the crest no number of Turks would be able to shift +them. But; if the Turks got there first? If, as Colonel Malcolm said, it +was impossible to get orders round the Division in time,--a surprising +statement--was there no body of troops--no Divisional reserve--no +nothing--which could be used for the purpose of marching a couple of +miles? Seemingly, there was no reserve! Never, in all my long soldiering +had I been faced with ideas like these. I have seen attack orders +dictated to a Division from the saddle in less than five minutes. Here +was a victorious Division, rested and watered, said to be unable to +bestir itself, even feebly, with less than twelve hours' notice! This +was what I felt and although I did not say it probably I looked it, for +Malcolm now qualified the original _non possumus_ by saying that +although the Irish and the 33rd and 34th Brigades could not be set in +motion before daylight, the 32nd Brigade, which was concentrated round +about Sulajik, would be ready to move at short notice. + +The moment had now come for making up my mind. I did so, and told +Hammersley in the most distinct terms that I wished this Brigade to +advance _at once and dig themselves in on the crestline_.[6] If the +Brigade could fix themselves upon the heights overlooking Anafarta Sagir +they would make the morning advance easy for their comrades and would be +able to interfere with and delay the Turkish reinforcements which might +try and debouch between the two Anafartas during the night or march down +upon Suvla from the North. Viewed from the sea or studied in a map there +might be some question of this hill, or that hill, but, on the ground it +was clear to half an eye that Tekke Tepe was the key to the whole Suvla +Bay area. If by dawn, I said, even one Company of ours was well +entrenched on the Tekke Tepe height we should have the whip hand of the +enemy in the opening moves next morning. + +Hammersley said he understood my order and that the advance should be +put in hand at once. Malcolm hurried off; I left a little before 6.30 +and went, _via_ the _Chatham_, back to the _Triad_. The _Arno_ had by +now come in, but de Robeck has kindly asked me not to shift quarters if +Anzac and Helles troubles will permit me to stay the night at Suvla. + +All was dead quiet ashore till 11 p.m. I was on the bridge until then +and, seeing and hearing nothing, felt sure the Brigade had made good +Tekke Tepe and were now digging themselves in. + +Captain Brody dined. The scraps of news picked up from the sailormen, +mainly by young Brodrick, confirm what the soldiers had told us about +the landing inside Suvla Bay along the narrow strip of land West of the +Salt Lake. The attacks on Hill 10 went to pieces, not against the Turks, +but by mishap. The first assault made by one or two Companies succeeded, +but the assailants were taken for Turks and were attacked in turn and +driven off by others of our men. A most distressing affair. + +If there was hesitation and mix-up in the general handling, the +Regimental folk atoned and there were many incidents of initiative and +daring on the part of battalions and companies. + +Mahon with some of his Irish and a Manchester Battalion are fighting +well and clearing Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Until this morning bullets from +that ridge were falling on "A" Beach; now the working parties are not in +any way disturbed. + +_9th August, 1915. Imbros._ With the first streak of dawn I was up on +the bridge with my glasses. The hills are so covered with scrub that it +was hard to see what was going on in that uncertain light, but the +heavyish shrapnel fire was a bad sign and the fact that the enemy's guns +were firing from a knoll a few hundred yards East of Anafarta Sagir was +proof that our troops were not holding Tekke Tepe. But the Officer of +the Watch said that the small hours passed quietly; no firing ashore +during the hours of darkness. Could not make head or tail of it! + +As the light grew stronger some of ours could be seen pushing up the +western slopes of the long spur running out South-west from Anafarta. +The scrub was so thick that they had to climb together and +follow-my-leader along what appeared to be cattle tracks up the hill. On +our right all seemed going very well. Looking through naval telescopes +we thought--we all thought--Ismail Oglu Tepe height was won. Very soon +the shrapnel got on to those bunches of men on our left and there was +something like a stampede from North to South. Looking closer we could +see the enemy advancing behind their own bursting shrapnel and rolling +up our line from the left on to the centre. Oh for the good "Queen +Bess," her high command, and her 15-inch shrapnel! One broadside and +these Turks would go scampering down to Gehenna. The enemy +counter-attack was coming from the direction of Tekke Tepe and moving +over the foothills and plain on Sulajik. Our centre made a convulsive +effort (so it seemed) to throw back the steadily advancing Turks; three +or four companies (they looked like) moved out from the brush about +Sulajik and tried to deploy. But the shrapnel got on to these fellows +also and I lost sight of them. Then about 6 a.m., the whole lot seemed +suddenly to collapse:--including the right! Not only did they give +ground but they came back--some of them--half-way to the sea. But others +made a stand. The musketry fire got very heavy. The enemy were making a +supreme effort. The Turkish shell fire grew hotter and hotter. The +enemy's guns seemed now to be firing not only from round about Anafarta +Sagir, but also from somewhere between 113 and 101, 2,500 yards or so +South-west of Anafarta. Still these fellows of ours; not more than a +quarter of those on the ground at the outset--stuck it out. My heart +has grown tough amidst the struggles of the Peninsula but the misery of +this scene well nigh broke it. What kept me going was the sight of Sari +Bair--I could not keep my eyes off the Sari Bair ridge. Guns from all +sides, sea and land, Turks and British, were turned on to it and +enormous explosions were sending slices off the top of the high mountain +to mix with the clouds in the sky. Under that canopy our men were +fighting for dear life far above us! + +Between 7.30 and 8.0 the Turkish reinforcements at Suvla seemed to have +got enough. They did not appear to be in any great strength: here and +there they fell back: no more came up in support: evidently, they were +being held: failure, not disaster, was the upshot: few things so bad +they might not be worse. By 8.0 the musketry and the shelling began to +slacken down although there was a good deal of desultory shooting. We +were holding our own; the Welsh Division are coming in this morning; but +we have not sweated blood only to hold our own; our occupation of the +open key positions has been just too late! The element of +surprise--wasted! The prime factor set aside for the sake of other +factors! Words are no use. + +Looked at from the bridge of the _Triad_--not a bad observation +station--the tendency of our men to get into little groups was very +noticeable: as if they had not been trained in working under fire in the +open. As to the general form of our attack against the hills on our +right, it seemed to be what our French Allies call _decousu_. After a +whole day's rest and preparing, there might have been more form and +shape about the movement. Yet it was for the sake of this form and shape +that the Turkish reinforcements have been given time to get on to the +heights. Our stratagems worked well, but there is a time limit set to +all make-believes; the hour glass of fate was set at forty-eight hours, +and now the sands have run out. + +Before going over to Anzac I had to get hold of Stopford so as to hear +what news had come in from Hammersley and from Mahon. If only Mahon is +pushing forward to Ejelmer Bay and can occupy the high range to the East +of it that would make amends for much. After breakfast, therefore, at +8.30 got into a launch and landed at Ghazi Baba with young Brodrick as +my only companion. Our boat took us into a deep, narrow creek cut by +nature into the sheer rock just by Ghazi Baba--a name only; there is +nothing to distinguish that spot from any other. Along the beach +feverish activity; stores, water, ammunition, all the wants of an army +being landed. Walking up the lower slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, we found +Stopford, about four or five hundred yards East of Ghazi Baba, busy with +part of a Field Company of Engineers supervising the building of some +splinter-proof Headquarters huts for himself and Staff. He was absorbed +in the work, and he said that it would be well to make a thorough good +job of the dug-outs as we should probably be here for a very long time. +I retorted, "Devil a bit; within a day or two you will be picking the +best of the Anafarta houses for your billet." + +From the spot he had selected the whole of Suvla Bay and the Salt Lake +lay open; also the Anafartas and Yilghin Burnu. But, being on a lower +spur of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, his post was "dead" to the fighting taking +place along the crest of Kiretch Tepe Sirt itself. I remarked on this +and asked what news of the Irish, saying that now we were certainly +forestalled at Yilghin Burnu and, apparently, on Tekke Tepe also, it was +doubly essential Mahon should make a clean sweep of the ridge. Stopford +said he was confident he would be able to do so, aided as he would be by +the fire from the ships in the harbour--a fire which enfiladed the whole +length of this feature. + +As to this morning's hold up, Stopford took it philosophically, which +was well so far as it went, but he seemed hardly to realize that the +Turks have rushed their guns and reinforcements here from a very long +way off whilst he has been creeping along at the rate of a mile a day. +Stopford expected Hammersley would be in to report progress in person; +he will keep me well posted in his news and he understands that the +Welsh Division will be at his disposal to help the 11th Division. + +As Stopford could give me no recent news from Mahon I suggested I should +go and find out from him personally how matters then stood. Stopford +said it was a good idea but that he himself thought it better not to +leave his Headquarters where messages kept coming in. I agreed and +started with George Brodrick to scale the hill. + +About half a mile up we struck a crowd of the Irish Pioneer Regiment +(Granard's) filling their water bottles at a well marked on the map as +Charak Cheshme. In their company we now made our way Northwards along a +path through fairly thick scrub as high as a man's waist. We were moving +parallel to, and about 300 yards below, the crestline of the ridge. When +we had gone another mile a spattering of "overs" began to fall around +like the first heavy drops of a thunderstorm. So wrapped in cotton wool +is a now-a-days Commander-in-Chief that this was the first musketry fire +I could claim to have come under since the beginning of the war. To sit +in a trench and hear flights of bullets flop into the sandbag parapet, +or pass harmlessly overhead, is hardly to be under fire. An irregular +stream of Irishmen were walking up the path along with us; one of them +was hit just ahead of me. He caught it in the thigh and stretcher men +whipped him off in a jiffy. At last we got to a spot some 2-1/2 miles +from Suvla and had not yet been able to find Mahon. So I sat down behind +a stone, somewhere about the letter "K" of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and sent +young Brodrick to espy the land. He found that we had pulled up within a +couple of hundred yards of the Brigade Headquarters, where portions of +the 30th, 31st and 34th Brigades (sounds very formidable but only five +Battalions) were holding a spur and preparing to make an attack. General +Mahon was actually in the Brigade Headquarters (a tiny ditch which only +held four or five people) and came back to where I was sitting. He is +angry, and small wonder, at the chaos introduced somehow into the Corps. +He is commanding some of Hammersley's men and Hammersley has the bulk of +his at the far extremity of the line of battle. He besought me to do my +utmost to get Hill and his troops back to their own command. + +I told him G.H.Q. had always understood Stopford would land his, +Mahon's, two Brigades intact at A Beach. When the naval people could not +find a beach at A, they, presumably with Stopford's concurrence, had +most unluckily dumped them ashore several miles South at C Beach. This +was the cause of the mix-up of his Division which Stopford, no doubt, +would take in hand as soon as he could. Mahon seemed in fighting form. +He said he could clear the whole of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, but that he did +not want to lose men in making frontal attacks, so he was trying to work +round South through the thick scrub so as to shift the enemy that way. +He had reckoned five or six hundred men were against him--gendarmes. But +there were more than there had been at daylight. My talk with Mahon made +me happier. Here, at least, was someone who had an idea of what he was +doing. The main thing was to attack before more Turks came down the +coast. My own idea would certainly have been to knock the Turks out by a +bayonet charge--right there. So far they had not had time to dig a +regular trench, only a few shallow scrapings along a natural fold of the +ground. If Mahon wished to make a turning movement, then, I think, he +would have been well advised to take it by the North where the ground +over which he must advance was not only unentrenched and clear of brush, +but also laid quite open to the supporting fire of the Fleet. But I kept +these views to myself until I could see Stopford; said good-bye to Mahon +and wished him luck; found Brodrick had wandered off on his own to see +the fun at close quarters; legged it, all alone, down the open southern +slope of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt and got down into ground less open to +snipers' fire from the scrub-covered plain.[7] Then, still quite alone, +I made my way back South-west towards Ghazi Baba on Suvla Bay. After a +little I was joined by two young Irish soldiers. I don't know who or +what they took me for; certainly not for the Generalissimo. They came +along with me and discussed identical adventures from diametrically +different standpoints. One, in fact, was an optimist; the other a +pessimist. One found fault with the war for not giving him enough +hardship and adventure; the other was entirely fed up with adventures +and hardships. This seems a trivial incident to jot down amidst issues +so tremendous, but life is life, and my chat with these youngsters put +some new life into me. Nearing the shore, I again struck Stopford's +Headquarters, now beginning to look habitable. Braithwaite, and one or +two others of my Staff turned up from Imbros at that moment. He shoved +some cables into my hand and hastened off to interview Reed. Helles and +Anzac have been duly warned we are both here for a few hours; all the +component parts of my machine, its cranks, levers, pulleys, are +assembled at Imbros, and G.H.Q. simply cannot be left under a junior +much longer. Meanwhile I told Stopford about Mahon and the gendarmes. +When I said that the sooner the Kiretch Tepe nettle was grasped the less +it would sting, he informed me he had issued an order that Commanders +were not to lose men by making frontal attacks on trenches but were to +turn them. + +So here is a theory which South African practice proved to be more often +wrong than right being treated as an axiom at Gallipoli! + +We next went into the question of digging a defensive line of trenches +half-way between Corps Headquarters and Mahon's force. Here we were in +accord. No man knows his luck and the tide may turn any moment. Both at +Liao-Yang and the Shaho the Japanese began to dig deep trenches directly +they captured a position. + +Young Brodrick rejoined me here; rather anxious at having lost me. He +had found Mahon with the Brigade Staff. He had been shown the exact +positions on a rough sketch map made by one of the Officers. We had +three Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve. The gendarmerie +had been reinforced and were now estimated at 700 without machine guns +or artillery. We had a mountain battery shelling the gendarmes and a +monitor occasionally gave them a big fellow. The Brigade Staff had said +nothing to him about a battalion working round to the South. I repeated +this to Stopford and begged him to make a push for it here. + +By now Braithwaite had finished with Reed, so we hurriedly discussed his +budget of news. Hammersley is expected but he has not turned up yet. +Indeed the situation is still by no means free from anxiety although the +arrival of the Welsh Division gives confidence. A battalion of the 32nd +Brigade did get up on to Tekke Tepe last night, it seems, but were +knocked off this morning before they had time to entrench.[8] Seeing +they should have had several hours time to dig in, that seems strange. +Braithwaite handed me a bunch of signals and wires; also the news of +what I had known at the back of my mind since morning,--the fact that we +had not got Sari Bair! Then we started back to see de Robeck and Keyes. +For the first time in this expedition Roger Keyes seemed down on his +luck: we had often before seen him raging, never dejected. These awful +delays:--delay in landing the Irish; delay in attacking on the 7th; +delay all night of the 7th; delay during the day of the 8th and night of +the 8th, have simply deprived him of the power of speech,--to soldiers, +that is to say, though, to shipmates, no doubt...! + +Now for Anzac. Since dawn a fever about Anzac had held me. Shades of +Staff College Professors, from you no forgiveness to a Chief who runs +about the mountain quitting his central post. But the luminous shade of +Napoleon would better understand my desperation. Some Generals are just +accumulators of the will of the C.-in-C. When that is the case, and when +they run down, there is only one man who can hope to pump in energy. + +Exact at noon Roger Keyes and I pushed off in the racing motor boat. On +our way we stopped at "C" beach and picked up Commander Worsley. Next to +Anzac, but at the Cove, found that Birdwood had left word he would meet +me at the ex-Turkish Post No. 2,--so, as the water was shoal in spots, +we rowed down there in a dinghy, along the shore where our lives would +not have been worth half a minute's purchase just three days ago. + +After scrambling awhile over the new trenches, Birdwood, Godley and I +sat down on a high spur above Godley's Headquarters which gave us a +grand outlook over the whole Suvla area, and across to Chunuk Bair. Here +we ate our rations and held an impromptu council of war; Shaw, +commanding the new 13th Division, joining in with us. All three Generals +were in high spirits and refused to allow themselves to be damped down +by the repulse of the morning's attack on the high ridge. They put down +that check to the lethargy of Suvla. Had Stopford taken up any point on +the watershed yesterday when it was unoccupied except by some fugitives, +the whole Turkish position on the Peninsula would have become so +critical that they could not have spared the numbers they have now +brought up to defend "Q" and Koja Chemen Tepe. The Anzac Generals +allowed that they themselves had got into arrears in their time tables, +but they had been swift compared to Suvla. + +Even as Godley was holding forth, messages came to hand to say that the +Turks were passing from the defensive to the offensive and urging fresh +attacks on the New Zealanders holding Chunuk Bair. Godley is certain the +Turks will never make us quit hold. Shaw, who also has some of his men +up there, is equally confident. Birdwood thinks Chunuk Bair should be +safe, though not so safe as it would have been had we held on to that +ridge at "Q" where Baldwin's delay from causes not yet known, lost us +the crestline this morning. Birdie said he could have cried, and is not +quite sure he didn't cry, when the bombardment stopped dead and minute +after minute passed away, from one minute to twenty, without a sign +of Baldwin and his column who had been booked to spurt for the top on +the heels of the last shell. Unaided, the 6th Gurkhas got well astride +the ridge, but had to fall back owing to the lack of his support. None +the less, these Anzac Generals are in great form. They are sure they +will have the whip hand of the Narrows by to-morrow. + +[Illustration: GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. _"Elliott and +Fry" phot._] + +Birdie was offered my last reserves, the 54th Essex Territorials under +Inglefield. But he can't water them. The effort to carry food, water and +cartridges to the firing lines is already overtaxing the Corps. If +Inglefield's men were also pushed in they simply could not be kept +going. When communication trenches have been dug and brushwood and rocks +flattened out, it will be easier. Till then, the Generals agreed they +would rather the extra pressure was applied from Suvla. Birdwood and +Godley were keen, in fact, that the Essex Division should go to Stopford +so that he might at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could, Tekke Tepe. +All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves, or heard from their own +extreme left or from aeroplanes, leads them to believe that the Turkish +reinforcements to the Suvla theatre came over the high shoulder of Tekke +Tepe or through Anafarta Sagir about dawn this morning and that the +enemy are in some strength now along the ridge between Anafarta Sagir +and Ismail Oglu Tepe with a few hundred on Kiretch Tepe Sirt: the +Turkish centre was a gift to us yesterday; certainly yesterday forenoon; +now it can only be won by hard fighting. But the Turks have not yet had +time to work round on to the high ridges east of Suvla Bay and although +a few Turks did pass over Kavak Tepe, it seems to be now clear of any +enemy. There is no sign of life on the bare Eastern slope of that +mountain. Probably one half of the great crescent of hills which +encircles the Suvla plain and, in places, should overlook the Narrows, +still lies open to an advance. + +So together we composed a message to Stopford and Godley sent it off by +telephone--now rigged up between the two Corps Headquarters: the form +was filled in by Godley; hence his counter signature:-- + + * * * * * + + TO:--G.O.C., IXth Corps. + + Sender's number. Day of month. In reply to + N.Z.G. 103 9 number AAA + + After speaking to Birdwood and Godley + think most important use fresh troops could + be put to if not urgently required to reinforce + would be the occupation as early as possible + of the commanding position running through + square 137-119 AAA Ismail Oglu Tepe are + less vital to security of base. + SIR IAN HAMILTON. + + _From_ + _Place_ Fisherman's Hut. + _Date_ 2 p.m. 9th August, 1915. + + A. J. GODLEY, + Maj. Gen. + + * * * * * + +Took leave of the Anzacs and the Anzac Generals about 4.30 p.m. The +whole crowd were in tip-top spirits and immensely pleased with the +freedom and largeness of their newly conquered kingdom. We of the G.H.Q. +were bitten by this same spirit; Suvla took second place in our minds +and when we got on board the _Arno_ the ugly events of the early morning +had been shaken, for the moment, out of our minds. But, on the sail +home, we were able to look at the Peninsula as a whole. Because the +Anzacs, plus the 13th Division of the New Army, had carried through a +brilliant stroke of arms was a reason, not for shutting our eyes to the +slowness of the Suvla Generals, but for spurring them on to do likewise. +There is nothing open to them now--not without efforts for which they +are, for the time being, unfit--but Kavak Tepe and the Aja Liman +Anafarta ridge. So, on arrival at 6 p.m., wrote out the following +message from myself to General Stopford:-- + + * * * * * + +"I am in complete sympathy with you in the matter of all your Officers +and men being new to this style of warfare and without any leaven of +experienced troops on which to form themselves. Still I should be wrong +if I did not express my concern at the want of energy and push displayed +by the 11th Division. It cannot all be want of experience as 13th have +shown dash and self-confidence. Turks were almost negligible yesterday +once you got ashore. To-day there was nothing to stop determined +commanders leading such fine men as yours. Tell me what is wrong with +the 11th Division. Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both? +I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once and can also supply +two competent Brigadiers. You must get a move on or the whole plan of +operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't secure the AJA +LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without delay the enemy will. You must use your +personal influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action against +the weak forces of the Turks in your front, and while agreeing to the +capture of W Hills and spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day, +it is of vital importance to the whole operation that you thereafter +promptly take steps to secure the ridge without possession of which +SUVLA BAY is not safe. You must face casualties and strike while the +opportunity offers and remember the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your +principal and dominant objective and it must be captured. Every day's +delay in its capture will enormously multiply your casualties. I want +the name of the Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was +retiring owing to a strong attack and then subsequently reported that +the attack in question has never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as he +may be able to help you on your right flank." + +[Illustration: LIEUT. GEN SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. _"Elliott +and Fry phot."_] + +This message seemed so important that it was sent by hand of +Hore-Ruthven and another Officer by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells +me that, when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day he showed General +Stopford the last two paragraphs of this memo which I had written when +toning down the wording of a General Staff draft:-- + + * * * * * + +"C.G.S. + +"(1) I do not think much good rubbing it into these fellows, there are +very few Turks opposed to them. We have done it, and that was right, but +we must not overdo it. + +"(2) But the men ought to be made to understand that really the whole +result of this campaign may depend on their quickly getting a footing on +the hills right and left of Anafarta. Officers and rank and file must be +made to grasp this. + +"(3) If Lindley and his new men were kept intact and thrown in on the +Anzac flank, surely they ought to be able to make a lodgment. + + (_Initialled_), "IAN H." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 2: Must have meant south-east?--IAN H., 1920.] + +[Footnote 3: Long afterwards--long after the Dardanelles Commission had +finished their Report--I had the curiosity to get permission to look at +the log of the _Exmouth_ (Rear-Admiral Nicholson) to see how my cable +had been translated. Here it is, very much Bowdlerized:--"Sent 11.45, +received 11.59. Sir I. Hamilton to Rear-Admiral 3. Urgent. 'Understand +_Arno_ drawing fires. Can this be stopped and _Arno_ sent (to) +_Mercedes_ to water at once? _Arno_ specially put at my disposal by +Vice-Admiral and I may require her at any moment.'" The _Mercedes_ was +the ship with our military drinking water.] + +[Footnote 4: There is a hiatus in my diary here which I must try and +bridge over by a footnote especially as my story seems to run off the +rails when I say that "nothing further" had come in from Suvla. At 10.50 +a.m. a further cable did come in from Suvla:-- + + * * * * * + +"Approximate position of troops under General Hammersley this morning. +Two battalions 33rd Brigade sea to S.E. corner of Salt Lake: will be +moved forward shortly to connect if possible with Anzac troops. Two +battalions 33rd holding Yilghin Burnu. Position on Hill 500 yards East +Yilghin Burnu not yet certain. From Yilghin Burnu 31st Brigade holds +line through Baka Baba crossroads, thence North to about 118 0 2. 32nd +and 34th Brigades ordered forward from Hill 10 (117 R) where they spent +night to line 118 M.R.W. to fill gap with Tenth Division. Detailed +information of Tenth Division not yet definite: will report later. +Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops under him deserve great +credit for result attained against strenuous opposition and great +difficulty." + +Manifestly, the data in this cable were not enough to enable me to form +any opinion of my own as to the credit due to anyone; but every soldier +will understand that it was up to me to respond: + + "To G.O.C. 8th Corps. + + "From General Sir Ian Hamilton. + +"You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please tell Hammersley +how much we hope from his able and rapid advance." + +I made no written note of this 10.50 a.m. cable (or of my reply to it) +at the time and, eighteen months later, no mental note of it remained, +probably because it had only added some detail to the news received +during the night. But I had reason to regret this afterwards when I came +to read the final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, paragraph 89. +There I see it stated that "with regard to this message" (my pat on the +back for Hammersley) "Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that the result +of the operations on the night of the 6th and day of the 7th was not as +satisfactory as he would have liked but he gathered from Sir Ian +Hamilton's congratulations that his dispositions and orders had met with +the latter's approval" + +As to my actual feelings that forenoon, I do remember them well. At +sunrise victory seemed assured. As morning melted into mid-day my mind +became more and more uneasy at the scant news about the Irish Division +and at the lack of news of a further advance of the 11th Division. This +growing anxiety drove me to quit my headquarters and to take ship for +Suvla.] + +[Footnote 5: The Admiral's wireless had said, so I was told:--"It is +important we should meet--shall I come to Kephalos or are you coming to +Suvla?" As stated in text I did not get this cable at the time nor did I +ever get it. Four years later the signal logs of the only ships through +which the message could have passed; viz., _Triad_, _Exmouth_, +_Chatham_, were searched and there is no trace of it. So I think it must +have been drafted and overlooked.--IAN H., 1920. + +Aspinall's cable:--"Just been ashore where I found all quiet AAA. No +rifle fire, no artillery fire and apparently no Turks AAA. IXth Corps +resting AAA. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and +look upon the situation as serious." I received this next morning from +Braithwaite.--IAN H., 1920.] + +[Footnote 6: Looking to the distance of Sulajik, the Brigade might have +been expected to move in about an hour and a half. But, as I did not +know at the time, or indeed till two years later, this Brigade was _not_ +concentrated. Only two battalions were at Sulajik; the other two, the +6th East Yorks and the 9th West Yorks, were in possession of Hill 70, +vide map.--IAN H., 1920.] + +[Footnote 7: My Aide-de-Camp, George Brodrick, has permitted me to use +the following extract from a letter of his written to his father, Lord +Midleton, at the time. + + * * * * * + +"I went to Suvla with Sir Ian in the afternoon of August 8th, and we +arrived to find 'Nothing doing.' The beaches and hillsides covered with +our men almost like a Bank Holiday evening at Hampstead Heath. Vague +shelling by one of our monitors was the only thing which broke the peace +of a most perfect evening--a glorious sunset. + +"We went over to the Destroyer where General Stopford had his +Headquarters, and I fancy words of exhortation were spoken to him. We +slept on the Triad, Admiral de Robeck's Yacht. I had a camp bed on the +Bridge, so as to hear any happenings during the night. About dawn our +Monitors started to shell the heights behind Anafarta and a sort of +assault was made; the Turkish battery opened with shrapnel, and our +fellows did not seem to get very far. + +"We went ashore on 'A' beach about 8 a.m. and walked up to Stopford's +Headquarters, as he had gone ashore the night before. They all seemed a +very lifeless crew, with but little knowledge of the general situation +and no spirit in them. We made our way on across some rocky scrubby +country towards Brigade Headquarters; fairly heavy rifle fire was going +on, and after about two miles bullets began to ping unpleasantly all +round us. I persuaded Sir Ian to lie down behind a rock, much against +his will, and went on myself another 150 yards to where the Brigade +Staff were sitting in a dip behind a stone wall. They told me that about +800 Turks were in front of them with no machine guns. We had 3 +Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve and yet could not get +on."] + +[Footnote 8: Only one Company we hear now.--IAN H., 15.8.15.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + + +KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES + + +_10th August, 1915. Imbros._ Had to remain at G.H.Q. all day--the worst +of all days. My visit to Anzac yesterday had infected me with the hopes +of Godley and Birdwood and made me feel that we would recover what we +had missed at Suvla, and more, if, working from the pivot of Chunuk +Bair, we got hold of the rest of Sari Bair. + +They believed they would bring this off and then the victory would have +been definite. Now--Chunuk Bair has gone! + +The New Zealand and New Army troops holding the knoll were relieved by +two New Army Battalions and, at daylight this morning, the Turks simply +ran amok among them with a Division in mass formation. Trenches badly +sited, they say, and Turks able to form close by in dead ground. Many +reasons no doubt and lack of swift pressure from Suvla. The Turks have +lost their fear of Stopford and concentrated full force against the +Anzacs. By Birdie's message, it looks as if the heavy fighting was at an +end--an end which leaves us with a fine gain of ground though minus the +vital crests. Next time we will get them. We are close up to the summit +instead of having five or six hundred feet to climb. + +News from Suvla still rotten. Here is the result of Hammersley's visit +to Stopford after I left:-- + + * * * * * + + "August 9. 5.35. Suvla Bay. + + "DEAR BRAITHWAITE, + +"I have had a talk with Hammersley and he tells me that his troops are +much exhausted, have had very heavy fighting, severe losses and have +felt the want of water very much. He does not consider that they are fit +to make a fresh attack to-morrow. + +"I have decided after consultation with him to make an attempt on the +ridge about Abrikja with three fresh Territorial Battalions and six +which have been used to-day. I am afraid from what I hear that the Naval +guns do not have much effect on account of difficulty of accurate +observation but I will arrange a programme, to be carefully timed, with +Brigadier-General Smith, my Brigadier R.A., and of course all the field +guns will also help. I _must_ see Smith so please ask the V. Admiral to +place a boat at Smith's disposal to bring him here to see me and then to +see Generals Hammersley and Lindley. General Lindley will be in +immediate command of the operations as all troops engaged in the attack +will be Territorials. + +"I trust the attack will succeed though to-day's did not, but in view of +the urgency of the matter I feel the attempt ought to be made. + +"It is absolutely necessary that I should see Smith. + + "Yours sincerely, + (_Sd._) "FRED W. STOPFORD." + +At mid-day, got a cable from the 9th Corps saying that Lindley's +Division had duly gone at Hill 70, a key feature on the ridge, about +1,500 yards North-east of Yilghin Burnu--and had failed! + +In giving me this news, Stopford proposes to make a second attack this +afternoon with the same Division. Have caused Braithwaite to cable: + + * * * * * + +"Hear you propose attacking again. Chief doubts advisability with tired +troops after morning's failure; if you agree consolidate where you are +and rest and reorganize." + +In a letter from Stopford in answer to my signal of yesterday from +Fisherman's Hut, he says:-- + + "No. 1. _Date_, Aug. 9. _Time_, 4 p.m. + + _Place_, Suvla Bay. + + "To: + + "DEAR SIR IAN, + +"I have received your message from Fisherman's Hut. Hammersley has not +been able to advance to-day, but the Turks have been counter-attacking +all day and he has had to put in one of the Territorial Brigades to +prevent being driven back. + +"I quite realize the importance of holding the high ground East of Suvla +Bay, but as the Turks advance through the gap between the two Anafartas +where all the roads are, it is absolutely necessary to keep sufficient +troops between Anafarta Sagir and Ismail Oglu Tepe, as otherwise if I +were to seize the high ground between Anafarta Sagir and Ejelmer Bay +without securing this gap, I might find myself holding the heights and +the Turks pouring down to the harbour behind me. I will bear what you +say in mind, and if I get an opportunity with fresh troops of taking the +heights whilst holding on tight to my right flank I will do so. I +understand that one reason why it was necessary to go for Ismail Oglu +Tepe was that if I did not hold the Turks there they would fire into the +rear of Birdwood's troops attacking Hill 305. + + "I am, Sir, + "Yours sincerely, + (_Sd._) "FRED W. STOPFORD." + +For myself I wish the Turks would try to pour down over that flat, open +country by the Salt Lake to seize the beaches under the guns of the +warships. + + * * * * * + +Well, we had Chunuk Bair in our hands the best part of two days and two +nights. So far the Turks have never retaken trenches once we had fairly +taken hold. Have they done so now? I hope not. Birdie and Godley are at +work upon a scheme for its recapture. The Turks are well commanded: that +I admit. Their Generals knew they were done unless they could quickly +knock us off our Chunuk Bair. So they have done it. Never mind: never +say die. Meanwhile we have the East Anglian Division available +to-morrow, and I have been over in the G.S. marquee working out ways and +means of taking Kavak Tepe which may also give us an outlook, more +distant, but yet an outlook, on to the Dardanelles. + +_11th August, 1915. Imbros._ Did not dare to break away from the wire +ends. A see-saw of cardinal events between Suvla and Anzac. + +A workable scheme of attack has now been put into such shape as to let +Stopford dovetail his Corps orders into it, and first thing sent him +this cable:-- + + * * * * * + +"G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. General Commanding wishes 54th Division Infantry +to attack line Kavak Tepe peak 1195.5. at dawn to-morrow after night +march to foothills; G.S.O. proceeding with detailed instructions. See +Inglefield, make arrangements and give all assistance possible by +landing 53rd Signal Company, water gear and tools. 53rd Division becomes +general reserve." + +At 4.30 p.m., a letter from Stopford anent the failure of the 53rd +Division,--depressing in itself but still more so in its inferences as +to the 54th Division. He says these troops showed "no attacking spirit +at all. They did not come under heavy shell fire nor was the rifle fire +very severe, but they not only showed no dash in attack but went back at +slight provocation and went back a long way. Lots of the men lay down +behind cover, etc. They went on when called upon to do so by Staff and +other Officers but they seemed lost and under no leadership--in fact, +they showed that they are not fit to put in the field without the help +of Regulars. I really believe that if we had had one Brigade of Regulars +here to set an example both the New Army and Territorials would have +played up well with them but they have no standard to go by." + +Worse follows, for Stopford takes back his assurance given me after my +cable of the 9th when he said, "given water, guns and ammunition, I have +no doubt about our being able to secure the hills." He tells me straight +and without any beating about the bush, "I am sure they" (the +Territorials) "would not secure the hills with any amount of guns, water +and ammunition assuming ordinary opposition, as the attacking spirit was +absent; chiefly owing to the want of leadership by the Officers." + +Ignoring our Kavak Tepe scheme, he goes on then to ask me in so many +words, not to try any attack with the 54th Division but to stick them +into trenches. + +This letter has driven me very nearly to my wits' ends. Things can't be +so bad! None of us have any complaint at all of the New Army troops; +only of their Old Army Generals. Stopford says the 13th Division were +not reliable when they were at Helles, whereas now, under Godley at +Anzac they have fought like lions. + +Rushed off in this, the good tub _Imogene_ (Lieutenant-Commander Potts). +There the rushing ceased as she steamed along so slowly that we didn't +get to Suvla till 7 p.m. Walked up with Braithwaite and Freddie to the +9th Corps Headquarters. Saw Stopford. Wrestled with him for over an +hour; Braithwaite doing ditto with Reed. + +Stopford urged that these last two Territorial formations sent out to us +were sucked oranges, the good in them having been drafted away into +France and replaced by rejections. He says he would have walked on to +the watershed the first day had we only stiffened his force with the +29th Division. There happened to be some pretty decisive objections but +there was no use entering into them then. So I merely told him that the +9th Corps and the Territorials being now well ashore we may be able to +bring up the 29th. No doubt--had we a couple of Regular Divisions +here--British or Indian--at full strength--no doubt we could astonish +the world. Having the 53rd and the 54th Divisions, half-trained and at +half strength, I tried to make Stopford see we must cut our coats with +the stuff issued to us. The 54th were good last winter, and, even if the +best have been picked out of them, the residue should do well under +sound leadership: Inglefield was a practised old warrior, and would not +let him down. + +There was nothing solid to go upon in crying down the credit of the 54th +beyond hearsay and the self-evident fact that they are half their +nominal strength. To assume they won't put up a fight is a certain way +of making the best troops gun-shy. We are standing up to our necks in a +time problem, and the tide is on the rise. There is not a moment to +spare. The Turks have reinforced and they have brought back their guns; +that is true. Now they will begin to dig trenches--indeed they are +already digging--and more and more enemy troops will be placed in +reserve behind the Anafartas and to the East of the Tekke Tepe--Ejelmer +Bay range. On the 10th the Helles people reported that, in spite of +their efforts to hold the Turks, they had detached reinforcements to the +North. These extra reinforcements may arrive to-morrow at Anzac or on +the Anafartas; but, for at least another twenty four hours, they will +not be able to get round to the high ridge between Anafarta and Ejelmer +Bay. So far as can be seen by aeroplane scouting, this ridge is still +unoccupied; certainly it is unentrenched. + +Stopford who, at first, was dead set on digging agreed to have a dart at +Kavak Tepe. He will throw the 54th at it. He will turn out the 9th Corps +and, if chance offers, they will attack along their own front. His chief +remaining ghost inhabits the jungly bit of country between Anafarta Ova +and the foothills. In that belt he fears the Turkish snipers may harass +our line of supply so that, when the heights are held, we may find it +hard to feed and water our garrison. The New Armies and Territorials +have no trained counter-snipers and are much at the mercy of the skilled +Anatolian shikarris who haunt the close country. + +So I suggested blockhouses on the South African system to protect our +line where it passed through the three quarters of a mile or so of close +country. The enemy artillery would not spot them amongst the trees. I +promised him also one hundred picked Australian bushmen, New Zealand +Maoris and Gurkhas to act as scouts and counter-snipers. + +Stopford took to this idea very kindly; has fixed up a Conference of 9th +Corps and Territorial Generals early to-morrow morning to discuss the +whole plan, and will make every effort to occupy Kavak Tepe to-morrow +night. Stopford seemed in much better form to-night; I think he is more +fit: there has been 24 hours' delay but by waiting that time Inglefield +and the Essex will have the help of a body of first-class scouts--quite +a luminous notion. Stopford, himself, presides at to-morrow's +Conference. Inglefield is a good, straight fellow, not so young as we +were in South Africa, but quite all right. + +Boarded the _Imogene_. Dropped anchor at 11 p.m. at Imbros. + +_12th August, 1915. Imbros._ Last thing last night Stopford promised to +let me know the result of the conference to be held at his Headquarters, +and upon the plans for the lines of supply. Sent him a reminder:-- + + * * * * * + +"G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. Have you arranged practical system for supplying +troops in the event of Tekke Tepe ridge being secured?" + +A cable from K.:-- + + * * * * * + +"I am sorry about the Xth and XIth Divisions in which I had great +confidence. Could you not ginger them up? The utmost energy and dash +are required for these operations or they will again revert to trench +warfare." + +K.'s disappointment makes me feel _sick_! I know the great hopes he has +built on these magnificent Divisions and I know equally well that he is +not capable of understanding how he has cut his own throat, the men's +throats and mine, by not sending young and up-to-date Generals to run +them. K. in this, and this alone, is with Tolstoi. The men are +everything; the man nothing. Have cabled back saying, "I am acting +absolutely as you indicate by 'ginger'; I only got back at 11 last night +from a further application of that commodity. As a result a fresh attack +will be made to-morrow morning by the IXth Corps and the LIVth +Division." + +As to the New Army I point out to K. that "they are fighting under +conditions quite foreign to their training and moreover they have no +regulars to set them a standard": also, (and pray Heaven it is truth) +"Everyone is fully alive to the necessity for dash, so I trust the +attack of to-morrow will be much better done than were the two previous +attempts." + +Hardly had my cable to K. been despatched when Stopford gives us a +sample specimen of "dash" by his answer to my reminder. He wires:-- + + * * * * * + +"IXth Corps to G.H.Q. I foresee very great difficulty. The only system +possible at first probably will be convoy under escort." + +Twelve hours ago, more or less, Stopford had agreed that there was a +difficulty which it was up to him to solve and that, at first, (i.e., +till blockhouses had been built) the system would be convoy under +escort. We ask him what he had done, expecting to get the particulars +worked out by his Staff after the conference of Generals, and this is +the reply! + +Five minutes later, in came another wire giving the general situation at +Suvla; saying the 53rd Division had failed to clear ground from which +the right of the advance of the 54th Division might be threatened, and +that Stopford wished to postpone his night march another four and twenty +hours. + +So this is the result of our "ginger," and Braithwaite or I must rush +over to Suvla at once. Meanwhile, tactics and Kavak Tepe must wait. + +Wired back:-- + + * * * * * + +"In the circumstances the operation for to-morrow is postponed. Chief +sending C.G.S. over now to see you." + +Braithwaite went: is back now: has seen both Stopford and Reed: has +agreed (with a sad heart) on my behalf to the night march being put off +another twenty four hours. + +Have had, therefore, to cable K. again, shouldering the heavy blame of +this further delay:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 545). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. After +anxiously weighing the pros and cons, I have decided that it is wiser to +wait another 24 hours before carrying out the general attack mentioned +in my No. M.F. 543. Braithwaite has just returned from the IXth Corps, +and he found that the spirit and general organization were improving +rapidly. A small attack by a Brigade, which promised well, was in +progress. This morning the Xth Division captured a trench." + +The story of the Suvla Council of War:--At first the Generals were for +fighting. Inglefield, of the LIVth, who is told off for the attack, was +keen. All he asked was, a clean start from Anafarta Ova. If his Division +could jump off, intact and fresh, from that well-watered half-way house, +Kavak Tepe was his. The LIIIrd Division for their part agreed to make +good Anafarta Ova; to clear out the snipers and to hold the place as a +base for the LIVth. + +So at 10 a.m. Stopford issued orders saying the LIVth must march off at +4 p.m. moving East of Anafarta Ova. Then,--when at last all seemed +settled, in came a message from the G.O.C. LIIIrd Division, saying he +could not undertake to clear Anafarta Ova of snipers and to hold it as a +cover to the advance of the LIVth. + +Stopford thereupon cancelled his first order, and, at 1.15 p.m., issued +fresh orders directing the LIVth Division _to send in one of their own +Brigades_ as an advance guard to clear the ground up to a point East of +Anafarta Ova. Braithwaite stayed at Corps Headquarters at Suvla until +this Brigade, the 163rd, was moving on Anafarta Ova driving the snipers +before them. Mahon, too, after sitting for three days where I left him +on the morning of the 9th, has got tired of looking at the gendarmes +and has carried their trenches by the forbidden frontal bayonet charge +without much trouble or loss although, naturally, these trenches have +been strengthened during the interval. + +Amidst these tactical miss-fires entered Hankey. He has had a cable from +his brother Secretary, Bonham Carter, saying the Prime Minister wishes +him to stay on longer and that Lord K. would like to know if he can do +anything to give an impetus to the operations. Hankey showed me this +cable; also his answer:-- + + * * * * * + +"Reference your 6910. I am glad to stay as desired. The chief thing you +could send to help the present operations would be more ammunition. For +supplies already sent everyone is most grateful. It is also important +that units should be kept up to strength. + +"As General Officer Commanding has already apprised you fully of the +situation I have nothing to add." + +In the Gordons' Mess "a Marine" used to stand as synonym for emptiness. +Asquith's "Marine"[9] is the reverse. Into two sentences totalling 27 +words he boils down the drift of hundreds of cables and letters. + +_13th August, 1915. Imbros._ Well, I must put it down. Worked till +lunch. In the afternoon, left in H.M.S. _Arno_ and sailed over to Suvla +to have a last look over the _band-o-bast_ for to-morrow's twice +to-morrowed effort. First, saw the Admiral and Commodore who are simply +dancing with impatience. No wonder. Whether or no Kavak Tepe summit +gives a useful outlook on to the back of Sari Bair and the Dardanelles, +at least it will give us the whip hand of the guns on the Anafarta ridge +and save our ships from the annoying attentions they are beginning to +receive. The sailors think too they have worked out an extra good scheme +for ship and shore guns. + +Stopford then came aboard; in the mood he was in aboard the _Jonquil_ on +the 8th,--only more so! The Divisional Generals are without hope, that +is the text of his sermon. Hopeless about to-night, or to-morrow, that +is to say; for there are rosy visions and to spare for next week, or the +week after, or any other time, so long as it is not too near us. There +is something in this beats me. We are alive--we are quite all right--the +Brigade of the LIVth sent on to Kuchuk Anafarta Ova made good its point. +True, one battalion got separated from its comrades in the forest and +was badly cut up by Turkish snipers just as was Braddock's force by the +Redskins, but this, though tragic, is but a tiny incident of a great +modern battle and the rest of the 163rd Brigade have not suffered and +hold the spot whence, it was settled, the attack on Kavak Tepe should +jump off. Nothing practical or tactical seems to have occurred to force +us to drop our plan. + +But no; Stopford and Reed count the LIIIrd Division as finished: the +LIVth incapable of attack; the rest of the IXth Corps immovable. + +If I accept; we have lost this battle. We are not beaten now--the men +are not--but if I accept, we are held up. + +There is no way out. Whether there is any good looking back even for one +moment, God knows; I doubt it! But I feel so acutely, I seem to see so +clearly, where our push for Constantinople first began to quit the +rails, that I must put it down right here. The moment was when I asked +for Rawlinson or Byng, and when, in reply, the keen, the young, the fit, +the up-to-date Commanders were all barred, simply and solely that Mahon +should not be disturbed in his Divisional Command. I resisted it very +strongly: I went so far as to remind K. in my cable of his own sad +disappointment at Bloemfontein when he (K.) had offered him a Cavalry +Brigade and he returned instead to his appointment in the Sudan. The +question that keeps troubling me is, ought I to have fought it further; +ought I to have resigned sooner than allow generals old and yet +inexperienced to be foisted on to me? + +These stories about the troops? I do not accept them. The troops have +lost heavily but they are right if there were leaders. + +I know quite well both Territorial Divisions. I knew them in England +that is to say. Since then, they have had their eyes picked out. They +have been through the strainer and the best officers and men and the +best battalions have been serving for months past in France. The three +show battalions in the 54th (Essex) Division are in France and their +places have been taken by the 10th and 11th London and by the 8th Hants. +Essex is good; London is good and Hants is good; but the trinity is not +Territorial. The same with the Welshmen. + +Yet even so; taking these Territorials as they are; a scratch lot; half +strength; no artillery; not a patch upon the original Divisions as I +inspected them in England six months ago; even so, they'd fight right +enough and keen enough if they were set fair and square at their fence. + +In the fight of the 10th the Welshmen were not given a chance. Sent in +on a narrow front--jammed into a pocket;--as they began to climb the +spur they caught it from the guns, rifles and machine guns on both +flanks. + +We might still do something with a change of commanders. But I have been +long enough Military Secretary both in India and at home to realize that +ruthlessness here is apt to be a two-edged sword. You can't clap a new +head on to old shoulders without upsetting circulation and equilibrium. +Still, I would harden my heart to it now--to-night--were not my hands +tied by Mahon's seniority. Mahon is the next senior--in the whole force +he stands next to myself. Had not Bruce Hamilton been barred by the P.M. +when I wanted to put him in vice Hunter-Weston at Helles, the problem +would be simple enough. Even if I had not, at the outset, given that +well-tried, thrusting old fighter the conduct of the Suvla enterprise, +at least I would have brought him in on the morning of the 9th instant +quite easily and without causing any upset to anyone or anything. He +ranks both Stopford and Mahon and nothing would have been simpler than +to let him bring up a contingent of troops from Helles, when, +automatically, he would have taken command in the Suvla area. What it +would have meant to have had a man imbued with the attack spirit at the +head of this IXth Corps would have been just--victory! + +Anchored at 9 p.m. and, before going to bed, sent following cable:-- + + * * * * * + +"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for War. + +"The result of my visit to the IXth Corps, from which I am just back, +has bitterly disappointed me. There is nothing for it but to allow them +time to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional +Generals to undertake a general action for which, in their present frame +of mind, they have no heart. In fact, these generals are unfit for it. +With exceeding reluctance I am obliged to give them time to rest and +reorganize their troops. + +"Though we were to repeat our landing operations a hundred times, we +would never dare hope to reproduce conditions so favourable as to put +one division ashore under cover of dark and, as the day broke, have the +next division sailing in to its support. No advantage was taken of these +favourable conditions and, for reasons which I can only explain by +letter, the swift advance was not delivered,--therefore, the mischief is +done. Until we are ready to advance again, reorganized and complete, we +must go slow." + + +_14th August, 1915. Imbros._ Before breakfast, Braithwaite brought me a +statement of our interview of last night with Stopford. He dictated it, +directly he got back last night; i.e., about three hours after the +event. I agree with every word:-- + + * * * * * + +"Notes of an interview which took place on board H.M.S. _Triad_ between +6 and 7 p.m. on the 13th August, 1915, between the General Commanding +and Sir Frederick Stopford, commanding 9th Corps. + +_Present_:-- + + General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., + Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, + K.C.M.G., etc., + Major-General Braithwaite, C.B. + + * * * * * + +"Sir Frederick represented that the 9th Corps were not fit to undertake +an advance at the present moment. Questioned why, he replied that the +losses had been considerable, that the disorganization of units was very +great, and that the length of the line he had to hold was all too thinly +held as it was. He stated that his Divisional Generals were entirely of +the same opinion as himself; in fact, he gave us completely the +impression that they were 'not for it,' but he only specifically +mentioned Hammersley and Lindley. He said water was no difficulty. He +implied that the troops were getting better every day, and given time to +rest and reorganize, he thought they would be able in time to make an +advance. But he was very emphatic on the point that at present such a +thing as an attack had practically no chance of success. He told us that +the opposition in the centre about Anafarta Ova could no longer be +classed as sniping, but that it was regular opposition. But as he also +told us that his landing was an opposed landing, I think perhaps that +during the short time he has been on active service in this country he +has not quite realized what opposition really means. But the salient +fact remains that none of his Divisional Generals who would be employed +in the attack thought that that attack would have any chance of success +whatever. Indeed, he saw every difficulty, and though he kept saying +that he was an optimist, he foresaw every bad thing that could possibly +happen and none of the bright spots. It was a most depressing interview, +but it left no doubt in the minds of the hearers that it would be quite +useless to order an attack to be undertaken by a Commander and +Divisional Generals whose hearts were confessedly not in it, who saw a +Turk behind every bush, a battalion behind every hill, and a Brigade +behind every mountain." + +At lunch time Lord K. answered my last night's cable:-- + + * * * * * + +"If you should deem it necessary to replace Stopford, Mahon and +Hammersley, have you any competent Generals to take their place? From +your report I think Stopford should come home. + +"This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers that +will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom. If, +therefore, any Generals fail, do not hesitate to act promptly. + +"Any Generals I have available I will send you." + +Close on the top of this tardy appreciation of youth, comes another +cable from him saying he has asked French to let me have Byng, Horne and +Kavanagh. "I hope," he says, "Stopford has been relieved by you +already." + +Have cabled back thanking him with all my heart; saying I shall be glad +of the Generals he mentions as "Byng, Kavanagh and Horne are all +flyers." + +Between them, these two messages have cleared the air. Mahon's seniority +has been at the root of this evil. K.'s conscience tells him so and, +therefore, he pricks his name now upon the fatal list. But he did not +know, when he cabled, that Mahon had done well. I shall replace Stopford +forthwith by de Lisle and chance Mahon's seniority. + +De Robeck came over for an hour in the evening. + +Lord and Lady Brassey arrived in the _Sunbeam_, together with two young +friends. They have both of them shown great enterprise in getting here. +The dear old man gave me a warm greeting, but also something of a shock +by talking about our terrible defeat: by condoling and by saying I had +been asked to do the impossible. I have _not_ been asked to do anything +impossible in taking Constantinople. The feat is perfectly feasible. For +the third time since we began it trembled in the balance a week ago. Nor +is the capture of Suvla Bay and the linking up thereof with Anzac a +defeat: a cruel disappointment, no doubt, but not a defeat; for, two +more such defeats, measured in mere acreage, will give us the Narrows. A +doctor at Kephalos, it seems, infected them with this poison of +despondency. In their _Sunbeam_ they will make first class carriers. + +_15th August, 1915. Imbros._ De Lisle has come over to relieve Stopford. +He has got his first instructions[10] and is in close communication with +myself and General Staff on the preparations for the next move which +will be supported by the Yeomanry from Egypt and by some more artillery. +I had meant to make time to run across to Suvla to-day but Stopford may +wish to see me on his way to Mudros so I shall sit tight in case he +does. + +Cables to and from K. about our new Generals. Byng, Maude and Fanshawe +are coming. A brilliant trio. All of the three Fanshawe brothers are +good; this one worked under me on Salisbury Plain. Maude is splendid! +Byng will make every one happy; he never spares himself. K. has agreed +to let de Lisle hold the command of the 9th Corps until Byng turns up. +He wants Birdie to take over the control of the whole of the Northern +theatre, i.e., Anzac and Suvla. I must think over this. Meanwhile, have +cabled back, "I am enchanted to hear Byng, Maude and Fanshawe are +coming--I could wish for no better men." + +Sent also following which explains itself:-- + + * * * * * + +"When I appointed de Lisle to command temporarily the IXth Corps I sent +the following telegram to Mahon:-- + + * * * * * + +"'Although de Lisle is junior to you, Sir Ian hopes that you will waive +your seniority and continue in command of the Xth Division, at any rate +during the present phase of operations.' + +"To this Mahon sent the following reply:-- + + * * * * * + +"'I respectfully decline to waive my seniority and to serve under the +officer you name. Please let me know to whom I am to hand over the +command of the Division.' + +"Consequently, I have appointed Brigadier-General F. F. Hill to command +temporarily the Division and have ordered Mahon to go to Mudros to await +orders. Will you please send orders as to his disposal. As Peyton is not +due from Egypt till 18th August, he was not in any case available." + +Also:-- + + * * * * * + +"Personal. You will like to know that the XIIIth Division is said to +have fought very well and with great tenacity of spirit. In many +instances poor company leading is said to have been responsible for +undue losses." + +_16th August, 1915. Imbros._ A great press of business. Amongst other +work, have written a long cable home giving them the whole story up to +date. Lots of petty troubles. Stopford goes to Mudros direct. De Lisle +makes a thorough overhaul at Suvla. + +Glyn and Hankey both looked in upon me. It is a relief to have an +outsider of Hankey's calibre on the spot. He said, "Thank God!" when he +heard of K.'s cable, and urged Birdie should be told off to take Suvla +in hand, in his stead. I suppose the G.S. have let him get wind of K.'s +identical suggestion. As I told Hankey, I have not yet made up my mind. +But it would be an awkward job for Birdie with all the Anzacs to run, +and no nearer Suvla really--in point of time--than we are. Nor is he +staffed for so big a business. Hankey has been too long away from +executive work to realize that difficulty. But the decisive factor is +this; that having been closely associated with him and with his work for +a good many years, I know as Hankey cannot know, how much of his +strength lies in his personal touch and presence:--spread his powers too +wide he loses that touch. Felt the better for my talk with Hankey. He +can grasp the bigness of what we are up against and can yet keep his +head and see that the game is worth the candle and that it is in our +hands the moment we make up our minds to pay the price of the +illuminant. + +Have written to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff saying:-- + + * * * * * + +"I have just been through a horrible mental crisis quite different from +the ordinary anxiety of the battlefield, where I usually see what I +think to be my way and chance it. I refer to Freddy Stopford. Here is a +man who has committed no fault; whose life-long conscientious study of +his profession has borne the best fruits in letting him see the right +thing to do and how it should be done. And yet he fails when many a man +possessing not one quarter of his military qualifications carries on +with flying colours. For there is no use beating about the bush now and, +simply, he was not big enough in character to face up to the situation. +It overwhelmed him. + + * * * * * + +"A month ago we had the Turks down, undoubtedly and, whenever we could +get a little ammunition together, we were confident we could take a line +of trenches. As for their attacks, it was obvious their men were not for +it. Now their four new Divisions of fine fighting material seem to have +animated the whole of the rest of the force with their spirit, and the +Turks have never fought so boldly as they are doing to-day. They are +tough to crack, but D.V., we will be the tougher of the two." + +_17th August, 1915. Imbros._ From his cable of the 14th, K. seems +prepared to see me relieve Mahon of his command. But Mahon is a fighter +and if I give him time to think over things a bit at Mudros, he'll be +sure to think better. I am sure the wisest course to take, is to take +time. A Lieutenant-General in the British Army chucking up his command +whilst his Division is actually under fire--is a very unhappy affair. +Lord Bobs used to say that a soldier asked, for the good of the cause, +to serve as a drummer boy under his worst enemy should do so not only +with alacrity but with joy. Braithwaite agrees with me that we must +just take the responsibility of doing nothing at all and of leaving him +quietly to cool down at Mudros. Hill, who carries on, was the General in +command at Mitylene when I inspected there; he is a good fellow; he was +anxious to push on upon that fatal 7th August at Suvla and everyone says +he is a stout fellow. + +Have got the name of the doctor who upset the Brasseys with his yarns. +He declares he only retailed the tales of the wounded youngsters whom he +tended. No more to be said. He has studied microbes extensively but one +genus has clearly escaped his notice: he has never studied or grasped +the fell methods of the microbes of rumour or panic. Am I sure that I +myself have not crabbed my own show a bit in telling the full story of +our fight to K. this afternoon? No, I am by no means sure. + +"(No. M.F. 562.) From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Have +thought it best to lay the truth fully before you, and am now able to +give a complete _resume_ of the past week's operations, and an +appreciation of the situation confronting me. + +"In broad outline, my plan was to hold the Turks in the Southern zone by +constant activity of French and VIIIth Corps, and to throw all the +reinforcements into the Northern zone with the object of defeating the +enemy opposite Anzac, seizing a new base at Suvla, and gaining a +position astride the narrow part of the peninsula. With this object, I +reinforced General Birdwood with the XIIIth Division, 29th Brigade, Xth +Division, and 29th Indian Brigade, all of which were secretly dribbled +ashore at Anzac Cove on the three nights preceding commencement of +operations. This was done without arousing the suspicions of the enemy. +Arrangements were made for the XIth Division to land at Suvla Bay on the +same night as General Birdwood commenced his attack. Meanwhile, the +Turks were deceived by ill-concealed preparations for landings on +Asiatic coast near Mitylene, at Enos, South of Gaba Tepe. + +"Following is detailed plan of operations:-- + + * * * * * + +"On the afternoon of 6th August the VIIIth Corps were to attack Krithia +trenches, and simultaneously General Birdwood was to attack Lone Pine +trenches on his right front, as though attempting to break out in this +direction. In this way it was hoped to draw the Turkish reinforcements +towards Krithia and Gaba Tepe and away from Anzac's left and Suvla Bay. +At 10 p.m. General Birdwood's main attack was to develop on his left +flank, the Turkish outposts were to be rushed and an advance made in +several columns up the precipitous ravines leading to Chunuk Bair and +the summit of Hill 305, which it was hoped might be captured before +daybreak. + +"As soon as the high ridge was in our hands an advance was to be made +down the Hill 305 to take in the rear the trenches on Baby 700 (see +enlarged map of Anzac positions) and at the same time the troops in the +original Anzac position were to attack all along the line in an +endeavour to break out and hurl the enemy off the Sari Bair. Meanwhile +the XIth Division was to commence landing 10.30 p.m. on 6th August, one +brigade inside Suvla Bay, two brigades on shore to South were to seize +and hold all hills covering Bay and especially Yilghin Burnu and Ismail +Oglu Tepe on which enemy were believed to have guns which could bring +fire to bear either on back of General Birdwood's advance on Hill 305, +or on Suvla Bay. The ridge from Anafarta Sagir to Aja Liman was also to +be lightly held. The Xth Division, less one brigade, was to follow XIth +Division at daybreak and LIIIrd Division was held in general reserve. +The LIVth Division had not arrived and could not be employed in the +first instance. + +"The moment Stopford had fulfilled the above tasks, which, owing to the +small number of the enemy in this neighbourhood and the absence of any +organized system of trenches, were considered comparatively easy, he was +to advance South-west through Biyuk Anafarta with the object of +assisting Birdwood in the event of his attack being held up. + +"Reliable information indicated the strength of the enemy about Suvla +Bay to be one regiment, one squadron and some Gendarmerie with at most +twelve guns, and events have shown that this estimate was correct. It +was also believed that the enemy had 36,000 in the Southern zone, 27,000 +against Anzac, and 37,000 in reserve. Also 45,000 near Keshan who could +not arrive for three days and 10,000 on Asiatic shore. + +"The attack by the VIIIth Corps opposite Krithia took place as arranged, +but was met by determined opposition. Some enemy trenches were +captured, but the Turks were found in great strength and full of fight. +They counter-attacked repeatedly on the night of 6th/7th, and eventually +regained the ground we had taken. Prisoners captured stated that the +Turks had planned to attack us that night in any case which accounts for +their strength. + +"In the Northern zone General Birdwood's afternoon attack was successful +and Lone Pine trenches were captured by a most gallant Australian +assault. Throughout the day, and for three successive days the enemy +made repeated attempts to recapture the position, but each time were +repulsed with severe loss. At 10 p.m. the main advance on the left flank +by the New Zealanders, XIIIth Division, 29th Brigade and Cox's Brigade +began, and in spite of stupendous difficulties, moving by night in most +difficult country, all enemy's posts in foot of hills were rushed and +captured up to and including Damakjelik Bair. The enemy was partly +surprised, but his reinforcements were all called up, and this, coupled +with the extreme difficulty of the country, made it impossible to reach +the crest of the hill that day or the following. The position +immediately below the crest, however, was reached, and on the morning of +the 8th, after severe fighting, two battalions of the XIIIth Division +and Gurkhas reached the top of Kurt Ketchede, and two battalions of New +Zealanders established themselves on the crest of the ridge at Chunuk +Bair. + +"Unfortunately, the troops on Kurt Ketchede were shelled off the ridge +by our own gun fire, and were unable to recapture it; and 48 hours +later two battalions of the XIIIth Division, who had relieved tired New +Zealanders on Chunuk Bair, were driven back by determined daybreak +assault, carried by the Turks in many successive lines, shoulder to +shoulder. Our troops were too weary, and much too disorganized to make a +counter-attack at that time, and could only maintain positions below +crest. Water supply, which had always been an anxiety, began to fail, +and grave difficulties arose which prevented the possibility of +reinforcing Birdwood, and almost necessitated our giving up our gains. +All this, however, has now been put right. + +"Meanwhile, Stopford's Corps at Suvla had landed most successfully, but, +owing to lack of energy and determination on the part of leaders, and, +perhaps, partly to the inexperience of the troops, had failed to take +advantage of the opportunities as already reported. + +"The result is that my coup has so far failed. It was soon realized that +it was necessary to give impetus to the IXth Corps, and the LIIIrd +Division was put in on 8th-9th. By this time the LIVth Division was +available as general reserve. Unfortunately, the LIIIrd Division broke +in my hand, leaving me like a fencer with rapier broken, and by the time +the LIVth Division arrived the remaining troops of the Corps were too +tired and disorganized for further immediate effort. + +"The IXth Corps holds the position from Kiretch Tepe Sirt, bench mark 2; +Sulajik; Yilghin Burnu, with right flank thrown south to connect with +Birdwood at Kazlar Chair. Godley has picket between Kazlar Chair and +Damakjelik Bair, whence his line runs South-east to the spur South of +Abdel Rahman Bair, thence South-west to square 80 D, South-east again to +within 300 yards of Point 161 on Chunuk Bair, and thence back to the +left of the Anzac position. + +"De Lisle has at his disposal the Xth Division, less one brigade, the +XIth, LIIIrd and LIVth Divisions; total rifles, owing to casualties, +under 30,000. The Suvla losses have been too severe considering extent +and nature of the fighting that has taken place, and can only be +attributed to the inexperience of the troops and their leaders, and the +daring way in which the enemy skirmishers presumed upon it in the broken +and wooded country. Birdwood has lost about 13,000 since the action +began, and has now available some 25,000 rifles. The VIIIth Corps has +23,000 rifles, and the French 17,000 rifles. + +"The Turks have continued to be most active in the South, no doubt with +the object of preventing us moving troops, but apparently they have now +no more than 35,000 in this zone. The majority of the enemy Commander's +troops are against Anzac and in reserve in the valley between Hills 305 +and 261, his strategic flank. + +"In the Northern zone, in the fighting line at Suvla and Anzac and in +reserve he may now have in all 75,000, and can either reinforce Hill 305 +or issue through the gap between the two Anafartas to oppose any attack +on Ismail Oglu Tepe or on the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. He +has guns on Hill 305, on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and on the ridge North of +Anafarta Sagir from which he can shell landing places at Suvla Bay, but +is not holding the latter ridge in strength, nor do I think he has +enough troops to enable him to do so. + +"The position regarding the Turkish reinforcements from Keshan is not +clear. Only small parties have been located by aeroplanes marching +South, and it appears that either this information was incorrect or that +the enemy's forces had already got as far as the peninsula before +fighting began. + +"I consider it urgently necessary to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe and Anafarta +Sagir at the earliest possible moment, and I have ordered de Lisle to +make the attempt at the earliest opportunity. I have also ordered +Birdwood to make a fresh attack on Hill 305 as soon as troops are +reorganized and the difficulties of water supply solved, but for this he +will require drafts and fresh troops. I have great hopes that these +attacks may yet be successful, but it is impossible to disguise the fact +that owing to the failure of the IXth Corps to take advantage of +opportunities and the fact that surprise may now be absent, and that the +enemy is prepared and in much greater strength, my difficulties are +enormously increased. In any case my cadres will be so depleted as a +result of action that I shall need large reinforcements to enable me to +bring the operations to a happy conclusion. + +"The Turkish losses have been heavier than ours, and the total number of +prisoners taken is 702, but I estimate that they have now in the +peninsula at least 110,000 rifles to my 95,000 and they have all the +advantage of position. They have, apparently, all the ammunition they +need and obtain reinforcements as they are wanted. In particular, we +have had no news of the arrival of the 45,000 troops reported to be at +Keshan, and only one of the Asiatic Divisions has as yet come over. I +had hoped that their reinforcements would be of poor quality and not a +match for ours but this is not the case, and unfortunately the Turks +have temporarily gained the moral ascendency over some of our new +troops. If, therefore, this campaign is to be brought to an early and +successful conclusion large reinforcements will have to be sent to +me--drafts for the formations already here, and new formations with +considerably reduced proportion of artillery. It has become a question +of who can slog longest and hardest. + +"Owing to the difficulty of carrying on a winter campaign, and the +lateness of the season, these troops should be sent immediately. My +British Divisions are at present 45,000 under establishment, exclusive +of about 9,000 promised or on the way. If this deficit were made up, and +new formations totalling 50,000 rifles sent out as well, these, with the +60,000 rifles which I estimate I shall have at the time of their +arrival, should give me the necessary superiority, unless the absence of +other enemies allows the Turks to bring up large additional +reinforcements. + +"I hope you will realize how nearly this operation was a success +complete beyond anticipation. The surprise was complete, and the army +was thrown ashore in record time, practically without loss, and a little +more push on the part of the IXth Corps would have relieved the pressure +on Anzac, facilitated the retention of Chunuk Bair, secured Suvla Bay as +a port, and threatened the enemy's right in a way that should have +enabled Anzac to turn a success into a great victory. + +"We are up against the Turkish Army which is well commanded and fighting +bravely." + +After all's said and done the troops at Helles and Anzac are still +perfectly game and we have got nearer our goal. We started forth to:-- + + * * * * * + +(1) Seize Suvla Bay; + +(2) Break out of Anzac and join on to Suvla; + +(3) Seize Sari Bair crestline; + +(4) Hold enough of the hinterland of Suvla Bay to make it a comfortable +harbour. + + * * * * * + +(1) and (2) we have carried through handsomely. We have trebled our +holding at Anzac and we have put Suvla Bay in our pocket. (3) we have +not done; we are short of it by a couple of hundred yards; (4) we have +not done; it is a practicable harbour but subject certainly to +annoyance. In honest, gambler's language, we have won a good stake but +we have not broke the Ottoman Bank. + +De Lisle reports confusion throughout Suvla Bay area. He _must_ have +three or four days to pull the troops together before he organizes a +fresh offensive. The IXth Corps has been _un corps sans tete_. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 9: Hankey belonged to the Royal Marine Artillery.--IAN H., +1920.] + +[Footnote 10: See Appendix IV containing actual letter of +instructions.--IAN H., 1920.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +THE LAST BATTLE + + +_18th August, 1915. Imbros._ Freddie and I left in the _Arno_ this +morning; Braithwaite and his boy Val came with us. We sailed for Suvla +_via_ Anzac and held a meeting which was nearer a Council of War than +anything up to date. Dawnay, Deedes and Beadon stood by; so did Generals +Skeen, Hammersley and Peyton. Reed, C.G.S., IXth Corps, was also +present. The discussion of the steps to be taken within the next two or +three days lasted an hour and a half. Every one who spoke had studied +the data and the ground and there was no divergence of view, which was a +comfort. Our attack will have as its objective the seizure of a foothold +on the high ground. Anzacs will co-operate. As I explained to the +Generals, we hardly dare hope to make a clean break through till drafts +and fresh munitions arrive as the Turks now have had too long to dig in. +But if we can seize and keep a point upon the watershed (however small) +from which we can observe the drop of our shell, we can knock out the +landing places of the Turks. At the end, I told them I had asked for +95,000 fresh rifles, 50,000 in new formations, 45,000 to bring my +skeleton units up to strength, adding, that if I was refused that help +then I felt Government had better get someone cleverer than myself to +put their Fleet into the Marmora. The Generals seemed satisfied with my +demands and sympathetic towards my personal attitude. + +As to the coming attack, the tone of the Conference was hopeful. They +agreed that the nut was hard for our enfeebled forces to crack, but they +seemed to think that if we were once to get the enemy on the run, with +the old 29th Division and the new, keen Yeomanry on their heels, we +might yet go further than we expected. One Brigade of the 29th Division +has been brought round from Helles to put shape and form into the 53rd +Division. Peyton's men are to be attached to the Irish Division. There +is a new spirit of energy and hope in the higher ranks but the men have +meanwhile been aimlessly marched and counter-marched, muddled, and +knocked about so that their spirit has suffered in consequence. + +No end of Yeomen on the beaches; the cream of agricultural England. Many +of them recognized me from my various home inspections. Would like very +much to have had a war inspection, but the enemy gunners are too +inquisitive. + +De Lisle tells me he has now been round every corner of Suvla and that +the want of grip throughout the higher command has been worse than he +dared to put on paper. To reorganize will take several weeks; but we +have to try and act within two or three days. + +Skeen told us that when the Turks stuck up a placard saying Warsaw had +fallen, the Australians gave three hearty cheers. + +The chief trouble in making plans for the coming attack lies in the want +of cover on, and for a mile inland of, the Suvla Bay beaches. The whole +stretch of the flat land immediately East and South of the Bay lies open +to the Turkish gunners. This is no longer a serious drawback if the men +are holding lines of trenches. But when the trench system is not yet in +working order, and they want to deploy, then it is so awkward a factor +that I would have been prepared to turn the whole battle into a night +attack. The others were not for it. They thought that the troops were +not highly enough trained and had lost too many officers to be able to +find their way over this country in the darkness. They are in immediate +touch with the men: I am not. + +Lindley asked if he might walk with me to the Beach, and on the way down +he told me frankly his Division had gone to pieces and that he did not +feel it in himself to pull it together again. Very fine of him to make a +clean breast of it, I thought, and said so: also advised him to put what +he had told me into writing to de Lisle, when we will relieve him and I +promised for my part, to try and fit him with some honourable but less +onerous job. + +On Hammersley's report, Sitwell, Brigadier of the 34th Brigade, 11th +Division, has just been relieved of his command. + +_19th August, 1915. Imbros._ Sat sweating here, literally and +metaphorically, from morn till dewy eve. King's Messenger left in the +evening. Altham came over from Mudros. He stays to-night and we will +work together to-morrow when the mails are off my mind. + +Hankey dined and left with the King's Messenger by the _Imogene_. He has +been a real help. The Staff has never quite cottoned to the chief among +us takin' notes, but that is, I think, from a notion that it is not +loyal to Lord K. to press the P.M.'s P.S. too closely to their bosom. +From my personal standpoint, it will be worth anything to us if, amidst +the flood of false gossip pouring out by this very mail to our +Dardanelles Committee, to the Press, to Egypt and to London Drawing +Rooms, we have sticking up out of it, even one little rock in the shape +of an eye-witness. + +A shocking aeroplane smash up within a few yards of us. A brilliant +young Officer (Captain Collet of the R.F.C.) killed outright and three +men badly hurt. + +_20th August, 1915._ Stayed in my tent keeping an eye on to-morrow. Put +through a lot with Altham. Am pressing him to hurry up with his canteens +at Helles, Anzac and Suvla. In May I cabled the Q.M.G. begging him +either to let me run a canteen on the lines of the South African Field +Force Canteen, myself; or, to run it from home, himself; or, to put the +business into the hands of some private firm like the Mess and Canteen +Company, or Lipton's, or Harrods or anything he liked. In South Africa +we could often buy something. In France our troops can buy anything. +Here, had they each the purse of Fortunatus, they could buy nothing. A +matter this, I won't say of life and death, but of sickness and health. +Now, after three months without change of diet, the first canteen ship +is about due. A mere flea bite of L10,000 worth. I am sending the whole +of it to the Anzacs to whom it will hardly be more use than a bun is to +a she bear. Only yesterday a letter came in from Birdie telling me that +the doctors all say that the sameness of the food is making the men +sick. The rations are A.1., but his men now loathe the very look of them +after having had nothing else for three months. Birdie says, "If we +could only get this wretched canteen ship along, and if, when she comes +she contains anything like condiments to let them buy freely from her, I +believe it would make all the difference in the world. But the fact +remains that at present we cannot count on anything like a big effort +from the men who have been here all these months." + +De Robeck came over at 4 p.m., by formal appointment, to talk business, +and deadly serious business at that! He has heard, by cable I suppose, +that the people at home will see him through if he sees his way to +strike a blow with the Fleet. He takes this as a pretty strong hint to +push through, or, to make some sort of a battleship attack to support +us. De Robeck knows that when the Fleet goes in our fighting strength +goes up. But he can gauge, as I cannot, the dangers the Fleet will +thereby incur. Every personal motive urges me to urge him on. But I have +no right to shove my oar in--no right at all--until I can say that we +are done unless the Fleet do make an attack. Can I say so? No; if we +get the drafts and munitions we can still open the Straits on our own +and without calling on the sister Service for further sacrifice. So I +fell back on first principles and said he must attack if he thought it +right from the naval point of view but that we soldiers did not call for +succour or ask him to do anything desperate: "You know how we stand," I +said; "do what is right from the naval point of view and as to what _is_ +right from that point of view, I am no judge." + +The Admiral went away: I have been no help to him but I can't help it. + +Hardly had he gone when Braithwaite (who had heard what was in the wind +by a side wind) came and besought me to try and induce the Admiral to +slip his battleships at the Straits. All the younger men of war are +dying to have a dash, he said. That's as it may be but my mind is clear. +If a sailor on land is a fish out of water, a soldier at sea is like a +game cock in a duckpond. When de Robeck said on March 22nd he wanted the +help of the whole Army that was quite in order. He would not have been +in order--at least, I don't think so--had he said in what manner he +wanted the Army to act after it had got ashore. We are being helped now +by the Navy; daily, hourly: we could not exist without the Fleet; but it +is not for me to say I think the battleships should or should not take +chances of mines and torpedoes. + +Brodrick is quite seedy. We are all afraid he won't be able to stick it +out much longer although he is making the most heroic efforts. In the +morning I attended the funeral of young Collet, killed yesterday so +tragically. A long, slow march through heavy sand all along the beach to +Kephalos; then up through some small rocky gullies, frightfully hot, +until, at last, we reached a graveyard. The congregation numbered many +of the poor boy's comrades who seemed much cut up about his untimely +end. + +The P.M. has answered my cable to Lord K. asking for 45,000 rifles to +fill up and for 50,000 fresh rifles. K. is in France, he says, and I +will have my answer when he gets back. The 5th Royal Scots are down to +289 rank and file. I have just cabled about them. Something must be +done. Certainly it must be "out" for that particular unit if they don't +very soon get some men. The War Office still refer to them as a +Battalion! + +_21st August, 1915._ Sailed for Suvla about 1 o'clock with Braithwaite, +Aspinall, Dawnay, Deedes, Ellison, Pollen and Maitland. The first time I +have set forth with such a Staff. Not wishing to worry de Lisle, I +climbed up to the Karakol Dagh, whence I got something like a bird's eye +view of the arena which was wrapt from head to foot in a mantle of +pearly mist. Assuredly the Ancients would have ascribed this phenomenon +to the intervention of an Immortal. Nothing like it had ever been seen +by us until that day and the cloud--mist--call it what you will--must +have had an unfortunate bearing on the battle. On any other afternoon +the enemy's trenches would have been sharply and clearly lit up, whilst +the enemy's gunners would have been dazzled by the setting sun. But +under this strange shadow the tables were completely turned; the outline +of the Turkish trenches were blurred and indistinct, whereas troops +advancing from the AEgean against the Anafartas stood out in relief +against a pale, luminous background. + +As a result of our instructions; of conferences and of the war council +we had got our plan perfectly clear and ship-shape. Everyone understood +it. The 10th Division was Corps reserve and was lying down in mass about +the old Hill 10 in the scrub. We had to trust to luck here as they were +under the enemy's fire if they were spotted. But very strict orders as +to keeping low and motionless had been issued and we had just to hope +for the best. The Yeomanry were also Corps reserve at Lala Baba where +they were safe. But when they advanced, supposing they had to, they +would have to cross a perfectly open plain under shell fire. This was +the special blot on the scheme but there was no getting away from it. +There was no room for them in the front line trenches and communication +trenches to the front had not yet been dug. + +As to the attack:--on the extreme right the Anzacs and Indian Brigade +were to push out from Damakjelik Bair towards Hill 60. Next to them in +the right centre the 11th Division was to push for the trenches at +Hetman Chair. On the left centre the 29th Division were to storm the now +heavily entrenched Hill 70. Holding that and Ismail Oglu Tepe we should +command the plateau between the two Anafartas; knock out the enemy's +guns and observation posts commanding Suvla Bay, and should easily be +able thence to work ourselves into a position whence we will enfilade +the rear of the Sari Bair Ridge and begin to get a strangle grip over +the Turkish communications to the Southwards. From the extreme left on +Kiretch Tepe Sirt by the sea, to Sulajik where they joined the 29th +Division the 53rd and 54th Divisions were simply holding the line. + +Only the broad outline of the fighting was visible through the dim +twilight atmosphere and I have not yet got any details. Our bombardment +began at 2.30 and lasted till 3 p.m., very inadequate in duration but +the most our munitions would run to. Then, to the accompaniment of quick +battery salvoes of shrapnel from the enemy and a heavy rattle of +musketry, the whole line from about a mile due East of the Easternmost +point of the Salt Lake down to Damakjelik Bair, nearly two miles, began +to stir and move Eastwards. We had the joy of seeing the Turks begin to +clear out of the trenches on Hill 70, and by 3.30 p.m. it seemed as if +distinct progress was being made: about that time it was I saw the +Yeomen marching in extended order over the open ground to the South of +the Salt Lake in the direction of Hetman Chair. The enemy turned a +baddish shrapnel fire on to them, and although they bore it most +unflinchingly, old experience told me that their nervous fighting energy +was being used up all the time. If only these men could have been +brought within charging distance, fresh and unbroken by any ordeal! But +here was just one of the drawbacks of the battlefield and no getting +over it. + +After a bit, I went down to de Lisle and found him sitting on a little +spur about fifty yards from his own Headquarters with one of his Staff +Officers. He was smoking a pipe--quite calm. There is usually nothing to +be said or to be done once our war dogs have been slipped. A soldier +might as well try to correct the aim of his bullet after he has pulled +the trigger! Whilst I was there we heard--probably about 4.30--that the +11th Division had captured the Turkish first line trenches which run +North and South of Hetman Chair. Real good news this. We were +considerably bucked up. Climbed back to Karakol Dagh but, from that time +onwards, could make out nothing of the course of the battle save that +Ismail Oglu Tepe was not yet taken. As to Knoll 70, it was completely +shrouded in dust and smoke. Sometimes it seemed as if the Turkish guns +were firing against it; sometimes we thought they were our own. Far away +by Kaiajik Aghala things looked well as many enemy shrapnel were +bursting there or thereabouts showing our men must have got home. By +6.30 it had become too dark to see anything. The dust mingling with the +strange mist, and also with the smoke of shrapnel and of the hugest and +most awful blazing bush fire formed an impenetrable curtain. + +As the light faded the rifles and guns grew silent. So I clambered down +off my perch and went again to de Lisle's post of command where I found +him still sitting. He had seen no more than I had seen. The bulk of our +reserves had been thrown in. No more news had come to hand. All was +quiet now. Our _role_, in fact, was finished, and Marshall, the man on +the spot, by now held our destinies in his hands. Firm hands too. The +telephone was working all right and I told de Lisle to try and get a +message through to him quickly saying that I hoped he would be able to +dig in and hold fast to whatever he had gained. I have no fears about de +Lisle's nerve; nor of Marshall's. + +Went on board and sailed for Headquarters, through darkness made visible +by the fires blazing on the battlefield. No shooting. Got on the wires +and found no news from Anzac nor more from de Lisle. Crossed backwards +and forwards the best part of the night between my tent and the G.S. +tent, but de Lisle had heard nothing definite enough to report. Brodrick +still has fever. Ruthven has been wounded. + +_22nd August, 1915._ Suvla gone wrong again; Anzac right. Left G.H.Q. at +11 o'clock with Braithwaite, Commodore Keyes, Captain Phillimore, +Aspinall, Beadon, Freddy and Val in the _Arno_ and went direct to Anzac. +There I picked up Birdie and heard the Anzac part of the battle. The +Indian Brigade have seized the well at Kabak Kuyu, and that fine +soldier, Russell, fixed himself into Kaiajik Aghala and is holding on +there tooth and nail. There was fighting going on there at the moment +but Russell is confident. How delightful it is to have to deal with men +who are confident! + +This success of old Cox's is worth anything. The well alone, I suppose, +might be valued at twenty or thirty thousand a year seeing it gives us +beautiful spring water in free gift from Mother Earth instead of very +dubious fluid conveyed at God only knows what cost from the Nile to +Anzac Cove. If we can only hold on to Kaiajik Aghala, then the road +between Anzac and Suvla will be freed from the sniper's bullet. + +Went on to Suvla and landed with all my posse, remaining in consultation +with Corps Headquarters till 3.30. + +Our attack on Hill 70 and Ismail Oglu Tepe has failed. The enemy has dug +himself well in by now and, therefore, we depended far more on our gun +fire than we did on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. Unfortunately, the +bombardment seems to have been pretty near futile--not the fault of the +gunners, but simply because, on the one hand, the mist interfered with +the accuracy of their aim, on the other, shortage of shell prevented +them from making up for inaccuracy by quantity. Then the bush fires seem +to have come along in the most terrible fashion and interposed between +our brave 29th and the Turks. The ancient Gods fought against us +yesterday:--mist and fire, still hold their own against the inventions +of man. Last but not least, all are agreed the fine edge of the 11th +Division has been at last blunted--and small wonder: there is no use +attacking any more with the New Army until it has been well rested and +refreshed with new drafts. + +So far de Lisle has no clear or connected story of the battle. The 29th +Division say they were shouldered off their true line of attack by the +11th Division, then driven in by the fire; the 11th Division, on their +side, say that the Yeomen barged into them and threw them off their +line. Had we been able to dig in we would have made good a lot of +ground. But Marshall, not showy or brilliant but one of my most sound +and reliable soldiers, decided, although he knew my wishes and hopes, +that the troops had got themselves so mixed up and disorganized that it +would be imprudent. So orders were issued by him, on the battlefield, to +fall back to the original line. There was neither use nor time to refer +back to de Lisle and he had to come to the decision himself. I am quite +confident he will be able to give good reasons for his act. Many of the +men did not get the order and were still out at daylight this morning +when they were heavily attacked by the Turks and fell back then of +themselves into their old trenches. Another case of "as you were." We +have lost a lot of men and can only hope that the Turks have lost as +many. I don't think for a moment they did, not at least in the Suvla Bay +sphere, but Cox and Russell claim to have accounted for a very great +number of them in their first retreat and in their counter-attacks in +the Southern sector of the battle. + +_23rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Not one moment, till to-day, to weigh +bearing of K.'s message of the 20th instant,--the message sent me in +reply to my appeal for 50,000 fresh troops and 45,000 drafts. In it K. +tells me that a big push is going to take place in the Western theatre, +and that I "must understand that no reinforcements of importance can be +diverted from the main theatre of operations in France." Certain named +transports are carrying, he says, more troops to Egypt, and he hopes +Maxwell will be able to spare me some. If we can't get through with +these we must hang on as best we may. + +To-day it has been up to us to try and bring home to the Higher +Direction the possible effects of trying to do two things at once; i.e., +break through in France and break through here. We are to stand aside +for a month or so just when we have made a big gain of ground but not +the decisive watershed gain; when the Turks, despite their losses in +life, shell, trenches and terrain, are shaken only; not yet shattered. + +K. sees all the Allied cards--we don't. But we do know our own hand. We +know that our Navy have now come clean down on the AEgean side of the +fence, and have determined once for all to make no attack on their own. +We have the _feel_ of the situation in our bones and it was up to us--I +_think_ it was--to rub it in that although the British War Direction may +decree that the Dardanelles are to hang on without further help, +indefinitely, yet sickness is not yet under their high command, nor are +the Turks. + +So Dawnay, who is making a name for himself as a master of plain +business diction, was told off to draft me an answer to the War Office +which should remove as many beams as possible out of their optics. He +overdid it: the whole tone of it indeed was despondent, so much so that, +as I told Braithwaite, a S. of S. for War getting so dark a presentment +of our prospects would be bound to begin to think it might be better to +recall the whole expedition. So I rewrote the whole thing myself:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 578). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for +War. We will endeavour to do the best possible with forces at our +disposal; we quite understand reason for your inability to send us +reinforcements necessary to bring operations to a successful conclusion, +and thank you for putting it so plainly. After the failure of the IXth +Corps to take prompt action after landing I took immediate steps to +persevere with plan in spite of absence of surprise and reinforced +northern wing with 2nd Mounted Division from Egypt and XXIXth Division +from Cape Helles. These movements and the necessary reorganization of +the IXth Corps formations which had become very mixed took time, so that +I was not able to renew the attack until 21st August. + +"By then enemy positions in Ratilva Valley had been immeasurably +strengthened and I was confronted with the difficulty that if I could +not drive the Turks back between Anafarta Sagir and Biyuk Anafarta my +new line from right of old Anzac position to sea coast North-east of +Suvla Bay would be more than I could hold with the troops at my +disposal. It would thus be a case of giving up either Anzac Cove or +Suvla Bay. Therefore, as a preliminary step to my fresh offensive I +determined to mass every man available against Ismail Oglu Tepe which +position it was necessary for me to capture whether as a first step +towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible and I was +thrown on the defensive, to secure comparative immunity from shell fire +either for Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove. + +"De Lisle planned the attack well. The LIIIrd and the LIVth Divisions +were to hold enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and XXIXth +Division and XIth Division were to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe with two +Brigades of Xth Division and the IInd Mounted Division (5,000 rifles) in +corps reserve. I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate by +swinging his left flank to Susak Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala. + +"The troops attacked with great dash and stormed the lower slopes of the +hill in spite of strong entrenchments, but I regret to say they were not +able to attain their objective nor even to consolidate the position +gained and yesterday found the whole line back in their original +trenches except the left of the Australians where one battalion of +Gurkhas and new Australian Battalion continue to hold Susak Kuyu. +Casualties not yet to hand, but I fear they amounted to some 6,000 in +all. This renewed failure combined with the heavy total casualties since +6th August, and the fact that sickness has been greatly on the increase +during the last fortnight has profoundly modified my position, and as +you cannot now give me further reinforcements it is only possible for me +to remain on the defensive. Naturally, I shall keep on trying to harry +the Turks by local attacks and thus keep alive the offensive spirit but +it must be stated plainly that no decisive success is to be looked for +until such time as reinforcements can be sent. + +"The total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, +and my total force is now only 85,000, of which the fighting strength is +68,000. The French fighting strength is about 15,000. Sick casualties +are becoming abnormal chiefly owing to troops other than late arrivals +being worn out with hardship and incessant shell fire, from which even +when in reserve they are never free. Where Anzac evacuated 100 a day +they are now evacuating 500, where Royal Naval Division evacuated 10 +they are now evacuating 60. The result is that I have only some 50,000 +men in the North to hold a line from the right of Anzac to the sea +North-east of Suvla, a distance of 23,000 yards. + +"When there is no serious engagement, but only daily trench fighting, +the average net wastage from sickness and war is 24 per cent. of +fighting strength per month. The Anzac Corps, the XXIXth Division and +the XLIInd Division are very tired and need a rest badly. Keeping these +conditions in view, it appears inevitable that within the next fortnight +I shall be compelled to relinquish either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and +must also envisage the possibility of a still further reduction of my +front in the near future. Taking the first question of abandoning Anzac +Cove and closing to the North, Suvla Bay is now netted and comparatively +secure from torpedo attack. Further, it offers certain facilities for +disembarkation in winter gales. It has, therefore, some decided +advantages but though I should be able to hold it safely at present, it +would present no facilities for further contraction of my line to meet +the future wastage of my force. On the other hand, by retiring South of +Suvla I could first hold a line Lala Baba--Yilghin Burnu--Kaiajik +Aghala, and then, when normal wastage diminished my strength below this +limit I could, if necessary, withdraw into the original Anzac position. +For these reasons it must probably be Suvla and not Anzac which must be +given up, though on account of its advantages as indicated above, and on +account of the moral effect of retiring, you may rely on my not +relinquishing it a single day before I am compelled. + +"I do not wish to paint a gloomy picture. It is a simple problem of +arithmetic and measurement. On the basis of normal wastage and the +present scale of drafts my total fighting strength by the middle of +December, including the French, will be only, say, 60,000. Of this +force, a certain percentage must of necessity be resting off the +peninsula, and the remainder will only suffice to hold Cape Helles and +the original Anzac line unless, of course, the enemy collapses. Until +now, however, the Turks replace casualties promptly, although frequently +by untrained men. Also our other foe, sickness, may abate, but seeing +how tired are the bulk of my force, I doubt if it would be wise to +reckon on this." + +At 11.15, red hot from France, there arrived in camp Byng (to command +the 9th Corps), Maude and Fanshawe (to command Divisions); also Tyrrell +and Byng's A.D.C., Sir B. Brooke, nephew of my old friend, Harry Brooke. +All three Generals remained for lunch and then the two Divisionals made +off respectively to the 11th and 13th Divisions. Byng and Brooke stayed +and dined. These fellows seem pretty cheery. Maude especially full of +ardour which will, I hope, catch on. + +_24th August, 1915. Imbros._ Been resolving yesterday's long cable. How +often it happens that a draft letter, if only it is well put, fixes the +mind into its grooves. My words were brighter than Dawnay's but the +backbone was not really me. No one knows better than myself that a great +deal more than arithmetic or measurement will be needed to make me give +ground at Suvla. The truth is, it is infinitely difficult to spur these +high folk on without frightening them; and then, if you frighten them, +you may frighten them too much. That's why cables are no substitutes for +converse. + +To a Commander standing in my shoes, the forces of the infidels are not +one half of the battle. The wobblers sit like nightmares on my chest. +"Tell them the plain truth" cries conscience. What is the plain truth? +Where is it? Is it in Dawnay's draft, or is it in my message, or does it +lie stillborn in some cable unwritten? God knows--I don't! But one thing +at least is true:--to steer a course between an optimism that deprives +us of support and a pessimism that may wreck the whole enterprise, there +indeed is a Scylla and Charybdis problem, a two-horned dilemma, or +whatever words may best convey the notion of the devil. + +The blessed cable is now lying on the well-known desk where K. will +frown at it through his enormous spectacles. Then he calls the +Adjutant-General and tells him Hamilton must be mad as all his +formations are full to overflowing and yet he says he is 45,000 short. +Next enters the Master-General of the Ordnance with a polite bow and K. +tells him Hamilton must be delirious as he keeps on raving for shell, +bombs, grenades although as he, Von Donop, knows well, he has been sent +more guns and explosives than any man has ever enjoyed in war. +Impossible to be so disrespectful to the Field Marshal or so +inconsiderate to their department as to reject the soft impeachment. How +easily do the great ones of this world kid themselves back into a +comfortable frame of mind! Then K. stalks off to the Dardanelles +Committee. + +Turns out that Cox and Russell did even better than Birdwood had thought +in the fighting on the 21st and the morning of the 22nd. They have +killed more Turks and the line held runs well out to the North-east and +quite a good long way to the North of Kaiajik Aghala. + +Byng left to take over his command. Davies came over from Helles and +stayed for dinner. + +The _Imogene_ sailed in with Mails. News by wireless of German Naval +defeat in the Baltic and Italian declaration of war against Turkey. +Well, that part at least of K.'s aspirations has come off; we have +dragged in Italy. Now--will she send us a contingent? + +Davies dined. With his ideas still framed on Western standards he puts +it forcibly, not to say ferociously, that we must, must, _must_ be given +our fair share of trench mortars, bombs and gun ammunition. Fresh from +France he watched the artillery preparation at Helles and (although we +had thought it rather grand) says we simply don't know what the word +bombardment means. Instead of seeing, as in the Western theatre, an +unbroken wall of flame and smoke rising above the enemy trenches about +to be stormed, here he saw a sprinkling of shells bursting at intervals +of 20 yards or so--a totally different effect. And yet the Turks are as +tough as the Germans and take as much hammering! + +When I read the British Press, starved and yet muzzled, I feel as if I +could render my country no better service than to kill my friend the +Censor and write them one or two articles. + +By surprise either Army can bulge in a sector of the opposing lines but, +until one Army loses its _moral_, neither Army can break through. An +engine will be found to restore marches and manoeuvres but, at this +historic moment, our tactics are at that stage. To break through, Armies +must advance some six or seven miles; otherwise they can't bag the +enemy's big guns. But, the backbone of their attack, their own guns, +can't support them when they get beyond five or six miles. The enemy +reserves come in; they come at last to a stop. A three or four mile +advance _should_ be easy enough, but, in the West, that would mean just +three or four miles of land; nothing more. But _here_, those three or +four miles--nay, two or three miles--(so ineffective in France) are an +objective in themselves; they give us the strategical hub of the +universe--Constantinople! + +Suppose even that by paying the cost in lives we did succeed in driving +the Germans over the Rhine, still we stand to gain less than by taking +this one little peninsula! A quarter of the energy they are about to +develop for the sake of getting back a few miles of _la belle France_ +could give us Asia; Africa; the Balkans; the Black Sea; the mouths of +the Danube: it would enable us to swap rifles for wheat with the +Russians; more vital still, it would tune up the hearts of the Russian +soldiery to the Anglo-Saxon pitch. + +Victory by killing Germans is a barbarous notion and a savage method. A +thrust with small forces at a weak spot to bring the enemy to their +knees by loss of provinces, resources and prestige is an artistic idea +and a scientific stroke: the one stands for a cudgel blow, the other for +rapier play. + +We take it for granted that we have to "push" in France and Flanders; +that we _have_ to exhaust ourselves in forcing the invaders back over +their own frontiers. Whereas, content to "hold" there, we might push +wherever else we wished. + +I can well understand that a Frenchman should say, "Let the world go +hang provided I get back my _Patrie_, whole; undivided and at once." +Indeed, only the other day, one of the best French Generals here, after +speaking of the decisive, world-embracing consequences of a victory at +the Dardanelles, went on to say, "But we ought to be in France." Seeing +my surprise he added, "Yes, I am quite illogical, I admit, but until our +nine _departements_ are freed from the Boche, world strategy and tactics +may go to the devil for me." + + +Have been writing my weekly budget. Part of my letter to K. harks back +to the first Suvla landing, and tries to give him a better notion of the +failure to profit by the enemy's surprise. Not that I have yet got any +very clear conception of the detail myself. No coherent narrative does, +in fact, exist. New troops, new Staff, new Generals, heavy losses, have +resulted in the confusions, gaps and contradictions still obscuring the +story of those first few days. + +Now that I am getting more precise news about what fighting there was, +it seems clear that this great mass of young, inexperienced troops +failed simply because their leaders failed to grasp the urgency of the +time problem when they got upon the ground, although, as far as orders +and pen and ink could go, it had been made perfectly clear. But, in face +of the Turk, things wore another and more formidable shape. Had Lord +Bobs been Commander of the 9th Corps; yes, just think of it! How far my +memory carries me back. Every item needed for the rapid advance: water, +ammunition, supplies and mules closely and personally checked and +counter-checked. Once the troops landed a close grip kept on the +advance. At the first sign of a check nothing keeps him from the spot. +The troops see him. In an hour they are up upon the crest. + +So far, so good. We had not another Lord Bobs and it would not have been +reasonable of us to expect him. But when I come to the failure of the +21st, where I have a seasoning of Regulars--as well as a commander of +energy--still we do not succeed. This time, no doubt, the enemy were on +the scene in force and had done ten days' digging; the non-success, in +fact, may be traced to the loss of the element of surprise; energy, in +fact, was met by preparation. The battle had to be fought like a +manoeuvre battle and yet the enemy were ready for us, more or less, +and already fairly well entrenched. Since the morning of the 7th the +chances had been rising steadily against us. Still, even so, the lack of +precise detail baffles me almost as much as in the case of the first +Suvla landing. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +MISUNDERSTANDINGS + + +_25th August, 1915. Imbros._ Davies left for Helles at mid-day. Was to +have gone with him but heard that Bailloud with Captain Lapruin would +like to see me, so stayed to receive them. + +Have got K.'s answer to my cable pointing out the probable results of +his declared intention of sending us no "reinforcements of importance" +during an indeterminate period. + +"(No. 7315, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. +Your No. 578. You will, I hope, fully discuss the situation described by +you with Birdwood and the Generals who have just joined you, and, when a +thorough examination on the ground of the whole state of affairs has +been made, give me the opinion at which you arrive. + +"It has been a sad disappointment to me that the troops have not been +able to do better, and that the drafts and reinforcements sent out to +you and Egypt, excluding any you have drawn from Egypt, amounting from +6th August to 47,000, have not proved sufficient to enable you to +contemplate holding your positions." + +Braithwaite and I have been electrified by this reference to 47,000 +drafts and reinforcements: it is so much Greek to us here: had there +been any question of reinforcements coming to us on that scale, my 578 +of 23rd August would never have been sent. + +On the heels of this has followed another:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. 7319, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. My +No. 7315. I hope that the result of your deliberations will reach me by +Friday morning, as the decision to be taken is one of considerable +importance." + +I have replied off the reel:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 588). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With +reference to your telegrams Nos. 7315 and 7319. I feel sure you cannot +think I would be capable of sending a telegram of such import as my No. +M.F. 578 without the deepest consideration and sense of my personal +responsibility which remains unaffected by any amount of conferences +with my subordinate commanders. I was careful in this instance, however, +to discuss the situation on the spot with both Corps Commanders +concerned and I then cabled you my considered opinion. I constantly +visit both Suvla and Anzac and have personally thoroughly examined the +state of affairs. In view of your telegram No. 7172, cipher, I do not +understand your allusion to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements from 6th +August as we have not been advised of any such number as 47,000. I felt +bound to lay the case plainly before you as to what might have to be +undertaken, though I do not contemplate giving up any position one hour +before I need. If the present wastage from sickness continues, however, +and if my cadres are allowed to fall below their present attenuated +strength I may be compelled to undertake such a step as I have +indicated." + +Bailloud arrived at tea time. Away from Piepape he is another person. At +dinner, he cracked jokes even about serious things like the guns of +Asia. + +Brodrick was carried off to the Hospital ship. The doctors think there +should be no real danger. We shall all miss him very much; as an aide he +has been A.1.; sympathetic and thoughtful. + +Braithwaite dined to meet Bailloud. + +_26th August, 1915._ After clearing my table and taking early lunch, +started off in the _Arno_ with C.G.S., Pollen, Freddie and Val. Sailed +for Suvla and went up straight to see Byng, brought by the whirl of +Fortune's wheel from a French chateau to a dugout. During the two days +he has been here, he has been working very hard. I hope he may not too +regretfully look back towards _la belle France_. Our old "A" Beach was +being briskly shelled as we walked down to our boats. Between Hill 10 +and the sea there were salvoes of shrapnel falling and about every +thirty seconds a big fellow, probably a six incher, made a terrible +hullaballoo. The men working at piling up stores "carried on." + +[Illustration: GENERAL BAILLOUD _"Exclusive News" phot._] + +When we got back to G.H.Q. there was a heavy thunderstorm in progress. +Mail bag closed 9.30. + +During our inspection at Suvla this "Personal" from K. to myself has +been deciphered:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. 7337, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. +Personal. I considered it advisable, that as the decision the Government +may have to come to on your No. 578 is one of grave importance, the +Generals out there should previously fully consider the situation on the +Gallipoli Peninsula; hence my No. 7315. It was intended to obviate any +possibility of overlooking points and in such cases two or more heads +sometimes elucidate matters that might otherwise be missed or not given +due weight to. It was in no way intended thereby to detract from the +importance of your views on the subject or to minimise your personal +responsibility for them. + +"I have no idea of the French Generals' views on the matter, and you +were apparently not fully considering the drafts and reinforcements that +were being sent out. + +"A detailed telegram is being sent you from the office of the 47,000 men +mentioned in my No. 7315. + +"I hope that the return of Younghusband's Brigade from Aden to Egypt +will still further increase these in a day or two (less one battalion). + +"But you should look on the forces in Egypt and your own as a whole, +allowing, of course, for the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the +general situation at the Dardanelles into consideration. + +"Do you think the Navy could do anything more than they are already +doing to help the situation? I hear it is thought that they could land +heavy naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in square 92 M and +other points, and might threaten from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish +supplies between Karna Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from ships) and also +bring a heavy and effective shell fire on the Turkish positions at and +behind Anafarta. There is a cabinet to-morrow." + +I would much like to sleep over this cable--so plain seemingly; really +so obscure. At face value, how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles +problem! Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make me, the +C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean with Maxwell administering my +Egyptian Base, then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been dated +from Constantinople. But am I? I can't believe it even now, with the +words before me. Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of others, one +thing is certain, namely, that up to date there has been +misunderstanding. Now, the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a +momentous wire without too much time to think it over. To clear my brain +let me set down the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared to +me:-- + + * * * * * + +Less than a week ago--20th inst.--K. cables me he is sending certain +units to Egypt and certain other units to the Dardanelles. The units and +their ships are named. He says there is going to be a big push in +France and that I must look to these troops, earmarked for the +Dardanelles, plus any I "can obtain from Egypt" to carry on. He winds up +by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to Egypt will enable Maxwell to +send you more fighting men on your demand." + +This same assumption that the G.O.C., Egypt, and myself are two equals +each having equal command over his own troops, is fully borne out by +another cable of the 21st August. My cable of 23rd August is based on +these messages; i.e. on the idea that we must carry on here for a good +long time to come with very little to help us. Then comes K.'s of the +25th telling me he is sorry 47,000 drafts and reinforcements he has sent +to Maxwell and myself since 6th August are not going to be enough to +enable me to hold on. But no one can make head or tail of these 47,000 +drafts and reinforcements; no one can run them to ground. He has +notified me the units and the ships, but the total coming to Maxwell +_and_ myself don't tot up to that figure, much less the portion of them +detailed for the Dardanelles.[11] Now comes to-day's cable in which +Egypt is spoken of as being mine, and the fatness thereof. Taking this +message _per se_, any one might imagine I could draw any troops I liked +from that country provided that _I_ thought _I_ was leaving enough to +defend the Suez Canal: and, apparently, the 47,000 men are about to +make an effort to materialize inasmuch as we are told that details are +being wired us. Finally, Younghusband's Brigade sails to help us! + +_27th August, 1915. Imbros._ As there is a Cabinet to-day I had to get +off my answer last night. In it I have made a desperate effort to +straighten out the tangle:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 589). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. On +returning from Suvla I have just found your No. 7337, cipher. I hope +there may be no misunderstanding as to meaning or intention of my No. +M.F. 578. I asked in my No. M.F. 562 for such drafts and reinforcements +as I considered necessary for the campaign to be brought to a conclusion +before the winter began. You told me in your No. 7172 that you could +spare no more reinforcements beyond those mentioned therein, and that if +I could not achieve success with these I must remain on the defensive +for some considerable time. I explained situation in my No. M.F. 578, +and said that the question was one of arithmetic and measurement. I was +anxious to hold all I had got and to gain more, but I required all my +available force at the present time merely to hold what I had got. I +pointed out that meanwhile a large proportion of my troops were urgently +in need of rest, and sickness was so great that unless reinforcements +were sent out my force would soon be too small for the number of yards +of front to be held. In that case, i.e., if reinforcements could not be +spared, but in that case only, it would be necessary to contract my +line. This welcome news of 47,000 reinforcements, however, alters the +whole situation. Such a number will do much to complete my diminished +cadres, and should materially lessen sick rate by giving more chance of +taking tired troops out of the trenches. Byng can certainly remain where +he is at present, and will even be able to rest some of the tired XXIXth +Division, while the arrival of the Australian Brigade will give General +Birdwood a similar chance of resting some of his troops. + +"General Birdwood meanwhile is to make a further advance to-morrow on +the left flank, to gain possession of important tactical feature, which +will eventually help an advance when the time arrives. Byng is getting +everything in order and has infected all around him with his own energy +and cheeriness and has quickly grasped the whole situation. + +"In communication with Maxwell I find I can have seven Territorial Force +units and the Scottish Horse, and now I have your welcome news of +Younghusband's Brigade. Please believe I am the last man in the world to +give up anything we have gained except under direct necessity, which I +trust may now never arise. The Navy is supporting me to its full +capacity. The guns of the four ships in Suvla Bay take on the Turkish +positions you mention almost as well as and certainly more safely than +if they were landed and placed where you suggest. Moreover, Navy cannot +lend those guns unless I supply the detachments to work them from the +Naval Division, and the latter is fully employed at present and cannot +spare the men. We are constantly sending ships round to Aja Liman to +fire at enemy positions from there, but I know you realize that one must +not rely too much upon effective fire on land targets from ships which +are not moored, as is the case in Suvla Bay. + +"I have not consulted the French General about the situation in the +North as he is at the Southern end and on the right of the line there. +He thinks more of Asia than of these operations in which he has no +troops engaged, but I discussed the matter with him only last night. +Before I sent my No. M.F. 578 I discussed every point closely for two +hours with the Corps Commanders." + +In the evening my A.G. brought me the promised details of the 47,000 +drafts and reinforcements. He has gone into the detail in proper A.G. +spirit, namely, as an arithmetician rather than a tactician. The result +has given us a shock! 10,000 men of the 54th Division and 4,000 drafts +are shown in the War Office cable as being still due to come to me as +reinforcements whereas they had actually landed on the Peninsula; had, +indeed, been shown in my total fighting strength of 68,000 in my +original cable, M.F. 578 of 23rd August, and are, too many of them, alas +already _hors de combat_. Here is the passage sent four days ago:--"The +total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, and +my total force is now only 85,000 of which the fighting strength is +68,000." In this 68,000 were included 14,000 of the men shown in +_subsequent_ War Office cables as being drafts and reinforcements on +their way to the Dardanelles! + +So my A.G. has become a bit suspicious about the balance of the 47,000. +On paper, he says, it looks as if I might expect to draw from Egypt and +England 30,000 reinforcements, but--he remarks sententiously--"we know +by now that paper is one thing and men are different." As to +Younghusband's Brigade, it turns out they cannot be employed here: too +many Mahomedans. Have sent the following reply:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 595). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for +War. With reference to your telegram No. 7337, cipher. Have now received +details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements in your No. 7354 cipher, +and I find that this figure includes nearly 10,000 men of the LIVth +Division and 4,234 drafts, all of whom had been landed on the peninsula +when I wrote my No. M.F. 578, and were reckoned in the total fighting +strength of 68,000 mentioned in that telegram. The statement, however, +shows that I can expect from England and Egypt during the next six weeks +a total of some 29,000 reinforcements, including new formations and two +battalions of non-fighting lines of communication troops. + +"This is a better situation than I was led by your 7172, cipher, to +expect, and you may rely on me to do the best I can with this addition +to my present very depleted strength. I hope, however, you realize that +whereas my British Divisions are now more than 55,000 rifles below their +establishment only 17,000 of these 29,000 are drafts, and before the +last of the drafts can arrive these divisions will have lost another 25 +per cent. of their remaining number by normal wastage. + +"In regard to Younghusband's Brigade, I learn that the three battalions +are practically half Mahomedans, and I am advised that it is better if +it can be avoided not to use Mahomedans so near the heart of Islam. +Would it not be possible to exchange these for some Hindu regiments in +France?" + +These cables give us an uncomfortable feeling that the people at home +wish to regard us as stronger than we are--a different thing from +wishing to add to our strength. + +On the other hand, another sort of message has come in which sheds a ray +of hope across our path so darkened at many other points:-- + +"(No 7372, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. +Although it is understood that we do not at present see our way to +change the recent decision not to send any fresh complete divisional +units, we wish to have all the material possible on which to form a +judgment from time to time. Therefore, will you please telegraph me your +opinion, from the point of view of the military and strategical +situation now existing on the peninsula, as to the prospects there are, +after the experience you have recently had, of our achieving the main +objective of turning the Turks out and what force you would consider +would be required to do this." + +Taylor of the G.S. lunched. A big parcel mail came in. Brodrick is to be +sent to Alexandria. + +_28th August, 1915. Imbros._ Braithwaite and I both feel we must take +time to think over last night's last cable and I have wired to say so. + +Cox's attack on Knoll 60 to the North-east of Kaiajik Aghala came off +well. The New Zealanders under Russell and the Connaught Rangers did +brilliantly. Fighting is still going on. + +A reply from the War Office to mine of last week wherein I pointed out +that the once splendid 5th Battalion Royal Scots had fallen from a +strength of 1,000 down to 289. They have had no one since the campaign +began. To-day the Battalion is just over 250--a Company! Now I am +officially told that "no reinforcements can be found for the 1/5th +Battalion of Royal Scots." This is the Battalion which did so well about +11 o'clock on the dreadful night of the 2nd May. I shall cable the Lord +Provost of Edinburgh. If we could get into touch with the human beings +of Edinburgh they would help us to keep a battalion like the Royal Scots +on their legs even if they had to break up half a dozen new formations +for the purpose. + +Freddie and I dined with de Robeck on board H.M.S. _Triad_. The V.A. was +well pleased with my cable of the 26th. + +_29th August, 1915. Imbros._ Last night two cables:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. 7414, cipher. C.I.G.S.). From War Office to General Headquarters, +Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Reference your No. M.F.Q.T. 2737. +The two Territorial Force battalions originally detailed--_see_ my No. +7172 of 20th August--to sail in the _Orsova_ will be taken by the +_Ceramic_. Of these, the 2/5th Devons is only about 700 strong and +contains a large percentage of recruits, while the 1/6th Royal Scots +contains about 40 per cent. partially trained men and a new Commanding +Officer who has only just been appointed. Until it has had further +training neither battalion is fit for anything more than garrison duty. +I suggest that under these circumstances the _Ceramic_ should proceed +direct to Egypt." + +"(No. 7401, cipher, 554/A.3.). From War Office to Inspector-General of +Communications, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. We are receiving from +Malta and Alexandria very large demands for materials and explosives for +making grenades. The supply of these seriously interferes with our +manufacture of grenades. At present we are hoping to send you 30 to +40,000 grenades weekly and this figure will be increased. When the +materials already sent out to Malta and Alexandria have been used up, +can the manufacture of grenades at those places cease? Please reply at +once; the matter is urgent." + +Do what I will my pen carries me away and I find myself writing like an +ill-conditioned "grouser." As an old War Office "hand" I ought to +know--and I do know--the frightful time of stress under which Whitehall +labours. But, just look at these two cables, you innocent and peaceful +citizen of a thousand years hence! The residue of the famous 47,000 +rifles sent me by the Adjutant-General are now being valued by the +official valuer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In all our +calculations the 2/5th Devons has hitherto masqueraded as an efficient +battalion at full strength. Figures are sometimes more eloquent than +words! + +As to the second cable, that deals us a worse blow. Seeing clearly, at +last, we should extract no hand grenades from the War Office, we turned +to Maxwell and Methuen, who have interested themselves in our plight and +have been making us so many that, with what we ourselves can add to +their manufacture, we are at last beginning to make things hum in the +Turkish trenches. Then in comes this War Office cable to crush our +nascent industry and give us in exchange some pious aspirations. + +There is no good making any trouble about the hand grenades. As to the +two raw battalions, I am asking they be sent, raw and weak as they are, +as I can train them in the trenches much better and more quickly than +they could be trained in Egypt or England. + +Church Parade; office work; sailed over to "K" Beach; inspected Clearing +Stations and walked up to site for new camp. Then back to G.H.Q., to +meet the V.A. and Roger Keyes. They remain the best of friends always. + +This evening we were all in good form owing to the news from Anzac. +Knoll 60, now ours throughout, commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley with +view and fire--a big tactical scoop. + +_30th August, 1915. Imbros._ Still good news from Anzac. Seeing that the +stunt was on a small scale, we seem to have got into the Turks with a +vengeance. In falling back as well as in counter-attacking after we had +taken Hill 60, the enemy were exposed to the fire from our trenches +along the Kaiajik Dere. Birdie declares that they have lost 5,000. We +have taken several machine guns and trench mortars as well as some fifty +prisoners. Have sent grateful message to all on the spot. + +At 10.30 four Russian Officers made their salaams. They are to report +how things are going, and they seem to have the usual quick Slav faculty +for grasping essential points combined, no doubt, with the usual Slav +slackness which lets them go again. I told them everything I knew. They +told us that our landing had saved the whole Army of the Caucasus; that +the Grand Duke knew it and that His Imperial Highness bitterly regretted +that, first of all, sheer lack of supplies; afterwards the struggles in +Galicia and Poland, had prevented Istomine and his Army Corps from +standing by to help. + +At 1.30 the C.G.S., Deedes, Val., Freddy and I crossed to Helles in the +_Arno_. Had a hard afternoon's walking, going first to 8th Corps +Headquarters; next to the Royal Naval Division and last to the 52nd +Divisional Headquarters. Returned to the 8th Corps Headquarters and +there met Bailloud. He is now full of good cheer. Got back to +Headquarters without adventure or misadventure. + +Have cabled home a suggestion made to me by Mahon, that the 16th Irish +Division at home might be used to fill up the gaps in the units of the +10th Division out here. + +_31st August, 1915._ After early lunch, left in the _Arno_ for Suvla. With +me were Braithwaite, Manifold, Freddy and Val. Walked up to the 9th +Corps Headquarters and saw Byng. I am very anxious indeed he should work +his men up into the mood for making a push. He charms everyone and he is +fast pulling his force together. Maude, Fanshawe, and de Lisle seem to +be keen to do something, but Byng, though he also is keen, has the +French standards for ammunition in his head. He does not think we have +enough to warrant us in making an attack. Also, he does not realize yet +that if he is going to wait until we are fitted out on that scale he +will have to wait till doomsday. + +Walked to de Lisle's Headquarters and saw him, and on to the 11th +Divisional Headquarters where I met Fanshawe and Malcolm. With them I +climbed back on to Karakol Dagh and sat me down on the identical same +stone whereon I sweated blood during that confused and indecisive battle +of the 21st August. From the Karakol Dagh I got a very fair idea of our +whole trench system. On either flank we hold the hills; elsewhere we are +on the flat. The 11th Division have recovered and only need drafts to be +as good a formation as any General could wish to command. In the evening +I left in the _Arno_ carrying off with me de Lisle and Captain Hardress +Lloyd to dine and stay the night. Quentin Agnew also dined. + +My first feeble little attempt to act on K.'s assumption that Egypt and +its army are mine has fallen a bit flat. The War Office promptly agreed +to my taking these two weak, half-trained battalions, the 1/6th Royal +Scots and 2/5th Devons, to be trained in my trenches. That was +yesterday. But the Senoussi must have heard of it at once, for Maxwell +forthwith cables, "The attitude of the Senoussi is distinctly dangerous +and his people have been latterly executing night manoeuvres round our +post at Sollum." To me, the night manoeuvres of these riff-raff seem +ridiculous. But distance, perhaps, has lent its enchantment to my view. + +The quibble that the troops in Egypt are mine has been broken to pieces +by my first touch! I have renounced the two battalions with apologies +and now I daresay the Senoussi will retire from his night manoeuvres +round Sollum and resume his old strategic position up Maxwell's sleeve. + +_1st September, 1915. Imbros._ Remained at Headquarters working. Wrote, +amongst other things, to K. as follows:-- + + * * * * * + +"I have just finished two days' hard physical exercise going round +visiting Egerton and Paris with Davies, and Fanshawe and de Lisle with +Byng. At Helles everything is quite right although they have only troops +enough there for the defensive. They are getting a lot of stores in, +and the really only anxious feature of the situation is the health of +the men who are very, very tired right through, having had no sort of +relief for months, and who go sick in large numbers. + + * * * * * + +"Fanshawe is first class. Full of go and plans, he will, if the Lord +spares him, be a real treasure. Maude and Mahon I am going to see after +Mail-day, and then I shall hope to inspect our new captured position on +the left of Anzac. + +"I do not know if they showed you the cable saying Hammersley has gone +home very ill with a clot of blood in his leg. He has to lie perfectly +prostrate and still, so I am told, as the least movement might set it +loose and it would then kill him. Evidently he was not really fit to +have been sent out on service. And this was the man, remember, on whom, +under Stopford, everything depended for making a push. + +"This Suvla Bay country, a jungle ringed round by high mountains, is +essentially a country for Boers or for Indian troops. De Lisle and +others who have watched them closely in India, say that a native soldier +on the Peninsula (although there, too, he goes to pieces if he loses his +Officers and under too prolonged a strain) is worth at least two Indian +soldiers in France. The climate suits him better, but, most of all, the +type of enemy is more or less the sort of type they are accustomed to +encounter. Not _Sahibs_ and _Ghora Log_ in helmets but _Mussalman Log_ +in turbans. As to the South Africans there can be no two opinions, I +think, that they would stand these conditions better than those of +Northern Europe. Indeed, we have one or two Boers serving now with the +Australians, and they have done extremely well." + +Some of K.'s questions take my breath away. I wish very much indeed he +could come and spend a week with me. Otherwise I feel hopeless of making +him grasp the realities of the trenches. On the 30th of August he +cables, "If required, I could send you a fresh consignment of junior +Officers. Or have you sufficient supernumerary Officers to fill all +casualties?" I have replied to him that, in my four regular Divisions, I +am short of 900 effective Officers in the Infantry alone. To meet my +total shortage of 1,450 Officers I have twenty-five young gentlemen who +have lately been sent out here to complete their training! + +De Lisle and Hardress Lloyd sailed back to Suvla in the evening. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 11: As will be seen further on the 47,000 actually panned out +at 29,000, of whom two battalions were at once diverted to Egypt, whilst +two other battalions turned out to be non-fighting formations.--IAN H., +1920.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE FRENCH PLAN + + +_2nd September, 1915. Imbros._ An ugly dream came to me last night. My +tent was at Imbros right enough, and I was lying in my little camp bed, +and yet I was being drowned, held violently under the Hellespont. + +The grip of a hand was still on my throat; the waters were closing over +my head as I broke away and found myself wide awake. I was trembling and +carried back with me into the realms of consciousness an idea that some +uncanny visitor had entered my tent. Already the vision was fading. I +could visualize the form of the presence, but the face remained hidden +in shadow. Never had I suffered from so fearful a dream. For hours +afterwards I was haunted by the thought that the Dardanelles were fatal; +that something sinister was a-foot; that we, all of us, were pre-doomed. + +Dreams go by contraries. Strange that so black a night should be +followed by a noon so brilliant--so brilliant beyond compare. + +K. cables the French are going to send three or four Divisions to work +with us along the Asiatic mainland. From bankrupt to millionaire in 24 +hours. The enormous spin of fortune's wheel makes me giddy! + +These French Divisions will be real Divisions: _must_ be; they have no +others. + +O, Hallelujah! + +"The sending of a force of three or four Divisions to operate on the +Asiatic mainland, independent as regards command, but in close relation +with the British forces on the Peninsula, is being considered by the +French Government. They will require an exclusively French military base +at Mitylene, and us to help with transport and fleet. + +"So far I have not discussed any details with the French, and have +simply told them we shall be delighted to have the help, which would be +given by such an expedition, towards the solution of the Dardanelles +problem. + +"Presumably they would require their two divisions now at Cape Helles. +What forces would you require to relieve them? I have asked Sir John +French if the XXVIIth and XXVIIIth Divisions could be spared for this +purpose. + +"Wire me any points that you think I had better settle with the French +authorities." + +_Deo volente_ we are saved; Constantinople is doomed. How clearly stand +forth the mosques and minarets of the Golden Horn. + +Mr. Murdoch, an Australian journalist, paid me a visit to thank me for +having stretched a point in his favour by letting him see the +Peninsula. Seemed a sensible man. + +Glyn and Holdich dined: both clever fellows in different ways. Dawnay +and Glyn after dinner left for England. Dawnay goes to explain matters +first hand to K. Next to my going home myself, or to K. himself coming +out here, this is the best I can do. Dawnay is one of the soundest young +officers we have, but he is run down physically (like most of us) and +jaded. He should benefit by the trip and so should the rumour-mongers at +home. + +_3rd September, 1915. Imbros._ Two cables: one to say that the news +about the French Divisions must be kept dark; the other, in reply to a +question by me, refusing to let me consult de Robeck on the matter. So +Braithwaite and I had to make out our cable expressing our delight and +thankfulness, and advising how the troops might best be used entirely on +our own. + +The cable took some doing but got it off my chest by mid-day and then +sailed with Ellison, Braithwaite and Val by the _Arno_ to Suvla. We +landed this time on Lala Baba instead of at our usual Ghazi Baba. Every +five minutes the Turks plumped one six-incher on to the beach. But +nobody now seems to mind. A lot of Generals present; Byng, Mahon, +Marshall, Maude and Peyton. Mahon took me up to the top of Lala Baba and +showed me the disposition of his division. He kindly asked us all to tea +at his Headquarters but as someone added that Ashmead-Bartlett was +going to take a cinema photo of the scene I thought I would not be thus +immortalized. The Scottish Horse were bivouacking on the beach; they +have just landed but already they have lost a member or two of their +Mess from shell fire. No wonder they looked a little bewildered, but +soon they will shake down. When we got back to the _Arno_ we found she +had been hit by shrapnel, but no damage. + +Things at Suvla are pulling together. No one gave me more confidence +than Maude. His mind travels beyond the needs of the moment. He is +firmly convinced that no very out-of-the-way effort by the Allies is +needed to score a big point in the War Game and that our hold-up here is +not a reality but only a hold-up or petrefaction of the brains of the +French and of our Dardanelles Committee. I longed to tell him he was +doing them both, especially the French, an injustice, and that four +splendid divisions were as good as on their way, but I had to content +myself with saying to him and to all the Generals that I was overjoyed +at a piece of news received yesterday. + +_4th September, 1915. Imbros._ Life would be as ditchwater were it not +stirred to its depths by K.'s secret cable. Sailed over with Freddie at +11.30 to "K" Beach and inspected the 88th Brigade. Had given orders to +the _Arno_ to stand by and to take me over to Anzac in the afternoon, +but the weather was so bad that I could not get off to her in the motor +boat. + +At 7.15 p.m. the V.A. sent his picket boat for me and Freddie and I went +on board the _Triad_. At 10 p.m. she started for Mudros. + +_5th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ Anchored at Mudros at 6 +a.m. Breakfast over, was met by Altham, Colonel McMunn and Captain +Stephens who took me ashore. There I met Lindley, now commanding the +troops on the island; also General Legge (commanding the 2nd Australian +Division); Lord Dudley and Colonel Forster. Lindley seems pleased at +having been given this command; says he feels like a man out hunting who +has a bad fall but alights on his feet, and Altham tells me he is doing +the work very well. Dudley, too, seemed full of business and contented +with his lot. + +The moment I got through the reception stunt I set myself to work like a +nigger at the Red Cross stunt:--that's how people talk now-a-days. Saw +the 15th Stationary Hospital; the 110th Indian Field Ambulance; "C" +Section of No. 24 British Indian Hospital; ate a hearty lunch; inspected +1st Australian Stationary Hospital. Walking round a Hospital and seeing +whether things are clean and bright is a treat but trying to cheer +people up and give a fillip to all good works--that implies an +expenditure of something vital and leaves a man, after a few hours, +feeling the worse for wear. + +By 4.45 the day's task was well over so refreshed myself by some right +soldier business reviewing the 4th Gurkhas under Major Tillard--a +superb battalion--1,000 strong!!! Had forgotten what a full battalion +looks like. At 5.45 wound up by inspecting a huge Convalescent Depot +under Colonel Forde and got back to the _Triad_ just in time for dinner. +Wemyss dined also. + +_6th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ After breakfast sailed +over to Mudros West; Lindley met me, also a host of doctors. Walked to +No. 3 Australian Hospital with an old acquaintance whose Italian name +slips my memory at the moment; then to No. 2 Australian Stationary +Hospital; then to Convalescent Depot of Lowland Division. At 12.30 ran +down to my launch and was swiftly conveyed to lunch on board the +_Europa_ with Admiral Wemyss. Such a lunch as a lost voyager may dream +of in the desert. Like roses blooming in a snowdrift, so puffs and pies +and kickshaws of all rarest sorts appeared upon a dazzling white +tablecloth, and then--disappeared. We too had to disappear and sail back +to Mudros West again. Horses were waiting and I rode to No. 18 +Stationary Hospital and made a thorough overhaul of it from end to end; +then tea with the Officers of No. 1. In No. 3 Australian General were +eighty nurses; in No. 3 Canadian Stationary seven nurses; in No. 1 +Canadian Stationary twenty-four nurses. Since Lady Brassey descended in +some miraculous manner upon Imbros, they were the first white women I +had seen for six months. Their pretty faces were a refreshing sight: a +capable crowd too: all these Hospitals were in good order, but the sick +and wounded in charge of the girls looked the happiest--and no wonder. +The Canadian Medicos are fresh from France and discoursed about +_moral_. Never a day passed, so they said, in France, but some patient +would, with tears in his eyes, entreat to be sent home. Here at Mudros +there had never been one single instance. The patients, if they said +anything at all, have showed impatience to get back to their comrades in +the fighting line. We discussed this mystery at tea and no one could +make head or tail of it. In France the men got a change; are pulled out +of the trenches; can go to cafes; meet young ladies; get drinks and +generally have a good time. On the Peninsula they are never safe for one +moment (whether they are supposed to be resting or are in the firing +line) from having their heads knocked off by a shell. + +Returned to the _Triad_ in time for dinner. + +Admiral vexed as his motor boat has gone ashore. Bowlby is with it +trying to get it off. + +The French Admiral commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has just sailed +in. + +_7th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 left the _Triad_ to call on +Admiral de la Perriera on board the _Gaulois_. Thence to _H.M.S. Racoon_ +(Lieutenant-Commander Hardy) and started back for Imbros, where we +arrived in time for tea. + +_8th September, 1915. Imbros._ Trying to clear a table blocked with +papers as a result of my two days' trip. Have written to K. as the Mail +bag goes to-morrow. Have told him I have had a nice letter from Mahon, +thanking me for allowing him to rejoin his Division and saying he hopes +he may stay with them till the end. Have given him all my Mudros news +and have sent him a memo. submitted to me by Birdwood showing how much +of the sickness on the Peninsula seems due to the War Office having hung +up my first request for a Field Force Canteen. + +Here is one of the enclosures to Birdwood's memo.:-- + + * * * * * + + "N. Z. and A. Division. + +I desire to draw attention to the remarkable drop in the sick +evacuations from this Brigade as shown by the following figures:-- + + August 28 -- 59. + " 29 -- 64. + " 30 -- 58. + " 31 -- 17. + Sept. 1 -- 2. + " 2 -- 6. + +I am convinced that this amelioration, and the observable improvement in +the condition of the men are largely to be attributed to the +distribution, on August 30 and 31 of Canteen Stores, providing a welcome +change of dietary. + +I strongly recommend that every effort be made to maintain such Canteen +supplies. + + (_Sd._), MONASH." + +_9th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 Admiral de la Perriera returned +my call. At 11.50 Braithwaite, Freddy and I went aboard the _Gaulois_. + +[Illustration: FISH FROM THE ENEMY, _"Central News" phot._] + +A five course lunch and I had to make a speech in French. + +When I got back I found that General Marshall, commanding the 53rd +Division, had come over from Suvla to stay with me. Lancelot Lowther +dined; he told us all the important things he was doing. + +_10th September, 1915. Imbros._ Lancelot Lowther left with the Mails at +7 a.m., glad, I suspect, to shake from his feet the sand of these +barbaric Headquarters. + +Not easy to get Marshall to loosen his tongue about the battle of the +21st, and he would not, or could not, add much to my knowledge. The +strength of Marshall depends not on what he seems but upon what his +officers and men know. He has got his chance amidst the realities of +war. In peace, except by a miracle, he would never have risen above the +command of a Battalion. The main reason I cannot draw him about the +battle of the 21st is, beyond doubt, that he does not want to throw +blame on others. + +Marshall is a matter-of-fact, unemotional sort of chap, yet he told the +sad tale of young O'Sullivan's death in a way which touched our hearts. +O'Sullivan was no novice where V.C.s were the stake and the forfeit +sudden death. + +_11th September, 1915. Imbros._ Ran across in the motor boat to see the +86th Brigade under Brigadier-General Percival. Went, man by man, down +the lines of the four battalions--no very long walk either! These were +the Royal Fusiliers (Major Guyon), Dublin Fusiliers (Colonel O'Dowda), +Munster Fusiliers (Major Geddes), Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Pearson). + +Shade of Napoleon--say, which would you rather not have, a skeleton +Brigade or a Brigade of skeletons? This famous 86th Brigade is a +combination. Were I a fat man I could not bear it, but I am as +unsubstantial as they themselves. A life insurance office wouldn't touch +us; and yet--they kept on smiling! + +_12th September, 1915. Imbros._ The C.O.'s, Geddes, Pearson, Guyon and +O'Dowda, lunched: an ideal lot; young, ardent, on the spot. Marshall +left by the Suvla trawler. Windy day, but calmer in the evening and at +night rained a little. + +_13th September, 1915. Imbros._ Crossed again with Freddie Maitland and +inspected the 87th Field Ambulance (Highland Territorials from Aberdeen) +under Colonel Fraser. Became so interested the dinner hour was +forgotten--a bad mark for a General. Much pleased with the whole show: +up to date, and complete in all respects. Got back lateish. Altham +dined. Sat up at business till midnight. + +Dictated a long letter to Callwell, Director of Military Operations at +the War Office, on the suicidal behaviour of the Military Censor. In +South Africa, my Chief of the Staff's latchkey let many a clandestine +tit-bit slip through to keep interest alive in England. K. regularly, +when the mails came back to roost, went for me, but the messages had got +home and done their duty as good little tit-bits should. The B.P. cannot +work up the full steam of their war energy when the furnaces of their +enthusiasms are systematically damped down; shut off from any breath +from outside. Your sealed pattern censor sees nothing beyond the +mischief that may happen if the enemy gets to know too much about us; he +does not see that this danger is negligible when compared with the +keenness or dullness of the nation. + + General Headquarters, + Medtn. Expeditionary Force, + 13th September, 1915. + + "Dear Callwell, + +"I am about to commit an atrocity by writing to an overworked man on a +subject which may seem to him of secondary importance. Still, to the +soldiers out here, the said subject means encouragement or +discouragement coming to them through the medium of their home +letters,--so vital a factor in victory or failure that the thought +emboldens me to proceed. + +"Our misfire of last month came within only a fine hair's breadth of the +grand coup and caused us proportionately bitter disappointment at the +moment. Yet, looking back over the whole affair in a more calm and +philosophical spirit, any General, I think, would now be bound to admit +that in some respects at least fortune had not been too unkind. + +"The Australians and New Zealanders have been extricated from what by +all the laws and traditions of war, was, in theory, an untenable +position; their borders have been enlarged; the heights they hold have +become more elevated and commanding; they have been entirely released +from shelling on the one flank and, on the other, the shelling has +dwindled away to next door to nothing. North of them again we have +captured a more or less practicable winter harbour, and have extended +our grip on the coastline. From the extreme South point of Anzacs to +their extreme North was formerly 2-3/4 miles. From the extreme South +point of Anzacs to our extreme North point (along which there is +inter-communication) is now 13 miles. Thus we force the enemy to +maintain a much larger number of troops on the Peninsula (where he is +already slowly bleeding to death under the stress of his supply and +transport difficulties) or else dangerously to weaken parts of his line. + +"As to the fighting by which this has been accomplished, there is +nothing from beginning to end that any army need be ashamed of. Every +word I sent home in my Proemial cables might have been published without +raising a blush to the cheek of the most ardent Imperialist. In saying +this I do not, of course, assume that raw troops could tackle a totally +strange and uncomfortable proposition with the swift directness and +savvy of veterans. The feat performed by the Australians and New +Zealanders was of the class of the storming of the heights of Abraham, +only it was infinitely, infinitely more difficult in every respect. + +"On the other side, still assuming the philosophical mantle, consider +what might have happened. Had the Australians and New Zealanders been +average troops, they would perhaps have burst through the first series +of wire entanglements and trenches, but they would not have stormed the +second, still less the third, fourth, fifth or sixth lines. Again, had +the Turks got the smallest inkling of our intention, the landing at +Suvla Bay would have failed altogether, and the New Armies would have +been virtually smashed to pieces without being able to show any _quid +pro quo_. + +"We soldiers out here have then it seems to me, much for which to thank +God on our bended knees. That, at least, is my personal attitude. + +"How is it then that our letters from home are filled with lamentations +and that, having just gained a proportionately very large accretion of +territory, we see headlines in the papers such as 'The Gallipoli +standstill,' whereas it does not seem to occur to anyone to speak about +'The French standstill'? + +"Well, I will tell you. The system upon which the Press Bureau +approaches the eagerly attentive ear of the British Public is the +reason. + +"Why I begged the War Office to change the method by which I sent copies +of my Proemial cables to Maxwell was that I found he (animated, of +course, by the best intentions) was improving the successes and +minimising the failures. The finishing touch was given when, one day, he +inserted the phrase 'The enemy is demoralized and has to submit by day +and by night to our taking his trenches.' Obviously, even the most +stupid fellaheen after reading such a sentence must, in the course of +time, begin to ask himself how, if trenches are being easily taken by +day and by night, we still remain on the wrong side of Achi Baba! + +"Turning now to the Press Bureau and our landing, there was nothing in +that landing, as I have just said, which need have caused sorrow to a +soul in the British Isles excepting, of course, the deplorable heavy +casualties which are inseparable now from making any attack. But, on the +23rd of August a correspondent cables to an American paper a sensational +story of a decisive victory, which the Press Bureau must have known to +be a tissue of lies. Had the lies taken the shape of disasters to the +British there would not, from the point of view of us soldiers, have +been the smallest objection to publishing them. Suppose Mr. X, for +instance, had said that the landing did not succeed, and had been driven +off with immense slaughter? Apart from the fact that such a cable would +have made many poor women in England unhappy for a few hours, the +fabrication would have done us positive good: when the truth was known +the relief would have been enormous, we would have gained handsome +recognition of what had actually been done, and German inspired lies +would have been discounted in future. + +"But there is no _moral_ in the world that can stand against a carefully +engineered disappointment. When you know perfectly well that the spirits +of the people are bound to be dashed down to the depths within a few +days, it is unsound statesmanship surely so to engineer the Press that +you raise those selfsame spirits sky high in the meantime. To climb up +and up is a funny way to prepare for a fall! If you know that your +balloon must burst in five minutes you use that time in letting out gas, +not in throwing away ballast. If you want to spoil a man's legacy of +L500 tell him the previous evening he has been left L50,000! + +"As I began by saying, do please forgive me, my dear Callwell, for +taking up your most precious time. But you are more in touch with this +particular business than anyone else at the War Office and, from your +large mindedness, I feel sure you will be able to spare me some +sympathy, and perhaps even get some recognition for the general +principle I herewith put forward:-- + + * * * * * + +"(1). Do not too curiously censor false alarmist reports put about by +the enemy. Let the papers publish them with a query and then smash them +as soon as this can be done with positive certainty. + +"(2). Mercilessly censor any report which you think is, even in the +smallest degree, overstating your own case. + +"The system needs courage but, with the British Public, it would pay! + + "Yours sincerely, + (_Sd._), "IAN HAMILTON." + +As suspense had, by now, become unbearable, cabled home asking S. of S. +to "let me know, as soon as you can safely do so," when the new +divisions may be expected. I tell him I have "informal" news from the +French but dare not take action on that. + +_14th September, 1915. Imbros._ Mails in with Ward as King's Messenger. +Captain Vitali (Italian liaison officer) and Captain Williams dined. +Vitali is worried about his status. He was told in the first instance he +was to be liaison officer between General Cadorna and myself. On this +understanding we agreed to his coming to our Headquarters. Once he was +here the Italian Government (not Cadorna he is careful to explain) said +he must be permanently attached to us. Vitali feels himself in a false +position as he thinks that,--had we known, we might not have let him +come. Personally, I am quite glad to have him; but we did not have much +talk as, immediately after dinner, Braithwaite brought me the decipher +of Lord K.'s answer to my reminder to him. This has greatly saddened me +and takes up the whole of my thoughts. + +"(No. 7843, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. +Reference your No. M.F. 630. I have just returned from France where I +went to settle up the questions asked in that telegram which were in a +very indefinite state owing apparently to a decision having been arrived +at by the French Government without reference to their military +advisers. The outcome of my meeting with Millerand, Joffre and Sarrail +was that the French force of four Divisions proposed to be sent to the +Dardanelles cannot leave until the result of the approaching offensive +in France is determined. If it be as successful as hoped for your +position in the Dardanelles would naturally be affected favourably. It +is hoped that the issue will be clear in the first few days of October, +and if indecisive, that by 10th October two of our Divisions may be at +Marseilles for embarkation to be followed closely by the four French +Divisions. The embarkation and transport of so large a force would, it +is thought, take about a month, but this has still to be worked out in +detail, so that by about the middle of November would be the time when +all would be ready. + +"In the meantime, as transport is available, I shall continue to send +you reinforcements and drafts of which you are fully informed, up to +20th instant, and on which you should alone calculate. + +"Sarrail, backed by General Bailloud, is greatly in favour of the French +expedition being employed independently on the Asiatic shore. + +"Joffre greatly doubts the wisdom of this course, and Millerand +requested me to ask you to state fully and confidentially, for his +personal information, your opinion on this matter. + +"Joffre's objections appear to be that a landing in Asia opens up a very +wide field if the force be not immediately successful, and that in that +case more troops, munitions and drafts would be eventually required than +he could spare with due regard to the safety of France. + +"Secondly, he is not very confident of Sarrail's leadership, +particularly as the plans Sarrail has made seem to be worthless. Joffre +is having careful plans worked out by his Staff for the expedition on +the Asiatic shore which, he says, though unfinished, do not look +promising. The same objection on his part would not, I gather, be felt +if the French troops were given a definite area and objective on the +Gallipoli Peninsula, where the scope of their activities, and +consequently the support required from France, could be limited." + +Where's the use of M. Millerand's consulting me over what lies on the +far side of a dead wall? Had he asked me to show why action here should +have priority over action in France, then I might have been of some use. +But that is settled: the four French Divisions earmarked for the East +will not now be sent until _after_ "the results of the coming offensive +in France have been determined." "If the success of this push equals +expectations you will reap the benefit." If indecisive then, "by the +10th October," two British Divisions and four French Divisions will be +at Marseilles ready to sail out here: "about the middle of November +would be the time when everything would be ready." There are altogether +too many ifs and ands and pots and pans about Millerand's question. +When a man starts going West who can foretell how long it will take him +to arrive at the East? + +(1) If the push in the West is victorious we will score, says K. That is +so. Far as the Western battlefield lies from the scene of our struggle, +the report of a German defeat in France would reverberate Eastwards and +would lend us a brave moral impetus. But the point I would raise is +this:--did K., as representing a huge Eastern Empire, press firmly upon +Millerand and Joffre the alternative,--_if the push in the East is +victorious the West will score_? + +What express strategical gain do they expect from pushing back the +Germans? A blow which merely destroys a proportion of men and material +without paralysing the resources of the enemy is a blow in the air. War +cannot be waged by tactics alone. That is a barbaric method. To bend +back the German lines in the West, or to push the first line back on to +the second or third, or twentieth, has of itself but slight strategical +or economic import. + +Here, on the other hand, we have literally in our grasp a clear cut gift +offered us by the Gods. The impossible part, the landing, is done. All +that remains is so many fresh men and so many thousand shell. The result +is not problematical, but mathematical. Napoleon is the only man who has +waged a world war in the world as we know it to-day. Napoleon said, I +think it was on the famous raft, "Who holds Constantinople is master of +the world." And there it lies at the mercy of the Briton--could he only +convince Joffre that the shortest cut to freeing his country from the +Germans lies through the Dardanelles. + +The principles which should underlie Entente strategy will be clear to +military historians although obscured to-day by jealousies and +amateurishness: just the usual one, two, three they are, in this +order:-- + + * * * * * + +(a) Hold the sea. + +(b) Hold the West. + +(c) Smash the Turk. + +A couple of miles won by us here gives England wheat and Russia rifles; +gives us the whip hand in the Balkans plus security in a couple of +Continents. A couple of miles lost by us here leaves the German with a +strengthened grip upon all the real world objectives for which he went +to war: it leaves us with a ruined prestige in Asia. But what is all +that to Joffre to whom, as a good Frenchman, the Balkans; the bracing up +of the Russian Army; all the Odessa corn; Asia and Africa thrown in, do +not count against _one departement_ of _la Patrie_. + +(2) If the push in the West is indecisive then our push is only to be +postponed. Postponed! The word is like a knell. To write it gives me a +feeling of sick despair. Only postponed! As well cable at once, _only_ +ruined!! + +(3) But there is a third eventuality not mentioned by Lord K. How if our +attack upon the main strength of the entrenched Germans is beaten off? +To Joffre France comes first and the rest nowhere--every time: that +is natural. But our Higher Direction are not Frenchmen--not yet! +Armageddon is actually being fought _here_, at the Dardanelles, and the +British outlook is focused on France. We are to sit here and rot away +with cholera, and see the winter gales approach, until the big push has +been made in the West where men can afford to wait--where they are +healthy--where time is all on their side. And this push in the West is +against the whole German Empire linked to all its own vast resources by +a few miles of the best railways in the world. We _can_ attack here with +more men and more munitions than the enemy the very moment we care to +accept the principle that, _at this moment_, Constantinople and the +heartening up of Russia and ascendency amongst the Balkan States are not +only the true positive objectives of our strategy, but are the sole +strategical stunts upon the board. We can do so because of our sea +power. We can borrow enough howitzers, aeroplanes, munitions and drafts +from the West; apply them here and then, if necessary, return them. We +are not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea +power! + +[Illustration: MARSHALL LIMAN VON SANDERS _"Exclusive News" phot._] + +Easy to preach patience to a nation in agony? Yes, for the whole agony +of the whole world is more important even than the agonies of France. +We've got to win the war and win it quick. There's only one way to do +that. The resources of the Entente are not equal to carrying on two +offensives at the same moment. If our Army in the West will just sit +tight awhile, we here will beat the Turks, and snip the last economic +lien binding the Central Powers to the outside world. + +Once more, our game is to _defend_ in the West until the _attack_ in the +East has borne economic fruit in the shape of ships and corn: political +fruit in the sentiment of the Balkans: military fruit in the fillip +given to the whole force of the Entente by actual tactical contact +between the British soldiers and the rank and file of the Ruskies. The +collapse of the Central Powers,--eclipsed in full view of all Asia and +Africa by the smoke from the funnels of the British Fleet at anchor in +the Golden Horn is what we are after here. Even if French and Joffre do +drive the German main hordes back to the Rhine the scope of their scoop +would be far less than ours, for we by getting to Constantinople can +starve those main armies stiff. + +How few of our people know anything of the Russians. At least, I have +been attached for eight months to the Armies which fought against them +in the field; have visited Russia and Siberia and have done two peace +manoeuvres as their guest. To send superior officers to Russia only +produces jealousy; to send supplies only breeds dishonesty. But with +50,000 British soldiers as yeast we could leaven 5,000,000 Muscovites; +we could fire their inert masses with our ardour; this is the best of +all uses to which 50,000 British soldiers could at present be put. + +From the early days when he told me the New Army should go to Salonika, +K. had an intuition at the back of his big mind that victory would dawn +in the East. But he is no longer the K. of K., the old K. of Khartoum +and Pretoria. He still has his moments of God-sent intuition. First, he +had _absolute_ knowledge that the Germans would come through Belgium: I +repeat this. The assumption was not uncommon perhaps, but he _knew the +fact_! Secondly, when everyone else spoke of a six weeks' war; when +every other soldier I can think of except Douglas Haig believed he'd be +back before the grouse shooting was over; K. went nap on a three years' +war. Pray heaven he was wrong; but, right or wrong, he has already +proved himself to have been nearer the mark than anyone else. Thirdly, +he had a call (by heavenly telepathy, I suppose) that his New Armies +must go out to the East. There is no more question about this than there +is about Belgium and the three years' duration. He has told me so; time +and again. + +Why then does he not act accordingly if he's in the Almighty know? +Because he can't. With the one exception of the Battle of Paardeberg, he +never in his palmiest days pretended to be a man of action. But now he +has lost his faculty of forcing others to act. He makes a spurt but he +can't stay the distance. He has met Millerand, French and Joffre in +Council and allowed the searchlights of his genius to be snuffed out! +That is what surprises me:--He, who once could deflect Joe Chamberlain +and Milner from their orbits; who twisted stiff-necked Boers round his +little finger; who bore down Asquith, Winston, Prince Louis and Beatty +in Valetta Harbour--East _versus_ West--Mediterranean _versus_ North +Sea--who, from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m., withstood, wrestled with and overthrew +Haldane's arguments in favour of his taking up the succession to the +Duke of Connaught, and that although he had one arm tied to his side by +having taken the King's shilling. What a marvel he was and now-- + + Ichabod! + +There is something so tragical in what home letters let us guess that +the pity of it almost makes me forget our own stillborn projects. + +_15th September, 1915. Imbros._ Altham and Major Hood left G.H.Q. for L. +of C. Headquarters. Had another hour with Altham before he got aboard +his destroyer. Gave an interview to Buchanan, A.M.S. After lunch, +Braithwaite, Val, Wells, Deedes, Freddie and myself went off to Suvla +aboard H.M.S. _Scourge_ (Lieutenant-Commander Tupper). On landing, +Braithwaite branched off to see the G.S. Byng has a keen sense of +humour; is energetic and by his looks and manner attracts all ranks. No +one could wish a better corps commander and I have never in all my +experience known anyone take greater and more minute trouble with his +field days and manoeuvres than he did in Egypt the year before the +war. But his sojourn on the Western front has given him inflated +standards as to the number of guns and stocks of H.E. shell which are +essential to success; especially with troops who have suffered heavy +losses. Perhaps he is right. This para. from a letter written to the +great man to-night explains more generally what I feel:-- + + * * * * * + +"Maude is burning to get on and do something and I heard him myself ask +Byng when he was going to let him have a dash. As to Byng, I think +myself he is not quite sure yet about the spirit of his men. I have been +trying to spur him on for the last day or so, although only by very +gentle hints, as I think, with a man of Byng's great reputation, one +must leave him to himself for as long as possible. I daresay he may be +quite right and very wise. Still, these reinforcements have brought the +Suvla Bay troops up to no less than 37,000 men, and I am most anxious +they should do something soon a little more rapid than sapping out +slowly towards the enemy's lines--which they are doing." + +After my talk with Byng, we went on to meet Fanshawe and de Lisle. Maude +came along with me as far as the crestline. I asked him about his +Division. He replied: "Sir Ian, may I be frank with you about the +Division?" At these ominous words I shivered. They positively gave me +the shivers. So I braced myself up when I answered, "But of course!" +Maude then said, "If you give the order now, and will arrange for a +little artillery support, my Division will storm and hold on to any +thousand yards of Turkish trench you like to point out; to-morrow." I +could have embraced him, but I had to go steady and explain to him that +a Corps Commander must judge all his Divisions and that, taking the +situation as a whole, Byng did not think it fair on the men to let them +have a dart yet--not, at least, till they had more munitions at their +back. Byng has had wide experiences in the West and he looks on it as +trying the men unfairly to ask them to attack without a preliminary +bombardment on a scale which we cannot at present afford. "Yes," said +Maude, "that is all very well but after all you must remember the Turks +have neither the artillery nor the munitions the Germans have at their +command on the Western front." + +"Well," I replied, "you put your points to Byng and you know I am a man +who never yet in my life refused a good brave offer like yours." He has +a great admiration for Byng and so, though sadly, he went away. + +Fanshawe met me at the South end of the Division trenches, as bright and +keen as a new nail. His men, too, seem full of go. Fanshawe hopes to +carry the whole ridge whenever he gets the order. The 11th Division +promise to be as fine a unit as any in the Army once they get their gaps +filled in. + +_16th September, 1915. Imbros._ We had quite a lively morning here. At +7.30 an enemy's biplane dropped four bombs on our Headquarters camp and +got away with hardly a shot fired at it. At 7.50 an enemy's Taube came +over and dropped bombs near my Signal Tent, also a little summer shower +of small steel darts: five men were wounded. At 8.10 a.m. yet another +enemy biplane circled round but was kept at a respectful distance by the +ship's guns. + +Gave an interview to Colonel Stewart, Armoured Car Squadron. + +Vice-Admiral Foumet and Staff called on me in the forenoon. He replaces +Admiral Nicol gone sick. Mails went out this evening. Freddie and I +gave tone to our debilitated constitutions by dining with the ever +hospitable V.A. on the _Triad_. + +A cable from Dawnay saying Lord K. "would not regard unfavourably" a +withdrawal from Suvla Bay. + +Dawnay left under the cloud of the 21st August. He it was who +rough-drafted the cable (in very much stronger terms than my final +version) suggesting that we might have to draw in our horns if we were +not kept up to strength. Since then our skies have cleared; the spirit +of the men has risen to set fair and we have got drafts enough, not for +a big push but certainly to enable us to be delighted should the Turks +attempt any sort of an attack, either at Suvla or anywhere else. The +Turks, in fact, are strictly on the defensive both actually and in their +spirit. + +_17th September, 1915. Imbros._ Had been going to Anzac to inspect and +then to bring Birdie back to stay with me. But the weather was too bad. +He got here all right as the wind is from the North and he was able to +climb aboard under the lee of Nibrunesi Point. Just as well, perhaps, we +did not go, for one way or another a good deal of extra work had to be +got through. One thing; two cables from Maxwell to the War Office have +been repeated to us here; inadvertently we think; divertingly for sure. +The story is this:-- + + * * * * * + +A few days ago we were offered the 51st and 53rd Sikhs who, despite +their titles, are half Mahomedan. After consulting Cox, Birdie and +other Indian Army Officers I cabled back saying we would gladly have +them "as soon as transport can be arranged," unless French is willing to +exchange them for two purely non-Mahomedan units. Here are the +collateral cables from Maxwell to the War Office:-- + + * * * * * + +"Both the 51st and 53rd Sikhs have already been disembarked. They had +better remain off ship as long as possible, I think, since they are +reported to be feverish. The troopship can wait at Port Said. The men on +the canal, I should like to point out, barely get two nights in bed per +week." + +"I have been asked by Hamilton to send him a double Company of Patiala +Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs. I can do this, and if you concur I +think it is a better arrangement than to send him the 51st and 53rd +Sikhs." + +The Sikhs meant for Gallipoli are gone; we shall never see them more; +they mount guard by night against the ghosts of the Suez Canal. + +Another thing; a Correspondent writes in and tells us that for the +honour of his profession he feels bound to let us know that Mr. +Ashmead-Bartlett has secretly sent home an uncensored despatch _per_, of +all people in the world, Mr. Murdoch! + +I had begun to wonder what had come over Mr. Murdoch and now it seems he +has come over me! + +The next paper on the table was my draft cable of advice for M. +Millerand. Joffre wants his four Divisions to land on the Peninsula; +Sarrail wishes them to work along the Asiatic side. No doubt the views +of the French Generals are being coloured by their wish to stand as +clear as they can of British command. So I have been careful to sweep +away _that_ obstacle by offering to stand down. Now they can fix up the +problem on its merits:-- + + * * * * * + +"Closest consideration has been given to your No. 7843, cipher. Until +now I have consistently opposed a landing on the Asiatic side of the +Straits with less than 6 divisions--see my telegram No. M.F. 349 of 19th +June. On Gallipoli Peninsula area and difficulties of supply limited +liabilities of the opposing forces whereas mainland of Asia gave scope +for the deployment of large forces by the enemy. Now, however, the +situation is clearing up and there has been a great change in the +conditions. + +"The Turks had formerly 10,000 to 12,000 men on Asiatic shore with large +reserves on the Peninsula available to cross over there if necessary. +Now Anatolia and Syria have been drained of troops to oppose us on the +Peninsula where the Turks have far longer front to hold, namely, 9-1/2 +miles instead of 2-1/2, whilst our position and strength at Suvla and +Anzac are more threatening to their communications than was our position +at Anzac in June. If, therefore, we can be strong enough to maintain +pressure on whole Turkish line on the Peninsula it is unlikely that +Turks could detach troops to oppose French landing on Asiatic shore. +Assuming even that the Turks were enabled to release every soldier from +Thrace by a definite understanding being arrived at with Bulgaria, I +calculate they might gather a total of five divisions but of these +probably only one or at most two would be on Asiatic side at beginning +of the operations and would probably be scattered so that opposition in +strength to surprise landing is improbable. Moreover, only one of the +divisions is composed of good Nizam troops, others believed to be not up +to establishment. The Asiatic coast down to Yukeri Bay is now heavily +trenched but I do not think much has been done below that point. +Supposing, therefore, French bring good divisions at war strength and +succeed in keeping their destination secret, they appear to have a good +chance of obtaining good covering positions without much loss and of +thence advancing on Chanak defeating any Turkish forces sent against +them. Degree of their success would depend on whether the entrenched +positions which have been prepared on the Kum Kale--Ehren Keui road +could be turned by the good road which leads from Yukeri through Ezine +and Ishiklar to Chanak, as it is unlikely that Turks would be able to +quickly organize new defensive positions with entirely new line of +supply. The distance of landing place from objective is a secondary +consideration. It is easier to march and fight 100 miles than to take +three lines of trenches. In the one case there is room for manoeuvre +at which Turks are bad while in the other case siege warfare results at +which the Turks stand supreme. Once Ehren Keui reached, the Turks +between that place and Kum Kale would be forced to retire and Kum Kale +would become our base, thereby greatly shortening line of supply. +Supposing Turks endeavoured to make bridgehead on Chanak promontory, the +country is so big that large forces would be necessary and once the +Turks were cut off from North their supply difficulties would be most +serious. French possession of Chanak should be equivalent to victory, +but as Turks are stubborn fellows it is better to confine anticipations +to commencement of results which I consider would be as +follows:--Cutting off of Turkish supply line Chanak to Akbashi Liman. +Narrows would be useless to Turks. Nagara communications could be cut. +Our 15-inch howitzer could be used to batter Kilid Bahr forts. Allied +Fleets should be able to enter Marmora without loss. + +"Turning to alternatives. If French were held up and unable to reach +Chanak, at least the last Turkish reserves would have been used up and I +think happy termination of operations though postponed would begin to +come clearly into view. Supposing the worst happened and that the French +were compelled to fall back after landing. In that case a clear road for +retirement to a bridgehead would be open. Positions covering landing +could be taken up and there they would continue to draw towards them +considerable Turkish forces which would otherwise be available for use +on Peninsula. + +"Finally, greater difficulties beset all other schemes. The notorious +military disadvantages of independent command would be less harmful if +the respective armies were separated by the Straits than if they were +mixed up together on Peninsula. As Achi Baba is now one of the +strongest fortresses in Europe, it would be unpopular to palm off the +Cape Helles end upon the French. Moreover, all the French here are, and +always have been, dead set on Asia. If the French were employed at Suvla +they would have to fight side by side with the British, a situation +which, with co-equal commanders, would be a military absurdity. Were +that course decided upon, I would ask the Allied Governments to make up +their minds which General had the most daring, brains and experience, +and if it were the Frenchman I would serve under him loyally. + +"As to making the attempt to the North of the Gulf of Xeros: a landing +there is certain to be opposed, and the Turkish reinforcements which are +always held ready in the neighbourhood of Uzunkiupru and Keshan could +arrive in strength very quickly and imperil the whole project. A further +objection lies in the distance of the French intermediate base and great +strain it would throw on Allied Fleets. Finally, it is all-important +that absolute secrecy should be maintained. I suggest that it should be +allowed to leak out that the destination of the French is Enos, this +would probably have the effect of tricking Turkish troops in Thrace, as +Enos is a destination which would gain most credence." + +Birdie has at last worn off the fine edge of his keenness; he looks a +little tired: General Russell, the New Zealander, dined also and was in +great form. + +_18th September, 1915. Imbros._ A cable to say that the French +Government are anxious to form two bases each capable of supplying three +Divisions: one to be at Mudros, the other at Mitylene. Is it business? +In spite of delay, in spite of lost chances, is it business? + + + + +CHAPTER XX + +LOOS AND SALONIKA + + +Left G.H.Q. at noon to-day, 18th, sailed to Helles; lunched with Davies; +went up to inspect the East Lanes Division. The trenches are in +apple-pie order and the men are in good heart, but the stomach has +always been held to be the mainstay of the fighting man, and theirs are +in the grip of enteritis. Stopped at 5th Corps Headquarters on my way +back. + +De Putron and la Borde came back with me. Struck an interesting +scientist called Lawes whilst I was in the Lancashire trenches. As we +were entering the harbour at Kephalos an enemy Taube tried to drop a +bomb aboard. No harm. + +Dined with the V.A. together with Birdie, Lord Anglesey and Freddie. + +When we got back found this from War Office. Rather amusing to be in the +know of the counter moves and to see their outcome:-- + + * * * * * + +"The exchange of battalions mentioned in No. 7873, cipher, of 14th +September cannot be effected, so that at present the 51st and 53rd Sikhs +will not proceed to France. From the General Officer Commanding, +Egypt's, telegram No. 1854. E. of 15th September, it is understood that +he can send you another double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the +14th Sikhs. Possibly this will suffice for your requirements in the +meantime, and the 51st and 53rd Sikhs will be left at the disposal of +General Officer Commanding, Egypt. If so, will you please make +arrangements with him accordingly? + +"Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Egypt." + +Our defeat is a foregone conclusion: the Senoussi is too strong for us. +All the same I am determined to press the matter to an issue, if only to +have a clean cut precedent as to whether we do have a first call on +troops in Egypt or whether it is the other way about. We want these men +so badly. They don't get sick here; are worth four European Battalions +at present, and Birdie has become most anxious to get them, especially +the 53rd. So I am cabling to Maxwell just to send us our troops (for +they are ours) forthwith and have cabled to the War Office:-- + + * * * * * + +"With reference to your telegram No. 8012, cipher. In accordance with +your telegram No. 8711, of 11th September, I am asking General Officer +Commanding, Egypt, to send here, at once, the 51st and 53rd Sikhs, as I +cannot do without them. I shall be very glad to receive the Patiala +Sikhs as well, as the 14th Sikhs are badly in need of a reinforcement." + +Imagine had we been sent Indian Divisions for Suvla and if the New Army, +Territorials and Yeomen had been sent instead to France! Each category +would have given (let me put it mildly) double value. The heat, the +thirst, the scrub, the snipers, all so disconcerting to our fresh +contingents would have been commonplaces of frontier warfare to our +Indian troops. See what the handful with us here have achieved. Yet in +vain do I write and cable my personal entreaties to Beauchamp Duff, the +all-powerful Commander-in-Chief in India, and a very old friend, for two +hundred Sikhs: first he offers me a couple of hundred Brahmins wherewith +to fill the ranks of the famous 14th Sikhs and then, when I hesitate +before a proposal which appears monstrous, withdraws even that offer. +Again, I beg for 200 recruits for the 14th, saying I will train them +myself; I am refused--very politely and at great length--refused, +because it would be "politically inexpedient" to send them. In vain do +we try to get our own two battalions through the Egyptian morass; they +are going to stick and do sentry go over nothing. Why; were there any +real trouble in Egypt I could land a whole Division there within four +and a half days! + +As for the New Army and Territorials, gradually entered with their +veteran comrades in the trenches of France and Flanders, they too would +have had more familiar surroundings and fairer play--as everyone here +now recognizes, too late! + +The crystals of history take shape while we fight. As in a glass darkly +the outlines begin to appear to anyone who has a moment wherein to peer +beyond the end of the war. Everything has gone by the contrary. Our +people have done as well as their neighbours, and better, with their +imaginations, whether in diplomacy, strategy or tactics. Where the +Gibbon or Plutarch who survives the War Office Censor is going to damn +their reputations into heaps is over their failure in business +commonsense. Under their noses, parts of their system, were two great +live organisms; the Indian Army and the Territorial Force. From the +moment the mobilization flag was dropped it was up to them to work tooth +and nail to treble or quadruple these sound, vigorous existing entities. +What have they done? After a year of war, the Indian Army and the +Territorial Army are staggering on their last legs instead of being the +best part of our forces. Compare the East Lanes Division, who had the +good fortune to escape from War Office clutches by getting right out to +Egypt at the outbreak of the war, with Territorial Divisions which have +remained since then under the eyes and in the hands of the War Office! + +The Turks are still withdrawing troops from the Caucasus front to ours. +Good for the Russians. Whilst I was at Helles, the enemy guns started a +heavy bombardment along the whole of our nine mile front from the right +of Anzac to the left of Suvla; a heavy musketry fire also along the +Turkish trenches. An attempt was then made to launch infantry assaults +against our lines, but these fizzled out, the rank and file having no +heart for the job. There is no doubt the Turks have had enough of it. +They can still hold on, but that's about all. + +_19th September, 1915. Imbros._ News in to say that the Turkish rank and +file at Suvla are not equal to any attack. At the end of the bombardment +yesterday a few officers jumped on to the parapet and waved their +swords; the men shouted from the safety of the trenches--that was all. +Alec McGrigor arrived from Alexandria as A.D.C. _vice_ Brodrick. At 9 +p.m. an enemy aeroplane dropped a couple of bombs. Very jolly having +Birdie here. He says that his latest returns show a daily sick list of +ten per battalion of British or Australian troops and of one per +battalion of Indian troops. + +_20th September, 1915. Imbros._ Nothing doing. There is still scope for +action at Suvla but we can't get them to take up any little schemes we +may suggest. Shell shortage is the invariable answer. At 5 p.m. Birdie +and Anglesey went back to Anzac. + +_21st September, 1915. Imbros._ Further development of the Sikh +comedy:--Maxwell cables, "No. 1883 E. Your No. M.F. 648. I have received +no orders to send these regiments. According to my last information from +the War Office they were to remain here, as I require them, but that I +should send you a double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the 14th +Sikhs." + +I have cabled this on to the War Office, saying, "As I understand it, +your No. 8012 of 18th September does not mean that the War Office have +withdrawn the offer of these two regiments, which are urgently required +here. I therefore hope that you will give early authority to General +Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send them on to Mediterranean +Expeditionary Force." + +The battalions were thrown at my head when that grand statement was made +as to the grand army I commanded; now where are they? + +Started off with Taylor, Freddie and Colonel Napier (British Military +Attache to Bulgaria) for Anzac. No shelling. Went round the whole left +centre and left of Birdie's position to right and left of Cheshire +Point, and saw the new Australian Division--very fine fellows. Bullets +were on the whistle and "the boys" were as keen and happy as any real +schoolboys. Memories of the Khyber, Chitral and Tirah can hardly yield +samples of a country so tangled and broken. Where the Turks begin and +where we end is a puzzler, and if you do happen to take a wrong turning +it leads to Paradise. Met various Australian friends--a full-blown Lord +Mayor--many other leading citizens both of Melbourne and of Sydney. + +At 5 p.m. re-embarked. Napier gave birth to a happy thought on our way +back. His idea is that we should transfer the troops on the Gallipoli +Peninsula to Salonika so as to hearten up the Serbians and Greeks and +dishearten our enemies at Sofia. He has pressed his view, he said, on +the Foreign Office. I asked him if his Chief, the Minister at Sofia, +stood behind him. He said he could not vouch for his Minister's views, +but that he, Napier, had power in his capacity as Military Attache to +correspond with the British Government direct. + +K. himself did at one time toy with the thought of sending his New Army +to Serbia either under Rundle or myself, and was only restrained by the +outbreak of typhus in that country. But, keen as I was for the warpath, +a very little study of the terrain and supply question was enough to +cool my ardour. + +Salonika is ruled out by history. In all the campaigns waged of old in +these very regions the part played by Salonika has been naval, not +military. There must have been some reason for this: there was; it still +exists--geography! You could not, and cannot, carry out anything big +_via_ a couple of narrow cracks through a trackless labyrinth of +mountains. The problem is a repetition of the Afghanistan dilemma. A big +army would starve at Nisch and along the Danube; a small army would be +swallowed up by the enemy. Unless they are going to trust to Bulgaria +and Roumania for supplies, one British Army Corps is about as much as +can manage to live and fight in Serbia. If they want to make Serbia safe +their only possible chance is to push through to Constantinople! There +is no other way. I said all this to Napier and a lot more besides and +left him keener on Salonika than ever. + +He actually thinks that from Salonika we could do what could be done by +us at any time at the Dardanelles! Salonika is no alternative to the +Dardanelles. I wish the War Office could hear Gouraud; Gouraud, that big +sane man with local knowledge. How strong he used to be on the point +that Greece lay altogether outside the sphere of any military action by +the Entente. We can't feed Russia with munitions through Salonika, nor +can we bring back Russian wheat _via_ Salonika,--not much, seeing we +would not be able to feed ourselves were we fifty miles into the +mountains. Salonika is a military mare's nest. + +Scatters Wilson and Captain Cheape dined and stayed the night. The +King's Messenger arrived with the Mails. + +Three cables:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 654). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. Only two +machine guns per battalion are being brought by the City of London +battalions, the balance, by order of General Officer Commanding, Egypt, +being handed over to Chief Ordnance Officer, Egypt. The former +telegraphs that this has been done by your order. There is nothing that +is more important to my force than an ample supply of these guns. I +would therefore request that early authority should be given to General +Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send on these guns." + +"(No. I.D. 116). From General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary +Force, to War Office. My No. I.D. 110. Please inform me whether Murdoch +has arrived, and whether my information was correct as regards his +carrying a despatch for Sir Harry Lawson from Ashmead-Bartlett." + +"(No. 8108, cipher). From War Office to General Headquarters, +Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your No. I.D. 116. A despatch +answering the description has been taken from Murdoch at Marseilles. You +should delay action, however, until we have seen it and you hear from us +further." + +The despatch should have been censored here and ought, therefore, to be +sent back here for censoring. The War Office, I suppose, want to have +first look in! + +_22nd September, 1915._ Scatters and Cheape sailed back for Suvla at +6.45 a.m.--just in good time to avoid a raid on our Headquarters carried +out by three Taubes between 7.50 and 8 a.m. A dozen bombs dropped; no +serious harm done. + +Heseltine, King's Messenger, came to dinner. + +Bad news from Bulgaria. She is mobilizing, not, we may be sure, for the +sake of helping those who do not help themselves. Well do I remember +Ferdinand, as long ago as 1909, turning to me and saying as he pointed +to a picture of himself in the robes of a Byzantine Emperor, "_Quand +vous arrivez au Bosphore, pensez a moi_." Well, there is one good side +to working over a narrow Peninsula, under the guns of your own Fleet, +all the Bulgars in the Balkans cannot add a rifle to the number of enemy +troops on Gallipoli, who already, can only be munitioned, watered and +fed with the greatest difficulty. The more targets the enemy cram on to +their present narrow front the merrier for our gunners; the better the +chance for our submarines starving the lot of them. So long as our Fleet +holds the AEgean, we may snap our fingers at the Bulgarians, whereas +they, were they fools enough to come here, would live on tenter hooks +lest haply some fine morning our Fleet should sail into the Marmora. + +Yes, two or three battleships in the Marmora! Think of it! The sea +communications, Constantinople-Gallipoli and Asia-Gallipoli, would +cease, _ipso facto_, to exist. The railways between Europe and +Constantinople and Asia and Constantinople must shut down. In a +fortnight the Turks on the Peninsula begin to pack up; in a month the +Turks in Constantinople move bag and baggage from Europe to Asia. +Ferdinand watching the cat's jump, prepares to turn those 400,000 +bayonets of his against the Kaiser. So wags my world in the might-be; +very much "might-be" for the Navy are turning down the "to be" for the +third time of asking. Three times the Sibyl makes her prodigious offer: +May--August--September a new world for old battleships:--two--four--six! + +_23rd September, 1915._ Stormy weather: the _Imogene_ could hardly crawl +out. Have written K. to tell him how day succeeds day, never without +incident, but never with achievement; how we are burnt up with longing +to get on and how we know that he is as anxious. Yet, as I tell him, +_we_ "can't force the pace." How can we? We have not the +wherewithal--the stuff. "Byng would like to have four days' successive +bombardment for an hour, and then attack, and speaks of one H.E. shell +per yard as pat as if they were shells we could pick up on the seashore. +I have assured him it is no earthly use; that he shall have his share of +what I have got, but that stuff for bombardment is simply not in +existence,--not here, at least." + +_24th September, 1915. Imbros._ Fought against exasperation all day. As +I thought:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. 8193, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. In +the existing situation, the two battalions referred to in your No. M.F. +655 of 21st September, should remain for the present in Egypt. I have +informed Maxwell to this effect." + +K. has re-opened the idea of giving up Suvla, saying, "it might become +necessary in certain eventualities to abandon that area." In my reply I +have said, "I hope there will be no question now of the abandonment of +Suvla.... In the Northern zone I have now more troops than at the time +of my telegram, my line is stronger, the old troops are resting, the new +troops are improving, and preparations are being made for a local +advance. At this stage withdrawal will be a great moral victory for the +Turks. Moreover, it would release a large number of enemy divisions to +oppose the Russians in Asia, or for other enterprises." + +Another cable also sent dealing with the ever present, ever pressing, +ever ghastlier shortage upon the Peninsula generally:-- + + * * * * * + +"My present shortages, 21st September, of infantry rank and file are +2,645 in the XXIXth Division, 17,166 in the three New Army Divisions, +and 23,986 in the four Territorial Divisions, totalling 43,797; out of +respective establishments of 11,652, 37,869 and 44,824, total, 97,345." + +Were the Royal Naval Division included the percentage would be worse. + +Peter Pollen and I dined with the Admiral. After dinner, we discussed +Fox-Ferdinand's little tricks. The Admiral had heard a lot about his +flirtations with the Duke of Mecklenburg lately sent from Berlin on some +sort of an ambassadorial mission to the Balkans. I told him of my visit +to Sofia during the interval which took place between Prince Ferdinand +proclaiming himself Tsar, and the tardy and unenthusiastic recognition +of his new rank by Great Britain. Ferdinand's Court Chamberlain asked me +to dine. I wanted to refuse as I had meant to go on to Constantinople, +but Sir George Buchanan, our Minister, begged me to accept. Diplomatic +relations were broken off; he had not seen Ferdinand for a month: he +wanted to know what that Prince would say to me: "_but_," he added, "you +must on no account go in uniform. Seeing you are on the Army Council it +would almost amount to a recognition of his Kingship if you went there +in uniform." I thought this a little far-fetched; however, I wrote back +and said that I had the honour to accept, but that, as I was travelling, +I had only my _kleine Uniform_; i.e., undress kit, handy. I proposed, +therefore, with permission to take the liberty of presenting myself in +evening dress, wearing miniature medals and decorations and the ribbon +of the Grand Cross of the Bath. By return messenger an answer came back, +"His Majesty particularly wished once more to see the admirable British +uniform:" would I come in _kleine Uniform_; meanwhile, to put me quite +at my ease, H.M. had commanded the Court also to wear undress. I showed +this to Sir George, who laughed and said, "He is too sharp; he has done +us; you must go now--there is no help for it." So I went in my grubby +blue serge and found Ferdinand and the whole of his Court blazing with +orders in the fullest of full dress! + +_25th September, 1915._ To Anzac in the _Arno_. Birdie met me and we +walked along the lower part of the left of the Australian trenches until +we reached the New Zealanders and were joined by Godley. Lunched with +General Inglefield; then plodded through the trenches held by his +Division (the 54th; nice-looking boys) and by the Indian Brigade. On the +left of the Indian Brigade I was met by Peyton who did pilot to me +through the Scottish Horse section. The Bard joined us here and was in +great form, full of administrative good works as in South Africa. The +Scottish Horse are as keen as schoolboys out for their first shoot. They +were very proud of themselves and of the effect their rifles with +telescopic sights had produced when put into the hands of gillies and +deer stalkers, and at every twenty yards or so there was a Scottish +Horseman looking along his sights, finger on trigger, and by his side a +spotter whose periscope was fixed on the opposite loophole. The moment a +Turkish shadow darkened the loophole the word was given, the bullet +sped. Not a very big mark a loophole at over 100 yards but they got it, +they said, one try out of three. + +At the end of the Scottish Horse we came to the Worcester Yeomanry +trench. But time was up[12] and I had to make tracks for Anzac where we +had tea with Birdie, who had stuck to us throughout the tour. Imbros by +dinner-time. The quietest day, bar none, we have had on the Peninsula +since we first landed. Not a shot was fired anywhere except by our own +snipers. + +_26th September, 1915. Imbros._ Last night, after dinner, Braithwaite +came across with a black piece of news in his pocket:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. 8229, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. On +account of the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army Greece has asked the +Allies to send a force to Salonika in order to enable her to support +Serbia should the latter be attacked by Bulgaria, as well as by German +forces from the North. No doubt you realize that if by such action +Bulgaria joins hands with the Central Powers they will have a clear road +to Constantinople and Gallipoli, and be able to send large quantities +of ammunition or troops, rendering your position very hazardous. + +"Both France and ourselves have promised to send between us the troops +asked for, viz., 150,000 men, and urgency is essential. It is evident +that under these circumstances some troops will have to be taken from +the Dardanelles to go to Salonika, but it must be clearly understood +that there is no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula or of +giving up the Dardanelles operations until the Turks are defeated. Your +staff officer has suggested to me that you saw no difficulty in reducing +the length of your line and concentrating your forces by withdrawing +from the position now held around Suvla Bay to the neighbourhood of the +Kaiajik Aghala position whence a line might be drawn to the sea. + +"Before the situation was changed by the Bulgarians' action we +considered that, owing to the marshy nature of the country now occupied +at Suvla and the approaching winter, this reduction of front would be +strategically advantageous. Hence my telegram No. 8162 to which your No. +M.F. 664 replies. + +"An offensive along practically the whole line in France has now +commenced. The infantry are attacking to-day. Far-reaching results are +anticipated which, if secured, should greatly affect your situation. + +"The projected dispatch of reinforcements of French and British +divisions for Asiatic operations must be in abeyance until a decision +in the Western theatre can be reached. The troops now at the Dardanelles +which are required for Salonika would be two divisions, preferably the +Xth and XIth. The French would also have to withdraw either a brigade or +a division from their force at Helles for the same purpose. The Yeomanry +now _en route_ to you would also have to be diverted to Salonika and we +should have to arrange to mount them from Egypt after their arrival. + +"Cable me at once your ideas as to meeting these requirements. The +Dardanelles Committee consider a withdrawal from Suvla to be advisable +under the circumstances, but they had not seen your telegram No. 664. We +have been asked to send the 15-inch howitzer, now on board ship at +Mudros, to Belgrade as soon as possible." + +Amen--so be it! Our mighty stroke at the vitals of the enemy is to break +itself to pieces against the Balkans. God save the King! May the Devil +fly away with the whole of the Dardanelles Committee!! + +What arguments--what pressure--I wonder can have moved K. to swap horse +in mid-Dardanelles? In December K. as good as told me I was "for it" if +the day should come along for his New Army to help the Serbians. G.H.Q. +in France had belittled his effort to create it; they had tried to throw +cold water on it (the New Army) and now we should see how they liked it +going to Salonika! The reason why K., at that time, turned the project +down was his view that one Army Corps was too small a force to launch +into those regions of great armies and that, if the Germans turned +seriously in that direction, it would be gobbled up. But two Army Corps +would starve, seeing we had no pack transport and that the railway would +only feed 40,000 men. Nor had we any mountain guns. In February he +resurrected the question but that time he was put off by the typhus. +"Whatever destroys my New Army," he said, "it shall not be the Serbian +lice." Now he cables as if he was being quite consistent and sensible, +_now_, when in every aspect, the odds have turned against the +undertaking. As to the Bulgarians having "a clear road to Constantinople +and Gallipoli" my memorable dinner with Ferdinand, and his insistence on +his "pivotal" position, makes me perfectly certain that the bones of no +Bulgarian grenadier will fertilize the Peninsula--whatever happens. And +if the inconceivable were conceivable and Ferdinand were to work for +anything but his own immediate gain--there is no room for them here! +That fact is cast iron. The Turkish Empire is _here_ in full force. +Enver can't feed more! These numbers cause us no alarm. Since the last +abortive effort of the Turkish Command to get their men to attack every +soldier in the trenches knows well that the enemy are afraid of us. They +dare not attack, they will not attack, and they cannot attack. We know +that quite well. If K. would only come out here he would realize that +the Turk has lost his sting. I don't mean to say he is not still a +formidable fellow to turn out of his trench, but he can't attack any +more: and that is just the moment we have chosen to sit down and do +nothing; now, when the enemy has been brought to a standstill! + +During my absence Bailloud has wired saying he had received orders from +his own Minister of War to arrange for sending away one Division of the +C.E.O. and Braithwaite has cabled the startling news to our S. of S. for +War. + +Well, well. If the Greeks and ourselves are going to push through the +mountains to help the Serbs to hold Belgrade and the line of the Danube, +why then, no doubt, we are embarking upon something that would be fine +were it feasible--something more hopeful than sitting at Salonika and in +its salubrious suburbs, the "political" advantages of which were +preached to us by Napier. + +But let no man hereafter talk of Dardanelles adventures. _Mon Dieu!_ + +Once again see the dupes of maps preparing to dash out their brains, or +rather the brains of others, against the rocks. If only Joffre and K. +had looked at Belgrade over the guns of an Austrian Battery in Semlin, +as I did in 1909! The line of the Danube is untenable except by a very +large force against the very large forces that can, and will, be brought +against it and there is no Fleet there to feed a large force. Also, the +communications of such a defending force will not only be mechanically +rotten but will also be strategically at the tender mercy of the most +cunning Prince in Europe. We may think we have squared Ferdinand. But it +is easier to square the circle than square a fox. + +On the Danube, the Central Powers can put _and keep_ six men to our one, +_unless_ we control the river from its mouth to Belgrade. This we can +only do by forcing the Dardanelles. + +After outlining an answer for Braithwaite to draft, I started off at +10.45 for Anzac and Suvla. With me were Taylor, Gascoigne, Lieutenant +Moore and Freddie. From Anzac I walked along the old communication +trench for a couple of miles, and then went round General Taylor's +Brigade along the front by Green Hill and the Chocolate Hills. The heat +was very exhausting. + +Yesterday's calm has proved to be the prelude to an attempted storm. At +5 a.m. there was a big bombardment of the front line trenches, and the +Turks made a gesture of defiance. The gesture did not go beyond fixing +bayonets and shouting "Allah!" and the only result has been to render +Suvla more convinced than ever that the Turks are absolutely fed up. + +After invigorating myself with a good draught of regimental spirit, set +forth to walk back to Anzac. Half way I halted at the Indian Brigade +Headquarters, and, on the invitation of the hospitable Colonel Palin, +had a square meal. Met Allanson, the brave commander of the 6th Gurkhas; +Allanson who scaled the heights of Sari Bair and entered for a few +hectic hours into the promised land. Oh, what a wonderful adventure his +has been! To have seen the Dardanelles and their defences lying flat at +his feet! To feel--as he says he did--that he held the whole Turkish +Army by the throat! + +To-day's inspection has once more brought me into personal touch with +the perfect confidence felt both at Anzac and Suvla in the +demoralization of the Turks. This has nerved me to cable agreeing to +spare the 10th and 53rd Divisions from Suvla as well as a Brigade of +French from Helles and four and a half Brigades of British Field +Artillery:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 675). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for +War. Reference your No. 8229. Let me begin by saying that I quite +realize that, to you, playing for your large stakes, the Dardanelles +operation may temporarily become of a secondary nature. In spite of the +Salonika scheme I am, however, particular to note that it is not +intended to withdraw from the Gallipoli Peninsula, nor to give up here +until the Turks are beaten. Bearing this in mind it becomes my duty to +point out the objection to the abandonment of Suvla Bay, the +consequences of which at this stage would, I consider, be so grave that +I am warranted in running much risk to get you your two divisions by +other means. The situation has greatly changed since I first suggested +the possibility of abandoning the Bay, and its abandonment at this stage +would, I feel convinced, enormously accentuate the difficulties of any +subsequent attempt to capture the Narrows; unless, as a result of our +landing troops at Salonika, Bulgaria were induced to side with us and +not against us. Even when I told you in my No. M.F. 578 of 23rd August +that the diminution of my forces might compel me to contract my line, I +could not view the project without misgiving, in spite of the fact +that, at that time, I had landed few reinforcements and little artillery +in the new zone, and my views are not rightly interpreted when it is +said that I saw no great difficulty in the enterprise. After I had +received the reassuring news of reinforcements I sent you my No. M.F. +589 of 26th August and I have from that date been pouring in large +quantities of reinforcements and supplies in anticipation of winter, and +have landed a large additional amount of artillery. Therefore, I could +not hurriedly evacuate the Bay without sacrificing the majority of +supplies and warlike stores. I might also have very considerable losses, +for the Turks, who were previously 700 yards away, are now within +bombing distance in places. They have a large number of guns in the +northern zone and a retirement could only be effected under heavy fire, +which with unseasoned troops would make the retreat a hazardous one. As +explained in my No. M.F. 664 evacuation of the Bay would involve with it +the _eventual_ evacuation of all but the original Anzac position. But +even if this last step were not necessary the withdrawal of British +soldiers from Suvla would be an overwhelming victory for the Turks. Our +position in the Dardanelles would be entirely altered for the worse and +even the effect of our landing of troops at Salonika might be discounted +in Bulgarian eyes. At the present moment the Turkish commissariat +difficulties and tales of starving families which the wounded bring back +from Constantinople are having a bad effect on their _moral_ and the +number of desertions is on the increase. Two Turkish attempts at the +offensive have broken down completely during the last week as their +troops refused to leave cover. If I give ground the Turkish _moral_ will +immediately recover and instead of containing over 60,000 Turks in the +Northern Zone there would be large numbers set free to go elsewhere. All +these arguments seem to prove plainly that to evacuate a yard of Suvla +would be a most serious, and might prove a disastrous step. I would +therefore prefer to run the risk of holding the line defensively with +fewer troops in order to spare two divisions for the new enterprise. + +"I have at present one division in Corps Reserve at Suvla and the 1st +Australian Division resting at Mudros and also one brigade resting at +Imbros. By bringing the tired Australians back and making them replace +the Mounted Division in the section north of Susak Kuyu I could spare +Xth and LIIIrd Divisions or else Xth and XIth. I could also spare one +French brigade from Cape Helles without replacing it by troops from +Suvla, and a total of 4-1/2 British Field Artillery brigades. This would +at any rate enable me to postpone any evacuation at Suvla and if the +withdrawal became necessary later on there would be less loss involved +in supplies and stores, as I could gradually make necessary preparations +for this deplorable contingency. + +"The 15-inch howitzer is at Alexandria and can be sent whenever you +desire on the receipt of instructions. To-morrow I am having a +conference here with the Corps Commanders concerned to consider the +details. I hope that you realize that though the IXth Corps consists of +Xth, XIth and XIIIth Divisions there are attached to it LIIIrd Welsh +Division, Mounted Division and XXIXth Division, and I therefore +sincerely trust you will not contemplate the withdrawal of the Corps +Staff and Corps Commander to accompany the two divisions destined for +Salonika, for I have absolutely no one to replace them." + +_27th September, 1915._ After breakfast a dove, the German sort, flew +across from Chanak and dropped four bombs on our Headquarters; all wide; +no damage. At 11 o'clock Birdwood and Byng came over for a confab on the +last upset. Both Generals went word by word through my M.F. 657 of the +26th September,--(1) as to drawing in our horns at Suvla,--(2) as to our +power of holding on after we lose the 10th and 53rd Divisions. They +concur in my cables and are emphatic as to the futility of making a gift +of ground to any enemy who are shaking in their shoes. What the Turks +want is a gift, not of ground but of high explosive shell. A few +thousand pounds worth of that and Byng would go ahead and settle their +hash for good. Birdie stayed to lunch during which meal I got a message +from Bailloud telling me flat that he had orders from his Government to +get one Division over to Mudros forthwith. As long as I am in command no +soldier but myself shall handle the troops entrusted to me. I have sent +the following reply:--"Sorry that as my orders already telegraphed to +you this morning are specific, I cannot permit any movement of troops +away from the Peninsula pending further instructions." + +Ross and Nevinson (Press Correspondents), who have been away on a jaunt, +called on me and had tea. Lord William Percy and Sir Walter Barttelot +dined. + +_28th September, 1915._ Office. At midnight an enemy aeroplane let us +have a taste of his high explosive--no harm done. At 10.30 this morning +another came over and dropped a couple of bombs into the aerodrome close +by--two men hit. + +Colonel Dorling reported himself to me as Senior Paymaster. + +A cable from K. saying he is glad to meet me as to holding on at Suvla. +He agrees in fact that to draw in our horns would merely set free six +Turkish Divisions to attack us elsewhere. He agrees also with my choice +of Divisions for Salonika. K. seems astonished at the behaviour of the +French Government in sending tactical orders direct to Bailloud. Most +extraordinary, he calls it. He wants Byng to go to Salonika and winds up +gloriously by telling me of the great things they are doing in France; +that, up to the present, 23,000 prisoners and over 40 guns have been +taken, and that he hopes there are more of each to follow. This fine +success, he says, should help us along in the East. So it should. I have +cabled the good news across and ordered a _feu de joie_ to be fired +everywhere on the Peninsula in honour of the victory. The ball was +opened at Helles at 7 p.m., the Turks replied vigorously with every gun +and rifle they could bring to bear, and rarely, I imagine, has a +"furious joy" expressed itself more furiously. + +Nowhere in the Empire has this fine victory brought more heartfelt +relief and joy than at the Dardanelles: to have been brought to a +standstill, for the third time of asking, for _nothing_; that was the +fear which had haunted us. + +_29th September, 1915._ Work. At 11 a.m. tore myself away from my papers +to play principal part in a gay little ceremony. Outside my office a +guard of honour of Surrey Yeomanry, Naval Division and Australians +formed three sides of a square. Bertier, de la Borde and Pelliot were +led in smiling like brides going up to the altar, and, after a tiny +speech, I decorated the first with the D.S.O. and the other two with the +Military Cross. All three Officers are most popular, and there were loud +cheers. De la Borde had tea and Mitchell came in at the same time to say +good-bye. We are all distressed at losing Mitchell. He is a very fine +specimen of the sailor of the modern school. Efficient, modest, untiring +at his work. He has collaborated in the most loyal and devoted manner +with the G.S., and I don't know how we should ever have got on without +him. + +Nevinson, the Correspondent, came again with Maxwell, the Press Censor. +Nevinson wants to find out whether it would be worth his while to go to +Salonika. I would like to lend him a hand for he is such a nice fellow, +but the matter is about as secret as can be, and I don't feel myself +free to say much. The Captains of H.M.S. _Cornwall_ and _Cornwallis_ +dined; also Flight Commander Samson and Ward, King's Messenger. The last +named starts to-morrow night and carried off with him my letter to K. +Amongst other things I write:--"In the cables which have passed between +us, I have found it anything but an easy business to strike the happy +mean between executing your wishes promptly and cheerfully on the one +hand, and, on the other, giving you a faithful impression of how we +should stand here once your orders had been carried out. + +"If I make too little of the dangers which surround me, then you may be +encouraged to weaken me still further, thereby jeopardizing the whole of +this enterprise. But if I allow my anxieties to get too much the upper +hand, why then I may be ruining some larger enterprise, the bearing of +which I have no means of gauging." + +I then explain the situation and wind up:--"In the small hours of the +morning, before I have had my matutinal cup of tea, the immediate +outlook gives me a feeling of cold feet in a more aggravated form than I +have hitherto experienced. The whole plan of the French Asiatic +subsidiary operation has gone, for the meantime, by the board. England +and France between them cannot find men enough, I should think, to send +considerable forces to Asia as well as run an entirely new show +elsewhere. Indeed, Naval requirements alone would seem entirely to +forbid it. But I must not worry you any more with surmises. After all, +nothing great in this world was ever easily accomplished. Never has +there been such an example of that as in the Dardanelles Expedition. How +many times has success seemed to be on the point of crowning our +efforts, and yet, on each occasion, just as we are beginning to see +light through the tangle of obstacles, preparing for an assault, or +whatever it may be, something occurs to upset the apple-cart. None the +less we do advance, and we will succeed in the end. I feel I am playing +it rather low down inflicting on you the outline of my own trouble at a +moment when your own must be infinitely greater. + +"Reading over this letter which I have not now time to re-write or +correct, it strikes me that in concentrating my mind purely on the +Dardanelles I may have given a wrong impression of my general attitude +towards your latest demand. No one can realize, I believe, more clearly +than I do that the Dardanelles operations themselves hinge for their +success to a very large extent upon the maintenance of a barrier between +the Central Powers and Constantinople. As far as reinforcements of men +to the enemy in the field are concerned, such inter-communication would +not be so fatal as might perhaps be imagined. The Gallipoli Peninsula is +a limited area, and if the Germans had a million men at Constantinople +they could not, under present conditions, add many, if any, to the +numbers already opposed to us. But the free transit of coal, flour, +ammunition and big guns might well put us all in the cart--the cart +being in this instance, the sea." + +My A.D.C. has brought me an irritated message from the A.G., War +Office:-- + + * * * * * + +"Your No. M.F.A. 4003 of the 24th instant. Are you aware that your +telegram was really a demand for 60,000 men with a weekly supply in +addition. We do not see how to meet such large numbers in view of the +present situation in France. Have the numbers at Base, Alexandria, and +men returning from hospital, etc., been taken into account? Please state +what are your minimum requirements to carry on with." + +Am I aware, etc.? Why certainly; _and so is the A.G._ To ignore facts is +one thing; to be ignorant of them is another. These facts are, or should +be, the daily bread of his Department. I resent this surprise; it is not +genuine. If, as the A.G. says, they have not got the men to send, why in +God's name do they go on telling the people they _have_ got them? + +Have drafted out this answer:-- + + * * * * * + +"A.G. My telegram No. M.F.A. 4003 told you the number required to bring +and keep all formations up to establishment and, as an estimate, the +numbers given therein are accurate. There is nothing new in that +telegram; it is only the culmination of many demands, the deficiency, +which was serious enough before, being aggravated by the prevailing +epidemic. I took into account the numbers in Base depots and men +returning from hospital. I certainly hope that there may be a decrease +in the sick rate and that there will be an increase in the numbers +returning from hospital, but that cannot make any difference to my +present shortage of establishment though it would affect the strength of +monthly drafts required. + +"I would like further to point out that only 750 of the 20,000 drafts +now coming are for the Territorial Force, the remainder being for the +Regulars. Hence assuming that wastage will be equally distributed over +all the eight divisions, the estimated shortage of 30,490 on 9th October +will be constituted as follows:--Four Territorial Force divisions, +26,583; four Regular divisions, 3,907. + +"When my No. M.F.A. 4003 was sent no question had arisen of denuding my +force for a fresh expedition elsewhere. I fully realize that you cannot +send what does not exist and I will do the best possible with what you, +knowing my situation, are able to send; but I do not consider that it is +possible to view my position in winter with any equanimity unless I am +to receive substantial drafts and unless a normal flow of reinforcements +for all divisions can be arranged so as to counter the difficulties that +are inherent in keeping a force operating so far from England up to +establishment." + +_30th September, 1915. Imbros._ Peace on the Peninsula; trouble at +G.H.Q. The 10th Division is taking its departure from Suvla undisturbed +by the enemy. Not a shot is being fired. Some say this denotes +extraordinary skill in the conduct of the withdrawal; others, +extraordinary delight on the part of the Turks to see them clearing +out. I don't believe in either theory. The Turks have been fought to a +standstill and there is no attack left in them--not under _any_ +circumstances or temptation; that is what I believe in my heart, +otherwise I would refuse point blank to strip myself of two full +divisions under their noses. Still, it is nervous work presuming to this +extent upon their fatigue and I will not agree to the 53rd going too, as +the loss of three Divisions would leave an actual hole in our line. +Meanwhile, it is a relief to hear that the move is going on just like +peacetime. As to G.H.Q., all is held up by uncertainty. Our whole +enterprise hangs still in the balance. No date for the sailing of our +troops for Salonika can yet be fixed, and we may get them back. Am glued +to the cable terminus waiting, waiting, waiting. I have agreed to let +the 2nd Brigade of the French go! + +This cable sent to-day to Lord K. explains itself:-- + + * * * * * + +"The following has just been received from Bailloud:--'I have the honour +to inform you that I have received a telegram from the French Minister +of War ordering me (1) to embark one division of the Corps +Expeditionnaire immediately for Salonika; (2) to organize this division, +which will be placed under my command, into two brigades of Metropolitan +Infantry with two groups of 75 mm., one group of mountain artillery, one +battery of 125 mm. howitzer and four 120 mm. guns. I am taking steps to +execute this order and to hold the present section of the French line +with the force remaining in the Peninsula, which will be placed under +General Brulard.' + +"I said in my telegram No. M.F. 675, that I could only spare one brigade +of the French. I desire to place on record that if this order of the +French Government is carried out the LIIIrd Division cannot possibly be +spared without seriously endangering the safety of this force and the +whole future of the Dardanelles enterprise. Even if I were to keep the +LIIIrd Division it would not relieve me of intense anxiety. The fact +will not escape your notice that the division to go is being +re-constructed so that nothing but European troops are included, thus +leaving an undue proportion of Senegalese. This constitutes such a grave +danger that, if I had the power, I would refuse to allow Bailloud to +carry out this order of his Government. It need hardly be pointed out +that all your hopes of success in the Balkans would be upset by a +disaster at Cape Helles. Even when I said that I could spare one French +Infantry Brigade the Commander of the VIIIth Corps, who is one of the +last men in the Army to express alarmist views, represented to me, in +view of the physical condition of a large proportion of his troops, the +gravity of the case in the strongest terms." + +A reminder of mine _re_ the Ashmead-Bartlett incident has drawn an +amusing and highly unexpected answer from the War Office:-- + + * * * * * + +"Murdoch was found to be carrying a despatch for the Prime Minister +criticizing military operations in Gallipoli. He carried nothing for +Lawson." + +I could not help laughing heartily at the blue looks of Tyrrell, the +Head of our Intelligence. After all, this is Asquith's own affair. I do +not for one moment believe Mr. Asquith would employ such agencies and +for sure he will turn Murdoch and his wares into the wastepaper basket. +I have reassured Tyrrell. Tittle-tattle will effect no lodgment in the +Asquithian brain. + +Lieutenant Moore from the Military Secretary's office in London dined. +He has been useful to us. During the night there was rain and heavy fog. +The evacuation of Suvla by the 10th Division goes on without the +smallest hitch and is almost finished--all except the guns. Whether the +Turks have fallen asleep or only closed an eye is the question of the +hour but Birdwood's Intelligence are certain they are stone cold and +cannot be dragged to the attack. + +_1st October, 1915. Imbros._ S. of S. cables he will not overlook our +wants in the matter of ammunition but that "at the present moment all he +can get has to be sent to France." I have thanked him. Not a word from +France since we fired the _feu de joie_. + +K. believes in the East and sends shell to the West. The reason is that +K.'s _beliefs_ are only intuitions; he believes in the same sort of way +that Elijah knew certain things. + +The principle underlying the world war seems to me this:--that wherever +the new system of trenches, dug-outs, barbed wire, can reach its fullest +development, _there_ we should prefer the defensive. Wherever this new +system cannot be fully developed, there the old ideas hold good and +there are the theatres for the offensive. In France and Flanders where +both sides are within a few hours' run, on good railways, from their own +chief arsenals and depots the new system attains prodigious power. In +the Turkish Empire almost all the conditions; railways, material, +factories, etc., are favourable to the old and unfavourable to the new +conditions. + +To me these views appear as clear as crystal and as unanswerable as +Euclid. The tenacity of the new system of defence; the pressure of +France; the apathy of a starved military opinion; the fact that all our +most powerful soldiers are up to their necks in the West, combine to +keep us ramming our heads against the big pile of barbed wire instead of +getting through by the gate called strait. + +Next Braithwaite with the following electrical bombshell:-- + + * * * * * + +"By Bailloud's report I see that he considers that the French line can +be held by one division. If, on reconsideration, you agree with this +view can you spare the LIIIrd Division?" + +K. has pounced like a hawk on Bailloud's statement (which I cabled to +him yesterday) that he is taking steps for Brulard to hold the French +section with one division. + +Have answered:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F. 703). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Your +No. 8409, cipher. Not one word of my No. M.F. 693 can I take back. The +situation at Cape Helles cannot be fully realized. May I remind you that +when on 20th August I moved the XXIXth Division to Suvla, I left at Cape +Helles only the minimum garrison compatible with safety. Since that date +the total British troops there have decreased in strength from 15,300 to +13,300 rifles, and now I am losing a French composite division which is +made up of the only troops of the Corps Expeditionnaire on whom I can +rely, as well as 44 guns. It is my considered opinion that to leave +protection of Cape Helles to one division of Colonial troops, plus +13,300 worn-out British Territorials and Naval Volunteers, is running +too serious a risk. To-day, therefore, I am moving one brigade of XXIXth +Division back from Suvla to reinforce VIIIth Corps in order to have some +regular troops there on whom I can rely. This makes it impossible to +spare the LIIIrd Division. The change of opinion on the part of +Bailloud, when he gets away from a position which I have found it +difficult to persuade him to hold with two divisions, and which he now, +as you say, thinks can be held with one division composed largely of +blacks, is startling enough to need no comment. If you want to get at +his real opinion, suggest that he stays here with one division while +Brulard goes to Salonika. + +"A despatch from Bailloud has _just_ reached me on the situation in +French section after his own departure with one division. It is as +follows:-- + + * * * * * + +"'One division will then be defending our present line with an effective +strength reduced by half, and with Infantry which comprises only +Colonial contingents, half European and half native. I feel it to be my +duty to expose the situation to you in order that you may be able to +decide whether the time has not now arrived to reduce the present +section of the C.E.O., making part of it occupied by British troops and +holding a solid reserve in rear of the Allies' first line capable of +dealing with any situation.' + +"I believe this indicates Bailloud's real opinion; it is a curious +contrast to that quoted in your No. 8409, cipher, dated 30th September." + +At 11.30 crossed to "K" and inspected the 87th Brigade of the 29th +Division. Lucas, of the Berks Regiment, commanded. Saw the Border +Regiment under Colonel Pollard; then the renowned Royal Inniskilling +Fusiliers under Major Pierce, the full strength of the Battalion on +parade "all present" was 220! Next the K.O.S.B.s; they were under the +command of Major Stoney; last the South Wales Borderers under the +command of Captain Williams. + +The men were in rags and looked very tired. This is the first time in +the campaign our rank and file have seemed sorry for themselves. Ten +days of rest had been promised them and now they are being hurried back +to the trenches before they have had a week. My heart goes out to them +entirely. Were I they I would feel mad with me. The breaking of my word +to the 29th Division has to be shouldered by me just like all the other +results of this new Balkan adventure; the withdrawal of the Irish and +the French for Salonika leaves no margin of rest for what's left. + +Inspected also the West Riding Field Company of Royal Engineers under +Major Bayley, and the West Lancashire Field Ambulance. + +A long letter from Maxwell putting his point of view about the 51st and +53rd Sikhs. Were we both sealed-pattern Saints we'd be bound to fall +foul of one another working under so perverse a system. He has written +me very nicely; nothing could be nicer. I have replied by return:-- + + * * * * * + +"Yours of 24th just received. As to the wires about the 51st and 53rd +between myself and the War Office, and your remarks thereon, we stand so +much on one platform, and are faced so much by the same difficulties, +that I think it ought to be fairly easy for us to come to an +understanding in most conceivable circumstances, as indeed our +co-operation up to date has shown. + +"If Egypt goes, then I shall not last very long. If I am wiped out, I +think it will be the preface to trouble in Egypt.[13] + +"As to myself I am 60,000 below strength. I had a cable from the War +Office a day or two ago expressing naive astonishment at this figure. I +replied that the figure was accurate and that there was nothing new +about it as it only denoted the accumulation of a state of things which +had been continuously reported since the very first day when we started +off from England minus the ten per cent. margin of excess given to every +unit going across to France. This is the essential cause of our repeated +failure to make that last little push which just differentiates partial +from conclusive success. In every case this has been so. Had I been able +to throw in my ten per cent. margin on the third day after landing, +there is no doubt in the world we would have got right up on to Achi +Baba. Afterwards, each engagement we fought, although our total numbers +may have been largely increased, the old formations were always at half +strength or something less. However, I won't bother you about this as +your time is too precious to enter into 'might-have-beens' and so is +mine. + +"Meantime, my line is very, very thin, and the men are getting entirely +worn out. In the midst of this I am called upon to send away two +Divisions, the French and the Irish, to ---- you know where. I have done +so without a murmur, although it puts me into a ticklish position. +Reinforcements are now to be diverted elsewhere and my command is not an +enviable one. I quite understand the necessity of trying to maintain a +barrier between Essen and Constantinople. I quite understand also the +danger of doing so at the expense of this attenuated, exhausted force. I +have represented the facts home, and it is for them to decide." + +Dined with the Admiral. + +_2nd October, 1915._ The despatch of the Salonika force and their outfit +are absorbing all my energies. Our whole Expeditionary Force is being +drawn upon to send the 10th Division creditably turned out to the new +theatre. The twenty-four hours' delay caused by the political crisis at +Athens has been a godsend in enabling me to reclothe and re-equip the +detachment from top to toe. The supplies for my own force are now +exhausted, but,--on the principle of the starving garrison who threw +loaves over the ramparts at the besiegers, we must try and make a good +first impression on the Greeks. + +The submarine catcher, or the "Silver Baby" as the men call it, has been +flying about all day, without luck. Gascoigne and Bertier dined. Blazing +hot; quite a setback to August temperatures. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 12: We had to get into Kephalos Harbour before dark; otherwise +the submarine indicator nets were damaged.--IAN H.] + +[Footnote 13: The last time this subject was broached between Lord +Kitchener and myself was immediately after the evacuation of Helles. +Everyone was intensely relieved, especially Lord Kitchener, for he had +realized better than our politicians the desperate stakes we had planked +down in our gamble with the Clerk of the Weather. Yet in that very +moment when the burden of an intolerable anxiety had just been lifted +from his shoulders he took the occasion to declare to me that he stood +by every word he had said. What he "had said," was that any withdrawal +from the Dardanelles must react in due course upon Islam, and especially +upon Egypt. Cairo, he held to be the centre of the Mahomedan doctrine +and the pivotal point of our great Mahomedan Imperium. An evacuation of +the Dardanelles would serve as an object lesson to Egypt just as our +blunders in the Crimea had served as a motive to the Indian mutineers. +Ultimate success was not the point in either case. The point was that +the legend of the invincibility of British troops should be shattered in +some signal and quite unmistakable fashion. "The East," he said, "moved +slowly in the fifties, and it will move slowly now. We've had a +wonderful delivery but--depend upon it--the price has yet to be +paid!"--IAN H., 1920.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +THE BEGINNING OF THE END + + +_3rd October, 1915. Imbros._ Church Parade. Inspected escort, men of the +Howe and Nelson Battalions and a contingent from the 12th and 26th +Australian Infantry. At 12.15 Bailloud, Brulard and Girodon arrived from +Mudros for a last conference. Everything is fixed up. We are going to +help the derelict division of French in every way we can. Bailloud, for +his part, promises to leave them their fair share of guns and trench +mortars. Whenever I see him I know he is one of the best fellows in the +world. We went down and waved farewells from the pier. He was quite +frank. He does not think the Allies have either the vision or the heart +to go through with Gallipoli: he begins to suspect that the big push on +the Western Front is going to yield no laurels: so Salonika hits his +fancy. + +Lieutenants Weston and Schemallach of the Australians and Lieutenant +Gellibrand of the Naval Division lunched. A Mr. Unsworth came to talk +over gifts for the Australian troops. He seems a capital chap; full of +go and goodwill to all men. + +_4th October, 1915. Imbros._ Vague warnings have taken shape in an +event. A cable from K. telling me to decipher the next message myself. I +have not drafted out an average of fifty telegrams a day for Lord K. for +six months at a stretch without knowing something of his _modus +scribendi_. The Staff were pleasantly excited at the idea that some new +move was in the wind. I knew the new move--or thought I did. + +Well, not that: not exactly that; not this time. But the enemies of our +enterprise have got our range to a nicety and have chucked their first +bomb bang into the middle of my camp. + +A "flow of unofficial reports from Gallipoli," so K. cables to me, is +pouring into the War Office. These "unofficial reports" are "in much the +same strain" (perhaps they spring from the same source?). "They +adversely criticize the work of the Headquarters Staff and complaints +are made that its members are much out of touch with the troops. The War +Office also doubt whether their present methods are quite satisfactory." +K. therefore suggests "some important changes in your Headquarters +Staff; for instance, if you agreed, Kiggell from home to take +Braithwaite's place with you. Should you, however, decline and desire to +remain as at present, may we assume that we are quite safe in regarding +these unofficial reports as not representing the true feelings of the +troops?" + +So----! On the face of it this cable seems to suggest that a man widely +known as a straight and capable soldier should be given the shortest of +shrifts at the instance of "unofficial reports"; i.e., camp gossip. +Surely the cable message carries with it some deeper significance! + +I am grateful to old K. He is trying to save me. He picked out +Braithwaite himself. Not so long ago he cabled me in his eagerness to +promote him to Major-General; he would not suggest substituting the +industrious Kiggell if he didn't fear for me and for the whole of this +enterprise. + +K. wants, so he says, "some important change"; that cannot mean, surely, +that he wants a sufficiently showy scapegoat to feed the ravenous +critics--or does it? Perhaps, he's got to gain time; breathing space +wherein to resume the scheme which was sidetracked by the offensive in +France and smashed by the diversion to Salonika. Given time, our scheme +may yet be resumed. The Turks are in the depths. Sarrail with his six +divisions behind him could open the Narrows in no time. I see the plan. +K. must have a splendid sacrifice but by the Lord they shan't have the +man who stood by me like a rock during those first ghastly ten days. + +The new C.R.E., General Williams, and Ellison turned up for lunch. +Williams gave us the first authentic news we have had about those Aden +excursions and alarms. + +An amusing aftermath of the evacuation by the French and Irish +Divisions. When the last of Bailloud's troops had embarked the Turks +dropped manifestoes from aeroplanes along the lines of the Senegalese +calling upon these troops to make terms and come over now that their +white comrades had left them to have their throats cut. I have cabled +this queer item to the S. of S. Evidently the enemy were quite well +aware of our withdrawal. Then _why_ didn't they shell the beaches? At +French Headquarters they believe that the Turks were so glad to see our +backs that they hardly dared breathe (much less fire a shell) lest we +should change our minds. + +_5th October, 1915._ First thing another cable from K. saying, "I think +it well to let you know" that it is "quite understood by the Dardanelles +Committee that you are adopting only a purely defensive attitude at +present." Also:--"I have no reason to imagine you have any intention of +taking the offensive anywhere along the line seeing I have been unable +to replace your sick and wounded men." But, if he knows I _can't_ take +the offensive, why trouble to cable me that the Dardanelles Committee +expect me to adopt "only a purely defensive attitude"? I realize where +we stand; K., Braithwaite and I,--on the verge. We are getting on for +two months now since the August fighting--all that time we have been +allowed to do nothing--literally, allowed to do nothing, seeing we have +been given no shell. What a fiasco! The Dardanelles is not a sanatorium; +Suvla is not Southend. With the men we have lost from sickness in the +past six weeks we could have beaten the Turks twice over. Now Government +seem to be about to damn everything--themselves included. + +But after all, who am I to judge the Government of the British Empire? +What do I know of their difficulties, pledges, and enemies--whether +outside or inside the fold? + +I have no grouse against Government or War Office--still less against +K.--though many hundred times have I groused.[14] + +Freely and gratefully do I admit that the individuals have done their +best. Most of all am I indebted--very deeply indebted--to K. for having +refrained absolutely from interference with my plan of campaign or with +the tactical execution thereof. + +But things are happening now which seem beyond belief. That the +Dardanelles Committee should complacently send me a message to say we +"quite understand that you are adopting only a purely defensive +attitude at present" is staggering when put side by side with the carbon +of this, the very last cable I have sent them. "I think you should know +immediately that the numbers of sick evacuated in the IXth Corps during +the first three days of October were 500 men on the 1st instant; 735 men +on the 2nd instant and 607 men on the 3rd instant. Were this rate kept +up it would come to 45 per cent. of our strength evacuated in one +month." + +Three quarters of this sickness is due to inaction--and now the +Dardanelles Committee "quite understand" I am "adopting only a purely +defensive action at present." I have never adopted a defensive attitude. +They have forced us to sit idle and go sick because--at the very last +moment--they have permitted the French offensive to take precedence of +ours, although, on the face of it, there was no violent urgency in +France as there is here. Our men in France were remarkably healthy; they +were not going sick by thousands. But I feel too sick myself--body and +soul--to let my mind dwell on these miseries. + +Sealed my resolution (resignation?) by giving my answer about +Braithwaite. Though the sins of my General Staff have about as much to +do with the real issues as the muddy water had to do with the death of +the argumentative lamb, I begin by pointing out to the War Office wolf +that "no Headquarters Staff has ever escaped similar criticism." + +Grumblings are an old campaigner's _vade mecum_. Bred by inaction; +enterprise and activity smother them. A sickness of the spirit, they +are like the flies that fasten on those who stay too long in one place. +Was Doughty Wylie "much out of touch with the troops" when he led the +Dublins, Munsters and Hampshires up from "V" beach and fell gloriously +at their head? Was Williams "out of touch" when he was hit? Was Hore +Ruthven? "As to Braithwaite," I say, "my confidence in that Officer is +complete. I did not select him; you gave him to me and I have ever since +felt most grateful to you for your choice." + +Now--I feel better. + +The plot thickens. A cable just come in from the S. of S. for War:-- + + * * * * * + +"The following statement has been made in letter to Prime Minister, +Australia, by Mr. Murdoch: 'The fact is that after the first day at +Suvla an order had to be issued to officers to shoot without mercy any +soldier who lagged behind or loitered in advance.' Wire me as to the +truth or otherwise of this allegation." + +Murdoch must be mad. Or, is there some method in this madness? + +Mr. Murdoch was not a war correspondent; he is purely a civilian and +could hardly have invented this "order" on his own. No soldier could +have told him this. Someone not a soldier--someone so interested in +discrediting the Dardanelles Campaign that he does not scruple to do so +even by discrediting our own troops must have put this invention about, +_per_ Murdoch. Doubtless we strike here upon the source of these +"unofficial statements" which have been flowing into the War Office. +All I remember of his visit to me here is a sensible, well-spoken man +with dark eyes, who said his mind was a blank about soldiers and +soldiering, and made me uncomfortable by an elaborate explanation of why +his duty to Australia could be better done with a pen than with a rifle. +He was one week at the Press Correspondents' camp and spent, so they +tell me, a few hours only at Anzac and Suvla, never once crossing to +Helles. If then his letter to his Prime Minister is a fair sample of the +grounds upon which Braithwaite has been condemned, Heaven help us all! + +As a relief to these disagreeable thoughts, a Taube dropped a couple of +bombs into camp. She flew so high that she was hard to see until the +bursting shrapnel gave us her line. As she made tracks back through the +trackless blue, the ships gave her a taste of some big projectiles, +12-inches or 9.2. The aerial commotion up there must have been +considerable. + +At noon, sailed over to Suvla in H.M.S. _Savage_. We took our lunch on +board. As we came into harbour the Turks gave us a shell or two from +their field guns, then stopped. Young Titchfield, the Duke of Portland's +son, met us at the beach and brought us along to Byng's Headquarters, +where I met also de Lisle and Reed. After hearing their news I started +off with the whole band to make a tour of the trenches held by the 88th +Brigade, under General Cayley. On the way I was taken up to "Gibraltar" +observation post to get a bird's-eye view of the line. Besides my old +friends of the 29th Division I saw some of the new boys, especially the +1st Newfoundland Battalion under Colonel Burton, and the 2/1st Coy. of +the London Regiment. This was the Newfoundlanders' first day in the +trenches and they were very pleased with themselves. They could not +understand why they were not allowed to sally forth at once and do the +Turks in. The presence of these men from our oldest colony adds to the +extraordinary mix-up of people now fighting on the Peninsula. All the +materials exist here for bringing off the biblical coup of Armageddon +excepting only the shell. + +In the course of these peregrinations I met Marshall of the 53rd +Division, Beresford, commanding the 86th Brigade, and Colonel Savage, +R.E. + +After tea with Byng, including the rare treat of a slice of rich cake, +we went down to our friend H.M.S. _Savage_. The wind had risen to a +fairly stiff gale, and the sea was beginning to get very big. Those +field gun shells had caused the _Savage_ to lie a desperate long way out +to sea; we had a very stiff pull in the teeth of the waves, and every +one of us began to think that salt water rather than the bullet was +going to end our days. However, we just managed by the skin of our teeth +and the usual monkey tricks, to scramble up on board. As I said in my +wrath when I first stood on the firm deck, I would sooner have a hundred +shells fired at me by the Turks. + +Captain Davidson commanding H.M.S. _Cornwallis_ dined; everyone liked +him very much. + +_6th October, 1915._ Left General Headquarters soon after 11 o'clock for +Helles, taking with me Aspinall and Freddie. Lunched with Davies at 8th +Corps Headquarters. + +Afterwards rode across to Royal Naval Division and saw Paris. Then went +with Bertie Lawrence, commanding 52nd Division, to his lines. Our route +lay up Achi Baba Nallah and along the trenches to the Horse Shoe; then +along Princes Street trench up the Vineyard, and back along the Krithia +Nallah to the Headquarters of the 156th Brigade. There we mounted our +horses and rode back to Corps Headquarters. I brought Steward back with +me to dine and sleep the night. Colonel Tyrrell and Major Hunloke +(King's Messenger) also dined. + +_7th October, 1915._ Wasted energy brooding over the addled eggs of the +past. Are the High Gods bringing our new Iliad to grief in a spirit of +wanton mischief? At whose door will history leave the blame for the +helpless, hopeless fix we are left in--rotting with disease and told to +take it easy? + +That clever fellow Deedes dined; also Rowan Hamilton, son of my old +Simla friend the Colonel of that name. + +_8th October, 1915. Imbros._ At 11 a.m. Ellison, Taylor, Gascoigne and +Freddie sailed with me for Anzac. There we lunched with the ascetic +Birdie and Staff off bully beef, biscuits and water. Then, the whole lot +of us, together with de Crespigny, Birdie's Staff Officer, hurried five +miles an hour down the communication trench to the Headquarters of the +Indian Brigade. After greetings we shoved on and saw the 2nd Lovat +Scouts under Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling and met, whilst going round +their line, Major Morrison Bell and Captain Oppenheim. They seemed in +very good fettle, and it would have been hard to find a finer lot of +men. Taking leave of the 2nd Lovat Scouts, we worked along the trenches +of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, under Colonel Mitchell, until we came +to the 1st Lovat Scouts under Colonel Bailey. Lovat himself was sick, +but Peyton commanding the 2nd Mounted Division turned up just when the +inspection was at an end. He had got lost in the trenches, or we had. +Next time the way was lost there was no mistake as to who had made the +mistake. Birdie and I were pushing along as fast as we could leg it back +towards Anzac. In the maze of trenches we came to a dividing of the +ways. Two jolly old Sikhs were sitting at the junction. I asked if the +road to the left led to the Headquarters of the Indian Brigade. They +said, "Yes," so on we went, I leading, Birdie following. The trench got +shallower and shallower until, in a little grove of trees, it petered +out entirely. But it seemed to begin again in the other side and so we +crossed through the trees. Once there we found that the supposed trench +was only a shallow scratching up of the earth, and that we were standing +within a hundred yards of the Turkish lines just about half way between +them and the Lovat Scouts! I shouted to Birdie and we turned and ran for +it--for our lives, I mean. Luckily the Turks were slow at spotting us, +all except one who was a rank bad shot: so tumbling back into the +trenches from which we had emerged, we saved ourselves by the skin of +our teeth. I could not have been smarter about dodging two or three +bullets had it been the beginning of our enterprise and had the high +minarets of Constantinople glittered before my eyes. + +When we got back to where the two old Sikhs were sitting, as placid as +idols, Birdie gave them his opinion of their ancestors. On reaching the +Australian and New Zealand Division we were done to a turn, but Godley +revived us with tea and then we made our way back to our destroyer and +to Headquarters. It was dark when we arrived and a bad storm was setting +in--wind and rain--which went on till midnight. + +Replies have come in to our enquiries as to Mr. Murdoch's statement to +the Prime Minister of Australia that British Officers had been ordered +to "shoot without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered." As +the Secretary of State seems to take this charge seriously, I thought it +well, before I sent my answer, just to make sure that no subordinate had +said, or done, or written anything which could plausibly be twisted into +this lie. The Generals have denied indignantly; are furious, in fact, at +the double insult to their men and to themselves. + +Have cabled accordingly:-- + + * * * * * + +"(No. M.F.A.B. 4491). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of +State for War. With reference to your No. 8554 M.O. 414 of the 5th inst. +I have _pro forma_ made full enquiries and I find that there is no +truth whatever in the allegation made by Murdoch." + +_9th October, 1915._ Had made my _band-o-bast_ for running over to +Helles, but the Vice-Admiral cabled he wanted to see me if he could at +11.45. Anyway the sea is still a bit rough for the crossing and landing. +A lot of damage was done last night to the Anzac piers, two of them +being clean washed away. Peter Pollen is off colour. Freddie and I dined +on board the _Triad_. + +Whilst at dinner got full reports both from Suvla and Anzac as to the +effects of the storm. The southerly gale, which not only washed away the +piers but sunk the water lighters at Anzac, has done no harm at Suvla +except that three motor lighters have been driven ashore. The Admiral is +clear that, during southerly gales we shall have to supply both Anzac +and Suvla by the new pier just north of Ari Burnu. The promontory is +small but last night it gave complete protection to everything in its +lea. By sinking an old ship we can turn Ari Burnu into quite a decent +little harbour. + +_10th October, 1915._ Made my deferred visit to Helles, going over this +morning in the _Arno_ with Braithwaite, Val and Alec McGrigor. Looked in +at the Clearing Hospital and cast an eye over Lancashire Landing. Then, +in company with Jimmy Watson and Colonel Ayres, walked up to Corps +Headquarters where we had a fine lunch with Davies, de Rougemont and the +melancholy Yarr. Afterwards rode across to the Headquarters of the +Royal Naval Division and on to their trenches, some 3-1/2 miles. +Generals Mercer and Paris followed us through their trenches. The Hood +and Hawke Battalions were in the firing line where we talked to great +numbers of old comrades of all ranks. Glad to meet Freyberg again (the +man who swam to light the flares at Enos). Kelly of the Hood Battalion +too, I saw, and Fairfax of the Hawke, also Commander King of the Drake +Battalion and Burrows, a gunner who was running a bombing school with +much zeal on a piece of ground specially patronized by the Turks as a +target for their own shelling practice. Got back to Helles by the Saghur +Dere and the Gulley. Going down the Gulley, nearly lost two of our +attendant Generals, a shrapnel bursting between them with a startling +loud report caused by the high banks of the Gulley on either side. + +In the Gulley we met a swarm of old friends from Kent; Brigadier-General +Clifton-Browne, an officer whose command I had inspected both at +Potchefstroom and near Canterbury, with a Brigade of West and East Kent +and Sussex Yeomen. They made a brave showing, but he tells me some of +them have caught this wretched enteritis already. Amongst others, I +spoke to Douglas, commanding the East Lancashire Division, Major Edwards +of the Sussex Yeomanry, Major Sir S. Scott and Colonel Whitburn of the +West Kent Yeomanry, Colonel Lord Guilford, East Kent Yeomanry. A +cheerier crowd no one could wish to meet. If these are the type of men +who spin black yarns for home wear, I can only say that not the most +finished actors could better disguise their despair. General King, R.A., +rode part of the way back with us. + +After all this hard exercise, got back to the _Arno_ in a lather of +sweat about 6 o'clock carrying Davies with me. Leslie Wilson, commanding +the Hawke Battalion, had gone sick to-day, so sent him a telegram after +dinner to the Hospital ship _Somali_, telling him his trenches had been +found in apple-pie order. + +_11th October, 1915._ Bad night with this beastly complaint. De Robeck +came up at 11 o'clock to see me. He has had a message from the Admiralty +asking him what number of extra troops could be maintained on the +Peninsula if the units there now were brought up to strength. The +Admiral asked me for the figures and the A.G. brought them over. My +force as a whole is as near as may be to half strength. Half of that +half are sick men. We have 100,000 men on the Peninsula, 50,000 of whom +are unfit: if the unfits were up to strength there would be 200,000 men +on the Peninsula as well as excitement and movement which would greatly +reduce the disease. Bearing in mind that the Anzacs have been well +supported by their Governments and that their units are fairly strong, +these figures show what wait-and-see-sickness has meant to British +Regiments. + +The tone of this Admiralty question had seemed cheerful: almost as if +the Higher Direction were thinking of putting us on our legs but, in +the evening, another cable from K. gave a different and a very ominous +complexion to the future:-- + +"From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. What is your estimate +of the probable losses which would be entailed to your force if the +evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was decided on and carried out in +the most careful manner? + +"No decision has been arrived at yet on this question of evacuation, but +I feel that I ought to have your views. + +"In your reply you need not consider the possible future danger to the +Empire that might be thus caused."[15] + +If they do this they make the Dardanelles into the bloodiest tragedy of +the world! Even if we were to escape without a scratch, they would stamp +our enterprise as the bloodiest of all tragedies! K. has always sworn by +all his Gods he would have no hand in it. I won't touch it, and I think +he knew that and calculated on that when he cabled. Anyway, let K., cat +or Cabinet leap where they will, I must sleep upon my answer, but that +answer will be NO! + +Just as I am turning in, a cable from the S. of S. saying, "there is an +idea that Sir John Maxwell is not sending you as many troops as he might +from Egypt. Have you any complaints on this score?" Rather late in the +day this "idea." Certainly, I have never made any "complaints" and I +don't mean to do so now. The War Office have only to look up their +returns and see how many men are being maintained to defend us from the +Senoussi! + +Maxwell has never had less than 70,000 troops in Egypt, a country which +might have been held with 10,000 rifles--ever since we landed here, that +is to say. My troops can sail back to Egypt very much faster than the +Turks--or the Senoussi for that matter--can march to the Canal. + +In the same cable the S. of S. asks what is the cause of the sick rate +and remarks that, "some accounts from the Dardanelles indicate that the +men are dispirited." Small wonder if they were! When they see two +Divisions taken away from the Peninsula; when their guns can't answer +those of the enemy; when each unit finds itself half-strength, and +falling--why then, tumbling as they do to the fact that we won't get +through till next year, they _ought_ to be unhappy. But the funny thing +is that the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are the people who are +"dispirited" and _not_ the people out here. If the P.M. could walk round +the trenches of the Naval Division at Helles, or if K. could exchange +greetings with the rank and file at Anzac and Suvla, they would find a +sovereign antidote for the blues and would realize that it was they who +were down-hearted and _not_ the men at the Dardanelles. There was an +old French Colonel, killed at Gravelotte; he had studied the classic +world battles and he shows that it was never the front line who gave way +first, but always the reserves:--they, the reserves, watched bloodshed +in cold blood until they could stand it no longer and so took to their +heels whilst the fighting men were still focussed upon victory. Not the +enemy in front but the friends behind are the men who spread despondency +and alarm. + +Charley Burn has arrived on the _Imogene_ with Dawnay. + +Davies went back to Helles after tea. Dawnay says K. was most interested +in him and most charming to him all through his stay until his last +interview just before he started on his return journey. K.'s manner +then, he said, had changed--so much so as to give him an impression that +the great man was turning, or was being turned, against all of us out +here. K.'s conduct at the first meetings is in full harmony with his +message sent to Braithwaite for me by Fitz about a fortnight ago, saying +I possessed his fullest confidence. The change of manner was marked and +Dawnay is sure he made no mistake about it. But nothing has happened +since the date of Dawnay's arrival and departure save a very well +engineered withdrawal of the 10th and the French Divisions for which, in +point of fact, we have all been rather expecting congratulations. Dawnay +thinks some queer things are happening. He could--or would--say nothing +more. + +_12th October, 1915. Imbros._ Early in the morning got off my answer to +K.'s evacuation cable. The elements, the enemy and ourselves are the +three factors of the problem. Were I to measure my problem by the night +flitting of the Irish and French Divisions (who lost neither man nor +beast in the process), I could guarantee that we would shoot the moon +with the balance of the force smoothly, swiftly and silently. That is to +say, supposing the Turks and the weather remain constant. But these are +two most inconstant things: no one can tell how a Turk will behave under +any given conditions; the Turks themselves do not know how they will +behave: the weather now is written down by the meteorologists for sudden +changes; for storms. Unsettled weather is due and ought to be reckoned +upon. Imagine a blow coming up from the South when the evacuation is +half way through. That does not seem to be, and is not, any great +stretch of imagination. Well then, having so imagined, we get a disaster +only equalled in history by that of the Athenians at Syracuse: a +disaster from which the British Empire could hardly hope to recover. + +Twice backwards and forwards to the General Staff Marquee with the draft +of my guesses, my first being that we would probably lose 35 to 45 per +cent. But the General Staff have also been consulting their oracle and +were clear for 50 per cent. Months of the most anxious calculations will +not get a white man one whit forrarder in seeing into the brains of an +Asiatic Army or in forecasting Mediterranean weather. Safest to assume +that both brains and weather will behave as the German General Staff +would wish them to behave rather than as they chanced to behave when the +French and Irish went off a few days ago. So have ended by taking the +Staff's figure because any figure being, in any case, the wildest of +shots, their shot best suits my views on the issue. + +"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Our losses would +depend on such uncertain factors, enemy's action or inaction, weather, +question whether we could rely on all troops covering embarkation to +fight to the last, that impossible to give you straight answer +especially until I have permission to consult Admiral. Once discussing +this very problem with General Gouraud, we came to the conclusion that +at Cape Helles we must sacrifice two divisions out of total of six +divisions and Cape Helles easiest of three places to get away from. My +opinion now is that it would not be wise to reckon on getting out of +Gallipoli with less loss than that of half the total force as well as +guns, which must be used to the last, stores, railway plant and horses. +Moral of those who got off would fall very low. One quarter would +probably get off quite easily, then the trouble would begin. We might be +very lucky and lose considerably less than I have estimated. On the +other hand, with all these raw troops at Suvla and all these Senegalese +at Cape Helles, we might have a veritable catastrophe." + +Do the men toying with the idea of bringing off our men not see that +thereby the Turks will be let loose somewhere; not nowhere? Do they not +see that if they are feeling the economic pinch of keeping their side of +the show in being, the Turks, much weaker economically, must be feeling +it much more--! + + * * * * * + +It was a relief to get this perilous stuff off my chest, and in a +brighter frame of mind, sailed for Anzac on the destroyer _Lewis_. We +took biscuits and bully beef with us but the hospitable sailors insisted +on regaling us with a hot meal. Sat in cabin all the way as usual +writing up my record. Freddie tells me that these studious habits of +mine have started the shave that I spend my time composing poetry, +especially during our battles! + +At Anzac Birdwood took us round the trenches and underground passages +about Russell's Top and Turk's Head, held by the 5th Brigade, 2nd +Division, under Legge. Half way up to Russell's Top was the 3rd Battery +Australian Field Artillery:--talked with Major King, the C.O. Next unit +was the 20th Infantry Battalion under Major Fitzgerald. Colonel Holmes, +commanding the 5th Infantry Brigade, and Wilson, his Brigade Major, took +us through their cave dwellings. Ex-westerners say that in France they +have nothing to touch these Australian tunnellings. In one place they +are boring into a crater only 20 feet from the Turkish trench. There is +nothing unusual in the fact, but there is in the great depth they are +going down so as to cross the danger zone far below the beaten track of +mines and counter-mines. On the steep slope in another place there is a +complete underground trench running parallel to, and only a short +bomb-throw from, a Turkish trench. We went through it with a lantern. +Sandbags, loopholes, etc., all are there, but blind! They are still +veiled from view by several feet of clay. To-morrow night the Anzacs are +going to chip off the whole upper crust of earth, and when light dawns +the Turks will find a well equipped trench, every loophole manned, +within bombing range of their own line. + +Other notables met with were Major Murphy of the 20th Infantry +Battalion, Major Anderson (an old friend) commanding the Australian +Field Artillery, and Captain Perry Oakdene, the Engineer Officer on the +job. Saw Birdie and returned in the destroyer about 6.30. The day had +been so quiet that it would have been almost dull had it not been for +the sightseeing--hardly a shot was fired by Turk or Anzac with either +gun, trench mortar or rifle. + +Bishop Price, the Bishop of North China, and Charlie Burn, King's +Messenger, dined. The quietness of the Bishop was remarkable. + +Have cabled the S. of S. for War in answer to his enquiries about the +causes of the sickness, and as to whether Maxwell is not holding up my +share of troops in Egypt, saying:--(1) that "constant strain and +infection by dust and flies" have caused the sickness but that the men +are getting better; (2) that "we have been under the impression that +drafts meant for us and due to us have been retained in Egypt; also, +that men discharged fit from Hospitals have been held back, but I have +represented this last point to Maxwell personally as I always feel I am +not the person to gauge Maxwell's needs. On 27th September, I asked him +to send up all available Australian--New Zealand Army Corps drafts and +reinforcements, and, as you already know, am at present in telegraphic +correspondence about these reinforcements coming straight here without +being kept in Egypt for training at all." + +At 10.40, after clearing my table, went with Ellison, Taylor, and +Freddie on board H.M.S. _Lefroy_ (Commander Edwards) and steamed for "V" +Beach. Enjoyed a fine luncheon with Brulard and then started off for the +trenches. At Morto Bay we were met by Captain de Bourbon, a big handsome +man with the characteristic Bourbon cut of countenance. He took us first +to the _chateau_ whence we worked down along the trenches to where our +extreme right overlooks the Kerevez Dere. General Faukard was here and +he thinks that we ought easily to get complete mastery of both sides of +the Kerevez Dere as soon as we get the means and the permission to shove +ahead again. When we do that the advance will let our Fleet another half +mile up the Straits and the "spotting" for the ships' guns will double +their value in the Narrows. From the Kerevez Dere we worked along the +fire trenches towards the French centre and then, getting to a sheltered +strip of country, walked back across the open to the second line. From +the second line we made our way, still across the open, to the third +line, over a heather covered strip. No one ever moves here by daylight +except in double quick time as there is always danger of drawing a shell +either from Asia or from Achi Baba and so it was that "Let the dead +bury the dead" had been the motto and that we met many corpses and +skeletons. Merciful God, what home tragedies may centre in each of these +sinister bundles. But it is the common lot--only quicker. Here, too, we +found excavations made by the French into a burial ground believed to be +of the date 2,500 B.C. The people of that golden age had the sentimental +idea of being buried in couples in big jars. A strange notion of our +Allies unburying quiet people who had enjoyed dreamless rest for 2,000 +years whilst, within a few yards, their own dead still welter in the +parching wind. + +[Illustration: CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD _"Central News" phot._] + +Had meant to run across and see Davies but time had slipped away and so +we made tracks for H.M.S. _Lefroy_, and on back here to G.H.Q., where a +letter from Callwell was laying in wait as a refresher after my +fatigues. + +Callwell begins by saying he encloses a document written by my late +visitor, Mr. K. A. Murdoch, although "there are certain statements in +this which are palpably false," and although Dawnay has pointed out to +him at the War Office "a number of passages in it which are wholly +incorrect as matters of actual fact." He says, Lord K., "who has not had +time to read it yet," thinks I ought to be given a chance of defending +myself. + +Callwell goes on to write about the Press Censorship and my plea for +publicity and then says he dislikes the Salonika stunt "because I am not +quite clear of where we are going to, and the immediate result at the +present is to take away from you troops that you can ill spare." Also, +because "we may be involving ourselves in operations on a great scale in +the heart of the Balkans, the result of which it is very difficult to +foresee." + +Godley dined. Captain Davidson, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in +harbour now, is a real Godsend. He looks after us as if we were Admirals +of the Fleet. + +Have now read, marked, learnt and inwardly indigested Callwell's +enclosure; viz., the letter written by Mr. K. A. Murdoch to the Prime +Minister of Australia. Quite a Guy Fawkes epistle. Braithwaite is "more +cordially detested in our forces than Enver Pasha." "You will trust me +when I say that the work of the General Staff in Gallipoli is +deplorable." "Sedition is talked round every tin of bully beef on the +Peninsula." "You would refuse to believe that these men were really +British soldiers ... the British physique is very much below that of the +Turks. Indeed, it is quite obviously so. Our men have found it +impossible to form a high opinion of the British K. men and +Territorials. They are merely a lot of childlike youths, without +strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions." "I shall +always remember the stricken face of a young English Lieutenant when I +told him he must make up his mind for a winter campaign." "I do not like +to dictate this sentence, even for your eyes, but the fact is that after +the first day at Suvla an order had to be issued to Officers to shoot +without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered in an advance." + +Well, Well! I should not worry myself over the out-pourings of our late +guest, who has evidently been made a tool of by some unscrupulous +person, were it not that Mr. Asquith has clothed the said out-pourings +in the title, number, garb and colour of a verified and authentic State +paper. He has actually had them printed on the famous duck's egg +foolscap of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and under his authority, +as President and Prime Minister, they have been circulated round the +Government and all the notables of the Empire without any chance having +been offered to me (or to K.) of defending the honour of British +Officers or the good name of the British Rank and File. K. tells +Callwell I should be given the opportunity of making a reply. Not having +read it himself he has not yet grasped the fact that he also should have +been given the opportunity of making a reply to the aspersions upon his +selections. As for me, by the time my answer can get home and can be +printed and circulated the slanders will have had over a month's start +in England and very likely two months' start in Australia, where all who +read them will naturally conclude their statements must have been tested +before ever they were published in that impressive form. + +Here we see an irresponsible statement by an ignorant man and I +instinctively feel as if it were being used as one more weapon to force +Asquith's hand and to ruin our last chance. I only hope it may not prove +another case of, "Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth!" + +Certain aspects of this affair trouble my understanding. The covering +note (dated 25th September) which encloses the letter to the Prime +Minister of Australia (dated 23rd September) is addressed by Mr. Murdoch +to Mr. Asquith by name. In that covering note Mr. Murdoch says, "I write +with diffidence, and only at Mr. Lloyd George's request." Within three +days (so great the urgency or pressure) Mr. Asquith causes--as he, +President of the Committee of Imperial Defence, alone can cause--the +covering note as well as the seven or eight thousand words of the letter +to be printed and circulated round the big wigs of Politics, as well as +(to judge by the co-incident hardening of the tone of this mail's +papers) some of the Editors. Not one word to me as to Mr. Murdoch's +qualifications or as to the truth or falsity of his statements, until +these last have been a week in circulation. Then, I receive; first, a +cable saying unofficial reports had come in censuring my General Staff +and that I had better, therefore, let Braithwaite go; secondly, a cable +asking me whether the absurd story of my having ordered my own soldiers +to be shot "without mercy " is well-founded; thirdly, a bad last, the +libellous letter itself. + +Yet Mr. Asquith did know the paper contained _some_ falsehoods. He _may_ +have attached weight to Mr. Murdoch's tale of the feelings of French +soldiers at Helles (although he never found time to go there): he _may_ +have believed Mr. Murdoch when he says that Sir John Maxwell "has a poor +brain for his big position"; that "our men feel that their reputation is +too sacred to leave in the hands of Maxwell"; that Sir William Birdwood +"has not the fighting quality or big brain of a great General"; that +General Spens was "a man broken on the Continent" (although he never was +broken and never served on the Continent); that "Kitchener has a +terrible task in getting pure work from the General Staff of the British +Army, whose motives can never be pure, for they are unchangeably +selfish"; that "from what I saw of the Turk, I am convinced he is ... a +better man than those opposed to him" (although, actually, Mr. Murdoch +saw nothing of the Turks). The P.M. may have taken these views at their +face values: even, he _may_ have swallowed Mr. Murdoch's picture of the +conscientious Altham "wallowing" in ice whilst wounded were expiring of +heat within a few hundred yards; but _Mr. Asquith has seen the K. Army_ +and, therefore, _he cannot have believed_ that these soldiers have +suddenly been transformed into "merely a lot of childish youths without +strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions." + +Once more; these reckless scraps of hearsay would not be worth the paper +they are printed on were it not that they are endorsed with the letters +C.I.D., the stamp of the ministerial Holy of Holies. Only the Prime +Minister himself, personally, can so consign a paper. Lord K. and I were +both members of the C.I.D., and members of long standing. For the +President to circularize our fellow members behind our backs with +unverified accusations is a strange act, foreign to all my ideas of Mr. +Asquith. On this point Callwell is quite clear: the Murdoch letter was +published to the C.I.D. on the 28th ult. and Callwell writes on the 2nd +inst., and says Lord K. "has not had time to read it yet."[16] But +nothing else is clear. In fact, the whole thing is foreign to all my +ideas of Mr. Asquith. He does not need to work the C.I.D. oracle in this +way. As P.M. he has only to speak the word. He does not work the Press +oracle either: not his custom: also he likes K. The whole thing is a +mystery, of which I can only say with Hamlet--"miching mallecho; it +means mischief." + +_14th October, 1915. Imbros._ Colder than ever. We are told that the +winter will kill the flies and that with their death we shall all get +hearty and well. Meanwhile, they have turned to winged limpets. + +Being Mail day as well as rough, stuck to camp. My friend England sailed +into harbour in the _Chelmer_ and came up to lunch. In the evening he +took Godley back to Anzac. Duncannon came to dinner. I have made him +liaison officer with the French in place of de Putron who has gone to +Salonika with Bailloud. + +As to the Murdoch unpleasantness, I began an _expose_ to be sent to the +Governor General of Australia; another to the Secretary of the C.I.D. +But Pollen, Braithwaite and Dawnay (the last of whom had been shown the +document whilst he was at home, though he had said nothing to me about +it) thought this was to make much ado about nothing. They cannot believe +Lord K. will trouble himself about the matter any further and they think +it best handled in lighter vein. Is K. still the demi-God, that is the +question? Anyway, there is simply no time this Mail to deal with so many +misstatements, so that has settled it. + + "GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, + "MEDTN. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, + _"14th October, 1915._ + + "DEAR CALLWELL, + +"I have read Mr. Murdoch's letter with care, and I have tried to give it +my most impartial consideration and not to allow myself in reply to be +influenced in any way by the criticisms he may have felt himself bound +to make upon myself personally. + +"What does this letter amount to? Here we have a man, a journalist by +profession, one who is quick to seize every point, and to coin epithets, +which throw each fleeting impression into strongest relief. He comes +armed with a natural and justifiably enthusiastic admiration for +everything connected with the Commonwealth to which he belongs, and +ready to retail to his Minister or his public anything that can +contribute to show the troops they have sent in an heroic light. + +"Here he obtains his first sight of war and of the horrors and hardships +inseparable from it. He finds men who have just been through some of +the hardest fighting imaginable and who have suffered terrible losses; +he finds probably that very many of those whom he hoped to see, +certainly many of those of whose welfare their motherland would wish to +hear, are killed, wounded or laid up with illness,--he finds all this +and he becomes very deeply depressed. In such an atmosphere Mr. Murdoch +composes his letter, a general analysis of which shows it to be divided, +to my mind, into two separate strata. + +"First an appreciation in burning terms of the spirit, the achievements, +the physique and all soldierly qualities of the Australian Forces. +Secondly, a condemnation, as sweeping and as unrelieved as his praise in +the first instance is unstinted, of the whole of the rest of the force. +I myself as C.-in-C., my Generals, my Staff, Lines of Communication, Sir +John Maxwell and General Spens at the Base, even the British soldiers +collectively and individually, are all embraced in this condemnation +which is completed by the inclusion of the entire direction of the +Forces at home, both Naval and Military. + +"Where all are thus tarred with the same brush, I am content to leave it +to the impartial reader to decide what reliance can be placed on Mr. +Murdoch's judgment. My own feeling certainly is that in his admiration +for the Australian Forces, and in his grief at their heavy losses (in +both of which feelings I fully share) he has allowed himself to belittle +and to criticize us all so that their virtues might be thrown into even +bolder relief. + +"With Mr. Murdoch's detailed points I do not propose to deal, nor do I +think you expect me to do so. On every page inaccuracies of fact abound. +The breaking of Spens on the Continent, a theatre of war he has never +visited; the over-statement of our casualties by more than 40 per cent.; +the acceptance as genuine of a wholly mythical order about the shooting +of laggards--really the task would be too long. As to the value of Mr. +Murdoch's appreciation of the strategical and tactical elements of the +situation you can yourself assess them at their true value. + +"Finally, I do not for one moment believe the general statement put +forward to the effect that the troops are disheartened. Neither that +statement nor the assertion that they are discontented with the British +Officers commanding them has the slightest foundation in fact. + + "Believe me, + "My dear Callwell, + "Yours very sincerely, + (_Sd._) "IAN HAMILTON. + +"P.S.--I attach correspondence showing how Mr. Murdoch's visit arose. I +believe I exceeded my power in giving him permission to come but I was +most anxious to oblige the Australian Prime Minister and Senator Pearce. +You will see that he promises faithfully to observe any conditions I may +impose. The only condition I imposed was that he should sign a +declaration identical with that which I attach. He signed and the paper +is in my possession." + + +CORRESPONDENCE. + + +"Dear Sir, + +"On the advice of Brigadier-General Legge I beg to request permission to +visit Anzac. + +"I am proceeding from Melbourne to London to take up the position of +managing editor of the Australian news cable service in connection with +the _London Times_ and at the Commonwealth Government's request am +enquiring into mail arrangements, dispositions of wounded, and various +matters in Egypt in connection with our Australian Forces. I find it +impossible to make a complete report upon changes that have been +suggested here until I have a better knowledge of the system pursued at +base Y, and on the Mainland, and I beg of you, therefore, to permit me +to visit these places. + +"I should like to go across in only a semi-official capacity, so that I +might record censored impressions in the London and Australian +newspapers I represent, but any conditions you impose I should, of +course, faithfully observe. + +"I beg to enclose (_a_) copy of general letter from the Prime Minister +and (_b_) copy of my instructions from the Government. I have a personal +letter of introduction to you from Senator Pearce, Minister of Defence. + +"May I add that I had the honour of meeting you at the Melbourne Town +Hall, and wrote fully of your visit in the Sydney _Sun_ and Melbourne +_Punch_; also may I say that my anxiety as an Australian to visit the +sacred shores of Gallipoli while our army is there is intense. + +"Senator Millen asked me to convey his most kindly remembrances to you +if I had the luck to see you and in case I have not I take this +opportunity of doing so. + +"As I have only four weeks in which to complete my work here and get to +London a 'collect reply by cable to C/o Colonel Sellheim, Australian +Intermediate Base, Cairo, would greatly oblige. + + "I have the honour to be, + "Sir, + "Your obediently, + (_Sd._) "KEITH A. MURDOCH. + + "C/o Colonel Sellheim, C.B., + "A.I.F. Intermediate Base, + "Cairo. + "_August 17, 1915._" + + + "COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, + "PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT, + "MELBOURNE. + _"July 14th, 1915._ + +"This letter will serve to introduce Mr. Keith Arthur Murdoch, a well +known journalist, of Melbourne, who is proceeding to Europe to undertake +important duties in connection with his profession. + +"Mr. Murdoch is also undertaking certain inquiries for the Government of +the Commonwealth in the Mediterranean Theatre of War. And for any +facilities which may be rendered him to enable him the better to carry +out these duties I shall be personally obliged. + + (_Sd._) "ANDREW FISHER, + "_Prime Minister._" + + + "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, + "MELBOURNE, + "_July 2nd, 1915._ + + "Mr. Keith A. Murdoch, + + "Alfred Place, Melbourne. + +"The Minister desires that you furnish a report upon the following +matters together with any suggestions for improvements. + +"1. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of letters, papers and +parcels to and from members of the Australian Imperial Force. + +"2. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of cablegrams to and from +members of the Australian Imperial Force. + +"3. Arrangements for notifications to the Department in Australia of the +disposition of Australian Wounded in Hospitals. + +"4. Suggested despatch of special expert corps to Hospitals. + +"5. Frauds by impersonation at cable offices. + + (_Sd._) "T. TRUMBLE, + "_Acting Secretary for Defence._" + +When I got this, I hesitated. Evidently the writer was not accredited as +a war correspondent and his remark about having written me up in the +_Sun_ and in _Punch_ did not count for much. But I was anxious then, as +ever, that as many journalists as possible should be put into a position +for seeing the fine things the troops had done and were doing; I noted +the emphasis laid by the writer upon his acceptance of the censorship, +and so I took upon myself to exceed my powers and asked Braithwaite to +cable to Mr. Murdoch:-- + + * * * * * + +"This cable is your authority to come to G.H.Q. at once whence you will +be sent to Anzac. + + C.G.S., Medforce." + +Mr. Murdoch landed on the 2nd instant and on that date signed the +following declaration:-- + + * * * * * + +DECLARATION TO BE USED BY WAR CORRESPONDENTS. + +I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly undertake to follow in every +particular the rules issued by the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief +Field Censor, relative to correspondence concerning the forces in the +Field, and bind myself not to attempt to correspond by any other route +or by any other means than that officially sanctioned. + +Further, in the event of my ceasing to act as correspondent with the +British Forces, I will not during the continuance of the War join the +forces of any other Power in any capacity, or impart to anyone military +information of a confidential nature or of a kind such that its +disclosure is likely to prejudice military operations, which may have +been acquired by me while with the British Forces in the Field, or +publish any writing, plan, map, sketch, photograph or other picture on +military subjects, the material for which has been acquired by me in a +similar manner, unless first submitted by me to the Chief Field Censor +for censorship and passed for publication by him. + +(_Signature of Correspondent_)................ + + * * * * * + +_15th October, 1915. Imbros._ Bitter cold. The whole camp upside down +and all the Staff busy with their shift of quarters to the other side of +the Bay. + +Altham has been at Salonika and came over to report how things were +going there. Remembering the accusation of "wallowing" in ice, I nearly +touched him for a Vanilla cream. + +As to Salonika, he tells me that, so far, the occupation has been a +travesty of any military operation. No plan; no administration; much +confusion; troops immobile and likely to sit for weeks upon the beach. +The Balkan States Intelligence Officers are on the spot and grasp the +inferences. Until the troops landed they were not quite sure whether +some serious factor was not about to be sprung upon them: now they are +quite sure nothing can happen, big or small, beyond our letting a lot of +our bayonets go rusty. Sarrail has been implored by the Serbians to push +his troops up into their country, but he has been wise enough to +refuse. How can he feed them? On the top of it all, the conduct of the +Greeks seems fishy. As to the Bulgarians, they have already thrown off +the mask. Although Salonika is going to be our ruin, I can still spare +some pity for Sarrail. + +Have heard from Birdie who at last gives me leave to see his Lone Pine +section. Until now I have never been able to get him to let me go there. +Too many bombs, he says, to make it quite healthy for a +Commander-in-Chief. + +_16th October, 1915. Imbros._ Had just got into bed last night when I +was ferreted out again by a cable "Secret and personal" from K. telling +me to decipher the next message myself. The messenger brought a note +from the G.S.--most of whom have now gone across to the other side of +the Bay--to ask if I would like to be awakened when the second message +came in. As I knew the contents as well as if I had written it out +myself, I said no, that it was to be brought me with the cipher book at +my usual hour for being called in the morning. When I had given this +order, my mind dwelt awhile over my sins. Through my tired brain passed +thought-pictures of philosophers waiting for cups of hemlock and various +other strange and half-forgotten antique images. Then I fell asleep. + +Next morning, Peter Pollen came in with the cipher book and the +bow-string. I got K.'s message pat in my dreams last night and here it +is, to a word, in black and white:-- + + * * * * * + +"The War Council held last night decided that though the Government +fully appreciate your work and the gallant manner in which you +personally have struggled to make the enterprise a success in face of +the terrible difficulties you have had to contend against, they, all the +same, wish to make a change in the command which will give them an +opportunity of seeing you." + +How far we have travelled, in spirit, since K. sent me his September +greetings with spontaneous assurances of complete confidence! Yet, since +then, on the ground, I have not travelled at all--have indeed been under +the order of the Dardanelles Committee to stand still. + +Charles Munro is to relieve me and brings with him a Chief of Staff who +will take Braithwaite's place. On my way back I "might visit Salonika +and Egypt" so as to be able to give the Cabinet the latest about the +hang of things in these places. + +When I go, Birdie is to take my place pending Munro's arrival. + +De Robeck must give me a cruiser so that we may start for home +to-morrow. The offer of a jaunt at Government expense to Salonika and +Egypt leaves me cold. They think nothing of spending some hundreds of +pounds to put off an awkward moment. What value on earth could my views +on Salonika and Egypt possess for people who have no use for my views on +my own subject! + +After breakfast, read K.'s cable over once more. "A War Council," it +seems, decided to make the change. Did the War Council also appoint +Munro? K. did not appoint him--anyway. Munro succeeded me at Hythe. In +1897 I was brought home from Tirah to Hythe by Evelyn Wood in order that +I might keep an eye on the original ideas which, from India under Lord +Roberts, had revolutionized the whole system of British musketry. I left +Hythe on the outbreak of the South African War and during that war Munro +went there. + +He was born with another sort of mind from me. Had he been sent out here +in the first instance he would never have touched the Dardanelles, and +people who have realized so much may conclude he will now clear out. But +it does not follow. Munro's refusal to attempt a landing in the first +instance would have served as the foundation stone for some totally +different policy in the Near East. That might perhaps have been a good +plan. But to start a campaign with me and try to carry it on with Munro +has already been tried and found hardly fair to either of us. The +intention of whoever selected Munro is so to use him as to force K. to +pull down the blinds. But they may be mistaken in his character. + +One thing is sure: whenever I get home I shall do what I can to convince +K. that the game is still in his hands if only he will shake himself +free from slippery politics; come right out here and run the show +himself. Constantinople is the only big big hit lying open on the map at +this moment. With the reinforcements and munitions K., as +Commander-in-Chief, would have at his command, he can bring off the coup +right away. He has only to borrow a suitable number of howitzers and +aeroplanes from the Western front and our troops begin to advance. +Sarrail has missed the chance of twenty generations by not coming here. +Let K. step in. In the whole of the Near East his name alone is still +worth an Army Corps. My own chance has gone. That is no reason why my +old Chief should not himself make good. I told the War Council we held +at Suvla before the battle of the 21st August that if the Government +persisted in refusing me drafts and munitions--if they insisted on +leaving my units at half-strength--then they would have to get someone +cleverer than myself to carry out the job. Well, it has come to that +now. K. looms big in the public eye and can insist on not being starved. +He must hurry up though! Time enough has been lost, God knows. But even +to-day there is time. Howitzers, trench mortars, munitions, men, on a +scale France would hardly miss,--the Asiatic side of the Straits would +be occupied--and, in one month from to-day, our warships will have +Constantinople under their guns. If K. won't listen to me, then, having +been officially mis-informed that the War Council wish to see me (the +last thing they _do_ wish), I will take them at their word. I will +buttonhole every Minister from McKenna and Lloyd George to Asquith and +Bonar Law,--and grovel at their feet if by doing so I can hold them on +to this, the biggest scoop that is, or ever has been, open to an +Empire. + +Rather a sickly lunch. Not so much the news as the Benger's on which we +all feasted for our stomach's sake. Birdie came over at 4 p.m. with +Ruthven. Both his A.D.C.s are sick. I am going to ask him to take on +young Alec McGrigor. Peter and Freddie will come home with Braithwaite +and myself. What a true saying,--a friend in need is a friend indeed. +Were I handing over to Birdie for good I should feel unalloyed happiness +in his well-deserved success. + +At tea Ellison, Braithwaite, Bertier, Colonel Sykes and Guest appeared. +They looked more depressed than I felt. I had to work like a beaver +before I could brighten them up. "I'm not dead yet," I felt inclined to +tell them, "no, not by long chalks." What I did say to one or two of +them was this:--"My credit with Government is exhausted; clearly I can't +screw men or munitions out of them. The new Commander will start fresh +with a good balance of faith, hope and charity lodged in the Bank of +England. He comes with a splendid reputation, and if he is big enough to +draw boldly on this deposit, the Army will march; the Fleet will steam +ahead; what has been done will bear fruit, and all our past struggles +and sacrifices will live." + +Dined with Freddie on the _Triad_. De Robeck and Keyes were all that +friends can be at such a moment. + +_17th October, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham"_ (_At sea_). A pretty beastly day +within and without. For the within part, all sorts of good-byes to put +pain into our hearts; for the without, a cold drizzle chilling us all to +the bone. + +At 10.30 Brulard and his Staff came over; also Generals Byng and Davies +with their Staffs. After bidding them farewell; a function whereat I was +grateful to the French for their lightness of touch, I rode over with +Braithwaite and the A.D.C.s to the new Headquarters at Kephalos to say +good-bye to my own Staff. Although I had meant to live there until we +drove the Turks far enough back to let us live on the Peninsula, I had +found time to see my little stone hut built by Greek peasants on the +side of the hill:--deliciously snug. To-day, this very day, I was to +have struck my tent and taken up these cosy winter quarters; now I move, +right enough, but on the wrong road. + +The adieu was a melancholy affair. There was no make-belief, that's a +sure thing. Whatever the British Officer may be his forte has never lain +in his acting. So, by 2.30, I made my last salute to the last of the old +lot and boarded the _Triad_. A baddish wrench parting from de Robeck and +Keyes with whom I have been close friends for so long. Up to midnight de +Robeck had intended coming home too. Keyes himself is following me in a +day or two, to implore the Cabinet to let us at least strike one more +blow before we haul down our flag, so there will be two of us at the +task. + +I wrung their hands. The Bo'sun's whistle sounded. The curtain was +falling so I wrung their hands once again and said good-bye; good-bye +also to the Benjamin of my personal Staff, young Alec, who stays on with +Birdie. A bitter moment and hard to carry through. + +Boarded the _Chatham_ (Captain Drury-Lowe) and went below to put my +cabin straight. The anchor came up, the screws went round. I wondered +whether I could stand the strain of seeing Imbros, Kephalos, the camp, +fade into the region of dreams,--I was hesitating when a message came +from the Captain to say the Admiral begged me to run up on to the +quarter deck. So I ran, and found the _Chatham_ steering a corkscrew +course--threading in and out amongst the warships at anchor. Each as we +passed manned ship and sent us on our way with the cheers of brave men +ringing in our ears. + + * * * * * + +FAREWELL ORDER BY GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON. + + + "GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, + "MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, + _"October 17th, 1915._ + +"On handing over the Command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to +General Sir C. C. Munro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few +farewell words to the Allied troops, with many of whom he has now for so +long been associated. First, he would like them to know his deep sense +of the honour it has been to command so fine an Army in one of the most +arduous and difficult Campaigns which has ever been undertaken; +secondly, he must express to them his admiration at the noble response +which they have invariably given to the calls he has made upon them. No +risk has been too desperate; no sacrifice too great. Sir Ian Hamilton +thanks all ranks, from Generals to private soldiers, for the wonderful +way they have seconded his efforts to lead them towards that decisive +victory, which, under their new Chief, he has the most implicit +confidence they will achieve." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 14: I think I hardly knew _how_ often till I came to read +through my diary in cold print. But all the time I was conscious, and am +still more so now, of K.'s greatness. Still more so now because, when I +compare him with his survivors, they seem measurable, he remains +immeasurable. + +I wish very much I could make people admire Lord K. understandingly. To +praise him wrongly is to do him the worst disservice. The theme can +hardly be squeezed into a footnote, but one protest must be made all the +same. Lord Fisher gives fresh currency to the fable that K. was a great +organizer. K. hated organization with all his primitive heart and soul, +because it cramped his style. + +K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients; the greatest +probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw _any_ organization his +inclination was to smash it, and often--but not always--he was right. +This may sound odd in Anglo-Celtic ears. But most British organizations +are relics of the past. They are better smashed than patched, and K. +loved smashing.--IAN H., 1920.] + +[Footnote 15: Lord K.'s reason for putting in this last paragraph may be +obscure unless I make it clear. As explained in a previous footnote, +Lord K. knew that I knew his strong personal view that the smashing blow +to our military reputation which would be caused by an evacuation of the +Dardanelles must, in course of time, imperil our hold upon Egypt. +Therefore, for the moment, it was necessary to warn me that the problem +must be considered in the purely military, tactical, aspect.--IAN H. +1920.] + +[Footnote 16: Lest anyone should imagine there is any privilege or +secrecy attached to this document it may be well to explain that all the +best passages came back to me from Melbourne in due course; often with +marginal comment.--IAN H., 1920.] + + + + +APPENDIX I + +STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE, +EX-COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY AT CAPE HELLES. + + +The first landing of British troops at Cape Helles took place on 25th +April, 1915. On arriving at that place during the first week in May, I +found that heavy fighting had occurred without ceasing from the time of +the disembarkation. Having come straight from the Headquarters Staff of +the 2nd Army in France, where the question of artillery ammunition was a +constant source of anxiety to all the higher commanders, I at once set +to work to discover what reserves remained in the hands of G.H.Q. and +what the daily expenditure had been since the landing. The greatest +difficulty was experienced in obtaining figures of expenditure from the +units, so constant had been the fighting, which still continued, and so +great the casualties, and consequent confusion in reckoning expenditure. +Yet, after some delay, sufficient information was obtained to enable me +to demonstrate with certainty that, if such severe fighting continued, +the Force would soon be in danger of losing their artillery support. + +On the 4th May a cable was sent, I believe, to Lord Kitchener saying +that ammunition was becoming a very serious matter owing to the +ceaseless fighting; pointing out that 18 pr. shell were a vital +necessity and that a supply promised by a certain ship (I believe the +S.S. _Funia_) had not turned up. A day or two later, a cable was +received by G.H.Q. saying munitions were never calculated on a basis of +prolonged occupation of the Peninsula, and that the War Office would +have to reconsider the whole position, if more was wanted. If I remember +aright, the cable finished by saying, "It is important to push on." A +few days later a cable was received saying the War Office would not give +us more ammunition until we submitted a return of what was in hand. The +compilation of that cut-and-dried return in the midst of a desperate +battle was a distracting and never-to-be-forgotten effort, but there was +no help for it: no return, no shells; that was the War Office order. The +ammunition still in hand lay mostly in the holds of the ships at Mudros, +60 miles away, and did not lend themselves to easy counting; while the +actual expenditure was, for reasons already given, an intricate problem +indeed. + +Continuous cables on the subject of ammunition passed during the next +few days between G.H.Q. and the War Office, all of which passed through +my hands and some of which I drafted for superior authority. I cannot +remember their sequence and not always their purport, but I distinctly +remember about the 10th or 11th May a cable being received from Lord +Kitchener saying ammunition for Field Artillery was being pushed out +_via_ Marseilles. I think the figures given were about ten or twenty +thousand rounds of 18-pr. and some one thousand rounds of 4.5 howitzer +H.E., but I am not sure. + +The fact that does remain indelibly impressed on my mind is that I am +convinced from the cables that passed through my office that no +provision had been made by the War Office to keep up a regular supply of +artillery ammunition to the Dardanelles Expedition. The W.O. authority +appeared to have given a bonus of ammunition when the Expedition sailed, +and to have been somewhat taken aback and annoyed by the fact that a +sure and continuous supply should afterwards be demanded. + +On 29th May I left G.H.Q. on appointment as Brigadier-General to command +all the artillery at Cape Helles, in which capacity I served till +September, i.e. through all the big attacks and counter-attacks of June, +July and August. In this capacity I was brought face to face with all +the deficiencies in artillery _materiel_ and ammunition, of which the +following were the most important. + +Although there was only one Battery of 4.5 and one Battery of 6-in. +howitzers at Helles there was always an extreme deficiency of howitzer +H.E. ammunition. So great was the shortage that immediately on taking up +my command I found it necessary to issue a most stringent order that no +howitzer on Cape Helles was ever to fire H.E. without my personal +authority. When the Turks attacked, 18-prs. and 15-prs. were to support +the Infantry with shrapnel; howitzers were only to be used with my +personal permission and then were only to fire shrapnel. All howitzer +H.E. was to be used exclusively for supporting British attacks by +bombarding the Turkish trenches before and during such activities. +Throughout the above months, constant appeals were made to me by +Infantry Commanders to bombard the Turkish trenches with H.E. in order +to retaliate for the loss our men had suffered from the Turkish guns +using H.E. Such requests I had invariably to refuse. + +There were fifty-six 18-prs. at Helles, when I assumed command on the +29th May, and subsequently they were increased to seventy-two at the end +of July. Except for 640 rounds of H.E., which was fired off during the +4th June battle, no more H.E. arrived till the end of July. + +Never during my command did the total number of rounds of 18-pr. +ammunition at Helles ever reach 25,000. Before one of our attacks, with +very careful previous husbanding, the total used perhaps to reach 19,000 +to 23,000. The total amount I could therefore allot justifiably for the +artillery preparation before an attack of our four British Infantry +Divisions never exceeded 12,000 rounds; as from 6,000 to 7,000 must +necessarily be kept in reserve to assist in beating off the determined +hostile counter-attacks. As I remarked at the beginning of this paper, +artillery ammunition was a constant anxiety to the higher commanders on +the Western Front also, but never, I believe, had Infantry to attack +with so little artillery support as the above. My position in France did +not give me any inside knowledge of the details of artillery supply, but +in one action at St. Eloi (near Ypres) on 14th or 15th February, in +which only 27th Division was concerned, the artillery of this Division +(so the C.R.A. informed me) alone fired 10,000 18-pr. rounds in one +night. At a similar action at the same place by the same division about +a month later the divisional artillery fired, I believe, a slightly +larger amount. Again, at Neuve Chapelle, in February, 1915, each +Division had its own divisional artillery and the ammunition expenditure +worked out to 150 rounds per 18-pr. gun. These official figures were +shown me a few days after the battle by the G.O.C., 2nd Army. + +In comparing the ammunition expenditure of France in 1915 and in the +Dardanelles, the enormous discrepancy in the number of 18-prs. per +Division must be taken into account. Reckoning on the scale of the +number of 18-prs. allotted to a British Division in France, we had at +Helles little more than sufficient 18-prs. for one Division, yet with +this number we had to give artillery support to four Divisions. As to +the French artillery at Helles, they could always reckon on being able +to expend 40,000 to 45,000 rounds when their two Divisions attacked. + +The complete absence of H.E. was severely felt, as shrapnel were of +little use for destroying trenches, machine gun emplacements, etc. +Therefore, in each and every British attack, success was jeopardized and +our infantry exposed to cruel losses, because, firstly, there was not +sufficient ammunition to prepare their attack, and, secondly, there was +no H.E. (except for howitzers) to destroy the machine guns in their +emplacements. The latter, therefore, inflicted great losses on our +Infantry in their advance. + +Our unfortunate position did not escape the notice of the French, who +used at times generously to place under my command some of their field +guns and howitzers, but in the latter they were also lamentably +deficient, and in ammunition they were, themselves, during May and early +June, none too well provided, although towards July their reserves grew +more sufficient. The British deficiency in ammunition, however, was so +great, and created so much merriment among the French that they +christened the British Artillery, "Un coup par piece"; with which term +of endearment I was always personally greeted by the French Artillery +General and his Staff, with all of whom I was great friends. + +At the battle of 28th June the French were unable to spare us the +howitzers or ammunition we begged of them. The failure of the gallant +156th Brigade of the 52nd Division to take the H.12 trenches was +essentially due to lack of artillery ammunition, especially of H.E. +Allowing for losses that must have been suffered under any condition, I +believe that some 700 or 800 Scottish casualties were due to this cause. +Before the action the Corps Commander sent for me to say that he did not +consider that enough guns and ammunition had been allotted to this +portion of the Turkish trenches. I replied that I agreed, but that there +were no more available and that to reduce the bombardment of the +hostile trenches on the left of our front would gravely prejudice the +success of the 29th Division in that quarter and that I understood +success there was more vital than on our right flank. After consultation +with the G.O.C. 29th Division, the Corps Commander agreed with my +allotment of the artillery. We then did our utmost to obtain the loan of +more guns, howitzers or ammunition from the French without success and +with the result that the attack was beaten off. + +So successful had been the attack on our left with its capture of five +successive lines of Turkish trenches that we had actually some +ammunition to spare. In the afternoon it was agreed that there should be +another attack on H.12, preceded by a very short but very intense +bombardment from every gun and howitzer we possessed. All artillery +arrangements for this were completed before 2.30 p.m., from which hour +all the guns waited alert and ready for the Infantry to inform us of the +hour they wished us to commence fire. I was in direct telephonic +communication with the commander of the 52nd Division, having had a +private wire laid on to his Headquarters the previous day. Suddenly, to +my horror, I received a telephone message from my Artillery Group +Commander, Colonel Stockdale, saying the Infantry were making the +assault and that he had no time to do more than fire half a dozen shots! + +In the attacks of 12th and 13th July, the French placed some thirty or +forty guns and howitzers under British command, and on account of the +shortage of British ammunition their guns undertook the whole of the +artillery preparation, our artillery confining itself to covering fire +during and after the Infantry advance. The counter-attacks were so +violent and the calls for artillery support were so incessant that +towards the afternoon of the 13th July the British gun ammunition began +to get alarmingly low, until finally only about 5,000 rounds of 18-pr. +ammunition, including all rounds in Battery charge, remained at Helles. +The French were reluctant to supply further artillery support, fearing +further attacks on themselves. This was the most anxious night I spent +on the Peninsula--all but a limited number of rounds were withdrawn from +most Batteries and were placed in horsed ammunition wagons, which +perambulated from one side of the British position to the other +according to where it seemed most likely the next Turkish attack would +take place. These measures were successful and no Battery actually was +left without one round at a critical moment, but the position throughout +that night was a most dangerous one. Every hour a wire was sent to +G.H.Q. giving expression to our crying needs, but there was next to +nothing at Mudros, while desperate fighting still went on without a +minute's respite. At 11 p.m. that night a trawler did, to the joy of +every gunner, reach Helles with 3,000 rounds of 18-pr., but on the +arrival of my Staff Officer to unload it, it was found that the fuses +were of a new pattern never issued before and that the existing fuse +keys would not adjust the fuses. As no new pattern fuse keys had been +sent from home the Batteries had to manufacture their own, which was +successfully accomplished after two days' delay. + +During June two Batteries, and during July two more Batteries of 5-inch +howitzers, manned by Territorials, arrived at Helles. During the last +week of July the first two Batteries were sent to Anzac. Some of these +howitzers were very old and worn by corrosion, and were consequently +inaccurate. + +The Gun History sheets of some of them showed they had been used at the +Battle of Omdurman, seventeen years before, and had been in use ever +since. After the big British attacks of 6th and 7th August, their +ammunition began to run short. On demand about 500 or 700 rounds were +sent up from Mudros--on arrival each shell was found to be of only 40 +lb. weight, whereas former shells were of 50 lb. weight. Their fuses +were also of new pattern, which existing fuse keys would not fit and, to +crown all, no range tables had been sent for this new pattern of shell. +In spite of continual letters and telegrams to the War Office, when I +left Helles in September no new pattern fuse keys or range tables had +ever arrived from England; consequently these shells remained stacked on +the Peninsula while the Batteries only fired occasionally for want of +ammunition! + +On another occasion, when we were in the greatest straits for 15-pr. +ammunition, many hundreds of rounds arrived at Helles, which on being +landed were discovered by my Staff only to be suitable for the Ehrhardt +R.H.A. guns in Egypt, no such guns being in the Dardanelles. + +As for heavy artillery, practically speaking, there was none! Only one +6-inch Howitzer Battery (4 howitzers) and one 60-pr. Battery (4 guns) +were in action at Helles up to July when four more guns of the latter +calibre were landed. Unfortunately, however, the 60-prs. were of little +use, as the recoil was too great for the carriages and the latter broke +down beyond repair by our limited resources after very few rounds. At +the beginning of August only one 60-pr. gun remained in action. +Consequently, we had no heavy guns capable of replying to the Turkish +heavy guns which enveloped us on three sides, and from whose fire our +infantry and artillery suffered severely. + +As to spare parts, spare guns and carriages, such luxuries were +practically non-existent. No provision appears to have been made by the +War Office to replace our guns or their parts, which became +unserviceable through use or through damage by the hostile artillery. As +the British were holding the lower slopes of the Achi Baba position, and +as all our gun positions could be seen into by the Turks with powerful +spectacles from their observation posts on the top of Achi Baba, our +equipment suffered severely. During June and July one 6-inch howitzer +and twenty-five 18-prs. (out of a total of seventy-two) as well as one +or two 60-prs., were put out of action by direct hits from the hostile +artillery. Such guns were withdrawn to the field workshops on "W" Beach, +but as these workshops were exposed to the enemy's artillery fire from +three sides, the guns were often further damaged while under repair. +Damaged guns had sometimes to wait for days in this workshop until other +guns had been damaged in a different place by the hostile artillery. +Then possibly one efficient gun could be made up of the undamaged +portions of one, two or more guns. Batteries often, therefore, remained +for days short of guns on account of the lack of spare parts. + +When I assumed command of the artillery at Helles, there were two +Batteries of mountain guns (10-prs.) in action, but they were of a +prehistoric pattern. In 1899 the Khedive of Egypt possessed in his Army, +in which I was then serving, mountain guns which were more up-to-date in +every respect. So inaccurate were these 10-prs. that they had to be +placed close behind the front trenches lest they should hit our own +Infantry, the result being a very heavy casualty list in officers and +men amongst their Territorial personnel. Many of these lives could have +been saved, had reasonable modern weapons been supplied. These obsolete +old guns wore out so quickly that the two Batteries quickly melted into +one Battery, and when they finally left Helles for Anzac at the end of +July, I believe only 3 guns and their detachments were left in being. + +As for anti-aircraft guns, they did not exist at all and the hostile +aeroplanes used to fly over and drop bombs _ad lib._ without fear of +molestation, the only saving clause being that the enemy appeared to +possess almost as few aeroplanes as the British. + +In no point of their equipment did the force at Helles suffer so much in +comparison with their comrades in France as in the matter of aeroplanes +which, at the Dardanelles, were hopelessly deficient not only in the +numbers but also in quality. There were not sufficient pilots and there +were no observers at all. Brave and efficient as the naval pilots were, +they could not be expected to be of any use as artillery spotters unless +they had been thoroughly trained for this important duty. This +deficiency had to be made good at all costs by drafting young artillery +subalterns from their Batteries and sending them to the Air Force, where +their lack of training and experience in operation was at first severely +felt, although later these lads did magnificent work. Thus Batteries +were deprived of their trained subalterns just at the moment when the +latter were most required on account of the severe casualties suffered +in the landing and during the subsequent early operations. But few of +the aeroplanes were fitted with wireless and the receivers on the ground +could not take in messages over a distance longer than 5,000 yards. +Consequently, each aeroplane had to return within this radius of the +receiver, before its observation could be delivered, thus immensely +curtailing the usefulness and efficiency of the aeroplane observation. +Owing to the above conditions, aeroplanes could only be used for the +counter-batteries firing on hostile artillery. + +As regards trench mortars, the supply was hopelessly inadequate. I +cannot give the exact figures, but I believe there were not a dozen at +Helles during the whole period I was there, and these were of such an +indifferent type as to be practically useless, and for this reason no +one bothered about them. No provision appears to have been made for the +supply of such necessities of trench warfare by the Home Authorities. +This appears to be indefensible, as I believe very early in the +operations their provision was specially asked for by G.H.Q. The +absolute failure to supply such articles of vital necessity eventually +led to the French C.-in-C. at Helles lending the British two demizel +trench mortars and large quantities of ammunition. These were manned by +artillery detachments, and by their magnificent work and the constant +demand from the Infantry for their services, it was conclusively proved +what an invaluable aid a sufficient supply of these weapons would have +been. + +From the very first it was apparent to me that the number of British +guns at Helles was not sufficient to prepare and support simultaneous +Infantry attacks of the whole British Force at this end of the +Peninsula. In June I drew up a memorandum to G.H.Q. pointing this out +and asking for a big increase of guns, howitzers and ammunition. What +happened to this I cannot say. I only know that the guns and ammunition +asked for never materialized. + +The whole story of the artillery at Helles may be summed up in the +following sentences: insufficiency of guns of every nature; +insufficiency of ammunition of every nature, especially of H.E.; +insufficient provision made by the Home Authorities for spare guns, +spare carriages, spare parts, adequate repairing workshops, or for a +regular daily, weekly or monthly supply of ammunition; guns provided +often of an obsolete pattern and so badly worn by previous use as to be +most inaccurate; lack of aeroplanes, trained observers and of all the +requisites for air observation; total failure to produce the trench +mortars and bombs to which the closeness of the opposing lines at Helles +would have lent themselves well--in short, total lack of organization at +home to provide even the most rudimentary and indispensable artillery +requisites for daily consumption; not to speak of downright carelessness +which resulted in wrong shells being sent to the wrong guns, and new +types of fuses being sent without fuse keys and new types of howitzer +shells without range tables. These serious faults provoked their own +penalties in the shape of the heavy losses suffered by our Infantry and +artillery, which might have been to a great measure averted if +sufficient forethought and attention had been devoted to the "side-show" +at the Dardanelles. + +After commanding the starved artillery at Helles it was my good fortune +to command the artillery of the 21st Army Corps at the third Battle of +Gaza, in November, 1917, and also at the great Battle of 19th +September, 1918, in which the Turks in Palestine were finally crushed, +and I think it may add emphasis to what I have said if I contrast the +artillery support of the two campaigns and show the results which +ensued. On the night before the third Battle of Gaza, the artillery +under my command (to support three Divisions) consisted of the +following, viz.:--19-1/2 Batteries (i.e., 78 guns and howitzers) of +heavy artillery, comprising 8-inch howitzers, 6-inch guns, 6-inch +howitzers and 60-pr. guns--all of the most modern and up-to-date type. + +The Field Artillery comprised 108 18-prs. and 36 4.5 howitzers while in +addition there were 8 modern mountain howitzers and guns. There was not +an artillery weapon in the whole Army Corps that was not efficient and +up-to-date, while immediately behind the front line existed perfectly +organized workshops capable of executing any repairs. There was ample +provision of spare guns, carriages and parts, and an abundance of trench +mortars which, though they would have changed the whole face of the +Peninsula conflict, could not be used in Palestine owing to the breadth +of No Man's Land. Ammunition for every nature of gun and howitzer was +pressed upon us in profusion--over a thousand rounds per gun was buried +and concealed near every Battery, while immediately behind the fighting +line huge reserves were available for immediate use if required. At the +advanced railhead, G.H.Q. literally built mountains of ammunition as a +further supply; all this in addition to vast quantities stored in depots +in Egypt and on the banks of the Suez Canal. So great was the +superabundance of shell, that hundreds of tons were left lying on the +ground after the nine days' Battle at Gaza; which it took months to +remove. At the battle of the 19th September, 1918, in Palestine +conditions were exactly the same. There was an absolute _embarras de +richesse_ of every artillery requisite. This wealth of artillery +material was supported in Palestine by a full complement of artillery, +aeroplanes, pilots and observers, the latter being all thoroughly +trained and efficient. In addition, by a sufficiency of fighting +aeroplanes with most efficient pilots, our artillery were adequately +guarded from sunrise to sunset from any hostile aeroplane observation. + +In short, our air supremacy was undisputed and absolutely protected our +own artillery against damage and molestation from the hostile guns. On +the other hand, the enemy's artillery lay at our mercy directly their +gun positions were discovered. + +The whole science of artillery and aeroplane co-operation had, of +course, been vastly extended and perfected since Gallipoli days, but the +point I wish to make is this: that in 1917 and 1918 the Palestine Front +was fitted out on the same scale, proportionately, as the Western Front; +whereas in 1915 this was not the case in the Dardanelles as regards +artillery, for instance, only one Division (the 29th) at Helles having +18-pr. guns and the Naval Division having been given no artillery at +all! + +To put the matter shortly, whereas at Helles I had under my command no +more than 88 to 95 guns and howitzers of all natures with scarcely any +ammunition or aeroplanes to support four British Divisions; in Palestine +at Gaza I had at least 230 guns and howitzers (one-third of which were +of heavy calibre) with an abundance of ammunition and a sufficiency of +aeroplanes to support the attack of one and a half Divisions, the +remaining one and a half Divisions at Gaza being in reserve. At the +battle of 19th September, 1918, in Palestine I had, to the best of my +recollection, about 360 guns of all calibres to support four Divisions. +The terrible casualties suffered by our Infantry at Helles are well +known, and my feelings as Artillery Commander unable to give them +anything like the support they would have had in France or Flanders may +be guessed. But this was made up to me afterwards when I commanded the +artillery at Gaza, that strong fortress which was captured by the 21st +Army Corps, with certainly under 3,000 casualties and I believe with +under 2,000 killed and wounded. At Gaza the Turks were simply crushed by +our overwhelming artillery, fed from inexhaustible Ordnance parks and +dumps. Before the Infantry attack commenced the position was subjected +to a continuous bombardment night and day for six days and six nights +from every available gun and howitzer. The Infantry then attacked and +took a large portion of the position with a loss of, I believe, under +1,000 men. The Turks counter-attacked, but they melted away under the +tremendous artillery barrage and never attempted another during this +battle. Next night our Infantry tried to extend their conquest but the +Turks had meanwhile brought up an old Gallipoli Division, the 7th, which +held them at bay and inflicted upon them serious losses which, I +believe, increased their casualties to between two and three thousand. +The Corps Commander then decided to let the Infantry stand where they +were, to submit the Turks to a further three days' and three nights' +bombardment, at the end of which our Infantry advanced again only to +find that the Turks were evacuating the whole of the Gaza position. +After the Battle of 19th September, 1918, many Infantry commanders of +Divisions, Brigades and Battalions have told me the Turks appeared +crushed by the terrific artillery bombardment (under cover of which our +men advanced) and offered a resistance which, in comparison with our +experiences of Gallipoli, can only be called feeble. + +The cardinal fact that remains in my mind is that in Palestine the 21st +Army Corps always had enough (and more than enough) of every artillery +requisite for whatever number of Divisions the Army Corps was composed +of; whereas, in Gallipoli, the VIIIth Army Corps at Helles, which was +composed of four British Divisions, never had enough Field Artillery or +ammunition to support more than one Division, and never possessed +sufficient heavy artillery to support more than one Infantry Brigade. + +The material part of my statement ends here, and it only remains for me +to remind you that all the grievous shortcomings I have exposed were +actually made good by the heroism, devotion and sufferings of the +Officers and men of the Artillery at Helles, both Regular, Territorial, +Australian and New Zealand. Rest was impossible, as no Battery could +ever be withdrawn from the line and all field Batteries were under rifle +fire. If placed outside that range, they were destroyed by flanking fire +from Turkish guns in Asia. No dug-outs were possible, as dug-outs were +understood in France, as there was no timber or roofing for their +construction. All ranks were thus exposed night and day to continuous +fire, and were sometimes killed as they slept in their valises by stray +bullets, thousands of which were fired unaimed every night by the Turks +in the hopes of inflicting casualties; water for drinking and washing +was almost as precious as guns and shells. The joys of a canteen, as was +at that time supplied by the War Office to our Army in France, were +unknown; bare rations washed down by a limited allowance of water were +our only form of food; everyone suffered more or less from dysentery, +spread by the millions of flies which settled on every mouthful we ate +and made life almost insupportable by day. No Man's Land was one vast +litter of unburied corpses. Yet no man's spirit ever wavered and all +ranks remained as bright, as hopeful and as cheerful as on the day of +the first great landing. If shells were scarce, complaints were +non-existent; all were upheld by the wonderful religion of +self-sacrifice. It will ever remain my greatest pride that I had the +astonishing good fortune to be associated with such a body of officers +and men; to them I owe a debt of gratitude that is beyond redemption, +and to them alone is due the credit for any success which the artillery +at Helles may have attained in what was one of England's greatest +tragedies, but was also one of England's greatest glories. + + + + +APPENDIX II + +DARDANELLES EXPEDITION + + NOTES BY LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES ROSENTHAL,[17] COMMANDING 3RD + AUSTRALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, + RELATING TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC, FROM 25TH APRIL TO 25TH AUGUST, + 1915. (_Compiled from personal diary._) + + +During the early hours of 25th April, 1915, the 3rd Australian Infantry +Brigade landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, close to Gaba Tepe, at a point +now known as Anzac Beach, followed by other troops of 1st Australian +Division and Australian and New Zealand Division. + +Arrangements had been made for artillery to land about 10 a.m. on the +same morning, but owing to delays in disembarkation of Infantry, and +enemy shelling of transports necessitating ships temporarily leaving +their allotted anchorage, it was after mid-day before the vessels +carrying guns were actually in correct position for disembarkation. + +I did not wait for the naval boats to come alongside, but after issuing +necessary instructions to Battery Commanders concerning the landing of +the guns, I disembarked in a ship's boat manned by a volunteer crew from +my Brigade Ammunition Column, accompanied by two officers and sixteen +men of my Headquarters' Staff. + +Immediately on landing I reported to my C.R.A., and was by him informed +that the Divisional Commander had decided no artillery should land +during the day. This decision absolutely nonplussed me, and on asking +the reason I was informed the position was not considered sufficiently +secure to ensure the safety of guns, if emplaced. With this decision I +did not agree and urged, without result, that the safety of guns was +surely secondary to the proper supporting of the troops already +committed. + +In view of the above decision instructions were at once sent off to the +ships ordering Colonel Johnstone, Commanding 2nd A.F.A. Brigade, and +Major Hughes, acting for me in command of 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, to defer +disembarkation of guns. Colonel Johnstone, however, by this time had one +18-pr. gun well on the way to the shore. Permission was given for it to +be landed and it was brought into action close to the beach against guns +at Gaba Tepe, undoubtedly temporarily silencing them. + +In the meantime the Indian Mountain Battery attached to 1st Australian +Division, which had landed early in the day, was in action doing +splendid work though suffering severe casualties. + +By the order of Colonel White, G.S.O. (1), 1st Australian Division, I +spent the afternoon in collecting Infantry stragglers and getting them +forward again to the firing line. At 5 p.m. I reported completion of +this task and then proceeded to thoroughly reconnoitre the right flank, +overlooking Gaba Tepe, which had seemed to me, from observations made +from the ship, to be a suitable area for emplacing of guns. + +I returned to Divisional Headquarters just before dark, and informed the +C.R.A. and Divisional Commander that I had found suitable places for +batteries and could use them effectively. + +I had in my reconnaissance conferred with three Battalion Commanders +(one of whom was killed a couple of days later), who were delighted to +hear that the artillery they were so anxiously waiting for was to come +up in support. + +After much discussion and persuasion the Divisional Commander agreed to +allow me to land two of my three 18-pr. batteries. This approval was +shortly afterwards altered to permission to land two guns only, and +finally all approval was cancelled, though no information of these +decisions officially reached me. + +During the night, in anticipation of early arrival of guns, my +Headquarters personnel worked untiringly in preparing a track from the +beach to the selected sites for guns, and it was not till 5.30 a.m. on +26th that I learned approval to land guns had been cancelled overnight. + +During the morning of 26th April one gun of 1st Battery, 1st Brigade, +and one gun of 4th Battery, 2nd Brigade, were landed, hauled up the +steep hill to their positions, and came into action on the extreme right +of ridge overlooking Gaba Tepe. + +Later in the day the 7th Battery of my Brigade came into action on the +same ridge and the single guns of 1st and 4th Batteries were withdrawn +for return to their respective Brigades. + +During the afternoon there also came ashore, apparently without order, +two guns of 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade, and 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, but +were returned to their respective ships by the C.R.A. + +My guns were placed absolutely in the Infantry front trenches, on the +sky line, no troops of any kind being in advance of them. It would have +been quite useless to take up positions behind the Infantry line in the +normal way, owing to the configuration of the ground, for in such cases +the lowest range at which the crest could be cleared was 3,000 yards, +while our targets were from 500 to 1,000 yards distant. Indeed at night, +shrapnel shell with fuse set at zero was frequently used. + +Each gun fired during the 26th about 400 rounds, over open sights, and +caused very heavy casualties to the enemy. + +The whole battery covered a front of 187 deg., necessitating each gun being +personally controlled by an officer and each with its own particular arc +of fire. + +The supply of ammunition was very difficult. It had to be delivered by +hand to the guns over a bullet-swept area, the distance from the beach +to the guns being about half a mile, while in this distance the hills +rose 400 feet. + +By the afternoon of the 3rd May, two guns of 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, +were in action, and 2nd Brigade also had guns in position on the left +flank of 1st Australian Divisional Front. + +The Australian and New Zealand Division also had 18-prs. in action +together with two 4.5-inch Howitzer Batteries, the latter being the only +howitzers available up to this time at Anzac. + +I was wounded on 5th May, evacuated to Cairo, and did not rejoin my +command at Anzac till 26th May. During this interval gun positions, as +well as Infantry trenches, had been much improved, and the enemy country +in our immediate front which, when I left on 5th May, gave no signs of +life, was now well traversed by trenches. + +I found in my sector that the guns of my Brigade were now all in action, +and the remainder of the artillery of the Division was also emplaced. + +About this time 6-inch howitzers were made available and later emplaced, +one for left sector, one for the centre, and one for the right, but with +very limited quantities of ammunition. Another 6-inch howitzer was +landed on 17th June. + +I had made continual urgent representations for two 4.7-inch guns for +right flank to deal with innumerable targets beyond the range of +18-prs., but it was not till 11th July that one very old and much worn +gun arrived, and was placed in position on right flank, firing its first +round on 26th July. + +On 24th June a Scottish Territorial Howitzer Battery (the 5th Battery, +City of Glasgow Lowland Howitzer Brigade) arrived and came under my +command. + +On 14th July a heavy battery was organized for right flank, consisting +of the two 6-inch howitzers and the 4.7-inch gun before mentioned, but +ammunition was still very scarce. + +On 15th July a 5-inch Howitzer Brigade under Colonel Hope Johnstone +commenced to arrive and was complete in position by 18th July. + +On 28th July the 4th Battery of Lowland Brigade arrived. + +About this time some alterations were made in artillery dispositions and +grouping in preparation for impending battle at Suvla Bay and Lone Pine, +commencing on 6th August, and on 30th July the artillery of right sector +under my command was as follows:-- + + 3rd A.F.A. Brigade (18-prs.). + Heavy Battery (two 6-inch howitzers and one 4.7-inch gun). + 2 Mountain Guns. + Two 5-inch Howitzer Batteries, Lowland Brigade. + One 5-inch Howitzer Battery, 69th Brigade. + +When leaving Australia in 1914 I had urged that a battery of 5-inch +howitzers (which I commanded prior to the outbreak of war), together +with stocks of ammunition held by Australia, should accompany 1st +Australian Division. This was not approved. On arrival at Gallipoli +Peninsula, when the need for howitzers was at once apparent, I again +re-opened the question, particularly on the 29th May, when the C.R.A. +agreed to press for them to be sent forward. The Divisional Commander, +on 25th June, cabled Australia definitely asking for this battery, which +was at once forwarded, but arrived at the Peninsula too late to be of +any service. + +Two Australian Field Batteries (together with a Brigade of Infantry) +were transferred to Cape Helles on 5th May and did not rejoin the +Australian Division at Anzac till 18th August. + +With the limited number of guns available it was exceedingly important +that transfers might be made very rapidly from one part of our front to +another, and on 2nd June I put forward a proposal which was approved +immediately to make a road along the entire front just behind the crest +on which infantry trenches were sited. This road was completed in about +two weeks and was a great boon alike to gunners and Infantry. + +Up to 24th August no anti-aircraft guns had been provided, but specially +constructed emplacements had been made for 18-prs. to be used against +aircraft, and though never successful in bringing down an enemy 'plane +they certainly made good enough shooting to cause enemy aviators to +treat them with respect. About 20th August three 3-pr. Hotchkiss arrived +for anti-aircraft purposes. They were of obsolete pattern and had been +manufactured for the Japanese Government many years before. In fact the +only range tables provided were printed in Japanese, but thanks to the +fact that one of my Sergeants (who was a Master Mariner) spoke Japanese, +we succeeded in preparing serviceable range tables. + +Two Japanese trench mortars were also used from Infantry trenches with +excellent effect, but owing to ammunition supply becoming soon exhausted +and no fresh supplies being available they had to be discarded. A good +supply of these weapons, together with full supplies of ammunition, +would have been invaluable in bombarding enemy front line trenches. + +The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation of 6th August was +a difficult problem. Frequently we had to be rationed to a very small +allowance per battery per day, and the guns of the heavy battery were +for some time not permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and +then only by special permission of the C.R.A. + +On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr. was to be +supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply for experiment was +landed at Anzac. I think I am right in saying my share was 15 rounds per +battery. + +On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only 150 rounds per +battery. + +During the first few months of the campaign, when our stocks of +ammunition were desperately low, our guns and gunners had to suffer +considerable casualties without being able to effectively reply. + +Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct observation +of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the detachments in building +earthworks for their protection made it possible to carry on. + +Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near the beach, our +artificers established a workshop, and the extraordinary ingenuity and +skill displayed in the repairing and replacing of damaged guns earned +for the artificers our most grateful appreciation and thanks. + +On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric. + +These notes only apply to the right sector, which I commanded. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 17: Now Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal, K.C.B., C.M.G., +D.S.O.--IAN H. 1920.] + + + + +APPENDIX III + + +The Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical document. In it +the situation should be set forth, as briefly and clearly as may be, +together with a few words indicative of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping +with it. After that comes a narrative which ends with thanks to those +individuals and units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so +written that civilians can follow the facts stated without trouble: it +should not be too technical. But when the Military Colleges and +Academies at Camberley, Duntroon, Kingston, West Point and in the +European and Japanese capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to +apportion praise or blame they are more influenced by the actual +instructions and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief _before and +during the battle_, than by any after-the-event stories of what +happened. They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but his +instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical effect to +those intentions, are what really interest them. + +When I came to write my Dispatch of the 11th December, so much about the +actual course of events at Suvla was still obscure, that it had become +desirable either to write the narrative in a more technical form than +was customary or else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously +with the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities had raised +objections to several passages in the Dispatch, and in every case but +one, where they had wished me to add something which was not, in my +opinion, correct, I had met them. No objection had been raised to the +inclusion of my instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January +(the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received a letter by +Special Messenger from the War Office telling me the Press Bureau were +wiring to all those to whom the Dispatch had been issued to suppress the +instructions! + +Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its result was clear +enough: my Dispatch was eviscerated at the very moment it was stepping +on to the platform. Had I known that these instructions, now given, were +to have been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written. + + IAN H., 1920. + + +SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS. + + + TO VICE-ADMIRAL, COMMANDING + EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, + + _17th July, 1915._ + +SIR,--I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show +in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc., which it will be +required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall +be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider +that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious +difficulties or is likely to require modification. + +In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged +if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the +disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed +arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops, +etc., to boats may be prepared. + +2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in +the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are +successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force +sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as +to disembarkation of these horses will be forwarded to you later. In the +meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should +subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on +August 6th. + +It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units +referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.), and, further, +the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this +latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with +mechanical transport. It will not be required to land any of the above +until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of +disembarkation, etc., will be forwarded to you later. + + I have the honour to be, Sir, + Your obedient Servant, + (_Signed_) IAN HAMILTON, + + _General, Commanding_ + _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + + + * * * * * + + +TABLE A. + +TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND GRADUALLY +AT ANZAC COVE BEFORE THE MORNING OF THE 3RD OF AUGUST. IT WILL BE +NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THESE DISEMBARKATIONS BY NIGHT, AND THE MOVEMENTS +CAN BEGIN AS SOON AS IT IS CONVENIENT TO THE NAVAL TRANSPORT +AUTHORITIES. + + + +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+ + Unit. | From | To |Personnel.| + +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+ + 69th Howitzer Bde. |Mudros |Anzac | 312 | + R.F.A. | |Cove | | + | | | | + 1/3rd City of Glasgow 5" | Helles |Anzac | 78 | + | | | | + 10th Heavy Battery |On board |Anzac | 11 | + R.G.A. |ship at |Cove | | + |Mudros | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + One F.A. Bde. (11th |On board |Anzac | 33 | + Division, "A" Bde.) |ship at |Cove | | + |Mudros | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + Reinforcements for Units |Alexandria |Anzac | 7,000 | + of A.N.Z.A.C. | |Cove | to | + | | | 8,000 | + | | | | + Mule Corps |Helles |Anzac | 50 | + | |Cove | | + | | | | + Ammunition Park |Mudros |Anzac | 65 | + | |Cove | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+ + + +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+-------------- + | Vehicles. |Animals.| Stores. | Remarks. + +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+-------------- + |16 guns, 16 wagons, | Nil | | + |4 water carts | | | + | | | | + |4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 | Nil | | + |water cart | | | + | | | | + |4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 | Nil | |I.G.C. has + |water cart, 2 | | |already been + |G.S. wagons | | |instructed to + | | | |arrange for + | | | |this move. + | | | | + |16 guns, 32 wagons, | Nil | |I.G.C. has + |telegraph cart, 4 | | |already been + |water carts | | |instructed to + | | | |arrange for + | | | |this move. + | | | | + | Nil | Nil | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | Nil | 200 | |By August 1st. + | | | | + | | | | + | Nil | Nil |S.A. Ammn. 5,500,000 rounds | + | | |Mk. VII (_a_) (225 tons), | + | | |760,000 rounds Mk. VI (30 | + | | |tons) | + | | |Gun Ammunition (_b_) 10 pr. | + | | |2,700 (19 tons), 18 pr. 5,500 | + | | |(70 tons), 4.5" How. 1,600 | + | | |(45 tons), 5" How. 10,000 | + | | |(330 tons), 6" How. 1,200 | + | | |(70 tons), 60 pr. 1,000 (30 | + | | |tons) | + +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+--------------- + + _a_ If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be + landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore + before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks). + + _b_ If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should + also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be + ashore before operations begin:-- + + 10 pr. 3,000 rounds} + 18 pr. 10,000 rounds} See Table "C" Remarks. + 6" Howitzer 1,000 rounds} + + +TABLE B. + +TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC +COVE ON THE NIGHTS OF AUGUST 3RD/4TH, AUGUST 4TH/5TH AND AUGUST 5TH/6TH. + + ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+--------------------- + Unit. | From.| Date. |Personnel.|Vehicles.| Remarks. + ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+--------------------- + 6 Battalions (_a_), |Mudros|Night, | 4,650 | Nil |Machine guns and + 13th Division | |August | | |other equipment + | |3rd/4th| | |carried by hand. + | | | | | + Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, | 100 | Nil | -- + personnel Anzac | |August | | | + | |3rd/4th| | | + | | | | | + 7 Battalions (_a_), |Mudros|Night, | 5,425 | Nil |Machine guns and + 13th Division | |August | | |other equipment + | |4th/5th| | |carried by hand. + | | | | | + Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, | 125 | Nil | -- + 1 Field Ambulance, | |August | | | + 13th Division | |4th/5th| | | + | | | | | + 4 Battalions, 10th |Mudros|Night, | 3,100 | Nil |Machine guns and + Division | |August | | |other equipment + | |5th/6th| | |carried by hand. + | | | | | + 29th Indian Brigade |Imbros|Night, | 2,000 | Nil | Ditto. + and Field Ambulance | |August | | | + | |5th/6th| | | + | | | | | + Bearer Sub-Divisions,|Mudros|Night, | 255 | Nil | -- + 2 Field Ambulance, | |August | | | + 13th Division | |5th/6th| | | + | | | | | + 3 Field Companies |Mudros|Night, | 525 | Nil |Machine guns and + R.E. (_a_), 13th | |August | | |other equipment + Division | |5th/6th| | |carried by hand. All + | | | | |tools carried by hand. + ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+--------------------- + + _a_ These units to move from Helles to Mudros as follows:-- + + 1 Brigade } Night, + 1 Field Company} 28th/29th July. + + 1 Brigade } Night, + 1 Field Company} 29th/30th July. + + 1 Brigade } Night, + 1 Field Company} 30/31st July. + + +TABLE C. + +TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT NEW +BEACH DURING THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 6TH/7TH, BEGINNING ONE HOUR AFTER DARK +(9.30 P.M.). ALL TROOPS WILL COME FROM IMBROS, BUT HORSES WILL COME +DIRECT EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE STATED. + + -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+-------------------------- + Unit. |Personnel.|Horses.| Vehicles. | Remarks. + -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+-------------------------- + 1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,050 | 36 | Nil |Personnel only to be + Sig. Sec.(_a_) | | | |disembarked in the order + | | | |shown. Animals of Mountain + 1 Bearer Sub-Div.| 40 | Nil | Nil |Batteries as soon as there + | | | |is sufficient light, + | | | |followed by horses of one + 1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,065 | 36 | Nil |18-pr. Battery (82) and of + Sig. Sec. and 1 | | | |H.Q. F.A. Brigade (10). + W/T Station | | | |Animals of remaining units + | | | |to follow in the order + 1 Bearer Sub-Div.| 40 | Nil | Nil |shown. Supplies and forage + | | | |for 7 days for these + Field Co. R.E. | 175 | 16 |4 tool carts |troops and animals to be + | | | |dumped on the beach as + 2 Mountain Batts.| 100 | 80 | Nil |soon as possible, will + (_b_) | | | |amount to about 250 tons. + | | | |S.A.A. 4,000,000 will also + Div. H.Q. and | 125 | 28 |2 cable wagons,|have to be landed besides + Sig. Co. | | |1 water cart, |that carried by the + | | |2 limbd. R.E. |troops, say, 150 tons. + | | |wagons | + | | | | + 1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,840 | 44 | Nil |Artillery reserve + Pioneer Bn. and | | | |ammunition will also be + Sig. Sec. and 1 | | | |required as follows:-- + W/T Station | | | |To come by trawler from + | | | |Mudros + 7 Bearer Sub-Divs| 300 | Nil | Nil | 10 pr. 3,000 rds. (20 tons) + | | | | 18 pr. 10,000 rds. (130 tons) + | | | | 60 pr. 1,000 rds. (30 tons) + 2 Platoons Div. | 62 | Nil |62 bicycles |(See notes to Table A.) If + Cycl. Co. | | | |reserve S.A.A. and gun + | | | |ammunition can be put + 2 Field Cos. R.E.| 350 | 32 |8 tool carts |ashore at Anzac Cove + | | | |before operations begin + 1 F.A. Bde. ("L" | 550 | 251 |16 guns, 44 |this will also be done. + Bde.) (_c_) | | |wagons, 1 |But the above-mentioned + | | |telephone |reserves must also be + | | |wagon, 5 water |landed at New Beach in + | | |carts |case the congestion on the + | | | |road from Anzac makes its + | | | |forwarding a matter of + | | | |great difficulty. + Ammn. Park | 65 | Nil | Nil | + Personnel (11 | | | | + Div.) | | | | + | | | | + 9 Tent Sub.-Divs.| 350 |84 |30 ambulance | + | |horses |wagons, 9 water| + | |or |carts, 3 | + | |144 |Maltese carts | + | |mules | | + | | | | + 4 Casualty | 360 | Nil | Nil | + Clearing Stations| | | | + | | | | + Bde. Ammn. Col. | 60 | 62 |8 ammunition | + | | |wagons, 1 water| + | | |cart, 4 S.A.A. | + | | |wagons | + 2 Bns. for Beach | 1,000 | Nil | Nil | + Parties | | | | + | | | | + Mule Corps | 150 | 300 |150 mule carts | + | | | | + Wireless Sec. | 18 | 16 |2 two-horse | + | | |vehicles | + -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+-------------------------- + + _a_ Helles to Imbros, night July 31st/August 1st. + + _b_ Helles to Imbros, night August 1st/2nd. + + _c_ Animals in remarks columns (82 and 10) come from Imbros, remainder + from Mudros in horse-ships. + + +TABLE D. + +TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC COVE +BEGINNING AT DAWN AUGUST 7TH. + +ORDER OF LANDING AS SHOWN. ALL THESE TROOPS WILL COME FROM MUDROS. + + ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+--------------------- + Unit. |Personnel.|Horses.|Vehicles.| Remarks. + ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+--------------------- + Medical personnel, tent sub-| 900 | Nil | Nil |All spare stretchers + divisions A. and A.N.Z.A.C. | | | |to be carried by + Field Ambulance | | | |hand. + | | | | + Bearer Sub-Divisions of 1 | 125 | Nil | Nil | + Field Ambulance, 10th Div | | | | + | | | | + One 18-pr. Battery and H.Q. | 120 | 92 | Nil | + F.A. Bde. ("A" Bde.) | | | | + | | | | + 10th Heavy Battery R.G.A. | 110 | 70 | Nil | + | | | | + Three 18-pr. Batteries ("A" | 300 | 246 | Nil |Guns and personnel + Brigade) | | | |already ashore, (See + | | | |Tables A and B.) + Mules of Mule Corps | * | 400 | Nil |* Sufficient personnel + | | | |to look after mules. + ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+--------------------- + + +TABLE E. + +TABLE SHOWING UNITS TO BE READY TO LAND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THOSE SHOWN IN +TABLES A, B, C AND D. UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED IN THE ORDER SHOWN EITHER +AT NEW BEACH OR ANZAC COVE AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DICTATE. + + -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------ + Unit. | From |Personnel.|Animals.| Vehicles. |Remarks. + -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------ + Divl. H.Q. 10th |Mudros| 125 | 28 |2 limbered R.E.| + Divn. | | | |wagons, 1 water| + | | | |cart, 2 cable | + | | | |wagons | + | | | | | + 3 Battalions 10th|Mudros| 2,325 | 40 |6 water carts |S.A.A. 2,600,000 + Divn. | | | | |rounds besides + | | | | |that carried on the + | | | | |men. + | | | | | + 6 Battalions 10th|Port | 4,650 | 76 |12 water carts | + Divn. |Iero | | | | + | | | | | + H.Q. Divl. R.E. |Mudros| 525 | 30 |12 tool carts, | + | | | |3 water carts | + | | | | | + 3 Field Cos. R.E.| -- | -- | -- | -- | + 10th Division | | | | | + | | | | | + Bearer Sub- |Mudros| 250 | -- | -- | + Divisions of 2 | | | | | + Field Ambulances,| | | | | + 10th Divn. | | | | | + | | | | | + 15th Heavy |On | 121 | 70 |4 guns, 4 | + Baattery R.G.A. |board | | |wagons, 1 water| + |ship--| | |cart, 2 G.S. | + |Mudros| | |wagons | + | | | | | + Tent Sub-Division|Mudros| 350 |54 |15 ambulance | + of 10th Divn. | | |horses |wagons, 12 | + | | |or 84 |carts | + | | |mules | | + | | | | | + Mule Corps |Mudros| 150 | 300 |150 carts | + -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------ + + + GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, + + AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS. + +With reference to your G.288 of 15th July, the Navy is being asked to +provide transport for the following ammunition to be landed at Anzac by +the 3rd August:-- + + * * * * * + +_For A. and N.Z.A.C._--Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount on shore up +to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-gun. + +_For other Troops._--300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds per +machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry on landing). + +These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrangements are being +made to begin landing this ammunition as soon as possible. + +2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be gradually +landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if possible, by August +3rd:-- + + 10 pr. 5,700 rounds + 18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.) 15,500 " + 4.5-in. Howitzer probably half H.E. 1,600 " + 5-in. Howitzer majority H.E. 10,000 " + 6-in. Howitzer majority H.E. 1,200 " + 60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E. 1,000 " + +All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the proportion of H.E. +shell is not yet ascertainable from England. The arrangements suggested +in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of your letter are noted, and will be +followed as far as possible. + +3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the necessary +arrangements are being prepared. You will be informed of the +arrangements and of the system of marking in due course. + +Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent separately as you +suggest. + +4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenishment +referred to in paragraph 2 (iv.) of your letter. Dispatch of +consignments on this account and consignments for the reserve will be +notified to you separately. + + (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, C.G.S.,_ + _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + +Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice-Admiral, showing troops, +animals, stores, etc., which the Navy is being asked to land at Anzac. + + _22nd July, 1915._ + + GENERAL OFFICES COMMANDING, + 9TH CORPS. + +The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of +his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of +yourself, your Divisional Generals, and such Officers of your Corps +Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it +necessary to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir Ian's +wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it. + +2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible +in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the +Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. +It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these +forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south +towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding +to seize a position across the peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos with a +protected line of supply from Suvla Bay. + +3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is +about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the +trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder +are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed +that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a +battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a battalion near +Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.) +and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji +Liman are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but +information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near +Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7-in. gun, +one 9.2-in. gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements +and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are +against attack from the south or west, and that there is no wire on the +northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a +southerly direction. + +4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will depend on two +main factors:-- + + (a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.). + + (b) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base + of operations for the northern army. + +5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the +enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand +Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army +Corps:-- + + 13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.). + + 29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division). + + 29th Indian Brigade. + + 69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A. + +6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at +your disposal:-- + + 11th Division. + + 10th Division (less 29th Brigade). + + Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade. + + 1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade. + +The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed, +though not in great strength, will be after dark at a point immediately +south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th +Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the +attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers +and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be +disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the +mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight. + +Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi +Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will +also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills +due east of Suvla Bay. It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and +Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in +order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our +troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped +that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these +objectives. + +Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at +present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will +be available on the morning of the 7th August to advance on Biyuk +Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305 so +as to assist General Birdwood's attack. + +7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin +during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the +reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore +in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The +operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left +centre, Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of Anzac +position), with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this +portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our +landing in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an +attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At +nightfall the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line +will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more +columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance, +which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the +shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near +Chunuk Bair about 2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise). + +Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not +extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the +higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength. + +As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a portion of the +attacking force will be left to consolidate the position gained and the +remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby +700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from +within the Anzac position. + +An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in +paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being +checked. + +8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your +force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or +vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and +machine-guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must +be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's +meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and +machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats +will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses +to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery +R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the +disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in +the attached table will be complete. + +One brigade R.F.A. 11th Division, 1/4th Lowland 5th Howitzer Brigade +(two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery, will be landed at Anzac +before the operations commence, and their personnel and horses will +disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be +directed along the beach to join your command. + +Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the +disembarkation of water carts a number of mules with special 8-gallon +water bags will be attached to the units of your command. + + (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, C.G.S._, + _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force_. + +P.S.--This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if, +as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-Gen. G.S., it must +be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer. + + + TABLE. + + |Animals. | Vehicles. + --------------------------------------------------------------------- + 11TH DIVISION. + + Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co. 28 1 cart, 2 cable wagons. + + 3 Infantry Brigades 108 Nil. + + Pioneer Battalion 8 Nil. + + 2 F.A. Brigades 506 32 guns, 88 wagons, 2 + telegraph wagons, + 10 carts. + + 1 Heavy Battery R.G.A. 45 4 guns, 4 wagons, 2 + G.S. wagons, 1 cart. + + 3 Field Coys. R.E. 48 12 tool carts. + + 2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. Nil 62 bicycles. + + 3 Field Ambulances 144 30 ambulances, 12 carts. + + 10TH DIVISION. + + Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co. } -- Transport on + 1-1/2 Infantry Brigades } approximately the same + Pioneer Battalion } scale + 3 Field Cos. R.E. } as that for 11th + 3 Field Ambulances } Division. + + 29th Indian Brigade and Indian Field Ambulance. + 2 Mountain Batteries (80 mules). + 2 Battalions (of 500 men each) for Beach parties. + Mule Corps with 300 mules and 150 carts. + 3 Casualty Clearing Stations. + +Organization Orders for Troops Landing at Anzac. + +1. Troops landing at Anzac are to land equipped as follows: + + * * * * * + +F.S. equipment, including respirator; + +Pack and waterproof sheet; + +No blanket. + +Officers' kit reduced to what they can carry. + +No transport of any kind will be available to move baggage or equipment. + +Ammunition S.A.A. 200 rounds per rifle or person; 3,500 rounds per +machine-gun in belt boxes. + +No regimental reserve S.A.A. + +Gun, limbers and wagons filled with fused shell. + +Water bottles--filled. + +Rations--iron rations one day meat and biscuit, two days' groceries. + +Sufficient to provide breakfasts. + +(Fuel will be issued on shore.) + +Tools--infantry. Regimental reserve distributed to individuals and +carried on person; Brigade reserve entrenching tools distributed to +units, by them to individuals and carried on person. + +Engineers--tools for road making and entrenching work--carried on +person. + +Other arms--usual allotment. + +Signal company cable and equipment usually carried in carts to be +transferred to barrows. + +Ambulances--all available stretchers and equipment of dressing stations +only. Tent sub-divisions in readiness to rejoin early. + +A.S.C.--Small allowance of distributing equipment, to be brought by +advance parties of S. and T. personnel. + + +Establishments. + +2. No horses, attendants or drivers are to land. Brigade Sections of +Signal Companies are to land with the brigades they serve. + +Tent sub-divisions of field ambulances are not to land. + +Equipment carried in technical vehicles is to be transferred to vehicles +which can be hand-propelled or else carried on person. + +3. Troops should disembark into lighters, etc., in complete units, +companies, platoons, and so on, unless much space is sacrificed in so +doing. + +4. All troops should land wearing two white 6-inch armlets and a white +patch on back of right shoulder. + +5. No lights or noise are to be permitted while disembarking; troops +will move into the lighters or horseboats as quickly as possible. + +6. On disembarking troops will be met by staff officers and guides, and +will be marched off direct to the ground allotted to them--in no case +more than 1,200 yards from the beach. All kit brought must be removed by +the troops, and must be taken out of the lighters at the same time as +the troops leave. + +Special parties to assist with the machine-gun and other loads are to be +detailed in the load of each lighter. + +7. No lights or talking are permitted on the beach or till the troops +reach their allotted area. Fires are not to be lit in any area till 4.15 +a.m., and must be extinguished by 8 p.m. Green wood is not to be used; +the smoke it causes will draw shell fire. + +8. No troops are to leave the area allotted to them between 4 a.m. and 8 +p.m. except on special duty with the authority of the Brigade Commander. +Piquets will be placed under area arrangements at intervals round the +area to prevent men straying independently. + +9. Troops may be exposed to desultory shelling during the day or night. +This is never aimed, and the best protection against it is to move into +the bottom of the gully in which the troops are bivouacked. + +10. Troops are not to use any portion of the iron ration with which they +land. Issues will be made under brigade arrangements of rations and +extras to last the period of their stay. + +11. Water is issued on ration at one gallon fresh water per day. This +includes water for all purposes. For bathing, the sea is available, but +may only be visited after 9 p.m. daily. + +12. Latrines for immediate use are dug and marked in each area; +additional latrines are to be prepared by units and the strictest +orders issued to prevent fouling the ground. Latrines are to be made +very deep, as space is much restricted. + +13. Casualties of any kind after treatment in the field ambulance +affiliated to the brigade will be taken to the casualty clearing station +in Anzac Cove for removal to Hospital Ship. + +Urgent cases at any time; others as far as possible between 7.30 and +8.30 p.m. and between 6 and 9 a.m. + +14. The following is to be practised by all troops after landing:-- + + * * * * * + +Falling in once during the night in any close formation, and to remain +so closed up for a period of at least half an hour, during which passing +of commands (messages from front to rear and back again and to the +flanks) is to be practised. + +The troops must be accustomed to the starlight, which may be expected +during night operations. + +15. If aeroplanes pass overhead troops are not to look up, as this will +give away the position of bodies of troops and probably draw shell fire. + +16. Troops landing should be provided with Maps 1/20,000 of the area in +which operations are to take place. These maps to be in bulk, and not +issued till after landing. + +Maps 1/10,000 of the Anzac area showing roads and bivouacs will be +issued to unit commanders on arrival. + +17. Telephone lines will be found laid from Anzac Headquarters to points +suitable for Brigade or higher Headquarters. On arrival brigades will +join up these points to Anzac. + +An officer and two orderlies per brigade will also be detailed to remain +at Anzac Headquarters. + +Staffs of formations higher than brigades will be located within easy +reach of Anzac Headquarters. + + * * * * * + +G.S.R. Z. 18/2. + +_Instructions for G.O.C. 9th Army Corps._ + +Reference Sheet Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000. + +1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the impending +operations, and a rough outline of the task which he has allotted to the +troops under your command, were communicated to you in my G.S.R. Z. 18, +dated 22nd instant. + +2. In addition to the information contained in paragraph 3 of the above +quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted troops and Gendarmerie +have been reported in the country north of Anzac, and three guns with +limbers, each drawn by six oxen, have been seen moving into Anafarta +Sagir. An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of a few +trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently +been constructed for some months, is attached. It is believed that the +channel connecting the Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry. + +3. Your landing will begin on the night 6th/7th August. Your primary +objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces +operating in the northern zone. Owing to the difficult nature of the +terrain, it is possible that the attainment of this objective will, in +the first instance, require the use of the whole of the troops at your +disposal. Should, however, you find it possible to achieve this object +with only a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such +direct assistance as is in your power to the G.O.C. Anzac in his attack +on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta, with the object of moving +up the eastern spurs of that hill. + +4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Commanding gives you +an entirely free hand in the selection of your plan of operations. + +He, however, directs your special attention to the fact that the hills +Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain guns which can bring +fire to bear on the flank and rear of an attack on Hill 305, and that on +this account they assume an even greater importance in the first +instance than if they were considered merely part of a position covering +Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the +attainment of your primary objective, to gain possession of these hills +at an early period of your attack, it will greatly facilitate the +capture and retention of Hill 305. It would also appear almost certain +that until these hills are in your possession it will be impossible to +land either troops or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day. + +5. The troops at your disposal will be:-- + +11th Division (less one Brigade R.F.A., at Helles). + +10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade). + +Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S. (one squadron motor +cycles, six machine guns; one squadron Ford cars, six machine guns; one +squadron armoured cars, six machine guns). + +Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries. + +An endeavour will be made to release for your force one or more 5-in. +howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the day following your initial +disembarkation. + +6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the disembarkation of +your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies will admit, with the +plan of operations on which you decide, the allocation of troops to the +ships and boats to be provided by the Navy is left to your decision. + +With this object, tables have been drawn up, and are enclosed with these +instructions, showing the craft which can be placed at your disposal by +the Navy, their capacity, and the points at which the troops can be +disembarked. The tables also show what numbers of troops, animals, +vehicles, and stores can be landed simultaneously. + +The beaches available for your landing on the first night are (1) a +frontage of 600 yards in Suvla Bay (sq. 117 Q.V.); (2) a frontage of +1,800 yards S. of Kuchuk Kemikli (sq. 9, 103 z, 104 V; 91 A.B.), called +"New Beach" in the tables. It will not be possible in the first instance +to land more than one brigade of your force in Suvla Bay, though other +vessels can simultaneously be discharging their passengers on New Beach. + +7. As regards the time at which the disembarkation may be expected to +commence, no craft will be allowed to leave Kephalos Harbour till after +dark, and the passage across will take from one and a half to two hours. +It is unsafe, therefore, to count on any troops being ashore before +10.30 p.m., and in no case must your approach be disclosed to the enemy +till 10 p.m., the hour at which the outposts on the left flank of the +Anzac position are to be rushed. + +8. No allowance has been made in the tables for the disembarkation of +your headquarters, as it is not known at what period of the operations +you will wish them to land. + +9. Special attention is directed to paragraph 8 of my letter G.S.R. Z. +18, dated 22nd July. + +10. The infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as Army Reserve, +and will be at the disposal of the General Commanding. + +11. Special instructions regarding signal communications will be issued +later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:-- + + * * * * * + +There is a submarine cable between Imbros and Anzac, and a cable will be +laid as soon as practicable from Imbros to Suvla Bay. A submarine cable +and a land cable will also be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon +as circumstances permit, probably before dawn. Pending the completion of +this work inter-communication between Anzac and Suvla Bay will be +carried out by lamp, and, subject to Naval approval, between Suvla Bay +and Imbros by wireless telegraphy. + +Two[18] military pack W.T. stations and one R.N. Base W.T. station will +be provided at Suvla Bay, four naval ratings will be attached to each +station as visual signalling personnel. One of these military pack W.T. +stations will be disembarked with the second brigade to land, and will +act as a base station pending the arrival of the R.N. Base wireless +station. The second military pack W.T. station will be disembarked with +the third brigade to land; it will be placed on a flank and used mainly +for fire control under the B.G.R.A. + +A wagon wireless station at G.H.Q., Imbros, will be in communication +with both these pack W.T. stations. + +One officer and 23 other ranks, with two pack animals from the Brigade +Signal Section, will be landed with each Infantry Brigade. + +These parties will lay their cable by hand and establish telephone and +vibrator communication from the beach forward. No vehicles will be +landed in the first instance, all necessary stores being man-handled. + +Three officers, 74 other ranks, 28 animals and five vehicles will be +landed with Divisional Headquarters. + +The advance parties will release the brigade sections from the beach and +be prepared to lay cable lines by hand. + +Two cable wagons will be included in the five vehicles, and should be +the first of those vehicles to be disembarked. + + + ----------------------+----------------------+--------------------+ + Time of Arrival | | | + off Coast. | Craft. | Capacity. | + ----------------------+----------------------+--------------------+ + In time to disembark |10 motor lighters |500 infantry | + all troops, |(10 steamboats |each (and | + vehicles, horses, |accompanying) |400,000 rds. | + stores, etc., by | |S.A.A. if necessary)| + night | | | + | | | + |10 destroyers |530 infantry | + | |each | + | | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + |1 sloop, towing |600 men | + |1 motor lighter |88 horses | + |and 4 horseboats |8 mtn. guns | + |(1 steamboat |30 bicycles | + |accompanying) | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + |1 sloop, towing |500 men | + |4 horseboats (1 |24 horses | + |steamboat |4 18-pr. guns | + |accompanying) |or wagons | + | | | + |1 trawler, towing |250 men | + |4 horseboats |24 horses | + |(1 steamboat |4 18-pr. guns | + |accompanying) |or wagons | + | | | + | | | + | | | + |H.M.S. |1,000 men | + |_Endymion_ | | + | | | + |H.M.S. |1,000 men | + |_Theseus_ | | + + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + | Method of | + Landing Place. | Disembarkation. | Remarks. + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + 7 lighters at |Land direct on beach |Ammunition if necessary + New Beach, | |may be left on motor + 3 lighters at | |lighters until convenient + Suvla Bay | |to land it, according to + | |circumstances. + | | + One attending |Motor lighters take |The disembarkation from + each motor |off troops and land |the destroyers cannot + lighter |them on beach |begin until the 10 motor + | |lighters have landed + | |their complement and + | |returned. + | | + New Beach |Motor lighters and |The sloops and trawler, + |horseboats loaded |after casting off their + |with guns, horses of |tows, will return to + |mountain and 18-pr. |Kephalos. Other + |batteries. Sloop |horseboats + |loaded with men and |boats will be there, + |bicycles |ready filled with the + | |remainder of the horses + New Beach |Horseboats loaded |required in the first + |with guns, vehicles, |instance for the two + |and horses of 18-pr. |Mountain Batteries, + |battery. Sloop |the 18-pr. Battery, and + |loaded with men |the Signal Company. + |and bicycles |They will pick up these + New Beach |Horseboats loaded |horseboats and tow + |with guns, vehicles, |them over to the beach + |and horses of 18-pr. |immediately. + |battery. Trawler | + |available to carry men | + | | + New Beach |Landed either from | -- + or Suvla |cutters towed by | + Bay, as may |steamboats, or from | -- + be convenient |motor lighters | + | | + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + +The above would admit of the disembarkation before dawn at and in the +neighbourhood of Suvla Bay of:-- + +Divisional Headquarters. +Signal Co. with 40 horses. +1 W.T. Section and 2 W.T. Stations. +H.Q. F.A. Bde. (18-pr.) with 10 horses. +1 F.A. Battery (18-pr.) with 82 horses. +2 Mountain Batteries with 80 horses. +3 Field Companies R.E. +3 Infantry Brigades and part of remainder of F.A. Bde. (personnel). +1 Pioneer Battalion. +2 Battalions for Beach parties and part of Ammn. Park personnel. +2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. and part of Tent Sub-divisions of Field +Ambulances. +Bearer Subdivisions of 3 Field Ambulances and part of Casualty Clearing +Stations. + +The 10 motor lighters will land their complements first, and then the troops +from the 10 Destroyers, the two sloops and their tows, and the trawler and her +tows, can proceed simultaneously on a front of about 600 yards in Suvla Bay and +1,800 on the beach south of Suvla Bay, directly beach secured. The two landing +places are about 2 miles apart. The landing of the troops from H.M.S. +_Endymion_ and _Theseus_ may be able to take place simultaneously, or +may have to be deferred until the motor lighters have cleared the destroyers. + + + ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + Time of Arrival | | | + off Coast. | Craft. | Capacity. | + ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + At or immediately |1 horse transport |All horses enumerated| + after dawn | |in Table C appended | + | |to letter G.S.R. Z. | + | |18 of 23rd July, | + | |except those already | + | |provided for. Water | + | |bags and pumps | + | | | + |1 mule transport |All mules and mule | + | |carts provided for in| + | |Tables C and E | + | |appended to G.S.R. Z.| + | |18 of 23rd July | + | | | + |6 small transports |5,000 Infantry | + | | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + | | | + Called up from |1 supply ship |7 days' supplies for | + Kephalos as soon after| |troops and animals | + dawn as circumstances | |in Tables C and E | + permit | |appended appended to | + | |G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd | + | |July | + | | | + Called up from |4 small transports |2,700 Infantry | + Kephalos as soon after| | | + dawn as circumstances | | | + permit | | | + | | | + |1 horse transport |All horses and | + | |vehicles enumerated | + | |in Table E, appended | + | |to G.S.R. Z. 18 of | + | |23rd July | + | | | + ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + | Method of | + Landing Place. | Disembarkation. | Remarks. + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + Suvla Bay |Six of the horseboats |Transport comes from + |from which the 18-pr. |Mudros. + |and mountain batteries | + |will previously have | + |been landed | + | | + | | + | | + Suvla Bay |Six of the horseboats |Transport comes from + |from which 18-pr. and |Alexandria. + |mountain bateries will | + |previously have been | + |landed | + | | + _Suvla Bay_or |Landed from motor |Six battalions 10th + _New Beach_ if |lighters as soon as |Division coming from + necessary) |they have finished |Port Iero. + |clearing the destroyers| + |and (if necessary) | + |H.M.S. _Endymion_ and | + |_Theseus_ | + | | + Suvla Bay |Landed from motor | + |lighters as soon as | + |the Port Iero troops | + |are cleared | + | | + | | + | | + _Suvla Bay_ (or |Landed from motor |Three battalions 10th + _New Beach_ if |lighters as soon as |Division from Mudros. + necessary) |the Port Iero troops | + |are cleared. | + | | + Suvla Bay |Landed from horseboats | + |brought up on second | + |trip by the trawler and| + |two sloops, as soon as | + |the horseboats have | + |been emptied | + -------------------+-----------------------+------------------------- + + +The above will provide for the disembarkation of the remainder of the +troops, etc., enumerated in Tables C and E, appended to letter G.S.R. Z. +18 of 23rd July, that is those not already detailed to be landed before +dawn, viz.:-- + +Remainder of F.A. Brigade (18 pr.). +Remainder of Ammunition Park Personnel. +15th Heavy Battery R.G.A. +Brigade Ammunition Column. +Remainder of Casualty Clearing Stations. +Mule Corps. +Also 4,000,000 rds. S.A.A. Reserve Gun Ammunition +(by special trawlers from Mudros) 7 days' supplies +for the above troops and animals. + +As soon as possible after Corps Headquarters go ashore, the personnel of +the Divisional Signal Companies will be released from work at the beach. + +Arrangements will be made subsequently to disembark an air line +detachment and a cable section to provide and pole local lines. + +The remainder of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company will be kept in +readiness to be forwarded as soon as Corps Headquarters reports that +circumstances admit of its disembarkation. + +12. Two Military Landing Officers and their assistant military landing +officers will be placed at your disposal from units other than those +under your command. + +13. In addition to the units mentioned in Tables A-E forwarded to you +with my letter G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 23rd July, the following are being +dispatched from Alexandria in this order:-- + +Three Squadrons Armoured Car Division R.N.A.S. (These will be available +to land on the morning after your disembarkation begins, if you so +desire.) + +(1) H.Q.R.A. 10th Division. + +Two F.A. Brigades 10th Division (modified scale of horses). + +R.A. personnel and ammunition of 10th Divisional Ammunition Park. + +(2) One F.A. Brigade 11th Division (modified scale of horses). One F.A. +Brigade 10th Division (modified scale of horses). + +(3) Two F.A. Brigades 13th Division. + +(4) Horses for 11th Division. + +and the following will be assembled at Imbros to land when required:-- + +11th Divisional Cyclist Company (less two Platoons). + +10th Divisional Cyclist Company. + +13th Divisional Cyclist Company. + +14. You are requested to submit your proposed plan of operations to +G.H.Q. for approval at the earliest possible date. + + (_Signed_) W. P. Braithwaite, + + _Major-General, C.G.S., + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. + 29th July, 1915._ + + + G.S.R. Z. 18/2. _July 29th._ + + GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, + 8TH CORPS. + +The General Commanding has decided that his next main attack shall be +made in the vicinity of Anzac with the object of placing ourselves +astride the Peninsula to the north of Kilid Bahr. + +2. The 8th Corps with attached troops is to assist this main operation +by offensive action in the south, the scope and form of this action +being determined solely with reference to its effects on the main +operation. + +As the decisive point will be in the neighbourhood of Anzac, all +reinforcements will be utilized in that theatre, and it is improbable +that any will be available for the southern zone before the middle of +August, except such drafts for the 8th Corps and the Corps Exp. Orient +as may reach the Peninsula in the next ten days. + +3. In order to free sufficient troops to enable the 8th Corps to take +the offensive, the French will take over part of the line as defined in +Force Order No. 22. + +4. In addition to the troops of the 8th Corps and R.N.D. at present at +your disposal, the following reinforcements may be expected:-- + + 29th Division 280 due 29th July. + 29th Division 900 due 4th August. + 42nd Division 100 due 29th July. + ----- + Total 1,280 + +which, allowing for normal wastage, should give an effective total of +24,780 on 5th August. These numbers, with the shorter line you will be +called upon to hold, should leave you with sufficient troops to +undertake a limited offensive operation on or about that day. + +5. Assuming that you are not attacked in the meanwhile, the total amount +of ammunition which should be available at Helles early in August for +offensive action, and to maintain a reserve is:-- + + 18 pr. 36,000 } + 4.5 inch 2,000 } Plus any amounts saved + 5 inch 4,000 } from normal daily expenditure. + 6 inch 545 } + 60 pr. 3,000 } + +but it must be borne in mind that no replacements can be looked for +before August 16th. + +6. The scope of your offensive action must be based upon these figures, +and it is thought that the most suitable objective will be the capture +of the Turkish trenches up to the line F. 13, G. 13, H. 13, and H. 12. +Plans for this operation should, therefore, be undertaken at once. + +7. Pre-supposing that this attack is successful, and that the numbers at +your disposal admit of a further advance, the capture of the trenches on +the line H. 14 to H. 15, followed perhaps by the capture of Krithia +could then be undertaken, and plans for this action should be prepared +beforehand. But as the launching of this further attack must be entirely +dependent on unknown factors, a definite decision on this point cannot +be arrived at beforehand. It is, moreover, essential that the plan of +your first attack should not definitely commit your troops to a further +advance unless the trend of events should render such a course +desirable. + +8. As regards the date for launching your first attack, it is thought +that the most favourable time would be shortly before the main +operations at Anzac begin, and you should therefore arrange for your +first attack to take place on the 4th August. + +9. Beyond holding the enemy in front of them to their positions and +assisting you with artillery fire, the French will not be asked to take +part in your first attack, but, in the event of your reaching Krithia, +they will be directed to conform to your movements and to establish +themselves on the spurs leading up to Achi Baba. + +I will ascertain the amount of artillery support and lean you can expect +from the C.E.O., and if the information arrives in time will attach it +as an appendix to this letter. + +10. The possibility of the southern force being able to capture Achi +Baba has not been dealt with in this memorandum, as the attempt should +only be made in the event of large reinforcements being available for +the southern zone, and these must depend on the course of events in the +main theatre. + + (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, C.G.S., + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + +It will be apparent to you how necessary it is not to allow any +suspicion of the reason for the date mentioned in paragraph 8 being told +to any person other than your Brigadier-General G.S. + + (_Intd._) W. P. B. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 18: All W.T. arrangements are subject to alteration, as they +have not yet been confirmed by the Vice-Admiral.] + + + + +APPENDIX. + +_French Artillery Support for 8th Corps._ + +1. One Brigade of 75's will be placed at the disposal of the 8th Corps +for the attack on 4th-5th August. + +Of these + +(_a_) One battery will be moved to support closely the attack on +Krithia. + +(_b_) One battery will fire up the Nullah E. of Krithia. + +2. In addition, six French howitzers will be so disposed as to open fire +upon Turkish artillery north of the ridge 150--Achi Baba peak. + + +INSTRUCTIONS FOR G.O.C. A. AND N.Z. ARMY CORPS. + +Reference Map Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000. + +1. The General Commanding has decided to mass the whole of his +reinforcements in and immediately north of the area occupied by the +corps under your command, with a view to securing Suvla Bay as a base of +operations, driving the enemy off the Sari Bair, and eventually securing +a position astride the Gallipoli Peninsula from the neighbourhood of +Gaba Tepe to the straits north of Maidos. + +2. The general outline for your proposals for the action of the A. and +N.Z. Army Corps contained in your G a 89 of 1st July are approved. + +3. (_a_) The General Commanding wishes your operations to begin on +August 6th with a strong and sustained attack on Hill 125 (Plateau 400), +every effort being made to deceive the enemy as to the locality against +which our main effort is to be made, and to induce him to believe that +it will be directed against his lines opposite the southern portion of +your position. In pursuance of this object the Vice-Admiral has arranged +that H.M. ships shall in the meantime display increased activity off +the coast between Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe. It has been arranged that +soundings shall be taken by night off the coast south of Gaba Tepe; and, +on the evening of August 6th, a naval demonstration will be made off +this part of the coast, H.M. ships being accompanied by a number of +trawlers as if a landing were to be undertaken. + +(_b_) The General Commanding further concurs in the subsequent sequence +of the operations outlined by you, namely:-- + +(i) The clearing of the enemy's outposts from the ridges facing Nos. 2 +and 3 posts, to be undertaken after nightfall. + +(ii) An attack in as great strength as possible up the Sazli Beit Dere, +the Chailak Dere and the Aghyl Dere, against the Chunuk Bair ridge, by +night. + +(iii) When the Chunuk Bair ridge is gained, a converging attack from +that ridge, and from the north-eastern section of your present position, +against Hill 180 (Baby 700). + +4. (_a_) For the above operations the following troops will be at your +disposal:-- + +A. and N.Z. Army Corps. 13th Division, less all artillery except 69th +F.A. (Howitzer) Brigade. 29th Brigade (10th Division). 29th Indian +Brigade. + +(_b_) At the date of commencement of the operations the following troops +belonging to or attached to the 9th Army Corps will be at Anzac, but +will not, except so far as is stated hereunder, be at your disposal:-- + +One F.A. Brigade, 11th Division: To rejoin 9th Army Corps as soon as +horses are landed. + +10th Heavy Battery, R.G.A.: Ditto. + +14th Lowland (Howitzer) Brigade (two Batteries): Arrangements must be +made so that these batteries may be free to rejoin the 9th Army Corps +before nightfall on August 7th. + +5. The operations carried out by the Corps under your command will form +part of a general combined offensive undertaken by the whole of the +forces of the Gallipoli Peninsula and by the 9th Army Corps, which will +be disembarked in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay, beginning on the night +of August 6th-7th. + +(_a_) The 8th Army Corps, in conjunction with the Corps Expeditionnaire, +will attack the Turkish lines south of Krithia on August 4th and 5th. +The attack will be made on a large scale, and will be vigorously +pressed, and it is hoped that by its means the enemy will be induced to +move part of his central reserves southward into the Cape Helles zone +during the 5th and 6th, so that they may not be available in the +northern zone on the 6th and 7th. + +(_b_) The 9th Army Corps will begin landing in and close to Suvla Bay +during the night of August 6th-7th. Three infantry brigades, with one +field and two mountain batteries, engineers and medical services, should +be ashore before dawn, and will be closely followed by two more infantry +brigades and additional artillery and engineers. + +The G.O.C. 9th Army Corps has been informed:-- + +(i) That his mission is to secure Suvla Bay as a base of operation for +all the forces in the northern zone. + +(ii) That the seizure of Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe ("W" and +Chocolate Hills), on account of the presence there of artillery which +may interfere with your operations, must be considered as of very +special importance. + +(iii) That so far as is possible after the fulfilment of his primary +mission, he is to render you such direct assistance as may be +practicable by moving any available troops via Biyuk Anafarta up the +eastern slopes of the Sari Bair. + +(_c_) At the commencement of these operations the infantry of the 53rd +Division will be available as Army Reserve and will be at the disposal +of the General Commanding. + +6. The Vice-Admiral has agreed provisionally to the following allotment +of ships affording naval support to the operations:-- + +In Suvla Bay: One 6-in. monitor. + +South of Kuchuk: H.M.S. _Endymion_. + +Kemliki (Nibrunesi Point): H.M.S. _Edgar_, H.M.S. _Talbot_, one 6-in. +monitor, one 9.2-in. monitor. These ships would be in position at +daylight on August 7th, and would mainly be required to support the +operations of the 9th Army Corps. + + West of Gaba Tepe: H.M.S. _Baccanto_, H.M.S. _Humber_, H.M.S. + _Havelock_, one 6-in. monitor. + +These ships would be in position at 3 p.m. on August 6th, except H.M.S. +_Havelock_, which would be in position at daylight on August 7th. They +would be detailed for support of the right flank of the A. and N.Z. Army +Corps. + + Off Kum Tepe: One 6-in. monitor. + +A separate communication is being sent to you with regard to the final +settlement of details as to the support of the operations by naval guns, +allocation of targets, etc. + +7. Special instructions regarding signal communication will be issued +later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:-- + +A submarine cable and a land cable will be laid between Anzac and Suvla + Bay as soon as circumstances permit. + +A submarine cable will also be laid as soon as practicable between + Imbros and Suvla Bay. Pending the completion of connection between + Anzac and Suvla Bay, inter-communication will be carried out by + lamp. + +Two military pack W/T stations and a R.N. Base W/T station will be + established in the vicinity of Suvla Bay. The W/T station at Anzac + will be able to intercept messages from seaplanes, but must not + attempt to reply. + +W/T via the ships will be an alternative means of communication between + G.H.Q. and the troops ashore in case of interruption of cable + communication. + +A system of flares will be arranged for employment on the left flank of + your position at dawn on August 7th to indicate to the ships the + positions reached by the troops. + +8. G.H.Q. will in the first instance be at Imbros. + + (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, C.G.S., + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + + G.H.Q., _30th July, 1915_. + + + +FORCE ORDER No. 25. + + GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, + + _2nd August, 1915._ + + +1. The total forces of the enemy in the Gallipoli Peninsula are +estimated at 100,000. + +Of these, 27,000 are in the neighbourhood of Anzac (5th, 19th, 16th +Divisions, and 18th and 64th Regiments); 36,000 are in the Southern zone +(1st, 4th, 6th Division less one regiment, 7th Division, 11th Division +less one regiment, and one regiment each of the 12th, 25th and 3rd +Divisions); and 37,000 are in Reserve (9th Division less one regiment, +12th less one regiment, 13th, 14th, and 25th less one regiment, and 10th +Divisions). Of this reserve force two Divisions are in the Bulair +district and one Division in the Eyerli Tepe zone. There are 12,000 on +the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles (2nd Division and 8th Division less +one regiment). There are believed to be five Divisions (45,000 men) in +the Keshan area belonging to the 5th and 6th Corps. + +All reports tend to show that though the enemy may be expected to fight +well in trenches, their _moral_ has suffered considerably as a result of +their recent heavy casualties, and that their stock of ammunition is +low. + +2. The General Commanding intends to carry out a combined and +simultaneous attack on the enemy in the northern and southern zone +commencing on 6th August, in accordance with the special instructions +already issued to the Corps Commanders concerned. + +During the first phase of these operations the 13th Division (less three +18-pdr. Bdes. R.F.A.), the 29th Infantry Brigade will be attached to the +A. and N.Z. Army Corps. Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division and +two batteries Highland Mounted Artillery will be attached to 9th Corps. +86th Brigade R.F.A. and 91st Heavy Battery R.G.A. will be attached to +8th Corps. + +3. Special instructions regarding embarkation and disembarkation are +issued to G.O.C. 9th Corps, G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Corps, and I.G.C., as +appended to this order. + +4. The 53rd Division will remain at the disposal of the General +Commanding as general reserve. + +5. G.H.Q. will remain in the first instance in its present situation. + + _(Signed)_ W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, C.G.S., + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + +Issued to: G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire; G.O.C. A. and N.Z. Army Corps; +G.O.C. 8th Army Corps; G.O.C. 9th Army Corps; G.O.C. 53rd Division; +I.G.C.; Vice-Admiral. + + +APPENDIX TO FORCE ORDER NO. 25. + +_Embarkations._ + +1. The embarkation of units of the 9th Corps concentrated at Imbros will +be carried out under the orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps, commencing for +personnel on 6th August, for vehicles and stores at such earlier date as +may be convenient. The necessary ships and boats (lists of which have +already been handed to the G.O.C. Corps) will be assembled in the +harbour beforehand; and the embarkation programme will be worked out in +consultation with Commander Ashby, R.N., who has been detailed by the +Vice-Admiral for this purpose, and who will arrange for the various +vessels to be in their allotted positions at the hours arranged. + +G.O.C. 9th Corps will also be responsible for the allocation to ships or +lighters, and for the embarkation of the following units:-- + + * * * * * + +At Imbros: One W.T. Section (Nos. W. 10 and W. 11 Pack Wireless +Stations); Two Anson Battalions R.N.D. (for duties on the beach); No. 16 +Casualty Clearing Station. + +In transit from Mudros to Imbros: One Casualty Clearing Station. + +Units and formations concentrated at Mudros and Mitylene will be +embarked for their various destinations under the orders of I.G.C. in +accordance with the programme already issued to that officer. + + +_Military Transport Officers._ + +2. G.O.C. 9th Corps and I.G.C. respectively will ensure that an officer +is appointed Military Transport Officer on every ship for the +embarkation of which they are severally responsible (_vide_ paragraph +1). + + +_Landing Places._ + +3. The landings of the 9th Corps will be referred to as "A," "B," and +"C" Beaches. + +"A" Beach--Square 117.q. and v. + +"C" Beach--Square 103.u.z. + +"B" Beach--Square 91.b, i, o. + +"C" and "B" Beaches are practically contiguous. + + +_Beach Control Personnel._ + +4. The following naval and military beach control personnel have been +appointed for the landing places of the 9th Corps:-- + + * * * * * + +Principal Beach Master: Captain H. F. G. Talbot, R.N. + +Beach Masters: Commander I. W. Gibson, M.V.O. ("A" Beach), Captain C. P. +Metcalfe, R.N. ("B" Beach), Commander C. Tindal-Carril-Worsley ("C" +Beach). + +Assistant Beach Masters and Beach Lieutenants: Four Lieutenant +Commanders, ten Lieutenants, R.N. + +Principal Mil. L.O.: Colonel W. G. B. Western, C.B. + +Mil. L.O.'s: Major F. W. Pencock, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Major Sir R. +Baker, Dorset Yeomanry, Captain Tylsen Wright, A.S.C. + +Assistant Mil. L.O.'s: Captain Wade Palmer, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Captain +B. A. Smith, South Notts Hussars, Lieutenant H. V. Browne, Dorset +Yeomanry, Lieutenant Krabbe, Berks Yeomanry. + +The allocation of the above military officers to the various landing +places will be detailed by the P.M.L.O. in consultation with the P.B.M. + +Special instructions with regard to beach fatigue parties have already +been issued to the G.O.C. 9th Corps. + +G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Army Corps will detail such military landing +officers, assistant military landing officers, and beach parties for +A.N.Z.A.C. as he may consider necessary. The names of officers so +appointed will be reported as early as possible to V.A. and to G.H.Q. + +The following special service officers are attached to H.Q., A. and N.Z. +Army Corps, for such duties in connection with the landing as the G.O.C. +may direct:-- + + * * * * * + +Major P. R. Bruce, S. Notts Hussars. + +Captain C. R. Higgens, County of London Yeomanry. + +Captain Sir E. Pauncefort Duncombe, Royal Bucks Hussars. + + +_General Instructions for Landing._ + +5. All troops will land with two iron rations (one day's meat only in +case of troops disembarking at Anzac). Infantry will carry 200 rounds of +S.A.A., machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds. Packs will not be worn. A +proportion of heavy entrenching tools, signalling and medical gear will +be carried by hand. Camp kettles will be handed to the Ordnance Officer +of the camp at which units concentrate before embarkation. They will be +forwarded and reissued at the first opportunity. + +6. Horses will be landed harnessed, and with nosebags filled to their +full capacity. + +Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and made fast to +the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers, and limbered wagons will +not be removed; these vehicles should be so placed in the boats that +they can be landed pole leading. + + +_Ammunition._ + +7. The G.O.C. 9th Corps will depute an officer to arrange, in +consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of reserve ammunition in +convenient localities near the beach. Guards for these stores may be +found from the beach fatigue parties. + + +_Water._ + +8. The strictest economy must be exercised with regard to drinking +water. Under arrangements already made by G.H.Q., receptacles filled +with water will be landed as early as possible from the ships carrying +the mule corps, and will be conveyed to the troops as transport becomes +available. Waterproof tanks (2,300 gallon capacity) and lift and force +pumps will be available on the _Prah_--R.E. Storeship--in Kephalos +Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C. +Corps. + + +_Transport._ + +9. Transport to supplement that in possession of units will be provided +for the 9th Corps and the A.N.Z. Corps by the Indian Mule Corps. The +amount of transport for each formation has been calculated to carry +rations, water, and S.A.A., making one or two trips a day, according to +the anticipated distance of the various units from the beach. + +This transport will be handed over, as it is landed, by an officer +appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of Brigades and +divisional troops for allotment as circumstances may require. + +Senior transport officers of Divisions will be ordered to report to the +following representatives of the D.S.T. immediately on landing:-- + + * * * * * + +At Anzac: Lieutenant-Colonel Streidinger, A.D.T. + +At "A" Beach: Major Badcock, D.A.D.T. + + +_Supplies._ + +10. A supply depot has been formed at Anzac, and it is in charge of +Major Izod, A.S.C. A supply depot will be formed by D.S.T. at "A" Beach +as soon as supplies can be landed, and will be in charge of Major +Huskisson, A.S.C. Senior supply officers of Divisions will be ordered to +place themselves in communication with the officer in charge of the +nearest supply depot and to keep him informed of their daily +requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed over to them +in bulk at the depot. Owing to the difficulty in landing sufficient +animals in the first instance it is possible that only half rations may +be available on the third and fourth days after the operations begin. +All units should be specially ordered to husband their rations. + + +_Medical._ + +11. Arrangements have been made to establish on the beach at Anzac two +casualty clearing stations, which will be embarked by I.G.C., and two +at "A" Beach, which will be embarked under orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps +(_see_ paragraph 1). Medical officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to +control these units, and to take charge of the arrangements for +evacuation of the wounded from the beach. + + (_Signed_) C. F. ASPINALL, + _Lieutenant-Colonel, + + For Major-General, C.G.S., + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL H. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O. + + +1. The operations of the northern wing of the Army have only been +partially successful. + +(_a_) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, with the 13th Division +and the 29th Brigade of 10th Division attached, has greatly extended the +area occupied, and now holds a position under the Chunuk Bair Ridge, +which the G.O.C. considers a favourable one from which to launch the +final attack on the ridge. The necessity for reorganization after the +recent operations, and for establishing a satisfactory system of +forwarding water, ammunition and supplies, will involve a delay of some +days before the attack on the main ridge can be made. + +(_b_) The 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and 29th Brigade, but +with the 53rd and 54th Divisions attached, holds the Yilghin Burnu +hills, and a line northwards from the easternmost of these two hills +roughly straight across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the highest point of +the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Attacks by the 11th Division against the Ismail +Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur from the north-west have been made +without any success. In the course of the operations the 9th Corps +became very much disorganized, and since August 11th the work of +reorganization and consolidation has been proceeding. + +2. At present the enemy has shown no great strength north of an east and +west line through Anafarta Sagir. He has a force operating on and near +the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the strength of which cannot yet be accurately +estimated. From present indications this appears to be a detachment +which is known to have guarded the coast from Ejelmer Bay to Suvla Bay; +it does not appear to have been reinforced to any extent. Across the +Kuchuk Anafarta Ova there appear to be no more than snipers. In the +region Anafarta Sagir--Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Biyuk Anafarta Valley +the enemy has developed considerable strength--his intention being, no +doubt, to protect the right of his main force which opposes the +Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to prevent our advance on the +Anafarta gap. + +3. The General Commanding has decided to strike as quickly and in as +great strength as possible against the enemy's on the line Ismail Oglu +Tepe--Anafarta Sagir with the objects, first, of driving in this flank +and preparing a further enveloping advance; and, secondly, by clearing +the Anafarta spur to deny to the enemy the gun positions and facilities +for observation therefrom, which would otherwise endanger Suvla Bay. He +considers it imperative to effect this with the least possible delay. In +his view the left flank of this advance will require comparatively +little protection, at all events in the first instance, in view of the +difficulty which the enemy may be expected to find in throwing any +considerable force round our left over the high and difficult country +north of Anafarta Sagir. It appears that the double purpose of defeating +the enemy and securing Suvla Bay as a port for the northern wing of the +Army can best be served by an attack on the enemy's right on the +Anafarta spur, made with all the strength at our command, while leaving +a comparatively small force as left flank guard to clear the enemy's +snipers out of the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and to occupy and press back his +detachment in the Ejelmer Bay region. + +4. You will have at your disposal the following troops:-- + + 11th Division, + 10th Division (less 29th Brigade), + 53rd Division, + 54th Division, + +and there is on its way from Egypt to join you the 2nd Mounted Division +(5,000 men dismounted), which should be available by August 18th. The +10th, 11th and 53rd Divisions are considerably depleted, and the _moral_ +of the latter at present leaves much to be desired. There are at present +ashore, belonging to the above two F.A. Brigades (three batteries of +which are awaiting horses to bring them up from Anzac) and two Heavy +Batteries. In addition, two Highland Mountain Batteries, attached to the +9th Corps, are ashore, and the 1/4th Lowland Brigade (two batteries +5-inch howitzers) are at your disposal when they can be brought up from +Anzac. It has only been possible to land a bare minimum of horses owing +to difficulties in respect of water and the landing of forage. + +Three further F.A. Brigades and the 57th Brigade (two batteries) +4.5-inch howitzers are at Mudros ready to be brought up as soon as it is +possible to land them. These Brigades will probably have to be landed +without any horses in the first instance, and taken into position by the +artillery horses already ashore. + +5. For the purpose of an early attack in accordance with the plan +indicated in paragraph 3, the A. and N.Z. Army Corps will probably not +be able to co-operate directly with more than one Infantry Brigade, and +it is possible that it may be able to do no more than swing up its left +into line with the right of your advance. It is improbable that the 8th +Corps and the C.E.O. will be in a position to do more than undertake +vigorous demonstrations. + +6. With the above in view, you will proceed at once to Suvla Bay and +take over command of the 9th Corps. Your immediate and most urgent +concern will be to complete the reorganization of the Corps and to +prepare as large a force as possible for the offensive against Ismail +Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur, bearing in mind that time is of vital +importance. You will then consider and report at the earliest moment:-- + + (_a_) What force you consider that you will be able to employ for + this purpose. + + (_b_) The date on which you will be ready to undertake the + offensive. + + (_c_) The method by which you purpose to carry out your task. + + (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE, + + _Major-General, Chief of the General Staff, + + Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._ + + + + +INDEX + + + "A" Beach, II. 69, 75, 146. + + Abdel Rahman Bair, II. 115. + + Abrikja, II. 87. + + Achi Baba, I. 272, 362; II. 194. + + Adderley, Lieut., II. 5. + + Adrianople, I. 10. + + Aeroplanes, I. 110. + + Agnew, Col. Quentin, II. 160. + + Air Service, I. 8, 287, 384. + + Aitkin, Capt., II. 30. + + Aja Liman, II. 112, 148, 152. + + Aja Liman Anafarta Ridge, II. 83, 84. + + Akbashi Liman, I. 291; II. 193. + + _H.M.T._ Alaudia, II. 44. + + Alexandretta, I. 9. + + Allanson, Col., II. 214. + + Altham, Genl., II. 6, 32, 123, 167, 172, 186, 261, 270. + + Ambulance-- + 87th Field, II. 172. + 110th Indian Field, II. 167. + 3rd R.N.D. Field, I. 317. + West Lancs. Field, II. 231. + + Amery, Col., I. 342. + + Ammunition, I. 62, 196, 286, 289, 308; II. 9, 10, 11, 13, 35, 41, 140. + + Anafarta, II. 148. + + Anafarta Ova, II. 93. + + Anafarta Sagir, II. 68, 69, 70, 81, 89, 112. + + Anatolia, II. 191. + + _H.M.T._ Andania, II. 44. + + Anderson, Maj., II. 255. + + Andrews, Col., II. 18. + + Anglesey, Lord, II. 196, 200. + + Anson Bn., I. 73, 271, 274, 333. + + Anstey, Capt., II. 58. + + Anzac Cove, II. 111. + + _S.S._ Arabian, I. 316. + + _H.M.S._ Arcadian, I. 84, 185, 248. + + Ari Burnu, II. 246. + + Armistice, I. 248, 387. + + Armoured Car Section, I. 106; II. 188. + + _H.M.S._ Arno, II. 57, 58, 98, 146, 158, 159, 165, 166, 246. + + Artillery, I. 48, 307, 374; II. 35. + Australian, I. 117. + _See_ also Appendices I. and II. + + Ashmead-Bartlett, Mr., I. 106, 253, 334; II. 8, 165, 190, 204, 226. + + _H.I.M.S._ Askold, I. 106, 135. + + Aspinall, Lt.-Col., I. 152, 169, 383; II. 4, 17, 25, 26, 61, 64, 126, + 130, 243. + + Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., I. 54, 247; II. 227, 259, 260, 261, 262, 274. + + Asquith, Lieut. Arthur, I. 20, 71. + + Australian F.A., 3rd Battery, II. 254. + + Australian Light Horse, I. 285, 359. + + Australians-- + 9th Bn., I. 49. + 12th Bn., II. 234. + 15th Bn., I. 216. + 16th Bn., I. 216. + 20th Bn., II. 254, 255. + 26th Bn., II. 234. + + Ayres, Col., II. 246. + + + Babtie, Genl., I. 367. + + Baby 700, II. 111. + + _H.M.S._ Bacchante, I. 154. + + Backhouse, Commodore, I. 333. + + Bailey, Col., II. 244. + + Bailloud, Genl., I. 192, 207, 243, 371, 379; II. 25, 27, 146, 158, + 179, 213, 218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 234. + + Baldwin, Genl., I. 386; II. 80, 81. + + Balkans-- + C.-in-C.'s views on, I. 115. + + Bard, _see_ Tullibardine. + + Barttelot, Sir W., II. 219. + + _H.M.S._ Basilisk, I. 328, 370, 372. + + Battle-- + Kum Kale, I. 135, 150. + Landing, I. 126. + Naval, I. 30. + Quinn's Post, I. 255. + Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131. + "V" Beach, I. 135. + "W" Beach, I. 130. + "X" Beach, I. 130. + "Y" Beach, I. 129 _et seq._ + Yeni Shahr, I. 151. + 6th-9th May, I. 206. + 4th June, I. 270 _et seq._ + 28th June, I. 344 _et seq._ + 12th July, II. 6 _et seq._ + 21st August, II. 127 _et seq._ + + Bayley, Maj., II. 231. (Should read "Baylay.") + + Beadon, Lt.-Col., II. 120, 130. + + Beetleheim, Capt., I. 273. + + Bell, Maj. Morrison, II. 244. + + Benbow Bn., I. 333. + + Beresford, Genl., I. 242. + + Berks Regt., II. 230. + + Bertier, Maj., I. 119, 379; II. 25, 40, 220, 233, 275. + + _Beryl_, II. 32. + + Besika Bay, I. 9. + + Birmingham, I. 326 + + Bishop, Maj., I. 320. + + Biyuk Anafarta, II. 112, 157. + + Blockhouses, II. 93. + + Bluff Redoubt, I. 225. + + Boers, II. 161, 162. + + Bombs, I. 43, 258, 321, 383; II. 140. + + Bonham-Carter, Mr., II. 98. + + Bonsor, Maj., I. 370. + + Boomerang Redoubt, I. 344, 352. + + Border Regt., I. 352; II. 230. + + _Bouvet_, I. 36. + + Bowlby, Flag-Lt., II. 8, 169 + + Boyle, R.N., Capt., I. 38. + + Boyle, R.N., Lt.-Comr., I. 234, 240. + + Braithwaite, Capt. V., II. 120, 130, 146, 158, 159, 165, 186, 246. + + Brassey, II. 110. + + Brassey, Lady, II. 105, 168. + + Brassey, Lord, II. 105. + + Bridges, Genl., I. 118, 179, 229, 256. + + Brigade-- + 1st (Australian), II. 55. + 2nd (French), II. 225. + 2nd (Naval), I. 333. + 3rd (Australian), I. 336. + 3rd (Marine), I. 303. + 4th (Australian), I. 249, 256. + 5th (Australian), II. 254. + 30th, II. 44. + 32nd, II. 22, 29, 60. + 33rd, II. 22, 46, 60. + 34th, II. 22, 28, 61. + 39th, II. 18. + 86th, I. 82, 220, 302, 345, 352; II. 171, 172. + 87th, I. 82, 209, 210, 224, 301, 345, 352; II. 230. + 88th, I. 170, 209, 210, 293, 353; II. 166, 241. + 127th, I. 317. + 155th, I. 303. + 156th, I. 303, 346, 352, 371; II. 9, 243. + Indian, I. 301; II. 15, 127, 130, 208. + Light Horse, I. 336. + Manchester, I. 272, 273. + Younghusband's, II. 147, 150, 151, 153, 154. + + Brodrick, Capt. Hon. G., I. 357; II. 24, 52, 68, 72, 74, 76, 78, + 125, 130, 146, 154. + + Brody, Capt., II. 68. + + Brooke, Sir B., II. 138. + + Brooke, Rupert, I. 71, 122, 124. + + Brown, Percy, I. 371. + + Browne, Maj., I. 336. + + Bruce, Col., I. 74, 301, 359, 361. + + Bruce, Maj., I. 74. + + Brulard, Genl., II. 225, 228, 229, 234, 256, 276. + + Bryant, Lt.-Col., I. 323. + + Buchanan, Col., II. 186. + + Buchanan, Sir G., II. 207, 208. + + Bulair Lines, I. 9, 29, 130, 275, 290, 291, 292, 361. + + Bulgaria, I. 116; II. 192, 202, 204, 209. + + Bulgarians, II. 212. + + Burleigh, Bennett, I. 339. + + Burmeister, Flag-Capt., I. 71. + + Burn, Col. C., I. 121; II. 8, 15, 251, 255. + + Burrell, Lieut., I. 370. + + Burrows, Capt., II. 247. + + Burton, Col., II. 18, 242. + + Bush-fires, II. 131. + + Byng, Genl., I. 303; II. 35, 105, 106, 137, 138, 139, 146, 151, 159, + 160, 165, 186, 206, 218, 219, 241, 242, 276. + + + "C" Beach, II. 75. + + Cadorna, Genl., II. 178. + + Callwell, Genl., I. 6, 241; II. 172 _et seq._ , 257, 259, 261, 263. + + Camel Corps, Bikaner, I. 74. + + Cameron, R.N., Capt., I. 8, 31. + + Campbell, Col., I. 74. + + _H.M.T._ Canada, II. 44. + + _H.M.S._ Canopus, II. 44. + + Canteen, II. 123, 170. + + Carden, Admiral, I. 17, 19. + + Carruthers, Genl., I. 142. + + Carter, Capt., I. 280. + + _Carthage_, I. 371. + + Casualty Clearing Station, 25th, II. 14. + + Cayley, Genl., II. 18, 241. + + Censorship, I. 320, 327, 332; II. 140, 172 _et seq._ , 257. + + _H.M.T._ Ceramic, II. 156. + + Chanak, I. 291, 292, 293; II. 192. + + Charak Cheshme, II. 74. + + _H.M.S._ Chatham, II. 43, 45, 60, 275, 277. + + Chauvel, Genl., I. 285, 359. + + Cheape, Capt., II. 203, 204. + + _H.M.S._ Chelmer, II. 262. + + Cheshire Point, II. 201. + + Chocolate Hill, II. 214. + + Christian, Admiral, II. 60. + + Chunuk Bair, I. 330, 361; II. 57, 86, 111, 113. + + Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., I. 44, 161, 240, 242, 247; II. 24. + + Churchill, Maj. J., I. 153, 178; II. 155. + + Church Parade, I. 370; II. 20, 29, 157, 234. + + Clarke, Lt.-Comr., I. 335. + + Clifton-Browne, Genl., II. 247. + + Coddan, Capt., I. 121. + + Coleridge, II. 52. + + Collet, Capt., II. 123, 126. + + Collingwood Bn., I. 333. + + Collins, Lt.-Col., I. 317. + + _H.M.S._ Colne, I. 112, 178, 180, 343. + + Conference--- + 17th March, I. 21. + 22nd March, I. 41. + 18th April, I. 118. + Midnight, 25th April, I. 142. + + Connaught Rangers, II. 155. + + Constantinople, I. 10. + + Convalescent Depot, II. 168. + + _H.M.S._ Cornwall, II. 221. + + _H.M.S._ Cornwallis, I. 134, 138; II. 221, 242. + + Cowans, Genl., I. 365, 366. + + Cox, Genl., I. 73, 174, 186; II. 15, 132, 139, 155, 190. + + + d'Amade, Genl., I. 3, 21, 64, 78, 118, 222, 223, 226. + + Damakjelik Bair, II. 113, 127, 128. + + Danube, I. 11; II. 202. + + _H.M.S._ Dartmouth, I. 106. + + Davidson, R.N., Capt., II. 242, 258. + + Davies, R.N.A.S. Capt., I. 109. + + Davies, Genl., II. 33, 51, 139, 140, 144, 160, 196, 243, 246, 248, + 251, 276. + + Dawnay, Capt., I. 152, 178, 343; II. 120, 126, 133, 165, 189, 251, 262. + + De Bourbon, Capt., II. 256. + + De Crespigny, Capt., II. 243. + + Deedes, Capt., I. 344; II. 120, 126, 158, 186, 243. + + De la Borde, Lieut., I. 119; II. 40, 196, 220. + + De la Fontaine, Capt., I. 185. + + De Lisle, Genl., I. 274, 280, 293, 356; II. 17, 18, 25, 106, 119, 121, + 129, 130, 132, 159 _et seq._, 241. + + De Lothbiniere, Genl., I. 259, 357. + + Dent, R.N., Capt., I. 118, 122. + + De Putron, Maj., II. 196, 262. + + De Robeck, Admiral, I. 21, 41, 48, 142, 383; II. 60, 124, 275, 276. + + De Rougemont, Col., II. 246. + + Des Coigns, Col., I. 183, 185. + + De Tott's Battery, I. 134; II. 26, 27. + + Devon Regt., 2/5th, II. 156, 157, 160. + Dick, Col., I. 105, 385. + + Diggle, Capt., II. 51. + + Division-- + 1st (Australian), II. 217. + 1st (French), I. 323, 324. + 2nd (Australian), II. 167. + 2nd (French), I. 323, 324. + 2nd (Mounted), II. 37. + 10th, I. 306, 328; II. 97, 127, 159, 217, 224, 227, 233. + 11th, I. 328; II. 49, 52, 60, 83, 127, 129, 131, 132, 159, 188. + 11th (Turkish), I. 373. + 13th, I. 328, 386; II. 18, 57, 83, 91, 107. + 16th (Irish), II. 159. + 42nd, I. 386; II. 40. + 52nd, I. 386; II. 158, 243. + 53rd, II. 90, 128, 217, 225, 226. + 54th (Essex), II. 81, 90, 92, 100, 128, 208. + East Lancs., I. 58, 314; II. 57, 196. + Irish, II. 31, 41, 60. + Lowland, I. 355; II. 6. + Mounted, II. 217. + Naval, I. 272, 303, 318, 377; II. 8, 25, 40, 158. + Welsh, II. 101. + + Djavad Pasha, I. 20. + + Dod, Col. Wolley, I. 302. + + Doran, Genl., I. 280, 282. + + _H.M.S._ Doris, I. 68. + + Dorling, Col., II. 219. + + Dorset Regt., 5th, II. 28. + + Doughtie, R.N., Capt., II. 21. + + Douglas, Genl., I. 282, 337, 382; II. 25, 247. + + Downing, Col., II. 44. + + Drafts, I. 368; II. 16, 35, 42, 46, 126, 132, 139, 223. + + Drake Bn., I. 73. + + Drury-Lowe, R.N., Capt., II. 43, 277. + + _H.M.S._ Dublin, I. 109, 146. + + Dublin Fusiliers, I. 157, 224; II. 172. + + Dudley, Lord, II. 167. + + Duff, Genl. Beauchamp, II. 198. + + Duncan, Major, II. 28. + + Duncannon, Lord, II. 262. + + + _H.M.S._ E 11, I. 282, 284. + + _H.M.S._ E 14, I. 234, 240. + + East Kent Yeomanry, II. 247. + + East Lancs. Regt., 6th, II. 18. + + East Yorks, 6th, II. 67. + + Edinburgh, Lord Provost of, II. 155. + + Edwards, Maj., II. 247. + + Edwards, Comr., II. 256. + + Edwards, Lieut., I. 370. + + Egerton, Genl., I. 371; II. 160. + + Egyptian Gazette, I. 77. + + Ehren-Keui, II. 192. + + Ejelmer Bay, II. 72. + + Elliot, Genl., I. 353. + + Elliot, Lieut., I. 336. + + Ellison, Genl., I. 7, 280, 366; II. 6, 32, 126, 165, 236, 243, 256, 275. + + Engineers, I. 43, 48. + + Enos, I. 275; II. 194. + + Enver Pasha, I. 12, 363; II. 212, 258. + + Erskine, Genl., I. 303. + + Eski Lines, II. 25. + + Essex Regt., I. 136, 220. + + _H.M.S._ Europa, II. 168. + + _H.M.S._ Euryalus, I. 133. + + Ewart, Genl., I. 306. + + _H.M.S._ Exmouth, II. 58. + + Ezine, II. 192. + + + Fairfax, Comr., II. 247. + + Fallowfield, R.N., Lieut., I. 328, 370. + + Fanshawe, Genl., II. 106, 138, 159, 160, 161, 188. + + Faukard, Genl., II. 256. + + Ferdinand, Tzar, II. 204, 205, 207, 208, 212, 213. + + Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, II. 244. + + Fisher, Lord, I. 44, 240, 247. + + Fitz, _see_ FitzGerald. + + FitzGerald, Col., I. 320, 321; II. 251. + + Fitzgerald, Maj., II. 254. + + Fitzmaurice, R.N., Capt., I. 112. + + Fitzmaurice, Mr., I. 114. + + Forde, Col., II. 168. + + _H.M.S._ Foresight, I. 16. + + Forster, Col., II. 167. + + Forts, I. 6. + + Foumet, Admiral, II. 188. + + _H.M.S._ Franconia, I. 36. + + Fraser, Col., II. 172. + + Freddie, see Maitland. + + French, Sir John, I. 269, 289, 305, 306, 311, 374. + + French Corps, I. 78. + + French Mission, I. 119. + + Freyberg, Lieut., II. 247. + + Fuller, Lieut.-Col., I. 178; II. 15. + + + Gamble, Sir D., II. 32, 33. + + Gascoigne, Lieut.-Col., II. 39, 214, 233, 243. + + _Gascon_, I. 228. + + _Gaulois_, I. 35, 36, 169, 170. + + Geddes, Maj., II. 172. + + Gellibrand, Lieut., II. 234. + + George, Rt. Hon. Lloyd, II. 260, 274. + + Ghazi Baba, II. 72, 77. + + Gillivan, Col., II. 18. + + Girdwood, Capt., I. 372. + + Girodon, Genl., I. 234, 244, 260, 325, 379; II. 46, 234. + + Glyn, Capt., II. 15, 108, 165. + + Godfrey, Maj., I. 152, 326. + + Godley, Genl., I. 118, 179, 309, 331, 386; II. 80, 82, 208, 245, + 258, 262. + + _Goeben_, I. 162. + + _H.M.S._ Goliath, I. 146, 152, 156, 224. + + Gouraud, Genl., I. 226, 244, 260, 270, 281, 288, 295 _et seq._, 304, + 305, 333, 346, 355, 359, 385; II. 203, 253. + + Graives, Mr., I. 385. + + _H.M.S._ Grampus, I. 293. + + Grand Duke Nicholas, I. 230; II. 158. + + Grant, R.N., Capt., II. 44. + + Greece, I. 116; II. 203. + + Greeks, II. 201. + + Green Hill, II. 214. + + Greer, Lieut.-Col., II. 44. + + Guepratte, Admiral, I. 21, 101, 118, 157. + + Guest, Capt. (?), II. 275. + + _Guildford Castle_, I. 217. + + Guilford, Col. Lord, II. 247. + + Gully Ravine, I. 376. + + Gurkhas, Bde. of, I. 43, 55, 56, 59, 75, 83, 193, 225, 226, 352, 359, + 361, 362, 364; II. 94. + + Gurkhas-- + 4th Bn., II. 167. + 5th Bn., II. 15. + 6th Bn., I. 74, 76; II. 15, 81, 214. + 10th Bn., II. 15. + + Guyon, Maj., II. 172. + + + H. 12, I. 355, 372; II. 9. + + Haig, Sir Douglas, I. 306; II. 185. + + Haldane, Lord, I. 240, 289. + + Hamilton, Genl. Bruce, II. 26, 32, 36, 101. + + Hamilton, Col. Cole, II. 18. + + Hamilton, Lieut. Rowan, II. 243. + + Hammersley, Genl., I. 328; II. 28, 52, 59, 64 _et seq._, 72, 87, 103, + 104, 120, 161. + + Hampshire Regt., I. 155, 157, 220. + 8th Bn., II. 101. + + Hand grenades, I. 43, 48, 356; II. 156, 157. + + Hankey, Col., II. 24, 37, 98, 108, 123. + + Harding, Col., I. 74. + + Hardy, Lieut.-Comr., II. 169. + + Hare, Mr., I. 338. + + Haricot Redoubt, I. 244, 271, 272, 324. + + Hawke Bn., II. 247, 248. + + Heliopolis, I. 61. + + Herbert, Aubrey, I. 239, 243. + + Herts Yeomanry, I. 58. + + Heseltine, Capt., II. 204. + + Hetman Chair, II. 128, 129. + + Hill, Genl., II. 44, 107, 110. + + Hill 10, II. 61, 62, 64, 69, 146. + + Hill 60, II. 127, 155, 157, 158. + + Hill 70, II. 88, 127, 128, 129, 131. + + Hill 305, I. 330; II. 89, 111. + + Hillyard, Maj., II. 18. + + Hindlip, Lord, I. 166. + + Hogg, Capt., I. 74. + + Holdich, Lt.-Col., II. 165. + + Holmes, Col., II. 254. + + Homer, Lt-Comr., II. 17. + + Hood, Maj., II. 186. + + Hood Bn., I. 206, 274, 333; II. 247. + + Hope, R.N., Capt., I. 26, 116. + + Horne, Genl., II. 105. + + Horse Shoe, II. 243. + + Hospital Ships, II. 24. + + Hospital-- + No. 1 Stationary, I. 323; II. 168. + No. 1 (Australian) Stationary, II. 167. + No. 2 Stationary, I. 322. + No. 2 (Australian) Stationary, II. 168. + No. 3 (Canadian) Stationary, II. 168. + No. 3 (Australian) Stationary, II. 168. + No. 15 Stationary, I. 322; II. 167. + No. 16 Stationary, I. 322. + No. 18 Stationary, II. 168. + No. 24 (British-Indian), II. 167. + + Howe Bn., I. 71, 73, 274, 333; II. 234. + + Howitzers, I. 48. _See also_ Appendices I and II. + + Hunloke, Maj., II. 243. + + Hunter-Weston, Genl., I. 3, 61, 62, 89, 118, 260, 280, 288, 346; + II. 22, 26. + + + _Imogene_, II. 91, 123, 139, 205, 251. + + _H.M.S._ Implacable, I. 52. + + Indian troops, II. 161. + + _H.M.S._ Inflexible, I. 33. + + Inglefield, Genl., II. 81, 90, 94, 97, 208. + + Inniskilling Fusiliers, I. 224, 361. + + Irish Pioneer Regt., II. 74. + + _H.M.S._ Irresistible, I. 35, 36, 51. + + Ishiklar, II. 192. + + Ismail Oglu Tepe, II. 63, 70, 81, 89, 112, 127, 129, 131. + + Istomine, Genl., I. 70, 108, 186; II. 158. + + Italy, II. 140. + + Ivanoff, Capt., I. 106. + + + J. 13, I. 362. + + Jackson, Capt., II. 18. + + _Jeanne d'Arc_, I. 135. + + Joffre, Genl., I. 269, 289, 305, 374; II. 179, 180, 190, 213. + + Johnson, R.N., Lieut. Ormsby, I. 326; II. 32. + + Jones, Col., I. 322. + + _H.M.S._ Jonquil, II. 61. + + Jordon, Col., II. 18. + + _Junia_, I. 196. + + + Kabak Kuyu, II. 130. + + Kahn, Capt., I. 184. + + Kaiajik Aghala, II. 129, 130, 139, 155, 210. + + Kaiajik Dere, II. 158. + + Kantara, I. 73. + + Karabingha, I. 292. + + Karakol Dagh, II. 126, 129, 159. + + Karna Bili, II. 148. + + Kavak Tepe Sirt, II. 81, 82, 90. + + Kavanagh, Genl., II. 105. + + Kelly, R.N., Capt., I. 109. + + Kelly, Comr., II. 247. + + _H.M.S._ Kennett, I. 176. + + Kephalos Camp, I. 317; II. 21, 126, 196, 209, 276. + + Kereves Dere, I. 324, 362; II. 256. + + Kereves Dere Ravine, I. 211. + + Keshan, II. 112, 194. + + Keyes, Commodore, I. 21, 48, 56, 142, 253; II. 60, 64, 79, 275, 276. + + Keyes, Sir C., I. 56. + + Keyes, Lady, I. 56. + + Keyes, Lt.-Comr., I. 254, 270. + + Kiggell, Genl., II. 235, 236. + + Kilia Liman, I. 291. + + Kilid Bahr, I. 330, 362; II. 193. + + King, Col., II. 31. + + King, Comr., II. 247. + + King, Genl., II. 248. + + King, Maj., II. 254. + + King's Own Scottish Borderers, I. 129; II. 230. + + Kiretch Tepe Sirt, II. 61, 69, 72, 75, 77, 81, 128. + + Koja Chemen Tepe, II. 57. + + Krithia, I. 330, 362. + + Kum Kale, I. 135, 150, 159; II. 192. + + Kurt Ketchede, II. 113. + + + Lala Baba, II. 61, 64. + + Lancashire Division, I. 198. + + Lancashire Fusiliers, I. 136, 220, 352; II. 172. + + Lancashire Fusiliers-- + 1st Bn., I. 320. + 5th Bn., I. 272. + 9th Bn., II. 28. + + Lancashire Fusilier Brigade, I. 207. + + Lancashire Landing, I. 371, 376; II. 246. + + Lapruin, Capt., II. 144. + + Laverton, Lieut., I. 371. + + Law, Rt. Hon. Bonar, II. 274. + + Law, Capt., I. 372. + + Lawes, Capt., II. 196. + + Lawrence, Genl., I. 382; II. 27, 243. + + Lawson, Sir H., II. 204, 226. + + _H.M.S._ Lefroy, II. 256, 257. + + Legge, Genl., II. 15, 20, 167, 254, 266. + + Lemnos, I. 26. + + _H.M.S._ Lewis, II. 254. + + Liman von Sanders, Genl., I. 95, 246, 357, 358. + + Lindley, Genl., II. 85, 87, 103, 122, 167, 168. + + Lines of Communication, I. 354, 365, 380; II. 264. + + Lister, Hon. C., II. 29. + + Lloyd, Capt., II. 20, 160, 162. + + _H.M.S._ London, I. 154. + + London Regt., 2/1st Coy., II. 242. + 10th Bn., II. 101. + 11th Bn., II. 101. + + Lone Pine, II. 55, 57, 111, 271. + + Long, Capt., I. 279. + + _H.M.S._ Lord Nelson, I. 228, 248. + + Loring, R.N., Capt., I. 119. + + Lovat, Lord, II. 244. + + Lovat's Scouts-- + 1st Bn., II. 244. + 2nd Bn., II. 244. + + Lowland Division, I. 219. + + Lowther, Lancelot, II. 171. + + Lucas, Maj., II. 230. + + + Mackenzie, Lieut.-Col., II. 14. + + Mackenzie, Compton, I. 234; II. 45. + + Maclagan, Col., I. 336. + + Maclean, Maj., I. 371. + + Maher, Col., I. 322. + + Mahon, Genl., I. 285, 289, 306, 328; II. 31, 61, 69 _et seq._, 100 + _et seq._, 159, 161, 165, 169. + + Maidos, I. 291, 330. + + Maitland, Capt. F., I. 323, 336, 383; II. 17, 32, 55, 92, 126, 130, 146, + 158, 159, 166, 167, 170, 172, 186, 189, 196, 214, 243, 254, 256, 275. + + _H.M.S._ Majestic, I. 154, 252. + + Makalinsky, I. 121. + + Malcolm, Col., II. 28, 52, 65 _et seq._, 159. + + Mal Tepe, I. 130. + + Manchester Bde., I. 207. + + Manchester Regt.-- + 6th Bn., II. 25. + 7th Bn., II. 25. + 11th Bn., II. 28. + + Manifold, Col., II. 159. + + _Manitou_, I. 116. + + Maoris, I. 234; II. 94. + + Marmora, II. 193, 205. + + Marshall, Genl., I. 224; II. 130, 132, 165, 171, 172, 242. + + Matthews, Lt.-Col., I. 72. + + Maude, Genl., II. 106, 137, 138, 159, 161, 165, 166, 186. + + Maxwell, Sir J., I. 58, 73, 306; II. 149, 176, 231, 250, 255, 260, 264. + + Maxwell, Capt., II. 220. + + McClay, Lieut., I. 372. + + McGrigor, Capt., II. 200, 246, 275, 277. + + McKenna, Rt. Hon. R., II. 274. + + McMahon, Sir H., I. 66, 77. + + McMunn, Col., II. 167. + + Mecklenburg, Duke of, II. 207. + + Mena Camp, I. 60. + + _H.M.S._ Mercedes, II. 58. + + Mercer, Genl., I. 73; II. 247. + + Methuen, Lord, I. 73, 259, 326. + + Mewes, Maj., I. 72. + + Micklem, Col., I. 243. + + Millen, Senator, II. 267. + + Millerand, M., II. 179, 180, 190. + + Mitchell, Col., II. 244. + + Mitchell, Commodore, II. 220. + + Mitylene, II. 43, 45. + + Monash, Col., I. 249; II. 170. + + Moore, Lieut., II. 214, 227. + + _H.M.S._ Mosquito, I. 335, 337. + + Mountain Battery, 29th, I. 74. + + Mudge, Col., I. 371. + + Mudros, I. 322; II. 167. + + Mudros West, II. 168. + + Munro, Genl., II. 272, 273, 277. + + Munster Fusiliers, I. 157; II. 172. + + Murdoch, Mr. K. A., II. 164, 190, 203, 204, 226, 227, 240, 245, 246, + 257, 260 _et seq._ + + Murphy, Maj., II. 255. + + Murray, Genl. Wolfe, II. 5, 22, 37. + + + Nagara Point, I. 290; II. 193. + + Nallah-- + Achi Baba, II. 243. + Krithia, II. 243. + + Napier, Genl., I. 150. + + Napier, Col., I. 115; II. 201, 202. + + Nasmith, Comr., I. 234, 284. + + Nelson Bn., I. 73; II. 234. + + Nevinson, Mr., II. 219, 220. + + Newfoundland Bn., 1st, II. 242. + + New Zealand Mounted Rifles, I. 250, 256, 359. + + Nibrunesi Point, II. 189. + + Nicholas, Grand Duke, I. 108, 230; II. 158. + + Nicholls, Admiral, II. 260. + + Nicholson, Admiral, I. 57. + + Nicol, Admiral, I. 247; II. 188. + + Nisch, II. 202. + + Nogues, Col., I. 135, 151, 325. + + Northcliffe, Lord, I. 66, 340. + + Northumberland Fusiliers, II. 28. + + _H.M.T._ Novian, II. 44. + + Nuillon, Col., I. 383. + + Nunn, Col., II. 18. + + + Oakdene. Capt. Perry-, II. 255. + + _H.M.S._ Ocean, I. 35, 36, 51. + + Odessa, I. 11. + + O'Dowda, Col., II. 172. + + Olivant, Lt.-Col., I. 71. + + Onslow, Capt., I. 360. + + Oppenheim, Capt., II. 244. + + Order to the Troops-- + 21st April, I. 120. + 22nd April, I. 121. + 28th April, I. 171. + 9th May, I. 213. + 12th May, I. 222. + 25th May, I. 250. + Farewell, II. 277. + By Genl. Gouraud, I. 324. + Turkish Divisional, I. 372. + + _H.M.T._ Orsova, II. 156. + + O'Sullivan, V.C., II. 171. + + Owen, Genl., Cunliffe-, I. 143. + + + Palin, Col., I. 74; II. 214. + + Pallin, Genl., I. 372. + + Palmer, Col., II. 18. + + Palmer, Maj., I. 72. + + Palmer, Mr. F., I. 338. + + Panderma, I. 292, 293. + + Paris, Genl., I. 3, 71, 93, 166, 303, 333; II. 25, 160, 243, 247. + + Paterson, Col, I. 106. + + Pearce, Senator, II. 265, 266. + + Pearson, Maj., II. 172. + + Peebles, Col., I. 372. + + Peel, Col., I. 117. + + Pelliot, Lieut., I. 119; II. 220. + + Percival, Genl., II. 171. + + Percy, Lord William, II. 219. + + Periscopes, I. 43, 48. + + Perriera, Admiral de la, II. 169, 170. + + Peter, _see_ Pollen. + + Peyton, Genl., II. 107, 120, 165, 208, 244. + + _H.M.S._ Phaeton, I. 18, 35, 36. + + Phillimore, R.N., Capt., I. 118, 178; II. 130. + + Piepape, Col., I. 379; II. 146. + + Pierce, Admiral, I. 71. + + Pierce, Maj., II. 230. + + Pike, Lt.-Col., II. 44. + + _H.M.S._ Pincher, I. 335. + + Plan of attack-- + C.-in-C.'s on Peninsula, I. 95. + Sari Bair, I. 329. + Suvla Landing, I. 329; II 3. + + Plymouth Bn., I. 72, 129, 221. + + Pollard, Capt., II. 230. + + Pollen, Capt., I. 21, 41, 178; II. 126, 146, 207, 246, 262, 271, 275. + + Porter, Sir James, I. 367. + + Potts. Lt.-Comr., II. 91. + + Press, I. 320, 327, 332, 337; II. 140, 175 _et seq._ + + Price, Bishop, II. 255. + + _H.M.S._ Prince of Wales, I. 154. + + Princes Street, II. 243. + + Punjabis-- + 69th Bn., I. 74. + 89th Bn., I. 74. + + + Q., II. 80. + + Quadrilateral, I. 355, 358. + + _H.M.S._ Queen, I. 35, 52, 154. + + _H.M.S._ Queen Elizabeth, I. 21, 32, 35, 103. + + Queensland Bn., I. 346, 358. + + Queen Victoria's Own Sappers, I. 74. + + Quinn's Post, I. 255, 256, 257, 259. + + + Rabbit Island, I. 35; II. 27. + + _H.M.S._ Racoon, II. 169. + + Ratilva Valley, II. 134. + + _H.M.S._ Rattlesnake, I. 228. + + Rawlinson, Genl., I. 303; II. 35. + + Reconnaissance of Peninsula, I. 28. + + Regiment de marche d'Afrique, 175th, I. 79. + + Regiment, 4th Colonial, I. 79. + + Regiment, 6th Colonial, I. 135. + + Reed, Genl, II, 5, 36, 53, 63, 77, 96, 99, 120, 241. + + Reinforcements, I. 368; II. 144 _et seq._ + + Rhodes, Lieut., I. 386. + + Rifaat, Col., I. 373. + + _H.M.T._ River Clyde, I. 131, 254. + + Rochdale, Lord, I. 317. + + Rodosto, I. 293. + + Roper, Genl., I. 178. + + Rosomore, Comr., I. 31. + + Ross, Mr. Malcolm, II. 219. + + Roumania, I. 116; II. 202. + + Royal Dublin Fusiliers-- + 6th Bn., II. 44. + 7th Bn., II. 44. + + Royal Engineers, II. 72. + West Riding Field Coy., II. 231. + 67th Coy., II. 29. + 68th Coy., II. 29. + 134th Fortress Coy., II. 29. + + Royal Field Artillery, 10th By., I. 364. _See also_ Appendix I. + + Royal Fusiliers, I. 136, 345; II. 172. + 2nd Bn., I. 352. + + Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, II. 230. + 5th Bn., II. 44. + 6th Bn., II 44. + + Royal Irish Fusiliers-- + 5th Bn., II. 44. + 6th Bn., II. 44. + + Royal Scot, wounded, I. 356. + + Royal Scots, I. 352, 355. + 4th Bn., I. 372. + 5th Bn., I. 190, 220, 318; II. 126, 155. + 6th Bn., II. 156, 160. + 7th Bn., I. 372. + + Ruef, Col, I. 186. + + Rundle, Genl., I. 14; II. 202. + + Russell, Genl., I. 359; II. 130, 132, 139, 155, 194. + + Russell's Top, II. 254. + + Russian Corps, I. 255, 375; II. 21. + + Russian Officers, II. 158. + + Ruthven, Maj. Hore-, I. 357; II. 84, 130, 240, 275. + + Ryrie, Col., I. 336. + + + Saghir Dere, I. 351, 352; II. 247. + + _St. Louis_, I. 325. + + Salonika, II. 184, 201 _et seq._ + + Salt Lake, I. 329; II. 69, 128. + + Samson, Comr., I. 109, 181, 238, 383; II. 54, 221. + + _H.M.S._ Sapphire, I. 146. + + Sari Bair, I. 330, 360; II. 71, 111, 128. + + Saros, I. 28, 349. + + Sarrail, Genl., II. 179, 180, 191, 236, 270, 271. + + Savage, Col., II. 242. + + _H.M.S._ Savage, I. 303; II. 17, 19, 20, 241, 242. + + Scatters, _see_ Wilson. + + Schemallach, Lieut., II. 234. + + Schroeder, I. 95. + + Schuler, Mr., II. 21. + + Sclater, Genl., I. 365. + + _H.M.S._ Scorpion, I. 253, 344, 351, 356, 364. + + Scott, Maj. Sir S., II. 247. + + Scottish Horse, II. 151, 166, 208, 209. + + Scottish Rifles, 8th Bn., I. 372. + + Scott-Moncrieff, Genl., I. 303. + + _H.M.S._ Scourge, I. 346; II. 186. + + Seaplane Camp, II. 21, 32. + + Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131. + + Sellheim, Col., II. 267. + + Senegalese, I. 104, 192, 195, 212; II. 226, 237, 253. + + Serbia, II. 202, 209. + + Serbians, II. 201, 213. + + Seymour, Comr., I. 343. + + Shaw, Genl., I. 328; II. 13, 18, 33, 80. + + Sheppard, Lieut., I. 370. + + Sickness, II. 136, 170, 239, 255. + + Signal Coy., 53rd, II. 90. + + Sikhs, II. 244, 245. + 14th Bn., I. 73, 74; II. 15, 190, 197, 198, 200. + 51st Bn., II. 189, 190, 196, 197, 231. + 53rd Bn., II. 189, 190, 196, 197, 231. + + Silver Baby, II. 233. + + _H.M.T._ Simla, II. 42. + + Simpson, Capt., II. 18. + + Simpson-Baikie, Genl., I. 286, 344, 376, 387. + + Sinclair, Capt., I. 372. + + Sitwell, Genl., II. 122. + + Skeen, Col., I. 288, 319; II. 120, 121. + + Smith, Col., I. 336. + + Smith, Genl., II. 87. + + Smith, Hesketh, II. 45. + + Smith, R.N., Lieut., I. 134. + + Sofia, II. 207. + + Soghan Dere, I. 290, 362. + + Solvili, II. 148. + + _Somali_, II. 248. + + _Southland_, I. 118. + + South Wales Borderers, I. 134, 318, 370; II. 230. + 2nd Bn., I. 138. + + Spens, Genl., II. 261, 264, 265. + + Stanley, Capt., I. 322. + + Stephens, Capt., II. 32, 167. + + Steward, (Col. ?), II. 243. + + Stewart, Col., II. 188. + + Stewart, Lieut. Shaw-, I. 387. + + Stirling, Lt.-Col., II. 244. + + Stockdale, Lt.-Col., I. 186. + + Stoney, Maj., II. 230. + + Stopford, Genl., I. 306; II. 1, 5, 25, 26, 40, 53, 61 _et seq._, 72, + 77, 82, 87, 99, 102, 104, 106, 108. + + Street, Col., I. 182. + + Stuart, Lt.-Col. Crauford-, I. 274. + + Stuart, Maj. Villiers-, I. 234. + + Sulajik, II. 67, 70, 128. + + Sultan of Egypt, I. 58, 60. + + _Sunbeam_, II. 105. + + Surrey Yeomanry, I. 370; II. 220. + + Susak Kuyu, II. 135, 217. + + Sussex Yeomanry, II. 247. + + Suvla Bay, I. 328; II. 84, 111. + + Sykes, Sir Mark, I. 335; II. 275. + + Syria, II. 191. + + + Tactics, I. 363. + + Talaat, I. 12. + + _H.M.S._ Talbot, I. 344, 351. + + Taube, I. 102, 171, 194, 196, 302; II. 188, 196, 204, 218, 219, 241. + + Taylor, Genl., II. 214. + + Taylor, Col., II. 154, 201, 214, 243, 256. + + Tekke Tepe, II. 63, 68, 69, 70, 79, 81. + + Tenedos, I. 21, 227, 331, 384. + + _H.M.T._ Themistocles, II. 42. + + Thomson, Col. Courtauld, I. 260. + + Thursby, Admiral, I. 52, 118, 142, 179, 239. + + Tillard, Maj., II. 167. + + Titchfield, Lord, II. 241. + + Tollemashe, Capt., I. 371. + + Trench mortars, I. 43, 48, 288, 317, 326, 352; II. 140. + + _H.M.S._ Triad, I. 284, 316, 357; II. 58, 71, 155, 167, 168, 275, 276. + + Trotman, Genl., I. 303. + + _H.M.S._ Triumph, I. 112, 154, 247, 248. + + Trumble, Mr. T., II. 268. + + Tullibardine, Lord, II. 208. + + Tupper, R.N., Lieut., I. 346; II. 186. + + Turkish Regt.-- + 13th, I. 356. + 16th, I. 356. + 33rd, I. 356. + 127th, I. 373. + + Turk's Head, II. 254. + + Tyrrell, Col., II. 226, 227, 243. + + Tyrrell, Capt., II. 138. + + + Unsworth, Mr., II. 234. + + Usborne, Neville, I. 384. + + Uzunkiupru, II. 194. + + + Val, _see_ Braithwaite. + + Valley of Death, I. 256. + + Vandenberg, Genl., I. 185. + + Vanrennan, Lieut.-Col., II. 44. + + "V" Beach, I. 135, 360. + + Venezelos, M., I. 316. + + _H.M.S._ Vengeance, I. 248. + + Vineyard, II. 57, 243. + + Viont, Col., I. 324. + + Vitali, Capt., II. 178. + + Von Donop, Genl., I. 197, 305; II. 139. + + Vyvian, R.N., Capt., I. 118. + + + Walden Point, II. 55. + + Wallace, Genl., I. 279, 353, 354, 382. + + _Waratah_, I. 371. + + War Correspondents, I. 320, 334, 338; II. 190, 269. + + Ward, Lt.-Col., I. 284, 343; II. 20, 178, 221. + + Wardian Camp, I. 84. + + Watson, Col. Jimmy, I. 344; II. 246. + + "W" Beach, I. 130, 177, 293. + + Weber Pasha, I. 387. + + Wedgwood, Comr., I. 106, 206, 228. + + Wells, Col., II. 186. + + Wemyss, Admiral, I. 21, 38, 41, 48, 118; II. 31, 168. + + West Kent Regt., 8th, II. 29. + + West Kent Yeomanry, II. 247. + + Westminster Dragoons, I. 58. + + Weston, Lieut., II. 234. + + West Yorks Regt., 9th, II. 29, 64, 67. + + Whitburn, Col., II. 247. + + White, Lt.-Col., I. 323. + + Wigram, Col. Clive, I. 208. + + Williams, Capt., II. 178, 230. + + Williams, Col., I. 17, 266; II. 240. + + Williams, Genl. Hanbury, I. 255. + + Williams, Genl., II. 236. + + Wilson, Bde.-Maj., II. 254. + + Wilson, Col. "Scatters," II. 203, 204, 248. + + Winter, Genl., I. 17, 118, 165, 353, 354. + + _H.M.S._ Wolverine, I. 254, 270, 344, 351, 356. + + Woodward, Genl., I. 17, 80, 118, 165; II. 24. + + Worcester Regt., I. 136, 318. + + Worcester Yeomanry, II. 209. + + Worsley, Comr., II. 79. + + Wyld, Lt.-Comr., I. 335. + + Wylie, Col. Doughty-, I. 53, 156; II. 240. + + + "X" Beach, I. 135. + + Xeros, II. 192. + + + Yarr, Col., II. 247. + + "Y" Beach, I. 129, 146, 163. + + Yeni Shahr, I. 151. + + Yeomanry, II. 121, 127, 128, 132, 211, 244, 247. + + Yilghin Burnu, II. 57, 65, 112. + + Yorks Regt., 6th Bn., II. 29. + + York and Lancs Regt., 6th Bn., II. 29. + + Younghusband, Genl., II. 147. + + Yukeri, I. 331; II. 192. + + + Zimmerman's Farm, II. 25. + + Zion Mule Corps, I. 84. + + Zouaves, I. 212. + + + * * * * * + + +_Printed in Great Britain by_ + +UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED + +WOKING AND LONDON + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2, by Ian Hamilton + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GALLIPOLI DIARY, VOLUME 2 *** + +***** This file should be named 22021.txt or 22021.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/2/0/2/22021/ + +Produced by Suzanne Shell, Janet Blenkinship and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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