diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 21995-8.txt | 5073 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 21995-8.zip | bin | 0 -> 109863 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 21995.txt | 5073 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 21995.zip | bin | 0 -> 109845 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 |
7 files changed, 10162 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/21995-8.txt b/21995-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25c8a85 --- /dev/null +++ b/21995-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5073 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Philosophy and Religion, by Hastings Rashdall + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Philosophy and Religion + Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge + + +Author: Hastings Rashdall + + + +Release Date: July 4, 2007 [eBook #21995] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed + in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page + breaks occurred in the original book. + + + + + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + +Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge + +by + +HASTINGS RASHDALL + +D. Litt. (Oxon.), D.C.L. (Dunelm.) +Fellow of the British Academy +Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford + + + + + + + +London: Duckworth & Co. +3 Henrietta St. Covent Garden +1909 +All rights reserved + + + + +{v} + +GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES + +Man has no deeper or wider interest than theology; none deeper, for +however much he may change, he never loses his love of the many +questions it covers; and none wider, for under whatever law he may live +he never escapes from its spacious shade; nor does he ever find that it +speaks to him in vain or uses a voice that fails to reach him. Once +the present writer was talking with a friend who has equal fame as a +statesman and a man of letters, and he said, 'Every day I live, +Politics, which are affairs of Man and Time, interest me less, while +Theology, which is an affair of God and Eternity, interests me more.' +As with him, so with many, though the many feel that their interest is +in theology and not in dogma. Dogma, they know, is but a series of +resolutions framed by a council or parliament, which they do not +respect any the more because the parliament was composed of +ecclesiastically-minded persons; while the theology which so interests +them is a discourse touching God, though the Being so named is the God +man conceived as not only related to himself and his world but also as +rising ever higher with the notions of the self and the world. Wise +books, not in dogma but in theology, may therefore be described as the +supreme {vi} need of our day, for only such can save us from much +fanaticism and secure us in the full possession of a sober and sane +reason. + +Theology is less a single science than an encyclopaedia of sciences; +indeed all the sciences which have to do with man have a better right +to be called theological than anthropological, though the man it +studies is not simply an individual but a race. Its way of viewing man +is indeed characteristic; from this have come some of its brighter +ideals and some of its darkest dreams. The ideals are all either +ethical or social, and would make of earth a heaven, creating +fraternity amongst men and forming all states into a goodly sisterhood; +the dreams may be represented by doctrines which concern sin on the one +side and the will of God on the other. But even this will cannot make +sin luminous, for were it made radiant with grace, it would cease to be +sin. + +These books then,--which have all to be written by men who have lived +in the full blaze of modern light,--though without having either their +eyes burned out or their souls scorched into insensibility,--are +intended to present God in relation to Man and Man in relation to God. +It is intended that they begin, not in date of publication, but in +order of thought, with a Theological Encyclopaedia which shall show the +circle of sciences co-ordinated under the term Theology, though all +will be viewed as related to its central or main idea. This relation +of God to human knowledge will then be looked at through mind as a +communion of Deity with humanity, or God in fellowship {vii} with +concrete man. On this basis the idea of Revelation will be dealt with. +Then, so far as history and philology are concerned, the two Sacred +Books, which are here most significant, will be viewed as the scholar, +who is also a divine, views them; in other words, the Old and New +Testaments, regarded as human documents, will be criticised as a +literature which expresses relations to both the present and the +future; that is, to the men and races who made the books, as well as to +the races and men the books made. The Bible will thus be studied in +the Semitic family which gave it being, and also in the Indo-European +families which gave to it the quality of the life to which they have +attained. But Theology has to do with more than sacred literature; it +has also to do with the thoughts and life its history occasioned. +Therefore the Church has to be studied and presented as an institution +which God founded and man administers. But it is possible to know this +Church only through the thoughts it thinks, the doctrines it holds, the +characters and the persons it forms, the people who are its saints and +embody its ideals of sanctity, the acts it does, which are its +sacraments, and the laws it follows and enforces, which are its polity, +and the young it educates and the nations it directs and controls. +These are the points to be presented in the volumes which follow, which +are all to be occupied with theology or the knowledge of God and His +ways. + +A. M. F. + 'O.' + + + + +{ix} + +PREFACE + +These Lectures were delivered in Cambridge during the Lent Term of last +year, on the invitation of a Committee presided over by the Master of +Magdalene, before an audience of from three hundred to four hundred +University men, chiefly Under-graduates. They were not then, and they +are not now, intended for philosophers or even for beginners in the +systematic study of philosophy, but as aids to educated men desirous of +thinking out for themselves a reasonable basis for personal Religion. + +The Lectures--especially the first three--deal with questions on which +I have already written. I am indebted to the Publisher of _Contentio +Veritatis_ and the other contributors to that volume for raising no +objection to my publishing Lectures which might possibly be regarded as +in part a condensation, in part an expansion of my Essay on 'The +ultimate basis of Theism.' I have dealt more systematically with many +of the problems here discussed in an Essay upon 'Personality in God and +Man' contributed to _Personal Idealism_ (edited by Henry {x} Sturt) and +in my 'Theory of Good and Evil.' Some of the doctrinal questions +touched on in Lecture VI. have been more fully dealt with in my volume +of University Sermons, _Doctrine and Development_. + +Questions which were asked at the time and communications which have +since reached me have made me feel, more even than I did when I was +writing the Lectures, how inadequate is the treatment here given to +many great problems. On some matters much fuller explanation and +discussion will naturally be required to convince persons previously +unfamiliar with Metaphysic: on others it is the more advanced student +of Philosophy who will complain that I have only touched upon the +fringe of a vast subject. But I have felt that I could not seriously +expand any part of the Lectures without changing the whole character of +the book, and I have been compelled in general to meet the demand for +further explanation only by the above general reference to my other +books, by the addition of a few notes, and by appending to each chapter +some suggestions for more extended reading. These might of course have +been indefinitely enlarged, but a long list of books is apt to defeat +its own purpose: people with a limited time at their disposal want to +know which book to make a beginning upon. + +The Lectures are therefore published for the most {xi} part just as +they were delivered, in the hope that they may suggest lines of thought +which may be intellectually and practically useful. I trust that any +philosopher who may wish to take serious notice of my views--especially +the metaphysical views expressed in the first few chapters--will be +good enough to remember that the expression of them is avowedly +incomplete and elementary, and cannot fairly be criticized in much +detail without reference to my other writings. + +I am much indebted for several useful suggestions and for valuable +assistance in revising the proofs to one of the hearers of the +Lectures, Mr. A. G. Widgery, Scholar of St. Catherine's College, +Cambridge, now Lecturer in University College, Bristol. + +H. RASHDALL. + +NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD, + Jan. 6, 1909. + + + + +{xii} + +CONTENTS + + +LECTURE I + +MIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + +1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate + knowledge of Matter; what we know is always + Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can exist + by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one? + +2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind. + This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour, + sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary + qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations, + no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + +3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did + not adequately distinguish between sensations and + intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + +4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_ + transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist + apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which + and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God, . . . . . . . 16 + +5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The + impossibility of Materialism has generally been + recognized (_e.g._ by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel). + If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be + utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The + latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + +6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the + higher than _vice versâ_, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + + +LECTURE II + +THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + +1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to + recognize the necessity of a Mind which _thinks_ the + world. Insufficiency of this view. + +{xiii} + +2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with + nothing but succession, never with Causality. The + Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical + Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of + Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition. + Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + +3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause + but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events + which _we_ do not cause must be caused by some other + Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that + this cause must be _One_ Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + +4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the + probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in + Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought, + Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + +5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist + who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it + fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the + relations between mind and matter, and with the + tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48 + +6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the + Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + +7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + + +LECTURE III + +GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + +1. The empirical study of Nature ('red in tooth and + claw') can tell us of purpose, not what the purpose is. + The only source of knowledge of the character of God is + to be found in the moral Consciousness. + +2. Our moral judgements are as valid as other judgements + (_e.g._ mathematical axioms), and equally reveal the + thought of God, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + +3. This does not imply that the moral consciousness is not + gradually evolved, or that each individual's conscience + is infallible, or that our moral judgements in detail + are as certain as mathematical judgements, or that the + detailed rules of human conduct are applicable to God, . . 63 + +{xiv} + +4. Corollaries: + + (_a_) Belief in the objectivity of our moral judgements + logically implies belief in God, . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + (_b_) If God aims at an end not fully realized here, we + have a ground for postulating Immortality, . . . . . . 77 + (_c_) Evil must be a necessary means to greater good, . . 79 + +5. In what sense this 'limits God.' Omnipotence=ability + to do all things which are in their own nature + possible, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 + + +LECTURE IV + +DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + +1. _Is the world created?_ There may or may not be a + beginning of the particular series of physical events + constituting our world. But, even if this series has a + beginning, this implies some previous existence which + has no beginning. + +2. _Is the whole-time series infinite?_ Time must be + regarded as objective, but the 'antinomies' involved + in the nature of Time cannot be resolved, . . . . . . . . 90 + +3. _Are Spirits created or pre-existent?_ The close + connexion and correspondence between mind and body + makes for the former view. Difficulties of + pre-existence--heredity, etc., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 + +4. _An Idealism based on Pre-existence without God_ is + open to the same objections and others. Such a system + provides no mind (_a_) in which and for which the whole + system exists, or (_b_) to effect the correspondence + between mind and body, or (_c_) to allow of a purpose + in the Universe; without this the world is not rational, . 96 + +5. _The human mind (i.e. consciousness) not apart of the + divine Consciousness_, though in the closest possible + dependence upon God. The Universe a Unity, but the + Unity is not that of Self-Consciousness, . . . . . . . . . 101 + +6. _There is no 'immediate' or 'intuitive' knowledge of + God_. Our knowledge is got by inference, like knowledge + of our friend's existence, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 + +{xv} + +7. _Religion and Psychology_. It is impossible to base + Religion upon Psychology or 'religious experience' + without Metaphysics, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 + +8. _Summary_: the ultimate nature of Reality, . . . . . . . . 118 + + Note on Non-theistic Idealism, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 + + +LECTURE V + +REVELATION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + +1. There is no special organ of religious knowledge, but + religious knowledge has many characteristics which may + be conveniently suggested by the use of the term 'faith,' + especially its connexion with character and Will. + +2. The psychological causes of religious belief must be + carefully distinguished from the reasons which make it + true. No logic of discovery. Many religious ideas + have occurred in a spontaneous or apparently intuitive + way to particular persons, the truth of which the + philosopher may subsequently be able to test by + philosophical reflection, though he could not have + discovered them, but they are not necessarily true + because they arise in a spontaneous or unaccountable + manner, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 + +3. False conceptions of Revelation and true. All knowledge + is in a sense revealed, especially religious and moral + knowledge: but spiritual insight varies. Need of the + prophet or religious genius, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 + +4. Reasoned and intuitive beliefs may both be 'revealed,' . . 143 + +5. Degrees of truth in the historical religions. Dependence + of the individual upon such religions. Christianity + occupies a unique position, because it alone combines an + ethical ideal which appeals to the universal Conscience + with a Theism which commends itself to Reason. The truth + of Christianity is dependent upon its appeal to the moral + and religious consciousness of the present, . . . . . . . 148 + + +{xvi} + +LECTURE VI + +CHRISTIANITY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 + +1. The claim of Christianity to be the special or absolute + Religion not dependent upon miracles. + +2. Ritschlian Theologians right in resting the truth of + Christianity mainly upon the appeal made by Christ to + the individual Conscience: but wrong in disparaging + (_a_) philosophical arguments for Theism, (_b_) the + relative truth of non-Christian systems, (_c_) the + value of Doctrine and necessity for Development, . . . . . 161 + +3. Christian doctrine (esp. of the Logos) is an attempt to + express the Church's sense of the unique value of Christ + and His Revelation. The necessity for recognizing + development both in Christian Ethics and in Theology, . . 164 + +4. Some reflections on our practical attitude towards + Christian doctrine. Some means of expressing the unique + position of Christ wanted. The old expressions were + influenced by philosophy of the time, but not valueless. + Illustrations. Need of re-interpretation and further + development, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 + +5. The doctrine of continuous Revelation through the + Spirit is a part of Christianity, and the condition + of its acceptance as the final or absolute Religion, . . . 185 + + + + +{1} + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + + +LECTURE I + +MIND AND MATTER + +I have been invited to speak to you about the relations between +Religion and Philosophy. To do that in a logical and thoroughgoing way +it would be necessary to discuss elaborately the meaning first of +Religion and then of Philosophy. Such a discussion would occupy at +least a lecture, and I am unwilling to spend one out of six scanty +hours in formal preliminaries. I shall assume, therefore, that we all +know in some general way the meaning of Religion. It is not necessary +for our present purpose to discuss such questions as the definition of +Religion for purposes of sociological investigation, or the possibility +of a Religion without a belief in God, or the like. I shall assume +that, whatever else may be included in the term Religion, Christianity +may at least be included in it; and that what you are practically most +interested in is the bearing of Philosophy upon the Christian ideas +concerning the {2} being and nature of God, the hope of Immortality, +the meaning and possibility of Revelation. When we turn to Philosophy, +I cannot perhaps assume with equal confidence that all of you know what +it is. But then learning what Philosophy is--especially that most +fundamental part of Philosophy which is called Metaphysics--is like +learning to swim: you never discover how to do it until you find +yourself considerably out of your depth. You must strike out boldly, +and at last you discover what you are after. I shall presuppose that +in a general way you do all know that Philosophy is an enquiry into the +ultimate nature of the Universe at large, as opposed to the discussion +of those particular aspects or departments of it which are dealt with +by the special Sciences. What you want to know, I take it, is--what +rational enquiry, pushed as far as it will go, has to say about those +ultimate problems of which the great historical Religions likewise +profess to offer solutions. The nature and scope of Philosophy is best +understood by examples: and therefore I hope you will excuse me if +without further preface I plunge _in medias res_. I shall endeavour to +presuppose no previous acquaintance with technical Philosophy, and I +will ask those who have already made some serious study of Philosophy +kindly to remember that I am trying to make myself intelligible to +those who have not. I shall {3} not advance anything which I should +not be prepared to defend even before an audience of metaphysical +experts. But I cannot undertake in so short a course of lectures to +meet all the objections which will, I know, be arising in the minds of +any metaphysically trained hearers who may honour me with their +presence, many of which may probably occur to persons not so trained. +And I further trust the Metaphysicians among you will forgive me if, in +order to be intelligible to all, I sometimes speak with a little less +than the _akribeia_ at which I might feel bound to aim if I were +reading a paper before an avowedly philosophical Society. +Reservations, qualifications, and elaborate distinctions must be +omitted, if I am to succeed in saying anything clearly in the course of +six lectures. + +Moreover, I would remark that, though I do not believe that an +intention to edify is any excuse for slipshod thought or intellectual +dishonesty, I am speaking now mainly from the point of view of those +who are enquiring into metaphysical truth for the guidance of their own +religious and practical life, rather than from the point of view of +pure speculation. I do not, for my own part, believe in any solution +of the religious problem which evades the ultimate problems of all +thought. The Philosophy of Religion is for me not so much a special +and sharply distinguished branch or department of {4} Philosophy as a +particular aspect of Philosophy in general. But many questions which +may be of much importance from the point of view of a complete theory +of the Universe can be entirely, or almost entirely, put on one side +when the question is, 'What may I reasonably believe about those +ultimate questions which have a direct and immediate bearing upon my +religious and moral life; what may I believe about God and Duty, about +the world and its ultimate meaning, about the soul and its destiny?' +For such purposes solutions stopping short of what will fully satisfy +the legitimate demands of the professed Metaphysician may be all that +is necessary, or at least all that is possible for those who are not +intending to make a serious and elaborate study of Metaphysic. I have +no sympathy with the attempt to base Religion upon anything but honest +enquiry into truth: and yet the professed Philosophers are just those +who will most readily recognize that there are--if not what are +technically called degrees of truth--still different levels of thought, +different degrees of adequacy and systematic completeness, even within +the limits of thoroughly philosophical thinking. I shall assume that +you are not content to remain at the level of ordinary unreflecting +Common-sense or of merely traditional Religion--that you do want (so +far as time and opportunity serve) to get to the bottom of things, {5} +but that you will be content in such a course as the present if I can +suggest to you, or help you to form for yourselves, an outline--what +Plato would call the _hypotypôsis_ of a theory of the Universe which +may still fall very far short of a finished and fully articulated +metaphysical system. + +I suppose that to nearly everybody who sets himself down to think +seriously about the riddle of the Universe there very soon occurs the +question whether Materialism may not contain the solution of all +difficulties. I think, therefore, our present investigation had better +begin with an enquiry whether Materialism can possibly be true. I say +'can be true' rather than 'is true,' because, though dogmatic +Materialists are rare, the typical Agnostic is one who is at least +inclined to admit the possibility of Materialism, even when he does +not, at the bottom of his mind, practically assume its truth. The man +who is prepared to exclude even this one theory of the Universe from +the category of possible but unprovable theories is not, properly +speaking, an Agnostic. To know that Materialism at least is not true +is to know something, and something very important, about the ultimate +nature of things. I shall not attempt here any very precise definition +of what is meant by Materialism. Strictly speaking, it ought to mean +the view that nothing really exists but matter. But the existence, in +some sense or {6} other, of our sensations and thoughts and emotions is +so obvious to Common-sense that such a creed can hardly be explicitly +maintained: it is a creed which is refuted in the very act of +enunciating it. For practical purposes, therefore, Materialism may be +said to be the view that the ultimate basis of all existence is matter; +and that thought, feeling, emotion--consciousness of every kind--is +merely an effect, a by-product or concomitant, of certain material +processes. + +Now if we are to hold that matter is the only thing which exists, or is +the ultimate source of all that exists, we ought to be able to say what +matter is. To the unreflecting mind matter seems to be the thing that +we are most certain of, the one thing that we know all about. Thought, +feeling, will, it may be suggested, are in some sense appearances which +(though we can't help having them) might, from the point of view of +superior insight, turn out to be mere delusions, or at best entirely +unimportant and inconsiderable entities. This attitude of mind has +been amusingly satirised by the title of one of Mr. Bradley's +philosophical essays--'on the supposed uselessness of the Soul.'[1] In +this state of mind matter presents itself as the one solid reality--as +something undeniable, something perfectly intelligible, something, too, +which is pre-eminently {7} important and respectable; while thinking +and feeling and willing, joy and sorrow, hope and aspiration, goodness +and badness, if they cannot exactly be got rid of altogether, are, as +it were, negligible quantities, which must not be allowed to disturb or +interfere with the serious business of the Universe. + +From this point of view matter is supposed to be the one reality with +which we are in immediate contact, which we see and touch and taste and +handle every hour of our lives. It may, therefore, sound a rather +startling paradox to say that matter--matter in the sense of the +Materialist--is something which nobody has ever seen, touched, or +handled. Yet that is the literal and undeniable fact. Nobody has ever +seen or touched or otherwise come in contact with a piece of matter. +For in the experience which the plain man calls seeing or touching +there is always present another thing. Even if we suppose that he is +Justified in saying 'I touch matter,' there is always present the 'I' +as well as the matter.[2] It is always and inevitably matter + mind +that he knows. Nobody ever can get away from this 'I,' nobody can ever +see or feel what matter is like apart from the 'I' which knows {8} it. +He may, indeed, infer that this matter exists apart from the 'I' which +knows it. He may infer that it exists, and may even go as far as to +assume that, apart from his seeing or touching, or anybody else's +seeing or touching, matter possesses all those qualities which it +possesses for his own consciousness. But this is inference, and not +immediate knowledge. And the validity or reasonableness of the +inference may be disputed. How far it is reasonable or legitimate to +attribute to matter as it is in itself the qualities which it has for +us must depend upon the nature of those qualities. Let us then go on +to ask whether the qualities which constitute matter as we know it are +qualities which we can reasonably or even intelligibly attribute to a +supposed matter-in-itself, to matter considered as something capable of +existing by itself altogether apart from any kind of conscious +experience. + +In matter, as we know it, there are two elements. There are certain +sensations, or certain qualities which we come to know by sensation, +and there are certain relations. Now, with regard to the sensations, a +very little reflection will, I think, show us that it is absolutely +meaningless to say that matter has the qualities implied by these +sensations, even when they are not felt, and would still possess them, +even supposing it never had been and never would be felt by any one +whatever. In a world in which {9} there were no eyes and no minds, +what would be the meaning of saying that things were red or blue? In a +world in which there were no ears and no minds, there would clearly be +no such thing as sound. This is exactly the point at which Locke's +analysis stopped. He admitted that the 'secondary qualities'--colours, +sounds, tastes--of objects were really not in the things themselves but +in the mind which perceives them. What existed in the things was +merely a power of producing these sensations in us, the quality in the +thing being not in the least like the sensations which it produces in +us: he admitted that this power of producing a sensation was something +different from, and totally unlike, the sensation itself. But when he +came to the primary qualities--solidity, shape, magnitude and the +like--he supposed that the qualities in the thing were exactly the same +as they are for our minds. If all mind were to disappear from the +Universe, there would henceforth be no red and blue, no hot and cold; +but things would still be big or small, round or square, solid or +fluid. Yet, even with these 'primary qualities' the reference to mind +is really there just as much as in the case of the secondary qualities; +only the fact is not quite so obvious. And one reason for this is that +these primary qualities involve, much more glaringly and unmistakably +than the secondary, something which is not _mere_ sensation--something +which {10} implies thought and not mere sense. What do we mean by +solidity, for instance? We mean partly that we get certain sensations +from touching the object--sensations of touch and sensations of what is +called the muscular sense, sensations of muscular exertion and of +pressure resisted. Now, so far as that is what solidity means, it is +clear that the quality in question involves as direct a reference to +our subjective feelings as the secondary qualities of colour and sound. +But something more than this is implied in our idea of solidity. We +think of external objects as occupying space. And spaciality cannot be +analysed away into mere feelings of ours. The feelings of touch which +we derive from an object come to us one after the other. No mental +reflection upon sensations which come one after the other in time could +ever give us the idea of space, if they were not spacially related from +the first. It is of the essence of spaciality that the parts of the +object shall be thought of as existing side by side, outside one +another. But this side-by-sideness, this outsideness, is after all a +way in which the things present themselves to a mind. Space is made up +of relations; and what is the meaning of relations apart from a mind +which relates, or _for_ which the things are related? If spaciality +were a quality of the thing in itself, it would exist no matter what +became of other things. It would be quite possible, therefore, {11} +that the top of this table should exist without the bottom: yet +everybody surely would admit the meaninglessness of talking about a +piece of matter (no matter how small, be it an atom or the smallest +electron conceived by the most recent physical speculation) which had a +top without a bottom, or a right-hand side without a left. This +space-occupying quality which is the most fundamental element in our +ordinary conception of matter is wholly made up of the relation of one +part of it to another. Now can a relation exist except for a mind? As +it seems to me, the suggestion is meaningless. Relatedness only has a +meaning when thought of in connection with a mind which is capable of +grasping or holding together both terms of the relation. The relation +between point A and point B is not _in_ point A or _in_ point B taken +by themselves. It is all in the 'between': 'betweenness' from its very +nature cannot exist in any one point of space or in several isolated +points of space or things in space; it must exist only in some one +existent which holds together and connects those points. And nothing, +as far as we can understand, can do that except a mind. Apart from +mind there can be no relatedness: apart from relatedness no space: +apart from space no matter. It follows that apart from mind there can +be no matter. + +It will probably be known to all of you that the {12} first person to +make this momentous inference was Bishop Berkeley. There was, indeed, +an obscure medieval schoolman, hardly recognized by the historians of +Philosophy, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, Dean of Metz,[3] who +anticipated him in the fourteenth century, and other better-known +schoolmen who approximated to the position; and there are, of course, +elements in the teaching of Plato and even of Aristotle, or possible +interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, which point in the same +direction. But full-blown Idealism, in the sense which involves a +denial of the independent existence of matter, is always associated +with the name of Bishop Berkeley. + +I can best make my meaning plain to you by quoting a passage or two +from his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, in which he extends to the +primary qualities of matter the analysis which Locke had already +applied to the secondary. + + +'But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances +may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of +bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must +know it by Sense or by Reason.--As for our senses, by them we have the +knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are +immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do +not inform us that things exist {13} without the mind, or unperceived, +like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists themselves +acknowledge.--It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all +of external things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from +what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us +to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we +perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend +there is any _necessary_ connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say +it is granted on all hands--and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and +the like, puts it beyond dispute--that it is possible we might be +affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies +existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition +of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since +it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be +produced always in the same order we see them in at present, without +their concurrence. + + * * * * * * + +'In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should +ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no +one can deny possible--an intelligence _without the help of external +bodies_, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that +you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his +mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to +believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his +ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for +believing the same thing? Of this there can be no {14} question--which +one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the +strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the +existence of bodies without the mind.'[4] + + +Do you say that in that case the tables and chairs must be supposed to +disappear the moment we all leave the room? It is true that we do +commonly think of the tables and chairs as remaining, even when there +is no one there to see or touch them. But that only means, Berkeley +explains, that if we or any one else were to come back into the room, +we should perceive them. Moreover, even in thinking of them as things +which might be perceived under certain conditions, they have entered +our minds and so proclaimed their ideal or mind-implying character. To +prove that things exist without the mind we should have to conceive of +things as unconceived or unthought of. And that is a feat which no one +has ever yet succeeded in accomplishing. + +Here is Berkeley's own answer to the objection: + + +'But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and +nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no +difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than +framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and +{15} at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may +perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all +the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you +have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does +not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought +may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that +_you_ conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a +manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence +of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own +ideas. But the mind, _taking no notice of itself_, is deluded to think +it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the +mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, +itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and +evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any +other proofs against the existence of _material substance_.'[5] + + +Berkeley no doubt did not adequately appreciate the importance of the +distinction between mere sensations and mental relations. In the +paragraph which I have read to you he tends to explain space away into +mere subjective feelings: in this respect and in many others he has +been corrected by Kant and the post-Kantian Idealists. Doubtless we +cannot analyse away our conception of space or of substance into mere +feelings. But relations imply mind no less than sensations. Things +are no mere {16} bundles of sensations; we do think of them as objects +or substances possessing attributes. Indeed to call them (with +Berkeley), 'bundles of sensations' implies that the bundle is as +important an element in thinghood as the sensations themselves. The +bundle implies what Kant would call the intellectual 'categories' of +Substance, Quantity, Quality, and the like. We do think objects: but +an object is still an object of thought. We can attach no intelligible +meaning to the term 'object' which does not imply a subject. + +If there is nothing in matter, as we know it, which does not obviously +imply mind, if the very idea of matter is unintelligible apart from +mind, it is clear that matter can never have existed without mind. + +What then, it may be asked, of the things which no human eye has ever +seen or even thought of? Are we to suppose that a new planet comes +into existence for the first time when first it sails into the +telescope of the astronomer, and that Science is wrong in inferring +that it existed not only before that particular astronomer saw it, but +before there were any astronomers or other human or even animal +intelligences upon this planet to observe it? Did the world of Geology +come into existence for the first time when some eighteenth-century +geologist first suspected that the world was more than six thousand +years old? Are all those ages of past {17} history, when the earth and +the sun were but nebulae, a mere imagination, or did that nebulous mass +come into existence thousands or millions of years afterwards when Kant +or Laplace first conceived that it had existed? The supposition is +clearly self-contradictory and impossible. If Science be not a mass of +illusion, this planet existed millions of years before any human--or, +so far as we know, any animal minds--existed to think its existence. +And yet I have endeavoured to show the absurdity of supposing that +matter can exist except for a mind. It is clear, then, that it cannot +be merely for such minds as ours that the world has always existed. +Our minds come and go. They have a beginning; they go to sleep; they +may, for aught that we can immediately know, come to an end. At no +time does any one of them, at no time do all of them together, +apprehend all that there is to be known. We do not create a Universe; +we discover it piece by piece, and after all very imperfectly. Matter +cannot intelligibly be supposed to exist apart from Mind: and yet it +clearly does not exist merely for _our_ minds. Each of us knows only +one little bit of the Universe: all of us together do not know the +whole. If the whole is to exist at all, there must be some one mind +which knows the whole. The mind which is necessary to the very +existence of the Universe is the mind that we call God. + +{18} + +In this way we are, as it seems to me, led up by a train of reasoning +which is positively irresistible to the idea that, so far from matter +being the only existence, it has no existence of its own apart from +some mind which knows it--in which and for which it exists. The +existence of a Mind possessing universal knowledge is necessary as the +presupposition both of there being any world to know, and also of there +being any lesser minds to know it. It is, indeed, possible to believe +in the eternal existence of limited minds, while denying the existence +of the one Omniscient Mind. That is a hypothesis on which I will say a +word hereafter.[6] It is enough here to say that it is one which is +not required to explain the world as we know it. The obvious _prima +facie_ view of the matter is that the minds which apparently have a +beginning, which develope slowly and gradually and in close connexion +with certain physical processes, owe their origin to whatever is the +ultimate source or ground of the physical processes themselves. The +order or systematic interconnexion of all the observable phenomena in +the Universe suggests that the ultimate Reality must be one Being of +some kind; the argument which I have suggested leads us to regard that +one Reality as a spiritual Reality. We are not yet entitled to speak +of this physical Universe as _caused_ {19} by God: that is a question +which I hope to discuss in our next lecture. All that I want to +establish now is that we cannot explain the world without the +supposition of one universal Mind in which and for which all so-called +material things exist, and always have existed. + +So far I have endeavoured to establish the existence of God by a line +of thought which also leads to the position that matter has no +independent existence apart from conscious mind, that at bottom nothing +exists except minds and their experiences. Now I know that this is a +line of thought which, to those who are unfamiliar with it, seems so +paradoxical and extravagant that, even when a man does not see his way +to reply to it, it will seldom produce immediate or permanent +conviction the first time he becomes acquainted with it. It is for the +most part only by a considerable course of habituation, extending over +some years, that a man succeeds in thinking himself into the idealistic +view of the Universe. And after all, there are many minds--some of +them, I must admit, not wanting in philosophical power--who never +succeed in accomplishing that feat at all. Therefore, while I feel +bound to assert that the clearest and most irrefragable argument for +the existence of God is that which is supplied by the idealistic line +of thought, I should be sorry to have to admit that a man {20} cannot +be a Theist, or that he cannot be a Theist on reasonable grounds, +without first being an Idealist. From my own point of view most of the +other reasons for believing in the existence of God resolve themselves +into idealistic arguments imperfectly thought out. But they may be +very good arguments, as far as they go, even when they are not thought +out to what seem to me their logical consequences. One of these lines +of thought I shall hope to develope in my next lecture; but meanwhile +let me attempt to reduce the argument against Materialism to a form in +which it will perhaps appeal to Common-sense without much profound +metaphysical reflection. + +At the level of ordinary common-sense thought there appear to be two +kinds of Reality--mind and matter. And yet our experience of the unity +of Nature, of the intimate connexion between human and animal minds and +their organisms (organisms governed by a single intelligible and +interconnected system of laws) is such that we can hardly help +regarding them as manifestations or products or effects or aspects of +some one Reality. There is, almost obviously, some kind of Unity +underlying all the diversity of things. Our world does not arise by +the coming together of two quite independent Realities--mind and +matter--governed by no law or by unconnected and independent systems of +law. {21} All things, all phenomena, all events form parts of a single +inter-related, intelligible whole: that is the presupposition not only +of Philosophy but of Science. Or if any one chooses to say that it +_is_ a presupposition and so an unwarrantable piece of dogmatism, I +will say that it is the hypothesis to which all our knowledge points. +It is at all events the one common meeting-point of nearly all serious +thinkers. The question remains, 'What is the nature of this one +Reality?' Now, if this ultimate Reality be not mind, it must be one of +two things. It must be matter, or it must be a third thing which is +neither mind nor matter, but something quite different from either. +Now many who will not follow the idealistic line of thought the whole +way--so far as to recognize that the ultimate Reality is Mind--will at +least admit that Idealists have successfully shown the impossibility of +supposing that the ultimate Reality can be matter. For all the +properties of matter are properties which imply some relation to our +sensibility or our thought. Moreover, there is such a complete +heterogeneity between consciousness and unconscious matter, considered +as something capable of existing without mind, that it seems utterly +impossible and unthinkable that mind should be simply the product or +attribute of matter. That the ultimate Reality cannot be what we mean +by matter has been admitted by the most naturalistic, {22} and, in the +ordinary sense, anti-religious thinkers--Spinoza, for instance, and +Haeckel, and Herbert Spencer. The question remains, 'Which is the +easier, the more probable, the more reasonable theory--that the +ultimate Reality should be Mind, or that it should be something so +utterly unintelligible and inconceivable to us as a _tertium quid_--a +mysterious Unknown and Unknowable--which is neither mind nor matter?' +For my own part, I see no reason to suppose that our inability to think +of anything which is neither matter nor mind but quite unlike either is +a mere imperfection of human thought. It seems more reasonable to +assume that our inability to think of such a mysterious X is due to +there being no such thing.[7] + +Our only way of judging of the Unknown is by the analogy of the known. +It is more probable, surely, that the world known to us should exhibit +something of the characteristics of the Reality from which it is +derived, or of which it forms a manifestation, than that it should +exhibit none of these characteristics. No doubt, if we were to argue +from some small part of our experience, or from the detailed +characteristics of one part of our experience to what is beyond our +experience; if, for instance {23} (I am here replying to an objection +of Höffding's), a blind man were to argue that the world must be +colourless because he sees no colour, or if any of us were to affirm +that in other planets there can be no colours but what we see, no +sensations but what we feel, no mental powers but what we possess, the +inference would be precarious enough. The Anthropomorphist in the +strict sense--the man who thinks that God or the gods must have human +bodies--no doubt renders himself liable to the gibe that, if oxen could +think, they would imagine the gods to be like oxen, and so on. But the +cases are not parallel. We have no difficulty in thinking that in +other worlds there may be colours which we have never seen, or whole +groups of sensation different from our own: we cannot think that any +existence should be neither mind nor matter, but utterly unlike either. +We are not arguing from the mere absence of some special experience, +but from the whole character of _all_ the thought and experience that +we actually possess, of all that we are and the whole Universe with +which we are in contact. The characteristic of the whole world which +we know is that it consists of mind and matter in close connexion--we +may waive for a moment the nature of that connexion. Is it more +probable that the ultimate Reality which lies beyond our reach should +be something which possesses the characteristics of mind, or that it +should {24} be totally unlike either mind or matter? Do you insist +that we logically ought to say it might contain the characteristics of +both mind and matter? There is only one way in which such a +combination seems clearly thinkable by us, _i.e._ when we represent +matter as either in the idealistic sense the thought or experience of +mind, or (after the fashion of ordinary realistic Theism) as created or +produced by mind. But if you insist on something more than this, if +you want to think of the qualities of matter as in some other way +included in the nature of the ultimate Reality as well as those of +mind, at all events we could still urge that we shall get nearer to the +truth by thinking of this ultimate Reality in its mind-aspect than by +thinking of it in its matter-aspect. + +I do not believe that the human mind is really equal to the task of +thinking of a Reality which is one and yet is neither mind nor matter +but something which combines the nature of both. Practically, where +such a creed is professed, the man either thinks of an unconscious +Reality in some way generating or evolving mind, and so falls back into +the Materialism which he has verbally disclaimed; or he thinks of a +mind producing or causing or generating a matter which when produced is +something different from itself. This last is of course ordinary +Theism in the form in which it is commonly {25} held by those who are +not Idealists. From a practical and religious point of view there is +nothing to be said against such a view. Still it involves a Dualism, +the philosophical difficulties of which I have attempted to suggest to +you. I confess that for my own part the only way in which I can +conceive of a single ultimate Reality which combines the attributes of +what we call mind with those of what we know as matter is by thinking +of a Mind conscious of a world or nature which has no existence except +in and for that Mind and whatever less complete consciousnesses that +may be. I trust that those who have failed to follow my sketch of the +arguments which lead to this idealistic conclusion may at least be led +by it to see the difficulties either of Materialism or of that kind of +agnostic Pantheism which, while admitting in words that the ultimate +Reality is not matter, refuses to invest it with the attributes of +mind. The argument may be reduced to its simplest form by saying we +believe that the ultimate Reality is Mind because mind will explain +matter, while matter will not explain mind: while the idea of a +Something which is neither in mind nor matter is both unintelligible +and gratuitous. + +And this line of thought may be supplemented by another. Whatever may +be thought of the existence of matter apart from mind, every one will +{26} admit that matter possesses no value or worth apart from mind. +When we bring into account our moral judgements or judgements of value, +we have no difficulty in recognizing mind as the highest or best kind +of existence known to us. There is, surely, a certain intrinsic +probability in supposing that the Reality from which all being is +derived must possess at least as much worth or value as the derived +being; and that in thinking of that Reality by the analogy of the +highest kind of existence known to us we shall come nearer to a true +thought of it than by any other way of thinking possible to us. This +is a line of argument which I hope to develope further when I come to +examine the bearing upon the religious problem of what is as real a +part of our experience as any other--our moral experience. + +I will remind you in conclusion, that our argument for the existence of +God is at present incomplete. I have tried to lead you to the idea +that the ultimate Reality is spiritual, that it is a Mind which knows, +or is conscious of, matter. I have tried to lead you with the Idealist +to think of the physical Universe as having no existence except in the +mind of God, or at all events (for those who fail to follow the +idealistic line of thought) to believe that the Universe does not exist +without such a Mind. What further relation exists between physical +nature and this Universal Spirit, I shall hope in the next lecture {27} +to consider; and in so doing to suggest a line of argument which will +independently lead to the same result, and which does not necessarily +presuppose the acceptance of the idealistic creed. + + +LITERATURE + +The reader who wishes to have the idealistic argument sketched in the +foregoing chapter developed more fully should read Berkeley's +_Principles of Human Knowledge_. For the correction of Berkeley's +sensationalistic mistakes the best course is to read Kant's _Critique +of Pure Reason_ or the shorter _Prolegomena to any future Metaphysic_ +or any of the numerous expositions or commentaries upon Kant. (One of +the best is the 'Reproduction' prefixed to Dr. Hutchison Stirling's +_Text-book to Kant_.) The non-metaphysical reader should, however, be +informed that Kant is very hard reading, and is scarcely intelligible +without some slight knowledge of the previous history of Philosophy, +especially of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, while some acquaintance with +elementary Logic is also desirable. He will find the argument for +non-sensationalistic Idealism re-stated in a post-Kantian but much +easier form in Ferrier's _Institutes of Metaphysic_. The argument for +a theistic Idealism is powerfully stated (though it is not easy +reading) in the late Prof. T. H. Green's _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book +I. In view of recent realistic revivals I may add that the earlier +chapters of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ still seem to me to +contain an unanswerable defence of Idealism as against Materialism or +any form of Realism, though his Idealism is not of the theistic type +defended in the above lecture. The idealistic argument is stated in a +way which makes strongly for Theism by Professor Ward in _Naturalism +and Agnosticism_--a work which would perhaps be the best sequel to +these lectures for any reader {28} who does not want to undertake a +whole course of philosophical reading: readers entirely unacquainted +with Physical Science might do well to begin with Part II. A more +elementary and very clear defence of Theism from the idealistic point +of view is to be found in Dr. Illingworth's _Personality Human and +Divine_. Representatives of non-idealistic Theism will be mentioned at +the end of the next lecture. + + + +[1] _Mind_, vol. iv. (U.S.), 1885. + +[2] I do not mean of course that in the earliest stages of +consciousness this distinction is actually made; but, if there are +stages of consciousness in which the 'I' is not realized, the idea of +matter or even of an 'object' or 'not-self' existing apart from +consciousness must be supposed to be equally absent. + +[3] I have dealt at length with this forgotten thinker in a +Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, printed in their +_Proceedings_ for 1907. + +[4] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. i., Sections 18, 20. + +[5] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. 1., Section 23. + +[6] See Lecture IV., pp. 96-101, 123-6. + +[7] I have attempted to meet this line of argument somewhat more +adequately, in the form in which it has recently been taken up by +Professor Höffding in his _Philosophy of Religion_, in a review in the +Review of Theology and Philosophy for November, 1907 (vol. iii.). + + + + +{29} + +LECTURE II + +THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE + +In my last lecture I endeavoured to show that matter, so far from +constituting the ultimate Reality, cannot reasonably be thought of as +existing at all without mind; and that we cannot explain the world +without assuming the existence of a Mind in which and for which +everything that is not mind has its being. But we are still very far +from having fully cleared up the relation between the divine Mind and +that Nature which exists in it and for it: while we have hardly dealt at +all with the relation between the universal Mind and those lesser minds +which we have treated--so far without much argument--as in some way +derived from, or dependent upon, that Mind. So far as our previous line +of argument goes, we might have to look upon the world as the thought of +God, but not as caused by Him or due to His will. We might speak of God +as 'making Nature,' but only in the sense in which you or I make Nature +when we think it or experience it. {30} 'The world is as necessary to +God as God is to the world,' we are often told--for instance by my own +revered teacher, the late Professor Green. How unsatisfactory this +position is from a religious point of view I need hardly insist. For all +that such a theory has to say to the contrary, we might have to suppose +that, though God is perfectly good, the world which He is compelled to +think is very bad, and going from bad to worse. To think of God merely +as the Mind which eternally contemplates Nature, without having any power +whatever of determining what sort of Nature it is to be, supplies no +ground for hope or aspiration--still less for worship, adoration, +imitation. I suggested the possibility that from such a point of view +God might be thought of as good, and the world as bad. But that is +really to concede too much. A being without a will could as little be +bad as he could be good: he would be simply a being without a character. +From an intellectual point such a way of looking at the Universe might be +more intelligent or intelligible than that of pure Materialism or pure +Agnosticism; but morally and religiously I don't know that, when its +consequences are fully realized, it is any great improvement upon either +of them.[1] {31} Moreover, even intellectually it fails to satisfy the +demand which most reflecting people feel, that the world shall be +regarded as a Unity of some kind. If God is thought of as linked by some +inexplicable fate to a Nature over which He has no sort of control--not +so much control as a mere human being who can produce limited changes in +the world,--we can hardly be said to have reduced the world to a Unity. +The old Dualism has broken out again: after all we still have God and the +world confronting one another; neither of them is in any way explained by +the other. Still less could such a world be supposed to have a purpose +or rational end. For our own mere intellectual satisfaction as well as +for the satisfaction of our religious needs we must go on to ask whether +we are not justified in thinking of God as the Cause or Creator of the +world, as well as the Thinker of it. + +This enquiry introduces us to the whole problem of Causality. The sketch +which I gave you last time of Bishop Berkeley's argument was a very +imperfect one. Bishop Berkeley was from one point of view a great +philosophic iconoclast, though he destroyed only that he might build up. +He destroyed the superstition of a self-existing matter: {32} he also +waged war against what I will venture to call the kindred superstition of +a mysterious causal nexus between the physical antecedent and the +physical consequent. On this side his work was carried on by Hume. +Berkeley resolved our knowledge into a succession of 'ideas.' He did, no +doubt, fall into the mistake of treating our knowledge as if it were a +mere succession of feelings: he ignored far too much--though he did not +do so completely--that other element in our knowledge, the element of +intellectual relation, of which I said something last time. Here, no +doubt, Berkeley has been corrected by Kant; and, so far, practically all +modern Idealists will own their indebtedness to Kant. Even in the +apprehension of a succession of ideas, in the mere recognition that this +feeling comes after that, there is an element which cannot be explained +by mere feeling. The apprehension that this feeling came after that +feeling is not itself a feeling. But can I detect any relation between +these experiences of mine except that of succession? We commonly speak +of fire as the cause of the melting of the wax, but what do we really +know about the matter? Surely on reflection we must admit that we know +nothing but this--that, so far as our experience goes, the application of +fire is always followed by the melting of the wax. Where this is the +case we do, from the point of view of {33} ordinary life, speak of the +one phenomenon as the cause of the other. Where we don't discover such +an invariable succession, we don't think of the one event as the cause of +the other. + +I shall be told, perhaps, that on this view of the nature of Causality we +ought to speak of night as the cause of day. So perhaps we should, if +the result to which we are led by a more limited experience were not +corrected by the results of a larger experience. To say nothing of the +valuable correction afforded by the polar winter and the polar summer, we +have learned by a more comprehensive experience to replace the law that +day follows night by the wider generalisation that the visibility of +objects is invariably coincident upon the presence of some luminous body +and not upon a previous state of darkness. But between cases of what we +call mere succession and what is commonly called causal sequence the +difference lies merely in the observed fact that in some cases the +sequence varies, while in others no exception has ever been discovered. +No matter how frequently we observe that a sensation of red follows the +impact upon the aural nerve of a shock derived from a wave of ether of +such and such a length, we see no reason why it should do so. We may, no +doubt, make a still wider generalization, and say that every event in +Nature is invariably preceded by some definite complex of conditions, +{34} and so arrive at a general law of the Uniformity of Nature. And +such a law is undoubtedly the express or implied basis of all inference +in the Physical Sciences. When we have once accepted that law (as the +whole mass of our experience in the purely physical region inclines us to +do), then a single instance of A B C being followed by D (when we are +quite sure that we have included all the antecedents which we do not know +from other experience to be irrelevant) will warrant our concluding that +we have discovered a law of nature. On the next occasion of A B C's +occurrence we confidently predict that D will follow. But, however often +we have observed such a sequence, and however many similar sequences we +may have observed, we are no nearer to knowing _why_ D should follow ABC: +we can only know that it always does: and on the strength of that +knowledge we infer, with a probability which we do no doubt for practical +purposes treat as a certainty, that it always will. But on reflection we +can see no reason why a wave of ether of a certain length should produce +red rather than blue, a colour rather than a sound. There, as always, we +discover nothing but succession, not necessary connexion. + +These cases of unvaried succession among phenomena, it should be +observed, are quite different from cases of real necessary connexion. We +don't want to examine thousands of instances of two {35} added to two to +be quite sure that they always make four, nor in making the inference do +we appeal to any more general law of Uniformity. We simply see that it +is and always must be so. Mill no doubt tells us he has no difficulty in +supposing that in the region of the fixed stars two and two might make +five, but nobody believes him. At all events few of us can pretend to +such feats of intellectual elasticity. No amount of contradictory +testimony from travellers to the fixed stars, no matter whether they were +Bishops of the highest character or trained as Professors of physical +Science, would induce us to give a moment's credence to such a story. We +simply see that two and two must make four, and that it is inconceivable +they should ever, however exceptionally, make five. It is quite +otherwise with any case of succession among external phenomena, no matter +how unvaried. So long as we confine ourselves to merely physical +phenomena (I put aside for the moment the case of conscious or other +living beings) nowhere can we discover anything but succession; nowhere +do we discover Causality in the sense of a necessary connexion the +reversal of which is inconceivable. + +Are we then to conclude that there is no such thing as Causality, that in +searching for a cause of everything that happens, we are pursuing a mere +will o' the wisp, using a mere _vox nihili_ which has {36} as little +meaning for the reflecting mind as fate or fortune? Surely, in the very +act of making the distinction between succession and causality, in the +very act of denying that we can discover any causal connexion between one +physical phenomenon and another, we imply that we have got the idea of +Causality in our minds; and that, however little we may have discovered a +genuine cause, we could not believe that anything could happen without a +cause. + +For my own part, I find it quite possible to believe that a phenomenon +which has been followed by another phenomenon 9999 times should on the +10,000th time be followed by some other phenomenon. Give me the +requisite experience, and belief would follow; give me even any adequate +evidence that another person has had such an experience (though I should +be very particular about the evidence), and I should find no difficulty +in believing it. But to tell me that the exception to an observed law +might take place without any cause at all for the variation would seem to +be pure nonsense. Put the matter in another way. Let us suppose an +empty world, if one can speak of such a thing without contradiction--let +us suppose that at one time nothing whatever had existed, neither mind +nor matter nor any of that mysterious entity which some people find it +possible to believe in which is {37} neither mind nor matter. Let us +suppose literally nobody and nothing to have existed. Now could you +under these conditions rationally suppose that anything could have come +into existence? Could you for one moment admit the possibility that +after countless aeons of nothingness a flash of lightning should occur or +an animal be born? Surely, on reflection those who are most suspicious +of _a priori_ knowledge, who are most unwilling to carry their +speculations beyond the limits of actual experience, will be prepared to +say, 'No, the thing is utterly for ever impossible.' _Ex nihilo nihil +fit_: for every event there must be a cause. Those who profess to reject +all other _a priori_ or self-evident knowledge, show by their every +thought and every act that they never really doubt that much. + +Now, it would be just possible to contend that we have got the bare +abstract concept or category of Causality in our minds, and yet that +there is nothing within our experience to give it any positive +content--so that we should have to say, 'Every event must have a cause, +but we never know or can know what that cause is. If we are to talk +about causes at all, we can only say "The Unknowable is the cause of all +things."' Such a position can be barely stated without a contradiction. +But surely it is a very difficult one. Nature does not generally supply +us with categories of thought, while it gives us no power {38} or +opportunity of using them. It would be like holding, for instance, that +we have indeed been endowed with the idea of number in general, but that +we cannot discover within our experience any numerable things; that we +have got the idea of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., but have no capacity whatever for +actually counting--for saying that here are three apples, and there four +marbles. And, psychologically, it would be difficult to find any +parallel to anything of the kind. Nature does not first supply us with +clearly defined categories of thought, and then give us a material to +exercise them upon. In general we discover these abstract categories by +using them in our actual thinking. We count beads or men or horses +before we evolve an abstract idea of number, or an abstract +multiplication table. It is very difficult to see how this idea of Cause +could possibly have got into our heads if we had never in the whole +course of our experience come into any sort of contact with any actual +concrete cause. Where then, within our experience, if not in the +succession of external events, shall we look for a cause--for something +to which we can apply this category or abstract notion of causality? I +answer 'We must look within: it is in our experience of volition that we +actually find something answering to our idea of causal connexion.' And +here, I would invite you not to think so much of our consciousness of +actually {39} moving our limbs. Here it is possible to argue plausibly +that the experience of exercising causality is a delusion. I imagine +that, if I will to do so, I can move my arm; but I will to stretch out my +arm, and lo! it remains glued to my side, for I have suddenly been +paralysed. Or I may be told that the consciousness of exerting power is +a mere experience of muscular contraction, and the like. I would ask you +to think rather of your power of directing the succession of your own +thoughts. I am directly conscious, for instance, that the reason why I +am now thinking of Causality, and not (say) of Tariff Reform, is the fact +that I have conceived the design of delivering a course of lectures on +this subject; the succession of ideas which flow through my mind as I +write or speak is only explicable by reference to an end--an end which I +am striving to bring into actual being. In such voluntarily concentrated +purposeful successions of thought I am immediately exercising causality: +and this causality does further influence the order of events in physical +nature. My pen or my tongue moves in consequence of this striving of +mine, though no doubt for such efforts to take place other physical +conditions must be presupposed, which are not wholly within my own +control. I am the cause, but not the whole or sole cause of these +physical disturbances in external nature: I am a cause but not an +uncaused cause. {40} My volition, though it is not the sole cause of the +event which I will, is enough to give me a conception of a cause which is +the sole cause of the events. + +The attempt is of course sometimes made, as it was made by Hume, to +explain away this immediate consciousness of volition, and to say that +all that I immediately know is the succession of my subjective +experiences. It may be contended that I don't know, any more than in the +case of external phenomena, that because the thought of my lecture comes +first and the thought of putting my pen into the ink to write it comes +afterwards, therefore the one thought causes the other. Hence it is +important to point out that I have a negative experience with which to +contrast the positive experience. I do not _always_, even as regards my +own inward experiences, assume that succession implies Causality. +Supposing, as I speak or write, a twinge of the gout suddenly introduces +itself into the succession of my experiences: then I am conscious of no +such inner connexion between the new experience and that which went +before it. Then I am as distinctly conscious of passivity--of not +causing the succession of events which take place in my mind--as I am in +the other case of actively causing it. If the consciousness of +exercising activity is a delusion, why does not that delusion occur in +the one case as much as in the other? I hold then that in the +consciousness of {41} our own activity we get a real direct experience of +Causality. When Causality is interpreted to mean mere necessary +connexion--like the mathematical connexion between four and twice two or +the logical connexion between the premisses of a Syllogism and its +conclusion,--its nature is fundamentally misrepresented. The essence of +Causality is not necessary connexion but Activity. Such activity we +encounter in our own experience of volition and nowhere else.[2] + +Now, if the only cause of which I am immediately conscious is the will of +a conscious rational being, is it not reasonable to infer that some such +agency is at work in the case of those phenomena which we see no reason +to attribute to the voluntary actions of men and animals? It is well +known that primitive man took this step. Primitive man had no notion of +the 'Uniformity of Nature': it is only very gradually that civilized man +has discovered it. But primitive man never doubted for one instant the +law of Causality: he never doubted that for any change, or at least for +any change of the kind which most frequently attracted his attention, +there must {42} be a cause. Everything that moved he supposed to be +alive, or to be under the influence of some living being more or less +like himself. If the sea raged, he supposed that the Sea-god was angry. +If it did not rain to-day, when it rained yesterday, that was due to the +favour of the Sky-god, and so on. The world for him was full of spirits. +The argument of primitive man's unconscious but thoroughly sound +Metaphysic is well expressed by the fine lines of Wordsworth in the +_Excursion_: + + Once more to distant ages of the world + Let us revert, and place before our thoughts + The face which rural solitude might wear + To the unenlightened swains of pagan Greece. + --In that fair clime, the lonely herdsman, stretched + On the soft grass through half a summer's day, + With music lulled his indolent repose: + And, in some fit of weariness, if he, + When his own breath was silent, chanced to hear + A distant strain, far sweeter than the sounds + Which his poor skill could make, his fancy fetched, + Even from the blazing chariot of the sun, + A beardless Youth, who touched a golden lute, + And filled the illumined groves with ravishment. + The nightly hunter, lifting a bright eye + Up towards the crescent moon, with grateful heart + Called on the lovely wanderer who bestowed + That timely light, to share his joyous sport: + And hence, a beaming Goddess with her Nymphs, + Across the lawn and through the darksome grove, + (Not unaccompanied with tuneful notes + By echo multiplied from rock or cave), +{43} + Swept in the storm of chace; as moon and stars + Glance rapidly along the clouded heaven, + When winds are blowing strong. The traveller slaked + His thirst from rill or gushing fount, and thanked + The Naiad. Sunbeams, upon distant hills + Gliding apace, with shadows in their train, + Might, with small help from fancy, be transformed + Into fleet Oreads sporting visibly. + The Zephyrs fanning, as they passed, their wings, + Lacked not, for love, fair objects whom they wooed + With gentle whisper. Withered boughs grotesque, + Stripped of their leaves and twigs by hoary age, + From depth of shaggy covert peeping forth + In the low vale, or on steep mountain side; + And, sometimes, intermixed with stirring horns + Of the live deer, or goat's depending beard,-- + These were the lurking Satyrs, a wild brood + Of gamesome Deities; or Pan himself, + The simple shepherd's awe-inspiring God![3] + + +Growing experience of the unity of Nature, of the interdependence of all +the various forces and departments of Nature, have made such a view of it +impossible to civilized and educated man. Primitive man was quite right +in arguing that, where he saw motion, there must be consciousness like +his own. But we have been led by Science to believe that whatever is the +cause of any one phenomenon (at least in inanimate nature), must be the +cause of all. The interconnexion, the regularity, the order observable +in phenomena are too great to be the result of chance or of the +undesigned concurrence of a number of {44} independent agencies: and +perhaps we may go on further to argue that this one cause must be the +ultimate cause even of those events which are directly and immediately +caused by our own wills. But that is a question which I will put aside +for the present. At least for the events of physical nature there must +be one Cause. And if the only sort of cause we know is a conscious and +rational being, then we have another most powerful reason for believing +that the ultimate reality, from which all other reality is derived, is +Mind--a single conscious Mind which we may now further describe as not +only Thought or Intelligence but also Will.[4] + +Let me add this additional consideration in support of the conclusion +that the world is not merely thought by God but is also willed by God. +When we talk about thought without will, we are talking about something +that we know absolutely nothing about. In all the consciousness that we +know of, in every moment of our own immediate waking experience, we find +thought, feeling, willing. Even in the consciousness of animals there +appears to be something analogous to these three sides or aspects of +consciousness: but at all events in developed human consciousness we know +of no such thing as thinking without willing. All thought involves +attention, and to attend is to will. If, therefore, on the grounds {45} +suggested by the Hegelian or other post-Kantian Idealists, we have been +led to think that the ultimate Reality is Mind or Spirit, we should +naturally conclude by analogy that it must be Will as well as Thought +and--I may add, though it hardly belongs to the present argument to +insist upon that--Feeling. On the other hand if, with men like +Schopenhauer and Edouard von Hartmann,[5] we are conducted by the +appearances of design in Nature to the idea that Nature is striving after +something, that the ultimate Reality is Will, we must supplement that +line of argument by inferring from the analogy of our own Consciousness +that Will without Reason is an unintelligible and meaningless +abstraction, and that (as indeed even Hartmann saw) Schopenhauer's Will +without Reason was as impossible an abstraction as the apparently +will-less universal Thinker of the Hegelian:[6] while against +Schopenhauer and his more reasonable successor, Hartmann, I should insist +that an unconscious Will is as unintelligible a contradiction as an +unconscious Reason. Schopenhauer and Hegel seem to have seen, each of +them, exactly {46} half of the truth: God is not Will without Reason or +Reason without Will, but both Reason and Will. + +And here I must try to meet an inevitable objection. I do not say that +these three activities of the human intellect stand in God side by side +with the same distinctness and (if I may say so) irreducibility that they +do in us. What feeling is for a Being who has no material organism, we +can form no distinct conception. Our thought with its clumsy processes +of inference from the known to the unknown must be very unlike what +thought is in a Being to whom nothing is unknown. All our thought too +involves generalization, and in universal concepts (as Mr. Bradley has +shown us) much that was present in the living experience of actual +perception is necessarily left out. Thought is but a sort of +reproduction--and a very imperfect reproduction--of actual, living, +sensible experience. We cannot suppose, then, that in God there is the +same distinction between actual present experience and the universal +concepts employed in thinking which there is in us. And so, again, +willing must be a very different thing in a being who wills or creates +the objects of his own thought from what it is in beings who can only +achieve their ends by distinguishing in the sharpest possible manner +between the indefinite multiplicity of things which they know but do not +cause and the tiny fragment {47} of the Universe which by means of this +knowledge they can control. Nevertheless, though all our thoughts of God +must be inadequate, it is by thinking of Him as Thought, Will and +Feeling--emancipated from those limitations which are obviously due to +human conditions and are inapplicable to a Universal Mind--that we shall +attain to the truest knowledge of God which lies within our capacity. Do +you find a difficulty in the idea of partial and inadequate knowledge? +Just think, then, of our knowledge of other people's characters--of what +goes on in other people's minds. It is only by the analogy of our own +immediate experience that we can come to know anything at all of what +goes on in other people's minds. And, after all, such insight into other +people's thoughts, emotions, motives, intentions, characters, remains +very imperfect. The difficulty is greatest when the mind which we seek +to penetrate is far above our own. How little most of us know what it +would feel like to be a Shakespeare, a Mozart, or a Plato! And yet it +would be absurd to talk as if our knowledge of our fellows was no +knowledge at all. It is sufficient not merely to guide our own thoughts +and actions, but to make possible sympathy, friendship, love. Is it not +so with our knowledge of God? The Gnosticism which forgets the immensity +of the difference between the Divine Mind and the human is not less +unreasonable--not {48} less opposed to the principles on which we conduct +our thinking in every other department of life--than the Agnosticism +which rejects probabilities because we cannot have immediate certainties, +and insists on knowing nothing because we cannot know everything. + +The argument which infers that God is Will from the analogy of our own +consciousness is one which is in itself independent of Idealism. It has +been used by many philosophers who are Realists, such as Reid or Dr. +Martineau, as well as by Idealists like Berkeley, or Pfleiderer, or +Lotze. It does not necessarily presuppose Idealism; but it does, to my +mind, fit in infinitely better with the idealistic mode of thought than +with the realistic. If you hold that there is no difficulty in supposing +dead, inert matter to exist without any mind to think it or know it, but +that only a Mind can be supposed to cause change or motion, you are +assuming a hard and fast distinction between matter and force which the +whole trend of modern Science is tending to break down. It seems to +imply the old Greek conception of an inert, passive, characterless _hule_ +which can only be acted upon from without. The modern Physicist, I +imagine, knows nothing of an inert matter which can neither attract nor +repel, even if he does not definitely embark on the more speculative +theory which actually defines the atom or the electron {49} as a centre +of force. Activity belongs to the very essence of matter as understood +by modern Science. If matter can exist without mind, there is (from the +scientific point of view) some difficulty in contending that it cannot +likewise move or act without being influenced by an extraneous Mind. If, +on the other hand, with the Idealist we treat the notion of matter +without mind as an unintelligible abstraction, that line of thought would +prepare us to see in force nothing but a mode of mental action. The +Idealist who has already identified matter with the object of thought +will find no difficulty in going on to see in force simply the activity +or expression or object of Will. And if he learns from the Physicist +that we cannot in the last resort--from the physical point of +view--distinguish matter from force, that will fit in very well with the +metaphysical position which regards thought and will as simply two +inseparable aspects of the life of mind. + +And now I will return once more for a moment to the idealistic argument. +I have no doubt that many of you will have felt a difficulty in accepting +the position that the world with which we come in contact is merely a +state of our own or anybody else's consciousness. It is so obvious that +in our experience we are in contact with a world which we do not create; +which is what it is whether we like it or not; which opposes itself at +every turn to our desires and {50} inclinations. You may have been +convinced that we know nothing of any external world except the effects +which it produces upon consciousness. But, you will say to yourselves, +there must have been something to cause these effects. You are perfectly +right in so thinking. Certainly in our experience of the world we are in +contact with a Reality which is not any state of our own mind, a Reality +which we do not create but simply discover, a Reality from which are +derived the sensations which we cannot help feeling, and the objects +which we cannot help thinking. So far you are quite right. But very +often, when the Realist insists that there must be something to cause in +my mind this appearance, which I call my consciousness of a table, he +assumes all the while that this something--the real table, the table in +itself--is _there_, inside or behind the phenomenal table that I actually +see and feel; out there, in space. But if we were right in our analysis +of space, if we were right in arguing that space is made up of +intellectual relations[7] and that {51} intellectual relations can have +no being and no meaning except in and for a mind which apprehends them, +then it is obvious that you must not think of this Reality which is the +cause of our experience of external objects, as being _there_, as +occupying space, as being 'external.' If space be a form of our thought, +or (in Kantian language) a form of our sensibility, then the Reality +which is to have an existence in itself, cannot be in space. A reality +which is not in space can no longer be thought of as matter: whatever +else matter (as commonly conceived) means, it is certainly something +which occupies space. Now we know of no kind of existence which is not +in space except Mind. On the idealistic view to which I have been +endeavouring to lead you, we are, indeed, justified in saying that there +is a Reality which is the underlying cause or ground of our experiences, +but that that Reality is one which we may describe as Thought no less +than as Will. + +It may interest some of you to know how near one who is often considered +the typical representative of naturalistic, if not materialistic, modes +of thought, ultimately came to accepting this identification. Let me +read to you a passage from one of Mr. Spencer's later works--the third +volume of his _Sociology_:-- + +'This transfiguration, which the inquiries of physicists continually +increase, is aided by that other {52} transfiguration resulting from +metaphysical inquiries. Subjective analysis compels us to admit that our +scientific interpretations of the phenomena which objects present, are +expressed in terms of our own variously-combined sensations and +ideas--are expressed, that is, in elements belonging to consciousness, +which are but symbols of the something beyond consciousness. Though +analysis afterwards reinstates our primitive beliefs, to the extent of +showing that behind every group of phenomenal manifestations there is +always a _nexus_, which is the reality that remains fixed amid +appearances which are variable;[1] yet we are shown that this _nexus_ of +reality is for ever inaccessible to consciousness. And when, once more, +we remember that the activities constituting consciousness, being +rigorously bounded, cannot bring in among themselves the activities +beyond the bounds, which therefore seem unconscious, though production of +either by the other seems to imply that they are of the same essential +nature; this necessity we are under to think of the external energy in +terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a +materialistic aspect to the Universe: further thought, however, obliging +us to recognize the truth that a conception given in phenomenal +manifestations of this ultimate energy can in no wise show us what it +is.'[8] + + +Now, I think this is one of the passages which would justify Mr. +Bradley's well-known epigram, that Mr. Herbert Spencer has told us more +about the Unknowable than the rashest of theologians has ever ventured to +tell us about God. + +{53} + +Even Kant, who is largely responsible for the mistakes about Causality +against which this lecture has been a protest--I mean the tendency to +resolve it into necessary connexion--did in the end come to admit that in +the large resort we come into contact with Causality only in our own +Wills. I owe the reference to Professor Ward, and will quote the +paragraph in which he introduces it:-- + + +'Presentation, Feeling, Conation, are ever one inseparable whole, and +advance continuously to higher and higher forms. But for the fact that +psychology was in the first instance studied, not for its own sake, but +in subservience to speculation, this cardinal importance of activity +would not have been so long overlooked. We should not have heard so much +of passive sensations and so little of active movements. It is +especially interesting to find that even Kant at length--in his latest +work, the posthumous treatise on the _Connexion of Physics and +Metaphysics_, only recently discovered and published--came to see the +fundamental character of voluntary movement. I will venture to quote one +sentence: "We should not recognise the moving forces of matter, not even +through experience, if we were not conscious of our own activity in +ourselves exerting acts of repulsion, approximation, etc." But to Maine +de Biran, often called the French Kant, to Schopenhauer, and, finally, to +our own British psychologists, Brown, Hamilton, Bain, Spencer, is +especially due the merit of seeing the paramount importance of the active +side of experience. To this then primarily, and not to any merely {54} +intellectual function, we may safely refer the category of causality.'[9] + + +I may add that Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, from which +I have quoted, constitutes the most brilliant and important modern +defence of the doctrine which I have endeavoured very inadequately to set +before you in this lecture. + +It is a remarkable fact that the typical exponent of popular so-called +'scientific' Agnosticism, and the founder of that higher metaphysical +Agnosticism which has played so large a part in the history of modern +Philosophy, should before their deaths have both made confessions which +really amount to an abjuration of all Agnosticism. If the ultimate +Reality is to be thought of as a rational Will, analogous to the will +which each of us is conscious of himself having or being, he is no longer +the Unknown or the Unknowable, but the God of Religion, who has revealed +Himself in the consciousness of man, 'made in the image of God.' What +more about Himself we may also hold to be revealed in the human spirit, I +hope to consider in our next lecture. But, meanwhile, a word may be +uttered in answer to the question which may very probably be asked--Is +God a Person? A complete answer to the question would involve elaborate +discussions, but for our present purpose the question may be answered +very {55} briefly. If we are justified in thinking of God after the +analogy of a human soul--if we are justified in thinking of Him as a +self-conscious Being who thinks, feels, and wills, and who is, moreover +(if I may a little anticipate the subject of our next lecture) in +relation with, capable of loving and being loved by other such +beings--then it seems most natural to speak of God's existence as +personal. For to be a self-conscious being--conscious of itself and +other beings, thinking, willing, feeling, loving--is what we mean by +being a person. If any one prefers to speak of God as 'super-personal,' +there is no great objection to so doing, provided that phrase is not made +(as it often is) an excuse for really thinking of God after the analogy +of some kind of existence lower than that of persons--as a force, an +unconscious substance, or merely a name for the totality of things. But +for myself, I prefer to say that our own self-consciousness gives us only +an ideal of the highest type of existence which it nevertheless very +imperfectly satisfies, and therefore I would rather think God is a Person +in a far truer, higher, more complete sense than that in which any human +being can be a person. God alone fully realizes the ideal of +Personality. The essence of Personality is something positive: it +signifies to us the highest kind of being within our knowledge--not (as +is too often supposed) the mere limitations {56} and restraints which +characterize human conscious life as we know it in ourselves. If we are +justified in thinking of God after the analogy of the highest existence +within our knowledge, we had better call Him a Person. The word is no +doubt inadequate to the reality, as is all the language that we can +employ about God; but it is at least more adequate than the terms +employed by those who scruple to speak of God as a Person. It is at +least more adequate and more intelligent than to speak of Him as a force, +a substance, a 'something not ourselves which makes for righteousness.' +_Things_ do not 'make for righteousness'; and in using the term Person we +shall at least make it clear that we do not think of Him as a 'thing,' or +a collection of things, or a vague substratum of things, or even a mere +totality of minds like our own.[10] + + +LITERATURE + +As has been explained in this Lecture, many idealistic writers who insist +upon the necessity of God as a universal, knowing Mind to explain both +the existence of the world and our knowledge of it, are more or less +ambiguous about the question whether the divine Mind is to be thought of +as willing or causing the world, though passages occur in the writings of +most of them which tend in this direction. 'God {57} must be thought of +as creating the objects of his own thought' is a perfectly orthodox +Hegelian formula. Among the idealistic writers (besides Berkeley) who +correct this--as it seems to me--one-sided tendency, and who accept on +the whole the view of the divine Causality taken in this Lecture, may be +mentioned Lotze, the 9th Book of whose _Microcosmus_ (translated by Miss +Elizabeth Hamilton and Miss Constance Jones) or the third Book of his +_Logic_ (translation ed. by Prof. Bosanquet), may very well be read by +themselves (his views may also be studied in his short _Philosophy of +Religion_--two translations, by the late Mrs. Conybeare and by Professor +Ladd); Pfleiderer, _Philosophy and Development of Religion_, especially +chapter v.; and Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. + +Among the non-idealistic writers who have based their argument for the +existence of God mainly or largely upon the consideration that Causality +is unintelligible apart from a rational Will, may be mentioned--among +older writers Reid, _Essays on the Active Powers of Man_, Essay I. +(especially chapter v.), and among more recent ones Martineau, _A Study +of Religion_. Flint's _Theism_ may be recommended as one of the best +attempts to state the theistic case with a minimum of technical +Metaphysic. + +Two little books by Professor Andrew Seth (now Seth Pringle-Pattison), +though not primarily occupied with the religious problem, may be +mentioned as very useful introductions to Philosophy--_The Scottish +Philosophers_ and _Hegelianism and Personality_. + + + +[1] Of course deeply religious men like Green who have held this view did +not admit, or did not realize, such consequences. The tendency here +criticized is undoubtedly derived from Hegel, but passages suggestive of +the opposite view can be extracted from his writings, e.g.: 'God, +however, as subjective Power, is not simply will, intention, etc., but +rather immediate Cause' (_Philosophy of Religion_, Eng. trans., ii. p. +129). + +[2] The idea of Causality was by Kant identified with the idea of logical +connexion, _i.e._ the relation of the premisses of a syllogism to its +conclusion; but this does not involve _time_ at all, and _time_ is +essential to the idea of Causality. For an admirable vindication of our +immediate consciousness of Causality see Professor Stout's chapter on +'The Concept of Mental Activity' in _Analytic Psychology_ (Book II. +chap. i.). + +[3] _Excursion_, Book IV. + +[4] For the further development of this argument see Lecture IV. + +[5] See especially the earlier chapters of _The Philosophy of the +Unconscious_ (translated by W. C. Coupland). + +[6] Of course passages can be quoted from Hegel himself which suggest the +idea that God is Will as well as Thought; I am speaking of the general +tendency of Hegel and many of his disciples. Some recent Hegelians, such +as Professor Boyce, seem to be less open to this criticism, but there are +difficulties in thinking of God as Will and yet continuing to speak of +ultimate Reality as out of Time. + +[7] It may be objected that this is true only of 'conceptual space' (that +is, the space of Geometry), but not of 'perceptual space,' _i.e._ space +as it presents itself in a child's perception of an object. The +distinction is no doubt from many points of view important, but we must +not speak of 'conceptual space' and 'perceptual space' as if they had +nothing to do with one another. If the relations of conceptual space +were not in some sense contained or implied in our perceptions, no amount +of abstraction or reflection could get the relations out of them. + +[8] _Sociology_, vol. iii. p. 172. + +[9] _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii. pp. 191-2. + +[10] For a further discussion of the subject the reader may be referred +to my essay on 'Personality in God and Man' in _Personal Idealism_. + + + + +{58} + +LECTURE III + +GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS + +A course of purely metaphysical reasoning has led us up to the idea of +God--that is to say, of a conscious and rational Mind and Will for +which the world exists and by which that world and all other spirits +are caused to exist. I have passed over a host of difficulties--the +relation of God to time, the question whether or in what sense the +world may be supposed to have a beginning and an end, the question of +the relation in which God, the universal Mind, stands to other minds, +the question of Free-will. These are difficulties which would involve +elaborate metaphysical discussions: I shall return to some of them in a +later lecture. It must suffice for the present to say that more than +one answer to many of these questions might conceivably be given +consistently with the view of the divine nature which I have contended +for. All that I need insist on for my present purpose is-- + +(1) That God is personal in the sense that He is a {59} self-conscious, +thinking, willing, feeling Being, distinguishable from each and all +less perfect minds. + +(2) That all other minds are in some sense brought into being by the +divine Mind, while at the same time they have such a resemblance to, or +community of nature with, their source that they may be regarded as not +mere creations but as in some sense reproductions, more or less +imperfect, of that source, approximating in various degrees to that +ideal of Personality which is realised perfectly in God alone. In +proportion as they approximate to that ideal, they are causes of their +own actions, and can claim for themselves the kind of causality which +we attribute in its perfection to God. I content myself now with +claiming for the developed, rational human self a measure of freedom to +the extent which I have just defined--that it is the real cause of its +own actions. It is capable of self-determination. The man's actions +are determined by his character. That is quite consistent with the +admission that God is the ultimate cause of a self of such and such a +character coming into existence at such and such a time. + +(3) I will not say that the conception of those who regard the human +mind as literally a part of the divine, so that the human consciousness +is in no sense outside of the divine, is necessarily, for those who +hold it, inconsistent with the conception of {60} personality both in +God and man: I will only say that I do not myself understand such an +assertion. I regard the human mind as derived from God, but not as +being part of God. Further discussion of this question I reserve for +my next lecture. + +We have led up to the idea of God's existence. But so far we have +discovered nothing at all about His character or purposes. And it is +clear that without some such knowledge the belief in God could be of +little or no value from any religious or moral point of view. How are +we to learn anything about the character of God? I imagine that at the +present day few people will attempt to prove the goodness or +benevolence of God from an empirical examination of the facts of Nature +or of History. There is, no doubt, much in History and in Nature to +suggest the idea of Benevolence, but there is much to suggest a +directly opposite conclusion. Few of us at the present day are likely +to be much impressed by the argument which Paley bases upon the +existence of the little apparatus in the throat by which it is +benevolently arranged that, though constantly on the point of being +choked by our food, we hardly ever are choked. I cannot help reminding +you of the characteristic passage: 'Consider a city-feast,' he +exclaims, 'what manducation, what deglutition, and yet not one Alderman +choked in a century!' Such arguments look at the matter from the point +{61} of view of the Alderman: the point of view of the turtle and the +turkey is entirely forgotten. I would not for a moment speak +disrespectfully of the argument from design. Darwinism has changed its +form, but anybody who reads Edouard von Hartmann's _Philosophy of the +Unconscious_ is not likely to rise from its perusal with the idea that +the evidences of design have been destroyed by Darwinism, whatever he +may think of Hartmann's strange conclusion that the design can be +explained by the operation of an unconscious Mind or Will. The +philosophical argument of Mr. R. B. Haldane in _The Pathway to +Reality_,[1] and the purely biological argument of Dr. John Haldane in +his two lectures on _Life and Mechanism_, and still more recently the +brilliant and very important work of M. Bergson, _L'Évolution +Creatrice_ have, as it seems to me, abundantly shown that it is as +impossible as ever it was to explain even the growth of a plant without +supposing that in it and all organic Nature there is a striving towards +an end. But the argument from design, though it testifies to purpose +in the Universe, tells us nothing about the nature of that purpose. +Purpose is one thing; benevolent purpose is another. Nobody's estimate +of the comparative amount of happiness and misery in the world is worth +much; but for my own part, if I trusted simply to empirical evidence, +{62} I should not be disposed to do more than slightly attenuate the +pessimism of the Pessimists. At all events, Nature is far too 'red in +tooth and claw' to permit of our basing an argument for a benevolent +deity upon a contemplation of the facts of animal and human life. +There is but one source from which such an idea can possibly be +derived--from the evidence of our own moral consciousness. + +Our moral ideals are the work of Reason. That the happiness of many +ought to be preferred to the happiness of one, that pleasure is better +than pain, that goodness is of more value than pleasure, that some +pleasures are better than others--such judgements are as much the work +of our own Reason, they are as much self-evident truths, as the truth +that two and two make four, or that A cannot be both B and not B at the +same time, or that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. We have +every right to assume that such truths hold good for God as well as for +man. If such Idealism as I have endeavoured to lead you to is well +founded, the mind which knows comes from God, and therefore the +knowledge which that mind possesses must also be taken as an imperfect +or fragmentary reproduction of God's knowledge. And the Theist who +rejects Idealism but admits the existence of self-evident truths will +be equally justified in assuming that, for God as well as for man, two +and two must make {63} four. We have just as much right to assume that +our moral ideas--our ideas of value--must come from God too. For God +too, as for us, there must exist the idea, the ultimate category of the +good; and our judgements of value--judgements that such and such an end +is good or worth striving for--in so far as they are true judgements, +must be supposed to represent His judgements. We are conscious, in +proportion as we are rational, of pursuing ends which we judge to be +good. If such judgements reveal God's judgements, God must be supposed +to aim likewise at an ideal of good--the same ideal which is revealed +to us by our moral judgements. In these judgements then we have a +revelation, the only possible revelation, of the character of God. The +argument which I have suggested is simply a somewhat exacter statement +of the popular idea that Conscience is the voice of God. + +Further to vindicate the idea of the existence, authority, objective +validity of Conscience would lead us too far away into the region of +Moral Philosophy for our present subject. I will only attempt very +briefly to guard against some possible misunderstandings, and to meet +some obvious objections: + +(1) It need hardly be pointed out that the assertion of the existence +of the Moral Consciousness is not in the slightest degree inconsistent +with recognising its gradual growth and development. The {64} moral +faculty, like every other faculty or aspect or activity of the human +soul, has grown gradually. No rational man doubts the validity--no +Idealist doubts the _a priori_ character--of our mathematical +judgements because probably monkeys and possibly primitive men cannot +count, and certainly cannot perform more than the very simplest +arithmetical operations. Still less do we doubt the validity of +mathematical reasoning because not only children and savages, but +sometimes even distinguished classical scholars--a Macaulay, a Matthew +Arnold, a T. S. Evans,--were wholly incapable of understanding very +simple mathematical arguments. Equally little do we deny a real +difference between harmony and discord because people may be found who +see no difference between 'God save the King' and 'Pop goes the +Weasel.' Self-evident truth does not mean truth which is evident to +everybody. + +(2) It is not doubted that the gradual evolution of our actual moral +ideas--our actual ideas about what is right or wrong in particular +cases--has been largely influenced by education, environment, +association, social pressure, superstition, perhaps natural +selection--in short, all the agencies by which naturalistic Moralists +try to account for the existence of Morality. Even Euclid, or whatever +his modern substitute may be, has to be taught; but that does not show +that Geometry is an arbitrary system {65} invented by the ingenious and +interested devices of those who want to get money by teaching it. +Arithmetic was invented largely as an instrument of commerce; but it +could not have been invented if there were really no such things as +number and quantity, or if the human mind had no original capacity for +recognizing them. Our scientific ideas, our political ideas, our ideas +upon a thousand subjects have been partly developed, partly thwarted +and distorted in their growth, by similar influences. But, however +great the difficulty of getting rid of these distorting influences and +facing such questions in a perfectly dry light, nobody suggests that +objective truth on such matters is non-existent or for ever +unattainable. A claim for objective validity for the moral judgement +does not mean a claim for infallibility on behalf of any individual +Conscience. We may make mistakes in Morals just as we may make +mistakes in Science, or even in pure Mathematics. If a class of forty +small boys are asked to do a sum, they will probably not all bring out +the same answer: but nobody doubts that one answer alone is right, +though arithmetical capacity is a variable quantity. What is meant is +merely that, if I am right in affirming that this is good, you cannot +be likewise right in saying that it is bad: and that we have some +capacity--though doubtless a variable capacity--of judging which is the +true {66} view. Hence our moral judgements, in so far as they are true +judgements, must be taken to be reproductions in us of the thought of +God. To show that an idea has been gradually developed, tells us +nothing as to its truth or falsehood--one way or the other. + +(3) In comparing the self-evidence of moral to that of mathematical +judgements, it is not suggested that our moral judgements in detail are +as certain, as clear and sharply defined, as mathematical judgements, +or that they can claim so universal a consensus among the competent. +What is meant is merely (_a_) that the notion of good in general is an +ultimate category of thought; that it contains a meaning intelligible +not perhaps to every individual human soul, but to the normal, +developed, human consciousness; and (_b_) that the ultimate truth of +morals, if it is seen at all, must be seen immediately. An ultimate +moral truth cannot be deduced from, or proved by, any other truth. You +cannot prove that pleasure is better than pain, or that virtue is +better than pleasure, to any one who judges differently. It does not +follow that all men have an equally clear and delicate moral +consciousness. The power of discriminating moral values differs as +widely as the power of distinguishing musical sounds, or of +appreciating what is excellent in music. Some men may be almost or +altogether without such a power of moral discrimination, just as some +men are wholly {67} destitute of an ear for music; while the higher +degrees of moral appreciation are the possession of the few rather than +of the many. Moral insight is not possessed by all men in equal +measure. Moral genius is as rare as any other kind of genius. + +(4) When we attribute Morality to God, it is not meant that the conduct +which is right for men in detail ought to be or could possibly in all +cases be practised by God. It is a childish objection (though it is +sometimes made by modern philosophers who should know better) to allege +with Aristotle that God cannot be supposed to make or keep contracts. +And in the same way, when we claim universal validity for our moral +judgements, we do not mean that the rules suitable for human conduct +would be the same for beings differently organized and constituted. +Our rules of sexual Morality are clearly applicable only to sexually +constituted beings. What is meant in asserting that these rules are +universally and objectively valid is that these are the rules which +every rational intelligence, in proportion as it is rational, will +recognize as being suitable, or conducive to the ideal life, in beings +constituted as we are. The truth that permanent monogamous marriage +represents the true type of sexual relations for human beings will be +none the less an objectively valid ethical truth, because the lower +animals are below it, while superior beings, {68} it may be, are above +it. Universal love is none the less the absolute moral ideal because +it would be absurd to say that beasts of prey do wrong in devouring +other creatures, or because war is sometimes necessary as a means to +the end of love at our present imperfect stage of social and +intellectual development. The means to the highest good vary with +circumstances; the amount of good that is attainable in such and such +circumstances varies also; consequently the right course of conduct +will be different for beings differently constituted or placed under +different circumstances: but the principles which, in the view of a +perfect intelligence, would determine what is the right course for +different beings in different circumstances will be always the same. +The ultimate principles of our moral judgement, _e.g._ that love is +better than hate, are just as applicable to God as they are to us. Our +conception of the highest good may be inadequate; but we certainly +shall not attain to greater adequacy, or a nearer approach to ultimate +truth, by flatly contradicting our own moral judgements. It would be +just as reasonable to argue that because the law of gravitation might +be proved, from the point of view of the highest knowledge, to be an +inadequate statement of the truth, and all inadequacy involves some +error, therefore we had better assume that from the point of view of +God there is no difference whatever {69} between attraction and +repulsion. All arguments for what is called a 'super-moral' Deity or a +'super-moral' Absolute are open to this fatal objection: moral +judgements cannot possibly rest upon anything but the moral +consciousness, and yet these doctrines contradict the moral +consciousness. The idea of good is derived from the moral +consciousness. When a man declares that from the point of view of the +Universe all things are very good, he gets the idea of good from his +own moral consciousness, and is assuming the objective validity of its +dictates. His judgement is an ethical judgement as much as mine when I +say that to me some things in this world appear very bad. If he is not +entitled to assume the validity of his ethical judgements, his +proposition is false or meaningless. If he is entitled to assume their +validity, why should he distrust that same moral consciousness when it +affirms (as it undoubtedly does) that pain and sin are for ever bad, +and not (as our 'super-moral' Religionists suggest) additional artistic +touches which only add to the aesthetic effect of the whole? + +I shall now proceed to develop some of the consequences which (as it +appears to me) flow from the doctrine that our belief in the goodness +of God is an inference from our own moral consciousness: + +(1) It throws light on the relations between Religion and Morality. +The champions of ethical {70} education as a substitute for Religion +and of ethical societies as a substitute for Churches are fond of +assuming that Religion is not only unnecessary to, but actually +destructive of, the intrinsic authority of the moral law. If we +supposed with a few theologians in the most degenerate periods of +Theology (with William of Occam, some extreme Calvinists, and a few +eighteenth-century divines like Archdeacon Paley) that actions are +right or wrong merely because willed by God--meaning by God simply a +powerful being without goodness or moral character, then undoubtedly +the Secularists would be right. If a religious Morality implies that +Virtue means merely (in Paley's words) 'the doing good to mankind in +obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness' +(so that if God were to will murder and adultery, those practices would +forthwith become meritorious), then undoubtedly it would be better to +teach Morality without Religion than with it. But that is a caricature +of the true teaching of Christ or of any considerable Christian +theologian. Undoubtedly we must assert what is called the +'independence' of the moral judgement. The judgement 'to love is +better than to hate' has a meaning complete in itself, which contains +no reference whatever to any theological presupposition. It is a +judgement which is, and which can intelligibly be, made by people of +all religions or of none. But {71} we may still raise the question +whether the validity of that judgement can be defended without +theological implications. And I am prepared most distinctly to +maintain that it cannot. These moral judgements claim objective +validity. When we say 'this is right,' we do not mean merely 'I +approve this course of conduct,' 'this conduct gives me a thrill of +satisfaction, a "feeling of approbation," a pleasure of the moral +sense.' If that were all that was meant, it would be perfectly +possible that another person might feel an equally satisfactory glow of +approbation at conduct of a precisely opposite character _without +either of them being wrong_. A bull-fight fills most Spaniards with +feelings of lively approbation, and most Englishmen with feelings of +acute disapprobation. If such moral judgements were mere feelings, +neither of them would be wrong. There could be no question of +objective rightness or wrongness. Mustard is not objectively nice or +objectively nasty: it is simply nice to some people and nasty to +others. The mustard-lover has no right to condemn the mustard-hater, +or the mustard-hater the mustard-lover. If Morality were merely a +matter of feeling or emotion, actions would not be objectively right or +objectively wrong; but simply right to some people, wrong to others. +Hume would be right in holding the morality of an action to consist +simply in the pleasure it gives to the person who {72} contemplates it. +Rightness thus becomes simply a name for the fact of social +approbation.[2] And yet surely the very heart of the affirmation which +the moral consciousness makes in each of us is that right and wrong are +not matters of mere subjective feeling. When I assert 'this is right,' +I do not claim personal infallibility. I may, indeed, be wrong, as I +may be wrong in my political or scientific theories. But I do mean +that I think I am right; and that, if I am right, you cannot also be +right when you affirm that this same action is wrong. This objective +validity is the very core and centre of the idea of Duty or moral +obligation. That is why it is so important to assert that moral +judgements are the work of Reason, not of a supposed moral sense or any +other kind of feeling. Feelings may vary in different men without any +of them being in the wrong; red really is the same as green to a +colour-blind person. What we mean when we talk about the existence of +Duty is that things are right or wrong, no matter what you or I think +about them--that the laws of Morality {73} are quite as much +independent of my personal likings and dislikings as the physical laws +of Nature. That is what is meant by the 'objectivity' of the moral law. + +Now, the question arises--'Can such an objectivity be asserted by those +who take a purely materialistic or naturalistic view of the Universe?' +Whatever our metaphysical theories about the nature of Reality may be, +we can in practice have no difficulty in the region of Physical Science +about recognizing an objective reality of some kind which is other than +my mere thinking about it. That fire will burn whether I think so or +not is practically recognized by persons of all metaphysical +persuasions. If I say 'I can cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bare +imagination of a feast,' I try the experiment, and I fail. I imagine +the feast, but I am hungry still: and if I persist in the experiment, I +die. But what do we mean when we say that things are right or wrong +whether I think them so or not, that the Moral Law exists outside me +and independently of my thinking about it? Where and how does this +moral law exist? The physical laws of Nature may be supposed by the +Materialist or the Realist somehow to exist in matter: to the +Metaphysician there may be difficulties in such a view, but the +difficulties are not obvious to common-sense. But surely (whatever may +be thought about physical laws) the moral law, {74} which expresses not +any matter of physical fact but what _ought_ to be thought of acts, +cannot be supposed to exist in a purely material Universe. An 'ought' +can exist only in and for a mind. In what mind, then, does the moral +law exist? As a matter of fact, different people's moral judgements +contradict one another. And the consciousness of no living man can +well be supposed to be a flawless reflection of the absolute moral +ideal. On a non-theistic view of the Universe, then, the moral law +cannot well be thought of as having any actual existence. The +objective validity of the moral law can indeed be and no doubt is +_asserted_, believed in, acted upon without reference to any +theological creed; but it cannot be defended or fully justified without +the pre-supposition of Theism. What we mean by an objective law is +that the moral law is a part of the ultimate nature of things, on a +level with the laws of physical nature, and it cannot be _that_, unless +we assume that law to be an expression of the same mind in which +physical laws originate. The idea of duty, when analysed, implies the +idea of God. Whatever else Plato meant by the 'idea of the good,' this +at least was one of his meanings--that the moral law has its source in +the source of all Reality. + +And therefore at bottom popular feeling is right in holding that +religious belief is necessary to Morality. Of course I do not mean to +say that, were {75} religious belief to disappear from the world, +Morality would disappear too. But I do think Morality would become +quite a different thing from what it has been for the higher levels of +religious thought and feeling. The best men would no doubt go on +acting up to their own highest ideal just as if it did possess +objective validity, no matter how unable they might be to reconcile +their practical with their speculative beliefs. But it would not be so +for the many--or perhaps even for the few in their moments of weakness +and temptation, when once the consequences of purely naturalistic +Ethics were thoroughly admitted and realized. The only kind of +objective validity which can be recognized on a purely naturalistic +view of Ethics is conformity to public opinion. The tendency of all +naturalistic Ethics is to make a God of public opinion. And if no +other deity were recognized, such a God would assuredly not be without +worshippers. And yet the strongest temptation to most of us is the +temptation to follow a debased public opinion--the opinion of our age, +our class, our party. Apart from faith in a perfectly righteous God +whose commands are, however imperfectly, revealed in the individual +Conscience, we can find no really valid reason why the individual +should act on his own sense of what is intrinsically right, even when +he finds himself an 'Athanasius contra mundum,' and when his own +personal likings and inclinations {76} and interests are on the side of +the world. Kant was at bottom right, though perhaps he did not give +the strongest reasons for his position, in making the idea of God a +postulate of Morality. + +From a more directly practical point of view I need hardly point out +how much easier it is to feel towards the moral law the reverence that +we ought to feel when we believe that that law is embodied in a +personal Will. Not only is religious Morality not opposed to the idea +of duty for duty's sake: it is speculatively the only reasonable basis +of it; practically and emotionally the great safeguard of it. And +whatever may be thought of the possibility of a speculative defence of +such an idea without Theism, the practical difficulty of teaching +it--especially to children, uneducated and unreflective persons--seems +to be quite insuperable.[3] In more than one country in which +religious education has been banished from the primary schools, grave +observers complain that the idea of Duty seems to be suffering an +eclipse in the minds of the rising {77} generation; some of them add +that in those lands crime is steadily on the increase. Catechisms of +civil duty and the like have not hitherto proved very satisfactory +substitutes for the old teaching about the fear of God. Would that it +were more frequently remembered on both sides of our educational +squabbles that the supreme object of all religious education should be +to instil into children's minds in the closest possible connexion the +twin ideas of God and of Duty! + +(2) I have tried to show that the ethical importance of the idea of God +is prior to and independent of any belief in the idea of future rewards +and punishments or of a future life, however conceived of. But when +the idea of a righteous God has once been accepted, the idea of +Immortality seems to me to follow from it as a sort of corollary. If +any one on a calm review of the actual facts of the world's history can +suppose that such a world as ours could be the expression of the will +of a rational and moral Being without the assumption of a future life +for which this is a discipline or education or preparatory stage, +argument would be useless with him. Inveterate Optimism, like +inveterate Scepticism, admits of no refutation, but in most minds +produces no conviction. For those who are convinced that the world has +a rational end, and yet that life as we see it (taken by itself) cannot +be that end, the hypothesis {78} of Immortality becomes a necessary +deduction from their belief in God. + +I would not disparage the educative effect of the belief in a future +life even when expressed in the crude and inadequate metaphor of reward +and punishment. Few of us, I venture to think, have reached the moral +level at which the belief--not in a vindictive, retributive, unending +torment, but in a disciplinary or purgatorial education of souls +prolonged after death--is without its value. At the same time it is a +mere caricature of all higher religious beliefs when the religious +motive is supposed to mean simply a fear of punishment and hope of +personal reward, even of the least sensuous or material kind. Love of +goodness for its own sake is for the Theist identical with the love of +God. Love of a Person is a stronger force than devotion to an idea; +and an ethical conception of God carries with it the idea of +Immortality. + + The wages of sin is death: if the wages of Virtue be dust, + Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm + and the fly? + + She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just, + To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky; + Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.[4] + + +Belief in human Immortality is, as I have suggested, the postulate +without which most of us cannot {79} believe in God. Even for its own +sake it is of the highest ethical value. The belief in Immortality +gives a meaning to life even when it has lost all other meaning. 'It +is rather,' in the noble words of the late Professor Sidgwick, 'from a +disinterested aversion to an universe so irrationally constituted that +the wages of virtue should be dust than from any private reckoning +about his own wages,' that the good man clings to the idea of +Immortality. And that is not all. The value of all higher goods even +in this life, though it does not depend wholly upon their duration, +does partly depend upon it. It would be better to be pure and +unselfish for a day than to be base and selfish for a century. And yet +we do not hesitate to commend the value of intellectual and of all +kinds of higher enjoyments on account of their greater durability. +Why, then, should we shrink from admitting that the value of character +really is increased when it is regarded as surviving bodily death? +Disbelief in Immortality would, I believe, in the long run and for the +vast majority of men, carry with it an enormous enhancement of the +value of the carnal and sensual over the spiritual and intellectual +element in life. + +(3) A third consequence which follows from our determining to accept +the moral consciousness as containing the supreme revelation of God is +this. From the point of view of the moral consciousness {80} we cannot +say that the Universe is wholly good. We have only one means of +judging whether things are good or bad: the idea of value is wholly +derived from our own ethical judgements or judgements of value. If we +distrust these judgements, there is no higher court to which we can +appeal. And if we distrust our most ultimate judgements of value, I do +not know why we should trust any judgements whatever. Even if we grant +that from some very transcendental metaphysical height--the height, for +instance, of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy--it may be contended that none of +our judgements are wholly true or fully adequate to express the true +nature of Reality, we at all events cannot get nearer to Reality than +we are conducted by the judgements which present themselves to us as +immediate and self-evident. Now, if we do apply these judgements of +value to the Universe as we know it, can we say that everything in it +seems to be very good? For my own part, I unhesitatingly say, 'Pain is +an evil, and sin is a worse evil, and nothing on earth can ever make +them good.' How then are we to account for such evils in a Universe +which we believe to express the thought and will of a perfectly +righteous Being? In only one way that I know of--by supposing they are +means to a greater good. That is really the substance and substratum +of all the Theodicies of all the Philosophers and all the {81} +Theologians except those who frankly trample on or throw over the Moral +Consciousness, and declare that, for those who see truly, pain and sin +are only additional sources of aesthetic interest in a great +world-drama produced for his own entertainment by a Deity not +anthropomorphic enough to love but still anthropomorphic enough to be +amused. + +I shall be told no doubt that this is limiting God. A human being may, +it will be urged, without loss of goodness, do things in themselves +evil, as a means to a greater good: as a surgeon, he may cause +excruciating pain; as a statesman or a soldier, he may doom thousands +to a cruel death; as a wise administrator of the poor law, he may +refuse to relieve much suffering, in order that he may not cause more +suffering. But this is because his power is limited; he has to work +upon a world which has a nature of its own independent of his volition. +To apply the same explanation to the evil which God causes, is to make +Him finite instead of Infinite, limited in power instead of Omnipotent. +Now in a sense I admit that this is so. I am not wedded to the words +'Infinite' or 'Omnipotent.' But I would protest against a persistent +misrepresentation of the point of view which I defend. It is suggested +that the limit to the power of God must necessarily spring from the +existence of some other thing or being outside of Him, not created by +Him or under His {82} control. I must protest that that is not so. +Everybody admits that God cannot change the past; few Philosophers +consider it necessary to maintain that God could construct triangles +with their angles not together equal to two right angles, or think it +any derogation from his Omnipotence to say that He could not make the +sum of two and two to be other than four. Few Theologians push their +idea of Freewill so far as to insist that God could will Himself to be +unjust or unloving, or that, being just and loving, he could do unjust +or unloving acts. There are necessities to which even God must submit. +But they are not imposed upon Him from without: they are parts of His +own essential nature. The limitation by which God cannot attain His +ends without causing some evil is a limitation of exactly the same +nature. If you say that it is no limitation of God not to be able to +change the past, for the thing is really unmeaning, then I submit that +in the same way it may be no limitation that He should not be able to +evolve highly organized beings without a struggle for existence, or to +train human beings in unselfishness without allowing the existence both +of sin and of pain. From the point of view of perfect knowledge, these +things might turn out to be just as unmeaning as for God to change the +past. The popular idea of Omnipotence is one which really does not +bear looking into. If we supposed the world {83} to contain no evil at +all, still there would be in it a definite amount of good. Twice such +a world would be twice as good. Why is there not twice that amount of +good? A being who deliberately created only a good world of limited +quantity--a definite number of spirits (for instance) enjoying so much +pleasure and so much virtue--when he could have created twice that +number of spirits, and consequently twice that amount of good, would +not be perfectly good or loving. And so on _ad infinitum_, no matter +how much good you suppose him to have created. The only sense which we +can intelligibly give to the idea of a divine Omnipotence is this--that +God possesses all the power there is, that He can do all things that +are in their own nature possible.[5] + +But there is a more formidable objection which I have yet to meet. It +has been urged by certain Philosophers of great eminence that, if we +suppose God not to be unlimited in power, we have no guarantee that the +world is even good on the whole; we should not be authorized to infer +anything as to a future life or the ultimate destiny of Humanity from +the fact of God's goodness. A limited God might be a defeated God. I +admit the difficulty. This is the 'greatest wave' of all in the +theistic {84} argument. In reply, I would simply appeal to the reasons +which I have given for supposing that the world is really willed by +God. A rational being does not will evil except as a means to a +greater good. If God be rational, we have a right to suppose that the +world must contain more good than evil, or it would not be willed at +all. A being who was obliged to create a world which did not seem to +him good would be a blind force, as force is understood by the pure +Materialist, not a rational Will. That much we have a right to claim +as a matter of strict Logic; and that would to my own mind be a +sufficient reason for assuming that, at least for the higher order of +spirits, such a life as ours must be intended as the preface to a +better life than this. But I should go further. To me it appears that +such evils as sin and pain are so enormously worse than the mere +absence of good, that I could not regard as rational a Universe in +which the good did not very greatly predominate over the evil. More +than that I do not think we are entitled to say. And yet Justice is so +great a good that it is rational to hope that for every individual +conscious being--at least each individual capable of any high degree of +good--there must be a predominance of good on the whole. Beings of +very small capacity might conceivably be created chiefly or entirely as +a means to a vastly greater good than any that they {85} themselves +enjoy: the higher a spirit is in the scale of being, the more difficult +it becomes to suppose that it has been brought into existence merely as +a means to another's good, or that it will not ultimately enjoy a good +which will make it on the whole good that it should have been born. + +I could wish myself that, in popular religious teaching, there was a +franker conception of this position--a position which, as I have said, +is really implied in the Theodicies of all the Divines. Popular +unbelief--and sometimes the unbelief of more cultivated persons--rests +mainly upon the existence of evil. We should cut at the roots of it by +teaching frankly that this is the best of all possible Universes, +though not the best of all imaginable Universes--such Universes as we +can construct in our own imagination by picturing to ourselves all the +good that there is in the world without any of the evil. We may still +say, if we please, that God is infinite because He is limited by +nothing outside His own nature, except what He has Himself caused. We +can still call Him Omnipotent in the sense that He possesses all the +power there is. And in many ways such a belief is far more practically +consolatory and stimulating than a belief in a God who can do all +things by any means and who consequently does not need our help. In +our view, we are engaged not in a sham warfare with an evil that is +really {86} good, but in a real warfare with a real evil, a struggle in +which we have the ultimate power in the Universe on our side, but one +in which the victory cannot be won without our help, a real struggle in +which we are called upon to be literally fellow-workers with God. + + +LITERATURE + +The subject is more or less explicitly dealt with in most of the works +mentioned at the end of the last two lectures, and also in books on +Moral Philosophy too numerous to mention. Classical vindications of +the authority of the Moral Consciousness are Bishop Butler's _Sermons_, +and Kant's _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_ and +other ethical writings (translated by T. K. Abbott). I have expressed +my own views on the subject with some fullness in the third book of my +_Theory of Good and Evil_. + + + +[1] See especially Book II. Lect. iii. + +[2] 'We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: +but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in +effect feel that it is virtuous.' (_Treatise_, Part I, Section ii., +ed. Green and Grose, vol. ii. p. 247.) 'The distinction of moral good +and evil is founded in the pleasure or pain, which results from the +view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain +cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows that there is +just so much virtue in any character as every one places in it, and +that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken.' +(_Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 311.) + +[3] There are no doubt ways of making Morality the law of the Universe +without what most of us understand by Theism, though not without +Religion, and a Religion of a highly metaphysical character; but +because such non-theistic modes of religious thought exist in Buddhism, +for instance, it does not follow that they are reasonable, and, at all +events, they are hardly intelligible to most Western minds. Such +non-theistic Religions imply a Metaphysic quite as much as Christianity +or Buddhism. There have been Religions without the idea of a personal +God, but never without Metaphysic, _i.e._ a theory about the ultimate +nature of things. + +[4] Tennyson's _Wages_. + +[5] The doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas is 'Cum possit Deus omnia +efficere quae esae possunt, non autem quae contradictionem implicant, +omnipotens merito dicitur.' (_Summa Theol_., Pars I. Q. xxv. art. 8.) + + + + +{87} + +LECTURE IV + +DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS + +In the present lecture I shall try to deal with some of the difficulties +which will probably have been arising in your minds in the course of the +last three; and in meeting them, to clear up to some extent various +points which have been left obscure. + +(1) _Creation_. I have endeavoured to show that the world must be +thought of as ultimately an experience in the mind of God, parts of which +are progressively communicated to lesser minds such as ours. This +experience--both the complete experience which is in His own mind and +also the measure of it which is communicated to the lesser minds--must be +thought of as willed by God. At the same time I suggested as an +alternative view that, even if we think of things as having an existence +which is not simply in and for minds, the things must be caused to exist +by a rational Will. Now the world, as we know it, consists of a number +of changes taking place in time, changes which are undoubtedly +represented in thought as changes happening to, or {88} accidents of, a +permanent substance, whether (with the Idealist) we suppose that this +substance is merely the object of Mind's contemplation, or whether (with +the Realist) we think of it as having some sort of being independent of +Mind. But what of the first of these events--the beginning of the whole +series? Are we to think of the series of events in time as having a +beginning and possibly an end, or as being without beginning or end? +What in fact are we to make of the theological idea of Creation, often +further defined as Creation out of nothing? It is often suggested both +by Idealists and by Realists that the idea of a creation or absolute +beginning of the world is unthinkable. Such a view seems to me to be a +piece of unwarrantable _a priori_ dogmatism--quite as much so as the +closely connected idea that the Uniformity of Nature is an _a priori_ +necessity of thought. No doubt the notion of an absolute beginning of +all things is unthinkable enough: if we think of God as creating the +world at a definite point of time, then we must suppose God Himself to +have existed before that creation. We cannot think of an event in time +without thinking of a time before it; and time cannot be thought of as +merely empty time. Events of some kind there must necessarily have been, +even though those events are thought of as merely subjective experiences +involving no relation to space. A beginning of existence is, {89} +indeed, unthinkable. But there is no difficulty in supposing that this +particular series of phenomena which constitutes our physical Universe +may have had a beginning in time. On the other hand there is no positive +evidence, for those who cannot regard the early chapters of Genesis as +representing on such a matter anything but a primitive legend edited by a +later Jewish thinker, that it had such a beginning. It is no doubt more +difficult to represent to ourselves a beginning of space; and the notion +of an empty space, eternally thought but not eternally filled up by any +series of phenomena of the space-occupying kind, represents a rather +difficult, though not (as it seems to me) an absolutely impossible +conception. The question, therefore, whether there was a beginning of +the series of events which constitute the history of our physical world +must (so far as I can see) be left an open one. + +Of course if the argument of Lord Kelvin be accepted, if he is justified +in arguing on purely physical grounds that the present distribution of +energy in the Universe is such that it cannot have resulted from an +infinite series of previous physical changes, if Science can prove that +the series is a finite one, the conclusions of Science must be +accepted.[1] Metaphysic has nothing to say for or against such a view. +That is a question of Physics on which {90} of course I do not venture to +express any opinion whatever. + +(2) _The time-series_. I am incompetent to pronounce an opinion on the +validity of such arguments as Lord Kelvin's. But, however we decide this +question, there will still remain the further and harder question, 'Is +the series of all events or experiences, physical or psychical (not +merely the particular series which constitutes our physical Universe), to +be thought of as finite or infinite? On the one hand it involves a +contradiction to talk of a time-series which has a beginning: a time +which has no time before it is not time at all; any more than space with +an end to it would be space. On the other hand, we find equally, or +almost equally, unthinkable the hypothesis of an endless series of events +in time: a series of events, which no possible enumeration of its members +will make any smaller, presents itself to us as unthinkable, directly we +regard it as expressing the true nature of a positive reality, and not as +a mere result of mathematical abstraction. Here then we are presented +with an antinomy--an apparent contradiction in our thought--which we can +neither avoid nor overcome. It is one of the classical antinomies +recognized by the Kantian Philosophy--the only one, I may add, which +neither Kant himself nor any of his successors has done anything to +attenuate or to remove. {91} Kant's own attempted solution of it +involved the impossible supposition that the past has no existence at all +except in so far as it is thought by some finite mind in the present. +The way out of this difficulty which is popular with post-Kantian +Idealists is to say that God is Himself out of time, and eternally sees +the whole series at once. But, in the first place, that does not get +over the difficulty: even if God does see the whole series at once, He +must see it either as limited or as endless, and the old antinomy breaks +out again when we attempt to think either alternative. And secondly, +when you treat a temporal series as one which is all really present +together--of course it may all be _known_ together as even we know the +past and the future--but when you try to think of God as contemplating +the whole series as really present altogether, the series is no longer a +time-series. You have turned it into some other kind of +series--practically (we may say) into a spacial series. You have cut the +knot, instead of unravelling it. I have no doubt that the existence of +this antinomy does point to the fact that there is some way of thinking +about time from which the difficulty disappears: but we are, so far as I +can see, incompetent so to resolve it. Philosophers resent the idea of +an insoluble problem. By all means let them go on trying to solve it. I +can only say that I find no difficulty in showing the futility {92} of +any solution of the time-difficulty which I have so far seen. For the +present at least--I strongly suspect for ever--we must acquiesce on this +matter in a reverent Agnosticism. We can show the absurdity of regarding +time as merely subjective; we can show that it belongs to the very +essence of the Universe we know; we can show that it is as 'objective' as +anything else within our knowledge. But how to reconcile this +objectivity with the difficulty of thinking of an endless succession no +Philosopher has done much to explain. For religious purposes it seems +enough to believe that each member of the time-series--no matter how many +such events there may be, no matter whether the series be endless or +not--is caused by God. The more reflecting Theologians have generally +admitted that the act of divine Conservation is essentially the same as +that of Creation. A God who can be represented as 'upholding all things +by the power of his word' is a creative Deity whether the act of creation +be in time, or eternally continuous, or (if there were any meaning in +that phrase) out of time altogether.[2] + +{93} + +(3) _The creation of spirits_. It may seem to some of you that I may +have so far left out, or too easily disposed of, an important link in our +argument. I have given reasons for thinking that the material world +cannot be explained without the assumption of a universal Consciousness +which both thinks and wills it. I have assumed rather than proved that +the lesser minds, in which the divine experience is partially reproduced, +are also caused to exist and kept in existence by the same divine Will. +But how, it may be said, do we know that those minds did not exist before +the birth of the organisms with which upon this planet they are +connected? The considerations which forbid our thinking of matter as +something capable of existing by itself do not apply to minds. A +consciousness, unlike a thing, exists 'for itself,' not merely 'for +another': a mind is not made what it is by being known or otherwise +experienced by another mind: its very being consists in being itself +conscious: it is what it is for itself. It is undoubtedly impossible +positively to disprove the hypothesis of eternally pre-existent souls. +Sometimes that hypothesis is combined with Theism. It {94} is supposed +that God is the supreme and incomparably the most powerful, but not the +only, self-existent and eternal Spirit. This hypothesis--sometimes +spoken of as Pluralism[3]--has many attractions: from the time of Origen +onwards the idea of Pre-existence has seemed to many to facilitate the +explanation of evil by making it possible to regard the sufferings of our +present state as a disciplinary process for getting rid of an original or +a pre-natal sinfulness. It is a theory not incapable of satisfying the +demands of the religious Consciousness, and may even form an element in +an essentially Christian theory of the Universe: but to my mind it is +opposed to all the obvious indications of experience. The connexion +between soul and body is such that the laws of the soul's development +obviously form part of the same system with the laws of physical nature. +If one part of that system is referred to the divine Will, so must the +whole of it be. The souls, when they have entered animal bodies, must be +supposed to be subject to a system of laws which is of one piece with the +system of physical laws. If the physical part of the world-order is +referred to the divine Will, the psychical part of it must be equally +referred to {95} that Will. The souls might, indeed, conceivably have an +independent and original nature of their own capable of offering +resistance to the divine intentions. But we see, to say the least, no +indications of a struggle going on between an outside divine Will and +independent beings not forming a part of the divine scheme. At all +events, the result of this struggle, if struggle there be, is (so far as +we can observe) a system, complete and orderly, within the psychical +sphere as much as within the purely physical sphere. And in particular +the body is exactly fitted to the soul that is to inhabit it. We never +find the intellect of a Shakespeare in connexion with the facial angle of +a negro; bodies which resemble the bodies of their parents are connected +with souls between which a similar resemblance can be traced. If the +souls existed before birth, we must suppose those souls to be kept +waiting in a limbo of some kind till a body is prepared suitable for +their reception. We must suppose that among the waiting souls, one is +from time to time selected to be the offspring of such and such a +matrimonial union, so as to present (as it were) a colourable appearance +of being really the fruit of that union. Further, before birth the souls +must be steeped in the waters of Lethe, or something of the kind, so as +to rid them of all memory of their previous experiences. Such a +conception seems to {96} me to belong to the region of Mythology rather +than of sober philosophical thought. I do not deny that Mythology may +sometimes be a means of pictorially or symbolically envisaging truths to +which Philosophy vaguely points but which it cannot express in clearly +apprehensible detail. But such a Mythology as this seems to be +intellectually unmotived and unhelpful. It is not wanted to explain the +facts: there is nothing in our experience to suggest it, and much which +is _prima facie_ opposed to it. It really removes no single difficulty: +for one difficulty which it presents some appearance of removing, it +creates a dozen greater ones. It is a hypothesis which we shall do well +to dismiss as otiose. + +(4) _Non-theistic Idealism_. Somewhat less unmotived, if we look upon it +from a merely intellectual point of view, is the theory of pre-existent +souls without a personal God. Many, if not most, of you probably possess +more or less acquaintance with the views of my friend, Dr. McTaggart. I +cannot here undertake a full exposition or criticism of one of the ablest +thinkers of our day--one of the very few English thinkers who is the +author of a truly original metaphysical system. I can only touch--and +that most inadequately--upon the particular side of it which directly +bears upon our present enquiry. Dr. McTaggart is an Idealist; he +recognizes the {97} impossibility of matter without mind. For him +nothing exists but spirits, but he does not recognize the necessity for +any one all-embracing or controlling Spirit: the only spirits in his +Universe are limited minds like those of men and animals. He differs, +then, from the Pluralist of the type just mentioned in getting rid of the +hypothesis of a personal God side by side with and yet controlling the +uncreated spirits. And he differs further from all Pluralists in not +treating the separate spirits as so many centres of consciousness quite +independent of, and possibly at war with, all the rest: the spirits form +part of an ordered system: the world is a unity, though that unity is not +the unity which belongs to self-consciousness. He recognizes, in the +traditional language of Philosophy, an Absolute, but this Absolute is not +a single spiritual Being but a Society: or, if it is to be called a +single spiritual Being, it is a Being which exists or manifests itself +only in a plurality of limited consciousnesses. + +This scheme is, I admit, more reasonable than Pluralism. It does, +nominally at least, recognize the world as an ordered system. It gets +rid of the difficulty of accounting for the apparent order of the Cosmos +as the result of a struggle between independent wills. It is not, upon +its author's pre-suppositions, a gratuitous theory: for a mind which +accepts Idealism and rejects Theism it is the only {98} intelligible +alternative. But I must confess that it seems to me open to most of the +difficulties which I have endeavoured to point out in Pluralism, and to +some others. In the first place, there is one, to my mind, great and +insuperable difficulty about it. As an Idealist, Dr. McTaggart has to +admit that the whole physical world, in so far as it exists at all, must +exist in and for some consciousness. Now, not only is there, according +to him, no single mind in which the system can exist as a whole, but even +all the minds together do not apparently know the whole of it, or (so far +as our knowledge goes) ever will. The undiscovered and unknown part of +the Universe is then non-existent. And yet, be it noticed, the known +part of the world does not make a perfectly articulated or (if you like +the phrase) organic system without the unknown part. It is only on the +assumption of relations between what we know and what we don't know that +we can regard it as an orderly, intelligible system at all. Therefore, +if part of the system is non-existent, the whole system--the system as a +whole--must be treated as non-existent. The world is, we are told, a +system; and yet as a system it has (upon the hypothesis) no real +existence. The systematic whole does not exist in matter, for to Dr. +McTaggart matter is merely the experience of Mind. What sort of +existence, then, can an undiscovered planet possess till it is {99} +discovered? For Dr. McTaggart has not provided any mind or minds in and +for which it is to exist. At one time, indeed, Dr. McTaggart seemed +disposed to accept a suggestion of mine that, on his view, each soul must +be omniscient; and to admit that, while in its temporal aspect, each soul +is limited and fallible in its knowledge, it is at the same time +supertemporally omniscient. That is a conception difficult beyond all +the difficulties of the most arbitrary and self-contradicting of orthodox +patristic or scholastic speculations. But, as Dr. McTaggart does not now +seem disposed to insist upon that point, I will say no more about it +except that to my mind it is a theory which defies all intellectual +grasp. It can be stated; it cannot be thought. + +Further, I would remind you, the theory is open to all the objections +which I urged against the Pre-existence theory in its pluralistic form. +I have suggested the difficulties involved in the facts of heredity--the +difficulty of understanding how souls whose real intellectual and moral +characteristics are uncaused and eternal should be assigned to parents so +far resembling them as to lead almost inevitably to the inference that +the characteristics of the children are to some extent causally connected +with those of the parents.[4] Now the Pluralist can {100} at least urge +that for this purpose ingenious arrangements are contrived by God--by the +One Spirit whom he regards as incomparably the wisest and most powerful +in the Universe. Dr. McTaggart recognizes no intelligence capable of +grappling with such a problem or succession of problems. But this +particular matter of the assignment of souls to bodies is only a +particular application of a wider difficulty. Dr. McTaggart contends +that the Universe constitutes not merely a physical but a moral order. +He would not deny that the Universe means something; that the series of +events tends towards an end, an end which is also a good; that it has a +purpose and a final cause. And yet this purpose exists in no mind +whatever, and is due to no will whatever--except to the very small extent +to which the processes of physical nature can be consciously directed to +an end by the volitions of men and similarly limited intelligences. As a +whole, the Universe is purposed and willed by no single will or +combination of wills. I confess I do not understand the idea of a +purpose which operates, but is not the purpose of a Mind which is also a +Will. All the considerations upon which I dwelt to show the necessity of +such a Will to account for the Universe which we know, are so many +arguments against Dr. McTaggart's scheme. The events of Dr. McTaggart's +Universe are, upon the view of Causality which I {101} attempted to +defend in my second lecture, uncaused events. + +Nevertheless, as a Philosopher, I am deeply grateful to Dr. McTaggart. +Not only does his scheme on its practical side seem to me preferable to +many systems which sound more orthodox--systems of vague pantheistic +Theism in which Morality is treated as mere 'appearance' and personal +Immortality deliberately rejected--but it has done much intellectually to +clear the air. Dr. McTaggart seems to me right in holding that, if God +or the Absolute is to include in itself all other spirits, and yet the +personality or self-consciousness of those spirits is not to be denied, +then this Absolute in which they are to be included cannot reasonably be +thought of as a conscious being, or invested with the other attributes +usually implied by the term God. + +And this leads me to say a few words more in explanation of my own view +of the relation between God and human or other souls. To me, as I have +already intimated, it seems simply meaningless to speak of one +consciousness as included in another consciousness. The essence of a +consciousness is to be for itself: whether it be a thought, a feeling, or +an emotion, the essence of that consciousness is what it is for me. +Every moment of consciousness is unique. Another being may have a {102} +similar feeling: in that case there are two feelings, and not one. +Another mind may know what I feel, but the knowledge of another's agony +is (fortunately) a very different thing from the agony itself. It is +fashionable in some quarters to ridicule the idea of 'impenetrable' +souls. If 'impenetrable' means that another soul cannot know what goes +on in my soul, I do not assert that the soul is impenetrable. I believe +that God knows what occurs in my soul in an infinitely completer way than +that in which any human being can know it. Further, I believe that every +soul is kept in existence from moment to moment by a continuous act of +the divine Will, and so is altogether dependent upon that Will, and forms +part of one system with Him. On the other hand I believe that (through +the analogy of my own mind and the guidance of the moral consciousness) I +do know, imperfectly and inadequately, 'as in a mirror darkly,' what goes +on in God's Mind. But, if penetrability is to mean identity, the theory +that souls are penetrable seems to me mainly unintelligible. The +acceptance which it meets with in some quarters is due, I believe, wholly +to the influence of that most fertile source of philosophical +confusion--misapplied spacial metaphor.[5] It seems easy to talk about a +mind being {103} something in itself, and yet part of another mind, +because we are familiar with the idea of things in space forming part of +larger things in space--Chinese boxes, for instance, shut up in bigger +ones. Such a mode of thought is wholly inapplicable to minds which are +not in space at all. Space is in the mind: the mind is not in space. A +mind is not a thing which can be round or square: you can't say that the +intellect of Kant or of Lord Kelvin measures so many inches by so many: +equally impossible is it to talk about such an intellect being a part of +a more extensive intellect. + +The theory of an all-inclusive Deity has recently been adopted and +popularized by Mr. Campbell,[6] who has done all that rhetorical skill +combined with genuine religious earnestness can do to present it in an +attractive and edifying dress. And yet the same Logic which leads to the +assertion that the Saint is part of God, leads also to the assertion that +Caesar Borgia and Napoleon Buonaparte and all the wicked Popes who have +ever been white-washed by episcopal or other historians are also parts of +God. How can I worship, how can I strive to be like, how can I be the +better for believing in or revering {104} a Being of whom Caesar Borgia +is a part as completely and entirely as St. Paul or our Lord himself? +Hindoo Theology is consistent in this matter. It worships the +destructive and the vicious aspects of Brahma as much as the kindly and +the moral ones: it does not pretend that God is revealed in the Moral +Consciousness, or is in any exclusive or one-sided way a God of Love. If +it be an 'ethical obsession' (as has been suggested) to object to treat +Immorality as no less a revelation of God than Morality, I must plead +guilty to such an obsession. And yet without such an 'obsession' I +confess I do not see what is left of Christianity. There is only one way +out of the difficulty. If we are all parts of God, we can only call God +good or perfect by maintaining that the deliverances of our moral +consciousness have no validity for God, and therefore can tell us nothing +about him. That has been done deliberately and explicitly by some +Philosophers:[7] the distinguished Theologians who echo the language of +this Philosophy have fortunately for their own religious life and +experience, but unfortunately for their philosophical consistency, +declined to follow in their steps. A God who is 'beyond good and evil,' +can be no fitting object of {105} worship to men who wish to become good, +just, merciful. If the cosmic process be indifferent to these ethical +considerations, we had better (with honest Agnostics like Professor +Huxley) make up our minds to defy it, whether it call itself God or not. + +But it is not so much on account of its consequences as on account of its +essential unmeaningness and intellectual unintelligibility that I would +invite you to reject this formula 'God is all.' Certainly, the Universe +is an ordered system: there is nothing in it that is not done by the Will +of God. And some parts of this Universe--the spiritual parts of it and +particularly the higher spirits--are not mere creations of God's will. +They have a resemblance of nature to Him. I do not object to your saying +that at bottom there is but one Substance in the Universe, if you will +only keep clear of the materialistic and spacial association of the word +Substance: but it is a Substance which reveals itself in many different +consciousnesses. The theory of an all-inclusive Consciousness is not +necessary to make possible the idea of close and intimate communion +between God and men, or of the revelation in and to Humanity of the +thought of God. On the contrary, it is the idea of Identity which +destroys the possibility of communion. Communion implies two minds: a +mind cannot have communion with itself or with part of itself. The two +may also in a {106} sense be one; of course all beings are ultimately +part of one Universe or Reality: but that Reality is not one +Consciousness. The Universe is a unity, but the unity is not of the kind +which constitutes a person or a self-consciousness. It is (as Dr. +McTaggart holds) the unity of a Society, but of a Society (as I have +attempted to argue) which emanates from, and is controlled by and guided +to a preconceived end by, a single rational Will.[8] + +(5) _The intuitive theory of religious knowledge_. In other quarters +objection will probably be taken to my not having recognized the +possibility of an immediate knowledge of God, and left the idea of God to +be inferred by intellectual processes which, when fully thought out, +amount to a Metaphysic. It will be suggested that to make religious +belief dependent upon Reason is to make it impossible to any but trained +Philosophers or Theologians. Now there is no doubt a great +attractiveness in the theory which makes belief in God depend simply upon +the immediate affirmation of the individual's own consciousness. It +would be more difficult to argue against such a theory of immediate +knowledge or intuition if we found that the consciousness of all or most +individuals does actually reveal to them {107} the existence of God: +though after all the fact that a number of men draw the same inference +from given facts does not show that it is not an inference. You will +sometimes find Metaphysicians contending that nobody is really an +Atheist, since everybody necessarily supposes himself to be in contact +with an Other of which he is nevertheless a part. I do not deny that, if +you water down the idea of God to the notion of a vague 'something not +ourselves,' you may possibly make out that everybody is explicitly or +implicitly a believer in such a Deity. + +I should prefer myself to say that, if that is all you mean by God, it +does not much matter whether we believe in Him or not. In the sense in +which God is understood by Christianity or Judaism or any other theistic +Religion it is unfortunately impossible to contend that everybody is a +Theist. And, if there is an immediate knowledge of God in every human +soul, this would be difficult to account for. Neither the cultivated nor +the uncultivated Chinaman has apparently any such belief. The ignorant +Chinaman believes in a sort of luck or destiny--possibly in a plurality +of limited but more or less mischievous spirits; the educated Chinaman, +we are told, is for the most part a pure Agnostic. And Chinamen are +believed to be one-fifth of the human race. The task of the Missionary +would be an easier one if he could {108} appeal to any such widely +diffused intuitions of God. The Missionary, from the days of St. Paul at +Athens down to the present, has to begin by arguing with his opponents in +favour of Theism, and then to go on to argue from Theism to Christianity. +I do not deny--on the contrary I strongly contend--that the rational +considerations which lead up to Monotheism are so manifold, and lie so +near at hand, that at a certain stage of mental development we find that +belief independently asserting itself with more or less fullness in +widely distant regions of time and space; while traces of it are found +almost everywhere--even among savages--side by side with other and +inconsistent beliefs. But even among theistic nations an immediate +knowledge of God is claimed by very few. If there is a tendency on the +part of the more strongly religious minds to claim it, it is explicitly +disclaimed by others--by most of the great Schoolmen, and in modern times +by profoundly religious minds such as Newman or Martineau. Its existence +is in fact denied by most of the great theological systems--Catholic, +Protestant, Anglican. Theologians always begin by arguing in favour of +the existence of God. And even among the religious minds without +philosophical training which do claim such immediate knowledge, their +creed is most often due (as is obvious to the outside observer) to the +influence of environment, of education, of social {109} tradition. For +the religious person who claims such knowledge of God does not generally +stop at the bare affirmation of God's existence: he goes on to claim an +immediate knowledge of all sorts of other things--ideas clearly derived +from the traditional teaching of his religious community. The Protestant +of a certain type will claim immediate consciousness of ideas about the +forgiveness of sins which are palpably due to the teaching of Luther or +St. Augustine, and to the influence of this or that preacher who has +transmitted those ideas to him or to his mother: while the Catholic, +though his training discourages such claims, will sometimes see visions +which convey to him an immediate assurance of the truth of the Immaculate +Conception. Even among Anglicans we find educated men who claim to know +by immediate intuition the truth of historical facts alleged to have +occurred in the first century, or dogmatic truths such as the complicated +niceties of the Athanasian Creed. These claims to immediate insight thus +refute themselves by the inconsistent character of the knowledge claimed. +An attempt may be made to extract from all these immediate certainties a +residual element which is said to be common to all of them. The attempt +has been made by Professor James in that rather painful work, the +_Varieties of Religious Experience_. And the residuum turns out to be +something so vague that, if not {110} absolutely worthless, it is almost +incapable of being expressed in articulate language, and constitutes a +very precarious foundation for a working religious creed. + +The truth is that the uneducated--or rather the unanalytical, perhaps I +ought to say the metaphysically untrained--human mind has a tendency to +regard as an immediate certainty any truth which it strongly believes and +regards as very important. Such minds do not know the psychological +causes which have led to their own belief, when they are due to +psychological causes: they have not analysed the processes of thought by +which they have been led to those beliefs which are really due to the +working of their own minds. Most uncultivated persons would probably be +very much surprised to hear that the existence of the friend with whose +body they are in physical contact is after all only an inference.[9] But +surely, in the man who has discovered that such is the case, the warmth +of friendship was never dimmed by the reflection that his knowledge of +his friend is not immediate but mediate. It is a mere prejudice to +suppose that mediate knowledge is in any {111} way less certain, less +intimate, less trustworthy or less satisfying than immediate knowledge. +If we claim for man the possibility of just such a knowledge of God as a +man may possess of his brother man, surely that is all that is wanted to +make possible the closest religious communion. It is from the existence +of my own self that I infer the existence of other selves, whom I observe +to behave in a manner resembling my own behaviour. It is by an only +slightly more difficult and complicated inference from my own +consciousness that I rise to that conception of a universal Consciousness +which supplies me with at once the simplest and the most natural +explanation both of my own existence and of the existence of the Nature +which I see around me. + +(6) _Religion and Psychology_. I do not deny that the study of religious +history, by exhibiting the naturalness and universality of religious +ideas and religious emotions, may rationally create a pre-disposition to +find some measure of truth in every form of religious belief. But I +would venture to add a word of caution against the tendency fashionable +in many quarters to talk of basing religious belief upon Psychology. The +business of Psychology is to tell us what actually goes on in the human +mind. It cannot possibly tell us whether the beliefs which are found +there are true or false. An erroneous {112} belief is as much a +psychological fact as a true one. A theory which goes on, by inference +from what we observe in our own minds, to construct a theory of the +Universe necessarily involves a Metaphysic, conscious or unconscious. It +may be urged that the reality of religious experience is unaffected by +the question whether the beliefs associated with it are true or false. +That is the case, so long as the beliefs are supposed to be true by the +person in question. But, when once the spirit of enquiry is aroused, a +man cannot be--and I venture to think ought not to be--satisfied as to +the truth of his belief simply by being told that the beliefs are +actually there. + +It may be contended, no doubt, that religious experience does not mean +merely a state of intellectual belief, but certain emotions, aspirations, +perhaps (to take one particular type of religious experience) a +consciousness of love met by answering love. To many who undergo such +experiences, they seem to carry with them an immediate assurance of the +existence of the Being with whom they feel themselves to be in communion. +That, on the intellectual presuppositions of the particular person, seems +to be the natural--it may be the only possible--way of explaining the +feeling. But even there the belief is not really immediate: it is an +inference from what is actually matter of experience. And it is, +unhappily, no less a matter of well-ascertained {113} psychological fact +that, when intellectual doubt is once aroused, such experiences no longer +carry with them this conviction of their own objective basis. The person +was really under the influence of an intellectual theory all along, +whether the theory was acquired by hereditary tradition, by the influence +of another's mind, or by personal thought and reflection. When the +intellectual theory alters, the same kind of experience is no longer +possible. I will not attempt to say how far it is desirable that persons +who are perfectly satisfied with a creed which they have never examined +should (as it were) pull up the roots of their own faith to see how deep +they go. I merely want to point out that the occurrence of certain +emotional experiences, though undoubtedly they may constitute part of the +data of a religious argument, cannot be held to constitute in and by +themselves sufficient evidence for the truth of the intellectual theory +connected with them in the mind of the person to whom they occur. They +do not always present themselves as sufficient evidence for their truth +even to the person experiencing them--still less can they do so to +others. Equally unreasonable is it to maintain, with a certain class of +religious philosophers, that the religious experience by itself is all we +want; and to assume that we may throw to the winds all the theological or +other beliefs which have actually been associated {114} with the various +types of religious experience, and yet continue to have those experiences +and find them no less valuable and no less satisfying. If there is one +thing which the study of religious Psychology testifies to, it is the +fact that the character of the religious experience (though there may be +certain common elements in it) varies very widely with the character of +the theoretical belief with which it is associated--a belief of which it +is sometimes the cause, sometimes the effect, but from which it is always +inseparable. The Buddhist's religious experiences are not possible to +those who hold the Christian's view of the Universe: the Christian's +religious experiences are not possible to one who holds the Buddhist +theory of the Universe. You cannot have an experience of communion with +a living Being when you disbelieve in the existence of such a Being. And +a man's theories of the Universe always at bottom imply a Metaphysic of +some kind--conscious or unconscious. + +Sometimes the theory of a Religion which shall be purely psychological +springs from pure ignorance as to the meaning of the terms actually +employed by the general usage of philosophers. Those who talk in this +way mean by Psychology what, according to the ordinary philosophic usage, +is really Metaphysic. For Metaphysic is simply the science which deals +with the ultimate nature of the Universe. {115} At other times attempts +are made by people of more or less philosophical culture to justify their +theory. The most widely influential of such attempts is the one made by +M. Auguste Sabatier.[10] This attempt has at least this much in its +favour--that it is not so much to the ordinary experience of average men +and women that M. Sabatier appeals as to the exceptional experiences of +the great religious minds. He lays the chief stress upon those +exceptional moments of religious history when a new religious idea +entered into the mind of some prophet or teacher, _e.g._ the unity of +God, the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of Man. Here, just because +the idea was new, it cannot (he contends) be accounted for by education +or environment or any other of the psychological causes which obviously +determine the traditional beliefs of the great majority. These new +ideas, therefore, he assumes to be due to immediate revelation or +inspiration from God. Now it is obvious that, even if this inference +were well grounded, it assumes that we have somehow arrived independently +at a conception of God to which such inspirations can be referred. The +Psychology of the human mind cannot assume the existence of such a Being: +if we infer such a Being from our own mental experience, that is not +immediate but {116} mediate knowledge. It is a belief based on +inference, and a belief which is, properly speaking, metaphysical. The +idea of a Religion which is merely based upon Psychology and involves +nothing else is a delusion: all the great Religions of the world have +been, among other things, metaphysical systems. We have no means of +ascertaining their truth but Reason, whether it assume the form of a +rough common-sense or of elaborate reasoning which not only is Metaphysic +but knows itself to be so. Reason is then the organ of religious truth. +But then, let me remind you, Reason includes our moral Reason. That +really is a faculty of immediate knowledge; and it is a faculty which, in +a higher or lower state of development, is actually found in practically +all human beings. The one element of truth which I recognize in the +theory of an immediate knowledge of God is the truth that the most +important data upon which we base the inference which leads to the +knowledge of God are those supplied by the immediate judgements or +intuitions of the Moral Consciousness. + +And here let me caution you against a very prevalent misunderstanding +about the word Reason. It is assumed very often that Reason means +nothing but inference. That is not what we mean when we refer moral +judgements to the Reason. We do not mean that we can prove that things +are right or {117} wrong: we mean precisely the opposite--that ultimate +moral truth is immediate, like the truth that two and two make four. It +might, of course, be contended that the same Reason which assures me that +goodness is worth having and that the whole is greater than the part, +assures us no less immediately of the existence of God. I can only say +that I am sure I have no such immediate knowledge, and that for the most +part that knowledge is never claimed by people who understand clearly the +difference between immediate knowledge and inference. The idea of God is +a complex conception, based, not upon this or that isolated judgement or +momentary experience, but upon the whole of our experience taken +together. It is a hypothesis suggested by, and necessary to, the +explanation of our experience as a whole. Some minds may lay most stress +upon the religious emotions themselves; others upon the experience of the +outer world, upon the appearances of design, or upon the metaphysical +argument which shows them the inconceivability of matter without mind; +others, again, may be most impressed by the impossibility of accounting +in any way for the immediate consciousness of duty and the conviction of +objective validity or authority which that consciousness carries with it. +But in any case the knowledge, when it is a reasonable belief and not +based merely upon authority, involves {118} inference--just like our +knowledge of our friend's existence. The fact that my friend is known to +me by experience does not prevent his communicating his mind to me. I +shall try to show you in my next lecture that to admit that our knowledge +of God is based upon inference is not incompatible with the belief that +God has spoken to man face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend. + + +At this point it may perhaps be well, for the sake of clearness, to +summarize the position to which I have tried to lead you. I have tried +to show that the material Universe cannot reasonably be thought of as +having any existence outside, or independently of, Mind. It certainly +does not exist merely in any or all of the human and similar minds whose +knowledge is fleeting, and which have, there is every reason to believe, +a beginning in time. We are bound then to infer the existence of a +single Mind or Consciousness, which must be thought of as containing all +the elements of our own Consciousness--Reason or Thought, Feeling, and +Will--though no doubt in Him those elements or aspects of Consciousness +are combined in a manner of which our own minds can give us but a very +faint and analogical idea. The world must be thought of as ultimately +the thought or experience of this Mind, which we call God. And this Mind +must be thought {119} of as not only a Thinker, but also as a Cause or a +Will. Our own and all other minds, no less than the events of the +material Universe, owe their beginning and continuance to this divine +Will: in them the thought or experience of the divine Mind is reproduced +in various degrees; and to all of them is communicated some portion of +that causality or activity of which God is the ultimate source, so that +their acts must be regarded as due mediately to them, ultimately to God. +But, though these minds are wholly dependent upon and in intimate +connexion with the divine Mind, they cannot be regarded as _parts_ of the +divine Consciousness. Reality consists of God and all the minds that He +wills to exist, together with the world of Nature which exists in and for +those minds. Reality is the system or society of spirits and their +experience. The character and ultimate purpose of the divine Mind is +revealed to us, however inadequately or imperfectly, in the moral +consciousness; and the moral ideal which is thus communicated to us makes +it reasonable for us to expect, for at least the higher of the dependent +or created minds, a continuance, of their individual existence, after +physical death. Pain, sin, and other evils must be regarded as necessary +incidents in the process by which the divine Will is bringing about the +greatest attainable good of all conscious beings. The question whether +our material Universe, {120} considered as the object of Mind, has a +beginning and will have an end, is one which we have no data for +deciding. Time-distinctions, I think, must be regarded as +objective--that is to say, as forming part of the nature and constitution +of the real world; but the antinomy involved either in supposing an +endless succession or a beginning and end of the time-series is one which +our intellectual faculties are, or at least have so far proved, incapable +of solving. The element of inadequacy and uncertainty which the +admission of this antinomy introduces into our theory of the Universe is +an emphatic reminder to us of the inadequate and imperfect character of +all our knowledge. The knowledge, however, that we possess, though +inadequate knowledge, is real knowledge--not a sham knowledge of merely +relative or human validity; and is sufficient not only for the guidance +of life but even for the partial, though not the complete, satisfaction +of one of the noblest impulses of the human mind--the disinterested +passion for truth. 'Now we see in a mirror darkly'; but still we see. + +The view of the Universe which I have endeavoured very inadequately to +set before you is a form of Idealism. Inasmuch as it recognizes the +existence--though not the separate and independent existence--of many +persons; inasmuch as it regards both God and man as persons, without +attempting {121} to merge the existence of either in one all-including, +comprehensive consciousness, it may further be described as a form of +'personal Idealism.' But, if any one finds it easier to think of +material Nature as having an existence which, though dependent upon and +willed by the divine Mind, is not simply an existence in and for mind, +such a view of the Universe will serve equally well as a basis of +Religion. For religious purposes it makes no difference whether we think +of Nature as existing in the Mind of God, or as simply created or brought +into and kept in existence by that Mind. When you have subtracted from +the theistic case every argument that depends for its force upon the +theory that the idea of matter without Mind is an unthinkable absurdity, +enough will remain to show the unreasonableness of supposing that in +point of fact matter ever has existed without being caused and controlled +by Mind. The argument for Idealism may, I hope, have at all events +exhibited incidentally the groundlessness and improbability of +materialistic and naturalistic assumptions, and left the way clear for +the establishment of Theism by the arguments which rest upon the +discovery that Causality implies volition; upon the appearances of +intelligence in organic life; upon the existence of the moral +consciousness; and more generally upon the enormous probability that the +ultimate Source of Reality should resemble rather {122} the highest than +the lowest kind of existence of which we have experience. That Reality +as a whole may be most reasonably interpreted by Reality at its highest +is after all the sum and substance of all theistic arguments. If anybody +finds it easier to think of matter as uncreated but as always guided and +controlled by Mind, I do not think there will be any religious objection +to such a position; though it is, as it seems to me, intellectually a +less unassailable position than is afforded by an Idealism of the type +which I have most inadequately sketched. + +Mr. Bradley in a cynical moment has defined Metaphysics as the 'finding +of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct.' I do not for myself +accept that definition, which Mr. Bradley himself would not of course +regard as expressing the whole truth of the matter. But, though I am +firmly convinced that it is possible to find good reasons for the +religious beliefs and hopes which have in fact inspired the noblest +lives, I still feel that the greatest service which even a little +acquaintance with Philosophy may render to many who have not the time for +any profounder study of it, will be to give them greater boldness and +confidence in accepting a view of the Universe which satisfies the +instinctive or unanalysed demands of their moral, intellectual, and +spiritual nature. + +{123} + +NOTE ON NON-THEISTIC IDEALISM + +It may perhaps be well for the sake of greater clearness to summarize my +objections--those already mentioned and some others--to the system of Dr. +McTaggart, which I admit to be, for one who has accepted the idealistic +position that matter does not exist apart from Mind, the only +intelligible alternative to Theism. His theory is, it will be +remembered, that ultimate Reality consists of a system of selves or +spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a Unity, but not a +conscious Unity, so that consciousness exists only in the separate +selves, not in the whole: + +(1) It is admitted that the material world exists only in and for Mind. +There is no reason to think that any human mind, or any of the other +minds of which Dr. McTaggart's Universe is composed, knows the whole of +this world. What kind of existence then have the parts of the Universe +which are not known to any mind? It seems to me that Dr. McTaggart would +be compelled to admit that they do not exist at all. The world +postulated by Science would thus be admitted to be a delusion. This +represents a subjective Idealism of an extreme and staggering kind which +cannot meet the objections commonly urged against all Idealism. + +(2) Moreover, the world is not such an intellectually complete system as +Dr. McTaggart insists that it must be, apart from the relations of its +known parts to its unknown parts. If there are parts which are unknown +to any mind, and which therefore do not exist at all, it is not a system +at all. + +(3) If it be said that all the spirits between them know the world--one +knowing one part, another another--this is a mere hypothesis, opposed to +all the probabilities suggested by experience, and after all would be a +very inadequate answer to our difficulties. Dr. McTaggart insists {124} +that the world of existing things exists as a system. Such existence to +an Idealist must mean existence for a mind; a system not known as a +system to any mind whatever could hardly be said to exist at all. + +(4) If it be suggested (as Dr. McTaggart was at one time inclined to +suggest) that every mind considered as a timeless Noumenon is omniscient, +though in its phenomenal and temporal aspect its knowledge is +intermittent and always limited, I reply (_a_) the theory seems to me not +only gratuitous but unintelligible, and (_b_) it is open to all the +difficulties and objections of the theory that time and change are merely +subjective delusions. This is too large a question to discuss here: I +can only refer to the treatment of the subject by such writers as Lotze +(see above) and M. Bergson. I may also refer to Mr. Bradley's argument +(_Appearance and Reality_, p. 50 sq.) against the theory that the +individual Ego is out of time. + +(5) The theory of pre-existent souls is opposed to all the probabilities +suggested by experience. Soul and organism are connected in such a way +that the pre-existence of one element in what presents itself and works +in our world as a unity is an extremely difficult supposition, and +involves assumptions which reduce to a minimum the amount of identity or +continuity that could be claimed for the Ego throughout its successive +lives. A soul which has forgotten all its previous experiences may have +some identity with its previous state, but not much. Moreover, we should +have to suppose that the correspondence of a certain type of body with a +certain kind of soul, as well as the resemblance between the individual +and his parents, implies no kind of causal connexion, but is due to mere +accident; or, if it is not to accident, to a very arbitrary kind of +pre-established harmony which there is nothing in experience to suggest, +and which (upon Dr. McTaggart's theory) there is no creative intelligence +to pre-establish. The theory cannot be absolutely refuted, but all Dr. +McTaggart's ingenuity has not--to my own mind, {125} and (I feel sure) to +most minds--made it seem otherwise than extremely difficult and +improbable. Its sole recommendation is that it makes possible an +Idealism without Theism: but, if Theism be an easier and more defensible +theory, that is no recommendation at all. + +(6) Dr. McTaggart's whole theory seems to me to waver between two +inconsistent views of Reality. When he insists that the world consists +of a system or Unity, he tends towards a view of things which makes the +system of intellectual relations constituting knowledge or Science to be +the very reality of things: on such a view there is no impossibility of +an ultimate Reality not known to any one mind. But Dr. McTaggart has too +strong a hold on the conviction of the supremely real character of +conscious mind and the unreality of mere abstractions to be satisfied +with this view. If there is no mind which both knows and wills the +existence and the mutual relations of the spirits, the supreme reality +must be found in the individual spirits themselves; yet the system, if +known to none of them, seems to fall outside the reality. The natural +tendency of a system which finds the sole reality in eternally +self-existent souls is towards Pluralism--a theory of wholly independent +'Reals' or 'Monads.' Dr. McTaggnrt is too much of a Hegelian to +acquiesce in such a view. The gulf between the two tendencies seems to +me--with all respect--to be awkwardly bridged over by the assumption that +the separate selves form an intelligible system, which nevertheless no +one really existent spirit actually understands. If a system of +relations can be Reality, there is no ground for assuming the +pre-existence or eternity of individual souls: if on the other hand +Reality is 'experience,' an unexperienced 'system' cannot be real, and +the 'unity' disappears. This is a line of objection which it would +require a much more thorough discussion to develope. + +(7) On the view which I myself hold as to the nature of Causality, the +only intelligible cause of events is a Will. The events of Dr. +McTaggart's world (putting aside the very {126} small proportion which +are due, in part at least, to the voluntary action of men or spirits) are +not caused at all. His theory is therefore open to all--and more than +all--the objections which I have urged in Lecture II. against the theory +which explains the Universe as the thought of a Mind but not as caused by +that Mind. + +(8) It is just possible that some one might suggest that the first of my +objections might be met by the allegation that there is nothing in the +scheme which forbids us to suppose that the whole of Nature is known to +more than one of the spirits which make up Reality, though not to all, or +indeed any, of the human and non-human spirits known to us. I should +reply (_a_) that the considerations which lead to the hypothesis of one +omniscient Being do not require more than one such spirit, and _entia non +sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_; (_b_) such a scheme would still +be open to Objection 7. If it is a speculative possibility that all +Nature may exist in the knowledge of more than one spirit, it cannot well +be thought of as willed by more than one spirit. If the Universe, +admitted to form an ordered system, is caused by rational will at all, it +must surely be caused by one Will. But perhaps a serious discussion of a +polytheistic scheme such as this may be postponed till it is seriously +maintained. It has not been suggested, so far as I am aware, by Dr. +McTaggart himself. + +(9) The real strength of Dr. McTaggart's system must be measured by the +validity of his objections to a Theism such as I have defended. I have +attempted to reply to those objections in the course of these Lectures, +and more at length in a review of his _Some Dogmas of Religion_ in _Mind_ +(N.S.), vol. xv., 1906. + + + +[1] Cf. Flint's _Theism_, Ed. v., p. 117 and App. xi. + +[2] The most illuminating discussion of time and the most convincing +argument for its 'objectivity' which I know, is to be found in Lotze's +_Metaphysic_, Book II. chap. iii., but it cannot be recommended to the +beginner in Metaphysic. A brilliant exposition of the view of the +Universe which regards time and change as belonging to the very reality +of the Universe, has recently appeared in M. Bergson's L'Évolution +Créatrice, but he has hardly attempted to deal with the metaphysical +difficulties indicated above. The book, however, seems to me the most +important philosophical work that has appeared since Mr. Bradley's +_Appearance and Reality_, and though the writer has hardly formulated his +Natural Theology, it constitutes a very important contribution to the +theistic argument. Being based upon a profound study of biological +Evolution, it may be specially commended to scientific readers. + +[3] Such a view is expounded in Dr. Schiller's early work _The Riddles of +the Sphinx_ and in Professor Howison's _The Limits of Evolution_. The +very distinguished French thinker Charles Renouvier (_La Nouvelle +Monadologie_, etc.), like Origen, believed that souls were pre-existent +but created. + +[4] I use the word 'causally connected' in the popular or scientific +sense of the word, to indicate merely an actually observed +psycho-physical law. + +[5] In part, perhaps, also to a mistaken theory of predication, which +assumes that, because every fact in the world can be represented as +logically a predicate of Reality at large, therefore there is but one +Substance or (metaphysically) Real Being in the world, of which all other +existences are really mere 'attributes.' But this theory cannot be +discussed here. + +[6] In _The New Theology_. + +[7] _E.g._ by Mr. Bradley in _Appearance and Reality_ and still more +uncompromisingly by Professor A. E. Taylor in _The Problem of Conduct_, +but I rejoice to find that the latter very able writer has recently given +up this theory of a 'super-moral' Absolute. + +[8] I think it desirable to mention here that Professor Watson's account +of my views in his _Philosophical Basis of Religion_ completely +misrepresents my real position. I have replied to his criticisms in +_Mind_, N.S. No. 69 (Jan. 1909). + +[9] This is sometimes denied by Philosophers, but I have never been able +to understand on what grounds. If I know _a priori_ the existence of +other men, I ought to be able to say _a priori_ how many they are and to +say something about them. And this is more than any one claims. + +[10] In _Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'aprčs La Psychologie +et l'histoire_. + + + + +{127} + +LECTURE V + +REVELATION + +I have tried in previous lectures to show that the apprehension of +religious truth does not depend upon some special kind of intuition; +that it is not due to some special faculty superior to and different in +kind from our ordinary intellectual activities, but to an exercise of +the same intellectual faculties by which we attain to truth in other +matters--including, however, especially the wholly unique faculty of +immediately discerning values or pronouncing moral judgements. The +word 'faith' should, as it seems to me, be used to express not a +mysterious capacity for attaining to knowledge without thought or +without evidence, but to indicate some of the manifold characteristics +by which our religious knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge +either of common life or of the physical Sciences. If I had time there +would be much to be said about these characteristics, and I think I +could show that the popular distinction between knowledge and religious +{128} faith finds whatever real justification it possesses in these +characteristics of religious knowledge. I might insist on the +frequently implicit and unanalysed character of religious thinking; +upon the incompleteness and inadequacy of even the fullest account that +the maturest and acutest Philosopher can give of ultimate Reality; upon +the merely probable and analogical character of much of the reasoning +which is necessarily employed both in the most popular and in the most +philosophical kinds of reasoning about such matters; and above all upon +the prominent place which moral judgements occupy in religious thought, +moral judgements which, on account of their immediate character and +their emotional setting, are often not recognized in their true +character as judgements of the Reason. Most of the mistakes into which +popular thinking has fallen in this matter--the mistakes which +culminate in the famous examination-paper definition of faith as 'a +means of believing that which we know not to be true'--would be avoided +if we would only remember, with St. Paul and most of the greater +religious thinkers, that the true antithesis is not between faith and +reason but between faith and sight. All religious belief implies a +belief in something which cannot be touched or tasted or handled, and +which cannot be established by any mere logical deduction from what can +be touched or tasted or handled. So far from implying {129} scepticism +as to the power of Reason, this opposition between faith and sight +actually asserts the possibility of attaining by thought to a knowledge +of realities which cannot be touched or tasted or handled--a knowledge +of equal validity and trustworthiness with that which is popularly said +to be due to the senses, though Plato has taught us once for all[1] +that the senses by themselves never give us real knowledge, and that in +the apprehension of the most ordinary matter of fact there is implied +the action of the self-same intellect by which alone we can reach the +knowledge of God. + +It may further be pointed out that, though neither religious knowledge +nor moral knowledge are mere emotion, they are both of them very +closely connected with certain emotions. Great moral discoveries are +made, not so much by superior intellectual power, as by superior +interest in the subject-matter of Morality. Very ordinary intelligence +can see, when it is really brought to bear upon the matter, the +irrationality or immorality of bad customs, oppressions, social +injustices; but the people who have led the revolt against these things +have generally been the people who have felt intensely about them. So +it is with the more distinctly religious knowledge. Religious thought +and insight are largely dependent upon the emotions to which religious +{130} ideas and beliefs appeal. The absence of religious thought and +definite religious belief is very often (I am far from saying always) +due to a want of interest in Religion; but that does not prove that +religious thought is not the work of the intellect, any more than the +fact that a man is ignorant of Politics because he takes no interest in +Politics proves that political truth is a mere matter of emotion, and +has nothing to do with the understanding. Thought is always guided by +interest--a truth which must not be distorted with a certain modern +school of thought, if indeed it can properly be called thought, into +the assertion that thinking is nothing but willing, and that therefore +we are at liberty to think just what we please. + +And that leads on to a further point. Emotion and desire are very +closely connected with the will. A man's moral insight and the +development of his thought about moral questions depend very largely +upon the extent to which he acts up to whatever light he has. Vice, as +Aristotle put it, is _phthartike arches_--destructive of moral first +principles. Moral insight is largely dependent upon character. And so +is religious insight. Thus it is quite true to say that religious +belief depends in part upon the state of the will. This doctrine has +been so scandalously abused by many Theologians and Apologists that I +use it with great hesitation. I have no sympathy {131} with the idea +that we are justified in believing a religious doctrine merely because +we wish it to be true, or with the insinuation that non-belief in a +religious truth is always or necessarily due to moral obliquity. But +still it is undeniable that a man's ethical and religious beliefs are +to some extent affected by the state of his will. That is so with all +knowledge to some extent; for progress in knowledge requires attention, +and is largely dependent upon interest. If I take no interest in the +properties of curves or the square root of -1, I am not very likely to +make a good mathematician. This connexion of knowledge with interest +applies in an exceptional degree to religious knowledge: and that is +one of the points which I think many religious thinkers have intended +to emphasize by their too hard and fast distinctions between faith and +knowledge. + +Belief itself is thus to some extent affected by the state of the will; +and still more emphatically does the extent to which belief affects +action depend upon the will. Many beliefs which we quite sincerely +hold are what have been called 'otiose beliefs'; we do not by an effort +of the will realize them sufficiently strongly for them to affect +action. Many a man knows perfectly that his course of life will injure +or destroy his physical health; it is not through intellectual +scepticism that he disobeys his {132} physician's prescriptions, but +because other desires and inclinations prevent his attending to them +and acting upon them. It is obvious that to men like St. Paul and +Luther faith meant much more than a mere state of the intellect; it +included a certain emotional and a certain volitional attitude; it +included love and it included obedience. Whether our intellectual +beliefs about Religion are energetic enough to influence action, does +to an enormous extent depend upon our wills. Faith is, then, used, and +almost inevitably used, in such a great variety of senses that I do not +like to lay down one definite and exclusive definition of it; but it +would be safe to say that, for many purposes and in many connexions, +religious faith means the deliberate adoption by an effort of the will, +as practically certain for purposes of action and of feeling, of a +religious belief which to the intellect is, or may be, merely probable. +For purposes of life it is entirely reasonable to treat probabilities +as certainties. If a man has reason to think his friend is +trustworthy, he will do well to trust him wholly and implicitly. If a +man has reason to think that a certain view of the Universe is the most +probable one, he will do well habitually to allow that conviction to +dominate not merely his actions, but the habitual tenour of his +emotional and spiritual life. We should not love a human being much if +we allowed ourselves habitually to {133} contemplate the logical +possibility that the loved one was unworthy of, or irresponsive to, our +affection. We could not love God if we habitually contemplated the +fact that His existence rests for us upon judgements in which there is +more or less possibility of error, though there is no reason why we +should, in our speculative moments, claim a greater certainty for them +than seems to be reasonable. The doctrine that 'probability is the +guide of life' is one on which every sensible man habitually acts in +all other relations of life: Bishop Butler was right in contending that +it should be applied no less unhesitatingly to the matter of religious +belief and religious aspiration. + +The view which I have taken of the nature of faith may be illustrated +by the position of Clement of Alexandria. It is clear from his +writings that by faith he meant a kind of conviction falling short of +demonstration or immediate intellectual insight, and dependent in part +upon the state of the will and the heart. Clement did not disparage +knowledge in the interests of faith: faith was to him a more elementary +kind of knowledge resting largely upon moral conviction, and the +foundation of that higher state of intellectual apprehension which he +called Gnosis. I do not mean, of course, to adopt Clement's Philosophy +as a whole; I merely refer to it as illustrating the point that, +properly considered, faith is, or rather includes, a particular kind or +stage {134} of knowledge, and is not a totally different and even +opposite state of mind. It would be easy to show that this has been +fully recognized by many, if not most, of the great Christian thinkers. + +One last point. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between +the process by which psychologically a man arrives at a religious or +other truth and the reasons which make it true. Because I deny that +the truth of God's existence can reasonably be accepted on the basis of +an immediate judgement or intuition, I do not deny for one moment that +an apparently intuitive conviction of the truth of Christianity, as of +other religions, actually exists. The religious belief of the vast +majority of persons has always rested, and must always rest, very +largely upon tradition, education, environment, authority of one kind +or another--authority supported or confirmed by a varying measure of +independent reflection or experience. And, just where the influence of +authority is most complete and overwhelming, it is least felt to be +authority. The person whose beliefs are most entirely produced by +education or environment is very often most convinced that his opinions +are due solely to his own immediate insight. But even where this is +not the case--even where the religious man is taking a new departure, +revolting against his environment and adopting a religious belief +absolutely at variance with the established {135} belief of his +society--I do not contend that such new religious ideas are always due +to unobserved and unanalysed processes of reasoning. That in most +cases, when a person adopts a new creed, he would himself give some +reason for his change of faith is obvious, though the reason which he +would allege would not in all cases be the one which really caused the +change of religion. There may be other psychological influences which +cause belief besides the influence of environment: in some cases the +psychological causes of such beliefs are altogether beyond analysis. +But, though I do not think M. Auguste Sabatier justified in assuming +that a belief is true, and must come directly from God, simply because +we cannot easily explain its genesis by the individual's environment +and psychological antecedents, it is of extreme importance to insist +that it is not proved to be false because it was not adopted primarily, +or at all, on adequate theoretical grounds. A belief which arose at +first entirely without logical justification, or it may be on +intellectual grounds subsequently discovered to be inadequate or false, +may nevertheless be one which can and does justify itself to the +reflective intellect of the person himself or of other persons. And +many new, true, and valuable beliefs have undoubtedly arisen in this +way. Even in physical Science we all know that there is no Logic of +discovery. It {136} is a familiar criticism upon the Logic of Bacon +that he ignored or under-estimated the part that is played in +scientific thinking by hypothesis, and the consequent need of +scientific imagination. Very often the new scientific idea comes into +the discoverer's mind, he knows not how or why. Some great man of +Science--I think, Helmholtz--said of a brilliant discovery of his, 'It +was given to me.' But it was not true because it came to Helmholtz in +this way, but because it was subsequently verified and proved. Now, +undoubtedly, religious beliefs, new and old, often do present +themselves to the minds of individuals in an intuitive and +unaccountable way. They may subsequently be justified at the bar of +Reason: and yet Reason might never have discovered them for itself. +They would never have come into the world unless they had presented +themselves at first to some mind or other as intuitions, inspirations, +immediate Revelations: and yet (once again) the fact that they so +present themselves does not by itself prove them to be true. + +I may perhaps illustrate what I mean by the analogy of Poetry. I +suppose few people will push the sound-without-sense view of Poetry to +the length of denying that poets do sometimes see and teach us truths. +No one--least of all one who is not even a verse-maker himself--can, I +suppose, analyse the intellectual process by which a poet {137} gets at +his truths. The insight by which he arrives at them is closely +connected with emotions of various kinds: and yet the truths are not +themselves emotions, nor do they in all cases merely state the fact +that the poet has felt such and such emotions. They are propositions +about the nature of things, not merely about the poet's mental states. +And yet the truths are not true because the poet _feels_ them, as he +would say--no matter how passionately he feels them. There is no +separate organ of poetic truth: and not all the things that poets have +passionately felt are true. Some highly poetical thoughts have been +very false thoughts. But, if they are true, they must be true for good +logical reasons, which a philosophical critic may even in some cases by +subsequent reflection be able to disentangle and set forth. Yet the +poet did not get at those truths by way of philosophical reflection: +or, if he was led to them by any logical process, he could not have +analysed his own reasoning. The poet could not have produced the +arguments of the philosopher: the philosopher without the poet's lead +might never have seen the truth. I am afraid I must not stay to defend +or illustrate this position: I will only say that the poets I should +most naturally go to for illustration would be such poets as +Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning, though perhaps all three are a +little {138} too consciously philosophic to supply the ideal +illustration. + +I do not think it will be difficult to apply these reflections to the +case of religious and ethical truth. All religious truth, as I hold, +depends logically upon inference; inference from the whole body of our +experiences, among which the most important place is held by our +immediate moral judgements. The truth of Theism is in that sense a +truth discernible by Reason. But it does not follow that, when it was +first discovered, it was arrived at by the inferences which I have +endeavoured to some extent to analyse, or by one of the many lines of +thought which may lead to the same conclusions. It was not the Greek +philosophers so much as the Jewish prophets who taught the world true +Monotheism. Hosea, Amos, the two Isaiahs probably arrived at their +Monotheism largely by intuition; or (in so far as it was by inferential +processes) the premisses of their argument were very probably inherited +beliefs of earlier Judaism which would not commend themselves without +qualification to a modern thinker. In its essentials the Monotheism of +Isaiah is a reasonable belief; we accept it because it is reasonable, +not because Isaiah had an intuition that it was true; for we have +rejected many things which to Isaiah probably seemed no less +self-evidently true. And yet it would be a profound mistake to assume +that {139} the philosophers who now defend Isaiah's creed would ever +have arrived at it without Isaiah's aid. + +I hope that by this time you will have seen to some extent the spirit +in which I am approaching the special subject of to-day's lecture--the +question of Revelation. In some of the senses that have been given to +it, the idea of Revelation is one which hardly any one trained in the +school--that is to say, any school--of modern Philosophy is likely to +accept. The idea that pieces of information have been supernaturally +and without any employment of their own intellectual faculties +communicated at various times to particular persons, their truth being +guaranteed by miracles--in the sense of interruptions of the ordinary +course of nature by an extraordinary fiat of creative power--is one +which is already rejected by most modern theologians, even among those +who would generally be called rather conservative theologians. I will +not now argue the question whether any miraculous event, however well +attested, could possibly be sufficient evidence for the truth of +spiritual teaching given in attestation of it. I will merely remark +that to any one who has really appreciated the meaning of biblical +criticism, it is scarcely conceivable that the evidence for miracles +could seem sufficiently cogent to constitute such an attestation. In +proof of that I will merely appeal to the modest, apologetic, tentative +tone in which {140} scholarly and sober-minded theologians who would +usually be classed among the defenders of miracles--men like the Bishop +of Ely or Professor Sanday of Oxford--are content to speak of such +evidences. They admit the difficulty of proving that such miraculous +events really happened thousands of years ago on the strength of +narratives written at the very earliest fifty years after the alleged +event, and they invite us rather to believe in the miracles on the +evidence of a Revelation already accepted than to accept the revelation +on the evidence of the miracles. I shall have a word to say on this +question of miracles next time; but for the present I want to +establish, or rather without much argument to put before you for your +consideration, this position; that the idea of revelation cannot be +admitted in the sense of a communication of truth by God, claiming to +be accepted not on account of its own intrinsic reasonableness or of +the intellectual or spiritual insight of the person to whom it is made, +but on account of the historical evidence for miraculous occurrences +said to have taken place in connexion with such communication. The +most that can reasonably be contended for is that super-normal +occurrences of this kind may possess a certain corroborative value in +support of a Revelation claiming to be accepted on other grounds. + +What place then is left for the idea of Revelation? {141} I will ask +you to go back for a moment to the conclusions of our first lecture. +We saw that from the idealistic point of view all knowledge may be +looked upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the +thoughts or experiences of the divine Mind. There is a sense then in +which all truth is revealed truth. In a more important sense, and a +sense more nearly allied to that of ordinary usage, all moral and +spiritual truth may be regarded as revealed truth. And in particular +those immediate judgements about good and evil in which we have found +the sole means of knowing the divine character and purposes must be +looked on as divinely implanted knowledge--none the less divinely +implanted because it is, in the ordinary sense of the words, quite +natural, normal, and consistent with law. Nobody but an Atheist ought +to talk about the unassisted human intellect: no one who acquiesces in +the old doctrine that Conscience is the voice of God ought either on +the one hand to deny the existence of Revelation, or on the other to +speak of Revelation as if it were confined to the Bible. + +But because we ascribe some intrinsic power of judging about spiritual +and moral matters to the ordinary human intellect, it would be a +grievous mistake to assume that all men have an equal measure of this +power. Because we assert that all moral and spiritual truth comes to +men by {142} Revelation, it does not follow that there are not degrees +of Revelation. And it is one of the special characteristics of +religious and moral truth that it is in a peculiar degree dependent +upon the superior insight of those exceptional men to whom have been +accorded extraordinary degrees of moral and spiritual insight. Even in +Science, as we have seen, we cannot dispense with genius: very ordinary +men can satisfy themselves of the truth of a hypothesis when it is once +suggested, though they would have been quite incompetent to discover +that hypothesis for themselves. Still more unquestionably are there +moral and spiritual truths which, when once discovered, can be seen to +be true by men of very commonplace intellect and commonplace character. +The truths are seen and passed on to others, who accept them partly on +authority, by way of social inheritance and tradition; partly because +they are confirmed in various degrees by their own independent +judgement and experience. Here then--in the discovery of new spiritual +truth--we encounter that higher and exceptional degree of spiritual and +ethical insight which in a special and pre-eminent sense we ought to +regard as Revelation or Inspiration. Here there is room, in the +evolution of Religion and Morality, for the influence of the men of +moral or religious genius--the Prophets, the Apostles, the Founders and +Reformers of Religions: and, since {143} moral and spiritual insight +are very closely connected with character, for the moral hero, the +leader of men, the Saint. Especially to the new departures, the +turning-points, the epoch-making discoveries in ethical and religious +progress connected with the appearance of such men, we may apply the +term Revelation in a supreme or culminating sense. + +It is, as it seems to me, extremely important that we should not +altogether divorce the idea of Revelation from those kinds of moral and +religious truth which are arrived at by the ordinary working of the +human intellect. The ultimate moral judgements no doubt must be +intuitive or immediate, but in our deductions from them--in their +application both to practical life and to theories about God and the +Universe--there is room for much intellectual work of the kind which we +commonly associate rather with the philosopher than with the prophet. +But the philosopher may be also a prophet. The philosophically trained +Greek Fathers were surely right in recognizing that men like Socrates +and Plato were to be numbered among those to whom the Spirit of God had +spoken in an exceptional degree. They too spoke in the power of the +indwelling Logos. But still it is quite natural that we should +associate the idea of Revelation or Inspiration more particularly with +that kind of moral and intellectual discovery which comes to +exceptional men by way {144} of apparent intuition or immediate +insight. We associate the idea of inspiration rather with the poet +than with the man of Science, and with the prophet rather than with the +systematic philosopher. It is quite natural, therefore, that we should +associate the idea of Revelation more especially with religious +teachers of the intuitive order like the Jewish prophets than with even +those philosophers who have also been great practical teachers of +Ethics and Religion. But it is most important to recognize that there +is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the two classes. The +Jewish prophets did not arrive at their ideas about God without a great +deal of hard thinking, though the thinking is for the most part +unexplicit and the mode of expression poetic. 'Their idols are silver +and gold; even the work of men's hands. . . . They have hands and +handle not; feet have they and walk not: neither speak they through +their throat.' There is real hard reasoning underlying such noble +rhetoric, though the Psalmist could not perhaps have reduced his +argument against Polytheism and Idolatry to the form of a dialectical +argument like Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas. In the highest instance of +all--the case of our Lord Jesus Christ himself--a natural instinct of +reverence is apt to deter us from analysing how he came by the truth +that he communicated to men; but, though I would not deny that the +deepest {145} truth came to him chiefly by a supreme gift of intuition, +there are obvious indications of profound intellectual thought in his +teaching. Recall for a moment his arguments against the misuse of the +Sabbath, against the superstition of unclean meats, against the +Sadducean objection to the Resurrection. I want to avoid at present +dogmatic phraseology; so I will only submit in passing that this is +only what we should expect if the early Church was right in thinking of +Christ as the supreme expression in the moral and religious sphere of +the Logos or Reason of God. + +The thought of great religious thinkers is none the less Revelation +because it involves the use of their reasoning faculties. But I +guarded myself against being supposed, in contending for the +possibility of a philosophical or metaphysical knowledge of God, to +assume that religious truth had always come to men in this way, or even +that the greatest steps in religious progress have usually taken the +form of explicit reasoning. Once again, it is all-important to +distinguish between the way in which a belief comes to be entertained +and the reasons for its being true. All sorts of psychological causes +have contributed to generate religious beliefs. And when once we have +discovered grounds in our own reflection or experience for believing +them to be true, there is no reason why we should not regard all of +them as {146} pieces of divine revelation. Visions and dreams, for +instance, had a share in the development of religious ideas. We might +even admit the possibility that the human race would never have been +led to think of the immortality of the soul but for primitive ideas +about ghosts suggested by the phenomena of dreams. The truth of the +doctrine is neither proved nor disproved by such an account of its +origin; but, if that belief is true and dreams have played a part in +the process by which man has been led to it, no Theist surely can +refuse to recognize the divine guidance therein. And so, at a higher +level, we are told by the author of the Acts that St. Peter was led to +accept the great principle of Gentile Christianity by the vision of a +sheet let down from heaven. There is no reason why that account should +not be historically true. The psychologist may very easily account for +St. Peter's vision by the working in his mind of the liberal teaching +of Stephen, the effect of his fast, and so on. But that does not +prevent us recognizing that vision as an instrument of divine +Revelation. We at the present day do not believe in this fundamental +principle of Christianity because of that dream of St. Peter's; for we +know that dreams are not always truth or always edifying. We believe +in that principle on other grounds--the convincing grounds (among +others) which St. Luke puts into St. Peter's mouth {147} on the +following morning. But that need not prevent our recognizing that God +may have communicated that truth to the men of that generation--and +through them to us--partly by means of that dream. + +The two principles then for which I wish to contend are these: (1) that +Revelation is a matter of degree; (2) that no Revelation can be +accepted in the long run merely because it came to a particular person +in a peculiarly intuitive or immediate way. It may be that M. Auguste +Sabatier is right in seeing the most immediate contact of God with the +human soul in those intuitive convictions which can least easily be +accounted for by ordinary psychological causes; in those new departures +of religious insight, those unaccountable comings of new thoughts into +the mind, which constitute the great crises or turning-points of +religious history. But, though the coming of such thoughts may often +be accepted by the individual as direct evidences of a divine origin, +the Metaphysician, on looking back upon them, cannot treat the fact +that the psychologist cannot account for them, as a convincing proof of +such an origin, apart from our judgement upon the contents of what +claims to be a revelation. Untrue thoughts and wicked thoughts +sometimes arise equally unaccountably: the fact that they do so is even +now accounted for by some as a sufficient proof of direct diabolic +suggestion. When we have judged the {148} thought to be true or the +suggestion to be good, then we, who on other grounds believe in God, +may see in it a piece of divine revelation, but not till then. + +From this point of view it is clear that we are able to recognize +various degrees and various kinds of divine revelation in many +different Religions, philosophies, systems of ethical teaching. We are +able to recognize the importance to the world of the great historical +Religions, in all of which we can acknowledge a measure of Revelation. +The fact that the truths which they teach (in so far as they are true) +can now be recognized as true by philosophic thought, does not show +that the world would ever have evolved those thoughts, apart from the +influence of the great revealing personalities. Philosophy itself--the +Philosophy of the professed philosophers--has no doubt contributed a +very important element to the content of the historical Religions; but +it is only in proportion as they become part of a system of religious +teaching, and the possession of an organized religious community, that +the ideas of the philosophers really come home to multitudes of men, +and shape the history of the world. Nor in many cases would the +philosophers themselves have seen what they have seen but for the great +epoch-making thoughts of the great religion-making periods. And the +same considerations which show the importance of religious movements in +the {149} past tend also to emphasize the importance of the historical +Religion and of the religious community in which it is enshrined in +modern times. Because religious truth can now be defended by the use +of our ordinary intellectual faculties, and because all possess these +faculties in some degree, it is absurd to suppose that the ordinary +individual, if left to himself, would be likely to evolve a true +religious system for himself--any more than he would be likely to +discern for himself the truths that were first seen by Euclid or Newton +if he were not taught them. To under-estimate the importance of the +great historical Religions and their creators has been the besetting +sin of technical religious Philosophy. Metaphysicians have in truth +often written about Religion in great ignorance as to the real facts of +religious history. + +But because we recognize a measure of truth in all the historical +Religions, it does not follow that we can recognize an equal amount of +truth in all of them. The idea that all the Religions teach much the +same thing--or that, while they vary about that unimportant part of +Religion which is called doctrine or dogma, they are all agreed about +Morality--is an idea which could only occur to the self-complaisant +ignorance which of late years has done most of the theological writing +in the correspondence columns of our newspapers. The real student of +comparative {150} Religion knows that it is only at a rather advanced +stage in the development of Religion that Religion becomes in any +important degree an ethical teacher at all. Even the highest and most +ethical Religions are not agreed either in their Ethics or in their +Theology. Not only can we recognize higher and lower Religions; but +the highest Religions, among many things which they have in common, are +at certain points diametrically antagonistic to each other. It is +impossible therefore reasonably to maintain that fashionable attitude +of mind towards these Religions which my friend Professor Inge once +described as a sort of honorary membership of all Religions except +one's own. If we are to regard the historical Religions as being of +any importance to our own personal religious life, we must choose +between them. If we put aside the case of Judaism in its most +cultivated modern form, a form in which it has been largely influenced +by Christianity, I suppose there is practically only one Religion which +would be in the least likely to appeal to a modern philosophical +student of Religion as a possible alternative to Christianity--and that +is Buddhism. But Buddhist Ethics are not the same as Christian Ethics. +Buddhist Ethics are ascetic: the Christianity which Christ taught was +anti-ascetic. In its view of the future, Buddhism is pessimistic; +Christianity is optimistic. Much as {151} Buddhism has done to +inculcate Humanity and Charity, the principle of Buddhist Humanity is +not the same as that of Christianity. Humanity is encouraged by the +Buddhist (in so far as he is really influenced by his own formal creed) +not from a motive of disinterested affection, but as a means of +escaping from the evils of personal and individual existence, and so +winning Nirvana. We cannot at one and the same time adhere to the +Ethics of Buddhism and to those of Christianity, though I am far from +saying that Christians have nothing to learn either from Buddhist +teaching or from Buddhist practice. Still less can we at one and the +same time be Atheists with the Buddhist and Theists with the Christian; +look forward with the Buddhist to the extinction of personal +consciousness and with the Christian to a fuller and more satisfying +life. To take an interest in comparative Religion is not to be +religious; to be religious implies a certain exclusive attachment to +some definite form of religious belief, though it may of course often +be a belief to which many historical influences have contributed. + +I have been trying to lead you to a view of Revelation which recognizes +the existence and the importance of those exceptional religious minds +to whom is due the foundation and development of the great historical +Religions, while at the same time we refuse, in the last resort, to +recognize any {152} revelation as true except on the ground that its +truth can be independently verified. I do not mean to deny that the +individual must at first, and may quite reasonably in some cases +throughout life, accept much of his religious belief on authority; but +that is only because he may be justified in thinking that such and such +a person, or more probably such and such a religious community, is more +likely to be right than himself. Rational submission to authority in +this or that individual postulates independent judgement on the part of +others. I am far from saying that every individual is bound to satisfy +himself by personal enquiry as to the truth of every element in his own +Religion; but, if and so far as he determines to do so, he cannot +reasonably accept an alleged revelation on any other ground than that +it comes home to him, that the content of that Religion appeals to him +as true, as satisfying the demands of his intellect and of his +conscience. The question in which most of us, I imagine, are most +vitally interested is whether the Christian Religion is a Religion +which we can accept on these grounds. That it possesses some truth, +that whatever in it is true comes from God--that much is likely to be +admitted by all who believe in any kind of Religion in the sense in +which we have been discussing Religion. The great question for us is, +'Can we find any reason for the modern man {153} identifying himself in +any exclusive way with the historical Christian Religion? Granted that +there is some truth in all Religions, does Christianity contain the +most truth? Is it in any sense the one absolute, final, universal +Religion?' + +That will be the subject for our consideration in the next lecture. +But meanwhile I want to suggest to you one very broad provisional +answer to our problem. Christianity alone of the historical Religions +teaches those great truths to which we have been conducted by a mere +appeal to Reason and to Conscience. It teaches ethical Monotheism; +that is to say, it thinks of God as a thinking, feeling, willing +Consciousness, and understands His nature in the light of the highest +moral ideal. It teaches the belief in personal Immortality, and it +teaches a Morality which in its broad general principles still appeals +to the Conscience of Humanity. Universal Love it sets forth as at once +the central point in its moral ideal and the most important element in +its conception of God. In one of those metaphors which express so much +more than any more exact philosophical formula, it is the Religion +which teaches the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. And +these truths were taught by the historical Jesus. No one up to his +time had ever taught them with equal clearness and in equal purity, and +with the same freedom from other and inconsistent teachings: {154} and +this teaching was developed by his first followers. Amid all +aberrations and amid all contamination by heterogeneous elements, the +society or societies which look back to Christ as their Founder have +never in the worst times ceased altogether to teach these truths; and +now they more and more tend to constitute the essence of Christianity +as it is to-day--all the more so on account of the Church's gradual +shuffling off of so many adventitious ideas and practices which were at +one time associated with them. Christianity is and remains the only +one of the great historical Religions which has taught and does teach +these great truths in all their fullness.[2] These considerations +would by themselves be sufficient to put Christianity in an absolutely +unique position among the Religions of Mankind. + +I have so far been regarding our Lord Jesus Christ simply as a teacher +of religious and ethical truth. I think it is of fundamental +importance that we should _begin_ by regarding him in this light. +{155} It was in this light that he first presented himself to his +fellow-countrymen--even before (in all probability) he claimed to be +the fulfiller of the Messianic ideal which had been set before them by +the prophets of their race. And I could not, without a vast array of +quotation, give you a sufficient impression of the prominence of this +aspect of his work and personality among the earlier Greek Fathers. +Even after the elaborate doctrines of Catholic Christianity had begun +to be developed, it was still primarily as the supremely inspired +Teacher that Jesus was most often thought of. When the early +Christians thought of him as the incarnate Logos or Reason of God, to +teach men divine truth was still looked upon as the supreme function of +the Logos and the purpose of his indwelling in the historical Jesus. +But from the first Jesus appealed to men as much more than a teacher. +It is one of the distinctive peculiarities of religious and ethical +knowledge that it is intimately connected with character: religious and +moral teaching of the highest kind is in a peculiar degree inseparable +from the personality of the teacher. Jesus impressed his +contemporaries, and he has impressed successive ages as having not only +set before man the highest religious and moral ideal, but as having in +a unique manner realized that ideal in his own life. Even the word +'example' {156} does not fully express the impression which he made on +his followers, or do justice to the inseparability of his personality +from his teaching. In the religious consciousness of Christ men saw +realized the ideal relation of man not merely to his fellow-man but +also to his heavenly Father. From the first an enthusiastic reverence +for its Founder has been an essential part of the Christian Religion +amid all the variety of the phases which it has assumed. The doctrine +of the Christian Church was in its origin an attempt to express in the +philosophical language of the time its sense of this supreme value of +Christ for the religious and moral life of man. As to the historical +success and the present usefulness of these attempts, I shall have a +word to say next time. Meanwhile, I would leave with you this one +thought. The claim of Christianity to be the supreme, the universal, +in a sense the final Religion, must rest mainly, in the last resort, +upon the appeal which Christ and his Religion make to the moral and +religious consciousness of the present. + + +LITERATURE + +See the works mentioned at the end of the next Lecture, to which, as +dealing more specially with the subject of Lecture v., may be added +Professor Sanday's _Inspiration_, and Professor Wendt's _Revelation and +Christianity_. + + + +[1] Throughout his writings, but pre-eminently in the _Theoetetus_. + +[2] If it be said that Judaism or any other Religion does now teach +these truths as fully as Christianity, this may possibly apply to the +creed of individual members of these Religions, but it can hardly be +claimed for the historical Religions themselves. I should certainly be +prepared to contend that even such individuals lose something by not +placing in the centre of their Religion the personality of him by whom +they were first taught, and the communities which have been the great +transmitters of them. But in this course of lectures I am chiefly +concerned with giving reasons why Christians should remain Christians, +rather than with giving reasons why others who are not so should become +Christians. + + + + +{157} + +LECTURE VI + +CHRISTIANITY + +In my last lecture I tried to effect a transition from the idea of +religious truth as something believed by the individual, and accepted +by him on the evidence of his own Reason and Conscience to the idea of +a Religion considered as a body of religious truth handed down by +tradition in an organized society. The higher Religions--those which +have passed beyond the stage of merely tribal or national Religion--are +based upon the idea that religious truth of enduring value has been +from time to time revealed to particular persons, the Founders or +Apostles or Reformers of such religions. We recognized the validity of +this idea of Revelation, and the supreme importance to the moral and +religious life of such historical revelations, on one condition--that +the claim of any historical Religion to the allegiance of its followers +must be held to rest in the last resort upon the appeal which it makes +to their Reason and Conscience: though the individual may often be +{158} quite justified in accepting and relying upon the Reason and +Conscience of the religious Society rather than upon his own. + +The view which I have taken of Revelation makes it quite independent of +what are commonly called miracles. All that I have said is quite +consistent with the unqualified acceptance or with the unqualified +rejection of miracles. But some of you may perhaps expect me to +explain a little more fully my own attitude towards that question. And +therefore I will say this much--that, if we regard a miracle as +implying a suspension of a law of nature, I do not think we can call +such a suspension _a priori_ incredible; but the enormous experience +which we have of the actual regularity of the laws of nature, and of +the causes which in certain states of the human mind lead to the belief +in miracles, makes such an event in the highest degree improbable. To +me at least it would seem practically impossible to get sufficient +evidence for the occurrence of such an event in the distant past: all +our historical reasoning presupposes the reign of law. But it is being +more and more admitted by theologians who are regarded as quite +orthodox and rather conservative, that the idea of a miracle need not +necessarily imply such a suspension of natural law. And on the other +hand, decidedly critical and liberal theologians are more and more +disposed to admit {159} that many of the abnormal events commonly +called miraculous may very well have occurred without involving any +real suspension of natural law. Recent advances in psychological +knowledge have widened our conception of the possible influence of mind +over matter and of mind over mind. Whether an alleged miraculous event +is to be accepted or not must, as it seems to me, depend partly upon +the amount of critically sifted historical evidence which can be +produced for it, partly upon the nature of the event itself--upon the +question whether it is or is not of such a kind that we can with any +probability suppose that it might be accounted for either by known laws +or by laws at present imperfectly understood. + +To apply these principles in detail to the New Testament narratives +would involve critical discussions which are outside the purpose of +these lectures. I will only say that few critical scholars would deny +that some recorded miracles even in the New Testament are unhistorical. +When they find an incident like the healing of Malchus's ear omitted in +the earlier, and inserted in the later redaction of a common original, +they cannot but recognize the probability of traditional amplification. +At the same time few liberal theologians will be disposed to doubt the +general fact that our Lord did cure some diseases by spiritual +influence, or that an appearance of our Lord to the disciples--of +whatever nature--actually {160} did occur, and was the means of +assuring them of his continued life and power. At all events I do not +myself doubt these two facts. But at least when miracles are not +regarded as constituting real exceptions to natural law, it is obvious +that they will not prove the truth of any teaching which may have been +connected with them; while, even if we treat the Gospel miracles as +real exceptions to law, the difficulty of proving them in the face of +modern critical enquiry is so great that the evidence will hardly come +home to any one not previously convinced, on purely spiritual grounds, +of the exceptional character of our Lord's personality and mission. +This being so, I do not think that our answer to the problem of +miracles, whatever it be, can play any very important part in Christian +Apologetic. When we have become Christians on other grounds, the acts +of healing may still retain a certain value as illustrating the +character of the Master, and the Resurrection vision as proclaiming the +truth of Immortality in a way which will come home to minds not easily +accessible to abstract argument. The true foundation not merely for +belief in the teaching of Christ, but also for the Christian's +reverence for his Person, must, as it seems to me, be found in the +appeal which his words and his character still make to the Conscience +and Reason of mankind. This proposition would be {161} perhaps more +generally accepted if I were to say that the claim of Christ to +allegiance rests upon the way in which he satisfies the heart, the +aspirations, the religious needs of mankind. And I should be quite +willing to adopt such language, if you will only include respect for +historic fact and intellectual truth among these religious needs, and +admit that a reasonable faith must rest on something better than mere +emotion. Fully to exhibit the grounds of this claim of Christ upon us +would involve an examination of the Gospel narratives in detail: it +would involve an attempt to present to you what was this teaching, this +character, this religious consciousness which has commanded the homage +of mankind. To attempt such a task would be out of place in a brief +course of lectures devoted to a particular aspect of Religion--its +relation to Philosophy. Here I must assume that you feel the spiritual +supremacy of Christ--his unique position in the religious history of +the world and his unique importance for the spiritual life of each one +of us--; and go on to ask what assertions such a conviction warrants us +in making about his person and nature, what in short should be our +attitude towards the traditional doctrines of the Christian Church. + +You may know something of the position taken up in this matter by the +dominant school of what I may call believing liberal Theology in {162} +Germany--the school which takes its name from the great theologian +Ritschl, but which will be best known to most Englishmen in connexion +with the name of Prof. Harnack, though it may be well to remember that +Harnack is nearer to the left than to the right wing of that school. +The fundamental principle of that school is to base the claims of +Christianity mainly upon the appeal which the picture of the life, +teaching, character, and personality of Christ makes to the moral and +religious consciousness of mankind. Their teaching is Christo-centric +in the highest possible degree: but they are almost or entirely +indifferent to the dogmatic formulae which may be employed to express +this supreme religious importance of Christ. In putting the personal +and historical Christ, and not any doctrine about him, in the centre of +the religious life I believe they are right. But this principle is +sometimes asserted in an exaggerated and one-sided manner. In the +first place they are somewhat contemptuous of Philosophy, and of +philosophic argument even for such fundamental truths as the existence +of God. I do not see that the subjective impression made by Christ can +by itself prove the fact of God's existence. We must first believe +that there is a God to be revealed before we can be led to believe in +Christ as the supreme Revealer. I do not believe that the modern world +will permanently accept a view of the Universe {163} which does not +commend itself to its Reason. The Ritschlians talk about the truth of +Religion resting upon value-judgements. I can quite understand that a +value-judgement may tell us the supreme value of Christ's character and +his fitness to be treated as the representative of God to us, when once +we believe in God: but I cannot see how any value-judgement taken by +itself can assure us of that existence. Value is one thing: existence +is another. To my mind a Christian Apologetic should begin, like the +old Apologies of Justin or Aristides, with showing the essential +reasonableness of Christ's teaching about God and its essential harmony +with the highest philosophic teaching about duty, about the divine +nature, about the soul and its eternal destiny. The Ritschlian is too +much disposed to underrate the value of all previous religious and +ethical teaching, even of Judaism at its highest: he is not content +with making Christ the supreme Revealer: he wants to make him the only +Revealer. And when we turn to post-Christian religious history, he is +apt to treat all the great developments of religious and ethical +thought from the time of the Apostles to our own day as simply +worthless and even mischievous corruptions of the original, and only +genuine, Christianity. He tends to reduce Christianity to the +_ipsissima verba_ of its Founder. The Ritschlian dislikes Dogma, not +because it may be at times a {164} misdevelopment, but because it is a +development; not because some of it may be antiquated Philosophy, but +simply because it is Philosophy.[1] + +In order to treat fairly this question of doctrinal development, it +must be remembered that what is commonly called dogma is only a +part--perhaps not the most important part--of that development. +Supreme as I believe to be the value of Christ's great principle of +Brotherhood, it is impossible to deny that, if we look in detail at the +moral ideal of any educated Christian at the present day, we shall find +in it many elements which cannot explicitly be discovered in the +_ipsissima verba_ of Christ and still less of his Apostles. And +development in the ethical ideal always carries with it some +development in a man's conception of God and the Universe. Some of +these elements are due to a gradual bringing out into clear +consciousness, and an application to new details, of principles latent +in the actual words of Christ; others to an infusion of Greek +Philosophy; others to the practical experience and the scientific +discoveries of the modern world. Christianity in the course of +nineteen centuries has gradually absorbed into itself many ideas from +various sources, {165} christianizing them in the process. Many ideas, +much Hellenic Philosophy, many Hellenic ideals of life, many Roman +ideas of government and organization have thus, in the excellent phrase +of Professor Gardner, been 'baptized into Christ.' This capacity of +absorbing into itself elements of spiritual life which were originally +independent of it is not a defect of historical Christianity, but one +of its qualifications for being accepted by the modern world as a +universal, an absolute, a final Religion. + +It does not seem to me possible to recognize the claim of any +historical Religion to be final and ultimate, unless it include within +itself a principle of development. Let me, as briefly as I can, +illustrate what I mean. It is most clearly and easily seen in the case +of Morality. If the idea of a universal Religion is to mean that any +detailed code of Morals laid down at a definite moment of history can +serve by itself for the guidance of all human life in all after ages, +we may at once dismiss the notion as a dream. In nothing did our Lord +show his greatness and the fitness of his Religion for universality +more than in abstaining from drawing up such a code. He confined +himself to laying down a few great principles, with illustrations +applicable to the circumstances of his immediate hearers. Those +principles require development and application to the needs and {166} +circumstances of successive ages before they can suffice to guide us in +the details of conduct. To effect this development and application has +been historically the work of the Church which owes its origin to the +disciples whom he gathered around him. If we may accept the teaching +of the fourth Gospel as at least having germs in the actual utterances +of our Lord, he himself foresaw the necessity of such a development. +At all events the belief in the continued work of God's Spirit in human +Society is an essential principle of the Christian Religion as it was +taught by the first followers of its Founder. Take for instance the +case of slavery. Our Lord never condemned slavery: it is not certain +that he would have done so, had the case been presented to him. Very +likely his answer would have been 'Who made me a judge or a divider,' +or 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' No one on +reflection can now fail to see the essential incompatibility between +slavery and the Christian spirit; yet it was perhaps fourteen hundred +years before a single Christian thinker definitely enunciated that +incompatibility, and more than eighteen hundred years before slavery +was actually banished from all nominally Christian lands. Who can +doubt that many features of our existing social system are equally +incompatible with the principles of Christ's teaching, and that the +{167} accepted Christian morality of a hundred years hence will +definitely condemn many things which the average Christian Conscience +now allows? + +And then there is another kind of development in Ethics which is +equally necessary. The Christian law of Love bids us promote the true +good of our fellow-men, bids us regard another man's good as equally +valuable with our own or with the like good of any other. But what is +this good life which we are to promote? As to that our Lord has only +laid down a few very general principles--the supreme value of Love +itself, the superiority of the spiritual to the carnal, the importance +of sexual purity. These principles our consciences still acknowledge, +and there are no others of equal importance. But what of the +intellectual life? Has that no value? Our Lord never depreciated it, +as so many religious founders and reformers have done. But he has +given us no explicit guidance about it. When the Christian ideal +embraced within itself a recognition of the value and duty of Culture, +it was borrowing from Greece. And when we turn from Ethics to +Theology, the actual fact of development is no less indisputable. +Every alteration of the ethical ideal has brought with it some +alteration in our idea of God. We can no longer endure theories of the +Atonement which are opposed to modern ideas of Justice, though they +were quite compatible with {168} patristic or medieval ideas of +Justice. The advances of Science have altered our whole conception of +God's mode of acting upon or governing the world. None of these things +are religiously so important as the great principle of the Fatherhood +of God, nor have they in any way tended to modify its truth or its +supreme importance. But they do imply that our Theology is not and +cannot be in all points the same as that of the first Christians. + +Now with these presuppositions let us approach the question of that +great structure of formal dogma which the Church has built upon the +foundation of Christ's teaching. A development undoubtedly it is; but, +while we must not assume that every development which has historically +taken place is necessarily true or valuable, it is equally +unphilosophical to assume that, because it is a development, it is +necessarily false or worthless. Our Lord himself did, indeed, claim to +be the Messiah; the fact of Messiahship was what was primarily meant by +the title 'Son of God.' Even in the Synoptists he exhibits a +consciousness of a direct divine mission supremely important for his +own race; and, before the close, we can perhaps discover a growing +conviction that the truth which he was teaching was meant for a larger +world. Starting from and developing these ideas, his followers set +themselves to devise terms which should express their own sense of +their Master's unique {169} religious value and importance, to express +what they felt he had been to their own souls, what they felt he might +be to all who accepted his message. Even to St. Paul the term 'Son of +God' still meant primarily 'the Messiah': but in the light of his +conception of Jesus, the Messianic idea expanded till the Christ was +exalted to a position far above anything which Jewish prophecy or +Apocalypse had ever claimed for him. And the means of expressing these +new ideas were found naturally and inevitably in the current +philosophical terminology of the day. With the fourth Gospel, if not +already with St. Paul, there was infused into the teaching of the +Church a new element. From the Jewish-Alexandrian speculative Theology +the author borrowed the term Logos to express what he conceived to be +the cosmic importance of Christ's position. He accepted from that +speculation--probably from Philo--the theory which personified or +half-personified that Logos or Wisdom of God through which God was +represented in the Old Testament as creating the world and inspiring +the prophets. This Logos through whom God had throughout the ages been +more and more fully revealing Himself had at last become actually +incarnate in Jesus Christ. This Word of God is also described as truly +God, though in the fourth Gospel the relation of the Father to the +Word--at {170} least to the Word before the Incarnation--is left wholly +vague and undefined. + +From these comparatively simple beginnings sprang centuries of +controversy culminating in that elaborate system of dogma which is +often little understood even by its most vigorous champions. You know +in a very general way the result. The Logos was made more and more +distinct from God, endowed with a more and more decidedly personal +existence. Then, when the interests of Monotheism seemed to be +endangered, the attempt was made to save it by asserting the +subordination of the Son to the Father. The result was that by +Arianism the Son was reduced to the position of an inferior God. +Polytheism had once more to be averted by asserting in even stronger +terms not merely the equality of the Son with the Father but also the +Unity of the God who is both Father and Son. The doctrine of the +Divinity of the Holy Ghost went through a somewhat similar series of +stages. At first regarded as identical with the Word, a distinction +was gradually effected. The Word was said to have been incarnate in +Jesus; while it was through the Holy Ghost that the subsequent work of +God was carried on in human hearts. And by similar stages the equality +of the Holy Ghost to Father and to Son was gradually evolved; while it +was more and more strongly asserted that, in spite of the eternal +distinction of {171} Persons, it was one and the same God who revealed +Himself in all the activities attributed to each of them. + +Side by side with these controversies about the relation between the +Father and the Word, there was a gradual development of doctrine as to +the relation between the Logos and the human Jesus in whom he took up +his abode. Frequently the idea of any real humanity in Jesus was all +but lost. That was at last saved by the Catholic formula 'perfect God +and perfect man'; though it cannot be denied that popular thought in +all ages has never quite discarded the tendency to think of Jesus as +simply God in human form, and not really man at all. Even now there +are probably hundreds of people who regard themselves as particularly +orthodox Churchmen who yet do not know that the Church teaches that our +Lord had a human soul and a human will. + +What are we to make of all that vast structure, of the elaboration and +complication of which the Constantinopolitan Creed which we miscall +Nicene and even the so-called Athanasian Creed give very little idea to +those who do not also know something of the Councils, the Fathers, and +the Schoolmen? Has it all a modern meaning? Can it be translated into +terms of our modern thought and speech? For I suppose it hardly needs +demonstration--that such {172} translation is necessary, if it be +possible. I doubt whether any man in this audience who has not made a +special study of the subject, will get up and say that the meaning of +such terms as 'substance,' 'essence,' 'nature,' 'hypostasis,' 'person,' +'eternal generation,' 'procession,' 'hypostatic union,' and the like is +at once evident to him by the light of nature and an ordinary modern +education. And those who know most about the matter will most fully +realize the difficulty of saying exactly what was meant by such phrases +at this or that particular moment or by this or that particular +thinker. A thorough discussion of this subject from the point of view +of one who acknowledges the supreme claims of Christ upon the modern +mind, and is yet willing fairly to examine the traditional Creed in the +light of modern philosophical culture, is a task which very much needs +to be undertaken. I doubt if it has been satisfactorily performed yet. +Even if I possessed a tithe of the learning necessary for that task, I +could obviously not undertake it now. But a few remarks on the subject +may be of use for the guidance of our personal religious life in this +matter: + +(1) I should like once more to emphasize the fact that the really +important thing, from the point of view of the spiritual life of the +individual soul, is our personal attitude towards our Lord himself and +his teaching, and not the phrases in which we express {173} it. A man +who believes what Christ taught about God's Fatherhood, about human +brotherhood and human duty, about sin, the need for repentance, the +Father's readiness to forgive, the value of Prayer, the certainty of +Immortality--the man who finds the ideal of his life in the character +of Jesus, and strives by the help which he has supplied to think of God +and feel towards God as he did, to imitate him in his life, to live +(like him) in communion with the Father and in the hope of +Immortality--he is a Christian, and a Christian in the fullest sense of +the word. He will find in that faith all that is necessary (to use the +old phrase) for salvation--for personal goodness and personal Religion. +And such a man will be saved, and saved through Christ; even though he +has never heard of the Creeds, or deliberately rejects many of the +formulae which the Church or the Churches have 'built upon' that one +foundation. + +(2) At the same time, if we believe in the supreme importance of Christ +for the world, for the religious life of the Church and of the +individual, it is surely convenient to have some language in which to +express our sense of that importance. The actual personal attitude +towards Christ is the essential thing: but as a means towards that +attitude it is of importance to express what Christ has actually been +to others, and what he ought to be to ourselves. Children {174} and +adults alike require to have the claims of Christ presented to them +before they can verify them by their own experience: and this requires +articulate language of some kind. Religion can only be handed down, +diffused, propagated by an organized society: and a religious society +must have some means of handing on its religious ideas. It is possible +to hold that under other conditions a different set of terms might have +expressed the truth as well as those which have actually been enshrined +in the New Testament, the Liturgies, and the Creeds. But the phrases +which have been actually adopted surely have a strong presumption in +their favour, even if it were merely through the difficulty of changing +them, and the importance of unity, continuity, corporate life. It is +easier to explain, or even if need be, alter in some measure the +meaning of an accepted formula than to introduce a new one. Religious +development has at all times taken place largely in this way. Our Lord +himself entirely transformed the meaning of God's Fatherhood, +Messiahship, the Kingdom of God, the people of God, the true Israel. +At all events we should endeavour to discover the maximum of truth that +any traditional formula can be made to yield before we discard it in +favour of a new one. If we want to worship and to work with Christ's +Church, we must do our best to give the maximum of meaning {175} to the +language in which it expresses its faith and its devotion. + +(3) We must insist strongly upon the thoroughly human character of +Christ's own consciousness. Jesus did not--so I believe the critical +study of the Gospels leads us to think--himself claim to be God, or to +be Son of God in any sense but that of Messiahship. He claimed to +speak with authority: he claimed a divine mission: he claimed to be a +Revealer of divine truth. The fourth Gospel has been of infinite +service to spiritual Christianity. It has given the world a due sense +of the spiritual importance of Christ as the Way, the Truth, and the +Life. Perhaps Christianity could hardly have expanded into a universal +Religion without that Gospel. But we cannot regard all that the +Johannine Christ says about himself as the _ipsissima verba_ of Jesus. +The picture is idealized in accordance with the writer's own +conceptions, though after all its Theology is very much simpler than +the later Theology which has grown out of it permits most people to +see. We must not let these discourses blind us to the human character +of Christ's consciousness. And this real humanity must carry with it +the recognition of the thoroughly human limitations of his knowledge. +The Bishop of Birmingham has prepared the way for the union of a really +historical view of Christ's life with a reasonable interpretation of +the Catholic {176} doctrine about him, by reviving the ancient view as +to the limitation of his intellectual knowledge;[2] but the principle +must be carried in some ways further than the Bishop himself would be +prepared to go. The accepted Christology must be distinctly recognized +as the Church's reflection and comment upon Christ's work and its +value, not as the actual teaching of the Master about himself. + +(4) It must likewise be recognized that the language in which the +Church expressed this attitude towards Christ was borrowed from Greek +Metaphysics, particularly from Plato and Neo-Platonism in the patristic +period, and from Aristotle in the Middle Ages. And we cannot +completely separate language from thought. It was not merely Greek +technical phrases but Greek ways of thinking which were imported into +Catholic Christianity. And the language, the categories, the ideas of +Greek Philosophy were to some extent different from those of modern +times. The most Platonically-minded thinker of modern times does not +really think exactly as Plato thought: the most Catholic-minded thinker +of modern times, if he has also breathed the atmosphere of modern +Science and modern Culture, cannot really think exactly as Athanasius +or Basil thought. I {177} do not suppose that any modern mind can +think itself back into exactly the state of mind which an ancient +Father was in, when he used the term Logos. This central idea of the +Logos is not a category of modern thought. We cannot really think of a +Being who is as distinct from the Father as he is represented as being +in some of the patristic utterances--I say advisedly some, for widely +different modes of thought are found in Fathers of equal authority--and +yet so far one with him that we can say 'One God, one spiritual Being, +and not two.' Nor are we under any obligation to accept these formulae +as representing profound mysteries which we cannot understand: they +were simply pieces of metaphysical thinking, some of them valuable and +successful pieces of thinking, others less so. We must use them as +helps, not as fetters to our thought. But, though we cannot think +ourselves back into exactly the same intellectual condition as a +fourth- or fifth-century Father, there is no reason why we should not +recognize the fundamental truth of the religious idea which he was +trying to express. A modern Philosopher would probably express that +thought somewhat in this manner. 'The whole world is a revelation of +God in a sense, and still more so is the human mind: all through the +ages God has gone on revealing Himself more and more in human +consciousness, especially through the prophets and other {178} +exceptionally inspired men. The fullest and completest revelation of +Himself was made once for all in the person and teaching of Jesus, in +whom we recognize a revelation of God adequate to all our spiritual +needs, when developed and interpreted by the continued presence of +God's Spirit in the world and particularly in the Church which grew out +of the little company of Jesus' friends.' + +(5) I do not think at the present day even quite orthodox people are +much concerned about the technicalities of the conciliar Theology, or +even about the niceties of the Athanasian Creed. They are even a +little suspicious sometimes that much talk about the doctrine of the +Logos is only intended to evade a plain answer to the supreme question +of the Divinity of Christ. You will expect me perhaps to say something +about that question. I would first observe that the popular term +'divinity of Christ' is apt to give a somewhat misleading impression of +what the orthodox teaching on the subject really is. For one thing, it +is apt to suggest the idea of a pre-existent human consciousness of +Jesus, which would be contrary to Catholic teaching. The Logos--the +eternal Son or Reason of God--pre-existed; but not the man Jesus Christ +who was born at a particular moment of history, and who is still, +according to Catholic Theology, a distinct human soul perfectly and for +ever united with the Word. {179} And then again, it is apt to suggest +the heretical idea that the whole Trinity was incarnate in Christ, and +not merely the Word. Orthodox Theology does not teach that God the +Father became incarnate in Christ, and suffered upon the Cross. And +lastly, the constant iteration of the phrase 'Divinity of Christ' tends +to the concealment of the other half of the Catholic doctrine--the real +humanity of Christ. To speak of the God-manhood of Christ or the +indwelling of God in Christ would be a truer representation even of the +strictest orthodox doctrine, apart from all modern re-interpretations. +But even so, when all this is borne in mind, it may be asked, What is +the real meaning of saying that a man was also God? I would answer, +'Whether it is possible to give a modern, intelligible, philosophically +defensible meaning to the idea of Christ's Divinity depends entirely +upon the question what we conceive to be the true relation between +Humanity in general and God.' If (as I have attempted to show) we are +justified in thinking of all human consciousness as constituting a +partial reproduction of the divine Mind; if we are justified in +thinking of human Reason, and particularly of the human Conscience, as +constituting in some measure and in some sense a revelation by means of +which we can rise to a contemplation of the divine nature; if +Personality (as we know it in man) is the highest category within our +knowledge; then {180} there is a real meaning in talking of one +particular man being also divine; of the divine Reason or Logos as +dwelling after a unique, exceptional, pre-eminent manner in him. + +As Dr. Edward Caird has remarked, all the metaphysical questions which +were formerly discussed as to the relation between the divine and the +human nature in Christ, are now being discussed again in reference to +the relation of Humanity in general to God. We cannot say intelligibly +that God dwells in Christ, unless we have already recognized that in a +sense God dwells and reveals Himself in Humanity at large, and in each +particular human soul. But I fully recognize that, if this is all that +is meant by the expression 'divinity of Christ,' that doctrine would be +evacuated of nearly all that makes it precious to the hearts of +Christian people. And therefore it is all-important that we should go +on to insist that men do not reveal God equally. The more developed +intellect reveals God more completely than that of the child or the +savage: and (far more important from a religious point of view), the +higher and more developed moral consciousness reveals Him more than the +lower, and above all the actually better man reveals God more than the +worse man. Now, if in the life, teaching, and character of Christ--in +his moral and religious consciousness, and in the life and character +which {181} so completely expressed and illustrated that +consciousness--we can discover the highest revelation of the divine +nature, we can surely attach a real meaning to the language of the +Creeds which singles him out from all the men that ever lived as the +one in whom the ideal relation of man to God is most completely +realized. If God can only be known as revealed in Humanity, and Christ +is the highest representative of Humanity, we can very significantly +say 'Christ is _the_ Son of God, very God of very God, of one substance +with the Father,' though the phrase undoubtedly belongs to a +philosophical dialect which we do not habitually use. + +(6) Behind the doctrine of the Incarnation looms the still more +technical doctrine of the Trinity. Yet after all, it is chiefly, I +believe, as a sort of necessary background or presupposition to the +idea of Christ's divine nature that modern religious people, not +professionally interested in Theology, attach importance to that +doctrine. They accept the doctrine in so far as it is implied by the +teaching of Scripture and by the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity, but +they are not much attached to the technicalities of the Athanasian +Creed. The great objection to that Creed, apart from the damnatory +clauses, is the certainty that it will be misunderstood by most of +those who think they understand it at all. The {182} best thing we +could do with the Athanasian Creed is to drop it altogether: the next +best thing to it is to explain it, or at least so much of it as really +interests the ordinary layman--the doctrine of three Persons in one +God. And therefore it is important to insist in the strongest possible +way that the word 'Person' which has most unfortunately come to be the +technical term for what the Greeks more obscurely called the three +_huostaseis_ in the Godhead does not, and never did, mean what we +commonly understand by Personality--whether in the language of ordinary +life or of modern Philosophy. I do not deny that at certain periods +Theology did tend to think of the Logos as a distinct being from the +Father, a distinct consciousness with thoughts, will, desires, emotions +not identical with those of God the Father. The distinction was at +times pushed to a point which meant either sheer Tritheism, or +something which is incapable of being distinctly realized in thought at +all. But that is scarcely true of the Theology which was finally +accepted either by East or West. This is most distinctly seen in the +Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas: and I would remind you that you +cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas--the source not only of the +Theology professed by the Pope and taught in every Roman Seminary but +of the Theology embodied in our own Articles. St. Thomas' explanation +of the Trinity {183} is that God is at one and the same time Power or +Cause[3] (Father), Wisdom (Son), Will (Holy Ghost); or, since the Will +of God is always a loving Will, Love (Amor) is sometimes substituted +for Will (Voluntas) in explanation of the Holy Spirit.[4] How little +{184} St. Thomas thought of the 'Persons' as separate consciousnesses, +is best seen from his doctrine (taken from Augustine) that the love of +the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit. The love of one Being for +himself or for another is not a Person in the natural, normal, modern +sense of the word: and it would be quite unorthodox to attribute +Personality to the Son in any other sense than that in which it is +attributed to the Holy Ghost. I do not myself attach any great +importance to these technical phrases. I do not {185} deny that the +supremely important truth that God has received His fullest revelation +in the historical Christ, and that He goes on revealing Himself in the +hearts of men, might have been otherwise, more simply, to modern minds +more intelligibly, expressed. There are detailed features of the +patristic or the scholastic version of the doctrine which involve +conceptions to which the most accomplished Professors of Theology would +find it difficult or impossible to give a modern meaning. I do not +know for instance that much would have been lost had Theology (with the +all but canonical writers Clement of Rome and Hermas, with Ignatius, +with Justin, with the philosophic Clement of Alexandria) continued to +speak indifferently of the Word and the Spirit. Yet taken by itself +this Thomist doctrine of the Trinity is one to which it is quite +possible to give a perfectly rational meaning, and a meaning probably +very much nearer to that which was really intended by its author than +the meaning which is usually put upon the Trinitarian formula by +popular religious thought. That God is Power, and Wisdom, and Love is +simply the essence of Christian Theism--not the less true because few +Unitarians would repudiate it. + +(7) Once more let me briefly remind you that any claim for finality in +the Christian Religion must be based on its power of perpetual +development. {186} Belief in the continued work of the Holy Spirit in +the Church is an essential element of the Catholic Faith. We need not, +with the Ritschlian, contemptuously condemn the whole structure of +Christian doctrine because undoubtedly it is a development of what was +taught by Christ himself. Only, if we are to justify the development +of the past, we must go on to assert the same right and duty of +development in Ethics and in Theology for the Church of the future. In +the pregnant phrase of Loisy, the development which the Church is most +in need of at the present moment is precisely a development in the idea +of development itself. + +But how can we tell (it may be asked), if we once admit that the +development of Religion does not end with the teaching of Christ, where +the development will stop? If we are to admit an indefinite +possibility of growth and change, how do we know that Christianity +itself will not one day be outgrown? If we once admit that the final +appeal is to the religious consciousness of the present, we must +acknowledge that it is not possible to demonstrate _a priori_ that the +Christian Religion is the final, universal, or absolute Religion. All +we can say is that we have no difficulty in recognizing that the +development which has so far taken place, in so far as it is a +development which we can approve and accept, seems to us a development +which leaves the {187} Religion still essentially the Religion of +Christ. In the whole structure of the modern Christian's religious +belief, that which was contributed by Christ himself is incomparably +the most important part--the basis of the whole structure. The +essentials of Religion and Morality still seem to us to be contained in +his teaching as they are contained nowhere else. All the rest that is +included in an enlightened modern Christian's religious creed is either +a direct working out of the principles already contained there, or (if +it has come from other sources) it has been transformed in the process +of adaptation. Nothing has been discovered in Religion and Morality +which tends in any way to diminish the unique reverence which we feel +for the person of Christ, the perfect sufficiency of his character to +represent and incarnate for us the character of God. It is a +completely gratuitous assumption to suppose that it will ever lose that +sufficiency. Even in the development of Science, there comes a time +when its fundamentals are virtually beyond the reach of +reconsideration. Still more in practical life, mere unmotived, +gratuitous possibilities may be disregarded. It weakens the hold of +fundamental convictions upon the mind to be perpetually contemplating +the possibility or probability of fundamental revision. We ought no +doubt to keep the spiritual ear ever open that we may always be hearing +what the Spirit saith unto {188} the Churches. But to look forward to +a time when any better way will be discovered of thinking of God than +Jesus' way of thinking of Him as a loving Father is as gratuitous as to +contemplate the probability of something in human life at present +unknown being discovered of greater value than Love. Until that +discovery is made, our Religion will still remain the Religion of him +who, by what he said and by what he was, taught the world to think of +God as the supreme Love and the supreme Holiness, the source of all +other love and all other holiness. + + +LITERATURE + +The literature is here too vast to mention even the works of the very +first importance: I can only select a very few books which have been +useful to myself. The late Sir John Seeley's _Ecce Homo_ may be +regarded as in the light of modern research a somewhat uncritical book, +but it remains to my mind the most striking expression of the appeal +which Christ makes to the Conscience of the modern world. It has +proved a veritable fifth Gospel to many seekers after light. Bishop +Moorhouse's little book, _The Teaching of Christ_, will serve as an +introduction to the study of Christ's life and work. A more elaborate +treatment of the subject, with which I am very much in sympathy, is +Wendt's _Teaching of Jesus_. The ideal life of Christ perhaps remains +to be written. Professor Sanday's Article on 'Jesus Christ' in +Hastings' _Dictionary of the Bible_ may be mentioned as a good +representative of moderate and scholarly Conservatism or Liberal +Conservatism. Professor Oscar Holtzmann's _Life of Jesus_ is based on +more radical, perhaps over-radical, criticism. Professor Harnack's +{189} _What is Christianity?_ has become the typical expression of the +Ritschlian attitude. The ideas of extreme Roman Catholic 'Modernism' +may be gathered from Loisy's _l'Évangile et l'Église_ and _Autour d'un +Petit Livre_. Professor Gardner's three books--_Exploratio +Evangelica_, the shorter _An Historic View of the New Testament_, and +_The Growth of Christianity_--may be especially commended to those who +wish to satisfy themselves that a thorough-going recognition of the +results of historical Criticism is compatible with a whole-hearted +personal acceptance of Christianity. Dr. Fairbairn's _Philosophy of +the Christian Religion_ and Bousset's _What is Religion?_ are +especially valuable as vindications of the supreme position of +Christianity combined with the fullest recognition of the measure of +Revelation contained in all the great historical Religions. Allen's +_Continuity of Christian Thought_ suggests what seems to me the right +attitude of the modern thinker towards traditional dogma, though the +author's position is more decidedly 'Hegelian' than mine. I may also +mention Professor Inge's contribution to _Contentio Veritatis_ on 'The +Personal Christ,' and some of the Essays in _Lux Hominum_. Though I +cannot always agree with him, I recognize the high value of the Bishop +of Birmingham's Bampton Lectures on _The Divinity of Jesus Christ the +Son of God_ and the accompanying volume of _Dissertations_. + + + +[1] In their assertion of the necessity of Development, and of the +religious community as the origin of Development, the teaching of the +Abbe Loisy and the Roman Catholic Modernists seems to me to be +complementary to that of the Kitschlians, though I do not always accept +their rather destructive critical conclusions. + +[2] In his Essay in _Lux Mundi_ (1889). He has since developed his +view in his Bampton Lectures on _The Incarnation of the Son of God_ and +a volume of _Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation_. + +[3] I venture thus to translate 'Principium' (_arche_); in Abelard and +his disciple Peter the Lombard, the famous Master of the Sentences, the +word is 'Potentia' (L. I. Dist. xxxiv.): and St. Thomas himself (P. I. +Q. xli. Art. 4) explains 'Principium' by 'Potentia generandi Filium.' + +[4] Thus in _Summa Theologica_, Pars I. Q. xxxvii. Art. 1, the +'conclusio' is 'Amor, personaliter acceptus, proprium nomen est +Spiritus sancti,' which is explained to mean that there are in the +Godhead 'duse processiones: Una per modum intellectus, quae est +processio Verbi; alia per modum voluntatis, quae est processio amoris.' +So again (_ibid._ Q. xlv. Art. 7): 'In creaturis igitur rationalibus, +in quibus est intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio +Trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis Verbum +conceptum, et amor procedens.' In a friendly review of my Essay in +_Contentio Veritatis_, in which I endeavoured to expound in a modern +form this doctrine, Dr. Sanday (_Journal of Theological Studies_, vol. +iv., 1903) wrote: 'One of the passages that seem to me most open to +criticism is that on the doctrine of the Trinity (p. 48). "Power, +Wisdom, and Will" surely cannot be a sound trichotomy as applied either +to human nature or Divine. Surely Power is an expression of Will and +not co-ordinate with it. The common division, Power (or Will), Wisdom, +and Love is more to the point. Yet Dr. Rashdall identifies the two +triads by what I must needs think a looseness of reasoning.' The +Margaret Professor of Divinity hardly seems to recognize that he is +criticizing the Angelical Doctor and not myself. If Dr. Sanday had had +the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, the result, if less +metaphysically subtle, might no doubt have proved more easily +intelligible to the modern mind; but the 'identification' of which he +complains happens to be part of the traditional doctrine, and I was +endeavouring merely to make the best of it for modern Christians. I +add St. Thomas' justification of it, which is substantially what I gave +in _Contentio Veritatis_ and have repeated above: 'Cum processiones +divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse est accipere, secundum +bonitatem, et hujusmodi alia attributa, non accipiuntur aliae +processiones, nisi Verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, +veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat' (Q. xxvii. Art. 5). The +source of the doctrine is to be found in St. Augustine, who habitually +speaks of the Holy Spirit as Amor; but, when he refers to the 'Imago +Trinitatia' in man the Spirit is represented sometimes by 'Amor,' +sometimes by 'Voluntas' (_de Trin._, L. xiv. cap 7). The other two +members of the human triad are with him 'Memoria' (or 'Mens') and +'Intelligentia.' + +With regard to the difficulty of distinguishing Power from Will, I was +perhaps to blame for not giving St. Thomas' own word 'Principium.' The +word 'Principium' means the _pege theoteos_, the ultimate Cause or +Source of Being: by 'Voluntas' St. Thomas means that actual putting +forth of Power (in knowing and in loving the Word or Thought eternally +begotten by God the Father) which is the Holy Ghost. I am far from +saying that the details of St. Thomas' doctrine are not open to much +criticism: a rough correspondence between his teaching and any view of +God's Nature which can commend itself to a modern Philosopher is all +that I endeavoured to point out. The modern thinker would no doubt +with Dr. Sanday prefer the triad 'Power, Wisdom, Love,' or (I would +suggest) 'Feeling, including Love as the highest form of Feeling.' The +reason why St. Thomas will not accept such an interpretation is that +his Aristotelianism (here not very consonant with the Jewish and +Christian view of God) excludes all feeling or emotion from the divine +nature; 'Love' has therefore to be identified with 'Will' and not with +'Feeling.' I cannot but think that the Professor might have taken a +little more trouble to understand both St. Thomas and myself before +accusing either of us of 'looseness of reasoning.' + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*** + + +******* This file should be named 21995-8.txt or 21995-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/1/9/9/21995 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://www.gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/pglaf. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://www.gutenberg.org/about/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: +http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/21995-8.zip b/21995-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..672df4c --- /dev/null +++ b/21995-8.zip diff --git a/21995.txt b/21995.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30bc97e --- /dev/null +++ b/21995.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5073 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Philosophy and Religion, by Hastings Rashdall + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Philosophy and Religion + Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge + + +Author: Hastings Rashdall + + + +Release Date: July 4, 2007 [eBook #21995] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed + in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page + breaks occurred in the original book. + + + + + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + +Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge + +by + +HASTINGS RASHDALL + +D. Litt. (Oxon.), D.C.L. (Dunelm.) +Fellow of the British Academy +Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford + + + + + + + +London: Duckworth & Co. +3 Henrietta St. Covent Garden +1909 +All rights reserved + + + + +{v} + +GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES + +Man has no deeper or wider interest than theology; none deeper, for +however much he may change, he never loses his love of the many +questions it covers; and none wider, for under whatever law he may live +he never escapes from its spacious shade; nor does he ever find that it +speaks to him in vain or uses a voice that fails to reach him. Once +the present writer was talking with a friend who has equal fame as a +statesman and a man of letters, and he said, 'Every day I live, +Politics, which are affairs of Man and Time, interest me less, while +Theology, which is an affair of God and Eternity, interests me more.' +As with him, so with many, though the many feel that their interest is +in theology and not in dogma. Dogma, they know, is but a series of +resolutions framed by a council or parliament, which they do not +respect any the more because the parliament was composed of +ecclesiastically-minded persons; while the theology which so interests +them is a discourse touching God, though the Being so named is the God +man conceived as not only related to himself and his world but also as +rising ever higher with the notions of the self and the world. Wise +books, not in dogma but in theology, may therefore be described as the +supreme {vi} need of our day, for only such can save us from much +fanaticism and secure us in the full possession of a sober and sane +reason. + +Theology is less a single science than an encyclopaedia of sciences; +indeed all the sciences which have to do with man have a better right +to be called theological than anthropological, though the man it +studies is not simply an individual but a race. Its way of viewing man +is indeed characteristic; from this have come some of its brighter +ideals and some of its darkest dreams. The ideals are all either +ethical or social, and would make of earth a heaven, creating +fraternity amongst men and forming all states into a goodly sisterhood; +the dreams may be represented by doctrines which concern sin on the one +side and the will of God on the other. But even this will cannot make +sin luminous, for were it made radiant with grace, it would cease to be +sin. + +These books then,--which have all to be written by men who have lived +in the full blaze of modern light,--though without having either their +eyes burned out or their souls scorched into insensibility,--are +intended to present God in relation to Man and Man in relation to God. +It is intended that they begin, not in date of publication, but in +order of thought, with a Theological Encyclopaedia which shall show the +circle of sciences co-ordinated under the term Theology, though all +will be viewed as related to its central or main idea. This relation +of God to human knowledge will then be looked at through mind as a +communion of Deity with humanity, or God in fellowship {vii} with +concrete man. On this basis the idea of Revelation will be dealt with. +Then, so far as history and philology are concerned, the two Sacred +Books, which are here most significant, will be viewed as the scholar, +who is also a divine, views them; in other words, the Old and New +Testaments, regarded as human documents, will be criticised as a +literature which expresses relations to both the present and the +future; that is, to the men and races who made the books, as well as to +the races and men the books made. The Bible will thus be studied in +the Semitic family which gave it being, and also in the Indo-European +families which gave to it the quality of the life to which they have +attained. But Theology has to do with more than sacred literature; it +has also to do with the thoughts and life its history occasioned. +Therefore the Church has to be studied and presented as an institution +which God founded and man administers. But it is possible to know this +Church only through the thoughts it thinks, the doctrines it holds, the +characters and the persons it forms, the people who are its saints and +embody its ideals of sanctity, the acts it does, which are its +sacraments, and the laws it follows and enforces, which are its polity, +and the young it educates and the nations it directs and controls. +These are the points to be presented in the volumes which follow, which +are all to be occupied with theology or the knowledge of God and His +ways. + +A. M. F. + 'O.' + + + + +{ix} + +PREFACE + +These Lectures were delivered in Cambridge during the Lent Term of last +year, on the invitation of a Committee presided over by the Master of +Magdalene, before an audience of from three hundred to four hundred +University men, chiefly Under-graduates. They were not then, and they +are not now, intended for philosophers or even for beginners in the +systematic study of philosophy, but as aids to educated men desirous of +thinking out for themselves a reasonable basis for personal Religion. + +The Lectures--especially the first three--deal with questions on which +I have already written. I am indebted to the Publisher of _Contentio +Veritatis_ and the other contributors to that volume for raising no +objection to my publishing Lectures which might possibly be regarded as +in part a condensation, in part an expansion of my Essay on 'The +ultimate basis of Theism.' I have dealt more systematically with many +of the problems here discussed in an Essay upon 'Personality in God and +Man' contributed to _Personal Idealism_ (edited by Henry {x} Sturt) and +in my 'Theory of Good and Evil.' Some of the doctrinal questions +touched on in Lecture VI. have been more fully dealt with in my volume +of University Sermons, _Doctrine and Development_. + +Questions which were asked at the time and communications which have +since reached me have made me feel, more even than I did when I was +writing the Lectures, how inadequate is the treatment here given to +many great problems. On some matters much fuller explanation and +discussion will naturally be required to convince persons previously +unfamiliar with Metaphysic: on others it is the more advanced student +of Philosophy who will complain that I have only touched upon the +fringe of a vast subject. But I have felt that I could not seriously +expand any part of the Lectures without changing the whole character of +the book, and I have been compelled in general to meet the demand for +further explanation only by the above general reference to my other +books, by the addition of a few notes, and by appending to each chapter +some suggestions for more extended reading. These might of course have +been indefinitely enlarged, but a long list of books is apt to defeat +its own purpose: people with a limited time at their disposal want to +know which book to make a beginning upon. + +The Lectures are therefore published for the most {xi} part just as +they were delivered, in the hope that they may suggest lines of thought +which may be intellectually and practically useful. I trust that any +philosopher who may wish to take serious notice of my views--especially +the metaphysical views expressed in the first few chapters--will be +good enough to remember that the expression of them is avowedly +incomplete and elementary, and cannot fairly be criticized in much +detail without reference to my other writings. + +I am much indebted for several useful suggestions and for valuable +assistance in revising the proofs to one of the hearers of the +Lectures, Mr. A. G. Widgery, Scholar of St. Catherine's College, +Cambridge, now Lecturer in University College, Bristol. + +H. RASHDALL. + +NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD, + Jan. 6, 1909. + + + + +{xii} + +CONTENTS + + +LECTURE I + +MIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + +1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate + knowledge of Matter; what we know is always + Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can exist + by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one? + +2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind. + This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour, + sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary + qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations, + no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + +3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did + not adequately distinguish between sensations and + intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + +4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_ + transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist + apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which + and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God, . . . . . . . 16 + +5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The + impossibility of Materialism has generally been + recognized (_e.g._ by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel). + If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be + utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The + latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + +6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the + higher than _vice versa_, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + + +LECTURE II + +THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + +1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to + recognize the necessity of a Mind which _thinks_ the + world. Insufficiency of this view. + +{xiii} + +2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with + nothing but succession, never with Causality. The + Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical + Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of + Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition. + Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + +3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause + but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events + which _we_ do not cause must be caused by some other + Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that + this cause must be _One_ Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + +4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the + probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in + Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought, + Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + +5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist + who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it + fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the + relations between mind and matter, and with the + tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48 + +6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the + Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + +7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + + +LECTURE III + +GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + +1. The empirical study of Nature ('red in tooth and + claw') can tell us of purpose, not what the purpose is. + The only source of knowledge of the character of God is + to be found in the moral Consciousness. + +2. Our moral judgements are as valid as other judgements + (_e.g._ mathematical axioms), and equally reveal the + thought of God, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + +3. This does not imply that the moral consciousness is not + gradually evolved, or that each individual's conscience + is infallible, or that our moral judgements in detail + are as certain as mathematical judgements, or that the + detailed rules of human conduct are applicable to God, . . 63 + +{xiv} + +4. Corollaries: + + (_a_) Belief in the objectivity of our moral judgements + logically implies belief in God, . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + (_b_) If God aims at an end not fully realized here, we + have a ground for postulating Immortality, . . . . . . 77 + (_c_) Evil must be a necessary means to greater good, . . 79 + +5. In what sense this 'limits God.' Omnipotence=ability + to do all things which are in their own nature + possible, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 + + +LECTURE IV + +DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + +1. _Is the world created?_ There may or may not be a + beginning of the particular series of physical events + constituting our world. But, even if this series has a + beginning, this implies some previous existence which + has no beginning. + +2. _Is the whole-time series infinite?_ Time must be + regarded as objective, but the 'antinomies' involved + in the nature of Time cannot be resolved, . . . . . . . . 90 + +3. _Are Spirits created or pre-existent?_ The close + connexion and correspondence between mind and body + makes for the former view. Difficulties of + pre-existence--heredity, etc., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 + +4. _An Idealism based on Pre-existence without God_ is + open to the same objections and others. Such a system + provides no mind (_a_) in which and for which the whole + system exists, or (_b_) to effect the correspondence + between mind and body, or (_c_) to allow of a purpose + in the Universe; without this the world is not rational, . 96 + +5. _The human mind (i.e. consciousness) not apart of the + divine Consciousness_, though in the closest possible + dependence upon God. The Universe a Unity, but the + Unity is not that of Self-Consciousness, . . . . . . . . . 101 + +6. _There is no 'immediate' or 'intuitive' knowledge of + God_. Our knowledge is got by inference, like knowledge + of our friend's existence, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 + +{xv} + +7. _Religion and Psychology_. It is impossible to base + Religion upon Psychology or 'religious experience' + without Metaphysics, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 + +8. _Summary_: the ultimate nature of Reality, . . . . . . . . 118 + + Note on Non-theistic Idealism, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 + + +LECTURE V + +REVELATION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + +1. There is no special organ of religious knowledge, but + religious knowledge has many characteristics which may + be conveniently suggested by the use of the term 'faith,' + especially its connexion with character and Will. + +2. The psychological causes of religious belief must be + carefully distinguished from the reasons which make it + true. No logic of discovery. Many religious ideas + have occurred in a spontaneous or apparently intuitive + way to particular persons, the truth of which the + philosopher may subsequently be able to test by + philosophical reflection, though he could not have + discovered them, but they are not necessarily true + because they arise in a spontaneous or unaccountable + manner, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 + +3. False conceptions of Revelation and true. All knowledge + is in a sense revealed, especially religious and moral + knowledge: but spiritual insight varies. Need of the + prophet or religious genius, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 + +4. Reasoned and intuitive beliefs may both be 'revealed,' . . 143 + +5. Degrees of truth in the historical religions. Dependence + of the individual upon such religions. Christianity + occupies a unique position, because it alone combines an + ethical ideal which appeals to the universal Conscience + with a Theism which commends itself to Reason. The truth + of Christianity is dependent upon its appeal to the moral + and religious consciousness of the present, . . . . . . . 148 + + +{xvi} + +LECTURE VI + +CHRISTIANITY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 + +1. The claim of Christianity to be the special or absolute + Religion not dependent upon miracles. + +2. Ritschlian Theologians right in resting the truth of + Christianity mainly upon the appeal made by Christ to + the individual Conscience: but wrong in disparaging + (_a_) philosophical arguments for Theism, (_b_) the + relative truth of non-Christian systems, (_c_) the + value of Doctrine and necessity for Development, . . . . . 161 + +3. Christian doctrine (esp. of the Logos) is an attempt to + express the Church's sense of the unique value of Christ + and His Revelation. The necessity for recognizing + development both in Christian Ethics and in Theology, . . 164 + +4. Some reflections on our practical attitude towards + Christian doctrine. Some means of expressing the unique + position of Christ wanted. The old expressions were + influenced by philosophy of the time, but not valueless. + Illustrations. Need of re-interpretation and further + development, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 + +5. The doctrine of continuous Revelation through the + Spirit is a part of Christianity, and the condition + of its acceptance as the final or absolute Religion, . . . 185 + + + + +{1} + +PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION + + +LECTURE I + +MIND AND MATTER + +I have been invited to speak to you about the relations between +Religion and Philosophy. To do that in a logical and thoroughgoing way +it would be necessary to discuss elaborately the meaning first of +Religion and then of Philosophy. Such a discussion would occupy at +least a lecture, and I am unwilling to spend one out of six scanty +hours in formal preliminaries. I shall assume, therefore, that we all +know in some general way the meaning of Religion. It is not necessary +for our present purpose to discuss such questions as the definition of +Religion for purposes of sociological investigation, or the possibility +of a Religion without a belief in God, or the like. I shall assume +that, whatever else may be included in the term Religion, Christianity +may at least be included in it; and that what you are practically most +interested in is the bearing of Philosophy upon the Christian ideas +concerning the {2} being and nature of God, the hope of Immortality, +the meaning and possibility of Revelation. When we turn to Philosophy, +I cannot perhaps assume with equal confidence that all of you know what +it is. But then learning what Philosophy is--especially that most +fundamental part of Philosophy which is called Metaphysics--is like +learning to swim: you never discover how to do it until you find +yourself considerably out of your depth. You must strike out boldly, +and at last you discover what you are after. I shall presuppose that +in a general way you do all know that Philosophy is an enquiry into the +ultimate nature of the Universe at large, as opposed to the discussion +of those particular aspects or departments of it which are dealt with +by the special Sciences. What you want to know, I take it, is--what +rational enquiry, pushed as far as it will go, has to say about those +ultimate problems of which the great historical Religions likewise +profess to offer solutions. The nature and scope of Philosophy is best +understood by examples: and therefore I hope you will excuse me if +without further preface I plunge _in medias res_. I shall endeavour to +presuppose no previous acquaintance with technical Philosophy, and I +will ask those who have already made some serious study of Philosophy +kindly to remember that I am trying to make myself intelligible to +those who have not. I shall {3} not advance anything which I should +not be prepared to defend even before an audience of metaphysical +experts. But I cannot undertake in so short a course of lectures to +meet all the objections which will, I know, be arising in the minds of +any metaphysically trained hearers who may honour me with their +presence, many of which may probably occur to persons not so trained. +And I further trust the Metaphysicians among you will forgive me if, in +order to be intelligible to all, I sometimes speak with a little less +than the _akribeia_ at which I might feel bound to aim if I were +reading a paper before an avowedly philosophical Society. +Reservations, qualifications, and elaborate distinctions must be +omitted, if I am to succeed in saying anything clearly in the course of +six lectures. + +Moreover, I would remark that, though I do not believe that an +intention to edify is any excuse for slipshod thought or intellectual +dishonesty, I am speaking now mainly from the point of view of those +who are enquiring into metaphysical truth for the guidance of their own +religious and practical life, rather than from the point of view of +pure speculation. I do not, for my own part, believe in any solution +of the religious problem which evades the ultimate problems of all +thought. The Philosophy of Religion is for me not so much a special +and sharply distinguished branch or department of {4} Philosophy as a +particular aspect of Philosophy in general. But many questions which +may be of much importance from the point of view of a complete theory +of the Universe can be entirely, or almost entirely, put on one side +when the question is, 'What may I reasonably believe about those +ultimate questions which have a direct and immediate bearing upon my +religious and moral life; what may I believe about God and Duty, about +the world and its ultimate meaning, about the soul and its destiny?' +For such purposes solutions stopping short of what will fully satisfy +the legitimate demands of the professed Metaphysician may be all that +is necessary, or at least all that is possible for those who are not +intending to make a serious and elaborate study of Metaphysic. I have +no sympathy with the attempt to base Religion upon anything but honest +enquiry into truth: and yet the professed Philosophers are just those +who will most readily recognize that there are--if not what are +technically called degrees of truth--still different levels of thought, +different degrees of adequacy and systematic completeness, even within +the limits of thoroughly philosophical thinking. I shall assume that +you are not content to remain at the level of ordinary unreflecting +Common-sense or of merely traditional Religion--that you do want (so +far as time and opportunity serve) to get to the bottom of things, {5} +but that you will be content in such a course as the present if I can +suggest to you, or help you to form for yourselves, an outline--what +Plato would call the _hypotyposis_ of a theory of the Universe which +may still fall very far short of a finished and fully articulated +metaphysical system. + +I suppose that to nearly everybody who sets himself down to think +seriously about the riddle of the Universe there very soon occurs the +question whether Materialism may not contain the solution of all +difficulties. I think, therefore, our present investigation had better +begin with an enquiry whether Materialism can possibly be true. I say +'can be true' rather than 'is true,' because, though dogmatic +Materialists are rare, the typical Agnostic is one who is at least +inclined to admit the possibility of Materialism, even when he does +not, at the bottom of his mind, practically assume its truth. The man +who is prepared to exclude even this one theory of the Universe from +the category of possible but unprovable theories is not, properly +speaking, an Agnostic. To know that Materialism at least is not true +is to know something, and something very important, about the ultimate +nature of things. I shall not attempt here any very precise definition +of what is meant by Materialism. Strictly speaking, it ought to mean +the view that nothing really exists but matter. But the existence, in +some sense or {6} other, of our sensations and thoughts and emotions is +so obvious to Common-sense that such a creed can hardly be explicitly +maintained: it is a creed which is refuted in the very act of +enunciating it. For practical purposes, therefore, Materialism may be +said to be the view that the ultimate basis of all existence is matter; +and that thought, feeling, emotion--consciousness of every kind--is +merely an effect, a by-product or concomitant, of certain material +processes. + +Now if we are to hold that matter is the only thing which exists, or is +the ultimate source of all that exists, we ought to be able to say what +matter is. To the unreflecting mind matter seems to be the thing that +we are most certain of, the one thing that we know all about. Thought, +feeling, will, it may be suggested, are in some sense appearances which +(though we can't help having them) might, from the point of view of +superior insight, turn out to be mere delusions, or at best entirely +unimportant and inconsiderable entities. This attitude of mind has +been amusingly satirised by the title of one of Mr. Bradley's +philosophical essays--'on the supposed uselessness of the Soul.'[1] In +this state of mind matter presents itself as the one solid reality--as +something undeniable, something perfectly intelligible, something, too, +which is pre-eminently {7} important and respectable; while thinking +and feeling and willing, joy and sorrow, hope and aspiration, goodness +and badness, if they cannot exactly be got rid of altogether, are, as +it were, negligible quantities, which must not be allowed to disturb or +interfere with the serious business of the Universe. + +From this point of view matter is supposed to be the one reality with +which we are in immediate contact, which we see and touch and taste and +handle every hour of our lives. It may, therefore, sound a rather +startling paradox to say that matter--matter in the sense of the +Materialist--is something which nobody has ever seen, touched, or +handled. Yet that is the literal and undeniable fact. Nobody has ever +seen or touched or otherwise come in contact with a piece of matter. +For in the experience which the plain man calls seeing or touching +there is always present another thing. Even if we suppose that he is +Justified in saying 'I touch matter,' there is always present the 'I' +as well as the matter.[2] It is always and inevitably matter + mind +that he knows. Nobody ever can get away from this 'I,' nobody can ever +see or feel what matter is like apart from the 'I' which knows {8} it. +He may, indeed, infer that this matter exists apart from the 'I' which +knows it. He may infer that it exists, and may even go as far as to +assume that, apart from his seeing or touching, or anybody else's +seeing or touching, matter possesses all those qualities which it +possesses for his own consciousness. But this is inference, and not +immediate knowledge. And the validity or reasonableness of the +inference may be disputed. How far it is reasonable or legitimate to +attribute to matter as it is in itself the qualities which it has for +us must depend upon the nature of those qualities. Let us then go on +to ask whether the qualities which constitute matter as we know it are +qualities which we can reasonably or even intelligibly attribute to a +supposed matter-in-itself, to matter considered as something capable of +existing by itself altogether apart from any kind of conscious +experience. + +In matter, as we know it, there are two elements. There are certain +sensations, or certain qualities which we come to know by sensation, +and there are certain relations. Now, with regard to the sensations, a +very little reflection will, I think, show us that it is absolutely +meaningless to say that matter has the qualities implied by these +sensations, even when they are not felt, and would still possess them, +even supposing it never had been and never would be felt by any one +whatever. In a world in which {9} there were no eyes and no minds, +what would be the meaning of saying that things were red or blue? In a +world in which there were no ears and no minds, there would clearly be +no such thing as sound. This is exactly the point at which Locke's +analysis stopped. He admitted that the 'secondary qualities'--colours, +sounds, tastes--of objects were really not in the things themselves but +in the mind which perceives them. What existed in the things was +merely a power of producing these sensations in us, the quality in the +thing being not in the least like the sensations which it produces in +us: he admitted that this power of producing a sensation was something +different from, and totally unlike, the sensation itself. But when he +came to the primary qualities--solidity, shape, magnitude and the +like--he supposed that the qualities in the thing were exactly the same +as they are for our minds. If all mind were to disappear from the +Universe, there would henceforth be no red and blue, no hot and cold; +but things would still be big or small, round or square, solid or +fluid. Yet, even with these 'primary qualities' the reference to mind +is really there just as much as in the case of the secondary qualities; +only the fact is not quite so obvious. And one reason for this is that +these primary qualities involve, much more glaringly and unmistakably +than the secondary, something which is not _mere_ sensation--something +which {10} implies thought and not mere sense. What do we mean by +solidity, for instance? We mean partly that we get certain sensations +from touching the object--sensations of touch and sensations of what is +called the muscular sense, sensations of muscular exertion and of +pressure resisted. Now, so far as that is what solidity means, it is +clear that the quality in question involves as direct a reference to +our subjective feelings as the secondary qualities of colour and sound. +But something more than this is implied in our idea of solidity. We +think of external objects as occupying space. And spaciality cannot be +analysed away into mere feelings of ours. The feelings of touch which +we derive from an object come to us one after the other. No mental +reflection upon sensations which come one after the other in time could +ever give us the idea of space, if they were not spacially related from +the first. It is of the essence of spaciality that the parts of the +object shall be thought of as existing side by side, outside one +another. But this side-by-sideness, this outsideness, is after all a +way in which the things present themselves to a mind. Space is made up +of relations; and what is the meaning of relations apart from a mind +which relates, or _for_ which the things are related? If spaciality +were a quality of the thing in itself, it would exist no matter what +became of other things. It would be quite possible, therefore, {11} +that the top of this table should exist without the bottom: yet +everybody surely would admit the meaninglessness of talking about a +piece of matter (no matter how small, be it an atom or the smallest +electron conceived by the most recent physical speculation) which had a +top without a bottom, or a right-hand side without a left. This +space-occupying quality which is the most fundamental element in our +ordinary conception of matter is wholly made up of the relation of one +part of it to another. Now can a relation exist except for a mind? As +it seems to me, the suggestion is meaningless. Relatedness only has a +meaning when thought of in connection with a mind which is capable of +grasping or holding together both terms of the relation. The relation +between point A and point B is not _in_ point A or _in_ point B taken +by themselves. It is all in the 'between': 'betweenness' from its very +nature cannot exist in any one point of space or in several isolated +points of space or things in space; it must exist only in some one +existent which holds together and connects those points. And nothing, +as far as we can understand, can do that except a mind. Apart from +mind there can be no relatedness: apart from relatedness no space: +apart from space no matter. It follows that apart from mind there can +be no matter. + +It will probably be known to all of you that the {12} first person to +make this momentous inference was Bishop Berkeley. There was, indeed, +an obscure medieval schoolman, hardly recognized by the historians of +Philosophy, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, Dean of Metz,[3] who +anticipated him in the fourteenth century, and other better-known +schoolmen who approximated to the position; and there are, of course, +elements in the teaching of Plato and even of Aristotle, or possible +interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, which point in the same +direction. But full-blown Idealism, in the sense which involves a +denial of the independent existence of matter, is always associated +with the name of Bishop Berkeley. + +I can best make my meaning plain to you by quoting a passage or two +from his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, in which he extends to the +primary qualities of matter the analysis which Locke had already +applied to the secondary. + + +'But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances +may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of +bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must +know it by Sense or by Reason.--As for our senses, by them we have the +knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are +immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do +not inform us that things exist {13} without the mind, or unperceived, +like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists themselves +acknowledge.--It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all +of external things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from +what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us +to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we +perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend +there is any _necessary_ connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say +it is granted on all hands--and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and +the like, puts it beyond dispute--that it is possible we might be +affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies +existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition +of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since +it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be +produced always in the same order we see them in at present, without +their concurrence. + + * * * * * * + +'In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should +ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no +one can deny possible--an intelligence _without the help of external +bodies_, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that +you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his +mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to +believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his +ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for +believing the same thing? Of this there can be no {14} question--which +one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the +strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the +existence of bodies without the mind.'[4] + + +Do you say that in that case the tables and chairs must be supposed to +disappear the moment we all leave the room? It is true that we do +commonly think of the tables and chairs as remaining, even when there +is no one there to see or touch them. But that only means, Berkeley +explains, that if we or any one else were to come back into the room, +we should perceive them. Moreover, even in thinking of them as things +which might be perceived under certain conditions, they have entered +our minds and so proclaimed their ideal or mind-implying character. To +prove that things exist without the mind we should have to conceive of +things as unconceived or unthought of. And that is a feat which no one +has ever yet succeeded in accomplishing. + +Here is Berkeley's own answer to the objection: + + +'But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and +nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no +difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than +framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and +{15} at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may +perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all +the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you +have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does +not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought +may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that +_you_ conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a +manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence +of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own +ideas. But the mind, _taking no notice of itself_, is deluded to think +it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the +mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, +itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and +evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any +other proofs against the existence of _material substance_.'[5] + + +Berkeley no doubt did not adequately appreciate the importance of the +distinction between mere sensations and mental relations. In the +paragraph which I have read to you he tends to explain space away into +mere subjective feelings: in this respect and in many others he has +been corrected by Kant and the post-Kantian Idealists. Doubtless we +cannot analyse away our conception of space or of substance into mere +feelings. But relations imply mind no less than sensations. Things +are no mere {16} bundles of sensations; we do think of them as objects +or substances possessing attributes. Indeed to call them (with +Berkeley), 'bundles of sensations' implies that the bundle is as +important an element in thinghood as the sensations themselves. The +bundle implies what Kant would call the intellectual 'categories' of +Substance, Quantity, Quality, and the like. We do think objects: but +an object is still an object of thought. We can attach no intelligible +meaning to the term 'object' which does not imply a subject. + +If there is nothing in matter, as we know it, which does not obviously +imply mind, if the very idea of matter is unintelligible apart from +mind, it is clear that matter can never have existed without mind. + +What then, it may be asked, of the things which no human eye has ever +seen or even thought of? Are we to suppose that a new planet comes +into existence for the first time when first it sails into the +telescope of the astronomer, and that Science is wrong in inferring +that it existed not only before that particular astronomer saw it, but +before there were any astronomers or other human or even animal +intelligences upon this planet to observe it? Did the world of Geology +come into existence for the first time when some eighteenth-century +geologist first suspected that the world was more than six thousand +years old? Are all those ages of past {17} history, when the earth and +the sun were but nebulae, a mere imagination, or did that nebulous mass +come into existence thousands or millions of years afterwards when Kant +or Laplace first conceived that it had existed? The supposition is +clearly self-contradictory and impossible. If Science be not a mass of +illusion, this planet existed millions of years before any human--or, +so far as we know, any animal minds--existed to think its existence. +And yet I have endeavoured to show the absurdity of supposing that +matter can exist except for a mind. It is clear, then, that it cannot +be merely for such minds as ours that the world has always existed. +Our minds come and go. They have a beginning; they go to sleep; they +may, for aught that we can immediately know, come to an end. At no +time does any one of them, at no time do all of them together, +apprehend all that there is to be known. We do not create a Universe; +we discover it piece by piece, and after all very imperfectly. Matter +cannot intelligibly be supposed to exist apart from Mind: and yet it +clearly does not exist merely for _our_ minds. Each of us knows only +one little bit of the Universe: all of us together do not know the +whole. If the whole is to exist at all, there must be some one mind +which knows the whole. The mind which is necessary to the very +existence of the Universe is the mind that we call God. + +{18} + +In this way we are, as it seems to me, led up by a train of reasoning +which is positively irresistible to the idea that, so far from matter +being the only existence, it has no existence of its own apart from +some mind which knows it--in which and for which it exists. The +existence of a Mind possessing universal knowledge is necessary as the +presupposition both of there being any world to know, and also of there +being any lesser minds to know it. It is, indeed, possible to believe +in the eternal existence of limited minds, while denying the existence +of the one Omniscient Mind. That is a hypothesis on which I will say a +word hereafter.[6] It is enough here to say that it is one which is +not required to explain the world as we know it. The obvious _prima +facie_ view of the matter is that the minds which apparently have a +beginning, which develope slowly and gradually and in close connexion +with certain physical processes, owe their origin to whatever is the +ultimate source or ground of the physical processes themselves. The +order or systematic interconnexion of all the observable phenomena in +the Universe suggests that the ultimate Reality must be one Being of +some kind; the argument which I have suggested leads us to regard that +one Reality as a spiritual Reality. We are not yet entitled to speak +of this physical Universe as _caused_ {19} by God: that is a question +which I hope to discuss in our next lecture. All that I want to +establish now is that we cannot explain the world without the +supposition of one universal Mind in which and for which all so-called +material things exist, and always have existed. + +So far I have endeavoured to establish the existence of God by a line +of thought which also leads to the position that matter has no +independent existence apart from conscious mind, that at bottom nothing +exists except minds and their experiences. Now I know that this is a +line of thought which, to those who are unfamiliar with it, seems so +paradoxical and extravagant that, even when a man does not see his way +to reply to it, it will seldom produce immediate or permanent +conviction the first time he becomes acquainted with it. It is for the +most part only by a considerable course of habituation, extending over +some years, that a man succeeds in thinking himself into the idealistic +view of the Universe. And after all, there are many minds--some of +them, I must admit, not wanting in philosophical power--who never +succeed in accomplishing that feat at all. Therefore, while I feel +bound to assert that the clearest and most irrefragable argument for +the existence of God is that which is supplied by the idealistic line +of thought, I should be sorry to have to admit that a man {20} cannot +be a Theist, or that he cannot be a Theist on reasonable grounds, +without first being an Idealist. From my own point of view most of the +other reasons for believing in the existence of God resolve themselves +into idealistic arguments imperfectly thought out. But they may be +very good arguments, as far as they go, even when they are not thought +out to what seem to me their logical consequences. One of these lines +of thought I shall hope to develope in my next lecture; but meanwhile +let me attempt to reduce the argument against Materialism to a form in +which it will perhaps appeal to Common-sense without much profound +metaphysical reflection. + +At the level of ordinary common-sense thought there appear to be two +kinds of Reality--mind and matter. And yet our experience of the unity +of Nature, of the intimate connexion between human and animal minds and +their organisms (organisms governed by a single intelligible and +interconnected system of laws) is such that we can hardly help +regarding them as manifestations or products or effects or aspects of +some one Reality. There is, almost obviously, some kind of Unity +underlying all the diversity of things. Our world does not arise by +the coming together of two quite independent Realities--mind and +matter--governed by no law or by unconnected and independent systems of +law. {21} All things, all phenomena, all events form parts of a single +inter-related, intelligible whole: that is the presupposition not only +of Philosophy but of Science. Or if any one chooses to say that it +_is_ a presupposition and so an unwarrantable piece of dogmatism, I +will say that it is the hypothesis to which all our knowledge points. +It is at all events the one common meeting-point of nearly all serious +thinkers. The question remains, 'What is the nature of this one +Reality?' Now, if this ultimate Reality be not mind, it must be one of +two things. It must be matter, or it must be a third thing which is +neither mind nor matter, but something quite different from either. +Now many who will not follow the idealistic line of thought the whole +way--so far as to recognize that the ultimate Reality is Mind--will at +least admit that Idealists have successfully shown the impossibility of +supposing that the ultimate Reality can be matter. For all the +properties of matter are properties which imply some relation to our +sensibility or our thought. Moreover, there is such a complete +heterogeneity between consciousness and unconscious matter, considered +as something capable of existing without mind, that it seems utterly +impossible and unthinkable that mind should be simply the product or +attribute of matter. That the ultimate Reality cannot be what we mean +by matter has been admitted by the most naturalistic, {22} and, in the +ordinary sense, anti-religious thinkers--Spinoza, for instance, and +Haeckel, and Herbert Spencer. The question remains, 'Which is the +easier, the more probable, the more reasonable theory--that the +ultimate Reality should be Mind, or that it should be something so +utterly unintelligible and inconceivable to us as a _tertium quid_--a +mysterious Unknown and Unknowable--which is neither mind nor matter?' +For my own part, I see no reason to suppose that our inability to think +of anything which is neither matter nor mind but quite unlike either is +a mere imperfection of human thought. It seems more reasonable to +assume that our inability to think of such a mysterious X is due to +there being no such thing.[7] + +Our only way of judging of the Unknown is by the analogy of the known. +It is more probable, surely, that the world known to us should exhibit +something of the characteristics of the Reality from which it is +derived, or of which it forms a manifestation, than that it should +exhibit none of these characteristics. No doubt, if we were to argue +from some small part of our experience, or from the detailed +characteristics of one part of our experience to what is beyond our +experience; if, for instance {23} (I am here replying to an objection +of Hoeffding's), a blind man were to argue that the world must be +colourless because he sees no colour, or if any of us were to affirm +that in other planets there can be no colours but what we see, no +sensations but what we feel, no mental powers but what we possess, the +inference would be precarious enough. The Anthropomorphist in the +strict sense--the man who thinks that God or the gods must have human +bodies--no doubt renders himself liable to the gibe that, if oxen could +think, they would imagine the gods to be like oxen, and so on. But the +cases are not parallel. We have no difficulty in thinking that in +other worlds there may be colours which we have never seen, or whole +groups of sensation different from our own: we cannot think that any +existence should be neither mind nor matter, but utterly unlike either. +We are not arguing from the mere absence of some special experience, +but from the whole character of _all_ the thought and experience that +we actually possess, of all that we are and the whole Universe with +which we are in contact. The characteristic of the whole world which +we know is that it consists of mind and matter in close connexion--we +may waive for a moment the nature of that connexion. Is it more +probable that the ultimate Reality which lies beyond our reach should +be something which possesses the characteristics of mind, or that it +should {24} be totally unlike either mind or matter? Do you insist +that we logically ought to say it might contain the characteristics of +both mind and matter? There is only one way in which such a +combination seems clearly thinkable by us, _i.e._ when we represent +matter as either in the idealistic sense the thought or experience of +mind, or (after the fashion of ordinary realistic Theism) as created or +produced by mind. But if you insist on something more than this, if +you want to think of the qualities of matter as in some other way +included in the nature of the ultimate Reality as well as those of +mind, at all events we could still urge that we shall get nearer to the +truth by thinking of this ultimate Reality in its mind-aspect than by +thinking of it in its matter-aspect. + +I do not believe that the human mind is really equal to the task of +thinking of a Reality which is one and yet is neither mind nor matter +but something which combines the nature of both. Practically, where +such a creed is professed, the man either thinks of an unconscious +Reality in some way generating or evolving mind, and so falls back into +the Materialism which he has verbally disclaimed; or he thinks of a +mind producing or causing or generating a matter which when produced is +something different from itself. This last is of course ordinary +Theism in the form in which it is commonly {25} held by those who are +not Idealists. From a practical and religious point of view there is +nothing to be said against such a view. Still it involves a Dualism, +the philosophical difficulties of which I have attempted to suggest to +you. I confess that for my own part the only way in which I can +conceive of a single ultimate Reality which combines the attributes of +what we call mind with those of what we know as matter is by thinking +of a Mind conscious of a world or nature which has no existence except +in and for that Mind and whatever less complete consciousnesses that +may be. I trust that those who have failed to follow my sketch of the +arguments which lead to this idealistic conclusion may at least be led +by it to see the difficulties either of Materialism or of that kind of +agnostic Pantheism which, while admitting in words that the ultimate +Reality is not matter, refuses to invest it with the attributes of +mind. The argument may be reduced to its simplest form by saying we +believe that the ultimate Reality is Mind because mind will explain +matter, while matter will not explain mind: while the idea of a +Something which is neither in mind nor matter is both unintelligible +and gratuitous. + +And this line of thought may be supplemented by another. Whatever may +be thought of the existence of matter apart from mind, every one will +{26} admit that matter possesses no value or worth apart from mind. +When we bring into account our moral judgements or judgements of value, +we have no difficulty in recognizing mind as the highest or best kind +of existence known to us. There is, surely, a certain intrinsic +probability in supposing that the Reality from which all being is +derived must possess at least as much worth or value as the derived +being; and that in thinking of that Reality by the analogy of the +highest kind of existence known to us we shall come nearer to a true +thought of it than by any other way of thinking possible to us. This +is a line of argument which I hope to develope further when I come to +examine the bearing upon the religious problem of what is as real a +part of our experience as any other--our moral experience. + +I will remind you in conclusion, that our argument for the existence of +God is at present incomplete. I have tried to lead you to the idea +that the ultimate Reality is spiritual, that it is a Mind which knows, +or is conscious of, matter. I have tried to lead you with the Idealist +to think of the physical Universe as having no existence except in the +mind of God, or at all events (for those who fail to follow the +idealistic line of thought) to believe that the Universe does not exist +without such a Mind. What further relation exists between physical +nature and this Universal Spirit, I shall hope in the next lecture {27} +to consider; and in so doing to suggest a line of argument which will +independently lead to the same result, and which does not necessarily +presuppose the acceptance of the idealistic creed. + + +LITERATURE + +The reader who wishes to have the idealistic argument sketched in the +foregoing chapter developed more fully should read Berkeley's +_Principles of Human Knowledge_. For the correction of Berkeley's +sensationalistic mistakes the best course is to read Kant's _Critique +of Pure Reason_ or the shorter _Prolegomena to any future Metaphysic_ +or any of the numerous expositions or commentaries upon Kant. (One of +the best is the 'Reproduction' prefixed to Dr. Hutchison Stirling's +_Text-book to Kant_.) The non-metaphysical reader should, however, be +informed that Kant is very hard reading, and is scarcely intelligible +without some slight knowledge of the previous history of Philosophy, +especially of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, while some acquaintance with +elementary Logic is also desirable. He will find the argument for +non-sensationalistic Idealism re-stated in a post-Kantian but much +easier form in Ferrier's _Institutes of Metaphysic_. The argument for +a theistic Idealism is powerfully stated (though it is not easy +reading) in the late Prof. T. H. Green's _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book +I. In view of recent realistic revivals I may add that the earlier +chapters of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ still seem to me to +contain an unanswerable defence of Idealism as against Materialism or +any form of Realism, though his Idealism is not of the theistic type +defended in the above lecture. The idealistic argument is stated in a +way which makes strongly for Theism by Professor Ward in _Naturalism +and Agnosticism_--a work which would perhaps be the best sequel to +these lectures for any reader {28} who does not want to undertake a +whole course of philosophical reading: readers entirely unacquainted +with Physical Science might do well to begin with Part II. A more +elementary and very clear defence of Theism from the idealistic point +of view is to be found in Dr. Illingworth's _Personality Human and +Divine_. Representatives of non-idealistic Theism will be mentioned at +the end of the next lecture. + + + +[1] _Mind_, vol. iv. (U.S.), 1885. + +[2] I do not mean of course that in the earliest stages of +consciousness this distinction is actually made; but, if there are +stages of consciousness in which the 'I' is not realized, the idea of +matter or even of an 'object' or 'not-self' existing apart from +consciousness must be supposed to be equally absent. + +[3] I have dealt at length with this forgotten thinker in a +Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, printed in their +_Proceedings_ for 1907. + +[4] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. i., Sections 18, 20. + +[5] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. 1., Section 23. + +[6] See Lecture IV., pp. 96-101, 123-6. + +[7] I have attempted to meet this line of argument somewhat more +adequately, in the form in which it has recently been taken up by +Professor Hoeffding in his _Philosophy of Religion_, in a review in the +Review of Theology and Philosophy for November, 1907 (vol. iii.). + + + + +{29} + +LECTURE II + +THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE + +In my last lecture I endeavoured to show that matter, so far from +constituting the ultimate Reality, cannot reasonably be thought of as +existing at all without mind; and that we cannot explain the world +without assuming the existence of a Mind in which and for which +everything that is not mind has its being. But we are still very far +from having fully cleared up the relation between the divine Mind and +that Nature which exists in it and for it: while we have hardly dealt at +all with the relation between the universal Mind and those lesser minds +which we have treated--so far without much argument--as in some way +derived from, or dependent upon, that Mind. So far as our previous line +of argument goes, we might have to look upon the world as the thought of +God, but not as caused by Him or due to His will. We might speak of God +as 'making Nature,' but only in the sense in which you or I make Nature +when we think it or experience it. {30} 'The world is as necessary to +God as God is to the world,' we are often told--for instance by my own +revered teacher, the late Professor Green. How unsatisfactory this +position is from a religious point of view I need hardly insist. For all +that such a theory has to say to the contrary, we might have to suppose +that, though God is perfectly good, the world which He is compelled to +think is very bad, and going from bad to worse. To think of God merely +as the Mind which eternally contemplates Nature, without having any power +whatever of determining what sort of Nature it is to be, supplies no +ground for hope or aspiration--still less for worship, adoration, +imitation. I suggested the possibility that from such a point of view +God might be thought of as good, and the world as bad. But that is +really to concede too much. A being without a will could as little be +bad as he could be good: he would be simply a being without a character. +From an intellectual point such a way of looking at the Universe might be +more intelligent or intelligible than that of pure Materialism or pure +Agnosticism; but morally and religiously I don't know that, when its +consequences are fully realized, it is any great improvement upon either +of them.[1] {31} Moreover, even intellectually it fails to satisfy the +demand which most reflecting people feel, that the world shall be +regarded as a Unity of some kind. If God is thought of as linked by some +inexplicable fate to a Nature over which He has no sort of control--not +so much control as a mere human being who can produce limited changes in +the world,--we can hardly be said to have reduced the world to a Unity. +The old Dualism has broken out again: after all we still have God and the +world confronting one another; neither of them is in any way explained by +the other. Still less could such a world be supposed to have a purpose +or rational end. For our own mere intellectual satisfaction as well as +for the satisfaction of our religious needs we must go on to ask whether +we are not justified in thinking of God as the Cause or Creator of the +world, as well as the Thinker of it. + +This enquiry introduces us to the whole problem of Causality. The sketch +which I gave you last time of Bishop Berkeley's argument was a very +imperfect one. Bishop Berkeley was from one point of view a great +philosophic iconoclast, though he destroyed only that he might build up. +He destroyed the superstition of a self-existing matter: {32} he also +waged war against what I will venture to call the kindred superstition of +a mysterious causal nexus between the physical antecedent and the +physical consequent. On this side his work was carried on by Hume. +Berkeley resolved our knowledge into a succession of 'ideas.' He did, no +doubt, fall into the mistake of treating our knowledge as if it were a +mere succession of feelings: he ignored far too much--though he did not +do so completely--that other element in our knowledge, the element of +intellectual relation, of which I said something last time. Here, no +doubt, Berkeley has been corrected by Kant; and, so far, practically all +modern Idealists will own their indebtedness to Kant. Even in the +apprehension of a succession of ideas, in the mere recognition that this +feeling comes after that, there is an element which cannot be explained +by mere feeling. The apprehension that this feeling came after that +feeling is not itself a feeling. But can I detect any relation between +these experiences of mine except that of succession? We commonly speak +of fire as the cause of the melting of the wax, but what do we really +know about the matter? Surely on reflection we must admit that we know +nothing but this--that, so far as our experience goes, the application of +fire is always followed by the melting of the wax. Where this is the +case we do, from the point of view of {33} ordinary life, speak of the +one phenomenon as the cause of the other. Where we don't discover such +an invariable succession, we don't think of the one event as the cause of +the other. + +I shall be told, perhaps, that on this view of the nature of Causality we +ought to speak of night as the cause of day. So perhaps we should, if +the result to which we are led by a more limited experience were not +corrected by the results of a larger experience. To say nothing of the +valuable correction afforded by the polar winter and the polar summer, we +have learned by a more comprehensive experience to replace the law that +day follows night by the wider generalisation that the visibility of +objects is invariably coincident upon the presence of some luminous body +and not upon a previous state of darkness. But between cases of what we +call mere succession and what is commonly called causal sequence the +difference lies merely in the observed fact that in some cases the +sequence varies, while in others no exception has ever been discovered. +No matter how frequently we observe that a sensation of red follows the +impact upon the aural nerve of a shock derived from a wave of ether of +such and such a length, we see no reason why it should do so. We may, no +doubt, make a still wider generalization, and say that every event in +Nature is invariably preceded by some definite complex of conditions, +{34} and so arrive at a general law of the Uniformity of Nature. And +such a law is undoubtedly the express or implied basis of all inference +in the Physical Sciences. When we have once accepted that law (as the +whole mass of our experience in the purely physical region inclines us to +do), then a single instance of A B C being followed by D (when we are +quite sure that we have included all the antecedents which we do not know +from other experience to be irrelevant) will warrant our concluding that +we have discovered a law of nature. On the next occasion of A B C's +occurrence we confidently predict that D will follow. But, however often +we have observed such a sequence, and however many similar sequences we +may have observed, we are no nearer to knowing _why_ D should follow ABC: +we can only know that it always does: and on the strength of that +knowledge we infer, with a probability which we do no doubt for practical +purposes treat as a certainty, that it always will. But on reflection we +can see no reason why a wave of ether of a certain length should produce +red rather than blue, a colour rather than a sound. There, as always, we +discover nothing but succession, not necessary connexion. + +These cases of unvaried succession among phenomena, it should be +observed, are quite different from cases of real necessary connexion. We +don't want to examine thousands of instances of two {35} added to two to +be quite sure that they always make four, nor in making the inference do +we appeal to any more general law of Uniformity. We simply see that it +is and always must be so. Mill no doubt tells us he has no difficulty in +supposing that in the region of the fixed stars two and two might make +five, but nobody believes him. At all events few of us can pretend to +such feats of intellectual elasticity. No amount of contradictory +testimony from travellers to the fixed stars, no matter whether they were +Bishops of the highest character or trained as Professors of physical +Science, would induce us to give a moment's credence to such a story. We +simply see that two and two must make four, and that it is inconceivable +they should ever, however exceptionally, make five. It is quite +otherwise with any case of succession among external phenomena, no matter +how unvaried. So long as we confine ourselves to merely physical +phenomena (I put aside for the moment the case of conscious or other +living beings) nowhere can we discover anything but succession; nowhere +do we discover Causality in the sense of a necessary connexion the +reversal of which is inconceivable. + +Are we then to conclude that there is no such thing as Causality, that in +searching for a cause of everything that happens, we are pursuing a mere +will o' the wisp, using a mere _vox nihili_ which has {36} as little +meaning for the reflecting mind as fate or fortune? Surely, in the very +act of making the distinction between succession and causality, in the +very act of denying that we can discover any causal connexion between one +physical phenomenon and another, we imply that we have got the idea of +Causality in our minds; and that, however little we may have discovered a +genuine cause, we could not believe that anything could happen without a +cause. + +For my own part, I find it quite possible to believe that a phenomenon +which has been followed by another phenomenon 9999 times should on the +10,000th time be followed by some other phenomenon. Give me the +requisite experience, and belief would follow; give me even any adequate +evidence that another person has had such an experience (though I should +be very particular about the evidence), and I should find no difficulty +in believing it. But to tell me that the exception to an observed law +might take place without any cause at all for the variation would seem to +be pure nonsense. Put the matter in another way. Let us suppose an +empty world, if one can speak of such a thing without contradiction--let +us suppose that at one time nothing whatever had existed, neither mind +nor matter nor any of that mysterious entity which some people find it +possible to believe in which is {37} neither mind nor matter. Let us +suppose literally nobody and nothing to have existed. Now could you +under these conditions rationally suppose that anything could have come +into existence? Could you for one moment admit the possibility that +after countless aeons of nothingness a flash of lightning should occur or +an animal be born? Surely, on reflection those who are most suspicious +of _a priori_ knowledge, who are most unwilling to carry their +speculations beyond the limits of actual experience, will be prepared to +say, 'No, the thing is utterly for ever impossible.' _Ex nihilo nihil +fit_: for every event there must be a cause. Those who profess to reject +all other _a priori_ or self-evident knowledge, show by their every +thought and every act that they never really doubt that much. + +Now, it would be just possible to contend that we have got the bare +abstract concept or category of Causality in our minds, and yet that +there is nothing within our experience to give it any positive +content--so that we should have to say, 'Every event must have a cause, +but we never know or can know what that cause is. If we are to talk +about causes at all, we can only say "The Unknowable is the cause of all +things."' Such a position can be barely stated without a contradiction. +But surely it is a very difficult one. Nature does not generally supply +us with categories of thought, while it gives us no power {38} or +opportunity of using them. It would be like holding, for instance, that +we have indeed been endowed with the idea of number in general, but that +we cannot discover within our experience any numerable things; that we +have got the idea of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., but have no capacity whatever for +actually counting--for saying that here are three apples, and there four +marbles. And, psychologically, it would be difficult to find any +parallel to anything of the kind. Nature does not first supply us with +clearly defined categories of thought, and then give us a material to +exercise them upon. In general we discover these abstract categories by +using them in our actual thinking. We count beads or men or horses +before we evolve an abstract idea of number, or an abstract +multiplication table. It is very difficult to see how this idea of Cause +could possibly have got into our heads if we had never in the whole +course of our experience come into any sort of contact with any actual +concrete cause. Where then, within our experience, if not in the +succession of external events, shall we look for a cause--for something +to which we can apply this category or abstract notion of causality? I +answer 'We must look within: it is in our experience of volition that we +actually find something answering to our idea of causal connexion.' And +here, I would invite you not to think so much of our consciousness of +actually {39} moving our limbs. Here it is possible to argue plausibly +that the experience of exercising causality is a delusion. I imagine +that, if I will to do so, I can move my arm; but I will to stretch out my +arm, and lo! it remains glued to my side, for I have suddenly been +paralysed. Or I may be told that the consciousness of exerting power is +a mere experience of muscular contraction, and the like. I would ask you +to think rather of your power of directing the succession of your own +thoughts. I am directly conscious, for instance, that the reason why I +am now thinking of Causality, and not (say) of Tariff Reform, is the fact +that I have conceived the design of delivering a course of lectures on +this subject; the succession of ideas which flow through my mind as I +write or speak is only explicable by reference to an end--an end which I +am striving to bring into actual being. In such voluntarily concentrated +purposeful successions of thought I am immediately exercising causality: +and this causality does further influence the order of events in physical +nature. My pen or my tongue moves in consequence of this striving of +mine, though no doubt for such efforts to take place other physical +conditions must be presupposed, which are not wholly within my own +control. I am the cause, but not the whole or sole cause of these +physical disturbances in external nature: I am a cause but not an +uncaused cause. {40} My volition, though it is not the sole cause of the +event which I will, is enough to give me a conception of a cause which is +the sole cause of the events. + +The attempt is of course sometimes made, as it was made by Hume, to +explain away this immediate consciousness of volition, and to say that +all that I immediately know is the succession of my subjective +experiences. It may be contended that I don't know, any more than in the +case of external phenomena, that because the thought of my lecture comes +first and the thought of putting my pen into the ink to write it comes +afterwards, therefore the one thought causes the other. Hence it is +important to point out that I have a negative experience with which to +contrast the positive experience. I do not _always_, even as regards my +own inward experiences, assume that succession implies Causality. +Supposing, as I speak or write, a twinge of the gout suddenly introduces +itself into the succession of my experiences: then I am conscious of no +such inner connexion between the new experience and that which went +before it. Then I am as distinctly conscious of passivity--of not +causing the succession of events which take place in my mind--as I am in +the other case of actively causing it. If the consciousness of +exercising activity is a delusion, why does not that delusion occur in +the one case as much as in the other? I hold then that in the +consciousness of {41} our own activity we get a real direct experience of +Causality. When Causality is interpreted to mean mere necessary +connexion--like the mathematical connexion between four and twice two or +the logical connexion between the premisses of a Syllogism and its +conclusion,--its nature is fundamentally misrepresented. The essence of +Causality is not necessary connexion but Activity. Such activity we +encounter in our own experience of volition and nowhere else.[2] + +Now, if the only cause of which I am immediately conscious is the will of +a conscious rational being, is it not reasonable to infer that some such +agency is at work in the case of those phenomena which we see no reason +to attribute to the voluntary actions of men and animals? It is well +known that primitive man took this step. Primitive man had no notion of +the 'Uniformity of Nature': it is only very gradually that civilized man +has discovered it. But primitive man never doubted for one instant the +law of Causality: he never doubted that for any change, or at least for +any change of the kind which most frequently attracted his attention, +there must {42} be a cause. Everything that moved he supposed to be +alive, or to be under the influence of some living being more or less +like himself. If the sea raged, he supposed that the Sea-god was angry. +If it did not rain to-day, when it rained yesterday, that was due to the +favour of the Sky-god, and so on. The world for him was full of spirits. +The argument of primitive man's unconscious but thoroughly sound +Metaphysic is well expressed by the fine lines of Wordsworth in the +_Excursion_: + + Once more to distant ages of the world + Let us revert, and place before our thoughts + The face which rural solitude might wear + To the unenlightened swains of pagan Greece. + --In that fair clime, the lonely herdsman, stretched + On the soft grass through half a summer's day, + With music lulled his indolent repose: + And, in some fit of weariness, if he, + When his own breath was silent, chanced to hear + A distant strain, far sweeter than the sounds + Which his poor skill could make, his fancy fetched, + Even from the blazing chariot of the sun, + A beardless Youth, who touched a golden lute, + And filled the illumined groves with ravishment. + The nightly hunter, lifting a bright eye + Up towards the crescent moon, with grateful heart + Called on the lovely wanderer who bestowed + That timely light, to share his joyous sport: + And hence, a beaming Goddess with her Nymphs, + Across the lawn and through the darksome grove, + (Not unaccompanied with tuneful notes + By echo multiplied from rock or cave), +{43} + Swept in the storm of chace; as moon and stars + Glance rapidly along the clouded heaven, + When winds are blowing strong. The traveller slaked + His thirst from rill or gushing fount, and thanked + The Naiad. Sunbeams, upon distant hills + Gliding apace, with shadows in their train, + Might, with small help from fancy, be transformed + Into fleet Oreads sporting visibly. + The Zephyrs fanning, as they passed, their wings, + Lacked not, for love, fair objects whom they wooed + With gentle whisper. Withered boughs grotesque, + Stripped of their leaves and twigs by hoary age, + From depth of shaggy covert peeping forth + In the low vale, or on steep mountain side; + And, sometimes, intermixed with stirring horns + Of the live deer, or goat's depending beard,-- + These were the lurking Satyrs, a wild brood + Of gamesome Deities; or Pan himself, + The simple shepherd's awe-inspiring God![3] + + +Growing experience of the unity of Nature, of the interdependence of all +the various forces and departments of Nature, have made such a view of it +impossible to civilized and educated man. Primitive man was quite right +in arguing that, where he saw motion, there must be consciousness like +his own. But we have been led by Science to believe that whatever is the +cause of any one phenomenon (at least in inanimate nature), must be the +cause of all. The interconnexion, the regularity, the order observable +in phenomena are too great to be the result of chance or of the +undesigned concurrence of a number of {44} independent agencies: and +perhaps we may go on further to argue that this one cause must be the +ultimate cause even of those events which are directly and immediately +caused by our own wills. But that is a question which I will put aside +for the present. At least for the events of physical nature there must +be one Cause. And if the only sort of cause we know is a conscious and +rational being, then we have another most powerful reason for believing +that the ultimate reality, from which all other reality is derived, is +Mind--a single conscious Mind which we may now further describe as not +only Thought or Intelligence but also Will.[4] + +Let me add this additional consideration in support of the conclusion +that the world is not merely thought by God but is also willed by God. +When we talk about thought without will, we are talking about something +that we know absolutely nothing about. In all the consciousness that we +know of, in every moment of our own immediate waking experience, we find +thought, feeling, willing. Even in the consciousness of animals there +appears to be something analogous to these three sides or aspects of +consciousness: but at all events in developed human consciousness we know +of no such thing as thinking without willing. All thought involves +attention, and to attend is to will. If, therefore, on the grounds {45} +suggested by the Hegelian or other post-Kantian Idealists, we have been +led to think that the ultimate Reality is Mind or Spirit, we should +naturally conclude by analogy that it must be Will as well as Thought +and--I may add, though it hardly belongs to the present argument to +insist upon that--Feeling. On the other hand if, with men like +Schopenhauer and Edouard von Hartmann,[5] we are conducted by the +appearances of design in Nature to the idea that Nature is striving after +something, that the ultimate Reality is Will, we must supplement that +line of argument by inferring from the analogy of our own Consciousness +that Will without Reason is an unintelligible and meaningless +abstraction, and that (as indeed even Hartmann saw) Schopenhauer's Will +without Reason was as impossible an abstraction as the apparently +will-less universal Thinker of the Hegelian:[6] while against +Schopenhauer and his more reasonable successor, Hartmann, I should insist +that an unconscious Will is as unintelligible a contradiction as an +unconscious Reason. Schopenhauer and Hegel seem to have seen, each of +them, exactly {46} half of the truth: God is not Will without Reason or +Reason without Will, but both Reason and Will. + +And here I must try to meet an inevitable objection. I do not say that +these three activities of the human intellect stand in God side by side +with the same distinctness and (if I may say so) irreducibility that they +do in us. What feeling is for a Being who has no material organism, we +can form no distinct conception. Our thought with its clumsy processes +of inference from the known to the unknown must be very unlike what +thought is in a Being to whom nothing is unknown. All our thought too +involves generalization, and in universal concepts (as Mr. Bradley has +shown us) much that was present in the living experience of actual +perception is necessarily left out. Thought is but a sort of +reproduction--and a very imperfect reproduction--of actual, living, +sensible experience. We cannot suppose, then, that in God there is the +same distinction between actual present experience and the universal +concepts employed in thinking which there is in us. And so, again, +willing must be a very different thing in a being who wills or creates +the objects of his own thought from what it is in beings who can only +achieve their ends by distinguishing in the sharpest possible manner +between the indefinite multiplicity of things which they know but do not +cause and the tiny fragment {47} of the Universe which by means of this +knowledge they can control. Nevertheless, though all our thoughts of God +must be inadequate, it is by thinking of Him as Thought, Will and +Feeling--emancipated from those limitations which are obviously due to +human conditions and are inapplicable to a Universal Mind--that we shall +attain to the truest knowledge of God which lies within our capacity. Do +you find a difficulty in the idea of partial and inadequate knowledge? +Just think, then, of our knowledge of other people's characters--of what +goes on in other people's minds. It is only by the analogy of our own +immediate experience that we can come to know anything at all of what +goes on in other people's minds. And, after all, such insight into other +people's thoughts, emotions, motives, intentions, characters, remains +very imperfect. The difficulty is greatest when the mind which we seek +to penetrate is far above our own. How little most of us know what it +would feel like to be a Shakespeare, a Mozart, or a Plato! And yet it +would be absurd to talk as if our knowledge of our fellows was no +knowledge at all. It is sufficient not merely to guide our own thoughts +and actions, but to make possible sympathy, friendship, love. Is it not +so with our knowledge of God? The Gnosticism which forgets the immensity +of the difference between the Divine Mind and the human is not less +unreasonable--not {48} less opposed to the principles on which we conduct +our thinking in every other department of life--than the Agnosticism +which rejects probabilities because we cannot have immediate certainties, +and insists on knowing nothing because we cannot know everything. + +The argument which infers that God is Will from the analogy of our own +consciousness is one which is in itself independent of Idealism. It has +been used by many philosophers who are Realists, such as Reid or Dr. +Martineau, as well as by Idealists like Berkeley, or Pfleiderer, or +Lotze. It does not necessarily presuppose Idealism; but it does, to my +mind, fit in infinitely better with the idealistic mode of thought than +with the realistic. If you hold that there is no difficulty in supposing +dead, inert matter to exist without any mind to think it or know it, but +that only a Mind can be supposed to cause change or motion, you are +assuming a hard and fast distinction between matter and force which the +whole trend of modern Science is tending to break down. It seems to +imply the old Greek conception of an inert, passive, characterless _hule_ +which can only be acted upon from without. The modern Physicist, I +imagine, knows nothing of an inert matter which can neither attract nor +repel, even if he does not definitely embark on the more speculative +theory which actually defines the atom or the electron {49} as a centre +of force. Activity belongs to the very essence of matter as understood +by modern Science. If matter can exist without mind, there is (from the +scientific point of view) some difficulty in contending that it cannot +likewise move or act without being influenced by an extraneous Mind. If, +on the other hand, with the Idealist we treat the notion of matter +without mind as an unintelligible abstraction, that line of thought would +prepare us to see in force nothing but a mode of mental action. The +Idealist who has already identified matter with the object of thought +will find no difficulty in going on to see in force simply the activity +or expression or object of Will. And if he learns from the Physicist +that we cannot in the last resort--from the physical point of +view--distinguish matter from force, that will fit in very well with the +metaphysical position which regards thought and will as simply two +inseparable aspects of the life of mind. + +And now I will return once more for a moment to the idealistic argument. +I have no doubt that many of you will have felt a difficulty in accepting +the position that the world with which we come in contact is merely a +state of our own or anybody else's consciousness. It is so obvious that +in our experience we are in contact with a world which we do not create; +which is what it is whether we like it or not; which opposes itself at +every turn to our desires and {50} inclinations. You may have been +convinced that we know nothing of any external world except the effects +which it produces upon consciousness. But, you will say to yourselves, +there must have been something to cause these effects. You are perfectly +right in so thinking. Certainly in our experience of the world we are in +contact with a Reality which is not any state of our own mind, a Reality +which we do not create but simply discover, a Reality from which are +derived the sensations which we cannot help feeling, and the objects +which we cannot help thinking. So far you are quite right. But very +often, when the Realist insists that there must be something to cause in +my mind this appearance, which I call my consciousness of a table, he +assumes all the while that this something--the real table, the table in +itself--is _there_, inside or behind the phenomenal table that I actually +see and feel; out there, in space. But if we were right in our analysis +of space, if we were right in arguing that space is made up of +intellectual relations[7] and that {51} intellectual relations can have +no being and no meaning except in and for a mind which apprehends them, +then it is obvious that you must not think of this Reality which is the +cause of our experience of external objects, as being _there_, as +occupying space, as being 'external.' If space be a form of our thought, +or (in Kantian language) a form of our sensibility, then the Reality +which is to have an existence in itself, cannot be in space. A reality +which is not in space can no longer be thought of as matter: whatever +else matter (as commonly conceived) means, it is certainly something +which occupies space. Now we know of no kind of existence which is not +in space except Mind. On the idealistic view to which I have been +endeavouring to lead you, we are, indeed, justified in saying that there +is a Reality which is the underlying cause or ground of our experiences, +but that that Reality is one which we may describe as Thought no less +than as Will. + +It may interest some of you to know how near one who is often considered +the typical representative of naturalistic, if not materialistic, modes +of thought, ultimately came to accepting this identification. Let me +read to you a passage from one of Mr. Spencer's later works--the third +volume of his _Sociology_:-- + +'This transfiguration, which the inquiries of physicists continually +increase, is aided by that other {52} transfiguration resulting from +metaphysical inquiries. Subjective analysis compels us to admit that our +scientific interpretations of the phenomena which objects present, are +expressed in terms of our own variously-combined sensations and +ideas--are expressed, that is, in elements belonging to consciousness, +which are but symbols of the something beyond consciousness. Though +analysis afterwards reinstates our primitive beliefs, to the extent of +showing that behind every group of phenomenal manifestations there is +always a _nexus_, which is the reality that remains fixed amid +appearances which are variable;[1] yet we are shown that this _nexus_ of +reality is for ever inaccessible to consciousness. And when, once more, +we remember that the activities constituting consciousness, being +rigorously bounded, cannot bring in among themselves the activities +beyond the bounds, which therefore seem unconscious, though production of +either by the other seems to imply that they are of the same essential +nature; this necessity we are under to think of the external energy in +terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a +materialistic aspect to the Universe: further thought, however, obliging +us to recognize the truth that a conception given in phenomenal +manifestations of this ultimate energy can in no wise show us what it +is.'[8] + + +Now, I think this is one of the passages which would justify Mr. +Bradley's well-known epigram, that Mr. Herbert Spencer has told us more +about the Unknowable than the rashest of theologians has ever ventured to +tell us about God. + +{53} + +Even Kant, who is largely responsible for the mistakes about Causality +against which this lecture has been a protest--I mean the tendency to +resolve it into necessary connexion--did in the end come to admit that in +the large resort we come into contact with Causality only in our own +Wills. I owe the reference to Professor Ward, and will quote the +paragraph in which he introduces it:-- + + +'Presentation, Feeling, Conation, are ever one inseparable whole, and +advance continuously to higher and higher forms. But for the fact that +psychology was in the first instance studied, not for its own sake, but +in subservience to speculation, this cardinal importance of activity +would not have been so long overlooked. We should not have heard so much +of passive sensations and so little of active movements. It is +especially interesting to find that even Kant at length--in his latest +work, the posthumous treatise on the _Connexion of Physics and +Metaphysics_, only recently discovered and published--came to see the +fundamental character of voluntary movement. I will venture to quote one +sentence: "We should not recognise the moving forces of matter, not even +through experience, if we were not conscious of our own activity in +ourselves exerting acts of repulsion, approximation, etc." But to Maine +de Biran, often called the French Kant, to Schopenhauer, and, finally, to +our own British psychologists, Brown, Hamilton, Bain, Spencer, is +especially due the merit of seeing the paramount importance of the active +side of experience. To this then primarily, and not to any merely {54} +intellectual function, we may safely refer the category of causality.'[9] + + +I may add that Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, from which +I have quoted, constitutes the most brilliant and important modern +defence of the doctrine which I have endeavoured very inadequately to set +before you in this lecture. + +It is a remarkable fact that the typical exponent of popular so-called +'scientific' Agnosticism, and the founder of that higher metaphysical +Agnosticism which has played so large a part in the history of modern +Philosophy, should before their deaths have both made confessions which +really amount to an abjuration of all Agnosticism. If the ultimate +Reality is to be thought of as a rational Will, analogous to the will +which each of us is conscious of himself having or being, he is no longer +the Unknown or the Unknowable, but the God of Religion, who has revealed +Himself in the consciousness of man, 'made in the image of God.' What +more about Himself we may also hold to be revealed in the human spirit, I +hope to consider in our next lecture. But, meanwhile, a word may be +uttered in answer to the question which may very probably be asked--Is +God a Person? A complete answer to the question would involve elaborate +discussions, but for our present purpose the question may be answered +very {55} briefly. If we are justified in thinking of God after the +analogy of a human soul--if we are justified in thinking of Him as a +self-conscious Being who thinks, feels, and wills, and who is, moreover +(if I may a little anticipate the subject of our next lecture) in +relation with, capable of loving and being loved by other such +beings--then it seems most natural to speak of God's existence as +personal. For to be a self-conscious being--conscious of itself and +other beings, thinking, willing, feeling, loving--is what we mean by +being a person. If any one prefers to speak of God as 'super-personal,' +there is no great objection to so doing, provided that phrase is not made +(as it often is) an excuse for really thinking of God after the analogy +of some kind of existence lower than that of persons--as a force, an +unconscious substance, or merely a name for the totality of things. But +for myself, I prefer to say that our own self-consciousness gives us only +an ideal of the highest type of existence which it nevertheless very +imperfectly satisfies, and therefore I would rather think God is a Person +in a far truer, higher, more complete sense than that in which any human +being can be a person. God alone fully realizes the ideal of +Personality. The essence of Personality is something positive: it +signifies to us the highest kind of being within our knowledge--not (as +is too often supposed) the mere limitations {56} and restraints which +characterize human conscious life as we know it in ourselves. If we are +justified in thinking of God after the analogy of the highest existence +within our knowledge, we had better call Him a Person. The word is no +doubt inadequate to the reality, as is all the language that we can +employ about God; but it is at least more adequate than the terms +employed by those who scruple to speak of God as a Person. It is at +least more adequate and more intelligent than to speak of Him as a force, +a substance, a 'something not ourselves which makes for righteousness.' +_Things_ do not 'make for righteousness'; and in using the term Person we +shall at least make it clear that we do not think of Him as a 'thing,' or +a collection of things, or a vague substratum of things, or even a mere +totality of minds like our own.[10] + + +LITERATURE + +As has been explained in this Lecture, many idealistic writers who insist +upon the necessity of God as a universal, knowing Mind to explain both +the existence of the world and our knowledge of it, are more or less +ambiguous about the question whether the divine Mind is to be thought of +as willing or causing the world, though passages occur in the writings of +most of them which tend in this direction. 'God {57} must be thought of +as creating the objects of his own thought' is a perfectly orthodox +Hegelian formula. Among the idealistic writers (besides Berkeley) who +correct this--as it seems to me--one-sided tendency, and who accept on +the whole the view of the divine Causality taken in this Lecture, may be +mentioned Lotze, the 9th Book of whose _Microcosmus_ (translated by Miss +Elizabeth Hamilton and Miss Constance Jones) or the third Book of his +_Logic_ (translation ed. by Prof. Bosanquet), may very well be read by +themselves (his views may also be studied in his short _Philosophy of +Religion_--two translations, by the late Mrs. Conybeare and by Professor +Ladd); Pfleiderer, _Philosophy and Development of Religion_, especially +chapter v.; and Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. + +Among the non-idealistic writers who have based their argument for the +existence of God mainly or largely upon the consideration that Causality +is unintelligible apart from a rational Will, may be mentioned--among +older writers Reid, _Essays on the Active Powers of Man_, Essay I. +(especially chapter v.), and among more recent ones Martineau, _A Study +of Religion_. Flint's _Theism_ may be recommended as one of the best +attempts to state the theistic case with a minimum of technical +Metaphysic. + +Two little books by Professor Andrew Seth (now Seth Pringle-Pattison), +though not primarily occupied with the religious problem, may be +mentioned as very useful introductions to Philosophy--_The Scottish +Philosophers_ and _Hegelianism and Personality_. + + + +[1] Of course deeply religious men like Green who have held this view did +not admit, or did not realize, such consequences. The tendency here +criticized is undoubtedly derived from Hegel, but passages suggestive of +the opposite view can be extracted from his writings, e.g.: 'God, +however, as subjective Power, is not simply will, intention, etc., but +rather immediate Cause' (_Philosophy of Religion_, Eng. trans., ii. p. +129). + +[2] The idea of Causality was by Kant identified with the idea of logical +connexion, _i.e._ the relation of the premisses of a syllogism to its +conclusion; but this does not involve _time_ at all, and _time_ is +essential to the idea of Causality. For an admirable vindication of our +immediate consciousness of Causality see Professor Stout's chapter on +'The Concept of Mental Activity' in _Analytic Psychology_ (Book II. +chap. i.). + +[3] _Excursion_, Book IV. + +[4] For the further development of this argument see Lecture IV. + +[5] See especially the earlier chapters of _The Philosophy of the +Unconscious_ (translated by W. C. Coupland). + +[6] Of course passages can be quoted from Hegel himself which suggest the +idea that God is Will as well as Thought; I am speaking of the general +tendency of Hegel and many of his disciples. Some recent Hegelians, such +as Professor Boyce, seem to be less open to this criticism, but there are +difficulties in thinking of God as Will and yet continuing to speak of +ultimate Reality as out of Time. + +[7] It may be objected that this is true only of 'conceptual space' (that +is, the space of Geometry), but not of 'perceptual space,' _i.e._ space +as it presents itself in a child's perception of an object. The +distinction is no doubt from many points of view important, but we must +not speak of 'conceptual space' and 'perceptual space' as if they had +nothing to do with one another. If the relations of conceptual space +were not in some sense contained or implied in our perceptions, no amount +of abstraction or reflection could get the relations out of them. + +[8] _Sociology_, vol. iii. p. 172. + +[9] _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii. pp. 191-2. + +[10] For a further discussion of the subject the reader may be referred +to my essay on 'Personality in God and Man' in _Personal Idealism_. + + + + +{58} + +LECTURE III + +GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS + +A course of purely metaphysical reasoning has led us up to the idea of +God--that is to say, of a conscious and rational Mind and Will for +which the world exists and by which that world and all other spirits +are caused to exist. I have passed over a host of difficulties--the +relation of God to time, the question whether or in what sense the +world may be supposed to have a beginning and an end, the question of +the relation in which God, the universal Mind, stands to other minds, +the question of Free-will. These are difficulties which would involve +elaborate metaphysical discussions: I shall return to some of them in a +later lecture. It must suffice for the present to say that more than +one answer to many of these questions might conceivably be given +consistently with the view of the divine nature which I have contended +for. All that I need insist on for my present purpose is-- + +(1) That God is personal in the sense that He is a {59} self-conscious, +thinking, willing, feeling Being, distinguishable from each and all +less perfect minds. + +(2) That all other minds are in some sense brought into being by the +divine Mind, while at the same time they have such a resemblance to, or +community of nature with, their source that they may be regarded as not +mere creations but as in some sense reproductions, more or less +imperfect, of that source, approximating in various degrees to that +ideal of Personality which is realised perfectly in God alone. In +proportion as they approximate to that ideal, they are causes of their +own actions, and can claim for themselves the kind of causality which +we attribute in its perfection to God. I content myself now with +claiming for the developed, rational human self a measure of freedom to +the extent which I have just defined--that it is the real cause of its +own actions. It is capable of self-determination. The man's actions +are determined by his character. That is quite consistent with the +admission that God is the ultimate cause of a self of such and such a +character coming into existence at such and such a time. + +(3) I will not say that the conception of those who regard the human +mind as literally a part of the divine, so that the human consciousness +is in no sense outside of the divine, is necessarily, for those who +hold it, inconsistent with the conception of {60} personality both in +God and man: I will only say that I do not myself understand such an +assertion. I regard the human mind as derived from God, but not as +being part of God. Further discussion of this question I reserve for +my next lecture. + +We have led up to the idea of God's existence. But so far we have +discovered nothing at all about His character or purposes. And it is +clear that without some such knowledge the belief in God could be of +little or no value from any religious or moral point of view. How are +we to learn anything about the character of God? I imagine that at the +present day few people will attempt to prove the goodness or +benevolence of God from an empirical examination of the facts of Nature +or of History. There is, no doubt, much in History and in Nature to +suggest the idea of Benevolence, but there is much to suggest a +directly opposite conclusion. Few of us at the present day are likely +to be much impressed by the argument which Paley bases upon the +existence of the little apparatus in the throat by which it is +benevolently arranged that, though constantly on the point of being +choked by our food, we hardly ever are choked. I cannot help reminding +you of the characteristic passage: 'Consider a city-feast,' he +exclaims, 'what manducation, what deglutition, and yet not one Alderman +choked in a century!' Such arguments look at the matter from the point +{61} of view of the Alderman: the point of view of the turtle and the +turkey is entirely forgotten. I would not for a moment speak +disrespectfully of the argument from design. Darwinism has changed its +form, but anybody who reads Edouard von Hartmann's _Philosophy of the +Unconscious_ is not likely to rise from its perusal with the idea that +the evidences of design have been destroyed by Darwinism, whatever he +may think of Hartmann's strange conclusion that the design can be +explained by the operation of an unconscious Mind or Will. The +philosophical argument of Mr. R. B. Haldane in _The Pathway to +Reality_,[1] and the purely biological argument of Dr. John Haldane in +his two lectures on _Life and Mechanism_, and still more recently the +brilliant and very important work of M. Bergson, _L'Evolution +Creatrice_ have, as it seems to me, abundantly shown that it is as +impossible as ever it was to explain even the growth of a plant without +supposing that in it and all organic Nature there is a striving towards +an end. But the argument from design, though it testifies to purpose +in the Universe, tells us nothing about the nature of that purpose. +Purpose is one thing; benevolent purpose is another. Nobody's estimate +of the comparative amount of happiness and misery in the world is worth +much; but for my own part, if I trusted simply to empirical evidence, +{62} I should not be disposed to do more than slightly attenuate the +pessimism of the Pessimists. At all events, Nature is far too 'red in +tooth and claw' to permit of our basing an argument for a benevolent +deity upon a contemplation of the facts of animal and human life. +There is but one source from which such an idea can possibly be +derived--from the evidence of our own moral consciousness. + +Our moral ideals are the work of Reason. That the happiness of many +ought to be preferred to the happiness of one, that pleasure is better +than pain, that goodness is of more value than pleasure, that some +pleasures are better than others--such judgements are as much the work +of our own Reason, they are as much self-evident truths, as the truth +that two and two make four, or that A cannot be both B and not B at the +same time, or that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. We have +every right to assume that such truths hold good for God as well as for +man. If such Idealism as I have endeavoured to lead you to is well +founded, the mind which knows comes from God, and therefore the +knowledge which that mind possesses must also be taken as an imperfect +or fragmentary reproduction of God's knowledge. And the Theist who +rejects Idealism but admits the existence of self-evident truths will +be equally justified in assuming that, for God as well as for man, two +and two must make {63} four. We have just as much right to assume that +our moral ideas--our ideas of value--must come from God too. For God +too, as for us, there must exist the idea, the ultimate category of the +good; and our judgements of value--judgements that such and such an end +is good or worth striving for--in so far as they are true judgements, +must be supposed to represent His judgements. We are conscious, in +proportion as we are rational, of pursuing ends which we judge to be +good. If such judgements reveal God's judgements, God must be supposed +to aim likewise at an ideal of good--the same ideal which is revealed +to us by our moral judgements. In these judgements then we have a +revelation, the only possible revelation, of the character of God. The +argument which I have suggested is simply a somewhat exacter statement +of the popular idea that Conscience is the voice of God. + +Further to vindicate the idea of the existence, authority, objective +validity of Conscience would lead us too far away into the region of +Moral Philosophy for our present subject. I will only attempt very +briefly to guard against some possible misunderstandings, and to meet +some obvious objections: + +(1) It need hardly be pointed out that the assertion of the existence +of the Moral Consciousness is not in the slightest degree inconsistent +with recognising its gradual growth and development. The {64} moral +faculty, like every other faculty or aspect or activity of the human +soul, has grown gradually. No rational man doubts the validity--no +Idealist doubts the _a priori_ character--of our mathematical +judgements because probably monkeys and possibly primitive men cannot +count, and certainly cannot perform more than the very simplest +arithmetical operations. Still less do we doubt the validity of +mathematical reasoning because not only children and savages, but +sometimes even distinguished classical scholars--a Macaulay, a Matthew +Arnold, a T. S. Evans,--were wholly incapable of understanding very +simple mathematical arguments. Equally little do we deny a real +difference between harmony and discord because people may be found who +see no difference between 'God save the King' and 'Pop goes the +Weasel.' Self-evident truth does not mean truth which is evident to +everybody. + +(2) It is not doubted that the gradual evolution of our actual moral +ideas--our actual ideas about what is right or wrong in particular +cases--has been largely influenced by education, environment, +association, social pressure, superstition, perhaps natural +selection--in short, all the agencies by which naturalistic Moralists +try to account for the existence of Morality. Even Euclid, or whatever +his modern substitute may be, has to be taught; but that does not show +that Geometry is an arbitrary system {65} invented by the ingenious and +interested devices of those who want to get money by teaching it. +Arithmetic was invented largely as an instrument of commerce; but it +could not have been invented if there were really no such things as +number and quantity, or if the human mind had no original capacity for +recognizing them. Our scientific ideas, our political ideas, our ideas +upon a thousand subjects have been partly developed, partly thwarted +and distorted in their growth, by similar influences. But, however +great the difficulty of getting rid of these distorting influences and +facing such questions in a perfectly dry light, nobody suggests that +objective truth on such matters is non-existent or for ever +unattainable. A claim for objective validity for the moral judgement +does not mean a claim for infallibility on behalf of any individual +Conscience. We may make mistakes in Morals just as we may make +mistakes in Science, or even in pure Mathematics. If a class of forty +small boys are asked to do a sum, they will probably not all bring out +the same answer: but nobody doubts that one answer alone is right, +though arithmetical capacity is a variable quantity. What is meant is +merely that, if I am right in affirming that this is good, you cannot +be likewise right in saying that it is bad: and that we have some +capacity--though doubtless a variable capacity--of judging which is the +true {66} view. Hence our moral judgements, in so far as they are true +judgements, must be taken to be reproductions in us of the thought of +God. To show that an idea has been gradually developed, tells us +nothing as to its truth or falsehood--one way or the other. + +(3) In comparing the self-evidence of moral to that of mathematical +judgements, it is not suggested that our moral judgements in detail are +as certain, as clear and sharply defined, as mathematical judgements, +or that they can claim so universal a consensus among the competent. +What is meant is merely (_a_) that the notion of good in general is an +ultimate category of thought; that it contains a meaning intelligible +not perhaps to every individual human soul, but to the normal, +developed, human consciousness; and (_b_) that the ultimate truth of +morals, if it is seen at all, must be seen immediately. An ultimate +moral truth cannot be deduced from, or proved by, any other truth. You +cannot prove that pleasure is better than pain, or that virtue is +better than pleasure, to any one who judges differently. It does not +follow that all men have an equally clear and delicate moral +consciousness. The power of discriminating moral values differs as +widely as the power of distinguishing musical sounds, or of +appreciating what is excellent in music. Some men may be almost or +altogether without such a power of moral discrimination, just as some +men are wholly {67} destitute of an ear for music; while the higher +degrees of moral appreciation are the possession of the few rather than +of the many. Moral insight is not possessed by all men in equal +measure. Moral genius is as rare as any other kind of genius. + +(4) When we attribute Morality to God, it is not meant that the conduct +which is right for men in detail ought to be or could possibly in all +cases be practised by God. It is a childish objection (though it is +sometimes made by modern philosophers who should know better) to allege +with Aristotle that God cannot be supposed to make or keep contracts. +And in the same way, when we claim universal validity for our moral +judgements, we do not mean that the rules suitable for human conduct +would be the same for beings differently organized and constituted. +Our rules of sexual Morality are clearly applicable only to sexually +constituted beings. What is meant in asserting that these rules are +universally and objectively valid is that these are the rules which +every rational intelligence, in proportion as it is rational, will +recognize as being suitable, or conducive to the ideal life, in beings +constituted as we are. The truth that permanent monogamous marriage +represents the true type of sexual relations for human beings will be +none the less an objectively valid ethical truth, because the lower +animals are below it, while superior beings, {68} it may be, are above +it. Universal love is none the less the absolute moral ideal because +it would be absurd to say that beasts of prey do wrong in devouring +other creatures, or because war is sometimes necessary as a means to +the end of love at our present imperfect stage of social and +intellectual development. The means to the highest good vary with +circumstances; the amount of good that is attainable in such and such +circumstances varies also; consequently the right course of conduct +will be different for beings differently constituted or placed under +different circumstances: but the principles which, in the view of a +perfect intelligence, would determine what is the right course for +different beings in different circumstances will be always the same. +The ultimate principles of our moral judgement, _e.g._ that love is +better than hate, are just as applicable to God as they are to us. Our +conception of the highest good may be inadequate; but we certainly +shall not attain to greater adequacy, or a nearer approach to ultimate +truth, by flatly contradicting our own moral judgements. It would be +just as reasonable to argue that because the law of gravitation might +be proved, from the point of view of the highest knowledge, to be an +inadequate statement of the truth, and all inadequacy involves some +error, therefore we had better assume that from the point of view of +God there is no difference whatever {69} between attraction and +repulsion. All arguments for what is called a 'super-moral' Deity or a +'super-moral' Absolute are open to this fatal objection: moral +judgements cannot possibly rest upon anything but the moral +consciousness, and yet these doctrines contradict the moral +consciousness. The idea of good is derived from the moral +consciousness. When a man declares that from the point of view of the +Universe all things are very good, he gets the idea of good from his +own moral consciousness, and is assuming the objective validity of its +dictates. His judgement is an ethical judgement as much as mine when I +say that to me some things in this world appear very bad. If he is not +entitled to assume the validity of his ethical judgements, his +proposition is false or meaningless. If he is entitled to assume their +validity, why should he distrust that same moral consciousness when it +affirms (as it undoubtedly does) that pain and sin are for ever bad, +and not (as our 'super-moral' Religionists suggest) additional artistic +touches which only add to the aesthetic effect of the whole? + +I shall now proceed to develop some of the consequences which (as it +appears to me) flow from the doctrine that our belief in the goodness +of God is an inference from our own moral consciousness: + +(1) It throws light on the relations between Religion and Morality. +The champions of ethical {70} education as a substitute for Religion +and of ethical societies as a substitute for Churches are fond of +assuming that Religion is not only unnecessary to, but actually +destructive of, the intrinsic authority of the moral law. If we +supposed with a few theologians in the most degenerate periods of +Theology (with William of Occam, some extreme Calvinists, and a few +eighteenth-century divines like Archdeacon Paley) that actions are +right or wrong merely because willed by God--meaning by God simply a +powerful being without goodness or moral character, then undoubtedly +the Secularists would be right. If a religious Morality implies that +Virtue means merely (in Paley's words) 'the doing good to mankind in +obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness' +(so that if God were to will murder and adultery, those practices would +forthwith become meritorious), then undoubtedly it would be better to +teach Morality without Religion than with it. But that is a caricature +of the true teaching of Christ or of any considerable Christian +theologian. Undoubtedly we must assert what is called the +'independence' of the moral judgement. The judgement 'to love is +better than to hate' has a meaning complete in itself, which contains +no reference whatever to any theological presupposition. It is a +judgement which is, and which can intelligibly be, made by people of +all religions or of none. But {71} we may still raise the question +whether the validity of that judgement can be defended without +theological implications. And I am prepared most distinctly to +maintain that it cannot. These moral judgements claim objective +validity. When we say 'this is right,' we do not mean merely 'I +approve this course of conduct,' 'this conduct gives me a thrill of +satisfaction, a "feeling of approbation," a pleasure of the moral +sense.' If that were all that was meant, it would be perfectly +possible that another person might feel an equally satisfactory glow of +approbation at conduct of a precisely opposite character _without +either of them being wrong_. A bull-fight fills most Spaniards with +feelings of lively approbation, and most Englishmen with feelings of +acute disapprobation. If such moral judgements were mere feelings, +neither of them would be wrong. There could be no question of +objective rightness or wrongness. Mustard is not objectively nice or +objectively nasty: it is simply nice to some people and nasty to +others. The mustard-lover has no right to condemn the mustard-hater, +or the mustard-hater the mustard-lover. If Morality were merely a +matter of feeling or emotion, actions would not be objectively right or +objectively wrong; but simply right to some people, wrong to others. +Hume would be right in holding the morality of an action to consist +simply in the pleasure it gives to the person who {72} contemplates it. +Rightness thus becomes simply a name for the fact of social +approbation.[2] And yet surely the very heart of the affirmation which +the moral consciousness makes in each of us is that right and wrong are +not matters of mere subjective feeling. When I assert 'this is right,' +I do not claim personal infallibility. I may, indeed, be wrong, as I +may be wrong in my political or scientific theories. But I do mean +that I think I am right; and that, if I am right, you cannot also be +right when you affirm that this same action is wrong. This objective +validity is the very core and centre of the idea of Duty or moral +obligation. That is why it is so important to assert that moral +judgements are the work of Reason, not of a supposed moral sense or any +other kind of feeling. Feelings may vary in different men without any +of them being in the wrong; red really is the same as green to a +colour-blind person. What we mean when we talk about the existence of +Duty is that things are right or wrong, no matter what you or I think +about them--that the laws of Morality {73} are quite as much +independent of my personal likings and dislikings as the physical laws +of Nature. That is what is meant by the 'objectivity' of the moral law. + +Now, the question arises--'Can such an objectivity be asserted by those +who take a purely materialistic or naturalistic view of the Universe?' +Whatever our metaphysical theories about the nature of Reality may be, +we can in practice have no difficulty in the region of Physical Science +about recognizing an objective reality of some kind which is other than +my mere thinking about it. That fire will burn whether I think so or +not is practically recognized by persons of all metaphysical +persuasions. If I say 'I can cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bare +imagination of a feast,' I try the experiment, and I fail. I imagine +the feast, but I am hungry still: and if I persist in the experiment, I +die. But what do we mean when we say that things are right or wrong +whether I think them so or not, that the Moral Law exists outside me +and independently of my thinking about it? Where and how does this +moral law exist? The physical laws of Nature may be supposed by the +Materialist or the Realist somehow to exist in matter: to the +Metaphysician there may be difficulties in such a view, but the +difficulties are not obvious to common-sense. But surely (whatever may +be thought about physical laws) the moral law, {74} which expresses not +any matter of physical fact but what _ought_ to be thought of acts, +cannot be supposed to exist in a purely material Universe. An 'ought' +can exist only in and for a mind. In what mind, then, does the moral +law exist? As a matter of fact, different people's moral judgements +contradict one another. And the consciousness of no living man can +well be supposed to be a flawless reflection of the absolute moral +ideal. On a non-theistic view of the Universe, then, the moral law +cannot well be thought of as having any actual existence. The +objective validity of the moral law can indeed be and no doubt is +_asserted_, believed in, acted upon without reference to any +theological creed; but it cannot be defended or fully justified without +the pre-supposition of Theism. What we mean by an objective law is +that the moral law is a part of the ultimate nature of things, on a +level with the laws of physical nature, and it cannot be _that_, unless +we assume that law to be an expression of the same mind in which +physical laws originate. The idea of duty, when analysed, implies the +idea of God. Whatever else Plato meant by the 'idea of the good,' this +at least was one of his meanings--that the moral law has its source in +the source of all Reality. + +And therefore at bottom popular feeling is right in holding that +religious belief is necessary to Morality. Of course I do not mean to +say that, were {75} religious belief to disappear from the world, +Morality would disappear too. But I do think Morality would become +quite a different thing from what it has been for the higher levels of +religious thought and feeling. The best men would no doubt go on +acting up to their own highest ideal just as if it did possess +objective validity, no matter how unable they might be to reconcile +their practical with their speculative beliefs. But it would not be so +for the many--or perhaps even for the few in their moments of weakness +and temptation, when once the consequences of purely naturalistic +Ethics were thoroughly admitted and realized. The only kind of +objective validity which can be recognized on a purely naturalistic +view of Ethics is conformity to public opinion. The tendency of all +naturalistic Ethics is to make a God of public opinion. And if no +other deity were recognized, such a God would assuredly not be without +worshippers. And yet the strongest temptation to most of us is the +temptation to follow a debased public opinion--the opinion of our age, +our class, our party. Apart from faith in a perfectly righteous God +whose commands are, however imperfectly, revealed in the individual +Conscience, we can find no really valid reason why the individual +should act on his own sense of what is intrinsically right, even when +he finds himself an 'Athanasius contra mundum,' and when his own +personal likings and inclinations {76} and interests are on the side of +the world. Kant was at bottom right, though perhaps he did not give +the strongest reasons for his position, in making the idea of God a +postulate of Morality. + +From a more directly practical point of view I need hardly point out +how much easier it is to feel towards the moral law the reverence that +we ought to feel when we believe that that law is embodied in a +personal Will. Not only is religious Morality not opposed to the idea +of duty for duty's sake: it is speculatively the only reasonable basis +of it; practically and emotionally the great safeguard of it. And +whatever may be thought of the possibility of a speculative defence of +such an idea without Theism, the practical difficulty of teaching +it--especially to children, uneducated and unreflective persons--seems +to be quite insuperable.[3] In more than one country in which +religious education has been banished from the primary schools, grave +observers complain that the idea of Duty seems to be suffering an +eclipse in the minds of the rising {77} generation; some of them add +that in those lands crime is steadily on the increase. Catechisms of +civil duty and the like have not hitherto proved very satisfactory +substitutes for the old teaching about the fear of God. Would that it +were more frequently remembered on both sides of our educational +squabbles that the supreme object of all religious education should be +to instil into children's minds in the closest possible connexion the +twin ideas of God and of Duty! + +(2) I have tried to show that the ethical importance of the idea of God +is prior to and independent of any belief in the idea of future rewards +and punishments or of a future life, however conceived of. But when +the idea of a righteous God has once been accepted, the idea of +Immortality seems to me to follow from it as a sort of corollary. If +any one on a calm review of the actual facts of the world's history can +suppose that such a world as ours could be the expression of the will +of a rational and moral Being without the assumption of a future life +for which this is a discipline or education or preparatory stage, +argument would be useless with him. Inveterate Optimism, like +inveterate Scepticism, admits of no refutation, but in most minds +produces no conviction. For those who are convinced that the world has +a rational end, and yet that life as we see it (taken by itself) cannot +be that end, the hypothesis {78} of Immortality becomes a necessary +deduction from their belief in God. + +I would not disparage the educative effect of the belief in a future +life even when expressed in the crude and inadequate metaphor of reward +and punishment. Few of us, I venture to think, have reached the moral +level at which the belief--not in a vindictive, retributive, unending +torment, but in a disciplinary or purgatorial education of souls +prolonged after death--is without its value. At the same time it is a +mere caricature of all higher religious beliefs when the religious +motive is supposed to mean simply a fear of punishment and hope of +personal reward, even of the least sensuous or material kind. Love of +goodness for its own sake is for the Theist identical with the love of +God. Love of a Person is a stronger force than devotion to an idea; +and an ethical conception of God carries with it the idea of +Immortality. + + The wages of sin is death: if the wages of Virtue be dust, + Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm + and the fly? + + She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just, + To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky; + Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.[4] + + +Belief in human Immortality is, as I have suggested, the postulate +without which most of us cannot {79} believe in God. Even for its own +sake it is of the highest ethical value. The belief in Immortality +gives a meaning to life even when it has lost all other meaning. 'It +is rather,' in the noble words of the late Professor Sidgwick, 'from a +disinterested aversion to an universe so irrationally constituted that +the wages of virtue should be dust than from any private reckoning +about his own wages,' that the good man clings to the idea of +Immortality. And that is not all. The value of all higher goods even +in this life, though it does not depend wholly upon their duration, +does partly depend upon it. It would be better to be pure and +unselfish for a day than to be base and selfish for a century. And yet +we do not hesitate to commend the value of intellectual and of all +kinds of higher enjoyments on account of their greater durability. +Why, then, should we shrink from admitting that the value of character +really is increased when it is regarded as surviving bodily death? +Disbelief in Immortality would, I believe, in the long run and for the +vast majority of men, carry with it an enormous enhancement of the +value of the carnal and sensual over the spiritual and intellectual +element in life. + +(3) A third consequence which follows from our determining to accept +the moral consciousness as containing the supreme revelation of God is +this. From the point of view of the moral consciousness {80} we cannot +say that the Universe is wholly good. We have only one means of +judging whether things are good or bad: the idea of value is wholly +derived from our own ethical judgements or judgements of value. If we +distrust these judgements, there is no higher court to which we can +appeal. And if we distrust our most ultimate judgements of value, I do +not know why we should trust any judgements whatever. Even if we grant +that from some very transcendental metaphysical height--the height, for +instance, of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy--it may be contended that none of +our judgements are wholly true or fully adequate to express the true +nature of Reality, we at all events cannot get nearer to Reality than +we are conducted by the judgements which present themselves to us as +immediate and self-evident. Now, if we do apply these judgements of +value to the Universe as we know it, can we say that everything in it +seems to be very good? For my own part, I unhesitatingly say, 'Pain is +an evil, and sin is a worse evil, and nothing on earth can ever make +them good.' How then are we to account for such evils in a Universe +which we believe to express the thought and will of a perfectly +righteous Being? In only one way that I know of--by supposing they are +means to a greater good. That is really the substance and substratum +of all the Theodicies of all the Philosophers and all the {81} +Theologians except those who frankly trample on or throw over the Moral +Consciousness, and declare that, for those who see truly, pain and sin +are only additional sources of aesthetic interest in a great +world-drama produced for his own entertainment by a Deity not +anthropomorphic enough to love but still anthropomorphic enough to be +amused. + +I shall be told no doubt that this is limiting God. A human being may, +it will be urged, without loss of goodness, do things in themselves +evil, as a means to a greater good: as a surgeon, he may cause +excruciating pain; as a statesman or a soldier, he may doom thousands +to a cruel death; as a wise administrator of the poor law, he may +refuse to relieve much suffering, in order that he may not cause more +suffering. But this is because his power is limited; he has to work +upon a world which has a nature of its own independent of his volition. +To apply the same explanation to the evil which God causes, is to make +Him finite instead of Infinite, limited in power instead of Omnipotent. +Now in a sense I admit that this is so. I am not wedded to the words +'Infinite' or 'Omnipotent.' But I would protest against a persistent +misrepresentation of the point of view which I defend. It is suggested +that the limit to the power of God must necessarily spring from the +existence of some other thing or being outside of Him, not created by +Him or under His {82} control. I must protest that that is not so. +Everybody admits that God cannot change the past; few Philosophers +consider it necessary to maintain that God could construct triangles +with their angles not together equal to two right angles, or think it +any derogation from his Omnipotence to say that He could not make the +sum of two and two to be other than four. Few Theologians push their +idea of Freewill so far as to insist that God could will Himself to be +unjust or unloving, or that, being just and loving, he could do unjust +or unloving acts. There are necessities to which even God must submit. +But they are not imposed upon Him from without: they are parts of His +own essential nature. The limitation by which God cannot attain His +ends without causing some evil is a limitation of exactly the same +nature. If you say that it is no limitation of God not to be able to +change the past, for the thing is really unmeaning, then I submit that +in the same way it may be no limitation that He should not be able to +evolve highly organized beings without a struggle for existence, or to +train human beings in unselfishness without allowing the existence both +of sin and of pain. From the point of view of perfect knowledge, these +things might turn out to be just as unmeaning as for God to change the +past. The popular idea of Omnipotence is one which really does not +bear looking into. If we supposed the world {83} to contain no evil at +all, still there would be in it a definite amount of good. Twice such +a world would be twice as good. Why is there not twice that amount of +good? A being who deliberately created only a good world of limited +quantity--a definite number of spirits (for instance) enjoying so much +pleasure and so much virtue--when he could have created twice that +number of spirits, and consequently twice that amount of good, would +not be perfectly good or loving. And so on _ad infinitum_, no matter +how much good you suppose him to have created. The only sense which we +can intelligibly give to the idea of a divine Omnipotence is this--that +God possesses all the power there is, that He can do all things that +are in their own nature possible.[5] + +But there is a more formidable objection which I have yet to meet. It +has been urged by certain Philosophers of great eminence that, if we +suppose God not to be unlimited in power, we have no guarantee that the +world is even good on the whole; we should not be authorized to infer +anything as to a future life or the ultimate destiny of Humanity from +the fact of God's goodness. A limited God might be a defeated God. I +admit the difficulty. This is the 'greatest wave' of all in the +theistic {84} argument. In reply, I would simply appeal to the reasons +which I have given for supposing that the world is really willed by +God. A rational being does not will evil except as a means to a +greater good. If God be rational, we have a right to suppose that the +world must contain more good than evil, or it would not be willed at +all. A being who was obliged to create a world which did not seem to +him good would be a blind force, as force is understood by the pure +Materialist, not a rational Will. That much we have a right to claim +as a matter of strict Logic; and that would to my own mind be a +sufficient reason for assuming that, at least for the higher order of +spirits, such a life as ours must be intended as the preface to a +better life than this. But I should go further. To me it appears that +such evils as sin and pain are so enormously worse than the mere +absence of good, that I could not regard as rational a Universe in +which the good did not very greatly predominate over the evil. More +than that I do not think we are entitled to say. And yet Justice is so +great a good that it is rational to hope that for every individual +conscious being--at least each individual capable of any high degree of +good--there must be a predominance of good on the whole. Beings of +very small capacity might conceivably be created chiefly or entirely as +a means to a vastly greater good than any that they {85} themselves +enjoy: the higher a spirit is in the scale of being, the more difficult +it becomes to suppose that it has been brought into existence merely as +a means to another's good, or that it will not ultimately enjoy a good +which will make it on the whole good that it should have been born. + +I could wish myself that, in popular religious teaching, there was a +franker conception of this position--a position which, as I have said, +is really implied in the Theodicies of all the Divines. Popular +unbelief--and sometimes the unbelief of more cultivated persons--rests +mainly upon the existence of evil. We should cut at the roots of it by +teaching frankly that this is the best of all possible Universes, +though not the best of all imaginable Universes--such Universes as we +can construct in our own imagination by picturing to ourselves all the +good that there is in the world without any of the evil. We may still +say, if we please, that God is infinite because He is limited by +nothing outside His own nature, except what He has Himself caused. We +can still call Him Omnipotent in the sense that He possesses all the +power there is. And in many ways such a belief is far more practically +consolatory and stimulating than a belief in a God who can do all +things by any means and who consequently does not need our help. In +our view, we are engaged not in a sham warfare with an evil that is +really {86} good, but in a real warfare with a real evil, a struggle in +which we have the ultimate power in the Universe on our side, but one +in which the victory cannot be won without our help, a real struggle in +which we are called upon to be literally fellow-workers with God. + + +LITERATURE + +The subject is more or less explicitly dealt with in most of the works +mentioned at the end of the last two lectures, and also in books on +Moral Philosophy too numerous to mention. Classical vindications of +the authority of the Moral Consciousness are Bishop Butler's _Sermons_, +and Kant's _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_ and +other ethical writings (translated by T. K. Abbott). I have expressed +my own views on the subject with some fullness in the third book of my +_Theory of Good and Evil_. + + + +[1] See especially Book II. Lect. iii. + +[2] 'We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: +but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in +effect feel that it is virtuous.' (_Treatise_, Part I, Section ii., +ed. Green and Grose, vol. ii. p. 247.) 'The distinction of moral good +and evil is founded in the pleasure or pain, which results from the +view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain +cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows that there is +just so much virtue in any character as every one places in it, and +that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken.' +(_Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 311.) + +[3] There are no doubt ways of making Morality the law of the Universe +without what most of us understand by Theism, though not without +Religion, and a Religion of a highly metaphysical character; but +because such non-theistic modes of religious thought exist in Buddhism, +for instance, it does not follow that they are reasonable, and, at all +events, they are hardly intelligible to most Western minds. Such +non-theistic Religions imply a Metaphysic quite as much as Christianity +or Buddhism. There have been Religions without the idea of a personal +God, but never without Metaphysic, _i.e._ a theory about the ultimate +nature of things. + +[4] Tennyson's _Wages_. + +[5] The doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas is 'Cum possit Deus omnia +efficere quae esae possunt, non autem quae contradictionem implicant, +omnipotens merito dicitur.' (_Summa Theol_., Pars I. Q. xxv. art. 8.) + + + + +{87} + +LECTURE IV + +DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS + +In the present lecture I shall try to deal with some of the difficulties +which will probably have been arising in your minds in the course of the +last three; and in meeting them, to clear up to some extent various +points which have been left obscure. + +(1) _Creation_. I have endeavoured to show that the world must be +thought of as ultimately an experience in the mind of God, parts of which +are progressively communicated to lesser minds such as ours. This +experience--both the complete experience which is in His own mind and +also the measure of it which is communicated to the lesser minds--must be +thought of as willed by God. At the same time I suggested as an +alternative view that, even if we think of things as having an existence +which is not simply in and for minds, the things must be caused to exist +by a rational Will. Now the world, as we know it, consists of a number +of changes taking place in time, changes which are undoubtedly +represented in thought as changes happening to, or {88} accidents of, a +permanent substance, whether (with the Idealist) we suppose that this +substance is merely the object of Mind's contemplation, or whether (with +the Realist) we think of it as having some sort of being independent of +Mind. But what of the first of these events--the beginning of the whole +series? Are we to think of the series of events in time as having a +beginning and possibly an end, or as being without beginning or end? +What in fact are we to make of the theological idea of Creation, often +further defined as Creation out of nothing? It is often suggested both +by Idealists and by Realists that the idea of a creation or absolute +beginning of the world is unthinkable. Such a view seems to me to be a +piece of unwarrantable _a priori_ dogmatism--quite as much so as the +closely connected idea that the Uniformity of Nature is an _a priori_ +necessity of thought. No doubt the notion of an absolute beginning of +all things is unthinkable enough: if we think of God as creating the +world at a definite point of time, then we must suppose God Himself to +have existed before that creation. We cannot think of an event in time +without thinking of a time before it; and time cannot be thought of as +merely empty time. Events of some kind there must necessarily have been, +even though those events are thought of as merely subjective experiences +involving no relation to space. A beginning of existence is, {89} +indeed, unthinkable. But there is no difficulty in supposing that this +particular series of phenomena which constitutes our physical Universe +may have had a beginning in time. On the other hand there is no positive +evidence, for those who cannot regard the early chapters of Genesis as +representing on such a matter anything but a primitive legend edited by a +later Jewish thinker, that it had such a beginning. It is no doubt more +difficult to represent to ourselves a beginning of space; and the notion +of an empty space, eternally thought but not eternally filled up by any +series of phenomena of the space-occupying kind, represents a rather +difficult, though not (as it seems to me) an absolutely impossible +conception. The question, therefore, whether there was a beginning of +the series of events which constitute the history of our physical world +must (so far as I can see) be left an open one. + +Of course if the argument of Lord Kelvin be accepted, if he is justified +in arguing on purely physical grounds that the present distribution of +energy in the Universe is such that it cannot have resulted from an +infinite series of previous physical changes, if Science can prove that +the series is a finite one, the conclusions of Science must be +accepted.[1] Metaphysic has nothing to say for or against such a view. +That is a question of Physics on which {90} of course I do not venture to +express any opinion whatever. + +(2) _The time-series_. I am incompetent to pronounce an opinion on the +validity of such arguments as Lord Kelvin's. But, however we decide this +question, there will still remain the further and harder question, 'Is +the series of all events or experiences, physical or psychical (not +merely the particular series which constitutes our physical Universe), to +be thought of as finite or infinite? On the one hand it involves a +contradiction to talk of a time-series which has a beginning: a time +which has no time before it is not time at all; any more than space with +an end to it would be space. On the other hand, we find equally, or +almost equally, unthinkable the hypothesis of an endless series of events +in time: a series of events, which no possible enumeration of its members +will make any smaller, presents itself to us as unthinkable, directly we +regard it as expressing the true nature of a positive reality, and not as +a mere result of mathematical abstraction. Here then we are presented +with an antinomy--an apparent contradiction in our thought--which we can +neither avoid nor overcome. It is one of the classical antinomies +recognized by the Kantian Philosophy--the only one, I may add, which +neither Kant himself nor any of his successors has done anything to +attenuate or to remove. {91} Kant's own attempted solution of it +involved the impossible supposition that the past has no existence at all +except in so far as it is thought by some finite mind in the present. +The way out of this difficulty which is popular with post-Kantian +Idealists is to say that God is Himself out of time, and eternally sees +the whole series at once. But, in the first place, that does not get +over the difficulty: even if God does see the whole series at once, He +must see it either as limited or as endless, and the old antinomy breaks +out again when we attempt to think either alternative. And secondly, +when you treat a temporal series as one which is all really present +together--of course it may all be _known_ together as even we know the +past and the future--but when you try to think of God as contemplating +the whole series as really present altogether, the series is no longer a +time-series. You have turned it into some other kind of +series--practically (we may say) into a spacial series. You have cut the +knot, instead of unravelling it. I have no doubt that the existence of +this antinomy does point to the fact that there is some way of thinking +about time from which the difficulty disappears: but we are, so far as I +can see, incompetent so to resolve it. Philosophers resent the idea of +an insoluble problem. By all means let them go on trying to solve it. I +can only say that I find no difficulty in showing the futility {92} of +any solution of the time-difficulty which I have so far seen. For the +present at least--I strongly suspect for ever--we must acquiesce on this +matter in a reverent Agnosticism. We can show the absurdity of regarding +time as merely subjective; we can show that it belongs to the very +essence of the Universe we know; we can show that it is as 'objective' as +anything else within our knowledge. But how to reconcile this +objectivity with the difficulty of thinking of an endless succession no +Philosopher has done much to explain. For religious purposes it seems +enough to believe that each member of the time-series--no matter how many +such events there may be, no matter whether the series be endless or +not--is caused by God. The more reflecting Theologians have generally +admitted that the act of divine Conservation is essentially the same as +that of Creation. A God who can be represented as 'upholding all things +by the power of his word' is a creative Deity whether the act of creation +be in time, or eternally continuous, or (if there were any meaning in +that phrase) out of time altogether.[2] + +{93} + +(3) _The creation of spirits_. It may seem to some of you that I may +have so far left out, or too easily disposed of, an important link in our +argument. I have given reasons for thinking that the material world +cannot be explained without the assumption of a universal Consciousness +which both thinks and wills it. I have assumed rather than proved that +the lesser minds, in which the divine experience is partially reproduced, +are also caused to exist and kept in existence by the same divine Will. +But how, it may be said, do we know that those minds did not exist before +the birth of the organisms with which upon this planet they are +connected? The considerations which forbid our thinking of matter as +something capable of existing by itself do not apply to minds. A +consciousness, unlike a thing, exists 'for itself,' not merely 'for +another': a mind is not made what it is by being known or otherwise +experienced by another mind: its very being consists in being itself +conscious: it is what it is for itself. It is undoubtedly impossible +positively to disprove the hypothesis of eternally pre-existent souls. +Sometimes that hypothesis is combined with Theism. It {94} is supposed +that God is the supreme and incomparably the most powerful, but not the +only, self-existent and eternal Spirit. This hypothesis--sometimes +spoken of as Pluralism[3]--has many attractions: from the time of Origen +onwards the idea of Pre-existence has seemed to many to facilitate the +explanation of evil by making it possible to regard the sufferings of our +present state as a disciplinary process for getting rid of an original or +a pre-natal sinfulness. It is a theory not incapable of satisfying the +demands of the religious Consciousness, and may even form an element in +an essentially Christian theory of the Universe: but to my mind it is +opposed to all the obvious indications of experience. The connexion +between soul and body is such that the laws of the soul's development +obviously form part of the same system with the laws of physical nature. +If one part of that system is referred to the divine Will, so must the +whole of it be. The souls, when they have entered animal bodies, must be +supposed to be subject to a system of laws which is of one piece with the +system of physical laws. If the physical part of the world-order is +referred to the divine Will, the psychical part of it must be equally +referred to {95} that Will. The souls might, indeed, conceivably have an +independent and original nature of their own capable of offering +resistance to the divine intentions. But we see, to say the least, no +indications of a struggle going on between an outside divine Will and +independent beings not forming a part of the divine scheme. At all +events, the result of this struggle, if struggle there be, is (so far as +we can observe) a system, complete and orderly, within the psychical +sphere as much as within the purely physical sphere. And in particular +the body is exactly fitted to the soul that is to inhabit it. We never +find the intellect of a Shakespeare in connexion with the facial angle of +a negro; bodies which resemble the bodies of their parents are connected +with souls between which a similar resemblance can be traced. If the +souls existed before birth, we must suppose those souls to be kept +waiting in a limbo of some kind till a body is prepared suitable for +their reception. We must suppose that among the waiting souls, one is +from time to time selected to be the offspring of such and such a +matrimonial union, so as to present (as it were) a colourable appearance +of being really the fruit of that union. Further, before birth the souls +must be steeped in the waters of Lethe, or something of the kind, so as +to rid them of all memory of their previous experiences. Such a +conception seems to {96} me to belong to the region of Mythology rather +than of sober philosophical thought. I do not deny that Mythology may +sometimes be a means of pictorially or symbolically envisaging truths to +which Philosophy vaguely points but which it cannot express in clearly +apprehensible detail. But such a Mythology as this seems to be +intellectually unmotived and unhelpful. It is not wanted to explain the +facts: there is nothing in our experience to suggest it, and much which +is _prima facie_ opposed to it. It really removes no single difficulty: +for one difficulty which it presents some appearance of removing, it +creates a dozen greater ones. It is a hypothesis which we shall do well +to dismiss as otiose. + +(4) _Non-theistic Idealism_. Somewhat less unmotived, if we look upon it +from a merely intellectual point of view, is the theory of pre-existent +souls without a personal God. Many, if not most, of you probably possess +more or less acquaintance with the views of my friend, Dr. McTaggart. I +cannot here undertake a full exposition or criticism of one of the ablest +thinkers of our day--one of the very few English thinkers who is the +author of a truly original metaphysical system. I can only touch--and +that most inadequately--upon the particular side of it which directly +bears upon our present enquiry. Dr. McTaggart is an Idealist; he +recognizes the {97} impossibility of matter without mind. For him +nothing exists but spirits, but he does not recognize the necessity for +any one all-embracing or controlling Spirit: the only spirits in his +Universe are limited minds like those of men and animals. He differs, +then, from the Pluralist of the type just mentioned in getting rid of the +hypothesis of a personal God side by side with and yet controlling the +uncreated spirits. And he differs further from all Pluralists in not +treating the separate spirits as so many centres of consciousness quite +independent of, and possibly at war with, all the rest: the spirits form +part of an ordered system: the world is a unity, though that unity is not +the unity which belongs to self-consciousness. He recognizes, in the +traditional language of Philosophy, an Absolute, but this Absolute is not +a single spiritual Being but a Society: or, if it is to be called a +single spiritual Being, it is a Being which exists or manifests itself +only in a plurality of limited consciousnesses. + +This scheme is, I admit, more reasonable than Pluralism. It does, +nominally at least, recognize the world as an ordered system. It gets +rid of the difficulty of accounting for the apparent order of the Cosmos +as the result of a struggle between independent wills. It is not, upon +its author's pre-suppositions, a gratuitous theory: for a mind which +accepts Idealism and rejects Theism it is the only {98} intelligible +alternative. But I must confess that it seems to me open to most of the +difficulties which I have endeavoured to point out in Pluralism, and to +some others. In the first place, there is one, to my mind, great and +insuperable difficulty about it. As an Idealist, Dr. McTaggart has to +admit that the whole physical world, in so far as it exists at all, must +exist in and for some consciousness. Now, not only is there, according +to him, no single mind in which the system can exist as a whole, but even +all the minds together do not apparently know the whole of it, or (so far +as our knowledge goes) ever will. The undiscovered and unknown part of +the Universe is then non-existent. And yet, be it noticed, the known +part of the world does not make a perfectly articulated or (if you like +the phrase) organic system without the unknown part. It is only on the +assumption of relations between what we know and what we don't know that +we can regard it as an orderly, intelligible system at all. Therefore, +if part of the system is non-existent, the whole system--the system as a +whole--must be treated as non-existent. The world is, we are told, a +system; and yet as a system it has (upon the hypothesis) no real +existence. The systematic whole does not exist in matter, for to Dr. +McTaggart matter is merely the experience of Mind. What sort of +existence, then, can an undiscovered planet possess till it is {99} +discovered? For Dr. McTaggart has not provided any mind or minds in and +for which it is to exist. At one time, indeed, Dr. McTaggart seemed +disposed to accept a suggestion of mine that, on his view, each soul must +be omniscient; and to admit that, while in its temporal aspect, each soul +is limited and fallible in its knowledge, it is at the same time +supertemporally omniscient. That is a conception difficult beyond all +the difficulties of the most arbitrary and self-contradicting of orthodox +patristic or scholastic speculations. But, as Dr. McTaggart does not now +seem disposed to insist upon that point, I will say no more about it +except that to my mind it is a theory which defies all intellectual +grasp. It can be stated; it cannot be thought. + +Further, I would remind you, the theory is open to all the objections +which I urged against the Pre-existence theory in its pluralistic form. +I have suggested the difficulties involved in the facts of heredity--the +difficulty of understanding how souls whose real intellectual and moral +characteristics are uncaused and eternal should be assigned to parents so +far resembling them as to lead almost inevitably to the inference that +the characteristics of the children are to some extent causally connected +with those of the parents.[4] Now the Pluralist can {100} at least urge +that for this purpose ingenious arrangements are contrived by God--by the +One Spirit whom he regards as incomparably the wisest and most powerful +in the Universe. Dr. McTaggart recognizes no intelligence capable of +grappling with such a problem or succession of problems. But this +particular matter of the assignment of souls to bodies is only a +particular application of a wider difficulty. Dr. McTaggart contends +that the Universe constitutes not merely a physical but a moral order. +He would not deny that the Universe means something; that the series of +events tends towards an end, an end which is also a good; that it has a +purpose and a final cause. And yet this purpose exists in no mind +whatever, and is due to no will whatever--except to the very small extent +to which the processes of physical nature can be consciously directed to +an end by the volitions of men and similarly limited intelligences. As a +whole, the Universe is purposed and willed by no single will or +combination of wills. I confess I do not understand the idea of a +purpose which operates, but is not the purpose of a Mind which is also a +Will. All the considerations upon which I dwelt to show the necessity of +such a Will to account for the Universe which we know, are so many +arguments against Dr. McTaggart's scheme. The events of Dr. McTaggart's +Universe are, upon the view of Causality which I {101} attempted to +defend in my second lecture, uncaused events. + +Nevertheless, as a Philosopher, I am deeply grateful to Dr. McTaggart. +Not only does his scheme on its practical side seem to me preferable to +many systems which sound more orthodox--systems of vague pantheistic +Theism in which Morality is treated as mere 'appearance' and personal +Immortality deliberately rejected--but it has done much intellectually to +clear the air. Dr. McTaggart seems to me right in holding that, if God +or the Absolute is to include in itself all other spirits, and yet the +personality or self-consciousness of those spirits is not to be denied, +then this Absolute in which they are to be included cannot reasonably be +thought of as a conscious being, or invested with the other attributes +usually implied by the term God. + +And this leads me to say a few words more in explanation of my own view +of the relation between God and human or other souls. To me, as I have +already intimated, it seems simply meaningless to speak of one +consciousness as included in another consciousness. The essence of a +consciousness is to be for itself: whether it be a thought, a feeling, or +an emotion, the essence of that consciousness is what it is for me. +Every moment of consciousness is unique. Another being may have a {102} +similar feeling: in that case there are two feelings, and not one. +Another mind may know what I feel, but the knowledge of another's agony +is (fortunately) a very different thing from the agony itself. It is +fashionable in some quarters to ridicule the idea of 'impenetrable' +souls. If 'impenetrable' means that another soul cannot know what goes +on in my soul, I do not assert that the soul is impenetrable. I believe +that God knows what occurs in my soul in an infinitely completer way than +that in which any human being can know it. Further, I believe that every +soul is kept in existence from moment to moment by a continuous act of +the divine Will, and so is altogether dependent upon that Will, and forms +part of one system with Him. On the other hand I believe that (through +the analogy of my own mind and the guidance of the moral consciousness) I +do know, imperfectly and inadequately, 'as in a mirror darkly,' what goes +on in God's Mind. But, if penetrability is to mean identity, the theory +that souls are penetrable seems to me mainly unintelligible. The +acceptance which it meets with in some quarters is due, I believe, wholly +to the influence of that most fertile source of philosophical +confusion--misapplied spacial metaphor.[5] It seems easy to talk about a +mind being {103} something in itself, and yet part of another mind, +because we are familiar with the idea of things in space forming part of +larger things in space--Chinese boxes, for instance, shut up in bigger +ones. Such a mode of thought is wholly inapplicable to minds which are +not in space at all. Space is in the mind: the mind is not in space. A +mind is not a thing which can be round or square: you can't say that the +intellect of Kant or of Lord Kelvin measures so many inches by so many: +equally impossible is it to talk about such an intellect being a part of +a more extensive intellect. + +The theory of an all-inclusive Deity has recently been adopted and +popularized by Mr. Campbell,[6] who has done all that rhetorical skill +combined with genuine religious earnestness can do to present it in an +attractive and edifying dress. And yet the same Logic which leads to the +assertion that the Saint is part of God, leads also to the assertion that +Caesar Borgia and Napoleon Buonaparte and all the wicked Popes who have +ever been white-washed by episcopal or other historians are also parts of +God. How can I worship, how can I strive to be like, how can I be the +better for believing in or revering {104} a Being of whom Caesar Borgia +is a part as completely and entirely as St. Paul or our Lord himself? +Hindoo Theology is consistent in this matter. It worships the +destructive and the vicious aspects of Brahma as much as the kindly and +the moral ones: it does not pretend that God is revealed in the Moral +Consciousness, or is in any exclusive or one-sided way a God of Love. If +it be an 'ethical obsession' (as has been suggested) to object to treat +Immorality as no less a revelation of God than Morality, I must plead +guilty to such an obsession. And yet without such an 'obsession' I +confess I do not see what is left of Christianity. There is only one way +out of the difficulty. If we are all parts of God, we can only call God +good or perfect by maintaining that the deliverances of our moral +consciousness have no validity for God, and therefore can tell us nothing +about him. That has been done deliberately and explicitly by some +Philosophers:[7] the distinguished Theologians who echo the language of +this Philosophy have fortunately for their own religious life and +experience, but unfortunately for their philosophical consistency, +declined to follow in their steps. A God who is 'beyond good and evil,' +can be no fitting object of {105} worship to men who wish to become good, +just, merciful. If the cosmic process be indifferent to these ethical +considerations, we had better (with honest Agnostics like Professor +Huxley) make up our minds to defy it, whether it call itself God or not. + +But it is not so much on account of its consequences as on account of its +essential unmeaningness and intellectual unintelligibility that I would +invite you to reject this formula 'God is all.' Certainly, the Universe +is an ordered system: there is nothing in it that is not done by the Will +of God. And some parts of this Universe--the spiritual parts of it and +particularly the higher spirits--are not mere creations of God's will. +They have a resemblance of nature to Him. I do not object to your saying +that at bottom there is but one Substance in the Universe, if you will +only keep clear of the materialistic and spacial association of the word +Substance: but it is a Substance which reveals itself in many different +consciousnesses. The theory of an all-inclusive Consciousness is not +necessary to make possible the idea of close and intimate communion +between God and men, or of the revelation in and to Humanity of the +thought of God. On the contrary, it is the idea of Identity which +destroys the possibility of communion. Communion implies two minds: a +mind cannot have communion with itself or with part of itself. The two +may also in a {106} sense be one; of course all beings are ultimately +part of one Universe or Reality: but that Reality is not one +Consciousness. The Universe is a unity, but the unity is not of the kind +which constitutes a person or a self-consciousness. It is (as Dr. +McTaggart holds) the unity of a Society, but of a Society (as I have +attempted to argue) which emanates from, and is controlled by and guided +to a preconceived end by, a single rational Will.[8] + +(5) _The intuitive theory of religious knowledge_. In other quarters +objection will probably be taken to my not having recognized the +possibility of an immediate knowledge of God, and left the idea of God to +be inferred by intellectual processes which, when fully thought out, +amount to a Metaphysic. It will be suggested that to make religious +belief dependent upon Reason is to make it impossible to any but trained +Philosophers or Theologians. Now there is no doubt a great +attractiveness in the theory which makes belief in God depend simply upon +the immediate affirmation of the individual's own consciousness. It +would be more difficult to argue against such a theory of immediate +knowledge or intuition if we found that the consciousness of all or most +individuals does actually reveal to them {107} the existence of God: +though after all the fact that a number of men draw the same inference +from given facts does not show that it is not an inference. You will +sometimes find Metaphysicians contending that nobody is really an +Atheist, since everybody necessarily supposes himself to be in contact +with an Other of which he is nevertheless a part. I do not deny that, if +you water down the idea of God to the notion of a vague 'something not +ourselves,' you may possibly make out that everybody is explicitly or +implicitly a believer in such a Deity. + +I should prefer myself to say that, if that is all you mean by God, it +does not much matter whether we believe in Him or not. In the sense in +which God is understood by Christianity or Judaism or any other theistic +Religion it is unfortunately impossible to contend that everybody is a +Theist. And, if there is an immediate knowledge of God in every human +soul, this would be difficult to account for. Neither the cultivated nor +the uncultivated Chinaman has apparently any such belief. The ignorant +Chinaman believes in a sort of luck or destiny--possibly in a plurality +of limited but more or less mischievous spirits; the educated Chinaman, +we are told, is for the most part a pure Agnostic. And Chinamen are +believed to be one-fifth of the human race. The task of the Missionary +would be an easier one if he could {108} appeal to any such widely +diffused intuitions of God. The Missionary, from the days of St. Paul at +Athens down to the present, has to begin by arguing with his opponents in +favour of Theism, and then to go on to argue from Theism to Christianity. +I do not deny--on the contrary I strongly contend--that the rational +considerations which lead up to Monotheism are so manifold, and lie so +near at hand, that at a certain stage of mental development we find that +belief independently asserting itself with more or less fullness in +widely distant regions of time and space; while traces of it are found +almost everywhere--even among savages--side by side with other and +inconsistent beliefs. But even among theistic nations an immediate +knowledge of God is claimed by very few. If there is a tendency on the +part of the more strongly religious minds to claim it, it is explicitly +disclaimed by others--by most of the great Schoolmen, and in modern times +by profoundly religious minds such as Newman or Martineau. Its existence +is in fact denied by most of the great theological systems--Catholic, +Protestant, Anglican. Theologians always begin by arguing in favour of +the existence of God. And even among the religious minds without +philosophical training which do claim such immediate knowledge, their +creed is most often due (as is obvious to the outside observer) to the +influence of environment, of education, of social {109} tradition. For +the religious person who claims such knowledge of God does not generally +stop at the bare affirmation of God's existence: he goes on to claim an +immediate knowledge of all sorts of other things--ideas clearly derived +from the traditional teaching of his religious community. The Protestant +of a certain type will claim immediate consciousness of ideas about the +forgiveness of sins which are palpably due to the teaching of Luther or +St. Augustine, and to the influence of this or that preacher who has +transmitted those ideas to him or to his mother: while the Catholic, +though his training discourages such claims, will sometimes see visions +which convey to him an immediate assurance of the truth of the Immaculate +Conception. Even among Anglicans we find educated men who claim to know +by immediate intuition the truth of historical facts alleged to have +occurred in the first century, or dogmatic truths such as the complicated +niceties of the Athanasian Creed. These claims to immediate insight thus +refute themselves by the inconsistent character of the knowledge claimed. +An attempt may be made to extract from all these immediate certainties a +residual element which is said to be common to all of them. The attempt +has been made by Professor James in that rather painful work, the +_Varieties of Religious Experience_. And the residuum turns out to be +something so vague that, if not {110} absolutely worthless, it is almost +incapable of being expressed in articulate language, and constitutes a +very precarious foundation for a working religious creed. + +The truth is that the uneducated--or rather the unanalytical, perhaps I +ought to say the metaphysically untrained--human mind has a tendency to +regard as an immediate certainty any truth which it strongly believes and +regards as very important. Such minds do not know the psychological +causes which have led to their own belief, when they are due to +psychological causes: they have not analysed the processes of thought by +which they have been led to those beliefs which are really due to the +working of their own minds. Most uncultivated persons would probably be +very much surprised to hear that the existence of the friend with whose +body they are in physical contact is after all only an inference.[9] But +surely, in the man who has discovered that such is the case, the warmth +of friendship was never dimmed by the reflection that his knowledge of +his friend is not immediate but mediate. It is a mere prejudice to +suppose that mediate knowledge is in any {111} way less certain, less +intimate, less trustworthy or less satisfying than immediate knowledge. +If we claim for man the possibility of just such a knowledge of God as a +man may possess of his brother man, surely that is all that is wanted to +make possible the closest religious communion. It is from the existence +of my own self that I infer the existence of other selves, whom I observe +to behave in a manner resembling my own behaviour. It is by an only +slightly more difficult and complicated inference from my own +consciousness that I rise to that conception of a universal Consciousness +which supplies me with at once the simplest and the most natural +explanation both of my own existence and of the existence of the Nature +which I see around me. + +(6) _Religion and Psychology_. I do not deny that the study of religious +history, by exhibiting the naturalness and universality of religious +ideas and religious emotions, may rationally create a pre-disposition to +find some measure of truth in every form of religious belief. But I +would venture to add a word of caution against the tendency fashionable +in many quarters to talk of basing religious belief upon Psychology. The +business of Psychology is to tell us what actually goes on in the human +mind. It cannot possibly tell us whether the beliefs which are found +there are true or false. An erroneous {112} belief is as much a +psychological fact as a true one. A theory which goes on, by inference +from what we observe in our own minds, to construct a theory of the +Universe necessarily involves a Metaphysic, conscious or unconscious. It +may be urged that the reality of religious experience is unaffected by +the question whether the beliefs associated with it are true or false. +That is the case, so long as the beliefs are supposed to be true by the +person in question. But, when once the spirit of enquiry is aroused, a +man cannot be--and I venture to think ought not to be--satisfied as to +the truth of his belief simply by being told that the beliefs are +actually there. + +It may be contended, no doubt, that religious experience does not mean +merely a state of intellectual belief, but certain emotions, aspirations, +perhaps (to take one particular type of religious experience) a +consciousness of love met by answering love. To many who undergo such +experiences, they seem to carry with them an immediate assurance of the +existence of the Being with whom they feel themselves to be in communion. +That, on the intellectual presuppositions of the particular person, seems +to be the natural--it may be the only possible--way of explaining the +feeling. But even there the belief is not really immediate: it is an +inference from what is actually matter of experience. And it is, +unhappily, no less a matter of well-ascertained {113} psychological fact +that, when intellectual doubt is once aroused, such experiences no longer +carry with them this conviction of their own objective basis. The person +was really under the influence of an intellectual theory all along, +whether the theory was acquired by hereditary tradition, by the influence +of another's mind, or by personal thought and reflection. When the +intellectual theory alters, the same kind of experience is no longer +possible. I will not attempt to say how far it is desirable that persons +who are perfectly satisfied with a creed which they have never examined +should (as it were) pull up the roots of their own faith to see how deep +they go. I merely want to point out that the occurrence of certain +emotional experiences, though undoubtedly they may constitute part of the +data of a religious argument, cannot be held to constitute in and by +themselves sufficient evidence for the truth of the intellectual theory +connected with them in the mind of the person to whom they occur. They +do not always present themselves as sufficient evidence for their truth +even to the person experiencing them--still less can they do so to +others. Equally unreasonable is it to maintain, with a certain class of +religious philosophers, that the religious experience by itself is all we +want; and to assume that we may throw to the winds all the theological or +other beliefs which have actually been associated {114} with the various +types of religious experience, and yet continue to have those experiences +and find them no less valuable and no less satisfying. If there is one +thing which the study of religious Psychology testifies to, it is the +fact that the character of the religious experience (though there may be +certain common elements in it) varies very widely with the character of +the theoretical belief with which it is associated--a belief of which it +is sometimes the cause, sometimes the effect, but from which it is always +inseparable. The Buddhist's religious experiences are not possible to +those who hold the Christian's view of the Universe: the Christian's +religious experiences are not possible to one who holds the Buddhist +theory of the Universe. You cannot have an experience of communion with +a living Being when you disbelieve in the existence of such a Being. And +a man's theories of the Universe always at bottom imply a Metaphysic of +some kind--conscious or unconscious. + +Sometimes the theory of a Religion which shall be purely psychological +springs from pure ignorance as to the meaning of the terms actually +employed by the general usage of philosophers. Those who talk in this +way mean by Psychology what, according to the ordinary philosophic usage, +is really Metaphysic. For Metaphysic is simply the science which deals +with the ultimate nature of the Universe. {115} At other times attempts +are made by people of more or less philosophical culture to justify their +theory. The most widely influential of such attempts is the one made by +M. Auguste Sabatier.[10] This attempt has at least this much in its +favour--that it is not so much to the ordinary experience of average men +and women that M. Sabatier appeals as to the exceptional experiences of +the great religious minds. He lays the chief stress upon those +exceptional moments of religious history when a new religious idea +entered into the mind of some prophet or teacher, _e.g._ the unity of +God, the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of Man. Here, just because +the idea was new, it cannot (he contends) be accounted for by education +or environment or any other of the psychological causes which obviously +determine the traditional beliefs of the great majority. These new +ideas, therefore, he assumes to be due to immediate revelation or +inspiration from God. Now it is obvious that, even if this inference +were well grounded, it assumes that we have somehow arrived independently +at a conception of God to which such inspirations can be referred. The +Psychology of the human mind cannot assume the existence of such a Being: +if we infer such a Being from our own mental experience, that is not +immediate but {116} mediate knowledge. It is a belief based on +inference, and a belief which is, properly speaking, metaphysical. The +idea of a Religion which is merely based upon Psychology and involves +nothing else is a delusion: all the great Religions of the world have +been, among other things, metaphysical systems. We have no means of +ascertaining their truth but Reason, whether it assume the form of a +rough common-sense or of elaborate reasoning which not only is Metaphysic +but knows itself to be so. Reason is then the organ of religious truth. +But then, let me remind you, Reason includes our moral Reason. That +really is a faculty of immediate knowledge; and it is a faculty which, in +a higher or lower state of development, is actually found in practically +all human beings. The one element of truth which I recognize in the +theory of an immediate knowledge of God is the truth that the most +important data upon which we base the inference which leads to the +knowledge of God are those supplied by the immediate judgements or +intuitions of the Moral Consciousness. + +And here let me caution you against a very prevalent misunderstanding +about the word Reason. It is assumed very often that Reason means +nothing but inference. That is not what we mean when we refer moral +judgements to the Reason. We do not mean that we can prove that things +are right or {117} wrong: we mean precisely the opposite--that ultimate +moral truth is immediate, like the truth that two and two make four. It +might, of course, be contended that the same Reason which assures me that +goodness is worth having and that the whole is greater than the part, +assures us no less immediately of the existence of God. I can only say +that I am sure I have no such immediate knowledge, and that for the most +part that knowledge is never claimed by people who understand clearly the +difference between immediate knowledge and inference. The idea of God is +a complex conception, based, not upon this or that isolated judgement or +momentary experience, but upon the whole of our experience taken +together. It is a hypothesis suggested by, and necessary to, the +explanation of our experience as a whole. Some minds may lay most stress +upon the religious emotions themselves; others upon the experience of the +outer world, upon the appearances of design, or upon the metaphysical +argument which shows them the inconceivability of matter without mind; +others, again, may be most impressed by the impossibility of accounting +in any way for the immediate consciousness of duty and the conviction of +objective validity or authority which that consciousness carries with it. +But in any case the knowledge, when it is a reasonable belief and not +based merely upon authority, involves {118} inference--just like our +knowledge of our friend's existence. The fact that my friend is known to +me by experience does not prevent his communicating his mind to me. I +shall try to show you in my next lecture that to admit that our knowledge +of God is based upon inference is not incompatible with the belief that +God has spoken to man face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend. + + +At this point it may perhaps be well, for the sake of clearness, to +summarize the position to which I have tried to lead you. I have tried +to show that the material Universe cannot reasonably be thought of as +having any existence outside, or independently of, Mind. It certainly +does not exist merely in any or all of the human and similar minds whose +knowledge is fleeting, and which have, there is every reason to believe, +a beginning in time. We are bound then to infer the existence of a +single Mind or Consciousness, which must be thought of as containing all +the elements of our own Consciousness--Reason or Thought, Feeling, and +Will--though no doubt in Him those elements or aspects of Consciousness +are combined in a manner of which our own minds can give us but a very +faint and analogical idea. The world must be thought of as ultimately +the thought or experience of this Mind, which we call God. And this Mind +must be thought {119} of as not only a Thinker, but also as a Cause or a +Will. Our own and all other minds, no less than the events of the +material Universe, owe their beginning and continuance to this divine +Will: in them the thought or experience of the divine Mind is reproduced +in various degrees; and to all of them is communicated some portion of +that causality or activity of which God is the ultimate source, so that +their acts must be regarded as due mediately to them, ultimately to God. +But, though these minds are wholly dependent upon and in intimate +connexion with the divine Mind, they cannot be regarded as _parts_ of the +divine Consciousness. Reality consists of God and all the minds that He +wills to exist, together with the world of Nature which exists in and for +those minds. Reality is the system or society of spirits and their +experience. The character and ultimate purpose of the divine Mind is +revealed to us, however inadequately or imperfectly, in the moral +consciousness; and the moral ideal which is thus communicated to us makes +it reasonable for us to expect, for at least the higher of the dependent +or created minds, a continuance, of their individual existence, after +physical death. Pain, sin, and other evils must be regarded as necessary +incidents in the process by which the divine Will is bringing about the +greatest attainable good of all conscious beings. The question whether +our material Universe, {120} considered as the object of Mind, has a +beginning and will have an end, is one which we have no data for +deciding. Time-distinctions, I think, must be regarded as +objective--that is to say, as forming part of the nature and constitution +of the real world; but the antinomy involved either in supposing an +endless succession or a beginning and end of the time-series is one which +our intellectual faculties are, or at least have so far proved, incapable +of solving. The element of inadequacy and uncertainty which the +admission of this antinomy introduces into our theory of the Universe is +an emphatic reminder to us of the inadequate and imperfect character of +all our knowledge. The knowledge, however, that we possess, though +inadequate knowledge, is real knowledge--not a sham knowledge of merely +relative or human validity; and is sufficient not only for the guidance +of life but even for the partial, though not the complete, satisfaction +of one of the noblest impulses of the human mind--the disinterested +passion for truth. 'Now we see in a mirror darkly'; but still we see. + +The view of the Universe which I have endeavoured very inadequately to +set before you is a form of Idealism. Inasmuch as it recognizes the +existence--though not the separate and independent existence--of many +persons; inasmuch as it regards both God and man as persons, without +attempting {121} to merge the existence of either in one all-including, +comprehensive consciousness, it may further be described as a form of +'personal Idealism.' But, if any one finds it easier to think of +material Nature as having an existence which, though dependent upon and +willed by the divine Mind, is not simply an existence in and for mind, +such a view of the Universe will serve equally well as a basis of +Religion. For religious purposes it makes no difference whether we think +of Nature as existing in the Mind of God, or as simply created or brought +into and kept in existence by that Mind. When you have subtracted from +the theistic case every argument that depends for its force upon the +theory that the idea of matter without Mind is an unthinkable absurdity, +enough will remain to show the unreasonableness of supposing that in +point of fact matter ever has existed without being caused and controlled +by Mind. The argument for Idealism may, I hope, have at all events +exhibited incidentally the groundlessness and improbability of +materialistic and naturalistic assumptions, and left the way clear for +the establishment of Theism by the arguments which rest upon the +discovery that Causality implies volition; upon the appearances of +intelligence in organic life; upon the existence of the moral +consciousness; and more generally upon the enormous probability that the +ultimate Source of Reality should resemble rather {122} the highest than +the lowest kind of existence of which we have experience. That Reality +as a whole may be most reasonably interpreted by Reality at its highest +is after all the sum and substance of all theistic arguments. If anybody +finds it easier to think of matter as uncreated but as always guided and +controlled by Mind, I do not think there will be any religious objection +to such a position; though it is, as it seems to me, intellectually a +less unassailable position than is afforded by an Idealism of the type +which I have most inadequately sketched. + +Mr. Bradley in a cynical moment has defined Metaphysics as the 'finding +of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct.' I do not for myself +accept that definition, which Mr. Bradley himself would not of course +regard as expressing the whole truth of the matter. But, though I am +firmly convinced that it is possible to find good reasons for the +religious beliefs and hopes which have in fact inspired the noblest +lives, I still feel that the greatest service which even a little +acquaintance with Philosophy may render to many who have not the time for +any profounder study of it, will be to give them greater boldness and +confidence in accepting a view of the Universe which satisfies the +instinctive or unanalysed demands of their moral, intellectual, and +spiritual nature. + +{123} + +NOTE ON NON-THEISTIC IDEALISM + +It may perhaps be well for the sake of greater clearness to summarize my +objections--those already mentioned and some others--to the system of Dr. +McTaggart, which I admit to be, for one who has accepted the idealistic +position that matter does not exist apart from Mind, the only +intelligible alternative to Theism. His theory is, it will be +remembered, that ultimate Reality consists of a system of selves or +spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a Unity, but not a +conscious Unity, so that consciousness exists only in the separate +selves, not in the whole: + +(1) It is admitted that the material world exists only in and for Mind. +There is no reason to think that any human mind, or any of the other +minds of which Dr. McTaggart's Universe is composed, knows the whole of +this world. What kind of existence then have the parts of the Universe +which are not known to any mind? It seems to me that Dr. McTaggart would +be compelled to admit that they do not exist at all. The world +postulated by Science would thus be admitted to be a delusion. This +represents a subjective Idealism of an extreme and staggering kind which +cannot meet the objections commonly urged against all Idealism. + +(2) Moreover, the world is not such an intellectually complete system as +Dr. McTaggart insists that it must be, apart from the relations of its +known parts to its unknown parts. If there are parts which are unknown +to any mind, and which therefore do not exist at all, it is not a system +at all. + +(3) If it be said that all the spirits between them know the world--one +knowing one part, another another--this is a mere hypothesis, opposed to +all the probabilities suggested by experience, and after all would be a +very inadequate answer to our difficulties. Dr. McTaggart insists {124} +that the world of existing things exists as a system. Such existence to +an Idealist must mean existence for a mind; a system not known as a +system to any mind whatever could hardly be said to exist at all. + +(4) If it be suggested (as Dr. McTaggart was at one time inclined to +suggest) that every mind considered as a timeless Noumenon is omniscient, +though in its phenomenal and temporal aspect its knowledge is +intermittent and always limited, I reply (_a_) the theory seems to me not +only gratuitous but unintelligible, and (_b_) it is open to all the +difficulties and objections of the theory that time and change are merely +subjective delusions. This is too large a question to discuss here: I +can only refer to the treatment of the subject by such writers as Lotze +(see above) and M. Bergson. I may also refer to Mr. Bradley's argument +(_Appearance and Reality_, p. 50 sq.) against the theory that the +individual Ego is out of time. + +(5) The theory of pre-existent souls is opposed to all the probabilities +suggested by experience. Soul and organism are connected in such a way +that the pre-existence of one element in what presents itself and works +in our world as a unity is an extremely difficult supposition, and +involves assumptions which reduce to a minimum the amount of identity or +continuity that could be claimed for the Ego throughout its successive +lives. A soul which has forgotten all its previous experiences may have +some identity with its previous state, but not much. Moreover, we should +have to suppose that the correspondence of a certain type of body with a +certain kind of soul, as well as the resemblance between the individual +and his parents, implies no kind of causal connexion, but is due to mere +accident; or, if it is not to accident, to a very arbitrary kind of +pre-established harmony which there is nothing in experience to suggest, +and which (upon Dr. McTaggart's theory) there is no creative intelligence +to pre-establish. The theory cannot be absolutely refuted, but all Dr. +McTaggart's ingenuity has not--to my own mind, {125} and (I feel sure) to +most minds--made it seem otherwise than extremely difficult and +improbable. Its sole recommendation is that it makes possible an +Idealism without Theism: but, if Theism be an easier and more defensible +theory, that is no recommendation at all. + +(6) Dr. McTaggart's whole theory seems to me to waver between two +inconsistent views of Reality. When he insists that the world consists +of a system or Unity, he tends towards a view of things which makes the +system of intellectual relations constituting knowledge or Science to be +the very reality of things: on such a view there is no impossibility of +an ultimate Reality not known to any one mind. But Dr. McTaggart has too +strong a hold on the conviction of the supremely real character of +conscious mind and the unreality of mere abstractions to be satisfied +with this view. If there is no mind which both knows and wills the +existence and the mutual relations of the spirits, the supreme reality +must be found in the individual spirits themselves; yet the system, if +known to none of them, seems to fall outside the reality. The natural +tendency of a system which finds the sole reality in eternally +self-existent souls is towards Pluralism--a theory of wholly independent +'Reals' or 'Monads.' Dr. McTaggnrt is too much of a Hegelian to +acquiesce in such a view. The gulf between the two tendencies seems to +me--with all respect--to be awkwardly bridged over by the assumption that +the separate selves form an intelligible system, which nevertheless no +one really existent spirit actually understands. If a system of +relations can be Reality, there is no ground for assuming the +pre-existence or eternity of individual souls: if on the other hand +Reality is 'experience,' an unexperienced 'system' cannot be real, and +the 'unity' disappears. This is a line of objection which it would +require a much more thorough discussion to develope. + +(7) On the view which I myself hold as to the nature of Causality, the +only intelligible cause of events is a Will. The events of Dr. +McTaggart's world (putting aside the very {126} small proportion which +are due, in part at least, to the voluntary action of men or spirits) are +not caused at all. His theory is therefore open to all--and more than +all--the objections which I have urged in Lecture II. against the theory +which explains the Universe as the thought of a Mind but not as caused by +that Mind. + +(8) It is just possible that some one might suggest that the first of my +objections might be met by the allegation that there is nothing in the +scheme which forbids us to suppose that the whole of Nature is known to +more than one of the spirits which make up Reality, though not to all, or +indeed any, of the human and non-human spirits known to us. I should +reply (_a_) that the considerations which lead to the hypothesis of one +omniscient Being do not require more than one such spirit, and _entia non +sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_; (_b_) such a scheme would still +be open to Objection 7. If it is a speculative possibility that all +Nature may exist in the knowledge of more than one spirit, it cannot well +be thought of as willed by more than one spirit. If the Universe, +admitted to form an ordered system, is caused by rational will at all, it +must surely be caused by one Will. But perhaps a serious discussion of a +polytheistic scheme such as this may be postponed till it is seriously +maintained. It has not been suggested, so far as I am aware, by Dr. +McTaggart himself. + +(9) The real strength of Dr. McTaggart's system must be measured by the +validity of his objections to a Theism such as I have defended. I have +attempted to reply to those objections in the course of these Lectures, +and more at length in a review of his _Some Dogmas of Religion_ in _Mind_ +(N.S.), vol. xv., 1906. + + + +[1] Cf. Flint's _Theism_, Ed. v., p. 117 and App. xi. + +[2] The most illuminating discussion of time and the most convincing +argument for its 'objectivity' which I know, is to be found in Lotze's +_Metaphysic_, Book II. chap. iii., but it cannot be recommended to the +beginner in Metaphysic. A brilliant exposition of the view of the +Universe which regards time and change as belonging to the very reality +of the Universe, has recently appeared in M. Bergson's L'Evolution +Creatrice, but he has hardly attempted to deal with the metaphysical +difficulties indicated above. The book, however, seems to me the most +important philosophical work that has appeared since Mr. Bradley's +_Appearance and Reality_, and though the writer has hardly formulated his +Natural Theology, it constitutes a very important contribution to the +theistic argument. Being based upon a profound study of biological +Evolution, it may be specially commended to scientific readers. + +[3] Such a view is expounded in Dr. Schiller's early work _The Riddles of +the Sphinx_ and in Professor Howison's _The Limits of Evolution_. The +very distinguished French thinker Charles Renouvier (_La Nouvelle +Monadologie_, etc.), like Origen, believed that souls were pre-existent +but created. + +[4] I use the word 'causally connected' in the popular or scientific +sense of the word, to indicate merely an actually observed +psycho-physical law. + +[5] In part, perhaps, also to a mistaken theory of predication, which +assumes that, because every fact in the world can be represented as +logically a predicate of Reality at large, therefore there is but one +Substance or (metaphysically) Real Being in the world, of which all other +existences are really mere 'attributes.' But this theory cannot be +discussed here. + +[6] In _The New Theology_. + +[7] _E.g._ by Mr. Bradley in _Appearance and Reality_ and still more +uncompromisingly by Professor A. E. Taylor in _The Problem of Conduct_, +but I rejoice to find that the latter very able writer has recently given +up this theory of a 'super-moral' Absolute. + +[8] I think it desirable to mention here that Professor Watson's account +of my views in his _Philosophical Basis of Religion_ completely +misrepresents my real position. I have replied to his criticisms in +_Mind_, N.S. No. 69 (Jan. 1909). + +[9] This is sometimes denied by Philosophers, but I have never been able +to understand on what grounds. If I know _a priori_ the existence of +other men, I ought to be able to say _a priori_ how many they are and to +say something about them. And this is more than any one claims. + +[10] In _Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'apres La Psychologie +et l'histoire_. + + + + +{127} + +LECTURE V + +REVELATION + +I have tried in previous lectures to show that the apprehension of +religious truth does not depend upon some special kind of intuition; +that it is not due to some special faculty superior to and different in +kind from our ordinary intellectual activities, but to an exercise of +the same intellectual faculties by which we attain to truth in other +matters--including, however, especially the wholly unique faculty of +immediately discerning values or pronouncing moral judgements. The +word 'faith' should, as it seems to me, be used to express not a +mysterious capacity for attaining to knowledge without thought or +without evidence, but to indicate some of the manifold characteristics +by which our religious knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge +either of common life or of the physical Sciences. If I had time there +would be much to be said about these characteristics, and I think I +could show that the popular distinction between knowledge and religious +{128} faith finds whatever real justification it possesses in these +characteristics of religious knowledge. I might insist on the +frequently implicit and unanalysed character of religious thinking; +upon the incompleteness and inadequacy of even the fullest account that +the maturest and acutest Philosopher can give of ultimate Reality; upon +the merely probable and analogical character of much of the reasoning +which is necessarily employed both in the most popular and in the most +philosophical kinds of reasoning about such matters; and above all upon +the prominent place which moral judgements occupy in religious thought, +moral judgements which, on account of their immediate character and +their emotional setting, are often not recognized in their true +character as judgements of the Reason. Most of the mistakes into which +popular thinking has fallen in this matter--the mistakes which +culminate in the famous examination-paper definition of faith as 'a +means of believing that which we know not to be true'--would be avoided +if we would only remember, with St. Paul and most of the greater +religious thinkers, that the true antithesis is not between faith and +reason but between faith and sight. All religious belief implies a +belief in something which cannot be touched or tasted or handled, and +which cannot be established by any mere logical deduction from what can +be touched or tasted or handled. So far from implying {129} scepticism +as to the power of Reason, this opposition between faith and sight +actually asserts the possibility of attaining by thought to a knowledge +of realities which cannot be touched or tasted or handled--a knowledge +of equal validity and trustworthiness with that which is popularly said +to be due to the senses, though Plato has taught us once for all[1] +that the senses by themselves never give us real knowledge, and that in +the apprehension of the most ordinary matter of fact there is implied +the action of the self-same intellect by which alone we can reach the +knowledge of God. + +It may further be pointed out that, though neither religious knowledge +nor moral knowledge are mere emotion, they are both of them very +closely connected with certain emotions. Great moral discoveries are +made, not so much by superior intellectual power, as by superior +interest in the subject-matter of Morality. Very ordinary intelligence +can see, when it is really brought to bear upon the matter, the +irrationality or immorality of bad customs, oppressions, social +injustices; but the people who have led the revolt against these things +have generally been the people who have felt intensely about them. So +it is with the more distinctly religious knowledge. Religious thought +and insight are largely dependent upon the emotions to which religious +{130} ideas and beliefs appeal. The absence of religious thought and +definite religious belief is very often (I am far from saying always) +due to a want of interest in Religion; but that does not prove that +religious thought is not the work of the intellect, any more than the +fact that a man is ignorant of Politics because he takes no interest in +Politics proves that political truth is a mere matter of emotion, and +has nothing to do with the understanding. Thought is always guided by +interest--a truth which must not be distorted with a certain modern +school of thought, if indeed it can properly be called thought, into +the assertion that thinking is nothing but willing, and that therefore +we are at liberty to think just what we please. + +And that leads on to a further point. Emotion and desire are very +closely connected with the will. A man's moral insight and the +development of his thought about moral questions depend very largely +upon the extent to which he acts up to whatever light he has. Vice, as +Aristotle put it, is _phthartike arches_--destructive of moral first +principles. Moral insight is largely dependent upon character. And so +is religious insight. Thus it is quite true to say that religious +belief depends in part upon the state of the will. This doctrine has +been so scandalously abused by many Theologians and Apologists that I +use it with great hesitation. I have no sympathy {131} with the idea +that we are justified in believing a religious doctrine merely because +we wish it to be true, or with the insinuation that non-belief in a +religious truth is always or necessarily due to moral obliquity. But +still it is undeniable that a man's ethical and religious beliefs are +to some extent affected by the state of his will. That is so with all +knowledge to some extent; for progress in knowledge requires attention, +and is largely dependent upon interest. If I take no interest in the +properties of curves or the square root of -1, I am not very likely to +make a good mathematician. This connexion of knowledge with interest +applies in an exceptional degree to religious knowledge: and that is +one of the points which I think many religious thinkers have intended +to emphasize by their too hard and fast distinctions between faith and +knowledge. + +Belief itself is thus to some extent affected by the state of the will; +and still more emphatically does the extent to which belief affects +action depend upon the will. Many beliefs which we quite sincerely +hold are what have been called 'otiose beliefs'; we do not by an effort +of the will realize them sufficiently strongly for them to affect +action. Many a man knows perfectly that his course of life will injure +or destroy his physical health; it is not through intellectual +scepticism that he disobeys his {132} physician's prescriptions, but +because other desires and inclinations prevent his attending to them +and acting upon them. It is obvious that to men like St. Paul and +Luther faith meant much more than a mere state of the intellect; it +included a certain emotional and a certain volitional attitude; it +included love and it included obedience. Whether our intellectual +beliefs about Religion are energetic enough to influence action, does +to an enormous extent depend upon our wills. Faith is, then, used, and +almost inevitably used, in such a great variety of senses that I do not +like to lay down one definite and exclusive definition of it; but it +would be safe to say that, for many purposes and in many connexions, +religious faith means the deliberate adoption by an effort of the will, +as practically certain for purposes of action and of feeling, of a +religious belief which to the intellect is, or may be, merely probable. +For purposes of life it is entirely reasonable to treat probabilities +as certainties. If a man has reason to think his friend is +trustworthy, he will do well to trust him wholly and implicitly. If a +man has reason to think that a certain view of the Universe is the most +probable one, he will do well habitually to allow that conviction to +dominate not merely his actions, but the habitual tenour of his +emotional and spiritual life. We should not love a human being much if +we allowed ourselves habitually to {133} contemplate the logical +possibility that the loved one was unworthy of, or irresponsive to, our +affection. We could not love God if we habitually contemplated the +fact that His existence rests for us upon judgements in which there is +more or less possibility of error, though there is no reason why we +should, in our speculative moments, claim a greater certainty for them +than seems to be reasonable. The doctrine that 'probability is the +guide of life' is one on which every sensible man habitually acts in +all other relations of life: Bishop Butler was right in contending that +it should be applied no less unhesitatingly to the matter of religious +belief and religious aspiration. + +The view which I have taken of the nature of faith may be illustrated +by the position of Clement of Alexandria. It is clear from his +writings that by faith he meant a kind of conviction falling short of +demonstration or immediate intellectual insight, and dependent in part +upon the state of the will and the heart. Clement did not disparage +knowledge in the interests of faith: faith was to him a more elementary +kind of knowledge resting largely upon moral conviction, and the +foundation of that higher state of intellectual apprehension which he +called Gnosis. I do not mean, of course, to adopt Clement's Philosophy +as a whole; I merely refer to it as illustrating the point that, +properly considered, faith is, or rather includes, a particular kind or +stage {134} of knowledge, and is not a totally different and even +opposite state of mind. It would be easy to show that this has been +fully recognized by many, if not most, of the great Christian thinkers. + +One last point. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between +the process by which psychologically a man arrives at a religious or +other truth and the reasons which make it true. Because I deny that +the truth of God's existence can reasonably be accepted on the basis of +an immediate judgement or intuition, I do not deny for one moment that +an apparently intuitive conviction of the truth of Christianity, as of +other religions, actually exists. The religious belief of the vast +majority of persons has always rested, and must always rest, very +largely upon tradition, education, environment, authority of one kind +or another--authority supported or confirmed by a varying measure of +independent reflection or experience. And, just where the influence of +authority is most complete and overwhelming, it is least felt to be +authority. The person whose beliefs are most entirely produced by +education or environment is very often most convinced that his opinions +are due solely to his own immediate insight. But even where this is +not the case--even where the religious man is taking a new departure, +revolting against his environment and adopting a religious belief +absolutely at variance with the established {135} belief of his +society--I do not contend that such new religious ideas are always due +to unobserved and unanalysed processes of reasoning. That in most +cases, when a person adopts a new creed, he would himself give some +reason for his change of faith is obvious, though the reason which he +would allege would not in all cases be the one which really caused the +change of religion. There may be other psychological influences which +cause belief besides the influence of environment: in some cases the +psychological causes of such beliefs are altogether beyond analysis. +But, though I do not think M. Auguste Sabatier justified in assuming +that a belief is true, and must come directly from God, simply because +we cannot easily explain its genesis by the individual's environment +and psychological antecedents, it is of extreme importance to insist +that it is not proved to be false because it was not adopted primarily, +or at all, on adequate theoretical grounds. A belief which arose at +first entirely without logical justification, or it may be on +intellectual grounds subsequently discovered to be inadequate or false, +may nevertheless be one which can and does justify itself to the +reflective intellect of the person himself or of other persons. And +many new, true, and valuable beliefs have undoubtedly arisen in this +way. Even in physical Science we all know that there is no Logic of +discovery. It {136} is a familiar criticism upon the Logic of Bacon +that he ignored or under-estimated the part that is played in +scientific thinking by hypothesis, and the consequent need of +scientific imagination. Very often the new scientific idea comes into +the discoverer's mind, he knows not how or why. Some great man of +Science--I think, Helmholtz--said of a brilliant discovery of his, 'It +was given to me.' But it was not true because it came to Helmholtz in +this way, but because it was subsequently verified and proved. Now, +undoubtedly, religious beliefs, new and old, often do present +themselves to the minds of individuals in an intuitive and +unaccountable way. They may subsequently be justified at the bar of +Reason: and yet Reason might never have discovered them for itself. +They would never have come into the world unless they had presented +themselves at first to some mind or other as intuitions, inspirations, +immediate Revelations: and yet (once again) the fact that they so +present themselves does not by itself prove them to be true. + +I may perhaps illustrate what I mean by the analogy of Poetry. I +suppose few people will push the sound-without-sense view of Poetry to +the length of denying that poets do sometimes see and teach us truths. +No one--least of all one who is not even a verse-maker himself--can, I +suppose, analyse the intellectual process by which a poet {137} gets at +his truths. The insight by which he arrives at them is closely +connected with emotions of various kinds: and yet the truths are not +themselves emotions, nor do they in all cases merely state the fact +that the poet has felt such and such emotions. They are propositions +about the nature of things, not merely about the poet's mental states. +And yet the truths are not true because the poet _feels_ them, as he +would say--no matter how passionately he feels them. There is no +separate organ of poetic truth: and not all the things that poets have +passionately felt are true. Some highly poetical thoughts have been +very false thoughts. But, if they are true, they must be true for good +logical reasons, which a philosophical critic may even in some cases by +subsequent reflection be able to disentangle and set forth. Yet the +poet did not get at those truths by way of philosophical reflection: +or, if he was led to them by any logical process, he could not have +analysed his own reasoning. The poet could not have produced the +arguments of the philosopher: the philosopher without the poet's lead +might never have seen the truth. I am afraid I must not stay to defend +or illustrate this position: I will only say that the poets I should +most naturally go to for illustration would be such poets as +Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning, though perhaps all three are a +little {138} too consciously philosophic to supply the ideal +illustration. + +I do not think it will be difficult to apply these reflections to the +case of religious and ethical truth. All religious truth, as I hold, +depends logically upon inference; inference from the whole body of our +experiences, among which the most important place is held by our +immediate moral judgements. The truth of Theism is in that sense a +truth discernible by Reason. But it does not follow that, when it was +first discovered, it was arrived at by the inferences which I have +endeavoured to some extent to analyse, or by one of the many lines of +thought which may lead to the same conclusions. It was not the Greek +philosophers so much as the Jewish prophets who taught the world true +Monotheism. Hosea, Amos, the two Isaiahs probably arrived at their +Monotheism largely by intuition; or (in so far as it was by inferential +processes) the premisses of their argument were very probably inherited +beliefs of earlier Judaism which would not commend themselves without +qualification to a modern thinker. In its essentials the Monotheism of +Isaiah is a reasonable belief; we accept it because it is reasonable, +not because Isaiah had an intuition that it was true; for we have +rejected many things which to Isaiah probably seemed no less +self-evidently true. And yet it would be a profound mistake to assume +that {139} the philosophers who now defend Isaiah's creed would ever +have arrived at it without Isaiah's aid. + +I hope that by this time you will have seen to some extent the spirit +in which I am approaching the special subject of to-day's lecture--the +question of Revelation. In some of the senses that have been given to +it, the idea of Revelation is one which hardly any one trained in the +school--that is to say, any school--of modern Philosophy is likely to +accept. The idea that pieces of information have been supernaturally +and without any employment of their own intellectual faculties +communicated at various times to particular persons, their truth being +guaranteed by miracles--in the sense of interruptions of the ordinary +course of nature by an extraordinary fiat of creative power--is one +which is already rejected by most modern theologians, even among those +who would generally be called rather conservative theologians. I will +not now argue the question whether any miraculous event, however well +attested, could possibly be sufficient evidence for the truth of +spiritual teaching given in attestation of it. I will merely remark +that to any one who has really appreciated the meaning of biblical +criticism, it is scarcely conceivable that the evidence for miracles +could seem sufficiently cogent to constitute such an attestation. In +proof of that I will merely appeal to the modest, apologetic, tentative +tone in which {140} scholarly and sober-minded theologians who would +usually be classed among the defenders of miracles--men like the Bishop +of Ely or Professor Sanday of Oxford--are content to speak of such +evidences. They admit the difficulty of proving that such miraculous +events really happened thousands of years ago on the strength of +narratives written at the very earliest fifty years after the alleged +event, and they invite us rather to believe in the miracles on the +evidence of a Revelation already accepted than to accept the revelation +on the evidence of the miracles. I shall have a word to say on this +question of miracles next time; but for the present I want to +establish, or rather without much argument to put before you for your +consideration, this position; that the idea of revelation cannot be +admitted in the sense of a communication of truth by God, claiming to +be accepted not on account of its own intrinsic reasonableness or of +the intellectual or spiritual insight of the person to whom it is made, +but on account of the historical evidence for miraculous occurrences +said to have taken place in connexion with such communication. The +most that can reasonably be contended for is that super-normal +occurrences of this kind may possess a certain corroborative value in +support of a Revelation claiming to be accepted on other grounds. + +What place then is left for the idea of Revelation? {141} I will ask +you to go back for a moment to the conclusions of our first lecture. +We saw that from the idealistic point of view all knowledge may be +looked upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the +thoughts or experiences of the divine Mind. There is a sense then in +which all truth is revealed truth. In a more important sense, and a +sense more nearly allied to that of ordinary usage, all moral and +spiritual truth may be regarded as revealed truth. And in particular +those immediate judgements about good and evil in which we have found +the sole means of knowing the divine character and purposes must be +looked on as divinely implanted knowledge--none the less divinely +implanted because it is, in the ordinary sense of the words, quite +natural, normal, and consistent with law. Nobody but an Atheist ought +to talk about the unassisted human intellect: no one who acquiesces in +the old doctrine that Conscience is the voice of God ought either on +the one hand to deny the existence of Revelation, or on the other to +speak of Revelation as if it were confined to the Bible. + +But because we ascribe some intrinsic power of judging about spiritual +and moral matters to the ordinary human intellect, it would be a +grievous mistake to assume that all men have an equal measure of this +power. Because we assert that all moral and spiritual truth comes to +men by {142} Revelation, it does not follow that there are not degrees +of Revelation. And it is one of the special characteristics of +religious and moral truth that it is in a peculiar degree dependent +upon the superior insight of those exceptional men to whom have been +accorded extraordinary degrees of moral and spiritual insight. Even in +Science, as we have seen, we cannot dispense with genius: very ordinary +men can satisfy themselves of the truth of a hypothesis when it is once +suggested, though they would have been quite incompetent to discover +that hypothesis for themselves. Still more unquestionably are there +moral and spiritual truths which, when once discovered, can be seen to +be true by men of very commonplace intellect and commonplace character. +The truths are seen and passed on to others, who accept them partly on +authority, by way of social inheritance and tradition; partly because +they are confirmed in various degrees by their own independent +judgement and experience. Here then--in the discovery of new spiritual +truth--we encounter that higher and exceptional degree of spiritual and +ethical insight which in a special and pre-eminent sense we ought to +regard as Revelation or Inspiration. Here there is room, in the +evolution of Religion and Morality, for the influence of the men of +moral or religious genius--the Prophets, the Apostles, the Founders and +Reformers of Religions: and, since {143} moral and spiritual insight +are very closely connected with character, for the moral hero, the +leader of men, the Saint. Especially to the new departures, the +turning-points, the epoch-making discoveries in ethical and religious +progress connected with the appearance of such men, we may apply the +term Revelation in a supreme or culminating sense. + +It is, as it seems to me, extremely important that we should not +altogether divorce the idea of Revelation from those kinds of moral and +religious truth which are arrived at by the ordinary working of the +human intellect. The ultimate moral judgements no doubt must be +intuitive or immediate, but in our deductions from them--in their +application both to practical life and to theories about God and the +Universe--there is room for much intellectual work of the kind which we +commonly associate rather with the philosopher than with the prophet. +But the philosopher may be also a prophet. The philosophically trained +Greek Fathers were surely right in recognizing that men like Socrates +and Plato were to be numbered among those to whom the Spirit of God had +spoken in an exceptional degree. They too spoke in the power of the +indwelling Logos. But still it is quite natural that we should +associate the idea of Revelation or Inspiration more particularly with +that kind of moral and intellectual discovery which comes to +exceptional men by way {144} of apparent intuition or immediate +insight. We associate the idea of inspiration rather with the poet +than with the man of Science, and with the prophet rather than with the +systematic philosopher. It is quite natural, therefore, that we should +associate the idea of Revelation more especially with religious +teachers of the intuitive order like the Jewish prophets than with even +those philosophers who have also been great practical teachers of +Ethics and Religion. But it is most important to recognize that there +is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the two classes. The +Jewish prophets did not arrive at their ideas about God without a great +deal of hard thinking, though the thinking is for the most part +unexplicit and the mode of expression poetic. 'Their idols are silver +and gold; even the work of men's hands. . . . They have hands and +handle not; feet have they and walk not: neither speak they through +their throat.' There is real hard reasoning underlying such noble +rhetoric, though the Psalmist could not perhaps have reduced his +argument against Polytheism and Idolatry to the form of a dialectical +argument like Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas. In the highest instance of +all--the case of our Lord Jesus Christ himself--a natural instinct of +reverence is apt to deter us from analysing how he came by the truth +that he communicated to men; but, though I would not deny that the +deepest {145} truth came to him chiefly by a supreme gift of intuition, +there are obvious indications of profound intellectual thought in his +teaching. Recall for a moment his arguments against the misuse of the +Sabbath, against the superstition of unclean meats, against the +Sadducean objection to the Resurrection. I want to avoid at present +dogmatic phraseology; so I will only submit in passing that this is +only what we should expect if the early Church was right in thinking of +Christ as the supreme expression in the moral and religious sphere of +the Logos or Reason of God. + +The thought of great religious thinkers is none the less Revelation +because it involves the use of their reasoning faculties. But I +guarded myself against being supposed, in contending for the +possibility of a philosophical or metaphysical knowledge of God, to +assume that religious truth had always come to men in this way, or even +that the greatest steps in religious progress have usually taken the +form of explicit reasoning. Once again, it is all-important to +distinguish between the way in which a belief comes to be entertained +and the reasons for its being true. All sorts of psychological causes +have contributed to generate religious beliefs. And when once we have +discovered grounds in our own reflection or experience for believing +them to be true, there is no reason why we should not regard all of +them as {146} pieces of divine revelation. Visions and dreams, for +instance, had a share in the development of religious ideas. We might +even admit the possibility that the human race would never have been +led to think of the immortality of the soul but for primitive ideas +about ghosts suggested by the phenomena of dreams. The truth of the +doctrine is neither proved nor disproved by such an account of its +origin; but, if that belief is true and dreams have played a part in +the process by which man has been led to it, no Theist surely can +refuse to recognize the divine guidance therein. And so, at a higher +level, we are told by the author of the Acts that St. Peter was led to +accept the great principle of Gentile Christianity by the vision of a +sheet let down from heaven. There is no reason why that account should +not be historically true. The psychologist may very easily account for +St. Peter's vision by the working in his mind of the liberal teaching +of Stephen, the effect of his fast, and so on. But that does not +prevent us recognizing that vision as an instrument of divine +Revelation. We at the present day do not believe in this fundamental +principle of Christianity because of that dream of St. Peter's; for we +know that dreams are not always truth or always edifying. We believe +in that principle on other grounds--the convincing grounds (among +others) which St. Luke puts into St. Peter's mouth {147} on the +following morning. But that need not prevent our recognizing that God +may have communicated that truth to the men of that generation--and +through them to us--partly by means of that dream. + +The two principles then for which I wish to contend are these: (1) that +Revelation is a matter of degree; (2) that no Revelation can be +accepted in the long run merely because it came to a particular person +in a peculiarly intuitive or immediate way. It may be that M. Auguste +Sabatier is right in seeing the most immediate contact of God with the +human soul in those intuitive convictions which can least easily be +accounted for by ordinary psychological causes; in those new departures +of religious insight, those unaccountable comings of new thoughts into +the mind, which constitute the great crises or turning-points of +religious history. But, though the coming of such thoughts may often +be accepted by the individual as direct evidences of a divine origin, +the Metaphysician, on looking back upon them, cannot treat the fact +that the psychologist cannot account for them, as a convincing proof of +such an origin, apart from our judgement upon the contents of what +claims to be a revelation. Untrue thoughts and wicked thoughts +sometimes arise equally unaccountably: the fact that they do so is even +now accounted for by some as a sufficient proof of direct diabolic +suggestion. When we have judged the {148} thought to be true or the +suggestion to be good, then we, who on other grounds believe in God, +may see in it a piece of divine revelation, but not till then. + +From this point of view it is clear that we are able to recognize +various degrees and various kinds of divine revelation in many +different Religions, philosophies, systems of ethical teaching. We are +able to recognize the importance to the world of the great historical +Religions, in all of which we can acknowledge a measure of Revelation. +The fact that the truths which they teach (in so far as they are true) +can now be recognized as true by philosophic thought, does not show +that the world would ever have evolved those thoughts, apart from the +influence of the great revealing personalities. Philosophy itself--the +Philosophy of the professed philosophers--has no doubt contributed a +very important element to the content of the historical Religions; but +it is only in proportion as they become part of a system of religious +teaching, and the possession of an organized religious community, that +the ideas of the philosophers really come home to multitudes of men, +and shape the history of the world. Nor in many cases would the +philosophers themselves have seen what they have seen but for the great +epoch-making thoughts of the great religion-making periods. And the +same considerations which show the importance of religious movements in +the {149} past tend also to emphasize the importance of the historical +Religion and of the religious community in which it is enshrined in +modern times. Because religious truth can now be defended by the use +of our ordinary intellectual faculties, and because all possess these +faculties in some degree, it is absurd to suppose that the ordinary +individual, if left to himself, would be likely to evolve a true +religious system for himself--any more than he would be likely to +discern for himself the truths that were first seen by Euclid or Newton +if he were not taught them. To under-estimate the importance of the +great historical Religions and their creators has been the besetting +sin of technical religious Philosophy. Metaphysicians have in truth +often written about Religion in great ignorance as to the real facts of +religious history. + +But because we recognize a measure of truth in all the historical +Religions, it does not follow that we can recognize an equal amount of +truth in all of them. The idea that all the Religions teach much the +same thing--or that, while they vary about that unimportant part of +Religion which is called doctrine or dogma, they are all agreed about +Morality--is an idea which could only occur to the self-complaisant +ignorance which of late years has done most of the theological writing +in the correspondence columns of our newspapers. The real student of +comparative {150} Religion knows that it is only at a rather advanced +stage in the development of Religion that Religion becomes in any +important degree an ethical teacher at all. Even the highest and most +ethical Religions are not agreed either in their Ethics or in their +Theology. Not only can we recognize higher and lower Religions; but +the highest Religions, among many things which they have in common, are +at certain points diametrically antagonistic to each other. It is +impossible therefore reasonably to maintain that fashionable attitude +of mind towards these Religions which my friend Professor Inge once +described as a sort of honorary membership of all Religions except +one's own. If we are to regard the historical Religions as being of +any importance to our own personal religious life, we must choose +between them. If we put aside the case of Judaism in its most +cultivated modern form, a form in which it has been largely influenced +by Christianity, I suppose there is practically only one Religion which +would be in the least likely to appeal to a modern philosophical +student of Religion as a possible alternative to Christianity--and that +is Buddhism. But Buddhist Ethics are not the same as Christian Ethics. +Buddhist Ethics are ascetic: the Christianity which Christ taught was +anti-ascetic. In its view of the future, Buddhism is pessimistic; +Christianity is optimistic. Much as {151} Buddhism has done to +inculcate Humanity and Charity, the principle of Buddhist Humanity is +not the same as that of Christianity. Humanity is encouraged by the +Buddhist (in so far as he is really influenced by his own formal creed) +not from a motive of disinterested affection, but as a means of +escaping from the evils of personal and individual existence, and so +winning Nirvana. We cannot at one and the same time adhere to the +Ethics of Buddhism and to those of Christianity, though I am far from +saying that Christians have nothing to learn either from Buddhist +teaching or from Buddhist practice. Still less can we at one and the +same time be Atheists with the Buddhist and Theists with the Christian; +look forward with the Buddhist to the extinction of personal +consciousness and with the Christian to a fuller and more satisfying +life. To take an interest in comparative Religion is not to be +religious; to be religious implies a certain exclusive attachment to +some definite form of religious belief, though it may of course often +be a belief to which many historical influences have contributed. + +I have been trying to lead you to a view of Revelation which recognizes +the existence and the importance of those exceptional religious minds +to whom is due the foundation and development of the great historical +Religions, while at the same time we refuse, in the last resort, to +recognize any {152} revelation as true except on the ground that its +truth can be independently verified. I do not mean to deny that the +individual must at first, and may quite reasonably in some cases +throughout life, accept much of his religious belief on authority; but +that is only because he may be justified in thinking that such and such +a person, or more probably such and such a religious community, is more +likely to be right than himself. Rational submission to authority in +this or that individual postulates independent judgement on the part of +others. I am far from saying that every individual is bound to satisfy +himself by personal enquiry as to the truth of every element in his own +Religion; but, if and so far as he determines to do so, he cannot +reasonably accept an alleged revelation on any other ground than that +it comes home to him, that the content of that Religion appeals to him +as true, as satisfying the demands of his intellect and of his +conscience. The question in which most of us, I imagine, are most +vitally interested is whether the Christian Religion is a Religion +which we can accept on these grounds. That it possesses some truth, +that whatever in it is true comes from God--that much is likely to be +admitted by all who believe in any kind of Religion in the sense in +which we have been discussing Religion. The great question for us is, +'Can we find any reason for the modern man {153} identifying himself in +any exclusive way with the historical Christian Religion? Granted that +there is some truth in all Religions, does Christianity contain the +most truth? Is it in any sense the one absolute, final, universal +Religion?' + +That will be the subject for our consideration in the next lecture. +But meanwhile I want to suggest to you one very broad provisional +answer to our problem. Christianity alone of the historical Religions +teaches those great truths to which we have been conducted by a mere +appeal to Reason and to Conscience. It teaches ethical Monotheism; +that is to say, it thinks of God as a thinking, feeling, willing +Consciousness, and understands His nature in the light of the highest +moral ideal. It teaches the belief in personal Immortality, and it +teaches a Morality which in its broad general principles still appeals +to the Conscience of Humanity. Universal Love it sets forth as at once +the central point in its moral ideal and the most important element in +its conception of God. In one of those metaphors which express so much +more than any more exact philosophical formula, it is the Religion +which teaches the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. And +these truths were taught by the historical Jesus. No one up to his +time had ever taught them with equal clearness and in equal purity, and +with the same freedom from other and inconsistent teachings: {154} and +this teaching was developed by his first followers. Amid all +aberrations and amid all contamination by heterogeneous elements, the +society or societies which look back to Christ as their Founder have +never in the worst times ceased altogether to teach these truths; and +now they more and more tend to constitute the essence of Christianity +as it is to-day--all the more so on account of the Church's gradual +shuffling off of so many adventitious ideas and practices which were at +one time associated with them. Christianity is and remains the only +one of the great historical Religions which has taught and does teach +these great truths in all their fullness.[2] These considerations +would by themselves be sufficient to put Christianity in an absolutely +unique position among the Religions of Mankind. + +I have so far been regarding our Lord Jesus Christ simply as a teacher +of religious and ethical truth. I think it is of fundamental +importance that we should _begin_ by regarding him in this light. +{155} It was in this light that he first presented himself to his +fellow-countrymen--even before (in all probability) he claimed to be +the fulfiller of the Messianic ideal which had been set before them by +the prophets of their race. And I could not, without a vast array of +quotation, give you a sufficient impression of the prominence of this +aspect of his work and personality among the earlier Greek Fathers. +Even after the elaborate doctrines of Catholic Christianity had begun +to be developed, it was still primarily as the supremely inspired +Teacher that Jesus was most often thought of. When the early +Christians thought of him as the incarnate Logos or Reason of God, to +teach men divine truth was still looked upon as the supreme function of +the Logos and the purpose of his indwelling in the historical Jesus. +But from the first Jesus appealed to men as much more than a teacher. +It is one of the distinctive peculiarities of religious and ethical +knowledge that it is intimately connected with character: religious and +moral teaching of the highest kind is in a peculiar degree inseparable +from the personality of the teacher. Jesus impressed his +contemporaries, and he has impressed successive ages as having not only +set before man the highest religious and moral ideal, but as having in +a unique manner realized that ideal in his own life. Even the word +'example' {156} does not fully express the impression which he made on +his followers, or do justice to the inseparability of his personality +from his teaching. In the religious consciousness of Christ men saw +realized the ideal relation of man not merely to his fellow-man but +also to his heavenly Father. From the first an enthusiastic reverence +for its Founder has been an essential part of the Christian Religion +amid all the variety of the phases which it has assumed. The doctrine +of the Christian Church was in its origin an attempt to express in the +philosophical language of the time its sense of this supreme value of +Christ for the religious and moral life of man. As to the historical +success and the present usefulness of these attempts, I shall have a +word to say next time. Meanwhile, I would leave with you this one +thought. The claim of Christianity to be the supreme, the universal, +in a sense the final Religion, must rest mainly, in the last resort, +upon the appeal which Christ and his Religion make to the moral and +religious consciousness of the present. + + +LITERATURE + +See the works mentioned at the end of the next Lecture, to which, as +dealing more specially with the subject of Lecture v., may be added +Professor Sanday's _Inspiration_, and Professor Wendt's _Revelation and +Christianity_. + + + +[1] Throughout his writings, but pre-eminently in the _Theoetetus_. + +[2] If it be said that Judaism or any other Religion does now teach +these truths as fully as Christianity, this may possibly apply to the +creed of individual members of these Religions, but it can hardly be +claimed for the historical Religions themselves. I should certainly be +prepared to contend that even such individuals lose something by not +placing in the centre of their Religion the personality of him by whom +they were first taught, and the communities which have been the great +transmitters of them. But in this course of lectures I am chiefly +concerned with giving reasons why Christians should remain Christians, +rather than with giving reasons why others who are not so should become +Christians. + + + + +{157} + +LECTURE VI + +CHRISTIANITY + +In my last lecture I tried to effect a transition from the idea of +religious truth as something believed by the individual, and accepted +by him on the evidence of his own Reason and Conscience to the idea of +a Religion considered as a body of religious truth handed down by +tradition in an organized society. The higher Religions--those which +have passed beyond the stage of merely tribal or national Religion--are +based upon the idea that religious truth of enduring value has been +from time to time revealed to particular persons, the Founders or +Apostles or Reformers of such religions. We recognized the validity of +this idea of Revelation, and the supreme importance to the moral and +religious life of such historical revelations, on one condition--that +the claim of any historical Religion to the allegiance of its followers +must be held to rest in the last resort upon the appeal which it makes +to their Reason and Conscience: though the individual may often be +{158} quite justified in accepting and relying upon the Reason and +Conscience of the religious Society rather than upon his own. + +The view which I have taken of Revelation makes it quite independent of +what are commonly called miracles. All that I have said is quite +consistent with the unqualified acceptance or with the unqualified +rejection of miracles. But some of you may perhaps expect me to +explain a little more fully my own attitude towards that question. And +therefore I will say this much--that, if we regard a miracle as +implying a suspension of a law of nature, I do not think we can call +such a suspension _a priori_ incredible; but the enormous experience +which we have of the actual regularity of the laws of nature, and of +the causes which in certain states of the human mind lead to the belief +in miracles, makes such an event in the highest degree improbable. To +me at least it would seem practically impossible to get sufficient +evidence for the occurrence of such an event in the distant past: all +our historical reasoning presupposes the reign of law. But it is being +more and more admitted by theologians who are regarded as quite +orthodox and rather conservative, that the idea of a miracle need not +necessarily imply such a suspension of natural law. And on the other +hand, decidedly critical and liberal theologians are more and more +disposed to admit {159} that many of the abnormal events commonly +called miraculous may very well have occurred without involving any +real suspension of natural law. Recent advances in psychological +knowledge have widened our conception of the possible influence of mind +over matter and of mind over mind. Whether an alleged miraculous event +is to be accepted or not must, as it seems to me, depend partly upon +the amount of critically sifted historical evidence which can be +produced for it, partly upon the nature of the event itself--upon the +question whether it is or is not of such a kind that we can with any +probability suppose that it might be accounted for either by known laws +or by laws at present imperfectly understood. + +To apply these principles in detail to the New Testament narratives +would involve critical discussions which are outside the purpose of +these lectures. I will only say that few critical scholars would deny +that some recorded miracles even in the New Testament are unhistorical. +When they find an incident like the healing of Malchus's ear omitted in +the earlier, and inserted in the later redaction of a common original, +they cannot but recognize the probability of traditional amplification. +At the same time few liberal theologians will be disposed to doubt the +general fact that our Lord did cure some diseases by spiritual +influence, or that an appearance of our Lord to the disciples--of +whatever nature--actually {160} did occur, and was the means of +assuring them of his continued life and power. At all events I do not +myself doubt these two facts. But at least when miracles are not +regarded as constituting real exceptions to natural law, it is obvious +that they will not prove the truth of any teaching which may have been +connected with them; while, even if we treat the Gospel miracles as +real exceptions to law, the difficulty of proving them in the face of +modern critical enquiry is so great that the evidence will hardly come +home to any one not previously convinced, on purely spiritual grounds, +of the exceptional character of our Lord's personality and mission. +This being so, I do not think that our answer to the problem of +miracles, whatever it be, can play any very important part in Christian +Apologetic. When we have become Christians on other grounds, the acts +of healing may still retain a certain value as illustrating the +character of the Master, and the Resurrection vision as proclaiming the +truth of Immortality in a way which will come home to minds not easily +accessible to abstract argument. The true foundation not merely for +belief in the teaching of Christ, but also for the Christian's +reverence for his Person, must, as it seems to me, be found in the +appeal which his words and his character still make to the Conscience +and Reason of mankind. This proposition would be {161} perhaps more +generally accepted if I were to say that the claim of Christ to +allegiance rests upon the way in which he satisfies the heart, the +aspirations, the religious needs of mankind. And I should be quite +willing to adopt such language, if you will only include respect for +historic fact and intellectual truth among these religious needs, and +admit that a reasonable faith must rest on something better than mere +emotion. Fully to exhibit the grounds of this claim of Christ upon us +would involve an examination of the Gospel narratives in detail: it +would involve an attempt to present to you what was this teaching, this +character, this religious consciousness which has commanded the homage +of mankind. To attempt such a task would be out of place in a brief +course of lectures devoted to a particular aspect of Religion--its +relation to Philosophy. Here I must assume that you feel the spiritual +supremacy of Christ--his unique position in the religious history of +the world and his unique importance for the spiritual life of each one +of us--; and go on to ask what assertions such a conviction warrants us +in making about his person and nature, what in short should be our +attitude towards the traditional doctrines of the Christian Church. + +You may know something of the position taken up in this matter by the +dominant school of what I may call believing liberal Theology in {162} +Germany--the school which takes its name from the great theologian +Ritschl, but which will be best known to most Englishmen in connexion +with the name of Prof. Harnack, though it may be well to remember that +Harnack is nearer to the left than to the right wing of that school. +The fundamental principle of that school is to base the claims of +Christianity mainly upon the appeal which the picture of the life, +teaching, character, and personality of Christ makes to the moral and +religious consciousness of mankind. Their teaching is Christo-centric +in the highest possible degree: but they are almost or entirely +indifferent to the dogmatic formulae which may be employed to express +this supreme religious importance of Christ. In putting the personal +and historical Christ, and not any doctrine about him, in the centre of +the religious life I believe they are right. But this principle is +sometimes asserted in an exaggerated and one-sided manner. In the +first place they are somewhat contemptuous of Philosophy, and of +philosophic argument even for such fundamental truths as the existence +of God. I do not see that the subjective impression made by Christ can +by itself prove the fact of God's existence. We must first believe +that there is a God to be revealed before we can be led to believe in +Christ as the supreme Revealer. I do not believe that the modern world +will permanently accept a view of the Universe {163} which does not +commend itself to its Reason. The Ritschlians talk about the truth of +Religion resting upon value-judgements. I can quite understand that a +value-judgement may tell us the supreme value of Christ's character and +his fitness to be treated as the representative of God to us, when once +we believe in God: but I cannot see how any value-judgement taken by +itself can assure us of that existence. Value is one thing: existence +is another. To my mind a Christian Apologetic should begin, like the +old Apologies of Justin or Aristides, with showing the essential +reasonableness of Christ's teaching about God and its essential harmony +with the highest philosophic teaching about duty, about the divine +nature, about the soul and its eternal destiny. The Ritschlian is too +much disposed to underrate the value of all previous religious and +ethical teaching, even of Judaism at its highest: he is not content +with making Christ the supreme Revealer: he wants to make him the only +Revealer. And when we turn to post-Christian religious history, he is +apt to treat all the great developments of religious and ethical +thought from the time of the Apostles to our own day as simply +worthless and even mischievous corruptions of the original, and only +genuine, Christianity. He tends to reduce Christianity to the +_ipsissima verba_ of its Founder. The Ritschlian dislikes Dogma, not +because it may be at times a {164} misdevelopment, but because it is a +development; not because some of it may be antiquated Philosophy, but +simply because it is Philosophy.[1] + +In order to treat fairly this question of doctrinal development, it +must be remembered that what is commonly called dogma is only a +part--perhaps not the most important part--of that development. +Supreme as I believe to be the value of Christ's great principle of +Brotherhood, it is impossible to deny that, if we look in detail at the +moral ideal of any educated Christian at the present day, we shall find +in it many elements which cannot explicitly be discovered in the +_ipsissima verba_ of Christ and still less of his Apostles. And +development in the ethical ideal always carries with it some +development in a man's conception of God and the Universe. Some of +these elements are due to a gradual bringing out into clear +consciousness, and an application to new details, of principles latent +in the actual words of Christ; others to an infusion of Greek +Philosophy; others to the practical experience and the scientific +discoveries of the modern world. Christianity in the course of +nineteen centuries has gradually absorbed into itself many ideas from +various sources, {165} christianizing them in the process. Many ideas, +much Hellenic Philosophy, many Hellenic ideals of life, many Roman +ideas of government and organization have thus, in the excellent phrase +of Professor Gardner, been 'baptized into Christ.' This capacity of +absorbing into itself elements of spiritual life which were originally +independent of it is not a defect of historical Christianity, but one +of its qualifications for being accepted by the modern world as a +universal, an absolute, a final Religion. + +It does not seem to me possible to recognize the claim of any +historical Religion to be final and ultimate, unless it include within +itself a principle of development. Let me, as briefly as I can, +illustrate what I mean. It is most clearly and easily seen in the case +of Morality. If the idea of a universal Religion is to mean that any +detailed code of Morals laid down at a definite moment of history can +serve by itself for the guidance of all human life in all after ages, +we may at once dismiss the notion as a dream. In nothing did our Lord +show his greatness and the fitness of his Religion for universality +more than in abstaining from drawing up such a code. He confined +himself to laying down a few great principles, with illustrations +applicable to the circumstances of his immediate hearers. Those +principles require development and application to the needs and {166} +circumstances of successive ages before they can suffice to guide us in +the details of conduct. To effect this development and application has +been historically the work of the Church which owes its origin to the +disciples whom he gathered around him. If we may accept the teaching +of the fourth Gospel as at least having germs in the actual utterances +of our Lord, he himself foresaw the necessity of such a development. +At all events the belief in the continued work of God's Spirit in human +Society is an essential principle of the Christian Religion as it was +taught by the first followers of its Founder. Take for instance the +case of slavery. Our Lord never condemned slavery: it is not certain +that he would have done so, had the case been presented to him. Very +likely his answer would have been 'Who made me a judge or a divider,' +or 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' No one on +reflection can now fail to see the essential incompatibility between +slavery and the Christian spirit; yet it was perhaps fourteen hundred +years before a single Christian thinker definitely enunciated that +incompatibility, and more than eighteen hundred years before slavery +was actually banished from all nominally Christian lands. Who can +doubt that many features of our existing social system are equally +incompatible with the principles of Christ's teaching, and that the +{167} accepted Christian morality of a hundred years hence will +definitely condemn many things which the average Christian Conscience +now allows? + +And then there is another kind of development in Ethics which is +equally necessary. The Christian law of Love bids us promote the true +good of our fellow-men, bids us regard another man's good as equally +valuable with our own or with the like good of any other. But what is +this good life which we are to promote? As to that our Lord has only +laid down a few very general principles--the supreme value of Love +itself, the superiority of the spiritual to the carnal, the importance +of sexual purity. These principles our consciences still acknowledge, +and there are no others of equal importance. But what of the +intellectual life? Has that no value? Our Lord never depreciated it, +as so many religious founders and reformers have done. But he has +given us no explicit guidance about it. When the Christian ideal +embraced within itself a recognition of the value and duty of Culture, +it was borrowing from Greece. And when we turn from Ethics to +Theology, the actual fact of development is no less indisputable. +Every alteration of the ethical ideal has brought with it some +alteration in our idea of God. We can no longer endure theories of the +Atonement which are opposed to modern ideas of Justice, though they +were quite compatible with {168} patristic or medieval ideas of +Justice. The advances of Science have altered our whole conception of +God's mode of acting upon or governing the world. None of these things +are religiously so important as the great principle of the Fatherhood +of God, nor have they in any way tended to modify its truth or its +supreme importance. But they do imply that our Theology is not and +cannot be in all points the same as that of the first Christians. + +Now with these presuppositions let us approach the question of that +great structure of formal dogma which the Church has built upon the +foundation of Christ's teaching. A development undoubtedly it is; but, +while we must not assume that every development which has historically +taken place is necessarily true or valuable, it is equally +unphilosophical to assume that, because it is a development, it is +necessarily false or worthless. Our Lord himself did, indeed, claim to +be the Messiah; the fact of Messiahship was what was primarily meant by +the title 'Son of God.' Even in the Synoptists he exhibits a +consciousness of a direct divine mission supremely important for his +own race; and, before the close, we can perhaps discover a growing +conviction that the truth which he was teaching was meant for a larger +world. Starting from and developing these ideas, his followers set +themselves to devise terms which should express their own sense of +their Master's unique {169} religious value and importance, to express +what they felt he had been to their own souls, what they felt he might +be to all who accepted his message. Even to St. Paul the term 'Son of +God' still meant primarily 'the Messiah': but in the light of his +conception of Jesus, the Messianic idea expanded till the Christ was +exalted to a position far above anything which Jewish prophecy or +Apocalypse had ever claimed for him. And the means of expressing these +new ideas were found naturally and inevitably in the current +philosophical terminology of the day. With the fourth Gospel, if not +already with St. Paul, there was infused into the teaching of the +Church a new element. From the Jewish-Alexandrian speculative Theology +the author borrowed the term Logos to express what he conceived to be +the cosmic importance of Christ's position. He accepted from that +speculation--probably from Philo--the theory which personified or +half-personified that Logos or Wisdom of God through which God was +represented in the Old Testament as creating the world and inspiring +the prophets. This Logos through whom God had throughout the ages been +more and more fully revealing Himself had at last become actually +incarnate in Jesus Christ. This Word of God is also described as truly +God, though in the fourth Gospel the relation of the Father to the +Word--at {170} least to the Word before the Incarnation--is left wholly +vague and undefined. + +From these comparatively simple beginnings sprang centuries of +controversy culminating in that elaborate system of dogma which is +often little understood even by its most vigorous champions. You know +in a very general way the result. The Logos was made more and more +distinct from God, endowed with a more and more decidedly personal +existence. Then, when the interests of Monotheism seemed to be +endangered, the attempt was made to save it by asserting the +subordination of the Son to the Father. The result was that by +Arianism the Son was reduced to the position of an inferior God. +Polytheism had once more to be averted by asserting in even stronger +terms not merely the equality of the Son with the Father but also the +Unity of the God who is both Father and Son. The doctrine of the +Divinity of the Holy Ghost went through a somewhat similar series of +stages. At first regarded as identical with the Word, a distinction +was gradually effected. The Word was said to have been incarnate in +Jesus; while it was through the Holy Ghost that the subsequent work of +God was carried on in human hearts. And by similar stages the equality +of the Holy Ghost to Father and to Son was gradually evolved; while it +was more and more strongly asserted that, in spite of the eternal +distinction of {171} Persons, it was one and the same God who revealed +Himself in all the activities attributed to each of them. + +Side by side with these controversies about the relation between the +Father and the Word, there was a gradual development of doctrine as to +the relation between the Logos and the human Jesus in whom he took up +his abode. Frequently the idea of any real humanity in Jesus was all +but lost. That was at last saved by the Catholic formula 'perfect God +and perfect man'; though it cannot be denied that popular thought in +all ages has never quite discarded the tendency to think of Jesus as +simply God in human form, and not really man at all. Even now there +are probably hundreds of people who regard themselves as particularly +orthodox Churchmen who yet do not know that the Church teaches that our +Lord had a human soul and a human will. + +What are we to make of all that vast structure, of the elaboration and +complication of which the Constantinopolitan Creed which we miscall +Nicene and even the so-called Athanasian Creed give very little idea to +those who do not also know something of the Councils, the Fathers, and +the Schoolmen? Has it all a modern meaning? Can it be translated into +terms of our modern thought and speech? For I suppose it hardly needs +demonstration--that such {172} translation is necessary, if it be +possible. I doubt whether any man in this audience who has not made a +special study of the subject, will get up and say that the meaning of +such terms as 'substance,' 'essence,' 'nature,' 'hypostasis,' 'person,' +'eternal generation,' 'procession,' 'hypostatic union,' and the like is +at once evident to him by the light of nature and an ordinary modern +education. And those who know most about the matter will most fully +realize the difficulty of saying exactly what was meant by such phrases +at this or that particular moment or by this or that particular +thinker. A thorough discussion of this subject from the point of view +of one who acknowledges the supreme claims of Christ upon the modern +mind, and is yet willing fairly to examine the traditional Creed in the +light of modern philosophical culture, is a task which very much needs +to be undertaken. I doubt if it has been satisfactorily performed yet. +Even if I possessed a tithe of the learning necessary for that task, I +could obviously not undertake it now. But a few remarks on the subject +may be of use for the guidance of our personal religious life in this +matter: + +(1) I should like once more to emphasize the fact that the really +important thing, from the point of view of the spiritual life of the +individual soul, is our personal attitude towards our Lord himself and +his teaching, and not the phrases in which we express {173} it. A man +who believes what Christ taught about God's Fatherhood, about human +brotherhood and human duty, about sin, the need for repentance, the +Father's readiness to forgive, the value of Prayer, the certainty of +Immortality--the man who finds the ideal of his life in the character +of Jesus, and strives by the help which he has supplied to think of God +and feel towards God as he did, to imitate him in his life, to live +(like him) in communion with the Father and in the hope of +Immortality--he is a Christian, and a Christian in the fullest sense of +the word. He will find in that faith all that is necessary (to use the +old phrase) for salvation--for personal goodness and personal Religion. +And such a man will be saved, and saved through Christ; even though he +has never heard of the Creeds, or deliberately rejects many of the +formulae which the Church or the Churches have 'built upon' that one +foundation. + +(2) At the same time, if we believe in the supreme importance of Christ +for the world, for the religious life of the Church and of the +individual, it is surely convenient to have some language in which to +express our sense of that importance. The actual personal attitude +towards Christ is the essential thing: but as a means towards that +attitude it is of importance to express what Christ has actually been +to others, and what he ought to be to ourselves. Children {174} and +adults alike require to have the claims of Christ presented to them +before they can verify them by their own experience: and this requires +articulate language of some kind. Religion can only be handed down, +diffused, propagated by an organized society: and a religious society +must have some means of handing on its religious ideas. It is possible +to hold that under other conditions a different set of terms might have +expressed the truth as well as those which have actually been enshrined +in the New Testament, the Liturgies, and the Creeds. But the phrases +which have been actually adopted surely have a strong presumption in +their favour, even if it were merely through the difficulty of changing +them, and the importance of unity, continuity, corporate life. It is +easier to explain, or even if need be, alter in some measure the +meaning of an accepted formula than to introduce a new one. Religious +development has at all times taken place largely in this way. Our Lord +himself entirely transformed the meaning of God's Fatherhood, +Messiahship, the Kingdom of God, the people of God, the true Israel. +At all events we should endeavour to discover the maximum of truth that +any traditional formula can be made to yield before we discard it in +favour of a new one. If we want to worship and to work with Christ's +Church, we must do our best to give the maximum of meaning {175} to the +language in which it expresses its faith and its devotion. + +(3) We must insist strongly upon the thoroughly human character of +Christ's own consciousness. Jesus did not--so I believe the critical +study of the Gospels leads us to think--himself claim to be God, or to +be Son of God in any sense but that of Messiahship. He claimed to +speak with authority: he claimed a divine mission: he claimed to be a +Revealer of divine truth. The fourth Gospel has been of infinite +service to spiritual Christianity. It has given the world a due sense +of the spiritual importance of Christ as the Way, the Truth, and the +Life. Perhaps Christianity could hardly have expanded into a universal +Religion without that Gospel. But we cannot regard all that the +Johannine Christ says about himself as the _ipsissima verba_ of Jesus. +The picture is idealized in accordance with the writer's own +conceptions, though after all its Theology is very much simpler than +the later Theology which has grown out of it permits most people to +see. We must not let these discourses blind us to the human character +of Christ's consciousness. And this real humanity must carry with it +the recognition of the thoroughly human limitations of his knowledge. +The Bishop of Birmingham has prepared the way for the union of a really +historical view of Christ's life with a reasonable interpretation of +the Catholic {176} doctrine about him, by reviving the ancient view as +to the limitation of his intellectual knowledge;[2] but the principle +must be carried in some ways further than the Bishop himself would be +prepared to go. The accepted Christology must be distinctly recognized +as the Church's reflection and comment upon Christ's work and its +value, not as the actual teaching of the Master about himself. + +(4) It must likewise be recognized that the language in which the +Church expressed this attitude towards Christ was borrowed from Greek +Metaphysics, particularly from Plato and Neo-Platonism in the patristic +period, and from Aristotle in the Middle Ages. And we cannot +completely separate language from thought. It was not merely Greek +technical phrases but Greek ways of thinking which were imported into +Catholic Christianity. And the language, the categories, the ideas of +Greek Philosophy were to some extent different from those of modern +times. The most Platonically-minded thinker of modern times does not +really think exactly as Plato thought: the most Catholic-minded thinker +of modern times, if he has also breathed the atmosphere of modern +Science and modern Culture, cannot really think exactly as Athanasius +or Basil thought. I {177} do not suppose that any modern mind can +think itself back into exactly the state of mind which an ancient +Father was in, when he used the term Logos. This central idea of the +Logos is not a category of modern thought. We cannot really think of a +Being who is as distinct from the Father as he is represented as being +in some of the patristic utterances--I say advisedly some, for widely +different modes of thought are found in Fathers of equal authority--and +yet so far one with him that we can say 'One God, one spiritual Being, +and not two.' Nor are we under any obligation to accept these formulae +as representing profound mysteries which we cannot understand: they +were simply pieces of metaphysical thinking, some of them valuable and +successful pieces of thinking, others less so. We must use them as +helps, not as fetters to our thought. But, though we cannot think +ourselves back into exactly the same intellectual condition as a +fourth- or fifth-century Father, there is no reason why we should not +recognize the fundamental truth of the religious idea which he was +trying to express. A modern Philosopher would probably express that +thought somewhat in this manner. 'The whole world is a revelation of +God in a sense, and still more so is the human mind: all through the +ages God has gone on revealing Himself more and more in human +consciousness, especially through the prophets and other {178} +exceptionally inspired men. The fullest and completest revelation of +Himself was made once for all in the person and teaching of Jesus, in +whom we recognize a revelation of God adequate to all our spiritual +needs, when developed and interpreted by the continued presence of +God's Spirit in the world and particularly in the Church which grew out +of the little company of Jesus' friends.' + +(5) I do not think at the present day even quite orthodox people are +much concerned about the technicalities of the conciliar Theology, or +even about the niceties of the Athanasian Creed. They are even a +little suspicious sometimes that much talk about the doctrine of the +Logos is only intended to evade a plain answer to the supreme question +of the Divinity of Christ. You will expect me perhaps to say something +about that question. I would first observe that the popular term +'divinity of Christ' is apt to give a somewhat misleading impression of +what the orthodox teaching on the subject really is. For one thing, it +is apt to suggest the idea of a pre-existent human consciousness of +Jesus, which would be contrary to Catholic teaching. The Logos--the +eternal Son or Reason of God--pre-existed; but not the man Jesus Christ +who was born at a particular moment of history, and who is still, +according to Catholic Theology, a distinct human soul perfectly and for +ever united with the Word. {179} And then again, it is apt to suggest +the heretical idea that the whole Trinity was incarnate in Christ, and +not merely the Word. Orthodox Theology does not teach that God the +Father became incarnate in Christ, and suffered upon the Cross. And +lastly, the constant iteration of the phrase 'Divinity of Christ' tends +to the concealment of the other half of the Catholic doctrine--the real +humanity of Christ. To speak of the God-manhood of Christ or the +indwelling of God in Christ would be a truer representation even of the +strictest orthodox doctrine, apart from all modern re-interpretations. +But even so, when all this is borne in mind, it may be asked, What is +the real meaning of saying that a man was also God? I would answer, +'Whether it is possible to give a modern, intelligible, philosophically +defensible meaning to the idea of Christ's Divinity depends entirely +upon the question what we conceive to be the true relation between +Humanity in general and God.' If (as I have attempted to show) we are +justified in thinking of all human consciousness as constituting a +partial reproduction of the divine Mind; if we are justified in +thinking of human Reason, and particularly of the human Conscience, as +constituting in some measure and in some sense a revelation by means of +which we can rise to a contemplation of the divine nature; if +Personality (as we know it in man) is the highest category within our +knowledge; then {180} there is a real meaning in talking of one +particular man being also divine; of the divine Reason or Logos as +dwelling after a unique, exceptional, pre-eminent manner in him. + +As Dr. Edward Caird has remarked, all the metaphysical questions which +were formerly discussed as to the relation between the divine and the +human nature in Christ, are now being discussed again in reference to +the relation of Humanity in general to God. We cannot say intelligibly +that God dwells in Christ, unless we have already recognized that in a +sense God dwells and reveals Himself in Humanity at large, and in each +particular human soul. But I fully recognize that, if this is all that +is meant by the expression 'divinity of Christ,' that doctrine would be +evacuated of nearly all that makes it precious to the hearts of +Christian people. And therefore it is all-important that we should go +on to insist that men do not reveal God equally. The more developed +intellect reveals God more completely than that of the child or the +savage: and (far more important from a religious point of view), the +higher and more developed moral consciousness reveals Him more than the +lower, and above all the actually better man reveals God more than the +worse man. Now, if in the life, teaching, and character of Christ--in +his moral and religious consciousness, and in the life and character +which {181} so completely expressed and illustrated that +consciousness--we can discover the highest revelation of the divine +nature, we can surely attach a real meaning to the language of the +Creeds which singles him out from all the men that ever lived as the +one in whom the ideal relation of man to God is most completely +realized. If God can only be known as revealed in Humanity, and Christ +is the highest representative of Humanity, we can very significantly +say 'Christ is _the_ Son of God, very God of very God, of one substance +with the Father,' though the phrase undoubtedly belongs to a +philosophical dialect which we do not habitually use. + +(6) Behind the doctrine of the Incarnation looms the still more +technical doctrine of the Trinity. Yet after all, it is chiefly, I +believe, as a sort of necessary background or presupposition to the +idea of Christ's divine nature that modern religious people, not +professionally interested in Theology, attach importance to that +doctrine. They accept the doctrine in so far as it is implied by the +teaching of Scripture and by the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity, but +they are not much attached to the technicalities of the Athanasian +Creed. The great objection to that Creed, apart from the damnatory +clauses, is the certainty that it will be misunderstood by most of +those who think they understand it at all. The {182} best thing we +could do with the Athanasian Creed is to drop it altogether: the next +best thing to it is to explain it, or at least so much of it as really +interests the ordinary layman--the doctrine of three Persons in one +God. And therefore it is important to insist in the strongest possible +way that the word 'Person' which has most unfortunately come to be the +technical term for what the Greeks more obscurely called the three +_huostaseis_ in the Godhead does not, and never did, mean what we +commonly understand by Personality--whether in the language of ordinary +life or of modern Philosophy. I do not deny that at certain periods +Theology did tend to think of the Logos as a distinct being from the +Father, a distinct consciousness with thoughts, will, desires, emotions +not identical with those of God the Father. The distinction was at +times pushed to a point which meant either sheer Tritheism, or +something which is incapable of being distinctly realized in thought at +all. But that is scarcely true of the Theology which was finally +accepted either by East or West. This is most distinctly seen in the +Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas: and I would remind you that you +cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas--the source not only of the +Theology professed by the Pope and taught in every Roman Seminary but +of the Theology embodied in our own Articles. St. Thomas' explanation +of the Trinity {183} is that God is at one and the same time Power or +Cause[3] (Father), Wisdom (Son), Will (Holy Ghost); or, since the Will +of God is always a loving Will, Love (Amor) is sometimes substituted +for Will (Voluntas) in explanation of the Holy Spirit.[4] How little +{184} St. Thomas thought of the 'Persons' as separate consciousnesses, +is best seen from his doctrine (taken from Augustine) that the love of +the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit. The love of one Being for +himself or for another is not a Person in the natural, normal, modern +sense of the word: and it would be quite unorthodox to attribute +Personality to the Son in any other sense than that in which it is +attributed to the Holy Ghost. I do not myself attach any great +importance to these technical phrases. I do not {185} deny that the +supremely important truth that God has received His fullest revelation +in the historical Christ, and that He goes on revealing Himself in the +hearts of men, might have been otherwise, more simply, to modern minds +more intelligibly, expressed. There are detailed features of the +patristic or the scholastic version of the doctrine which involve +conceptions to which the most accomplished Professors of Theology would +find it difficult or impossible to give a modern meaning. I do not +know for instance that much would have been lost had Theology (with the +all but canonical writers Clement of Rome and Hermas, with Ignatius, +with Justin, with the philosophic Clement of Alexandria) continued to +speak indifferently of the Word and the Spirit. Yet taken by itself +this Thomist doctrine of the Trinity is one to which it is quite +possible to give a perfectly rational meaning, and a meaning probably +very much nearer to that which was really intended by its author than +the meaning which is usually put upon the Trinitarian formula by +popular religious thought. That God is Power, and Wisdom, and Love is +simply the essence of Christian Theism--not the less true because few +Unitarians would repudiate it. + +(7) Once more let me briefly remind you that any claim for finality in +the Christian Religion must be based on its power of perpetual +development. {186} Belief in the continued work of the Holy Spirit in +the Church is an essential element of the Catholic Faith. We need not, +with the Ritschlian, contemptuously condemn the whole structure of +Christian doctrine because undoubtedly it is a development of what was +taught by Christ himself. Only, if we are to justify the development +of the past, we must go on to assert the same right and duty of +development in Ethics and in Theology for the Church of the future. In +the pregnant phrase of Loisy, the development which the Church is most +in need of at the present moment is precisely a development in the idea +of development itself. + +But how can we tell (it may be asked), if we once admit that the +development of Religion does not end with the teaching of Christ, where +the development will stop? If we are to admit an indefinite +possibility of growth and change, how do we know that Christianity +itself will not one day be outgrown? If we once admit that the final +appeal is to the religious consciousness of the present, we must +acknowledge that it is not possible to demonstrate _a priori_ that the +Christian Religion is the final, universal, or absolute Religion. All +we can say is that we have no difficulty in recognizing that the +development which has so far taken place, in so far as it is a +development which we can approve and accept, seems to us a development +which leaves the {187} Religion still essentially the Religion of +Christ. In the whole structure of the modern Christian's religious +belief, that which was contributed by Christ himself is incomparably +the most important part--the basis of the whole structure. The +essentials of Religion and Morality still seem to us to be contained in +his teaching as they are contained nowhere else. All the rest that is +included in an enlightened modern Christian's religious creed is either +a direct working out of the principles already contained there, or (if +it has come from other sources) it has been transformed in the process +of adaptation. Nothing has been discovered in Religion and Morality +which tends in any way to diminish the unique reverence which we feel +for the person of Christ, the perfect sufficiency of his character to +represent and incarnate for us the character of God. It is a +completely gratuitous assumption to suppose that it will ever lose that +sufficiency. Even in the development of Science, there comes a time +when its fundamentals are virtually beyond the reach of +reconsideration. Still more in practical life, mere unmotived, +gratuitous possibilities may be disregarded. It weakens the hold of +fundamental convictions upon the mind to be perpetually contemplating +the possibility or probability of fundamental revision. We ought no +doubt to keep the spiritual ear ever open that we may always be hearing +what the Spirit saith unto {188} the Churches. But to look forward to +a time when any better way will be discovered of thinking of God than +Jesus' way of thinking of Him as a loving Father is as gratuitous as to +contemplate the probability of something in human life at present +unknown being discovered of greater value than Love. Until that +discovery is made, our Religion will still remain the Religion of him +who, by what he said and by what he was, taught the world to think of +God as the supreme Love and the supreme Holiness, the source of all +other love and all other holiness. + + +LITERATURE + +The literature is here too vast to mention even the works of the very +first importance: I can only select a very few books which have been +useful to myself. The late Sir John Seeley's _Ecce Homo_ may be +regarded as in the light of modern research a somewhat uncritical book, +but it remains to my mind the most striking expression of the appeal +which Christ makes to the Conscience of the modern world. It has +proved a veritable fifth Gospel to many seekers after light. Bishop +Moorhouse's little book, _The Teaching of Christ_, will serve as an +introduction to the study of Christ's life and work. A more elaborate +treatment of the subject, with which I am very much in sympathy, is +Wendt's _Teaching of Jesus_. The ideal life of Christ perhaps remains +to be written. Professor Sanday's Article on 'Jesus Christ' in +Hastings' _Dictionary of the Bible_ may be mentioned as a good +representative of moderate and scholarly Conservatism or Liberal +Conservatism. Professor Oscar Holtzmann's _Life of Jesus_ is based on +more radical, perhaps over-radical, criticism. Professor Harnack's +{189} _What is Christianity?_ has become the typical expression of the +Ritschlian attitude. The ideas of extreme Roman Catholic 'Modernism' +may be gathered from Loisy's _l'Evangile et l'Eglise_ and _Autour d'un +Petit Livre_. Professor Gardner's three books--_Exploratio +Evangelica_, the shorter _An Historic View of the New Testament_, and +_The Growth of Christianity_--may be especially commended to those who +wish to satisfy themselves that a thorough-going recognition of the +results of historical Criticism is compatible with a whole-hearted +personal acceptance of Christianity. Dr. Fairbairn's _Philosophy of +the Christian Religion_ and Bousset's _What is Religion?_ are +especially valuable as vindications of the supreme position of +Christianity combined with the fullest recognition of the measure of +Revelation contained in all the great historical Religions. Allen's +_Continuity of Christian Thought_ suggests what seems to me the right +attitude of the modern thinker towards traditional dogma, though the +author's position is more decidedly 'Hegelian' than mine. I may also +mention Professor Inge's contribution to _Contentio Veritatis_ on 'The +Personal Christ,' and some of the Essays in _Lux Hominum_. Though I +cannot always agree with him, I recognize the high value of the Bishop +of Birmingham's Bampton Lectures on _The Divinity of Jesus Christ the +Son of God_ and the accompanying volume of _Dissertations_. + + + +[1] In their assertion of the necessity of Development, and of the +religious community as the origin of Development, the teaching of the +Abbe Loisy and the Roman Catholic Modernists seems to me to be +complementary to that of the Kitschlians, though I do not always accept +their rather destructive critical conclusions. + +[2] In his Essay in _Lux Mundi_ (1889). He has since developed his +view in his Bampton Lectures on _The Incarnation of the Son of God_ and +a volume of _Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation_. + +[3] I venture thus to translate 'Principium' (_arche_); in Abelard and +his disciple Peter the Lombard, the famous Master of the Sentences, the +word is 'Potentia' (L. I. Dist. xxxiv.): and St. Thomas himself (P. I. +Q. xli. Art. 4) explains 'Principium' by 'Potentia generandi Filium.' + +[4] Thus in _Summa Theologica_, Pars I. Q. xxxvii. Art. 1, the +'conclusio' is 'Amor, personaliter acceptus, proprium nomen est +Spiritus sancti,' which is explained to mean that there are in the +Godhead 'duse processiones: Una per modum intellectus, quae est +processio Verbi; alia per modum voluntatis, quae est processio amoris.' +So again (_ibid._ Q. xlv. Art. 7): 'In creaturis igitur rationalibus, +in quibus est intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio +Trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis Verbum +conceptum, et amor procedens.' In a friendly review of my Essay in +_Contentio Veritatis_, in which I endeavoured to expound in a modern +form this doctrine, Dr. Sanday (_Journal of Theological Studies_, vol. +iv., 1903) wrote: 'One of the passages that seem to me most open to +criticism is that on the doctrine of the Trinity (p. 48). "Power, +Wisdom, and Will" surely cannot be a sound trichotomy as applied either +to human nature or Divine. Surely Power is an expression of Will and +not co-ordinate with it. The common division, Power (or Will), Wisdom, +and Love is more to the point. Yet Dr. Rashdall identifies the two +triads by what I must needs think a looseness of reasoning.' The +Margaret Professor of Divinity hardly seems to recognize that he is +criticizing the Angelical Doctor and not myself. If Dr. Sanday had had +the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, the result, if less +metaphysically subtle, might no doubt have proved more easily +intelligible to the modern mind; but the 'identification' of which he +complains happens to be part of the traditional doctrine, and I was +endeavouring merely to make the best of it for modern Christians. I +add St. Thomas' justification of it, which is substantially what I gave +in _Contentio Veritatis_ and have repeated above: 'Cum processiones +divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse est accipere, secundum +bonitatem, et hujusmodi alia attributa, non accipiuntur aliae +processiones, nisi Verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam, +veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat' (Q. xxvii. Art. 5). The +source of the doctrine is to be found in St. Augustine, who habitually +speaks of the Holy Spirit as Amor; but, when he refers to the 'Imago +Trinitatia' in man the Spirit is represented sometimes by 'Amor,' +sometimes by 'Voluntas' (_de Trin._, L. xiv. cap 7). The other two +members of the human triad are with him 'Memoria' (or 'Mens') and +'Intelligentia.' + +With regard to the difficulty of distinguishing Power from Will, I was +perhaps to blame for not giving St. Thomas' own word 'Principium.' The +word 'Principium' means the _pege theoteos_, the ultimate Cause or +Source of Being: by 'Voluntas' St. Thomas means that actual putting +forth of Power (in knowing and in loving the Word or Thought eternally +begotten by God the Father) which is the Holy Ghost. I am far from +saying that the details of St. Thomas' doctrine are not open to much +criticism: a rough correspondence between his teaching and any view of +God's Nature which can commend itself to a modern Philosopher is all +that I endeavoured to point out. The modern thinker would no doubt +with Dr. Sanday prefer the triad 'Power, Wisdom, Love,' or (I would +suggest) 'Feeling, including Love as the highest form of Feeling.' The +reason why St. Thomas will not accept such an interpretation is that +his Aristotelianism (here not very consonant with the Jewish and +Christian view of God) excludes all feeling or emotion from the divine +nature; 'Love' has therefore to be identified with 'Will' and not with +'Feeling.' I cannot but think that the Professor might have taken a +little more trouble to understand both St. Thomas and myself before +accusing either of us of 'looseness of reasoning.' + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*** + + +******* This file should be named 21995.txt or 21995.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/1/9/9/21995 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://www.gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/pglaf. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://www.gutenberg.org/about/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: +http://www.gutenberg.org/fundraising/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/21995.zip b/21995.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e699028 --- /dev/null +++ b/21995.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4b3fa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #21995 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21995) |