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diff --git a/21877-h/21877-h.htm b/21877-h/21877-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4563348 --- /dev/null +++ b/21877-h/21877-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,9245 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Woodrow Wilson and the World War, by Charles Seymour. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + a { text-decoration: none; } + + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + font-size: 110%; + } + + ul { line-height: 1.5em; + } + + ul li { list-style-type: none; + } + + .blockquot{margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 10%;} + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + .figleft {float: left; clear: left; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: + 1em; margin-right: 1em; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .figright {float: right; clear: right; margin-left: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; + margin-top: 1em; margin-right: 0; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .poem br {display: none;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem span.i0 {display: block; margin-left: 0em; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's Woodrow Wilson and the World War, by Charles Seymour + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Woodrow Wilson and the World War + A Chronicle of Our Own Times. + +Author: Charles Seymour + +Release Date: June 20, 2007 [EBook #21877] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Anne Storer, Suzanne Shell and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<div class="figcenter"><strong>TEXTBOOK EDITION</strong></div> +<h2>. .<br /> + .</h2> +<h1>THE YALE CHRONICLES<br /> +OF AMERICA SERIES</h1> +<h2>ALLEN JOHNSON<br /> +EDITOR</h2> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<div class="figcenter"><strong>GERHARD R. LOMER<br /> +CHARLES W. JEFFERYS<br /> +ASSISTANT EDITORS</strong></div> + +<hr style='width: 100%;' /> + +<h1>WOODROW WILSON<br /> +AND THE WORLD WAR</h1> + +<h2>A CHRONICLE OF OUR OWN TIMES<br /> +BY CHARLES SEYMOUR<br /> +1921</h2> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 311px;"> +<img src="images/001.png" width="311" height="500" alt="" title="" /> +</div> + +<div class="figcenter"><strong>TORONTO: GLASGOW, BROOK & CO.<br /> +NEW YORK: UNITED STATES PUBLISHERS<br /> +ASSOCIATION, INC.</strong></div> + +<hr style='width: 100%;' /> + +<div class="figcenter"><strong><em>Copyright, 1921, by Yale University Press</em></strong></div> +<p> </p> +<div class="figcenter">Printed in the United States of America</div> + +<hr style='width: 100%;' /> + +<div class='center'><big>CONTENTS</big></div> +<p> </p> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="10" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents"> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>I.</td><td align='left'><a href="#WOODROW_WILSON_AND_THE_WORLD_WAR">WILSON THE EXECUTIVE</a></td><td align='left'>Page</td><td align='right'>1</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>II.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_II">NEUTRALITY</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>27</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>III.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_III">THE SUBMARINE</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>47</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>IV.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">PLOTS AND PREPAREDNESS</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>71</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>V.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_V">AMERICA DECIDES</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>94</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>VI.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">THE NATION IN ARMS</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>116</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>VII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">THE HOME FRONT</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>150</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>VIII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">THE FIGHTING FRONT</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>192</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>IX.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">THE PATH TO PEACE</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>228</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>X.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_X">WAYS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>254</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>XI.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">BALANCE OF POWER OR LEAGUE OF NATIONS?</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>281</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>XII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">THE SETTLEMENT</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>310</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>XIII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">THE SENATE AND THE TREATY</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>330</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'>XIV.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">CONCLUSION</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>352</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'></td><td align='left'><a href="#BIBLIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE">BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>361</td></tr> +<tr><td align='right'></td><td align='right'></td><td align='left'><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td><td align='center'>"</td><td align='right'>367</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> + + +<h2><a name="WOODROW_WILSON_AND_THE_WORLD_WAR" id="WOODROW_WILSON_AND_THE_WORLD_WAR"></a>WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD WAR</h2> +<h2>. .<br /> + .</h2> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>WILSON THE EXECUTIVE</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a>When, on March 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson entered the White House, the first +Democratic president elected in twenty years, no one could have guessed +the importance of the rôle which he was destined to play. While business +men and industrial leaders bewailed the mischance that had brought into +power a man whose attitude towards vested interests was reputed none too +friendly, they looked upon him as a temporary inconvenience. Nor did the +increasingly large body of independent voters, disgusted by the +"stand-pattism" of the Republican machine, regard Wilson much more +seriously; rather did they place their confidence in a reinvigoration of +the Grand Old Party through the <a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a>progressive leadership of Roosevelt, +whose enthusiasm and practical vision had attracted the approval of more +than four million voters in the preceding election, despite his lack of +an adequate political organization. Even those who supported Wilson most +whole-heartedly believed that his work would lie entirely within the +field of domestic reform; little did they imagine that he would play a +part in world affairs larger than had fallen to any citizen of the United +States since the birth of the country.</p> + +<p>The new President was fifty-six years old. His background was primarily +academic, a fact which, together with his Scotch-Irish ancestry, the +Presbyterian tradition of his family, and his early years spent in the +South, explains much in his character at the time when he entered upon +the general political stage. After graduating from Princeton in 1879, +where his career gave little indication of extraordinary promise, he +studied law, and for a time his shingle hung out in Atlanta. He seemed +unfitted by nature, however, for either pleasure or success in the +practice of the law. Reserved and cold, except with his intimates, he was +incapable of attracting clients in a profession and locality where +ability to "mix" was a prime qualification. A certain lack of tolerance +for the failings of his fellow <a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>mortals may have combined with his +Presbyterian conscience to disgust him with the hard give-and-take of the +struggling lawyer's life. He sought escape in graduate work in history +and politics at Johns Hopkins, where, in 1886, he received his Ph.D. for +a thesis entitled <em>Congressional Government</em>, a study remarkable for +clear thinking and felicitous expression. These qualities characterized +his work as a professor at Bryn Mawr and Wesleyan and paved his path to +an appointment on the Princeton faculty in 1890, as Professor of +Jurisprudence and Politics.</p> + +<p>Despite his early distaste to the career of practicing lawyer, Wilson was +by no means the man to bury himself in academic research. He lacked the +scrupulous patience and the willingness to submerge his own personality +which are characteristic of the scientific scholar. His gift was for +generalization, and his writings were marked by clarity of thought and +wealth of phrase, rather than by profundity. But such qualities brought +him remarkable success as a lecturer and essayist, and constant practice +gave him a fluency, a vocal control, and a power of verbal expression +which assured distinction at the frequent public meetings and dinners +where he was called upon to speak. Professional <a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a>interest in the science +of government furnished him with topics of far wider import than the +ordinary pedagogue cares to handle, and he became, even as professor, +well known outside of Princeton. His influence, already broad in the +educational and not without some recognition in the political world, was +extended in 1902, when he was chosen President of the University.</p> + +<p>During the succeeding eight years Wilson enjoyed his first taste of +executive power, and certain traits which he then displayed deserve brief +notice. Although a "conservative" in his advocacy of the maintenance of +the old-time curriculum, based upon the ancient languages and mathematics, +and in his opposition to the free elective system, he proved an inflexible +reformer as regards methods of instruction, the efficiency of which he was +determined to establish. He showed a ruthless resolution to eliminate what +he looked upon as undemocratic social habits among the undergraduates, and +did not hesitate to cut loose from tradition, regardless of the prejudice +thereby aroused against him. As an executive he evoked intense admiration +and virulent dislike; the Board of Trustees and the alumni body were alike +divided between enthusiastic support and bitter anathematization of the +<a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a>measures he proposed. What seems obvious is that many graduates +sympathized with his purposes but were alienated by his methods. His +strength lay chiefly in the force of his appeal to democratic sentiment; +his weakness in complete inability to conciliate opponents.</p> + +<p>At the moment when the issue of the struggle at Princeton was still +undecided, opportunity was given Wilson to enter political life; an +ambition for such a career had evidently stirred him in early days and +was doubtless resuscitated by his success as a public speaker. While +President of Princeton he had frequently touched upon public issues, and +so early as 1906 Colonel George Harvey had mentioned him as a possible +President of the United States. From that time he was often considered as +available for political office, and in 1910, with New Jersey stirred by a +strong popular movement against boss-rule, he was tendered the nomination +for Governor of that State. He accepted and proved an ideal candidate. +Though supported by the Democratic machine, which planned to elect a +reformer and then control him, Wilson won the adherence of independents +and progressive Republicans by his promise to break the power of the boss +system, and by the clarity of his plans for reform. <a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a>His appeals to the +spirit of democracy and morality, while they voiced nothing new in an +electoral campaign, rang with unusual strength and sincerity. The State, +which had gone Republican by eighty-two thousand two years before, now +elected Wilson its Governor by a plurality of forty-nine thousand.</p> + +<p>He retained office in New Jersey for only two years. During that period he +achieved a high degree of success. Had he served longer it is impossible +to say what might have been his ultimate position, for as at Princeton, +elements of opposition had begun to coalesce against him and he had found +no means to disarm them. As Governor, he at once declared himself head of +the party and by a display of firm activity dominated the machine. The +Democratic boss, Senator James Smith, was sternly enjoined from seeking +reëlection to the Senate, and when, in defiance of promises and the wish +of the voters as expressed at the primaries, he attempted to run, Wilson +entered the lists and so influenced public opinion and the Legislature +that the head of the machine received only four votes. Attempts of the +Democratic machine to combine with the Republicans, in order to nullify +the reforms which Wilson had promised in his campaign, proved equally +futile. <a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>With strong popular support, constantly exercising his influence +both in party conferences and on the Legislature, the Governor was able to +translate into law the most important of the measures demanded by the +progressives. He himself summed up the essence of the situation when he +said: "The moment the forces in New Jersey that had resisted reform +realized that the people were backing new men who meant what they had +said, they realized that they dare not resist them. It was not the +personal force of the new officials; it was the moral strength of their +backing that accomplished the extraordinary result." Supreme confidence in +the force of public opinion exerted by the common man characterizes much +of Wilson's political philosophy, and the position in the world which he +was to enjoy for some months towards the end of the war rested upon the +same basis.</p> + +<p>In 1912 came the presidential election. The split in the Republican +forces promised if it did not absolutely guarantee the election of a +Democrat, and when the party convention met at Baltimore in June, +excitement was more than ordinarily intense. The conservative elements in +the party were divided. The radicals looked to Bryan for leadership, +although his nomination seemed out of the question. <a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a>Wilson had stamped +himself as an anti-machine progressive, and if the machine conservatives +threatened he might hope for support from the Nebraskan orator. From the +first the real contest appeared to be between Wilson and Champ Clark, who +although hardly a conservative, was backed for the moment by the machine +leaders. The deciding power was in Bryan's hand, and as the strife +between conservatives and radicals waxed hot, he turned to the support of +Wilson. On the forty-sixth ballot Wilson was nominated. With division in +the Republican ranks, with his record in New Jersey for legislative +accomplishment, and winning many independent votes through a succession +of effective campaign speeches, Wilson more than fulfilled the highest of +Democratic hopes. He received on election day only a minority of all the +votes cast, but his majority in the electoral college was overwhelming.</p> + +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<p>The personality of an American President has seldom undergone so much +analysis with such unsatisfactory results; almost every discussion of +Wilson's characteristics leads to the generation of heat rather than +light. Indeed the historian of the future may ask whether it is as +important, in this age <a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>of democracy, to know exactly what sort of man he +was as to know what the people thought he was. And yet in the case of a +statesman who was to play a rôle of supreme importance in the affairs of +the country and the world, it is perhaps more than a matter of merely +personal interest to underline his salient traits. Let it be premised +that a logical and satisfactory analysis is well-nigh impossible, for his +nature is self-contradictory, subject to gusts of temperament, and he +himself has pictured the struggle that has gone on between the impulsive +Irish and the cautious Scotch elements in him. Thus it is that he has +handled similar problems in different ways at different times, and has +produced upon different persons diametrically opposed impressions.</p> + +<p>As an executive, perhaps his most notable characteristic is the will to +dominate. This does not mean that he is the egocentric autocrat pictured +by his opponents, for in conference he is apt to be tolerant of the +opinions of others, by no means dictatorial in manner, and apparently +anxious to obtain facts on both sides of the argument. An unfriendly +critic, Mr. E. J. Dillon, has said of him at Paris that "he was a very +good listener, an intelligent questioner, and amenable to argument +whenever he felt <a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a>free to give practical effect to his conclusions." +Similar evidence has been offered by members of his Cabinet. But +unquestionably, in reaching a conclusion he resents pressure and he +permits no one to make up his mind for him; he is, said the German +Ambassador, "a recluse and lonely worker." One of his enthusiastic +admirers has written: "Once in possession of every fact in the case, the +President withdraws, commences the business of consideration, comparison, +and assessment, and then emerges with a decision." From such a decision +it is difficult to shake him and continued opposition serves merely to +stiffen his resolution. Wherever the responsibility is his, he insists +upon the finality of his judgment. Those who have worked with him have +remarked upon his eagerness, once he has decided a course of action, to +carry it into practical effect. The President of the Czecho-Slovak +Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk, said that of all the men he had met, "your +visionary, idealistic President is by far and away the most intensely +practical." One of the Big Four at Paris remarked: "Wilson works. The +rest of us play, comparatively speaking. We Europeans can't keep up with +a man who travels a straight path with such a swift stride, never looking +to right or left." But with all his eagerness for practical effect he is +notably less efficient in the execution than in the formation of +policies.</p> + +<p>Wilson lacks, furthermore, the power of quick decision which is apt to +characterize the masterful executive. He is slow to make up his mind, a +trait that results partly, perhaps, from his Scotch blood and partly from +his academic training. Except for his steadfast adherence to what he +regards as basic principles, he might rightly be termed an opportunist. +For he is prone to temporize, anxious to prevent an issue from approaching +a crisis, evidently in the hope that something may "turn up" to improve +the situation and obviate the necessity of conflict. "Watchful waiting" in +the Mexican crises and his attitude towards the belligerents during the +first two years of the European war are cases in point. There are +instances of impulsive action on his part, when he has not waited for +advice or troubled to acquire exact knowledge of the facts underlying a +situation, but such occasions have been infrequent.</p> + +<p>Wilson's dislike of advice has been widely advertized. It is probably +closer to the truth to say that he is naturally suspicious of advisers +unless he is certain that their basic point of view is the same as his +own. <a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a>This is quite different from saying that he wants only opinions that +coincide with his own and that he immediately dispenses with advisers who +disagree with him. Colonel House, for example, who for five years exerted +constant influence on his policy, frequently advanced opinions quite at +variance from those of the President, but such differences did not weaken +House's influence inasmuch as Wilson felt that they were both starting +from the same angle towards the same point. Prejudiced though he seemed +to be against "financiers," Wilson took the opinions of Thomas W. Lamont +at Paris, because the underlying object of both, the acquisition of a +secure peace, was identical. It is true, however, that with the exception +of Colonel House, Wilson's advisers have been in the main purveyors of +facts rather than colleagues in the formation of policies. Wilson has +generally been anxious to receive facts which might help him to build his +policy, as will be attested by those who worked with him at Paris.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But +he was less interested in the <a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>opinions of his advisers, especially when +it came to principles and not details, for he decides principles for +himself. In this sense his Cabinet was composed of subordinates rather +than counselors. Such an attitude is, of course, characteristic of most +modern executives and has been intensified by war conditions. The summary +disregard of Lansing, shown by Wilson at Paris, was less striking than +the snubbing of Balfour by Lloyd George, or the cold brutality with which +Clemenceau treated the other French delegates.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Mr. Lamont says of the President at Paris: "I never saw a +man more ready and anxious to consult than he.... President Wilson did +not have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of the +work himself, studying until late at night papers and documents that he +should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was by all odds, +the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to delegate +more of his work was not due to any inherent distrust that he had of +men—and certainly not to any desire to 'run the whole show' himself—but +simply to the lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on a large +scale. In execution we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. +President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; an inability, mind +you, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any of us volunteered or +insisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted."</p></div> + +<p>General conviction of Wilson's autocratic nature has been intensified by +his choice of assistants, who have not as a rule enjoyed public +confidence. He debarred himself from success in the matter of +appointments, in the first place, by limiting his range of choice through +unwillingness to have about him those who did not share his point of +view. It is more epigrammatic than exact to say that he was the sole unit +in the Government giving value to a row of ciphers, for his Cabinet, as +a whole, was not composed of weak men. But the fact that the members of +his Cabinet accepted implicitly his firm creed that the Cabinet ought to +be an executive and not a political council, that it depended upon the +President's policy, and that its main function should be merely to carry +that policy into effect, gave to the public some justification for its +belief that Wilson's was a "one-man" Government. This belief was further +intensified by the President's extreme sensitiveness to hostile +criticism, which more than anything else hindered frank interchange of +opinion between himself and strong personalities. On more than one +occasion he seemed to regard opposition as tantamount to personal +hostility, an attitude which at times was not entirely unjustified. In +the matter of minor appointments Wilson failed generally of success +because he consistently refused to take a personal interest, leaving them +to subordinates and admitting that political necessities must go far to +determine the choice. Even in such an important problem as the +appointment of the Peace Commission the President seems to have made his +selection almost at haphazard. Many of his war appointments proved +ultimately to be wise. But it is noteworthy that <a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>such men as Garfield, +Baruch, and McCormick, who amply justified their choice, were appointed +because Wilson knew personally their capacity and not because of previous +success along special lines which would entitle them to public +confidence.</p> + +<p>The obstinacy of the President has become proverbial. The square chin, +unconsciously protruded in argument, indicates definitely his capacity, +as a British critic has put it, "to dig his toes in and hold on." On +matters of method, however, where a basic principle is not involved, he +is flexible. According as you approve or disapprove of him, he is +"capable of development" or "inconsistent." Thus he completely changed +front on the question of preparedness from 1914 to 1916. When the +question of the initiative and referendum arose in Oregon, his attitude +was the reverse of what it had been as professor of politics. When +matters of detail are under discussion, he has displayed much willingness +for and some skill in compromise, as was abundantly illustrated at Paris. +But when he thinks that a principle is at stake, he prefers to accept any +consequences, no matter how disastrous to his policy; witness his refusal +to accept the Lodge reservation on Article X of the League Covenant.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>All those included within the small circle of Wilson's intimates attest +the charm and magnetism of his personality. The breadth of his reading is +reflected in his conversation, which is enlivened by anecdotes that +illustrate his points effectively and illumined by a sense of humor which +some of his friends regard as his most salient trait. His manner is +marked by extreme courtesy and, in view of the fixity of his opinions, a +surprising lack of abruptness or dogmatism. But he has never been able to +capitalize such personal advantages in his political relations. Apart +from his intimates he is shy and reserved. The antithesis of Roosevelt, +who loved to meet new individualities, Wilson has the college professor's +shrinking from social contacts, and is not at ease in the presence of +those with whom he is not familiar. Naturally, therefore, he lacks +completely Roosevelt's capacity to make friends, and there is in him no +trace of his predecessor's power to find exactly the right compliment for +the right person. Under Roosevelt the White House opened its doors to +every one who could bring the President anything of interest, whether in +the field of science, literature, politics, or sport; and the Chief +Magistrate, no matter who his guest, instantly found a common ground for +discussion. <a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a>That capacity Wilson did not possess. Furthermore his health +was precarious and he was physically incapable of carrying the burden of +the constant interviews that characterized the life of his immediate +predecessors in the presidential office. He lived the life of a recluse +and rarely received any one but friends of the family at the White House +dinner table.</p> + +<p>While he thus saved himself from the social intercourse which for +Roosevelt was a relaxation but which for him would have proved a nervous +and physical drain, Wilson deprived himself of the political advantages +that might have been derived from more extensive hospitality. He was +unable to influence Congressmen except by reason of his authority as head +of the party or nation. He lost many a chance of removing political +opposition through the personal appeal which is so flattering and +effective. He seems to have thought that if his policy was right in +itself, Congressmen ought to vote for it, without the satisfaction of +personal arguments, a singular misappreciation of human nature. The same +was true of his relations with the Washington correspondents; he was never +able to establish a man to man basis of intercourse. This incapacity in +the vital matter of human contacts was, perhaps, his greatest political +weakness. <a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a>If he had been able to arouse warm personal devotion in his +followers, if he could have inflamed them with enthusiasm such as that +inspired by Roosevelt, rather than mere admiration, Wilson would have +found his political task immeasurably lightened. It is not surprising that +his mistakes in tactics should have been so numerous. His isolation and +dependence upon tactical advisers, such as Tumulty and Burleson, lacking +broad vision, led him into serious errors, most of which—such as his +appeal for a Democratic Congress in 1918, his selection of the personnel +of the Peace Commission, his refusal to compromise with the "mild +reservationist Senators" in the summer of 1919—were committed, +significantly, when he was not in immediate contact with Colonel House.</p> + +<p>The political strength of Wilson did not result primarily from +intellectual power. His mind is neither profound nor subtle. His serious +writings are sound but not characterized by originality, nor in his +policies is there anything to indicate creative genius. He thinks straight +and possesses the ability to concentrate on a single line of effort. He is +skillful in catching an idea and adapting it to his purposes. <a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>Combined +with his power of expression and his talent for making phrases, such +qualities were of great assistance to him. But the real strength of the +President lay rather in his gift of sensing what the common people wanted +and his ability to put it into words for them. Few of his speeches are +great; many of them are marred by tactless phrases, such as "too proud to +fight" and "peace without victory." But nearly all of them express +honestly the desires of the masses. His strength in New Jersey and the +extraordinary effect produced in Europe by his war speeches might be cited +as evidence of this peculiar power. He sought above everything to catch +the trend of inarticulate rather than vociferous opinion. If one objects +that his patience under German outrages was not truly representative, we +must remember that opinion was slow in crystallizing, that his policy was +endorsed by the election of 1916, and that when he finally advocated war +in April, 1917, the country entered the struggle practically a unit.</p> + +<p>But it is obvious that, however much political strength was assured the +President by his instinctive appreciation of popular feeling, this was +largely offset by the <em>gaucherie</em> of his political tactics. He had a genius +for alienating persons who <a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>should have supported him and who agreed in +general with the broad lines of his policies. Few men in public life have +so thoroughly aroused the dislike of "the man in the street." Admitting +that much of Wilson's unpopularity resulted from misunderstanding, from the +feeling that he was a different sort, perhaps a "highbrow," the degree of +dislike felt for him becomes almost inexplicable in the case of a President +who, from all the evidence, was willing to sacrifice everything for what he +considered to be the benefit of the common man. He might almost repeat +Robespierre's final bitter and puzzled phrase: "To die for the people and +to be abhorred by them." So keen was the irritation aroused by Wilson's +methods and personality that many a citizen stated frankly that he +preferred to see Wilsonian policies which he approved meet defeat, rather +than see them carried to success by Wilson. This executive failing of the +President was destined to jeopardize the greatest of his policies and to +result in the personal tragedy of Wilson himself.</p> + +<p>Certain large political principles stand out in Wilson's writings and +career as Governor and President. Of these the most striking, perhaps, is +his conviction that the President of the United States must be something +more than a mere executive superintendent. <a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>The entire responsibility for +the administration of government, he believed, should rest upon the +President, and in order to meet that responsibility, he must keep the +reins of control in his own hands. In his first essays and in his later +writings Wilson expressed his disgust with the system of congressional +committees which threw enormous power into the hands of irresponsible +professional politicians, and called for a President who would break that +system and exercise greater directive authority. For a time he seemed, +under the influence of Bagehot, to have believed in the feasibility of +introducing something like the parliamentary system into the government +of the United States. To the last he regarded the President as a sort of +Prime Minister, at the head of his party in the Legislature and able to +count absolutely upon its loyalty. More than this, he believed that the +President should take a large share of responsibility for the legislative +programme and ought to push this programme through by all means at his +disposal. Such a creed appeared in his early writings and was largely +carried into operation during his administration. We find him bringing +all possible pressure upon the New Jersey Legislature in order to redeem +his campaign pledges. When elected President, he went directly to +Congress with his message, instead of sending it to be read. Time and +again he intervened to forward his special legislative interests by +direct influence.</p> + +<p>Both in his writings and in his actions Wilson has always advocated +government by party. Theoretically and in practice he has been opposed to +coalition government, for, in his belief, it divides responsibility. +Although by no means an advocate of the old-type spoils system, rewards +for party service seem to him essential. Curiously enough, while +insisting that the President is the leader of his party like a Prime +Minister, he has also described him, with an apparent lack of logic, as +the leader of the country. Because Wilson has thus confused party and +people, it is easy to understand why he has at times claimed to represent +the nation when, in reality, he was merely representing partisan views. +Such an attitude is naturally irritating to the Opposition and explains +something of the virulence that characterized the attacks made upon him +in 1918 and later.</p> + +<p>Wilson's political sentiments are tinged by a constant and intense +interest in the common man. More than once he has insisted that it was +more important to know what was said by the fireside than what was said +in the council chamber. <a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>His strongest political weapon, he believes, has +been the appeal over the heads of politicians to public opinion. His +dislike of cliques and his strong prejudice against anything that savors +of special privilege shone clear in his attack upon the Princeton club +system, and the same light has not infrequently dazzled his vision as +President. Thus, while by no means a radical, he instinctively turned to +the support of labor in its struggles with capital because of the abuse +of its privilege by capital in the past and regardless of more recent +abuse of its power by labor. Similarly at the Peace Conference his +sympathies were naturally with every weak state and every minority group.</p> + +<p>Such tendencies may have been strengthened by the intensity of his +religious convictions. There have been few men holding high office in +recent times so deeply and constantly affected by Christian faith as +Woodrow Wilson. The son of a clergyman and subjected during his early +years to the most lively and devout sort of Presbyterianism, he preserved +in his own family circle, in later years, a similar atmosphere. Nor was +his conviction of the immanence and spiritual guidance of the Deity ever +divorced from his professional and public life. <a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>We can discover in his +presidential speeches many indications of his belief that the duties he +had undertaken were laid upon him by God and that he might not deviate +from what seemed to him the straight and appointed path. There is +something reminiscent of Calvin in the stern and unswerving determination +not to compromise for the sake of ephemeral advantage. This aspect of +Wilson has been caught by a British critic, J. M. Keynes, who describes +the President as a Nonconformist minister, whose thought and temperament +were essentially theological, not intellectual, "with all the strength +and weakness of that manner of thought, feeling, and expression." The +observation is exact, although it does not in itself completely explain +Wilson. Certainly nothing could be more characteristic of the President +than the text of a Baccalaureate sermon which he preached at Princeton in +1907: "And be ye not conformed to this world." He believed with intensity +that each individual must set up for himself a moral standard, which he +must rigidly maintain regardless of the opinions of the community.</p> + +<p>Entirely natural, therefore, is the emphasis which he has placed, whether +as President of Princeton or of the United States, upon moral rather +than material virtues. <a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>This, indeed, has been the essence of his +political idealism. Such an emphasis has been for him at once a source of +political strength and of weakness. The moralist unquestionably secures +wide popular support; but he also wearies his audience, and many a voter +has turned from Wilson in the spirit that led the Athenian to vote for +the ostracism of Aristides, because he was tired of hearing him called +"the Just." Whatever the immediate political effects, the country owes to +Wilson a debt, which historians will doubtless acknowledge, for his +insistence that morality must go hand in hand with public policy, that as +with individuals, so with governments, true greatness is won by service +rather than by acquisition, by sacrifice rather than by aggression. +Wilson and Treitschke are at opposite poles.</p> + +<p>During his academic career Wilson seems to have displayed little interest +in foreign affairs, and his knowledge of European politics, although +sufficient for him to produce an admirable handbook on governments, +including foreign as well as our own, was probably not profound. During +his first year in the White House, he was typical of the Democratic +party, which then approved the political isolation of the United States, +abhorred the kind of commercial imperialism summed up in the phrase +"dollar diplomacy," and apparently believed that the essence of foreign +policy was to keep one's own hands clean. The development of Wilson from +this parochial point of view to one which centers his whole being upon a +policy of unselfish international service, forms, to a large extent, the +main thread of the narrative which follows.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>NEUTRALITY</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>Despite the wars and rumors of wars in Europe after 1910, few Americans +perceived the gathering of the clouds, and probably not one in ten +thousand felt more than an ordinary thrill of interest on the morning of +June 29, 1914, when they read that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of +Austria had been assassinated. Nor, a month later, when it became obvious +that the resulting crisis was to precipitate another war in the Balkans, +did most Americans realize that the world was hovering on the brink of +momentous events. Not even when the most dire forebodings were realized +and the great powers of Europe were drawn into the quarrel, could America +appreciate its significance. Crowds gazed upon the bulletin boards and +tried to picture the steady advance of German field-gray through the +streets of Liège, asked their neighbors what were these French 75's, and +endeavored to locate Mons and Verdun on inadequate maps. <a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>Interest could +not be more intense, but it was the interest of the moving-picture +devotee. Even the romantic voyage of the <em>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</em> with +her cargo of gold, seeking to elude the roving British cruisers, seemed +merely theatrical. It was a tremendous show and we were the spectators. +Only the closing of the Stock Exchange lent an air of reality to the +crisis.</p> + +<p>It was true that the Spanish War had made of the United States a world +power, but so firmly rooted in American minds was the principle of +complete political isolation from European affairs that the typical +citizen could not imagine any cataclysm on the other side of the Atlantic +so engrossing as to engage the active participation of his country. The +whole course of American history had deepened the general feeling of +aloofness from Europe and heightened the effect of the advice given by +the first President when he warned the country to avoid entangling +alliances. In the early nineteenth century the United States was a +country apart, for in the days when there was neither steamship nor +telegraph the Atlantic in truth separated the New World from the Old. +After the close of the "second war of independence," in 1815, the +possibility of foreign complications seemed remote. <a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>The attention of the +young nation was directed to domestic concerns, to the building up of +manufactures, to the extension of the frontiers westward. The American +nation turned its back to the Atlantic. There was a steady and welcome +stream of immigrants from Europe, but there was little speculation or +interest as to its headwaters.</p> + +<p>Governmental relations with European states were disturbed at times by +crises of greater or less importance. The proximity of the United States +to and interest in Cuba compelled the Government to recognize the +political existence of Spain; a French army was ordered out of Mexico +when it was felt to be a menace; the presence of immigrant Irish in large +numbers always gave a note of uncertainty to the national attitude +towards Great Britain. The export of cotton from the Southern States +created industrial relations of such importance with Great Britain that, +during the Civil War, after the establishment of the blockade on the +Confederate coast, wisdom and forbearance were needed on both sides to +prevent the breaking out of armed conflict. But during the last third of +the century, which was marked in this country by an extraordinary +industrial evolution and an increased <a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a>interest in domestic +administrative issues, the attitude of the United States towards Europe, +except during the brief Venezuelan crisis and the war with Spain, was +generally characterized by the indifference which is the natural outcome +of geographical separation.</p> + +<p>In diplomatic language American foreign policy, so far as Europe was +concerned, was based upon the principle of "non-intervention." The right +to manage their affairs in their own way without interference was conceded +to European Governments and a reciprocal attitude was expected of them. +The American Government followed strictly the purpose of not participating +in any political arrangements made between European states regarding +European issues. Early in the life of the nation Jefferson had correlated +the double aspect of this policy: "Our first and fundamental maxim," he +said, "should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our +second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." +The influence of John Quincy Adams crystallized this double policy in the +Monroe Doctrine, which, as compensation for denying to European states the +right to intervene in American politics, sacrificed the generous +sympathies of many Americans, among them <a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>President Monroe himself, with +the republican movements across the Atlantic. With the continued and +increasing importance of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of national +policy, the natural and reciprocal aspect of that doctrine, implying +political isolation from Europe, became more deeply imbedded in the +national consciousness.</p> + +<p>There was, it is true, another aspect to American foreign policy besides +the European, namely, that concerning the Pacific and the Far East, which, +as diplomatic historians have pointed out, does not seem to have been +affected by the tradition of isolation. Since the day when the western +frontier was pushed to the Golden Gate, the United States has taken an +active interest in problems of the Pacific. Alaska was purchased from +Russia. An American seaman was the first to open the trade of Japan to the +outside world and thus precipitated the great revolution which has touched +every aspect of Far Eastern questions. American traders watched carefully +the commercial development of Oriental ports, in which Americans have +played an active rôle. In China and in the maintenance of the open door +especially, has America taken the keenest interest. It is a matter of +pride that American policy, always of a purely commercial and peaceful +nature, showed itself less aggressive than that of some European states. +<a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>But the Government insisted upon the recognition of American interest in +every Far Eastern issue that might be raised, and was ready to intervene +with those of Europe in moments of crisis or danger.</p> + +<p>A fairly clear-cut distinction might thus be made between American +pretensions in the different parts of the world. In the Americas the +nation claimed that sort of preëminence which was implied by the Monroe +Doctrine, a preëminence which as regards the Latin-American states north +of the Orinoco many felt must be actively enforced, in view of special +interests in the Caribbean. In the Far East the United States claimed an +equality of status with the European powers. In the rest of the world, +Europe, Africa, the Levant, the traditional American policy of abstention +held good absolutely, at least until the close of the century.</p> + +<p>The war with Spain affected American foreign policy vitally. The holding +of the Philippines, even if it were to prove merely temporary, created new +relations with all the great powers, of Europe as of Asia; American +Caribbean interests were strengthened; and the victory over a European +power, even one of a second class in material strength, <a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>necessarily +altered the traditional attitude of the nation towards the other states of +Europe and theirs towards it. This change was stimulated by the close +attention which American merchants and bankers began to give to European +combinations and policies, particularly to the exploitation of thinly +populated districts by European states. Even before the Spanish War a +keen-sighted student of foreign affairs, Richard Olney, had declared that +the American people could not assume an attitude of indifference towards +European politics and that the hegemony of a single continental state +would be disastrous to their prosperity if not to their safety. Conversely +Europeans began to watch America with greater care. The victory over Spain +was resented and the fear of American commercial development began to +spread. The Kaiser had even talked of a continental customs union to meet +American competition. On the other hand, Great Britain, which had +displayed a benevolent attitude during the Spanish War and whose admiral +at Manila had perhaps blocked German interference, showed an increasing +desire for a close understanding. The friendship of the United States, +itself once a British dependency, for the British colonies was natural +and <a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>American interests in the Far East had much in common with those of +Great Britain.</p> + +<p>External evidence of the new place of the United States in the world might +be found in the position taken by Roosevelt as peacemaker between Russia +and Japan, and, more significantly, in the rôle played by the American +representative, Henry White, at the Conference of Algeciras in 1906. Not +merely did the American Government consent to discuss matters essentially +European in character, but its attitude proved almost decisive in the +settlement then drafted. It is true that the Senate, in approving that +settlement, refused to assume responsibility for its maintenance and +reiterated its adherence to traditional policy. But those who watched +developments with intelligent eyes must have agreed with Roosevelt when he +said: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as to whether we +shall play a great part in the affairs of the world. That has been decided +for us by fate, by the march of events." Yet it may be questioned whether +the average American, during the first decade of the twentieth century, +realized the change that had come over relations with Europe. The majority +of citizens certainly felt that anything happening east of the Atlantic +was none of <a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a>their business, just as everything that occurred in the +Americas was entirely outside the scope of European interference.</p> + +<p>There is little to show that Woodrow Wilson, at the time when he entered +upon his duties as President, was one of the few Americans who fully +appreciated the new international position of the United States and its +consequences, even had there been no war. The Democratic platform of 1912 +hardly mentioned foreign policy, and Wilson's Inaugural contained no +reference to anything except domestic matters. Certain problems inherited +from the previous Administration forced upon the President, however, the +formulation, if not of a policy, at least of an attitude. The questions of +the Panama Canal tolls and Japanese immigration, the Mexican situation, +the Philippines, general relations with Latin-America, all demanded +attention. In each case Wilson displayed a willingness to sacrifice, a +desire to avoid stressing the material strength of the United States, an +anxiety to compromise, which matched in spirit the finest traditions of +American foreign policy, which has generally been marked by high ideals. +Many of his countrymen, possibly without adequate study or command of the +facts, supposed that Wilson was inspired less by positive ideals than by +the belief that no problem of a foreign nature was worth a quarrel. People +liked the principle contained in the sentence: "We can afford to exercise +the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own +strength and scorns to misuse it." But they also wondered whether the +passivity of the Government did not in part proceed from the fact that the +President could not make up his mind what he wanted to do. They looked +upon his handling of the Mexican situation as clear evidence of a lack of +policy. Nevertheless the country as a whole, without expressing enthusiasm +for Wilson's attitude, was obviously pleased by his attempts to avoid +foreign entanglements, and in the early summer of 1914 the eyes of the +nation were focused upon domestic issues.</p> + +<p>Then came the war in Europe.</p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + +<p>Today, after the long years of stress and struggle in which the crimes of +Germany have received full advertisement, few Americans will admit that +they did not perceive during that first week of August, 1914, the +complete significance of the moral issues involved in the European war. +They read back into their thoughts of those early <a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>days the realization +which, in truth, came only later, that Germany was the brutal aggressor +attacking those aspects of modern civilization which are dear to America. +In fact there were not many then who grasped the essential truth that the +cause defended by Great Britain and France was indeed that of America and +that their defeat would bring the United States face to face with vital +danger, both material and moral.</p> + +<p>Partisanship, of course, was not lacking and frequently it was of an +earnest kind; in view of the large number of European-born who enjoyed +citizenship, sympathy with one side or the other was inevitably warm. +West of the Mississippi it was some time before the masses were stirred +from their indifference to and their ignorance of the struggle. But on +the Atlantic seaboard and in the Middle West opinion became sharply +divided. The middle-class German-Americans naturally espoused with some +vehemence the justice of the Fatherland's cause. German intellectuals of +influence, such as Hugo Münsterberg, inveighed against the hypocrisy and +the decadence of the Entente powers. Many Americans who had lived or had +been educated in Germany, some professors who had been brought into +contact with the Kaiser explained the <a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>"essentially defensive character" +of Germany's struggle against the threatening Slav. Certain of the +politically active Irish elements, anxious to discredit the British, also +lent their support to the German cause.</p> + +<p>On the Atlantic coast, however, the general trend of opinion ran strongly +in favor of the Entente. The brave defense of the Belgians at Liège +against terrible odds evoked warm sympathy; the stories of the atrocities +committed by the invading Germans, constantly more frequent and more +brutal in character, enhanced that feeling. The valorous retreat of the +French and their last-ditch stand on the Marne compelled admiration. +Moreover, the school histories of the United States with their emphasis +upon La Fayette and the aid given by the French in the first fight for +liberty proved to be of no small importance in the molding of sympathy. +Business men naturally favored Great Britain, both because of financial +relationships and because of their dislike and fear of German commercial +methods.</p> + +<p>But in all this partisanship there was little appreciation of the peril +that might result from German victory and no articulate demand that the +United States intervene. <a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>Warm sympathy might be given to one side or the +other, but the almost universal opinion was that the war was none of our +business. Even Theodore Roosevelt, who later was to be one of the most +determined advocates of American intervention on the side of the Entente, +writing for <em>The Outlook</em> in September, 1914, congratulated the country +on its separation from European quarrels, which made possible the +preservation of our peace.</p> + +<p>Whatever the trend of public opinion, President Wilson would have +insisted upon neutrality. Everything in his character and policy demanded +the maintenance of peace. He had entered office with a broad programme of +social reform in view, and the attainment of his ideals depended upon +domestic tranquillity. He was, furthermore, a real pacifist, believing +that war is debasing morally and disastrous economically. Finally, he was +convinced that the United States was consecrated to a special task, +namely, the inspiration of politics by moral factors; if the nation was +to accomplish this task its example must be a higher example than one of +force. Unquestionably he looked forward to acting as mediator in the +struggle and thus securing for the country and himself new prestige such +as had come in Roosevelt's mediation between Russia and Japan. <a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>But the +main thought in his mind was, first, the preservation of peace for the +sake of peace; and next, to attain the supreme glory of showing the world +that greatness and peaceableness are complementary in national character +and not antithetic. "We are champions of peace and of concord," he said, +"and we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought +to earn."</p> + +<p>Wilson's determination was strengthened by his obvious failure to +distinguish between the war aims of the two sides. He did not at first see +the moral issue involved. He was anxious to "reserve judgment until the +end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their +entirety and in their true relations." When appeals and protests were sent +to him from Germany, Belgium, and France dealing with infractions of the +law and practice of nations, he was willing to return a response to +Germany, which had confessedly committed an international wrong, identical +with that sent to Belgium which had suffered from that wrong. Wilson has +himself confessed that "America did not at first see the full meaning of +the war. It looked like a natural raking out of the pent-up jealousies and +rivalries of the complicated politics of Europe.... <a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>We, at the distance +of America, looked on at first without a full comprehension of what the +plot was getting into."<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> That the aims of the belligerent powers might +affect the conscience or the fortunes of America he did not perceive. He +urged us not to be "thrown off our balance by a war with which we have +nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords +us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make +us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for +trouble." Hence his proclamation of neutrality, which was universally +accepted as right. Hence, also, his adjuration to be "impartial in thought +as well as in action," which was not so universally accepted and marks, +perhaps, a definite rift between Wilson and the bulk of educated opinion +in the Northeast.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Speech on the <em>George Washington</em>, July 4, 1919.</p></div> + +<p>During the early days of August Wilson had proclaimed his desire to act +as mediator between the warring forces, although he must have realized +that the suggestion would prove fruitless at that moment. Again, after +the battle of the Marne, he took advantage of German discouragement, +apparently receiving a hint from <a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a>Johann von Bernstorff, German +Ambassador in Washington, to sound the belligerents on the possibility of +an arrangement. Failing a second time to elicit serious consideration of +peace, he withdrew to wait for a better opportunity. Thus the Germans, +beaten back from Paris, vainly pounded the allied lines on the Yser; the +Russians, after forcing their path through Galicia, defended Warsaw with +desperation; while Wilson kept himself and his country strictly aloof +from the conflict.</p> + +<p>But no mere desires or declarations could prevent the war from touching +America, and each day made more apparent the difficulties and the dangers +of neutrality. The Atlantic no longer separated the two worlds. In +September and October the British Government, taking advantage of the +naval supremacy assured by their fleet, issued Orders in Council designed +to provide for close control of neutral commerce and to prevent the +importation of contraband into Germany. British supervision of war-time +trade has always been strict and its interpretation of the meaning of +contraband broad; the present instance was no exception. American ships +and cargoes were seized and confiscated to an extent which, while it +doubtless seemed justified to the British, who were fighting for their +lives, evoked a chorus of bitter complaints from American producers and +exporters. <a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a>Commerce with neutral countries of Europe threatened to become +completely interrupted. On the 21st of October and again on the 26th of +December, the State Department sent notes of protest to the British +Government. The tone of the discussion was notably sharpened by the +seizure of the <em>Wilhelmina</em>, supposedly an American ship, though, as +later developed, she had been chartered by a German agent in New York, +Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, in order to bring the Anglo-American dispute to a +head.</p> + +<p>How far the interference with our trade by the British might have +embittered relations, if other issues had not seemed more pressing, no one +can say. Precisely at the moment when business men were beginning to call +upon Wilson for a sturdier defense of American commercial rights, a +controversy with Germany eclipsed, at least from the eye of the general +public, all other foreign questions. From the moment when the defeat on +the Marne showed the Germans that victory was not likely to come quickly +to their arms, the Berlin Government realized the importance of preventing +the export of American munitions. Since the allies held control of the +seas an embargo on such export <a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>would be entirely to German advantage, and +the head of German propaganda in this country, a former Colonial +Secretary, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, attempted to mobilize German-American +sentiment and to bring pressure upon Congressmen through their +constituents in favor of such an embargo. It was easy to allege that the +export of arms, since they went to the allied camp alone, was on its face, +unneutral. Several Senators approved the embargo, among them the chairman +of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William J. Stone of Missouri. +Against the proposed embargo Wilson set his face steadfastly. He perceived +the fallacy of the German argument and insisted that to prevent the export +of arms would be itself unneutral. The inability of the Central Powers to +import arms from the United States resulted from their inferiority on the +high seas; the Government would be departing from its position of +impartiality if it failed to keep American markets open to every nation of +the world, belligerent or neutral. The United States could not change the +rules in the middle of the game for the advantage of one side. The perfect +legality of Wilson's decision has been frankly recognized since the war by +the German Ambassador.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>But the execution of German military plans demanded that the allied +shortage in munitions, upon which the Teutons counted for success in the +spring campaigns, should not be replenished from American sources. +Failing to budge Wilson on the proposal of an embargo, they launched +themselves upon a more reckless course. On February 4, 1915, the German +Admiralty issued a proclamation to the effect that after the 18th of +February, German submarines would destroy every enemy merchant vessel +found in the waters about the British Isles, which were declared a "war +zone"; and that it might not be possible to provide for the safety of +crew or passengers of destroyed vessels. Neutral ships were warned of the +danger of destruction if they entered the zone. The excuse alleged for +this decided departure from the custom of nations was the British +blockade upon foodstuffs, which had been declared as a result of the +control of food in Germany by the Government. Here was quite a different +matter from British interference with American trade-rights; for if the +German threat were carried into effect it signified not merely the +destruction or loss of property, for which restitution might be made, but +the possible drowning of American citizens, perhaps women and children, +<a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>who would be entirely within their rights in traveling upon merchant +vessels and to whom the Government owed protection.</p> + +<p>Wilson's reply was prompt and definite. "If the commanders of German +vessels of war should ... destroy on the high seas an American vessel or +the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government +of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an +indefensible violation of neutral rights.... The Government of the United +States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a +strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take +any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and +property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their +acknowledged rights on the high seas." It was the clearest of warnings. +Would Germany heed it? And if she did not, would Wilson surrender his +pacific ideals and take the nation into war?</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>THE SUBMARINE</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>Early in the winter of 1914-1915 President Wilson apparently foresaw +something of the complications likely to arise from the measures and +counter-measures taken by the belligerents to secure control of overseas +commerce, and sent his personal adviser, Colonel House, across the +Atlantic to study the possibilities of reaching a <em>modus vivendi</em>. There +was no man so well qualified for the mission. Edward Mandell House was a +Texan by birth, but a cosmopolitan by nature. His hobby was practical +politics; his avocation the study of history and government. His +catholicity of taste is indicated by the nature of his library, which +includes numerous volumes not merely on the social sciences but also on +philosophy and poetry. His intellectual background was thus no less +favorable than his political for the post which he assumed as Wilson's +personal adviser. <a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>Disqualified by physical delicacy from entering the +political arena himself and consistently refusing office, he had for +years controlled the political stage in his own State; in 1912, +exercising strong influence in the national party organization, he had +done much to crystallize sentiment in favor of Wilson as presidential +candidate. Slight in stature, quiet in manner and voice, disliking +personal publicity, with an almost uncanny instinct for divining the +motives that actuate men, he possessed that which Wilson lacked—the +capacity to "mix," to meet his fellow mortals, no matter what their +estate, on a common ground.</p> + +<p>Courteous and engaging, Colonel House was an unexcelled negotiator: he +had a genius for compromise, as perfect a control of his emotions as of +his facial expression, and a pacific magnetism that soothed into +reasonableness the most heated interlocutor. His range of acquaintance in +the United States was unparalleled. Abroad, previous to the war, he had +discussed international relations with the Kaiser and the chief statesmen +of France and England. His experience of American politics and knowledge +of foreign affairs, whether derived from men or from books, were matched +by an almost unerring penetration in the analysis of a political +situation, domestic or European. <a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>As a liberal idealist and pacifist, he +saw eye to eye with Wilson; his sense of political actualities, however, +was infinitely more keen.</p> + +<p>But even the skill of Colonel House was not sufficient to induce Germany +to hold her hand, and, as spring advanced, it became increasingly clear +that she was resolved to carry her threats of unrestricted submarine +warfare into effect. The quality of Wilson's pacifism was about to be put +to the test. In March a British steamer, the <em>Falaba</em>, was sunk and an +American citizen drowned; some weeks later an American boat, the +<em>Cushing</em>, was attacked by a German airplane; and on the 1st of May, +another American steamer, the <em>Gulflight</em>, was sunk by a submarine with +the loss of two American lives. When was Wilson going to translate into +action his summary warning of "strict accountability?" Even as the +question was asked, we heard that the Germans had sunk the <em>Lusitania</em>. +On the 7th of May, 1915, at two in the afternoon, the pride of the +British merchant marine was struck by two torpedoes fired from a German +submarine. She sank in half an hour. More than eleven hundred of her +passengers and crew were drowned, among them one hundred and twenty-four +Americans, men, women, and children.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a>The cry that went up from America was one of anguish, but still more one +of rage. This attack upon non-combatant travelers, citizens of a neutral +state, had been callously premeditated and ruthlessly executed in cold +blood. The German Government had given frigid warning, in a newspaper +advertisement, of its intention to affront the custom of nations and the +laws of humanity. A wave of the bitterest anti-German feeling swept down +the Atlantic coast and out to the Mississippi; for the first time there +became apparent a definite trend of opinion demanding the entrance of the +United States into the war on the side of the Entente. On that day Wilson +might have won a declaration of war, so strong was popular sentiment; and +despite the comparative indifference of the Missouri valley and the Far +West, he might have aroused enthusiasm if not unity.</p> + +<p>But a declaration of war then would, in all probability, have been a +mistake. Entrance into the war at that time would have been based upon +neither judgment nor ideals, but merely upon emotion. The American people +were in no way prepared to bring material aid to the cause of justice, +nor did the nation yet appreciate the moral issues involved. <a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>It would +have been a war of revenge for American lives lost. The President was by +temperament disinclined to listen to the passionate demands for +intervention, and, as historian, he must have had in mind the error +committed by McKinley when he permitted the declaration of war on Spain, +after the sinking of the <em>Maine</em> in 1898. Sober afterthought has +generally agreed that Wilson was right. But he was himself led into a +serious error that produced consequences which were not soon to be +dissipated. Speaking three days after the event, when the world looked to +him to express the soul of America, and dealing with the spirit of +Americanism, he permitted an unfortunate phrase to enter his address and +to cloud his purpose. "There is such a thing," he said, "as a man being +too proud to fight." The phrase was by no means essential to the main +points of his address; it was preceded by one of greater importance, +namely that "the example of America must be a special example ... of +peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world +and strife is not." It was followed by another of equal importance, that +a nation may be so much in the right "that it does not need to convince +others by force that it is right." These two phrases expressed what was +in the President's mind clearly and definitely: the United States was +<a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>consecrated to ideals which could not be carried into effect through +force, unless every other method dictated by supreme patience had failed. +But the world did not notice them. All that it remembered was that the +United States was "too proud to fight." What did this mean to the average +man except that the country was afraid to fight? The peoples of the +Entente powers were contemptuous; Germans were reassured; Americans were +humiliated.</p> + +<p>Wilson the phrase-maker was betrayed by a phrase, and it was to pursue him +like a Fury. The chorus of indignation and shame aroused by this phrase +covered completely the determination and skill with which he entered upon +the diplomatic struggle with Germany. His purpose was definite. He had +gone on record in February that the United States Government would protect +the rights of American citizens, and he was bound to secure from Germany a +promise that merchant ships should not be torpedoed without warning or +assuring the lives of crew and passengers. And yet by virtue of his +pacific principles this promise could not be forcibly extracted until +every other possible method had been attempted in vain. <a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>Unquestionably he +was supported in his policy by many, perhaps most, thoughtful people, +although wherever support was given him in the East it was generally +grudging. Such a representative and judicial mind as that of ex-President +Taft favored cool consideration and careful action. But the difficulties +encountered by the President were tremendous. On the one hand he met the +bitter denunciations of the group, constantly increasing in numbers, which +demanded our immediate intervention on the side of the Entente. Led by +Roosevelt, who no longer felt as in the previous September, that the +United States had no immediate interest in the war, this group included +influential men of business and many writers. They had lost patience with +Wilson's patience. His policy was, in their opinion, that of a coward. On +the other hand, Wilson was assailed by pro-Germans and die-hard pacifists; +the former believed that the British blockade justified Germany's +submarine warfare; the latter were afraid even of strong language in +diplomatic notes, lest it lead to war. At the very outset of the +diplomatic controversy with Germany, before the second <em>Lusitania</em> note +was dispatched, the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned, +in the belief that the President's tone was too peremptory. For Bryan was +willing to arbitrate even Germany's right to drown American citizens on +the high seas. <a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>The defection of this influential politician a year +previous would have weakened Wilson seriously, but by now the President +had won secure control of the party. He was, indeed, strengthened +diplomatically by Bryan's resignation, as the latter, in a conversation +with the Austrian Ambassador, had given the impression that American +protests need not be taken over-seriously. His continuance in office might +have encouraged German leaders to adopt a bolder tone.</p> + +<p>From the very beginning of his attempts to obtain from Germany a disavowal +for the sinking of the <em>Lusitania</em> and a promise not to sink without +warning, the President took his stand upon high ground. Not merely did he +insist upon the rights guaranteed to neutrals by the law of nations; he +took the controversy out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic +discussion and contended "for nothing less high and sacred than the rights +of humanity." To this he recurred in each of his notes. Germany avoided +the issue. At first she insisted that the <em>Lusitania</em> was armed, carrying +explosives of war, transporting troops from Canada, and thus virtually +acting as a naval auxiliary. After the falsity of this assertion was +shown, she adduced the restrictions placed by Great Britain on neutral +trade as excuse for submarine operations, and contended that the +circumstances of naval warfare in the twentieth century had so changed +that the principles of international law no longer held good.</p> + +<p>Each time Wilson returned to his point that the "rights of neutrals are +based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are +immutable. Illegal and inhuman acts ... are manifestly indefensible when +they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when +they violate the right to life itself. If a belligerent cannot retaliate +against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their +property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity +of neutral powers should dictate that the practice be discontinued." +Wilson terminated his third note to Germany with a warning, which had the +tone, if not the form, of an ultimatum: there must be a scrupulous +observance of neutral rights in this critical matter, as repetition of +"acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government +of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately +unfriendly."</p> + +<p>The exchange of notes consumed much time and proved a severe test for +American patience. <a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>The first <em>Lusitania</em> note was sent on the 13th of +May and it was not until the 1st of September that the German Government +finally gave a pledge that was acceptable to Wilson. In the meantime +there had been continued sinkings, or attempts to sink, in clear +violation of the principles for which the President was contending. The +<em>Nebraskan</em>, the <em>Armenian</em>, the <em>Orduna</em>, were subjected to submarine +attacks. On the 19th of August the <em>Arabic</em> was sunk and two Americans +lost. The ridicule heaped upon the President by the British and certain +sections of the American press, for his writing of diplomatic notes, was +only equaled by the sense of humiliation experienced by pro-Entente +elements in this country. <em>Punch</em> issued a cartoon in which Uncle Sam +pointed to Wilson as having outstripped the record made by Job for +patience. Nevertheless Wilson obtained the main point for which he was +striving. On September 1, 1915, the German Government gave the definite +pledge that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning +and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the +liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." Wilson had sought to +safeguard a principle by compelling from Germany a written acknowledgment +of its validity. So much he had won and without the exercise of force. +<a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a>Even those whose nerves were most overwrought by the long-drawn-out +negotiations, admitted that it was a diplomatic victory.</p> + +<p>The victory was not clean-cut, for Germany had not yet disavowed the +sinking of the <em>Lusitania</em>, nor did the category "liners" seem to include +all merchant vessels. How real was even the partial victory remained to +be seen. Within three days of the German pledge the <em>Hesperian</em> was sunk +and an American citizen drowned. On the 7th of November the <em>Ancona</em> was +torpedoed in the Mediterranean by an Austrian submarine with the loss of +more American lives. It is true that after each case a disavowal was made +and a renewal of promises vouchsafed. But it seemed obvious that Germany +was merely playing for time and also that she counted upon pro-German and +pacifist agitation in this country. For a brief period it appeared as if +her hopes were not to be entirely disappointed. British merchant vessels, +following long-established custom, had for some months been armed for +purposes of defense. The German Government on February 10, 1916, +announced that henceforward such armed merchantmen would be regarded as +auxiliary cruisers and would be sunk without warning. <a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>It was unfortunate +that Robert Lansing, who had succeeded Bryan as Secretary of State, had +proposed on January 18, 1916, to the diplomatic representatives of the +Allied forces that they cease the arming of merchantmen as a means of +securing from Germany a pledge which would cover all merchantmen as well +as passenger liners; this proposal gave to Germany a new opportunity for +raising the issue of the submarine. But either Lansing's proposal had +been made without Mr. Wilson's sanction or the President changed his +mind, since on the 10th of February Wilson declared that he intended to +recognize the right of merchantmen to arm for purposes of defense. Once +more he insisted that the rules of war could not be changed during war +for the advantage of one side.</p> + +<p>His declaration led at once to something like a revolt of Congress. +Already some of those who especially feared intervention had been +suffering from an attack of panic as a result of Wilson's recent decision +to support the preparedness movement. They were further terrified by the +possibility that some American citizen traveling on an armed merchantman +might lose his life and that the demand for entrance into the war might +thus become irresistible. <a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>Bryanites, pro-German propagandists, and Irish +combined against the President, and were reinforced by all the +discontented elements who hoped to break Wilson's control of the +Democratic party. The combination seemed like a new cave of Adullam. +Resolutions were introduced in the Senate by Thomas P. Gore and in the +House by Jeff McLemore, based upon suggestions made by Bryan nine months +before, that American citizens should be warned not to travel on armed +merchant vessels. Senator Stone, of the Foreign Relations Committee, +supported these resolutions and it appeared probable that Germany would +find her strongest support in the American Congress.</p> + +<p>Wilson struck sharply. Not merely his leadership of the party and the +country was at stake, but also that moral leadership of neutral nations +and the world toward which the struggle with Germany was to take him. +Refusing to receive Senator Stone, he sent him a letter in which the +cardinal points of his position were underlined. "Once accept a single +abatement of right," he insisted, "and many other humiliations would +certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might +crumble under our hands piece by piece.<a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a> What we are now contending for in +this matter is the very essence of the things that have made America a +sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own +impotency as a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independent +position among the nations of the world." This definite enunciation was +in effect an appeal to the American people, which came as a relief to +those who had suffered from presidential patience under German outrages. +The storm of public feeling aroused against the rebellious Congressmen +was such that Wilson's victory became assured. Demanding concrete +justification of his stand, he insisted that the resolutions be put to +the vote. The issue was somewhat confused in the Senate so that the vote +was not decisive; but in the House the McLemore resolution was defeated +by a vote of 276 to 142.</p> + +<p>And yet the submarine issue was not finally closed. Less than a month +after the rights of American citizens were thus maintained, the British +passenger steamer <em>Sussex</em>, crossing the English Channel, was torpedoed +without warning. It was the clearest violation of the pledge given by the +German Government the previous September. Once again Wilson acted without +precipitancy.<a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a> He waited until the Germans should present explanations +and thereafter took more than a week in which to formulate his decision. +Finally, on April 19, 1916, he called the two houses of Congress in joint +session to lay before them his note to Germany. Unlike his <em>Lusitania</em> +notes, this was a definite ultimatum, clearly warranted by the undeniable +fact that Germany had broken a solemn pledge. After recounting the long +list of events which had so sorely tried American patience, Wilson +concluded that "unless the Imperial German Government should now +immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of +warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels this Government +can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government +of the German Empire altogether." The force of the ultimatum was +emphasized by the general tone of the note, in which, as in the +<em>Lusitania</em> notes, the President spoke not so much for the legal rights +of the United States, as in behalf of the moral rights of all humanity. +He stressed the "principles of humanity as embodied in the law of +nations," and excoriated the "inhumanity of submarine warfare"; he +terminated by stating that the United States would contemplate a +diplomatic break with reluctance, but would feel constrained to take the +step "in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations." <a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>This note +of emphasis upon America's duty to mankind rather than to herself formed +the main theme of a speech delivered two days previous: "America will +have forgotten her traditions whenever upon any occasion she fights +merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has +forgotten to fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America can +ever have for the assertion of her physical force is that she asserts it +in behalf of the interests of humanity."</p> + +<p>Germany yielded before Wilson's ultimatum, though with bad grace, and +promised that no more merchant ships would be sunk "without warning and +without saving human lives." But she also tried to make her promise +conditional upon the cessation by Great Britain of methods of warfare +which Germany called illegal, implying that her pledge might be withdrawn +at her pleasure: "the German Government ... must reserve itself complete +liberty of action." This condition Wilson, in taking note of Germany's +pledge, definitely waved aside: "the Government of the United States +notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, +much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities +<a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>for the rights of American citizens upon the high seas should in any way +or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any +other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. +Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not +relative." By its silence the German Government seemed to acquiesce and +the crisis was over. The country had been close to war, but intervention +might yet be avoided if Germany kept her word. That, however, was a +condition upon which people were learning not to rely.</p> + +<p>It is obvious that by the early summer of 1916 President Wilson's +attitude on foreign affairs had undergone a notable transformation from +that parochial spirit of 1914 which had led him to declare that the war +was no concern of America; he had given over completely the tradition +that if we keep our own hands clean we fulfill our duty. He had begun to +elaborate an idealistic policy of service to the world, not unreminiscent +of the altruistic schemes of Clay and Webster for assisting oppressed +republicans in Europe during the first third of the nineteenth century. +Wilson, like those statesmen, had always felt that the position of the +United States in the world was of a special sort, quite different from +that of the European states, and circumstances were forcing him to take +the stand that the nation must assume the lead in the world in order to +ensure the operation of the principles that Americans believe in. "We are +in some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesman +of the rights of humanity." He still opposed active intervention in the +war; the mission of the United States was a higher one than could +adequately be fulfilled through war; the kind of service we could best +give was not fighting. Yet he was brought to admit, even before the +<em>Sussex</em> crisis (February 26, 1916), that in the last instance war might +be necessary if the American people were to assume the rôle of champion +of liberty in the world at large, as they had championed it in the +Americas; for the rights of humanity must be made secure against menace: +"America ought to keep out of this war ... at the expense of everything +except this single thing upon which her character and history are +founded, her sense of humanity and justice.... Valor withholds itself +from all small implications and entanglements and waits for the great +opportunity, when the sword will flash as if it carried the light of +heaven upon its blade." Thus the possibility of ultimate force was +implied. <a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>Eighteen months previous, peace had been for Wilson an end in +itself. Now it was subordinated to the greater end implied in maintaining +the principle of justice in the world.</p> + +<p>During this period popular sentiment also underwent a notable +development. Americans reacted sharply to German threats and outrages, +and were thrown off their comfortable balance by the events which touched +American honor and safety so closely. Like Wilson, they were shaken out +of that sense of isolation which enveloped them in 1914, and they were +thus prepared for the reception of broader ideals. The process of +education was slow and difficult. It was hampered by the confusion of +foreign issues. Propagandists took advantage of the controversy with +Great Britain in order to obscure the principles upon which the +discussions with Germany were based. The increasing stringency of British +control of commerce and the blacklisting of various American firms by the +British authorities resulted in numerous American protests and to some +warmth of feeling. Wilson was no particular friend of the British, but he +rightly insisted upon the distinction between the dispute with Germany, +which involved the common right of humanity to life, and that with Great +Britain, which involved merely rights of property. <a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a>Nevertheless that +distinction was blurred in the minds of many Americans, and their +perception of the new ideals of foreign policy was necessarily confused.</p> + +<p>The education of the American people to the significance of the issue was +also hampered by the material change that came over the country during +the latter part of 1915 and the spring of 1916. The influx of gold and +the ease with which fortunes were accumulated could not but have +widespread effects. The European war came at a moment when the United +States was passing through a period of comparatively hard times. +Stringency was naturally increased by the liquidation of foreign +investments in 1914 and the closing of European markets to American +commerce. Business was dull. But this condition was rapidly altered +through the placing of large contracts by the Entente Governments and the +most extensive buying by foreign purchasers. New markets were found among +the neutral states, which were unable to buy in Europe. Naturally there +developed a rapid extension of industrial activities. New manufacturing +concerns grew up, large and small, as a result of these adventitious +conditions, which paid enormous returns. Activities upon the stock market +were unparalleled. <a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a>New and sudden fortunes were made; millionaires +became common. The whole world was debtor to America and a golden stream +flowed across the Atlantic. Prices rose rapidly and wages followed.</p> + +<p>Inevitably materialism conquered, at least for the moment. The demand for +luxuries was only equaled by the craze for entertainment. Artisans and +shopgirls invaded the jewelry stores of Fifth Avenue. Metropolitan life +was a succession of luncheons and teas, where fertile brains were busied +with the invention of new dancing steps rather than the issues of the +European war. Cabarets were crowded and seats for midnight beauty shows +must be secured well in advance or by means of gargantuan tips to +plutocratic head waiters. Much of the materialism was simply external. In +every town American women by the thousand gave lavishly of their time and +strength to knit and roll bandages for the fighters and wounded overseas. +America was collecting millions for the relief of Belgium, Serbia, and +for the Red Cross. The American Ambulance in France was served by men +imbued with the spirit of sacrifice. Thousands of American youths +enlisted in the Canadian forces. <a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a>The general atmosphere of the country, +however, was heavy with amusement and money-making. Not yet did America +fully realize that the war was a struggle of ideals which must concern +every one closely. In such an atmosphere the idealistic policy of Wilson +was not easily understood.</p> + +<p>The President himself cannot escape a large share of the blame for +America's blindness to the issue. During the first twelve months of the +war, when the country looked to him for leadership, he had, purposely or +otherwise, fostered the forces of pacifism and encouraged the advocates +of national isolation. He had underlined the separation of the United +States from everything that went on in Europe and insisted that in the +issues of the war the American people had no interest. In deference to +the spirit of pacifism that engrossed the Middle West, he had opposed the +movement for military preparedness. When, late in 1915, Wilson changed +his attitude and attempted to arouse the country to a sense of American +interest in world affairs and to the need of preparing to accept +responsibility, he encountered the opposition of forces which he himself +had helped to vitalize.</p> + +<p>Popular education, especially upon the Atlantic coast, was further +hampered by the personal irritation which the President aroused. <a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>Disliked +when inaugurated, he had attracted bitter enmity among the business men +who dominate opinion in New England and the Eastern States. They accused +him of truckling to labor. They were wearied by his idealism, which +seemed to them all words and no deeds. They regarded his handling of +foreign affairs, whether in the Mexican or submarine crises, as weak and +vacillating. He was, in Rooseveltian nomenclature, a "pussyfooter." Hence +grew up the tradition, which was destined to endure among many elements +of opinion, that everything advocated by Wilson must, simply by reason of +its authorship, be essentially wrong. The men of Boston, New York, and +Philadelphia were beginning to give over their attitude of isolation and +admit with Roosevelt that the United States ought to stand with the +Entente. The Wilsonian doctrine of service to the world, however, was not +to their taste, partly because they did not like Wilson.</p> + +<p>It was to the rural districts of the upper Mississippi and to the South +that the President looked most eagerly for support of his new policy. +These were the regions where indifference to and ignorance of foreign +affairs had been most conspicuous, but they were also the regions where +the President's personal influence was strongest; finally they were the +districts where extreme pacifism was most deeply embedded. <a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>If Wilson's +championship of the rights of liberty throughout the world could be +accomplished by pacific methods, they would follow him; but if it meant +war, no one could guarantee what their attitude might be. Bryan was +popular in those parts. As yet Wilson, while he had formulated his policy +in broad terms, had not indicated the methods or mechanism by which his +principles were to be put into operation. He would without question +encounter strong opposition among the German-Americans; he would find the +attitude of the Irish foes of the Entente hostile; he would find the +Pacific coast more interested in Japanese immigration than in the ideals +of the European war. Fortunately events were to unify the heterogeneous +elements of the country, at least for the moment, in a way that +simplified greatly the President's problem. Not the least of the unifying +forces was to be found in German psychology, which led the Imperial +Government to believe that the United States could be rendered helpless +through the intrigues of German spies.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>PLOTS AND PREPAREDNESS</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a>The Government of the German Empire was inspired by a spirit that was at +once modern and medieval, and this contradictory spirit manifested itself +in the ways and means employed to win the sympathy of the United States +and to prevent it, as a neutral power, from assisting the Entente. +Germany worked on the one hand by means of open propaganda, which is the +method of modern commercial advertisement translated into the political +field, and on the other by secret intrigue reminiscent of the days of +Louis XI. Her propaganda took the form of organized campaigns to +influence opinion through speeches, pamphlets, and books, which were +designed to convince the country of the justice of Germany's cause and +the dangers of becoming the catspaw of the Entente. Her plans of intrigue +were directed towards the use of German-Americans or German spies to +assist in the return<a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a> of German officers from this country, to hinder the +transport of Canadian troops, to destroy communications, and to hamper +the output of munitions for the Entente by strikes, incendiary fires, and +explosions.</p> + +<p>During the first weeks of the war a German press bureau was established +in New York for the distribution of pro-German literature and the support +of the German-American press. Its activities were chiefly directed by Dr. +Bernhard Dernburg, who defended Germany from the charge of responsibility +for the war and expatiated upon her efficiency and the beneficence of her +culture in the same breath that he attacked the commercial greed of Great +Britain, the cruel autocracy of Russia, and the imperialistic designs of +Japan in the Pacific. Its pamphlets went so far as to excoriate allied +methods of warfare and to level accusations of inhumanity against the +Belgians. It distributed broadcast throughout the country an appeal +signed by ninety-three German professors and intellectuals, and +countersigned by a few notable Americans, which besought the American +people not to be deceived by the "lies and calumnies" of the enemies of +Germany.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>This propaganda left all cold except those who already sympathized with +Germany. Indeed it reacted unfavorably against the German cause, as soon +as the well-authenticated reports came of German atrocities in Belgium, +of the burning of the Louvain library, and of the shelling of Rheims +cathedral. The efforts of German agents then shifted, concentrating in an +attack upon the United States Government for its alleged unneutral +attitude in permitting the export of munitions to the Entente. In some +sections of the country they were able to arouse an opinion favorable to +the establishment of an embargo. In the Senate, on December 10, 1914, a +bill was offered by John D. Works of California providing for the +prohibition of the sale of war supplies to any belligerent nation and a +similar bill was fathered in the House by Charles L. Bartlett of Georgia. +These efforts were warmly supported by various associations, some of +which were admittedly German-American societies, although the majority +attempted to conceal their partisan feeling under such titles as +<em>American Independence Union</em> and <em>American Neutrality League</em>. The +latter effectively displayed its interest in America and in neutrality by +tumultuous singing of <em>Deutschland über Alles</em> and <em>Die Wacht am Rhein</em>. +Of sincerely pacifist organizations there were not a few, among<a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a> which +should not be forgotten the fantastic effort of Henry Ford in December, +1915, to end the war by sending a "Peace Ship" to Europe, designed to +arouse such public opinion abroad in favor of peace that "the boys would +be out of the trenches by Christmas." The ship sailed, but the +expedition, which was characterized by equal amounts of honesty and +foolishness, broke up shortly in dissension. For the most part pacifism +and pro-Germanism went hand in hand—a tragic alliance of good and evil +which was to hamper later efforts to evolve an international organization +for the preservation of peace.</p> + +<p>The attempts of German propagandists to influence the policy of the +Government met, as we have seen, the stubborn resolve of the President +not to favor one camp of the belligerents by a departure from +international custom and law during the progress of the war. Their +efforts, however, were not entirely relaxed. Appeals were made to workmen +to stop the war by refusing to manufacture munitions; vigorous campaigns +were conducted to discredit the Administration by creating the belief +that it was discriminating in favor of the British. But more and more +Germany took to secret intrigue, the strings of which were pulled by the +military and naval attachés, von Papen and Boy-Ed. <a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>The German Ambassador, +von Bernstorff, also took a lively interest in the plans to control +public opinion and later to hamper munitions production. With his +approval, German manufacturing companies were organized at Bridgeport and +elsewhere to buy up the machinery and supplies essential to the +production of powder, shrapnel, and surplus benzol; arrangements were +made with the Bosch Magneto Company to enter into contracts with the +Entente for fuses and at the last moment to refuse to complete the +contract. Von Bernstorff was careful to avoid active participation in +plots for the destruction of property; but his interest and complicity, +together with that of Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, Financial Adviser of the +German Embassy, are evidenced by the checks drawn on their joint account +and paid to convicted criminals.</p> + +<p>One of the first of the plots was the attempted blowing up of the +international bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, on December 31, 1914. The +materials for this explosion were collected and the fuse set by a German +reservist lieutenant, Werner Horn, who admitted that he acted under the +orders of von Papen. Another plan of the German agents was the +destruction of the Welland Canal, which was <a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a>entrusted to a brilliant and +erratic adventurer, von der Goltz, who later confessed that he was under +the supervision of von Papen and had secured his materials from Captain +Hans Tauscher, the agent in New York of the Hamburg-American Line. This +company was involved in securing false manifests for vessels that carried +coal and supplies to German cruisers, thus defrauding the United States, +and in obtaining false passports for German reservists and agents; it +acted, in fact, as an American branch of the German Admiralty. More +serious yet was an attempt of the naval attaché, Boy-Ed, to involve the +United States and Mexico in a dispute by a plot to bring back Huerta. +This unhappy Mexican leader was arrested on the Mexican border in June, +1915, and shortly afterwards died.</p> + +<p>For some months the existence of such activities on the part of German +agents had been suspected by the public. A series of disclosures +followed. In July, 1915, Dr. Albert, while riding on a New York elevated +train, was so careless as to set his portfolio on the seat for a few +moments; it was speedily picked up by a fellow passenger who made a hasty +exit. Soon afterwards the chief contents of the portfolio were published. +They indicated the complicity of the German Embassy in different +<a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>attempts to control the American press and to influence public opinion, +and proved the energy of less notable agents in illegal undertakings. +Towards the end of August, the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantin Dumba, +made use of an American correspondent, James F. J. Archibald by name, to +carry dispatches to the Central Empires. He was arrested by the British +authorities at Falmouth, and his effects proved Dumba's interest in plans +to organize strikes in American munitions plants. "It is my impression," +wrote the Austrian Ambassador, "that we can disorganize and hold up for +months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in +Bethlehem and the Middle West, which in the opinion of the German +military attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the +expenditure of money involved." Archibald also carried a letter from von +Papen to his wife in which he wrote: "I always say to these idiotic +Yankees that they had better hold their tongues." Its publication did not +serve to allay the warmth of American feeling.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a>It was with great satisfaction, therefore, that the public learned in +September that President Wilson had requested the recall of Ambassador +Dumba in the following words: "By reason of the admitted purpose and +intent of Ambassador Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries +of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate +trade, and by reason of the flagrant diplomatic impropriety in employing +an American citizen protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer +of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of +Austria-Hungary.... Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government +of the United States." The two German attachés were given a longer +shrift, but on the 30th of November von Bernstorff was told that they +were no longer acceptable; von Papen sailed on the 22d of December and +was followed a week later by Boy-Ed.</p> + +<p>During the two preceding months there had been a constant series of +strikes and explosions in munitions plants and industrial works, and +public opinion was now thoroughly aroused. The feeling that Germany and +Austria were thus through their agents virtually carrying on warfare in +the United States was intensified by the revelations of Dr. Joseph +Goričar, formerly an Austrian consul, but a Jugoslav who sympathized with +the Entente; according to his statement every Austrian consul in the +country was "a center of intrigue of the most criminal character." His +charges came at the moment <a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>when Americans were reading that the number +of strikes in munitions plants was unparalleled, no less than one hundred +and two in a few months, of which fifty were in Bridgeport, which was +known to be a center of German activities. Explosions and fires at the +plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and the Baldwin Locomotive Works, +and at the Roebling wire-rope shop in Trenton were of mysterious origin.</p> + +<p>To what extent explosions in munitions plants were the result of German +incendiarism and not of an accidental nature, it is difficult to +determine. But the Department of Justice was so thoroughly convinced of +the far-reaching character of German plots that President Wilson, in his +annual message of December, 1915, frankly denounced the "hyphenates" who +lent their aid to such intrigues. "I am sorry to say that the gravest +threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within +our own borders. There are citizens of the United States ... who have +poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national +life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our +Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought +it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to +debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue." <a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>His attack drew +forth the bitter resentment of the foreign language press, but was hailed +with delight in the East, where German intrigues aroused as great +excitement against the Fatherland as the submarine campaign. Nor was it +calmed by the continuance of fires and explosions and the evident +complicity of German officials. During the spring of 1916 a German agent, +von Igel, who occupied the former offices of von Papen, was arrested, and +the activities of Franz von Rintelen, who had placed incendiary bombs on +vessels leaving New York with food and supplies for the Allies, were +published. Taken in conjunction with the sinking of the <em>Sussex</em>, German +plots were now stimulating the American people to a keen sense of their +interest in the war, and preparing them effectively for a new attitude +toward foreign affairs in general.</p> + +<p>It was inevitable that such revelations should have created a widespread +demand for increased military efficiency. The nation was approaching the +point where force might become necessary, and yet it was in no way +prepared for warfare, either on land or sea. During the first months of +the war the helplessness of the United States had been laid bare by +General Leonard Wood, who declared that we <a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a>had never fought a really +first-class nation and "were pitifully unprepared, should such a calamity +be thrust upon us." The regular army "available to face such a crisis" +would be "just about equal to the police forces of Boston, New York, and +Philadelphia." The "preparedness movement" thus inaugurated was +crystallized by the formation of the National Security League, designed +to organize citizens in such a way "as may make practical an intelligent +expression of public opinion and may ensure for the nation an adequate +system of national defense." Pacifists and pro-Germans immediately +organized in opposition; and the movement was hampered by President +Wilson's unwillingness to coöperate in any way. He was flatly opposed, in +the autumn of 1914 and the spring of the following year, to compulsory +military service: "We will not ask our young men to spend the best years +of their lives making soldiers of themselves." He insisted that the +American people had always been able to defend themselves and should be +able to continue to do so without altering their military traditions. It +must not be forgotten that at this time Wilson still believed in absolute +isolation and refused to consider force as an element in our foreign +policy. <a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>His attitude was sufficient to render fruitless various +resolutions presented by Congressman Augustus P. Gardner and Senator +George E. Chamberlain, who proposed improvements in the military system. +Congress was pacifically-minded. This was the time when many Congressmen +were advocating an embargo on arms, and so far from desiring to learn how +to make and use munitions of war they concentrated their efforts on +methods of preventing their export to the Allies.</p> + +<p>The preparedness movement, none the less, spread through the country and +the influence of the National Security League did much to inform the +public. In the summer of 1915 there was organized at Plattsburg, New +York, under the authority of General Wood, a civilian camp designed to +give some experience in the rudiments of military science. It was not +encouraged by the Administration, but at the end of the year the +President himself confessed that he had been converted. He was about to +abandon his policy of isolation for his new ideal of international +service, and he realized the logical necessity of supporting it by at +least a show of force. Mere negative "neutrality" no longer sufficed. His +fear that greater military strength might lead to an aggressive spirit in +the country had been obliterated by the attacks of submarines and by the +German plots.<a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a> He admitted frankly that he had changed his mind. "I would +be ashamed," he said, "if I had not learned something in fourteen +months." To the surprise of many who had counted upon his pacific +tendencies to the end, he did what he had not heretofore done for any of +his policies; he left his desk in Washington and took to the platform.</p> + +<p>During January and February, 1916, President Wilson delivered a +succession of speeches in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. +Louis, and other places in the upper Mississippi Valley, emphasizing his +conversion to preparedness. Aware that his transformation would be +regarded as anti-German and tending to draw the United States into the +conflict, he apparently sought out pro-German and pacifist centers, and +for the first time utilized something of the traditional "patriotic" +style to rouse those citizens who, as yet, failed to appreciate the +significance of the international situation. "I know that you are +depending upon me to keep the nation out of war. So far I have done so, +and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I will—if it is possible. +You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothing +stains or impairs the honor of the United States. <a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>And that is a matter +not within my control. That depends upon what others do, not upon what +the Government of the United States does, and therefore there may be at +any moment a time when I cannot both preserve the honor and the peace of +the United States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory +thing, but stand ready and insist that everybody that represents you +should stand ready to provide the means for maintaining the honor of the +United States." And later: "America cannot be an ostrich with its head in +the sand. America cannot shut itself out from the rest of the world.... +Do you want the situation to be such that all the President can do is to +write messages, to utter words of protest? If these breaches of +international law which are in daily danger of occurring should touch the +very vital interests and honor of the United States, do you wish to do +nothing about it? Do you wish to have all the world say that the flag of +the United States, which we all love, can be stained with impunity?" What +a transformation from those days of December, 1914, when he believed that +military preparation would prove that the American people had been thrown +off their balance by a war with which they had nothing to do! <a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>And what a +revelation of the wounds inflicted by the barbed taunts cast against the +President for his patience in the writing of diplomatic notes!</p> + +<p>Had the President carried his enthusiasm into actual accomplishment and +provided for effective military and naval preparation, his claim to the +title of great statesman would be more clear. Unfortunately when it came +to forcing Congress to take the necessary steps, he failed. The inertia +and reluctance of pacifist or partisan representatives would have been +broken by Roosevelt. But Wilson did mere lip-service to the principle of +military efficiency. The bills introduced in Congress were denounced by +military experts as half-measures likely to produce no efficient result, +and the President, who in most matters was determined to dominate, in +this permitted congressional committees to have their way. The protests +of the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, led to his resignation; and +(most curious development) the President replaced him by a man, Newton D. +Baker, who, whatever his capacity, was generally known as a pacifist. +Wilson's intelligence told him that military preparation was necessary, +if his policy of international service was to be anything more than +academic; but his pacific<a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a> instincts prevented him from securing real +military efficiency.</p> + +<p>An example of the unreadiness of the United States was furnished in the +late spring and summer of 1916, when relations with Mexico became strained +almost to the breaking point. President Wilson's handling of the knotty +Mexican problem had been characteristic. He had temporized in the hope +that anything like a break might be avoided and was resolutely opposed to +formal armed intervention. But after refusing to recognize Huerta, who had +gained his position of provisional president of Mexico through the murder +of Madero, in which he was evidently implicated, the President had ordered +the occupation of Vera Cruz by United States troops in retaliation for the +arrest of an American landing party and Huerta's refusal to fire an +apologetic salute. Huerta was forced to give up his position and fled, but +the crisis continued and American-Mexican relations were not improved. The +country was left in the hands of three rival presidents, of whom Carranza +proved the strongest, and, after an attempt at mediation in which the +three chief South American powers participated, President Wilson decided +to recognize him. <a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a>But Mexican conditions remained chaotic and American +interests in Mexico were either threatened or destroyed. In the spring of +1916 an attack on American territory led by a bandit, Francisco Villa, +again roused Wilson to action. He dispatched General John J. Pershing +across the border to pursue and catch Villa. The expedition was difficult, +but well-conducted; it extended far south of the frontier and provoked the +protests of Carranza. At the moment when Pershing's advance guard seemed +to have its hands on the bandit, orders were given to cease the pursuit.</p> + +<p>The opponents of the Administration had some excuse for laughing at the +"inglorious and ineffectual war" thus waged. It had failed to result in +the capture of Villa and it gave rise to serious danger of an open break +with Mexico. On the 21st of June an attack at Carrizal by Carranza's +troops resulted in the capture of some United States cavalrymen and the +mobilization of the national guard troops for the protection of the +border. But President Wilson was not to be drawn into intervention. He +might be compelled to exercise force in carrying out his ideals of +international service against an international criminal like Germany; he +would not use it against a weaker neighbor and particularly at the moment +when the United States must be free to face European complications. <a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a>But +the Mexican crisis proved definitely the weakness of the military system. +Though the regulars who accompanied Pershing proved their worth, the +clumsy inefficient mobilization of the National Guard, on the other hand, +indicated as plainly as possible the lack of trained troops and officers.</p> + +<p>The President's determination not to intervene in Mexico probably assured +him many votes in the pacifist regions of the Middle West in the +presidential election of 1916. That he would be renominated by the +Democrats was a foregone conclusion. He had alienated the machine leaders +by his strict domination of Congress and the party; if he had permitted +certain political leaders to distribute offices for necessary organization +interests, he had seen to it, none the less, that the Democratic bosses +had no share in the determination of policies. Still they could not hope +to prevent his nomination. Whatever chance the party might have in the +coming election lay in the personal strength of Wilson with the masses. In +the South and the districts west of the Mississippi he was regarded as the +greatest Democrat since Jackson. His patience in dealing with Germany, as +with Carranza, convinced them of his desire for peace; the slogan, <a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a>"He has +kept us out of war," was a powerful argument in those regions. His +attitude towards labor had been friendly, so that the support of the +unions in the large industrial centers might be expected. Placards were +posted showing a poor man's family with the caption, "He has protected me +and mine," in answer to the Republican posters which showed a widow and +orphans (presumably of a drowned American citizen) and the caption, "He +has neglected me and mine." The remnants of the Progressives, who were not +purely Roosevelt supporters, were attracted by Wilson's legislative +programme and record of accomplishment. He could look to an independent +vote such as no other Democrat could hope for.</p> + +<p>Despite this strength, the Republican leaders, if they could succeed in +effecting a reunion of their party, awaited the results of the election +with confidence. They counted chiefly upon the personal unpopularity of +Wilson on the Atlantic seaboard and the normal Republican vote in the +industrial centers of the Middle West. His foreign policy, east of the +Mississippi, was generally looked upon as anæmic and nebulous. He had +permitted, so the Republicans contended, the honor of the country to be +stained and Americans to be destroyed, without effective action. <a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>His +early opposition to preparedness and the half-hearted measures of army +reform had proved his weakness, at least to the satisfaction of +Republican stump orators. He had won the hearty dislike of the bankers, +the manufacturers, and the merchants by his attacks on capitalist +interests and by his support of labor unions. The Clayton Act, which +exempted strikes from Federal injunctions, and the Adamson Act, which +granted, under threat, the immediate demands of the striking railroad +employees, were cited as clear proof of his demagogic character. +Furthermore, while he alienated the pro-Entente elements in New England +and the Eastern States, he had drawn upon himself the hatred of the +German-Americans by his attacks upon hyphenates and his refusal to accept +an embargo on American munitions.</p> + +<p>Had the Republicans been willing to accept Theodore Roosevelt, victory +would probably have come to them. He alone could have gathered in the +Progressive and independent vote, and that of the Pacific coast, which +ultimately went to Wilson. But the Old Guard of the Republicans refused +to consider Roosevelt; they could not take a man who had broken party +lines four years before; <a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>above all they wanted a "safe and sane" +President, who would play the political game according to rule—the rule +of the bosses—and they knew that were Roosevelt elected they could not +hope to share in the spoils. The Republican convention ultimately settled +upon Charles E. Hughes, who certainly was not beloved by the bosses, but +who was regarded as "steadier" than Roosevelt. The latter, in order to +defeat Wilson, refused the offer of the Progressives, practically +disbanded the party he had created, and called upon his friends to return +with him to their first allegiance.</p> + +<p>Hughes did not prove a strong candidate. Whereas Wilson had stated his +position on the German-American problem plainly, "I neither seek the +favor nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us which +puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States," +Hughes was ordered by his party managers not to offend foreign-born +voters, and in his attempt to steer a middle course, gave a clear +impression of vacillation. Many of those who had been most thoroughly +disgusted with Wilson turned back to him again, as the weeks passed and +Hughes more and more sought refuge in vague generalizations. <a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>In a +campaign in which the issues were largely personal the Republican +candidate's failure to evolve a constructive policy greatly weakened him, +especially as Wilson had the advantage of the maxim that it is best not +to change horses in the middle of the stream. Finally, Hughes did not +prove adept in reconciling the Progressives. Indeed it was said to be a +political <em>gaucherie</em> on his part, or that of his advisers, which +alienated the friends of Governor Hiram Johnson of California and threw +the electoral vote of that State to Wilson.</p> + +<p>California turned the scale. When on the evening of the 7th of November +the first returns came in and it was seen that Wilson had lost New York +and Illinois, the election of Hughes was generally conceded. Even the +<em>New York Times</em> and the <em>World</em> admitted Wilson's defeat. But the next +morning, news from the west indicated that the President still had a +chance. Later in the day the chance grew larger; he had won Ohio; +Minnesota and California were doubtful. In both States voting was close; +if Wilson won either the election would be his. It was not until the 11th +of November that the returns from California definitely showed a small +Wilson plurality, and only on the 21st that the Republicans finally +abandoned hope. Wilson had secured 277 electoral votes to 254 for +Hughes. He had been saved by the pacifist Middle and Far West, in +combination with the South. But the victory meant something far different +from peace at any price.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>AMERICA DECIDES</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>The presidential campaign of 1916, taken in conjunction with the +increasing tension of European relations, forced Wilson to a further +development of his international ideals and a more definite formulation of +the means by which to attain them. As we have observed, the spring of that +year saw him reject the doctrine of isolation. "We are participants," he +said on the 27th of May, "whether we would or not, in the life of the +world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with +the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the +affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." This recognition of our +interest in world affairs immediately took him considerably beyond the +position he had assumed during the earlier stages of the submarine +controversy. Until the spring of 1916 he had restricted his aims to the +championship of neutral and human rights in time of war. <a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>But now he began +to demand something more far-reaching, namely a system that would prevent +unjust war altogether and would protect the rights of all peoples in time +of peace. He insisted, in this same speech of the 27th of May, before the +League to Enforce Peace at Washington, "First that every people has a +right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.... Second, +that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect +for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and +powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a +right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin +in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." These +words sum up the gist of his international aims during the three following +years. His later speeches are merely refinement of details.</p> + +<p>In order that these ends might be secured it was necessary that some +international system be inaugurated other than that which had permitted +the selfishness of the great powers to produce war in the past. In his +search for a concrete mechanism to realize his ideals and secure them +from violation, Wilson seized upon the essential principles of the +League to Enforce Peace, of which William Howard Taft was president.<a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a> The +basis of permanent peace, Wilson insisted, could be found only by +substituting international coöperation in place of conflict, through a +mobilization of the public opinion of the world against international +lawbreakers: "an universal association of the nations to maintain the +inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and +unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war +begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full +submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee +of territorial integrity and political independence." These were the +principles and methods which formed the keynote of his foreign policy +until the end of the Peace Conference. The first part of the programme, +that which concerned the security of the seas and which originated in the +particular circumstances of 1915, faded from his sight to a large extent; +the second portion, more general in its nature, became of increasing +importance until, as Article X of the League Covenant, it seemed to him +the heart of the entire settlement.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a>The unselfish nature of his idealism, as well as his continued detachment +from both camps of the belligerents, was obvious. "We have nothing +material of any kind to ask for ourselves," he said, "and are quite aware +that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our +interest is only in peace and in its future guarantees." But <em>noblesse +oblige</em>, and we must serve those who have not had our good fortune. "The +commands of democracy are as imperative as its privileges are wide and +generous. Its compulsion is upon us.... We are not worthy to stand here +unless we ourselves be in deed and truth real democrats and servants of +mankind."</p> + +<p>That the United States might be drawn into the conflict evidently seemed +possible to the President, despite pacific whispers that came from +Germany in the spring and summer of 1916. There was a note of +apprehension in his speeches. No one could tell when the extremist +faction in Berlin might gain control and withdraw the <em>Sussex</em> pledge. +The temper of Americans was being tried by continued sinkings, although +the exact circumstances of each case were difficult to determine. The +attacks made by the German U-53 immediately off the American coast and +the deportation of Belgian civilians into Germany made more difficult the +preservation of amicable relations. In view of the possibility of war +Wilson wanted to define the issue exactly.<a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a> "We have never yet," he said +at Omaha, a peace center, on the 5th of October, "sufficiently formulated +our programme for America with regard to the part she is going to play in +the world, and it is imperative that she should formulate it at once.... +It is very important that the statesmen of other parts of the world +should understand America.... We are holding off, not because we do not +feel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation we +want to know what we are exerting it for." Ten days later at Shadowlawn +he said: "Define the elements, let us know that we are not fighting for +the prevalence of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this group +of nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; let +us once be convinced that we are called in to a great combination to +fight for the rights of mankind and America will unite her force and +spill her blood for the great things which she has always believed in and +followed." He thus gave warning that the United States might have to +fight. He wanted to be certain, however, that it did not fight as so many +other nations have fought, greedily or vindictively, but rather as in a +crusade and for clearly defined ideals.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a>His reëlection gave to the President an opportunity for bringing before +the world his international aims. He purposed not merely to end the +existing conflict but also to provide a basis for permanent peace and the +security of democracy. During the early summer of 1916 he had received +from Berlin hints that his mediation would not be unacceptable and it is +possible that he planned at that time new efforts to bring the war to a +close. But such a step was bound to be regarded as pro-German and in the +state of opinion immediately after the <em>Sussex</em> crisis would have +produced a storm of American protests. Then the entrance of Rumania into +the war so encouraged the Entente powers that there seemed little chance +of winning French and British acceptance of mediation. The presidential +election further delayed any overt step towards peace negotiations. +Finally the wave of anti-German feeling that swept the United States in +November, on account of Belgian deportations, induced Wilson to hold back +the note which he had already drafted. But it was important not to delay +his pacific efforts over-long, since news came to Washington that unless +Germany could obtain a speedy peace the extremist group in Berlin would +insist upon a resumption of "ruthless" submarine warfare.<a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a> In these +circumstances, early in December, the President prepared to issue his +note.</p> + +<p>But Germany acted more rapidly. Warned of Wilson's purpose the Berlin +Government, on December 12, 1916, proposed negotiations. The occasion +seemed to them propitious. Rumania had gone down to disastrous defeat. +Russia was torn by corruption and popular discontent. On the western +front, if the Germans had failed at Verdun, they were aware of the deep +disappointment of the Allies at the paltry results of the great Somme +drive. German morale at home was weakening; but if the Allies could be +pictured as refusing all terms and determined upon the destruction of +Germany, the people would doubtless agree to the unrestricted use of the +submarine as purely defensive in character, even if it brought to the +Allies the questionable assistance of America. The German note itself +contained no definite terms. But its boastful tone permitted the +interpretation that Germany would consider no peace which did not leave +Central and Southeastern Europe under Teuton domination; the specific +terms later communicated to the American Government in secret, verified +this suspicion. <a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a>A thinly veiled threat to neutral nations was to be read +between the lines of the German suggestion of negotiations.</p> + +<p>Although it was obvious that he would be accused of acting in collusion +with Germany, President Wilson decided not to postpone the peace note +already planned. He looked upon the crisis as serious, for if peace were +not secured at this time the chances of the United States remaining out +of the war were constantly growing less. If he could compel a clear +definition of war aims on both sides, the mutual suspicion of the warring +peoples might be removed; the German people might perceive that the war +was not in reality for them one of defense; or finally the Allies, toward +whom Wilson was being driven by the threats of German extremists, might +define their position in such terms as would justify him before the world +in joining with them in a conflict not waged for selfish national +purposes but for the welfare of humanity. Issued on December 18, 1916, +his note summed up the chief points of his recently developed policy. It +emphasized the interest of the United States in the future peace of the +world, the irreparable injury to civilization that might result from a +further continuance of the existing struggle, the advantages that would +follow an explicit exposure of belligerent purposes, and the<a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a> possibility +of making "the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate +future, a concert of nations immediately practicable."</p> + +<p>As a step towards peace the note was unsuccessful. Germany was evasive. +There was nothing her Government wanted less than the definite exposure +of her purposes that Wilson asked. Her leaders were anxious to begin +negotiations while German armies still held conquered territories as +pawns to be used at the peace table. They would not discuss a League of +Nations until Germany's continental position was secured. The Allies on +the other hand would not make peace with an unbeaten Germany, which +evidently persisted in the hope of dominating weaker nationalities and +said no word of reparations for the acknowledged wrongs committed. +Feeling ran high in England and France because Wilson's note had seemed +to place the belligerents on the same moral plane, in its statement that +the objects on both sides "are virtually the same, as stated in general +terms to their own people and to the world." The statement was verbally +accurate and rang with a certain grim irony which may have touched +Wilson's sense of humor. But the Allies were not in a state of mind to +appreciate such humor.<a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a> Their official answer, however, was frank, and in +substance accepted the principles of permanent peace propounded by +Wilson. It was evident to most Americans that the main purpose of Germany +was to establish herself as the dominating power of the continent and +possibly of the world; the aim of the Allies, on the other hand, seemed +to be the peace of the world based upon democracy and justice rather than +material force.</p> + +<p>The President's attempt thus cleared the air. It made plain to the +majority of Americans that in sympathy, at least, the United States must +be definitely aligned with Great Britain and France. Furthermore the +replies of the belligerents gave to Wilson an opportunity to inform the +world more definitely of the aims of the United States, in case it should +be drawn into the war. This he did in a speech delivered to the Senate on +January 22, 1917. America would play her part in world affairs, he said, +but the other nations must clearly understand the conditions of our +participation. The basis of peace must be the right of each individual +nation to decide its destiny for itself without interference from a +stronger alien power. "I am proposing as it were, that the nations should +with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of +the world: <a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a>that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any +other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to +determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, +unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." +Instead of the old system of alliances there should be a general concert +of powers: "There is no entangling alliance in a concert of powers. When +all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in +the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common +protection." As the result of such a concert no one power would dominate +the sea or the land; armaments might safely be limited; peace would be +organized by the major force of mankind. As a guarantee of future justice +and tranquillity the terms that settled the present war must be based +upon justice and not be of the sort ordinarily dictated by the victor to +the vanquished. It must be a "peace without victory." Thus while Wilson +warned Germany that her ambitions for continental domination would not be +tolerated, he also warned the Allies that they could not count upon the +United States to help them to crush Germany for their selfish individual +purposes.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a>This speech, despite the unfortunate phrase, "peace without victory," was +hailed in all liberal circles, amongst the Allies and in the United +States, as a noble charter of the new international order. Wilson had +expressed the hope that he was "speaking for the silent mass of mankind +everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real +hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already +upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear." This hope was +doubtless realized. The first reaction in France and England was one of +rather puzzled contempt, if we may judge by the press. But the newspaper +writers soon found that what Wilson said many people had been thinking, +and waiting for some one to say. Hall Caine wrote to the <em>Public Ledger</em>, +"Let President Wilson take heart from the first reception of his +remarkable speech. The best opinion here is one of deep feeling and +profound admiration." From that moment Wilson began to approach the +position he was shortly to hold—that of moral leader of the world.</p> + +<p>The President had been anxious to make plain his principles, before the +United States became involved in the conflict through the withdrawal of +German submarine pledges, as well as to convince the world that every +honest effort possible had been made to preserve the peace. <a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a>He was only +just in time. Already the advocates of ruthlessness in Berlin had +persuaded the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg. They recognized that the +resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare meant, in all probability, +the intervention of the United States, but they recked little of the +consequences. On January 16, 1917, the Kaiser telegraphed: "If a break +with America is unavoidable, it cannot be helped; we proceed." The same +day the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann, telegraphed to the +German Minister in Mexico, instructing him to form an alliance with +Mexico in the event of war between Germany and the United States, and to +offer as bribe the States of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas; he also +suggested the possibility of winning Japan from her allegiance to the +Entente and persuading her to enter this prospective alliance.</p> + +<p>On the 31st of January, von Bernstorff threw off the mask. The German +Ambassador informed our Government of the withdrawal of the <em>Sussex</em> +pledge. On and after the 1st of February, German submarines would sink on +sight all ships met within a delimited zone around the British Isles and +in the Mediterranean. <a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a>They would permit the sailing of a few American +steamships, however, provided they followed a certain defined route to +Falmouth and nowhere else, and provided there were marked "on ship's hull +and superstructure three vertical stripes one meter wide, to be painted +alternately white and red. Each mast should show a large flag checkered +white and red, and the stern the American national flag. Care should be +taken that during dark, national flag and painted marks are easily +recognizable from a distance, and that the boats are well lighted +throughout." Other conditions followed. There might sail one steamship a +week "in each direction, with arrival at Falmouth on Sunday and departure +from Falmouth on Wednesday." Furthermore the United States Government +must guarantee "that no contraband (according to the German contraband +list) is carried by those steamships." Such were the orders issued to the +United States. No native American could escape the humor of the +stipulations, which for a moment prevented the national irritation from +swelling into an outburst of deep-seated wrath.</p> + +<p>There seems to have been little hesitation on the part of the President. +On April 19, 1916, he had warned Germany that unrestricted submarine +warfare meant a severance of diplomatic relations. <a name="Page_108" id="Page_108"></a>Now, on February 3, +1917, addressing both houses of Congress, he announced that those +relations had been broken. Von Bernstorff was given his papers and the +American Ambassador, James W. Gerard, was recalled from Berlin. No other +course of action could have been contemplated in view of the formality of +the President's warning and the definiteness of Germany's defiance. +Despite the protests of scattered pacifists, the country was as nearly a +unit in its approval of Wilson's action as its heterogeneous national +character permitted. All the pent-up emotions of the past two years found +expression in quiet but unmistakable applause at the departure of the +German Ambassador.</p> + +<p>The promptitude of the President's dismissal of von Bernstorff did not +conceal the disappointment which he experienced from Germany's revelation +of her true purposes. He seems to have hoped to the end that the German +liberals would succeed in bringing their Government to accept moderate +terms of peace. Even now he expressed the hope that Germany's actions +would not be such as to force the United States into the War: "I refuse +to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in +fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do.... Only +actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now."<a name="Page_109" id="Page_109"></a> But +"if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by +their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and +reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates +of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress +to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary +for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of +their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing +less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the +same course." He was careful, moreover, to underline the fact that his +action was dictated always by a consistent desire for peace: "We wish to +serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and +in action to the immemorial principles of our people.... These are the +bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend +them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of +Germany!"</p> + +<p>But Germany proceeded heedlessly. Warned that American intervention would +result only from overt acts, the German Admiralty hastened to commit such +acts. <a name="Page_110" id="Page_110"></a>From the 3d of February to the 1st of April, eight American vessels +were sunk by submarines and forty-eight American lives thus lost. +Because of the practical blockade of American ports which followed the +hesitation of American shipping interests to send boats unarmed into the +dangers of the "war zone," President Wilson came again to Congress on the +26th of February to ask authority to arm merchant vessels for purposes of +defense. Again he stressed his unwillingness to enter upon formal warfare +and emphasized the idealistic aspect of the issue: "It is not of material +interests merely that we are thinking. It is, rather, of fundamental +human rights, chief of all the right of life itself. I am thinking not +only of the rights of Americans to go and come about their proper +business by way of the sea, but also of something much deeper, much more +fundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity without +which there is no civilization.... I cannot imagine any man with American +principles at his heart hesitating to defend these things."</p> + +<p>Blinded by prejudice and tradition, a handful of Senators, twelve +"willful men," as Wilson described them, blocked, through a filibuster, +the resolution granting the power requested by the President. But the +storm of popular obloquy which covered them proved that the nation as a +whole was determined to support him in the defense of American rights. +<a name="Page_111" id="Page_111"></a>The country was stirred to the depths. The publication of the plans of +Germany for involving the United States in war with Mexico and Japan came +merely as added stimulus. <em>So also of the story of the cruelties heaped by +the Germans on the American prisoners of the Yarrowdale</em>. There was so +much of justice in the cause that passion was notable by its absence. +When finally on the 17th of March news came of the torpedoing of the +<em>Vigilancia</em> without warning, America was prepared and calmly eager for +the President's demand that Congress recognize the existence of a state +of war.</p> + +<p>The demand was made by Wilson in an extraordinary joint session of +Congress, held on the 2d of April. In this, possibly his greatest speech, +he was careful not to blur the idealistic principles which, since the +spring of 1916, he had been formulating. War existed because Germany by +its actions had thrust upon the United States the status of belligerent. +But the American people must meet the challenge with their purpose +clearly before them. "We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will +not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the +nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we +are only a single champion.... The wrongs against which we now array +ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human +life." He went on to define the objects of the war more specifically, +referring to his earlier addresses: "Our object now, as then, is to +vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as +against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really +free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and +action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles." +Democracy must be the soul of the new international order: "A steadfast +concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of +democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep +faith within it or observe its covenants.... Only free peoples can hold +their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the +interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own." Because the +existing German Government was clearly at odds with all such ideals, "We +are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about +them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the +liberation of its peoples, the German people included: <a name="Page_113" id="Page_113"></a>for the rights of +nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose +their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for +democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of +political liberty."</p> + +<p>Wilson thus imagined the war as a crusade, the sort of crusade for +American ideals which Clay and Webster once imagined. He was in truth +originating nothing, but rather resuscitating the generous dreams which +had once inspired those statesmen. In conclusion, he reiterated his love +of peace. "But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight +for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for +democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice +in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, +for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as +shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at +last free." At the moment of the declaration of war Wilson was still the +man of peace, and the war upon which the nation was embarking was, in his +mind, a war to ensure peace. To such a task of peace and liberation, he +concluded in a peroration reminiscent of Lincoln and Luther, <a name="Page_114" id="Page_114"></a>"we can +dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and +everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day +has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for +the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she +has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."</p> + +<p>How many Americans caught the real significance of Wilson's thought with +all its consequences is doubtful. The country certainly looked upon the +war as a crusade. But there was in the national emotion much that did not +accord with the ideals of Wilson. The people hated Germany for the +sinking of the <em>Lusitania</em> and all the other submarine outrages, for her +crimes in Belgium, for the plots and explosions in this country, for the +Zimmermann note, and finally for her direct and insulting defiance of +American rights. They recognized that the Allies were fighting for +civilization; they sympathized with the democracies of Europe, of which, +since the Russian revolution of March, the Allied camp was composed, and +they wanted to help them. They feared for America's safety in the future, +if Germany won the war. Most Americans entered the struggle, therefore, +with a sober gladness, based partly on emotional, partly on quixotic, and +partly on selfish grounds. <a name="Page_115" id="Page_115"></a>But nearly all fought rather to beat Germany +than to secure a new international order. Hence it was that after Germany +was beaten, Wilson was destined to discover that his idealistic preaching +had not fully penetrated, and that he had failed to educate his country, +as completely as he believed, to the ideal of a partnership of democratic +and peace-loving peoples as the essential condition of a new and safe +world.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>THE NATION IN ARMS</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116"></a>When Congress declared that the United States was in a state of war with +Germany, on April 6, 1917, the public opinion of the country was unified +to a far greater extent than at the beginning of any previous war. The +extreme patience displayed by President Wilson had its reward. When the +year opened the majority of citizens doubtless still hoped that peace was +possible. But German actions in February and March had gone far towards +the education of the popular mind, and the final speeches of the President +crystallized conviction. By April there were few Americans, except those +in whom pacifism was a mania, who were not convinced that war with Germany +was the only course consistent with either honor or safety. It is probable +that many did not understand exactly the ideals that actuated Wilson, but +nine persons out of ten believed it absolutely necessary to fight.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117"></a>But, however firmly united, the country was completely unprepared for war +in a military sense, and must now pay the penalty for President Wilson's +opposition to adequate improvement of the military system in 1915 and for +the half-hearted measures taken in 1916. Total military forces, including +regular army, national guard, and reserves amounted to hardly three +hundred thousand men and less than ten thousand officers. Even the regular +army was by no means ready for immediate participation in the sort of +fighting demanded by the European war; and, even if adequate troops were +raised, the lack of trained officers would create the most serious +difficulties. No wonder that the German General Staff ranked the United +States, from the military point of view, somewhere between Belgium and +Portugal. Furthermore, military experts had been discouraged by the +attitude of the Administration. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, had +failed, either through lack of administrative capacity or because of +pacifistic tendencies, to prepare his department adequately. He had done +nothing to rouse Congress or the nation from its attitude of indifference +towards preparation. By faith a pacifist, he had been opposed to universal +military service.<a name="Page_118" id="Page_118"></a> An extreme liberal, he distrusted the professional +military type and was to find it difficult to coöperate with the captains +of industry whose assistance was essential.</p> + +<p>Thus with a President and War Secretary, both of whom had been +instinctively opposed to a large army and who had expressed their fear of +the development of a militaristic spirit, and with a majority in Congress +favoring the traditional volunteer system, adherence to which had cost +the British thousands of lives that might better have been used at home, +the building of an effective army seemed a matter of extreme doubt. Great +credit must go to both President Wilson and Secretary Baker for sinking +their natural instincts and seeking, as well as following, the advice of +the military experts, who alone were capable of meeting the problems that +arose from a war for which the nation was not prepared.</p> + +<p>The President must face not only the special problems caused by +unreadiness, but also the general difficulties which confront every +American war-President and which had tried nearly to the breaking-point +even the capacity of Lincoln. The President of the United States in time +of war is given the supreme unified command of the army and navy.<a name="Page_119" id="Page_119"></a> But +while the responsibility is his, actual control often rests in the hands +of others. Members of Congress always take a keen interest in army +matters; many of them have been or are militia-men. They have always +opposed a single army which could be recruited, trained, and operated as +a unit, and approved the system of State militia which makes for +decentralization and gives to the separate States large influence in the +formation of military policy. Even the President's control of the Federal +army, regulars and volunteers, is limited by the decentralized +organization of the different army bureaus, which depend upon Congress +for their appropriations and which operate as almost independent and +frequently competing units. The creation of a single programme for the +army as a whole is thus a task of extreme difficulty.</p> + +<p>President Wilson, as historian, was well aware of the tremendous price +that had been paid in past wars for such decentralization, accompanied as +it was, inevitably, by delays, misunderstandings, and mistakes. He was +determined to create a single coördinating command, and his war policies +were governed from beginning to end by this purpose. He set up no new +machinery, but utilized as his main instrument the General Staff, which +had been created in 1903 as a result of the blunders and confusion that +had been so painfully manifest in the Spanish War. When the United States +entered the World War the General Staff had by no means acquired the +importance expected by those who had created it.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> But to it the +President turned, and it was this body enlarged in size and influence +that ultimately put into operation Wilson's policy of centralization. It +was in accordance with the advice of the men who composed the General +Staff that the President elaborated the larger lines of the military +programme, and they were the men who supervised the operation of details.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In April, 1917, the General Staff consisted of fifty-one +officers, only nineteen of whom were on duty in Washington. Of these, +eight were occupied with routine business, leaving but eleven free for +the real purpose for which the staff had been created—"the study of +military problems, the preparation of plans for national defense, and +utilization of the military forces in time of war."</p></div> + +<p>None of the processes which marked the transition of the United States +from a peace to a war basis are comprehensible unless we remember that +the President was constantly working to overcome the forces of +decentralization, and also that the military programme was always on an +emergency basis, shifting almost from week to week in accordance with +developments in Europe.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121"></a>The original programme did not provide for an expeditionary force in +France. During the early days of participation in the war it was generally +believed that the chief contributions of the United States to Allied +victory would not be directly upon the fighting front. If the United +States concentrated its efforts upon financing the Allies, furnishing them +with food, shipping, and the munitions which had been promised—so many +persons argued—it would be doing far better than if it weakened +assistance of that sort by attempting to set up and maintain a large +fighting force of its own. The impression was unfortunately prevalent in +civilian circles that Germany was on her last legs, and that the outcome +of the war would be favorably settled before the United States could put +an effective army in the field. Military experts, on the other hand, more +thoroughly convinced of German strength, believed that the final campaigns +could not come before the summer of 1919, and did not expect to provide a +great expeditionary force previous to the spring of that year if indeed it +were ever sent. Thus from opposite points of view the amateur and the +professional deprecated haste in dispatching an army to France. From the +moment the United States entered the war, <a name="Page_122" id="Page_122"></a>President Wilson certainly +seems to have resolved upon the preparation of an effective fighting +force, if we may judge from his insistence upon the selective draft, +although he did not expect that it would be used abroad. But it may be +asked whether he did not hope for the arrangement of a negotiated peace, +which if not "without victory" would at least leave Germany uncrushed. It +is probable that he did not yet perceive that "force to the utmost" would +be necessary before peace could be secured; that realization was to come +only in the dark days of 1918.</p> + +<p>A few weeks after America's declaration of war, however, France and Great +Britain dispatched missions led by Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre, to +request earnestly that at least a small American force be sent overseas +at once for the moral effect upon dispirited France. The plea determined +the President to send General Pershing immediately with a force of about +two thousand, who were followed in June and July, 1917, by sufficient +additional forces to make up a division. Wilson had been authorized by +Congress, under the Selective Service Act, to send four volunteer +divisions abroad under the command of Roosevelt. But he refused to +interfere with the plans of the military experts, who strongly objected +to any volunteer forces whatever.<a name="Page_123" id="Page_123"></a> Neither the valiant ex-President nor +the prospective volunteers were trained for the warfare of the moment, +and their presence in France would bring no practical good to the Allied +cause; moreover the officers whom Roosevelt requested were sorely needed +in American training camps.</p> + +<p>General Pershing, to whom was now entrusted the military fortunes of the +American army abroad, was an officer fifty-seven years old, who had +undergone wide military and administrative experience in Cuba and the +Philippines; he had been given extraordinary promotion by President +Roosevelt, who had jumped him from the rank of captain to that of +Brigadier General; and he had been selected to lead the punitive force +dispatched in pursuit of Villa in the spring of 1916. Distinguished in +appearance, with superb carriage, thin lips, and squarely-chiselled chin, +he possessed military gifts of a sound rather than brilliant character. A +strict disciplinarian, he failed to win from his troops that affection +which the <em>poilus</em> gave to Pétain, while he never displayed the genius +that compelled universal admiration for Foch. Neither ultimate success +nor the stories of his dramatic remarks (as at the grave of La Fayette: +"La Fayette, we are here!") <a name="Page_124" id="Page_124"></a>succeeded in investing him with the heroic +halo that ought to come to a victorious commander. As time passes, +however, Pershing takes higher rank. His insistence upon soldierly +qualities, his unyielding determination to create American armies under +an independent command, his skill in building up a great organization, +his successful operations at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne drive, +despite faulty staff work—all these facts become more plain as we +acquire perspective. If historians refuse to recognize him as a great +general, they will surely describe his talents as more than adequate to +the exigencies of the military situation.</p> + +<p>The sending of the Pershing expedition did not at once alter +fundamentally the original programme for raising an army of about a +million men to be kept in the United States, as a reserve in case of +emergency. There was no intention of sending to France more troops than +would be needed to keep filled the ranks of the small expeditionary +force. But the urgent representations of the Allies and reports from +American officers induced a radical change in policy. The latter +emphasized the unsound military position of our Allies and insisted that +the deadlock could be broken and the war won only by putting a really +effective American army beside the French and British by the summer of +1918. A programme was drawn up in France and sent to the War Department, +according to which an army of thirty divisions should be sent abroad +before the end of that year. Throughout 1917 this plan remained rather a +hope than a definite programme and it was not until early in 1918 that it +was officially approved. It was thus of an emergency character and this +fact combined with the indefiniteness prevalent during the autumn of 1917 +to produce extreme confusion. In July, 1918, an eighty-division programme +was adopted and more confusion resulted. Furthermore the entire problem +was complicated by the question as to whether or not ships could be found +for transportation. It had been assumed that it would take six months to +transport five hundred thousand troops. But in May, 1918, and thereafter +nearly three hundred thousand troops a month were carried to France, +largely through tonnage obtained from the British. Such a development of +transportation facilities was not and could not be foreseen. It increased +the confusion. In the face of such difficulties, the problems of +man-power, training, and supplies had to be met and ultimately solved, +largely through the centralization carried into effect by the General +Staff.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126"></a>The problem of man-power had been carefully considered during the weeks +that preceded our entrance into the war and the declaration of war found +the Government prepared with a plan for a selective draft. On the 7th of +April, the day after the declaration of war, President Wilson insisted +that "the safety of the nation depended upon the measure."</p> + +<p>Congress, however, was slow to accept the principle of conscription, and +the President encountered fierce opposition on the part of the advocates +of the volunteer system, who were led by men of such influence as Speaker +Champ Clark, House Leader Claude Kitchin, and the chairman of the House +Committee on Military Affairs, Stanley H. Dent. The President was +inflexible, declaring that the Administration would not "yield an inch of +any essential parts of the programme for raising an army by conscription," +and exercised his personal influence to its fullest extent in order to +secure a favorable vote. He was ably seconded by Julius Kahn, the ranking +Republican member of the House Military Committee, who was himself born in +Germany. The failure of House and Senate to agree on the matter of age +liability delayed action for some weeks. <a name="Page_127" id="Page_127"></a>Finally, on May 18, 1917, what +is popularly known as the Selective Service Act became law.</p> + +<p>This Act gave to the President power to raise the regular army by +enlistment to 287,000 men, to take into the Federal service all members +of the national guard, and to raise by selective draft, in two +installments, a force of a million troops. All men between the ages of +twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, were registered on the 5th of +June; this with the subsequent registration of men coming of age later, +produced an available body of more than ten millions. And when in the +following year, the draft age was extended to include all men between the +ages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive, thirteen millions more +were added. From this body the names of those who were to serve were +drawn by lot. All men registered were carefully classified, in order that +the first chosen might be those not merely best fitted for fighting, but +those whose absence on the firing line would least disturb the essential +economic life of the nation. Liberal exemptions were accorded, including +artisans employed in industries necessary to war production and men upon +whom others were dependent. On the 20th of July the first drawings were +made, and by the end of the year about half a million of the drafted men, +now called the National Army, were mustered in. <a name="Page_128" id="Page_128"></a>In the meantime +enlistments in the regular army and the national guard had raised the +total number of troops to about a million and a quarter and of officers +to more than one hundred thousand. Less than a year later, when the +armistice was signed, the army included over three and a half millions, +of whom nearly two millions were in France.</p> + +<p>The real military contribution of the United States to allied victory lay +in man-power. It could not of its own resources transport the troops nor +equip them completely, but the raising of an enormous number of fresh +forces, partially trained, it is true, but of excellent fighting caliber, +made possible the maneuvers of Foch that brought disaster to German arms. +When once these armies arrived in numbers on the battle-line in France, +the realization of the inexhaustible man-power of America did more than +anything else to revive the spirit of the Allies and discourage the +enemy.</p> + +<p>Infinitely more difficult than the problem of man-power were those of +training and supplies. As we have seen, these problems were complicated +by the decision to send abroad an effective fighting force, a decision +which completely changed the entire military situation.<a name="Page_129" id="Page_129"></a> The original +plan of maintaining an army only in the United States, as a reserve, +permitted the questions of camps, supplies, equipment, munitions, and +training to be undertaken at comparative leisure. But if a large army was +to be placed in France by 1918, these problems must be solved immediately +and upon an emergency basis. Hence resulted the confusion and expense +which nearly led to the breakdown of the whole programme in the winter of +1917-18. The War Department faced a dilemma. If it waited until supplies +were ready, the period of training would be too short. On the other hand, +if it threw the new draft armies immediately into the camps, assuming +that the camps could be prepared, the troops would lack the wool uniforms +and blankets necessary for protection, as well as the equipment with +which to drill. The second alternative appeared the less dangerous, and +in September the first draft calls were made and by December the camps +were filled.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The size of the army raised in 1917 demanded the building of +enormous cantonments. Within three months of the first drawings sixteen +complete cities of barracks had sprung up, each to accommodate 40,000 +inhabitants. They had their officers' quarters, hospitals, sewage +systems, filter plants, and garbage incinerators, electric lighting +plants, libraries, theaters. By the 4th of September the National Army +cantonments were ready for 430,000 men, two-thirds of the first draft. A +single camp involved the expenditure of approximately $11,000,000. Camp +Grant, at Rockford, Illinois, included 1600 buildings with space for +45,000 men and 12,000 horses. The water, which before use was tested and +filtered, was supplied from six huge wells drilled 175 feet deep, carried +through 38 miles of water main, and stored in reservoir tanks holding +550,000 gallons. For lighting purposes there were 1450 miles of electric +wire, 1200 poles, 35,000 incandescent lamps. During the period of +construction, 50 carloads of building material were daily unloaded, and +for several weeks an average of 500,000 board feet of lumber set up +daily. The entire construction of the camp demanded 50,000,000 feet of +lumber, 700 tons of nails, 4,000,000 feet of roofing, and 3,000,000 +square feet of wall board.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130"></a>Many apprehensions were fulfilled in fact, when the terrible winter +weather came, the worst in years. The northern camps faced it with +insufficient clothing. Pneumonia made its invasion. Artillerymen were +trained with wooden guns; infantrymen with wooden rifles or antiquated +Krags. But all the time the essential training proceeded and the calls +for replacements sent by General Pershing in France were met.</p> + +<p>The first and vital need was for officers to train the willing but +inexperienced recruits. To meet this need a series of officers' training +camps had been established in the spring of 1917 and continued for a year. +Each camp lasted for three months, where during twelve hours a day the +candidates for commissions, chiefly college graduates<a name="Page_131" id="Page_131"></a> and young business +men, were put through the most intensive drill and withering study. All +told, more than eighty thousand commissions were granted through the +camps, and the story of the battlefields proved at once the caliber of +these amateur officers and the effectiveness of their training. Special +camps, such as the school of fire at Fort Sill, carried the officers a +step further, and when they went overseas they received in schools in +France instruction in the latest experience of the Allied armies. The +colleges of the country were also formed into training schools and +ultimately about 170,000 young men, under military age, in five hundred +institutions of learning, joined the Students' Army Training Corps.</p> + +<p>In all the army schools French and British officers coöperated as +instructors and gave the value of their three years' experience on the +fighting front. But the traditions of the American regular army, +formulated in the Indian and frontier fights, rather than the siege +methods of the trenches, formed the basic principles of the instruction; +General Pershing was insistent that an offensive spirit must be instilled +into the new troops, a policy which received the enthusiastic endorsement +of the President. <a name="Page_132" id="Page_132"></a>The development of "a self-reliant infantry by thorough +drill in the use of a rifle and in the tactics of open warfare" was always +uppermost in the mind of the commander of the expeditionary force, who +from first to last refused to approve the extreme specialization in trench +warfare that was advised by the British and the French.</p> + +<p>The emergency nature of the military programme, resulting from the sudden +decision to send a large army to France, the decentralization of army +affairs, and the failure to prepare adequately in the years preceding +entrance into the war—all these factors made a shortage of supplies in +the training camps inevitable.</p> + +<p>The first appropriation bill which was to provide the funds to purchase +clothing, blankets, and other necessities was not passed until the 15th of +June, leaving a pitifully brief space of time for the placing of contracts +and the manufacture and transport of supplies. Many factories had to be +built, and many delays resulted from the expansion of the Quartermaster +Department, which had not been manned or equipped for such an emergency. +The shortage of clothing was felt the more because of the extreme severity +of the winter. After the initial difficulties had been passed supplies of +this kind were furnished in profusion;<a name="Page_133" id="Page_133"></a> but lack of preparation on the +part of the War Department and the slowness of Congress to appropriate +promptly produced a temporary situation of extreme discomfort and worse. +The provision of food supplies was arranged more successfully. Soldiers +would not be soldiers if they did not complain of their "chow." But the +quality and variety of the food given to the new troops reached a higher +degree than was reasonably to have been expected. The average soldier +gained from ten to twelve pounds after entering the service. Provision was +also made for his entertainment. Vaudeville, concerts, moving pictures +formed an element of camp life, much to the surprise of the visiting +French officers and Civil War veterans.</p> + +<p>Americans naturally look back with pride to the making of their new army. +The draft was accomplished smoothly and rapidly. Demonstrations against +conscription, which in view of the Civil War draft riots had caused some +apprehension, were almost unheard of and never serious. Of the three +million called for service on the first draft, all but 150,000 were +accounted for, and of those missing most were aliens who had left to +enlist in their own armies. The problem of the slacker and of the +conscientious objector, although vexatious, was never serious.<a name="Page_134" id="Page_134"></a> The +educative effect of the training upon the country was very considerable. +All ranks and classes were gathered in, representing at least fifty-six +different nationalities; artisans, millionaires, and hoboes bunked side by +side; the youthful plutocrat saw life from a new angle, the wild +mountaineer learned to read, the alien immigrant to speak English. Finally +the purpose of the training was achieved, for America sent over a force +that could fight successfully at the moment of crisis.</p> + +<p>Amateur critics had assumed that the problem of raising an effective +number of troops would prove far more difficult than that of producing +the necessary equipment and munitions. It was generally believed that the +industrial genius of America was such that American factories could +provide all the artillery, small-arms, and aircraft that the armies could +use. The most fantastic prophecies were indulged in. Experience showed, +however, that it is easier to raise, train, and organize troops of +superior sort in a brief period than it is to arm them. It stands as a +matter of record that foreign artillery and machine guns alone made +possible the attack on the St. Mihiel salient and the advance in the +Argonne. <a name="Page_135" id="Page_135"></a>As for military airplanes, had the Government relied upon those +of American manufacture there would have been no American squadrons +flying over the German lines previous to August, 1918, and not many +between then and the signing of the armistice.</p> + +<p>Such a statement should not imply blanket criticism of the Ordnance +Department. The Government was perhaps slow, even after the United States +entered the war, to realize the serious character of the military +situation abroad and to appreciate the extent to which American aid would +be necessary to allied victory. Hence the changes in the military +programme which inevitably created confusion. But the decision to ensure +against unforeseen disaster by preparing heavily for 1919 and 1920 and +partially disregarding 1918 was based upon sound strategical reasoning. +The war was brought to a close sooner than had been expected; hence the +period of actual hostilities was devoted to laying down the foundations +of a munitions industry, and the munitions actually produced, in the +words of Assistant Secretary Crowell, "might almost be termed casual to +the main enterprise, pilots of the quantities to come." Such a policy was +possible because of the surplus production of the Allies. The latter +stated that their production of artillery was such that they could equip +all American divisions as they arrived in France during the year +1918.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> This gave time "to build manufacturing capacity on a grand scale +without the necessity of immediate production, time to secure the best in +design, time to attain quality in the enormous outputs to come later as +opposed to early quantities of indifferent class."</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> As a result of the agreement thus made the United States +shipped overseas between the time of the declaration of war and the +signing of the armistice only 815 complete pieces of mobile artillery, +including all produced for France and Great Britain as well as for +American troops. Of the 75's only 181 complete units were shipped abroad, +the American Expeditionary Force securing 1828 from the French. Of the +155 millimeter howitzers none of American manufacture reached the front. +French deliveries amounted to 747.—<em>America's Munitions</em>, 1917-1918 +(Report of Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War), p. 90.</p></div> + +<p>The lack of preparation in the matter of machine guns has received wide +publicity. In this, as in artillery, the deficiency was made good by the +Allies up to the final weeks of the war. In April, 1917, the army +possessed only a small number of machine guns entirely inadequate even +for the training of the new troops and half of which would not take +American service cartridges. Less than seven hundred machine rifles were +on hand. Manufacturing facilities for machine guns were limited; there +were only two factories in the United States actually producing in +quantity.<a name="Page_137" id="Page_137"></a> Orders for four thousand Vickers had been placed the preceding +December, but deliveries had not been made by the beginning of April. +Either because of jealousy in the department, or because of justifiable +technical reasons, various experts demanded a better machine gun than any +used by the Allies, and Secretary Baker took the responsibility of +delaying matters so as to hold the competition recommended by a board of +investigation. This competition was planned for May 1, 1917, with the +result that we entered the war without having decided upon any type of +machine gun, and it was not until some weeks later that the Browning was +approved.</p> + +<p>First deliveries of this gun could not be made until April, 1918, a year +after the declaration of war. In the meantime, the War Department +utilized existing facilities to the limit, and placed large orders for +Colt, Lewis, and Vickers machine guns. But the heavy machine guns and +automatic rifles used by our troops in the field were furnished by the +French and the British until May, 1918. During that month and June the +eleven American divisions that sailed were provided with American-made +Vickers, although they still used the French-made Chauchat automatic +rifles.<a name="Page_138" id="Page_138"></a> After June, all American troops to sail received a full equipment +of Brownings, both heavy machine guns and automatic rifles. Altogether +27,000 heavy Brownings and 29,000 light Brownings were shipped to the +American Expeditionary Force, sufficient by the time of the armistice to +equip completely all the American troops in France. They were not used in +combat until the Meuse-Argonne battle, where they amply justified the +faith of General Pershing.</p> + +<p>The policy of delaying production in order to obtain the best quality was +not followed in the case of the rifle, and the results unquestionably +justified the plan, ultimately adopted, of accepting a slightly inferior +type which could be produced at once in quantity. The American army +rifle, the Springfield, was generally regarded as the most accurate the +world had seen. Unfortunately there was little hope of expanding the +production of Springfields sufficiently to meet the necessities of the +new National Army. For several years previous to 1917 the Government, +with myopic vision, had cut down expenditures for the manufacture of +small-arms and ammunition, with the result that artisans skilled in +making Springfields had been scattered. Even if the two factories that +had been turning out Springfields could be restaffed, their combined +production would be insufficient. <a name="Page_139" id="Page_139"></a>Private plants could not be utilized +for early quantity production, because of the time that would be taken in +building up an adequate manufacturing equipment and training the +artisans. Fortune intervened. It happened that three large American firms +were about to complete important contracts for supplying Enfield rifles +to the British Government. Their plants and skilled labor might be turned +to account, but the Enfield was not regarded as satisfactory, principally +because its ammunition was inferior to that taken by the Springfield. The +War Department decided to attempt a change in the bore of the Enfield so +that it would use Springfield cartridges, and to make other minor +simplifications and improvements. The experiment proved successful to the +highest degree. The modified Enfields were reported to be only slightly +inferior to the Springfields and by the end of December, 1917, five +thousand a day were being turned out. Altogether American manufactories +produced during the war about two and a half million rifles, of which all +but three hundred thousand were modified Enfields.</p> + +<p>In the matter of airplane production the record is far less satisfactory. +It is, perhaps, too early to distribute with justice the blame for the +delays in production, <a name="Page_140" id="Page_140"></a>and full cognizance should be taken of the +difficulties which had to be overcome. But whatever explanations are to be +found, it is an undeniable fact that not until August, 1918, three months +before the armistice, was an American squadron equipped with American +planes. The Allies had looked to America for the production of combat +planes in quantity and Congress, responding to popular enthusiasm, had in +the first days of the war appropriated more than half a billion dollars +for their manufacture. An Aircraft Production Board was organized, with +Howard E. Coffin as chairman, although the actual manufacture of the +machines was under the supervision of the Signal Corps. Promises were made +that by the spring of 1918 the Germans would be completely at the mercy of +American airmen.</p> + +<p>But difficulties developed. A new type of motor had to be produced, +capable of serving in any kind of airplane; this was rapidly and +successfully accomplished, and in July, 1917, the Liberty Motor was +approved. But just as manufacturing was about to begin changes in the +design were demanded, with ensuing delays. There was confusion between +the jurisdiction of the Aircraft Board and that of the Signal Corps. The +organization of the latter was less efficient than had been expected, +and men who knew little or nothing of the technique of aircraft were +placed in charge of production. When orders were given for planes to be +constructed in France, seven thousand American machinists had to be sent +over to release the French machinists who were to work on these +contracts, with consequent delays to American production. Repeated +alterations in the designs of airplanes must be made to meet changing +requirements sent from the front, and large numbers of planes almost +ready for delivery had to be scrapped. Two of the types manufactured +proved to be unsatisfactory and were condemned, with an estimated loss of +twenty-six million dollars. Finally the bitter cold of the winter made it +difficult to secure the indispensable spruce from the northwestern +forests, and lumbering operations were hampered by extensive strikes, +which were said to have resulted from German intrigues.</p> + +<p>General disappointment at the failure to produce airplanes in quantity by +the spring of 1918 was the more bitter because of the high hopes that had +been aroused by those in authority. Instead of confessing the serious +nature of the delays, the War Department attempted to conceal not merely +the<a name="Page_142" id="Page_142"></a> mistakes made but the fact that airplanes could not possibly reach +France in any numbers before the autumn of 1918. Thus when at last, in +February, a single combat plane was completed and shipped, the War +Department issued the statement: "The first American-built battle planes +are to-day <em>en route</em> to France. This first shipment, although not in +itself large, marks the final overcoming of many difficulties met in +building up a new and intricate industry." When General Wood returned +from France in March and reported that not one American-built plane was +in action there, and when the Senate investigation committee unearthed +the existence of all the delays, the disillusioned public gave vent to +fierce criticism. It was to some extent calmed by the appointment, in +April, of John D. Ryan, of the Anaconda Copper Company, as director of +aircraft production for the army. By this time many of the most serious +difficulties had been passed. When the armistice was signed about twelve +thousand airplanes had been produced by American plants, of which a third +were service-planes.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Ayres. <em>The War with Germany</em>, 87-90.</p></div> + +<p>It is impossible here to trace the activities of the various departments +in the herculean task of arming the nation.<a name="Page_143" id="Page_143"></a> But one should not forget +that there was much which never received wide publicity. The development +of ordnance carried with it the manufacture of quantities of ammunition +hitherto undreamt of, the building of railway and motorized artillery, +the improvement of sight and fire-control apparatus, the making of all +sorts of trench-warfare <em>matériel</em>. The Air Service had to concern itself +with the manufacture of radio telephones, armament for airplanes, the +synchronizing of machine guns to fire through propeller blades, airplane +bombs, air photography, and pyrotechnics. The Chemical Warfare Service +was busy with the making of toxic gases and gas defense equipment, using +the peach stones and cocoanut shells which every one was asked to save. +The enormous quantities of medical and dental supplies must be gathered +by the Quartermaster Department, which also had charge of the salvage +service and the thousand gargantuan household occupations, such as +laundering and incineration of garbage, that went with the maintenance of +the army in camp. The Signal Corps must produce wire, telegraphs, +telephones, switchboards, radio equipment, batteries, field glasses, +photographic outfits, and carrier pigeons.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144"></a>Upon its navy the United States has always relied chiefly for defense and +in this branch of the service the country was better prepared for war in +1917 than in the army. Indeed when the nation entered the struggle many +persons believed that the sole practical fighting assistance the United +States should give the Allies would be upon the sea. Josephus Daniels, +the Secretary of the Navy, was a Southern politician, of limited +administrative experience and capacity. During the first years of his +appointment he had alienated navy officers through the introduction of +pet reforms and his frank advocacy of a little navy. Resiliency, however, +was one of his characteristics and he followed President Wilson in 1916, +when the latter demanded from Congress authority for an expansion in the +navy which seemed only prudent in view of international conditions. +Largely owing to the efforts of the Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. +Roosevelt, the months immediately preceding the declaration of war +witnessed strenuous preparations to render aid to the Allies in case the +United States should participate. Thereafter Secretary Daniels tended to +sink his personality and judgment in the conduct of the naval war and to +defer to the opinion of various officers, of whom Admiral William S. +Benson, Chief of Naval Operations was the most influential. <a name="Page_145" id="Page_145"></a>When war was +declared two flotillas of destroyers were at once sent to Queenstown to +assist in chasing and sinking submarines, and were placed under the +command of Admiral William S. Sims. Battleships and cruisers followed, +though by no means with the expedition nor in the numbers desired by +Sims, who believed that by using practically the entire naval force at +once the submarine could be exterminated and the war ended.</p> + +<p>At home, the Navy Department entered upon a process of expansion which +increased its personnel from 65,000 to 497,000 when the armistice was +signed. A rapid development in naval construction was planned, with +emphasis upon destroyers. The effects of this programme became visible +within a year; during the first nine months of 1918 no less than +eighty-three destroyers were launched, as against sixty-two for the +preceding nine years. Submarine chasers of a special design were built +and many private yachts taken over and adapted to the war against the +submarine. During the course of the war two battleships and twenty-eight +submarines were completed. Expansion in naval shipbuilding plans was +paralleled by the construction of giant docks; by camps sufficient for +the training of two hundred thousand men; and by a naval aircraft +factory from which a seaplane was turned out seven months after work on +the factory was begun. Naval aviators returning from the Channel coasts +superintended flying schools and undertook the patrol of our Atlantic +seaboard.</p> + +<p>If much of these military preparations was not translated into +accomplishment before the war ended, it was because the United States was +preparing wisely for a long struggle and it seemed necessary that the +foundations should be broad and deep. "America was straining her energies +towards a goal," said the Director of Munitions, "toward the realization +of an ambition which, in the production of munitions, dropped the year +1918 almost out of consideration altogether, which indeed did not bring +the full weight of American men and <em>matériel</em> into the struggle even in +1919, but which left it for 1920, if the enemy had not yet succumbed to +the growing American power, to witness the maximum strength of the United +States in the field." It was the knowledge of this preparation which, to +some extent, helped to convince the German General Staff of the futility +of further resistance and thus to bring the war to an early end.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147"></a>The dependence of the United States upon the Allies for equipment and +munitions does not deserve the vitriolic anathemas of certain critics. +The country did not enter the struggle as if it expected to fight the war +single-handed. Distribution of labor and supplies between the United +States and the Allies was merely a wise and economic measure. At their +own request, the Allies were furnished with that which they most +needed—money, food, and man-power. In return they provided the United +States with the artillery and machine guns which they could spare and +which they could manufacture more cheaply and rapidly. Finally there is +the outstanding fact, of which America may always be proud, that this +heterogeneous democracy, organized, so far as organization existed, for +the pursuits of peace, was able in the space of sixteen months, to +provide an army capable of fighting successfully one of the most +difficult campaigns of the war, and that which led directly to the +military defeat of Germany.</p> + +<p>The ultimate success of President Wilson's war policies could hardly have +been achieved except by the process of centralization which he never lost +from view. His insistence upon centralized responsibility and control in +political matters was paralleled in the military field. Nothing +illustrates<a name="Page_148" id="Page_148"></a> this principle better than the centralization of the American +Expeditionary Force under the absolute and unquestioned command of General +Pershing. The latter was given free rein. The jealousies which so weakened +the Union armies during the first years of the Civil War were ruthlessly +repressed. No generals were sent to France of whom he did not approve. +When the Allies threatened to appeal to Washington over Pershing's head, +President Wilson turned a deaf ear.</p> + +<p>In the United States, the President sought similar centralization through +the General Staff. It was this body which prepared the different plans for +the Draft Act, the Pershing expedition, and finally for the gigantic task +of putting a million men in France by the summer of 1918. To the staff was +given the formulation of the training programme along the lines +recommended by Pershing. Always, however, it was hampered by the multiple +responsibility that characterized the old-style army machine with its +bureau chiefs competing with each other, with the navy, and with the +Allies. Quartermaster Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and +the other bureaus were uncoördinated, and inevitable waste and +inefficiency followed all their operations. <a name="Page_149" id="Page_149"></a>It was the crisis that arose +from the problem of supplies, in the winter of 1917, that furnished the +President with the opportunity to cut red-tape and secure the +centralization he desired. That opportunity came with the blanket powers +bestowed upon him by the Overman Act, the full significance of which can +only be appreciated after a consideration of the measures taken to +centralize the industrial resources of the nation.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>THE HOME FRONT</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150"></a>On May 18, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation in which are to +be found the following significant sentences:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are no +armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. Thus, the men +who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of +the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags. It +must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for +war—it is a Nation. To this end our people must draw close in one +compact front against a common foe. But this cannot be if each man +pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose. The Nation needs +all men, but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure +him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, +though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a trip-hammer for the forging +of great guns, and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, +the Nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the +machinist remains at his levers. <a name="Page_151" id="Page_151"></a>The whole Nation must be a team, in +which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted.</p></div> + +<p>If President Wilson deserves severe criticism for his failure to endorse +adequate plans of preparation for war while his country was at peace, he +should be given due credit for his appreciation that the home front must +be organized if the fighting front was to be victorious. He perceived +clearly that it was necessary to carry into the industrial life of the +nation that centralizing process which characterized his military policy. +That the nation at home was made to feel itself part of the fighting +forces and coöperated enthusiastically and effectively in the organization +of the national resources was not the least of the triumphs of the United +States. Such organization demanded great sacrifice, not merely of luxuries +or comforts, but of settled habits, which are difficult to break. It must +necessarily be of an emergency character, for the United States possessed +no bureaucratic system like that which obtains on the continent of Europe +for the centralization of trade, manufactures, food production, and the +thousand activities that form part of economic life. But the event proved +that both the spirit and the brains of the American people were equal to +the crisis.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152"></a>The problem of coördinating the national industries for the supply of the +army was complicated by the military decentralization described in the +preceding chapter, which President Wilson was not able to remedy before +the final months of the war. The army did not form or state its +requirements as one body but through five supply bureaus, which acted +independently and in competition with each other. Bids for materials from +the different bureaus conflicted with each other, with those of the navy, +and of the Allies. Not merely was it essential that such demands should +be coördinated, but that some central committee should be able to say how +large was the total supply of any sort of materials, how soon they could +be produced, and to prevent the waste of such materials in unessential +production. If the army was decentralized, American industry as a whole +was in a state of complete chaos, so far as any central organization was +concerned. On the side of business every firm in every line of production +was competing in the manufacture of essential and unessential articles, +in transportation, and in bidding for and holding the necessary labor. +Mr. Wilson set himself the task of evolving order out of this chaos.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153"></a>The President, as in the purely military problem where he utilized the +General Staff as his instrument, prepared to adapt existing machinery, +rather than to create a completely new organization. For a time he seems +to have believed that his Cabinet might serve the function. But it was +ill-adapted to handle the sort of problems that must be solved. It was +composed of men chosen largely for political reasons, and despite much +public complaint it had not been strengthened after Wilson's reëlection. +Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, was generally recognized +as a man of excellent business judgment, willing to listen to experts, and +capable of coöperating effectively with the economic leaders of the +country. His influence with the President, however, seemed to be +overshadowed by that of Newton D. Baker and William G. McAdoo, Secretaries +of War and of the Treasury, who had inspired the distrust of most business +men. McAdoo in particular alienated financial circles because of his +apparent suspicion of banking interest, and both, by their appeals to +laboring men, laid themselves open to the charge of demagogic tactics. +Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, had won recognition as an expert +international lawyer of long experience, but he could not be expected to +exercise great influence, inasmuch as the<a name="Page_154" id="Page_154"></a> President obviously intended to +remain his own foreign secretary. Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster-General, +was a politician, expert in the minor tactics of party, whose conduct of +the postal and telegraphic systems was destined to bring a storm of +protest upon the entire Administration. Thomas W. Gregory, the +Attorney-General, had gained entrance into the Cabinet by means of a +railroad suit which had roused the ire of the transportation interests. +The other members were, at that time, little known or spoken of. Wilson +spent much time and effort in defending his Cabinet members from attacks, +and yet it was believed that he rarely appealed to them for advice in the +formulation of policies. Thus the Cabinet as a whole lacked the very +qualities essential to a successful organizing committee: ability to +secure the coöperation and respect of the industrial leaders of the +country.</p> + +<p>Titular functions of an organizing character, nevertheless, had been +conferred upon six members of the Cabinet in August, 1916, through the +creation of a "Council of National Defense"; they were charged with the +"coördination of industries and resources for the national security and +welfare." The actual labor of coördination, however, was to be exercised +by an advisory commission of seven,<a name="Page_155" id="Page_155"></a> which included Howard E. Coffin, in +charge of munitions, Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio +Railroad, in charge of transportation, Julius Rosenwald, president of the +Sears-Roebuck Company, in charge of supplies including clothing, Bernard +M. Baruch, a versatile financial trader, in charge of metals, minerals, +and raw materials, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation +of Labor, in charge of labor and the welfare of workers, Hollis Godfrey +in charge of engineering and education, and Franklin H. Martin in charge +of medicine. The commission at once prepared to lay down its programme, +to create sub-committees and technical boards, and to secure the +assistance of business leaders, without whose coöperation their task +could not be fulfilled.</p> + +<p>Following plans developed by the Council of National Defense, experts in +every business likely to prove of importance were called upon to +coördinate and stimulate war necessities, to control their distribution, +to provide for the settlement of disputes between employers and +wage-earners, to fix prices, to conserve resources. Scientific and +technical experts were directed in their researches. The General Medical +Board and the Committee on Engineering and Education were supervised in +their<a name="Page_156" id="Page_156"></a> mobilization of doctors and surgeons, engineers, physicists and +chemists, professors and graduate students in the university laboratories. +Everywhere and in all lines experience and brains were sought and +utilized. State Councils of Defense were created to oversee the work of +smaller units and to establish an effective means of communication between +the individual and the national Government. Naturally much +over-organization resulted and some waste of time and energy; but the +universal spirit of voluntary coöperation evoked by the Councils +overbalanced this loss and aided greatly in putting the country on an +effective war basis. As Wilson said, "beyond all question the highest and +best form of efficiency is the spontaneous coöperation of a free people." +In return for their efforts the people received an education in public +spirit and civic consciousness such as could have come in no other way.</p> + +<p>Of the committees of the Council, that on munitions developed along the +most elaborate lines, becoming of such importance that on July 28, 1917, +it was reorganized as the War Industries Board. As such it gradually +absorbed most of the functions of the Council which were not transferred +to other agencies of the Government. <a name="Page_157" id="Page_157"></a>During the autumn of 1917 the +activities of the Board underwent rapid extension, but it lacked the +power to enforce its decisions. As in the case of the General Staff, it +was important that it should have authority not merely to plan but also +to supervise and execute. Such a development was foreshadowed in the +reorganization of the Board in March, 1918, under the chairmanship of +Bernard M. Baruch, and when the President received the blanket authority +conferred by the Overman Act, he immediately invested the War Industries +Board with the centralizing power which seemed so necessary. Henceforth +it exercised an increasingly strict control over all the industries of +the country.</p> + +<p>The purpose of the Board was, generally speaking, to secure for the +Government and the Allies the goods essential for making war +successfully, and to protect the civil needs of the country. The supply +of raw materials to the manufacturer as well as the delivery of finished +products was closely regulated by a system of priorities. The power of +the Board in its later development was dictatorial, inasmuch as it might +discipline any refractory producer or manufacturer by the withdrawal of +the assignments he expected. The leaders of each of the more important +industries were called into council, in order to determine resources and +needs, and the degree of preference to which each industry was entitled. +Some were especially favored, in order to stimulate production in a line +that was of particular importance or was failing to meet the exigencies +of the military situation; shipments to others of a less essential +character were deferred. Committees of the Board studied industrial +conditions and recommended the price that should be fixed for various +commodities; stability was thus artificially secured and profiteering +lessened. The Conservation Division worked out and enforced methods of +standardizing patterns in order to economize materials and labor. The +Steel Division coöperated with the manufacturers for the speeding-up of +production; and the Chemical Division, among other duties, stimulated the +vitally important supply of potash, dyes, and nitrates. Altogether it has +been roughly estimated that the industrial capacity of the country was +increased by twenty per cent through the organizing labors and authority +of the War Industries Board.</p> + +<p>The success of this Board would have been impossible without the building +up of an extraordinary <em>esprit de corps</em> among the men who were brought +face to face with these difficult problems of industry and commerce. +<a name="Page_159" id="Page_159"></a>Their chairman relied, of course, upon the coöperation of the leaders of +"big business," who now, in the hour of the country's need, sank their +prejudice against governmental interference and gave freely of their +experience, brains, and administrative power. Men whose incomes were +measured in the hundreds of thousands forgot their own business and +worked at Washington on a salary of a dollar a year.</p> + +<p>The same spirit of coöperation was evoked when it came to the conservation +and the production of food. If steel was to win the war, its burden could +not be supported without wheat, and for some months in 1917 and 1918 +victory seemed to depend largely upon whether the Allies could find enough +to eat. Even in normal times Great Britain and France import large +quantities of foodstuffs; under war conditions they were necessarily +dependent upon foreign grain-producing countries. The surplus grain of the +Argentine and Australia was not available because of the length of the +voyage and the scarcity of shipping; the Russian wheat supply was cut off +by enemy control of the Dardanelles even before it was dissipated by +corrupt officials or reckless revolutionaries. The Allies, on the verge of +starvation, therefore looked to North America.<a name="Page_160" id="Page_160"></a> Yet the stock of cereals +when the United States entered the war was at a lower level than it had +been for years and the number of food animals had also been reduced.</p> + +<p>To meet the crisis President Wilson called upon one of the most +interesting and commanding personalities of modern times. Herbert Clark +Hoover was a Californian mining engineer, of broad experience in +Australia, China, and England, who in 1914 had been given control of +Allied Relief abroad. The following year he undertook the difficult and +delicate task of organizing food relief for Belgium. He was able to +arouse the enthusiastic sympathy of Americans, win financial support on a +large scale, procure the much-needed food, and provide for its effective +distribution among the suffering Belgians, in spite of the suspicions of +the Germans and the hindrances thrown in his path. A master organizer, +with keen flair for efficient subordinates, of broad vision never muddied +by details, with sound knowledge of business economics, and a gift for +dramatic appeal, Hoover was ideally fitted to conduct the greatest +experiment in economic organization the world had seen. Unsentimental +himself, he knew how to arouse emotion—a necessary quality, since the +food problem demanded heavy personal sacrifices<a name="Page_161" id="Page_161"></a> which would touch every +individual; brusque in manner, he avoided giving the offense which +naturally follows any interference with the people's dinner and which +would destroy the essential spirit of voluntary coöperation.</p> + +<p>Five days after the declaration of war, President Wilson, through the +Council of National Defense, named a committee on food supply, with Hoover +at its head, and shortly thereafter named him food commissioner. Hoover +began his work of educating the people to realize the necessity of economy +and extra-production; but he lacked the administrative powers which were +essential if his work was to prove effective, and it was not until August +that Congress passed the Lever Act which provided for strict control of +food under an administrator. This measure encountered strong opposition in +the Senate and from the farmers, who feared lest the provisions against +hoarding of food would prevent them from holding their products for high +prices. Wilson exerted his personal influence vigorously for the bill in +the face of congressional opposition, which demanded that large powers of +control should be given to a Senate committee of ten, and he was finally +successful in his appeal. He thereupon appointed Hoover Food Administrator +with practically unlimited powers, legalizing the work already begun on +his own initiative.</p> + +<p>Hoover at once made arrangements to prevent the storage of wheat in large +quantities and to eliminate speculative dealings in wheat on the grain +exchanges. He then offered to buy the entire wheat crop at a fair price +and agreed with the millers to take flour at a fair advance on the price +of wheat. Fearful lest the farmers should be discouraged from planting the +following year, 1918, he offered to buy all the wheat that could be raised +at two dollars a bushel. If peace came before the crop was disposed of, +the Government might be compelled to take over the wheat at a higher price +than the market, but the offer was a necessary inducement to extensive +planting. In the meantime Hoover appealed to the country to utilize every +scrap of ground for the growing of food products. Every one of whatever +age and class turned gardener. The spacious and perfectly trimmed lawns of +the wealthy, as well as the weed-infested back yards of the poor, were dug +up and planted with potatoes or corn. Community gardens flourished in the +villages and outside of the larger towns, where men, women, and children +came out in the evening, after their regular work, to labor with rake and +hoe. There were perhaps two million "war gardens" over and beyond the +already established gardens, which unquestionably enabled many a citizen +to reduce his daily demands on the grocer, and stimulated his interest in +the problem of food conservation. As a result of Hoover's dealing with the +farmers, during the year 1917 the planted wheat acreage exceeded the +average of the preceding five years by thirty-five million acres, or by +about twelve per cent, and another additional five million acres were +planted in 1918. The result was the largest wheat crop in American history +except that of 1915, despite the killing cold of the winter of 1917 and +the withering drought of the summer of 1918. An increase in the number of +live stock was also secured and the production of milk, meat, and wool +showed a notable development.</p> + +<p>Hoover achieved equal success in the problem of conserving food. He +realized that he must bring home to the individual housewife the need of +the closest economy, and he organized a nation-wide movement to secure +voluntary pledges that the rules and requests of the Food Administration +would be observed. People were asked to use other flours than wheat +whenever possible, to be sparing of sugar and meat, to utilize +substitutes, and rigidly to avoid waste. On every billboard and in all +the newspapers were to be seen appeals to save food. Housewives were +enrolled as "members of the Food Administration" and were given placards +to post in their windows announcing their membership and the willingness +of the family to abide by its requests. Certain days of the week were +designated as "wheatless" or "meatless" when voluntary demi-fasts were to +be observed, the nonobservance of which spelled social ostracism. To +"Hooverize" became a national habit, and children were denied a spoonful +of sugar on their cereal, "because Mr. Hoover would not like it." Hoover, +with his broad forehead, round face, compelling eyes, and underhung jaw, +became the benevolent bogey of the nation. It was a movement of general +renunciation such as no country had undergone except at the pinch of +biting necessity.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> In the meantime prices were prevented from rapid +increase by a system of licenses, which tended to prevent hoarding or +speculation. Attempts to capitalize the need of the world for private +gain, or in common parlance, to "profiteer," were comparatively rare and +were adequately punished by revocation of license or by forced sale of +hoardings.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Restaurants and hotels coöperated; during a period of only +two months they were reported as having saved nine thousand tons of meat, +four thousand tons of flour, and a thousand tons of sugar. City garbage +plants announced a decrease in the amount of garbage collected ranging +from ten to thirteen per cent.</p></div> + +<p>As a result of the organization of food supply, the stimulation of +production, and the prevention of waste, America was able to save the +Entente nations, and, later, much of central and southeastern Europe from +starvation, without herself enduring anything worse than discomfort. The +Government was able at the same time to provide the troops in France with +food which, to the <em>poilus</em> at least, seemed luxurious. When the United +States entered the war the country was prepared to export 20,000,000 +bushels of wheat; instead it sent over 141,000,000. In four months, in +the summer of 1918, the American people saved out of their regular +consumption and sent abroad half a million tons of sugar. The autumn of +1918 saw an increase of nearly a million tons of pork products over what +was available the previous year. Altogether, during the crop year of +1918, America doubled the average amount of food sent to Europe +immediately before the war, notwithstanding unfavorable weather +conditions and the congestion of freight that resulted from other war +necessities. <a name="Page_166" id="Page_166"></a>The total contribution in foodstuffs exported to Europe +that year amounted to a value of about two billion dollars. This was done +without food cards and with a minimum of edicts. It was the work of +education and conscience.</p> + +<p>Fuel like food was a war necessity and there was equal need of +stimulating production by assuring a fair profit and of eliminating all +possible waste. Without the steam power provided by coal, raw materials +could not be transformed into the manufactured articles demanded by +military necessity, nor distributed by the railroads and steamships. Soon +after the declaration of war, a committee of coal operators, meeting +under the authorization of the Council of National Defense, drew up a +plan for the stimulation of coal production and its more economical +distribution. This committee voluntarily set a price for coal lower than +the current market price, in order to prevent a rise in manufacturing +costs; it was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, who warmly +praised the spirit of sacrifice displayed by the operators. Unfortunately +the Secretary of War, as chairman of the Council of National Defense, +repudiated the arrangement, on the ground that the price agreed upon was +too high. <a name="Page_167" id="Page_167"></a>The operators were discouraged, because of the difficulty of +stimulating production under the lower price which Secretary Baker +insisted upon; they were further disappointed at the postponement of +plans for a zone system and an elimination of long cross hauls, designed +to relieve the load that would be thrown upon railroad transportation in +the coming winter.</p> + +<p>In August, Wilson was empowered by the Lever Act to appoint a Fuel +Administrator and chose Harry A. Garfield, President of Williams College. +Conditions, however, became more confused. The fuel problem was one of +transportation quite as much as of production; the railroads were unable +to furnish the needed coal-cars, and because of an expensive and possibly +unfair system of car allotment, coal distribution was hampered. Add to +this the fact that numerous orders for coal shipments had been deferred +until autumn, in the belief that the Administration, which in the person +of Baker was not believed to look on the coal operators with favor, would +enforce low prices. Hence during the last three months of the year an +unprecedented amount of coal had to be shipped, and the congestion on the +competing railroads was such that the country faced a real coal famine. +In December, the Government recognized the obvious fact that the railroad +must be placed under one management, if the confusion in the whole +industrial situation were to be eliminated. President Wilson accordingly +announced that the Federal Government would take over the railroads for +the period of the war.</p> + +<p>This measure came too late to save the country from the evil effects of +the fuel shortage. The penalty for the delays of the preceding summer had +to be paid, and it was the heavier because of the severity of the winter. +Overloaded trains were stalled and harbors froze over, imprisoning the +coal barges. Thirty-seven ships laden with essential military supplies +were held up in New York harbor for lack of fuel, and long strings of +empties blocked the sidings, while the shippers all over the country cried +for cars. To meet the crisis Garfield decreed that all manufacturing +plants east of the Mississippi should be shut down for five days and for a +series of Mondays, until the 25th of March. The order applied also to +places of amusement, private offices, and most stores, which were not +allowed to furnish heat. Munitions plants and essential industries, as +well as Government offices were naturally excepted. "Heatless Mondays" +caused great inconvenience and bitter criticism, for they came at the +moment when it was most<a name="Page_169" id="Page_169"></a> important that the economic life of the nation +should be functioning at its greatest efficiency. But the embargo helped +to tide over the crisis. As in the case of food, the public, once it +appreciated the necessity of the situation, accepted it cheerfully. +Domestic economy was also widely preached and applied, to the slogan, +"Save a shovelful of coal a day." The elimination of electric +advertisements and the diminution of street lighting, served to lessen the +non-essential demand for coal; and the crisis also forced the introduction +of "daylight saving," the advancement of the clock by an hour, during the +months extending from March to October, thus saving artificial light.</p> + +<p>In the meantime the Fuel Administration, the operators, and the miners +were coöperating to increase coal production. The enthusiasm of the mine +workers was stimulated by making them realize that they were indeed part +of the fighting forces. A competitive spirit was aroused and mining +conditions were bettered to keep them satisfied. Labor responded to the +call. Holidays were omitted and emulation between different shifts became +keen.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Increased production was paralleled by more efficient +distribution.<a name="Page_170" id="Page_170"></a> A zone system, finally put into operation, eliminated +approximately 160,000,000 car miles. Local fuel administrators kept in +constant touch with the need of the localities under their jurisdiction, +studied methods of abolishing unnecessary manufacturing use of coal and +refused coal to non-essential industries.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> In 1918 the average number of days worked by each miner in +the bituminous fields was greater by twelve than that of 1917, and by +twenty-five than that of 1916. During the half-year period from April to +September, 1918, bituminous production was twelve per cent greater than +in the corresponding period of the previous year, which had itself +established a record, despite the decrease in the number of mine +workers.</p></div> + +<p>Similar increase in the production and saving of oil was accomplished. +The oil-burning vessels of the allied navies and merchant marines, the +motor transport service of the armies, all made this necessary. In 1918 +the production of oil in the United States was fourteen per cent greater +than in 1914. In response to an urgent cable from Marshal Foch, which +ran: "If you don't keep up your petrol supply we shall lose the war," a +series of "gasless Sundays" was suggested. For nearly two months, merely +at the request of the Fuel Administration and without any compulsion +except that arising from public opinion, Sunday motoring was practically +abandoned. <a name="Page_171" id="Page_171"></a>That most crowded of motor thoroughfares, the Boston Post +Road from New York to Stamford, might have served as playground for a +kindergarten. The estimated saving of gasoline amounted to a million +barrels: about four per cent of the gasoline sent abroad in 1918 was +provided by the gasless Sundays.</p> + +<p>Credit must be given the Fuel Administration for the large measure of +success which it finally secured. It was slow in its early organization +and at first failed to make full use of the volunteer committees of coal +operators and labor representatives who offered their assistance and +whose experience qualified them to give invaluable advice. But Garfield +showed his capacity for learning the basic facts of the situation, and +ultimately chose strong advisers. When he entered upon his duties he +found the crisis so far advanced that it could not be immediately solved. +Furthermore, in a situation which demanded the closest coöperation +between the Fuel and the Railroad Administration, he did not always +receive the assistance from the latter which he had a right to expect.</p> + +<p>As a war measure, the temporary nationalization of the railroads was +probably necessary. Whatever the ultimate advantages of private ownership +and the system of competition, during the period of<a name="Page_172" id="Page_172"></a> military necessity +perfect coördination was essential. Railroad facilities could not be +improved because new equipment, so far as it could be manufactured, had +to be sent abroad; the only solution of the problem of congestion seemed +to be an improvement of service. During the first nine months after the +declaration of war a notable increase in the amount of freight carried +was effected; nevertheless, as winter approached, it became obvious that +the roads were not operating as a unit and could not carry the load +demanded of them. Hence resulted the appointment of McAdoo in December, +1917, as Director-General, with power to operate all the railroads as a +single line.</p> + +<p>During the spring of 1918 the Administration gradually overcame the worst +of the transportation problems. To the presidents and management of the +various railroads must go the chief share of credit for the successful +accomplishment of this titanic task. Despite their distrust of McAdoo and +their objections to his methods, they coöperated loyally with the +Railroad Administration in putting through the necessary measures of +coördination and in the elimination of the worst features of the former +competitive system. They adopted a permit system which prevented the +loading of freight unless it could be unloaded at its destination; they +insisted upon more rapid unloading of cars; they consolidated terminals +to facilitate the handling of cars; they curtailed circuitous routing of +freight; they reduced the use of Pullman cars for passenger service. As a +result, after May, 1918, congestion was diminished and during the summer +was no longer acute. This was accomplished despite the number of troops +moved, amounting during the first ten months of 1918 to six and a half +millions. In addition the railroads carried large quantities of food, +munitions, building materials for cantonments, and other supplies, most +of which converged upon eastern cities and ports. The increase in the +number of grain-carrying cars alone, from July to November, was 135,000 +over the same period of the previous year.</p> + +<p>Unquestionably the Government's administration of the railroads has a +darker side. Complaints were frequent that the Railroad Administration +sacrificed other interests for its own advantage. The future of the roads +was said not to be carefully safeguarded, and equipment and rolling stock +mishandled and allowed to deteriorate.<a name="Page_174" id="Page_174"></a> Above all, at the moment when it +was quite as essential to preserve the morale of labor on the home front +as that of the troops in France, McAdoo made concessions to labor that +were more apt to destroy discipline and <em>esprit de corps</em> than to +maintain them. The authority given for the unionization of railroad +employees, the stopping of piecework, the creation of shop committees, +weakened the control of the foremen and led to a loss of shop efficiency +which has been estimated at thirty per cent. Government control was +necessary, but in the form in which it came it proved costly.</p> + +<p>During the months when manufacturing plants were built and their output +speeded up, when fuel and food were being produced in growing amounts, +when the stalled freight trains were being disentangled, there was +unceasing call for ocean-going tonnage. Food and war materials would be +of little use unless the United States had the ships in which to +transport them across the Atlantic. The Allies sorely needed American +help to replace the tonnage sunk by German submarines; during some +months, Allied shipping was being destroyed at the rate of six million +tons a year. Furthermore if an effective military force were to be +transported to France, according to the plans that germinated in the +summer of 1917, there would be need of every possible cubic inch of +tonnage. <a name="Page_175" id="Page_175"></a>The entire military situation hinged upon the shipping problem. +Yet when the United States joined in war on Germany there was not a +shipyard in the country which would accept a new order; every inch of +available space was taken by the navy or private business.</p> + +<p>In September, 1916, the United States Shipping Board had been organized +to operate the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which had been set up +primarily to develop trade with South America. This body now prepared a +gigantic programme of shipbuilding, which expanded as the need for +tonnage became more evident. By November 15, 1917, the Board planned for +1200 ships with dead weight tonnage of seven and a half millions. The +difficulties of building new yards, of collecting trained workmen and +technicians were undoubtedly great, but they might have been overcome +more easily had not unfortunate differences developed between William +Denman, the chairman of the Board, who advocated wooden ships, and +General George W. Goethals, the head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, +who depended upon steel construction. The differences led to the +resignation of both and continued disorganization hampered the rapid +fulfillment of the programme<a name="Page_176" id="Page_176"></a> Edward N. Hurley became chairman of the +Shipping Board, but it was not until the spring of 1918, when Charles M. +Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Company was put in charge of the Emergency +Fleet Corporation as Director General of shipbuilding, that public +confidence in ultimate success seemed justified.</p> + +<p>Much of the work accomplished during the latter days of the war was +spectacular. Waste lands along the Delaware overgrown with weeds were +transformed within a year into a shipyard with twenty-eight ways, a ship +under construction on each one, with a record of fourteen ships already +launched. The spirit of the workmen was voiced by the placard that hung +above the bulletin board announcing daily progress, which proclaimed, +"Three ships a week or bust." The Hog Island yards near Philadelphia and +the Fore River yards in Massachusetts became great cities with docks, +sidings, shops, offices, and huge stacks of building materials. Existing +yards, such as those on the Great Lakes, were enlarged so that in +fourteen months they sent to the ocean a fleet of 181 steel vessels. The +new ships were standardized and built on the "fabricated" system, which +provided for the manufacture of the various parts in different factories +and their assembling at the shipyards. In a single day, July 4, 1918, +there were launched in American shipyards ninety-five vessels, with a +dead weight tonnage of 474,464. In one of the Great Lakes yards a 5500 +ton steel freighter was launched seventeen days after the keel was laid, +and seventeen days later was delivered to the Shipping Board, complete +and ready for service.</p> + +<p>This work was not accomplished without tremendous expenditure and much +waste. The Shipping Board was careless in its financial management and +unwise in many of its methods. By introducing the cost plus system in the +letting of contracts it fostered extravagance and waste and increased and +intensified the industrial evils that had resulted from its operation in +the building of army cantonments. The contractors received the cost of +construction plus a percentage commission; obviously they had no incentive +to economize; the greater the expense the larger their commission. Hence +they willingly paid exorbitant prices for materials and agreed to "fancy" +wages. Not merely was the expense of securing the necessary tonnage +multiplied, but the cost of materials and labor in all other industries +was seriously enhanced. <a name="Page_178" id="Page_178"></a>The high wages paid tended to destroy the +patriotic spirit of the shipworkers, who were enticed by greed rather +than by the glory of service. The effect on drafted soldiers was bound to +be unfortunate, for they could not but realize the injustice of a system +which gave them low pay for risking their lives, while their friends in +the shipyards received fabulous wages. Such aspects of the early days of +the Shipping Board were ruthlessly re-formed by Schwab when he took +control of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Appealing to the patriotism of +the workers he reduced costs and increased efficiency, according to some +critics, by thirty per cent, according to others, by no less than one +hundred and ten per cent.</p> + +<p>By September, 1918, the Shipping Board had brought under its jurisdiction +2600 vessels with a total dead weight tonnage of more than ten millions. +Of this fleet, sixteen per cent had been built by the Emergency Fleet +Corporation. The remainder was represented by ships which the Board had +requisitioned when America entered the war, by the ships of Allied and +neutral countries which had been purchased and chartered, and by interned +enemy ships which had been seized. The last-named were damaged by their +crews at the time of the declaration of war, but were fitted for<a name="Page_179" id="Page_179"></a> service +with little delay by a new process of electric welding. Such German boats +as the <em>Vaterland</em>, rechristened the <em>Leviathan</em>, and the <em>George +Washington</em>, together with smaller ships, furnished half a million tons +of German cargo-space. The ships which transported American soldiers were +not chiefly provided by the Shipping Board, more than fifty per cent +being represented by boats borrowed from Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> In the last six months of the war over 1,500,000 men were +carried abroad as follows:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 7em;">44 per cent in United States ships</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 7em;">51 per cent in British ships</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 7.5em;">3 per cent in Italian ships</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 7.5em;">2 per cent in French ships</span><br /> +The United States transports included 450,000 tons of German origin; +300,000 tons supplied by commandeered Dutch boats; and 718,000 tons +provided by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.</p></div> + +<p>More effective use of shipping was fostered by the War Trade Board, which +had been created six months after the declaration of war by the Trading +with the Enemy Act (October 6, 1917), and which, in conjunction with the +activities of the Alien Property Custodian, possessed full powers to +curtail enemy trade. It thereby obtained practical control of the foreign +commerce of this country, and was able both to conserve essential products +for American use and to secure and economize tonnage.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180"></a>Such control was assured through a system of licenses for exports and +imports. No goods could be shipped into or out of the country without a +license, which was granted by the War Trade Board only after investigation +of the character of the shipment and its destination or source. The +earlier export of goods which had found their way to Germany through +neutral countries was thus curtailed and the blockade on Germany became +strangling. Products necessary to military effectiveness were secured from +neutral states in return for permission to buy essentials here. Two +millions of tonnage were obtained from neutral states for the use of the +United States and Great Britain. Trade in non-essentials with the Orient +and South America was limited, extra bottoms were thus acquired, and the +production of non-essentials at home discouraged. Altogether, the War +Trade Board exercised tremendous powers which, however necessary, might +have provoked intense resentment in business circles; but these powers +were enforced with a tact and discretion characteristic of the head of the +Board, Vance McCormick, who was able successfully to avoid the irritation +that might have been expected from such governmental interference with +freedom of commerce.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181"></a>The problem of labor was obviously one that must be faced by each of the +war boards or administrations, and nearly all of them were compelled to +establish some sort of labor division or tribunal within each separate +field. The demands made upon the labor market by war industry were heavy, +for the withdrawal of labor into the army created an inevitable scarcity +at the moment when production must be increased, and the different +industries naturally were brought to bid against each other; the value of +any wage scale was constantly affected by the rising prices, while the +introduction of inexperienced workmen and women affected the conditions +of piecework, so that the question of wages and conditions of labor gave +rise to numerous discussions. The Labor Committee of the Council of +National Defense had undertaken to meet such problems as early as +February, 1917, but it was not until the beginning of the next year that +the Department of Labor underwent a notable reorganization with the +purpose of effecting the coördination necessary to complete success.</p> + +<p>Unlike the food, fuel, and transportation problems, which were solved +through new administrations not connected with the <a name="Page_182" id="Page_182"></a>Department of +Agriculture, the Bureau of Mines, or the Interstate Commerce Commission +respectively, that of labor was met by new bureaus and boards which were +organic parts of the existing Department of Labor. In January, 1918, that +Department undertook the formulation and administration of a national war +labor policy. Shortly afterwards delegates of the National Industrial +Conference Board and of the American Federation of Labor, representing +capital and labor, worked out a unanimous report upon the principles to +be followed in labor adjustment. To enforce these recommendations the +President, on April 9, 1918, appointed a National War Labor Board, which +until November sat as a court of final appeal in labor disputes. An index +of the importance of the Board was given by the choice of ex-President +Taft as one of its chairmen. A month later, a War Labor Policies Board +was added to the system to lay down general rules for the use of the War +Labor Board in the rendering of its judgments.</p> + +<p>Not merely enthusiasm and brains enabled America to make the +extraordinary efforts demanded by the exigencies of war. Behind every +line of activity lay the need of money: and the raising of money in +amounts so large that they<a name="Page_183" id="Page_183"></a> passed the comprehension of the average +citizen, forms one of the most romantic stories of the war. It is the +story of the enthusiastic coöperation of rich and poor: Wall Street and +the humblest foreign immigrants gave of their utmost in the attempt to +provide the all-important funds for America and her associates in the +war. Citizens accepted the weight of income and excess profit taxes far +heavier than any American had previously dreamed of. They were asked in +addition to buy government bonds to a total of fourteen billions, and +they responded by oversubscribing this amount by nearly five billions. Of +the funds needed for financing the war, the Government planned to raise +about a third by taxation, and the remainder by the sale of bonds and +certificates maturing in from five to thirty years. It would have proved +the financial statesmanship of McAdoo had he dared to raise a larger +proportion by taxation; for thus much of the inflation which inevitably +resulted from the bond issues might have been avoided. But the Government +feared alike for its popularity and for the immediate effect upon +business, which could not safely be discouraged. As it was, the excess +profit taxes aroused great complaint. <a name="Page_184" id="Page_184"></a>The amount raised in direct +taxation represented a larger proportion of the war budget than any +foreign nation had been able to secure from tax revenues.</p> + +<p>In seeking to sell its bonds the Government, rather against its will, was +compelled to rely largely upon the capitalists. The large popular +subscriptions would have been impossible but for the assistance and +enthusiasm shown by the banks in the selling campaign. Wall Street and +the bankers of the country were well prepared and responded with all +their strength, a response which deserves the greater credit when we +remember the lack of sympathy which had existed between financial circles +and President Wilson's Administration. Largely under banking auspices the +greatest selling campaign on record was inaugurated. Bonds were placed on +sale at street corners, in theaters, and restaurants; disposed of by +eminent operatic stars, moving-picture favorites, and wounded heroes from +the front. Steeple jacks attracted crowds by their perilous antics, in +order to start the bidding for subscriptions. Villages and isolated +farmhouses were canvassed. The banks used their entire machinery to +induce subscriptions, offering to advance the subscription price. When +during the first loan campaign the rather unwise optimism of the Treasury +cooled enthusiasm for a moment, by making it appear that the loan could +be floated without effort, Wall Street took up the load. The first loan +was oversubscribed by a billion. The success of the three loans that +followed was equally great; the fourth, coming in October, 1918, was set +for six billion dollars, the largest amount that had ever been asked of +any people, and after a three weeks' campaign, seven billions were +subscribed. Quite as notable as the amount raised was the progressive +increase in the number of subscribers, which ranged from four million +individuals in the first loan to more than twenty-one millions in the +fourth. Equally notable, as indicating the educative effect of the war +and of the sale of these Liberty Bonds, was the successful effort to +encourage thrift. War Savings societies were instituted and children +saved their pennies and nickels to buy twenty-five cent "thrift stamps" +which might be accumulated to secure interest-bearing savings +certificates. Down to November 1, 1918, the sale of such stamps totalled +$834,253,000, with a maturity value of more than a billion dollars.</p> + +<p>The successful organizing of national resources to supply military +demands obviously depended, in the last instance, upon the education of +the people to a desire for service and sacrifice. <a name="Page_186" id="Page_186"></a>The Liberty Loan +campaigns, the appeals of Hoover, and the Fuel Administration, all were +of importance in producing such morale. In addition the Council of +National Defense, through the Committee on Public Information, spread +pamphlets emphasizing the issues of the war and the objects for which we +were fighting. At every theater and moving-picture show, in the factories +during the noon hours, volunteer speakers told briefly of the needs of +the Government and appealed for coöperation. These were the so-called +"Four Minute Men." The most noted artists gave their talent to covering +the billboards with patriotic and informative posters. Blue Devils who +had fought at Verdun, captured tanks, and airplanes, were paraded in +order to bring home the realities of the life and death struggle in which +America was engaged. The popular response was inspiring. In the face of +the national enthusiasm the much-vaunted plans of the German Government +for raising civil disturbance fell to the ground. Labor was sometimes +disorganized by German propaganda; destruction of property or war +material was accomplished by German agents; and valuable information +sometimes leaked out to the enemy. But the danger was always kept in +check by the <a name="Page_187" id="Page_187"></a>Department of Justice and also by a far-reaching citizen +organization, the American Protective League. Equally surprising was the +lack of opposition to the war on the part of pacifists and socialists. It +was rare to find the "sedition" for which some of them were punished, +perhaps over-promptly, translated from words to actions.</p> + +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<p>The organization of the industrial resources of the nation was +complicated by the same conditions that affected the purely military +problems—decentralization and the emergency demands that resulted from +the sudden decision to send a large expeditionary force to France. The +various organizing boards were so many individual solutions for +individual problems. At the beginning of the war the Council of National +Defense represented the only attempt at a central business organization, +and as time went on the importance and the influence of the Council +diminished. The effects of decentralization became painfully apparent +during the bitter cold of the winter months, when the fuel, +transportation, and food crises combined to threaten almost complete +paralysis of the economic and military mobilization.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188"></a>The distrust and discouragement that followed brought forth furious +attacks upon the President's war policies, led not merely by Roosevelt +and Republican enemies of the Administration, but by Democratic Senators. +The root of the whole difficulty, they contended, lay in the fact that +Wilson had no policy. They demanded practically the abdication of the +presidential control of military affairs, either through the creation of +a Ministry of Munitions or of a War Cabinet. In either case Congress +would control the situation through its definition of the powers of the +new organization and the appointment of its personnel.</p> + +<p>President Wilson utilized the revolt to secure the complete +centralization toward which he had been aiming. He fought the new +proposals on the ground that they merely introduced new machinery to +complicate the war organization, and he insisted that true policy +demanded rather an increase in the efficiency of existing machinery. If +the General Staff and the War Industries Board were given power to +supervise and execute as well as to plan, the country would have the +machinery at hand capable of forming a central organization, which could +determine in the first place what was wanted and where, and in the second +place how it could be supplied. <a name="Page_189" id="Page_189"></a>All that was necessary was to give the +President a free hand to effect any transfer of organization, funds, or +functions in any of the existing departments of government, without being +compelled to apply to Congress in each case.</p> + +<p>The struggle between Wilson and his opponents was sharp, but the +President carried the day. He exerted to the full his influence on +Congress and utilized skillfully the argument that at this moment of +crisis a swapping of horses might easily prove fatal. Opposing +Congressmen drew back at the thought of shouldering the responsibility +which they knew the President would throw upon them if he were defeated. +On May 20, 1918, the Overman Act became law, giving to the President the +blanket powers which he demanded and which he immediately used to +centralize the military and industrial organization. Bureau chiefs were +bitter in their disapproval; the National Guard grumbled, even as it +fought its best battles in France; politicians saw their chance of +influencing military affairs disappear; business men complained of the +economic dictatorship thus secured by the President. But Mr. Wilson was +at last in a position to effect that which seemed to him of greatest +importance—the concentration of responsibility and authority.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190"></a>Upon the shoulders of the President, accordingly, must rest in the last +instance the major portion of the blame and the credit to be distributed +for the mistakes and the achievements of the military and economic +organization. He took no part in the working out of details. Once the +development of any committee of organization had been started, he left +the control of it entirely to those who had been placed in charge. But he +would have been untrue to his nature if he had not at all times been +determined to keep the reins of supreme control in his own hands. His +opponents insisted that the organization was formed in spite of him. It +is probable that he did not himself perceive the crying need for +centralization so clearly in 1917 as he did in 1918; and the protests of +his political opponents doubtless brought the realization of its +necessity more definitely home to him. But there is no evidence to +indicate that the process of centralization was forced upon him against +his will and much to show that he sought always that concentration of +responsibility and power which he insisted upon in politics. The task was +herculean; ironically enough it was facilitated by the revolt against his +war policies which resulted in the Senate investigation and the Overman +Act.<a name="Page_191" id="Page_191"></a> His tactics were by no means above reproach, and his entire policy +nearly went on the rocks in the winter of 1917 because of his inability +to treat successfully with the Senate and with Republican Congressmen.</p> + +<p>When all is said, however, the organization that was developed during the +last six months of the war transported and maintained in Europe more than +a million and a half American soldiers; at home it maintained two +millions more, ready to sail at the earliest opportunity; and it was +prepared to raise and equip an army of five and a half millions by June +30, 1920. The process had been slow and the results were not apparent for +many months. Furthermore, because of the intensity of the danger and the +absolute need of victory, cherished traditions were sacrificed and steps +taken which were to cost much later on; for the price of these +achievements was inevitable reaction and social unrest. But with all the +mistakes and all the cost, the fact still remains that the most gigantic +transformation of history—the transformation of an unmilitary and +peace-loving nation of ninety million souls into a belligerent power—was +successfully accomplished.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<h3>THE FIGHTING FRONT</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192"></a>The encouragement given to the Allies by the entrance of the United +States into the war injected a temporary ray of brightness into the +situation abroad, but with the realization that long months must elapse +before American aid could prove effective, came deep disappointment. The +spring of 1917 did not bring the expected success to the French and +British on the western front; and the summer and autumn carried intense +discouragement. Hindenburg, early in the spring, executed a skillful +retreat on the Somme front, which gave to the Allies the territory to +which their previous capture of Peronne and Bapaume entitled them. But +the Germans, losing some square miles, saved their troops and supplies. +British attacks on the north gained little ground at terrible cost. The +French offensive, planned by Nivelle, which was designed to break the +German line, had to be given up after bloody checks. <a name="Page_193" id="Page_193"></a>There was mutiny in +the French armies and the morale of the civilian population sank.</p> + +<p>The hopes that had been aroused by the Russian revolution were seen to be +deceptive; instead of a national movement directed towards a more active +struggle against Germany, it now appeared in its true colors as a demand +for peace and land above everything. The Brusilov attack, which the +Allies insisted upon, proved to be a flash in the pan and ended with the +complete military demoralization of Russian armies. The collapse of the +Italian forces at Caporetto followed. Italy was not merely unable to +distract the attention of the Central Powers by a determined offensive +against Austria, but she threatened to become a liability; no one knew +how many French divisions might have to be diverted to aid in the defense +of the new Piave front. General Byng's break of the German lines at +Cambrai was more than offset by the equally brilliant German +counter-attack. And every day the submarine was taking its toll of Allied +shipping.</p> + +<p>Following the Italian débâcle, the Bolshevik revolution of November +indicated that Russia would wholly withdraw and that that great potential +source of man-power for the Allies could no longer be counted upon. +<a name="Page_194" id="Page_194"></a>Allied leaders realized that Germany would be able to transfer large +numbers of troops to the western front, and became seriously alarmed. +"The Allies are very weak," cabled General Pershing, on the 2d of +December, "and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The year +after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 +unless we give them a lot of support this year." Showing that the +schedule of troop shipments would be inadequate and complaining that the +actual shipments were not even being kept up to programme, Pershing +insisted upon the importance of the most strenuous efforts to secure +extra tonnage, which alone would make it possible for the American army +to take a proper share in the military operations of 1918.</p> + +<p>The serious representations of General Pershing were reinforced by +Colonel House when he returned from abroad on the 15th of December. For +six weeks he had been in conference, as head of a war mission, with the +Allied political and military leaders, who now realized the necessity of +unity of plan. Because of his personal intimacy with French and British +statesmen and his acknowledged skill in negotiations, House had done +much<a name="Page_195" id="Page_195"></a> to bring about Allied harmony and to pave the way for a supreme +military command. Like Pershing, he was convinced of the danger +threatening the Allies, and from the moment of his return began the +speeding-up process, which was to result in the presence of a large +American force on the battle front at the moment of crisis in the early +summer of 1918.</p> + +<p>Tonnage was obviously the vital factor upon which effective military +assistance depended. The United States had the men, although they were +not completely trained, but the apparent impossibility of transporting +them formed the great obstacle. The problem could not have been solved +without the assistance of the Allies. With the threat of the German +drive, and especially after the first German victories of 1918, they +began to appreciate the necessity of sacrificing everything to the +tonnage necessary to transport American soldiers to France. After long +hesitation they agreed to a pooling of Allied tonnage for this purpose. +Most of the Allied ships ultimately furnished the United States were +provided by the British, whose transports carried a million American +troops to France. French and Italian boats transported 112,000; our own +transports, 927,000.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196"></a>Thus by relying largely upon the shipping assistance of our associates in +the war we were able to respond to the demands of General Pershing and, +later, Marshal Foch. And thus came about the extraordinary development of +our military programme from the thirty to the eighty and one hundred +division plans, which resulted in tremendous confusion, but which also +ultimately ensured Allied victory in 1918. Until the end of the year +1917, we had put into France only 195,000 troops, including 7500 marines, +an average of about 28,000 a month. From December to February the average +rose to 48,000; from March to May it was 149,000; and from June to August +it was 290,000 men a month. During the four months from May to August +inclusive, 1,117,000 American troops were transported to France.</p> + +<p>Altogether about two million Americans were sent to France, without the +loss of a single man while under the escort of United States vessels. No +navy troop transports were torpedoed on east-bound trips although three +were sunk on the return trip with loss of 138 lives. To the American and +British navies must go the credit for carrying through this stupendous +feat, and in the work of assuring the safety of the troop transports the +navy <a name="Page_197" id="Page_197"></a>of the United States may claim recognition for the larger share, +since 82 per cent of the escorts furnished were American cruisers and +destroyers. It was a nerve-racking and tantalizing experience—the troop +ships sailing in echelon formation, preceded, followed, and flanked by +destroyers; at night every glimmer of light eclipsed, the ships speeding +ahead in perfect blackness, each inch of the sea swept by watchful eyes +to discover the telltale ripple of a periscope or the trail of a torpedo, +gun crews on the alert, depth bombs ready. Nor was the crossing anything +like a vacation yachting cruise for the doughboys transported, packed as +they were like sardines two and three decks below the waterline, brought +up in shifts to catch a brief taste of fresh air, assailed at once by +homesickness, seasickness, and fears of drowning like rats in a trap.</p> + +<p>The work of the navy was far more extensive, moreover, than the safe +convoying of troop ships, important though that was. The very first +contingent of American overseas fighting forces was made up of two +flotillas of destroyers, which upon the declaration of war had been sent +to Queenstown where they were placed under the command of Admiral William +S. Sims. <a name="Page_198" id="Page_198"></a>Their main function was to hunt submarines, which, since the +decree of the 1st of February, had succeeded in committing frightful +ravages upon Allied commerce and seriously threatened to starve the +British Isles. Admiral Sims was two years older than Pershing and as +typical a sailor as the former was soldier. With his bluff and genial, +yet dignified, manner, his rubicund complexion, closely-trimmed white +beard, and piercing eyes, no one could have mistaken his calling. Free of +speech, frank in praise and criticism, abounding in indiscretions, he +possessed the capacity to make the warmest friends and enemies. He was an +ardent admirer of the British, rejoiced in fighting with them, and +ashamed that our Navy Department was unwilling to send more adequate and +immediate assistance to their fleet. Sims's international reputation as +an expert in naval affairs was of long standing. Naval officers in every +country of Europe knew of him as the inventor of a system of fire control +which had been adopted by the great navies of the world, and it was +largely because of his studies and devices that the extraordinary records +of the American fleets at target practice had been secured. The British +naval officers reciprocated Sims's admiration for them, and, according to +popular belief, it was at their special request that he had been sent to +command our overseas naval forces. <a name="Page_199" id="Page_199"></a>No one else could have obtained such +effective coöperation between the British and American fleets.</p> + +<p>While at first the major portion of the American fleet was retained in +home waters for the protection of American coasts and ports, a policy +which aroused the stinging criticism of Admiral Sims, gradually the fleet +added strength to the Allied navies in their patrol of European coasts +and the bottling-up of the German high seas fleet. Destroyer bases were +maintained at Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar, from which were +dispatched constant patrols. Individual destroyers, during the first year +of service overseas, steamed a total of 60,000 miles. Their crews were on +the watch in the dirtiest weather, unable to sleep, tossed and battered +by the incessant rolling, without warm food, facing the constant peril of +being swept overboard and knowing that their boat could not stop to pick +them up. American submarine-chasers and converted yachts, mine-sweepers +on their beneficent and hazardous duty, were equally active. Naval +aviators coöperated with the British to patrol the coasts in search of +submarines. Late in 1917, six battleships were sent to join the British +Grand Fleet, which was watching for the Germans<a name="Page_200" id="Page_200"></a> in the North Sea, thus +constituting about twelve per cent of the guarding naval force. More +important, perhaps, was the American plan for laying a mine barrage from +the Scotch coast across to Norwegian waters. The Ordnance Bureau of the +navy, despite the discouragement of British experts, manufactured the +mines, 100,000 of them, and shipped them abroad in parts ready for final +assembling. The American navy was responsible for eighty per cent of the +laying of the barrage, which when finished was 245 miles long and twenty +miles wide. The complete story of the achievements of the navy cannot now +be told in detail. It was not always inspiring, for numerous mistakes +were made. Confusion of counsels in the Naval Board left one important +bombing squadron so bereft of supplies that after an expenditure of four +millions only two bombs were dropped in the entire course of its +operations. But there are also to be remembered the unheralded stories of +heroism and skill, such as the dash of the submarine-chasers and +destroyers through the mine fields at Durazzo, and the work of our naval +guns in the attack on Zeebrugge.</p> + +<p>The armies, safely brought to France, were meanwhile undergoing the +essential intensive training, and the task of organizing the service of +supply was being undertaken. The training given in the United States +before sailing had been in the ordinary forms of drill and tactics; now +it was necessary that there should be greater specialization. Numerous +schools for the training of officers were established. For the troops the +plan for training allowed, according to the intent of General Pershing, +"a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small units +from battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors by +battalion, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when it +should be trained as a complete division in war of movement."<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The +entire process of training was a compromise between speed and efficiency. +During the latter months of the war many of the American troops were put +on the battle-line when they were by no means sufficiently trained. +Certain draft units were transported and thrown up to the front after +experience of a most superficial character; there are instances of men +going into action without knowing how to load their rifles or adjust +their gas masks properly. But on the whole the training given was +surprisingly <a name="Page_202" id="Page_202"></a>effective in view of the speed with which it was +accomplished. American skill with the rifle won the envy of foreign +officers, and the value of American troops in open warfare was soon to be +acknowledged by the Germans.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> This plan could not be fulfilled for troops coming to +France in 1918, because of lack of time.</p></div> + +<p>The same sort of centralization sought by Wilson in America obviously +became necessary in France with the expanding plans for an enormous army. +In February, 1918, the Service of Supply was organized. With its +headquarters at Tours, the S. O. S. was responsible for securing, +organizing, and distributing all the food, equipment, building materials, +and other necessities demanded by the expeditionary force. In order to +provide for the quantities of essential supplies and to avoid the +congestion of the chief ports of France, certain ports were especially +allotted to our army, of which the most important were St. Nazaire, +Bordeaux, and Brest. The first, a somnolent fishing village, was +transformed by the energy of American engineers into a first-class port +with enormous docks, warehouses, and supply depots; Brest rose in the +space of twelve months from the rank of a second-class port to one that +matched Hamburg in the extent of its shipping. In all, more than a dozen +ports were used by the Americans and in each extensive improvements and +enlargements proved necessary. <a name="Page_203" id="Page_203"></a>At Bordeaux not more than two ships a +week, of any size, could conveniently be unloaded prior to June, 1917. +Eight months later, docks a mile long had been constructed, concrete +platforms and electric cranes set up; within a year fourteen ships could +be unloaded simultaneously, the rate of speed being determined only by +the number of stevedores. For unloading purposes regiments of negroes +were stationed at each port.</p> + +<p>A few miles back from the coast were the base depots where the materials +were stored as they came from the ships. Thence distribution was made to +the intermediate depots in the cities of supply, and finally to the +depots immediately behind the fighting front. All these depots involved +enormous building operations; at first the lumber was shipped, but later, +American lumber jacks were brought over to cut French forests. At one +supply depot three hundred buildings were put up, covering an area of six +square miles, operated by 20,000 men, and holding in storage a hundred +million dollars' worth of supplies. For distribution purposes it proved +necessary for American engineers to take over the construction and +maintenance of communications. <a name="Page_204" id="Page_204"></a>At first American engines and cars were +operated under French supervision; but ultimately many miles of French +railroads were taken over bodily by the American army and many more built +by American engineers. More than 400 miles of inland waterways were also +used by American armies. This transportation system was operated by +American experts of all grades from brakemen to railroad presidents, +numbering altogether more than 70,000.</p> + +<p>In order to meet the difficulty of securing tonnage for supplies and to +avoid competition with the Allies, a General Purchasing Board was created +for the coördination of all purchases. Agents of this board were +stationed in the Allied countries, in Switzerland, Holland, and Spain, +who reconnoitered resources, analyzed requirements, issued forecasts of +supplies, supervised the claims of foreign governments on American raw +materials, and procured civilian manual labor. Following the +establishment of the supreme interallied command, the Interallied Board +of Supplies was organized in the summer of 1918, with the American +purchasing agent as a member. Other activities of the S. O. S., too +numerous to recount in detail, included such important tasks as the +reclassification of personnel, the installation and operation of a +<a name="Page_205" id="Page_205"></a>general service of telephone and telegraph communication, with 115,500 +kilometers of lines, and the renting and requisitioning of the land and +buildings needed by the armies. It was a gigantic business undertaking, +organized at top speed, involving tremendous expenditure. Its success +would have been impossible without the coöperation of hundreds of men of +business, who found in it a sphere of service which enabled the army to +utilize the proverbial American genius for meeting large problems of +economic organization. At the time of the armistice the S. O. S. reached +a numerical strength in personnel of 668,000, including 23,000 civilian +employees.</p> + +<p>From the first, Pershing had been determined that the American +Expeditionary Force should ultimately operate as an independent unit, +although in close coöperation with the Allies. During the autumn of 1917 +the disasters in Italy and the military demoralization of Russia had led +to the formation of the Supreme Military Council of the Allies, upon +which the United States was represented by General Tasker Bliss, whose +rough visage and gruff manner gave little indication of his wide +interests. Few suspected that this soldierly character took secret +pleasure in the reading of Latin poets. <a name="Page_206" id="Page_206"></a>The coördination that resulted +from the creation of the Supreme Council, however, proved insufficient to +meet the crisis of the spring of 1918.</p> + +<p>On the 21st of March, the Germans attacked in overwhelming force the +southern extremity of the British lines, near where they joined the +French, and disastrously defeated General Gough's army. The break-through +was clean and the advance made by the endless waves of German +shock-troops appalling. Within eight days the enemy had swept forward to +a depth of fifty-six kilometers, threatening the capture of Amiens and +the separation of the French and British. As the initial momentum of the +onslaught was lost, the Allied line was re-formed with the help of French +reserves under Fayolle. But the Allies had been and still were close to +disaster. Complete unity of command was essential. It was plain also, in +the words of Pershing's report, that because of the inroads made upon +British and French reserves, "defeat stared them in the face unless the +new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the +most optimistic had dared to hope." The first necessity was satisfied +early in April. <a name="Page_207" id="Page_207"></a>The extremity of the danger reinforced the demand long +made by the French, and supported by President Wilson through Colonel +House, that a generalissimo be appointed. The British finally sank their +objection, and on the 28th of March it was agreed that General Ferdinand +Foch should be made commander-in-chief of all the Allied armies with the +powers necessary for the strategic direction of all military operations. +The decision was ratified on the 3d and approved by President Wilson on +the 16th of April.</p> + +<p>General Foch had long been recognized as an eminent student of strategy, +and he had proved his practical capacity in 1914 and later. It was he who +commanded the French army that broke the German line at the marshes of +St. Gond, in the battle of the Marne, thus assuring victory to Joffre, +and he had later in the year secured fresh laurels in the first battle of +the Yser. At the moment of extreme danger to Italy, after Caporetto, in +1917, he had been chosen to command the assisting force sent down by the +French. Unsentimental and unswayed by political factors, he was +temperamentally and intellectually the ideal man for the post of supreme +Allied commander; he was furthermore supported by the capacity of General +Pétain, the French commander-in-chief, and by a remarkable<a name="Page_208" id="Page_208"></a> group of army +commanders, among whom Fayolle, Mangin, and Gouraud were to win +particular fame. But he lacked troops, the Germans disposing of 200 +divisions as against 162 Allied divisions.</p> + +<p>Hence the hurry call sent to America and hence the heavy sacrifice now +forced upon Pershing. Much against his will and only as a result of +extreme pressure, the American commander-in-chief agreed to a temporary +continuance of the brigading of American troops with the British and the +French. He had felt all along that "there was every reason why we could +not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, much +less as replacements, except by pressure of pure necessity." He disliked +the emphasis placed by the Allies upon training for trench warfare; he +feared the effect of the lack of homogeneity which would render the mixed +divisions "difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under the +stress of defeat," and he believed that the creation of independent +American armies "would be a severe blow to German morale." When the pinch +of necessity came, however, Pershing sank his objections to amalgamation +and, to his credit, agreed with a <em>beau geste</em> and fine phrase which +concealed the differences between the Allied chiefs and won the heartiest +sympathy from France and England. <a name="Page_209" id="Page_209"></a>The principle of an independent American +force, however, Pershing insisted upon, and he made clear that the +amalgamation of our troops with the French and British was merely a +temporary expedient.</p> + +<p>Immediately after the stabilization of the battle-line near Amiens, the +Germans began their second great drive, this time against the British +along the Lys, in Flanders. The initial success of the attack, which began +on the 9th of April, was undeniable, and Sir Douglas Haig himself admitted +the danger of the moment: "Every position must be held to the last man. +There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in +the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety +of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of +each one of us at this critical moment." The value of Allied unity of +command now became apparent, for heavy French reinforcements were brought +up in time to help stave off the German drive on the Channel Ports.</p> + +<p>But still the demand went up for more men and ships. "Scrap before +shipping every pound that takes tonnage and is not necessary to the +killing of Germans," wrote a French military authority.<a name="Page_210" id="Page_210"></a> "Send the most +infantry by the shortest route to the hottest corner. No matter what flag +they fight under, so long as it is an Allied flag." On the 27th of May +the Germans caught Foch by surprise and launched a violent attack on the +Chemin des Dames, between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac. This formed the +third phase of their great offensive. In four days they pushed before +them the tired French divisions, sent into that sector to recuperate, a +distance of fifty kilometers and reached the Marne. Again, as in 1914, +Paris began to empty, fearful of capture. A statement sent to Wilson on +the 2d of June and signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, read +as follows: "There is great danger of the war being lost unless the +numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as +possible by the advent of American troops.... We are satisfied that +General Foch ... is not over-estimating the needs of the case." Such was +the peril of the Allies. But in the month of May 245,000 Americans had +been landed, and in the following month there were to be 278,000 more.</p> + +<p>Previous to June, 1918, the participation of American troops in military +operations had been of comparative unimportance and less for tactical +purposes than as a part of their training.<a name="Page_211" id="Page_211"></a> In October, 1917, the First +Division had been sent into trenches on the quiet Lorraine front and had +engaged in raids and counter-raids. Three other divisions, the Second, the +Forty-second, or "Rainbow," and the Twenty-sixth from New England, +followed, and by March, 1918, they were all described by Pershing as +"equal to any demands of battle action." On the 29th of April, the +last-named division was engaged in something more serious than a mere raid +at Seicheprey, near St. Mihiel; the number of prisoners lost indicated +lack of experience, but the vigor of the American counter-attack proved +definitely the will to fight. That belligerent spirit was equally +displayed by various engineering units which, during the break of General +Gough's army before the German assault of March, near St. Quentin, had +dropped their tools, seized rifles, and, hastily organizing to cover the +retreat, had secured valuable respite for various fleeing units.</p> + +<p>More important yet, because of the moral effect achieved, was the +engagement at Cantigny near Montdidier, on the 28th of May. The Americans +launched their attack with skill as well as dash, and stood firm against +the violence of the German reaction; this they met without assistance +from the French, who had been called to oppose the German advance on the +Marne. <a name="Page_212" id="Page_212"></a>Pershing spoke of the "desperate efforts" of the enemy at +Cantigny, "determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent +effect the American success had produced." For three days guns of all +calibers were vainly concentrated upon the new positions. Coming at the +moment of extreme discouragement, Cantigny was of an importance entirely +out of proportion to the numbers involved. For months France had been +awaiting American assistance. A year before the French had seen Pershing +and the first few doughboys, but the long delay had caused them to lose +the confidence which that sight had aroused. Now suddenly came the news +that the Americans were arriving in tremendous numbers and from Cantigny, +north and south along the lines, spread the report: "These men will +fight."</p> + +<p>Four days later at Château-Thierry,<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Americans proved not merely the +moral but the practical value of their assistance. The German drive of the +27th of May, beginning on the Chemin des Dames, had pushed south to the +Marne and westward towards Meaux. The French falling back in haste had +maintained their lines intact, but were pessimistic as to the possibility +of stopping the enemy advance. On the 31st of May, German vanguard units +entered Château-Thierry, crossed the river, and planned to secure the +bridges. At this moment American machine gunners of the Third Division +came up with a battalion of French colonials in support, drove the Germans +back to the north bank, covered the retreat of the French forces across +the Marne, on the following day, and gave time to blow up the bridges. On +the same day, the 1st of June, northwest of Château-Thierry, the Second +Division came into line to support the wearied French, and as the latter +came filtering back and through, soon found itself meeting direct German +assaults. Stretching across the road to Paris, with the French too weak to +make a stand, it blocked the German advance. Even so, the danger was not +entirely parried, since the enemy held strong positions from Vaux +northwest to Veuilly, which, when German reinforcements came up, would +enable them to deliver deadly assaults. Those positions had to be taken. +From the 6th to the 11th of June, American troops, among them marine +regiments, struck viciously, concentrating<a name="Page_214" id="Page_214"></a> against the railroad +embankment at Bouresches and the hill of Belleau Woods. The stiffness of +the German defense, maintained by their best troops, was overcome by +fearless rushing of machine-gun nests, ruthless mopping-up of isolated +stragglers, and a final clearing of the Woods by heavy artillery fire. On +the 18th of June the Americans took the approaches to Torcy and on the 1st +of July the village of Vaux. If the attack on Belleau Woods proved their +courage, the capture of Vaux vindicated their skill, for losses were +negligible.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The reader should distinguish the defensive operations at +Château-Thierry, on the 1st of June, from the attack launched from this +sector in July. Both are known as the battle of Château-Thierry.</p></div> + +<p>The Allied line was now in a position to contest actively any deepening +of the Marne salient to the west, and American troops had so clearly +proved their quality that Pershing could with justice demand a radical +revision of the Allied opinion that American soldiers were fit only for +the defense. His confidence in their fighting capacity was soon further +put to the test and vindicated. On the 15th of July the Germans opened +the fourth and last of their great drives, with tremendous artillery fire +from Rheims to the Marne. They hoped to capture the former, swing far to +the south and west, and, if they failed to take Paris, at least to draw +sufficient troops from Flanders and Picardy as to assure a successful +drive on Amiens and the Channel Ports. <a name="Page_215" id="Page_215"></a>For the first time, however, the +element of surprise in their attack was lacking. At the eastern end of +the battle-line General Gouraud, with whom were fighting the Forty-second +Division and four colored regiments, warned of the moment of attack, +withdrew his front lines and permitted the Germans to shell empty +trenches; all important positions he held firmly. On the Marne, east of +Château-Thierry, the enemy succeeded in crossing the river in the early +morning. At various points the American line was compelled to yield, +although one of the American regiments stood its ground while on either +flank the Germans, who had gained a footing on the south bank, pressed +forward; it was, according to Pershing's report, "one of the most +brilliant pages in our military annals." At noon, heedless of the warning +given by the French commander, American reinforcements launched a strong +counter-attack and drove the enemy back to the river; on the next morning +no Germans were to be found on the south bank in front of the American +troops. During the next two days German efforts to press forward were +unrelaxing but in vain, and on the 18th of July, Foch launched his +counter-offensive.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216"></a>The inherent weakness of the Marne salient from the German point of view +and the opportunity which it offered the Allied command had not been +forgotten by the generalissimo. Foch waited until the enemy had spent his +strength in the attacks around Rheims and on the Marne, then struck +fiercely between Soissons and Château-Thierry. The spearhead of the main +drive was composed of the First and Second American Divisions, +immediately to the south of Soissons, who were operating under Mangin +with the First French Moroccan Division between them. Straightway, +without the orthodox preliminary artillery fire, a deep thrust was made +against the western side of the salient; near Soissons, despite fierce +resistance, advances of from eight to ten kilometers and large numbers of +prisoners were reported in the first twenty-four hours. "Due to the +magnificent dash and powers displayed on the field of Soissons by our +First and Second Divisions," said Pershing, "the tide of war was +definitely turned in favor of the Allies." Further to the south, the +Fourth and Twenty-sixth Divisions crossed the road running from +Château-Thierry to Soissons, pushing east; while from the southern bank +of the Marne, the Third Division pushed north across the river. It was +obvious to the Germans that retreat from the perilous salient must +proceed at once, especially as Franco-British counter-attacks on the +eastern side threatened to close it at the neck and cut the main line of +German withdrawal. The retreat was executed with great skill and valor. +While holding on the sides, the enemy forces were slowly pulled back from +the apex, striving to win time to save artillery, although they must +perforce lose or destroy great quantities of ammunition. Against the +retreating foe fresh American divisions were hurled. On the 25th of July +the Forty-second division relieved the Twenty-sixth, advancing toward the +Vesle, with elements of the Twenty-eighth, until relieved on August 3d, +by the Fourth Division. Farther east the Thirty-second had relieved the +Third. The Americans had to face withering fire from machine-gun nests +and fight hand to hand in the crumbled streets of the Champagne villages. +Here were carried on some of the fiercest conflicts of American military +history. Finally on the 6th of August the Germans reached the line of the +Vesle, their retreat secured, although their losses had been terrific. +But the pause was only momentary. Before they could bring up +replacements, the British launched their great drive south of the Somme, +the American Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, <a name="Page_218" id="Page_218"></a>and Seventy-seventh divisions +crossed the Vesle pushing the Germans before them, and there began what +Ludendorff in his memoirs calls "the last phase."</p> + +<p>Pershing had not lost sight of his original object, which was to assemble +the American divisions into a separate army. After the victories of July, +which wiped out the Marne salient, and those of August, which put the +enemy definitely on the defensive, he felt that "the emergency which had +justified the dispersion of our divisions had passed." Soon after the +successful British attack, south of Amiens, he overcame the objections of +Foch and concluded arrangements for the organization of this army, which +was to operate in the Lorraine sector.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> It contained 600,000 men, +fourteen American divisions and two French. On the 30th of August the +sector was established and preparations made for the offensive, the first +step in which was to be the wiping out of the St. Mihiel salient. This +salient had existed since 1914, when the Germans, failing to storm the +scarp protecting Verdun on the east, had driven a wedge across the lower +heights to the south. <a name="Page_219" id="Page_219"></a>The elimination of this wedge would have great +moral effect; it would free the Paris-Nancy railway from artillery fire; +and would assure Pershing an excellent base for attack against the +Metz-Sedan railway system and the Briey iron basin. The German positions +were naturally strong and had withstood violent French attacks in 1915. +But there was only one effective line of retreat and the enemy, if he +persisted in holding the apex of the salient, risked losing his entire +defending force, should the sides be pressed in from the south and west.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Allied opposition to an American army was so strong as to +bring threats of an appeal to Wilson. The President steadfastly supported +Pershing.</p></div> + +<p>On the 12th of September the attack was launched. It was originally +planned for the 15th, but word was brought that the Germans were about to +retire at a rate which would have left none of them in the salient by +that date. Hence the attack was advanced by three days. The attempted +withdrawal secured the retreat of the German main force, but they were +unable to save their rear guard. After four hours of vigorous artillery +preparation, with the largest assemblage of aviation ever engaged in a +single operation (mainly British and French) and with American heavy guns +throwing into confusion all rail movements behind the German lines, the +advancing Americans immediately overwhelmed all of the enemy that +attempted to hold their ground. By the afternoon of the second day the +salient was extinguished, 16,000 prisoners were taken, 443 guns and large +stores of supplies captured. American casualties totaled less than 7000. +The effects of the victory were incalculable. Apart from the material +results, hope of which had motivated the attack, the moral influence of +the battle of St. Mihiel in the making of American armies and the +discouragement of the German High Command was of the first importance. +"An American army was an accomplished fact," wrote Pershing, "and the +enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the +depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our +ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully +through his defense. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their +superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first +time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and +open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved +to be the correct doctrine."</p> + +<p>The victory of St. Mihiel was merely the necessary prelude to greater +things. During the first week of September the Allied command decided +that the general offensive movement of their armies<a name="Page_221" id="Page_221"></a> should be pressed as +rapidly as possible, converging upon the main line of German retreat +through Mezières and Sedan. The British were to pursue the attack in the +direction of Cambrai, the center of the French armies, west of Rheims, +was to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne, while the Americans were to +attack through the Argonne and on both sides of the Meuse, aiming for +Sedan. Pershing was given his choice of the Champagne or Argonne sectors, +and chose the latter, which was the more difficult, insisting that no +other Allied troops possessed the offensive spirit which would be +necessary for success. In the meantime a new American army was to be +organized, to operate south of Verdun and against Metz, in the spring of +1919; in fact this was designed to be the chief American effort. As +matters turned out this second American army was ready to make its +offensive early in November, but in September none of the Allied chiefs +expressed the opinion that the final victory could be achieved in 1918. +Such were the difficulties of terrain in the Argonne advance that the +French did not believe that the attack could be pushed much beyond +Montfaucon, between the forest and the Meuse, before winter forced a +cessation of active operations.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222"></a>The defensive importance of the Argonne for the Germans could hardly be +overestimated, for if the railway line running through Sedan and Mezières +were severed, they would be cut in two by the Ardennes and would be +unable to withdraw from France the bulk of their forces, which, left +without supplies, would suffer inevitable disaster. As a consequence the +Argonne had been strengthened by elaborate fortifications which, taken in +conjunction with the natural terrain, densely wooded, covered with rugged +heights, and marked by ridges running east and west, made it apparently +impregnable. The dense undergrowth, the bowlders, and the ravines offered +ideal spots for machine-gun nests. The Germans had the exact range of +each important position.</p> + +<p>But Pershing's confidence in the offensive valor of the Americans was +amply justified. On the morning of the 26th of September the initial +attack was delivered, the main force of the blow falling east of the +forest, where the natural strength of the enemy positions was less +formidable. By noon of the second day Montfaucon was captured, and by the +29th all the immediate objectives of the attack were secured. Losses were +heavy, staff work was frequently open to severe criticism, communications<a name="Page_223" id="Page_223"></a> +were broken at times, the infantry had not always received adequate +artillery support, but the success of the drive was undeniable. Before the +American troops, however, still lay two more lines of defense, the Freya +and Kriemhilde, and the Germans were bringing up their best divisions. On +the 4th of October the attack was renewed, in coöperation with the French +under Gouraud to the west of the forest who pressed forward actively; a +week's more bitter fighting saw the Argonne itself cleared of the enemy. +Hard struggles ensued, particularly around Grandpré, which was taken and +retaken, while on the east of the Meuse the enemy was pushed back. By the +end of the month the Kriemhilde line had been broken and the great railway +artery was threatened. On the 1st of November the third phase of the great +advance began. The desperate efforts of the Germans to hold were never +relaxed, but by the evening of that day the American troops broke through +their last defense and forced rapid retreat. Motor trucks were hurriedly +brought up for the pursuit, and by the fifth the enemy's withdrawal became +general. Two days later Americans held the heights which dominated Sedan, +the strategic goal, and the German line of communications was as good as +severed.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224"></a>The converging offensive planned by Foch had succeeded. At Cambrai, Le +Câtelet, and St. Quentin, the British, with whom were operating four +American divisions (the Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-seventh, and +Ninety-first), had broken the Hindenburg line; the French had pushed the +Germans back from Laon, north of the Aisne, and with the British were +driving them into the narrow neck of the bottle; and now the French and +Americans, by their Argonne-Meuse advance had closed the neck. The enemy +faced an appalling disaster. A few weeks, if not days, of continued +fighting meant the most striking military débâcle of history. Germany's +allies had fallen from her. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary had +sued for peace and agreed to cease fighting on what amounted to terms of +unconditional surrender. At home, the German Government faced revolution; +the Kaiser was about to abdicate and flee. On the 6th of November, the +Berlin Government begged for an immediate armistice and five days later +agreed to the stringent terms which the Allies presented. On the 11th of +November, at eleven in the morning, firing ceased. Until the last second +the battle raged with a useless intensity dictated by stern military +tradition: then perfect quiet on the battle front.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225"></a>At the present moment we lack the perspective, perhaps, to evaluate +exactly the share of credit which the American Expeditionary Force +deserves for the Allied military victory of 1918. Previous to June the +military contribution of the United States had no material effects. The +defense of Château-Thierry at the beginning of the month and the +operations there and at Belleau Woods had, however, important practical +as well as moral effects. The fighting was of a purely local character, +but it came at a critical moment and at a critical spot. It was a crisis +when the importance of standing firm could not be overestimated, and the +defensive capacity of the French had been seriously weakened. The advance +of American divisions with the French in the clearing of the Marne sector +was of the first military importance. The Americans were better qualified +than any European troops, at that stage of the war, to carry through +offensive operations. They were fearless not merely because of natural +hardihood, but through ignorance of danger; they were fresh and +undefeated, physically and morally capable of undergoing the gruelling +punishment delivered by the rearguards of the retreating Germans; their +training had been primarily for open warfare. The same qualities were +<a name="Page_226" id="Page_226"></a>essential for the arduous and deadly task of breaking the German line in +the Argonne, which was the finishing blow on the western battlefields.</p> + +<p>The defects of the American armies have been emphasized by European +experts. They point especially to the faulty staff-work, apparent in the +Argonne particularly, which resulted in heavy losses. Staff-officers in +numerous instances seem to have been ill-trained and at times positively +unequal to the exigencies of the campaign. Mistakes in selection account +for this to some degree, for men were appointed who were not equipped +temperamentally or intellectually for the positions given them. Equally +frequent were mistakes in the distribution of staff-officers. It is a +notable fact, however, that such mistakes resulted from inexperience and +ignorance and not from the intrusion of politics. President Wilson +guaranteed to General Pershing complete immunity from the pleas of +politicians and in no war fought by the United States have political +factors played a rôle of such insignificance.</p> + +<p>Finally, and aside from the fighting qualities of the rank and file and +certain defects of the higher command, the Americans represented numbers; +and without the tremendous numerical force <a name="Page_227" id="Page_227"></a>transported to Europe in the +spring and summer, the plans of Foch could not have been completed. We +have the testimony of the Allied chiefs in June that without American +man-power they faced defeat. It is equally obvious that without the +1,390,000 American troops which, by November, had appeared on the +fighting line, the autumn of 1918 would not have witnessed the military +triumph of the Allies.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<h3>THE PATH TO PEACE</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228"></a>The armistice of November 11, 1918, resulted directly from the military +defeat of German armies in France, following upon the collapse of Turkey, +Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary. But there were many circumstances other +than military that led to Germany's downfall, and by no means of least +importance were the moral issues so constantly stressed by Wilson. His +speeches had been carefully distributed through the Central Empires; they +had done much to arouse the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary to revolt +for their freedom, and also to weaken the morale of the German people. The +value of Wilson's "verbiage drives" was questioned in this country. +Abroad, his insistence upon a peace of justice was generally reckoned a +vital moral force in the political movements that supplemented the +victories of Marshal Foch. Jugoslavs consented to coöperate with their +Italian<a name="Page_229" id="Page_229"></a> enemies because they felt that "Wilson's justice" would guarantee +a fair court for their aspirations in the Adriatic; Magyars and Austrians +threw down their arms in the belief that his promise to "be as just to +enemies as to friends" secured a better future than they could hope for +through the continuance of the war; the leaders of the German Reichstag +demanded the Kaiser's abdication in November, under the impression that +Wilson had laid it down as a condition of peace.</p> + +<p>From the time when the United States entered the war it was obvious that +Wilson placed less emphasis upon defeating Germany than upon securing a +just peace. Military victory meant nothing to him except as the road to +peace. In his first war speeches the President, much to the irritation of +many Americans, insisted that the United States was fighting the +government and not the people of Germany. "We have no quarrel," he said, +"with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of +sympathy and friendship." In his Flag Day address he was careful not to +attack "Germany" but only "the military masters under whom Germany is +bleeding." Certain effects of this attitude were to be seen in the +Reichstag revolt of July, 1917, led by that most<a name="Page_230" id="Page_230"></a> sensitive of political +weathercocks, Matthias Erzberger, which was designed to take political +control out of the hands of the military clique. That crisis, however, +was safely survived by Ludendorff, who remained supreme. President Wilson +then returned to the attack in his reply to the Pope's peace proposals of +August. "The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the +world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military +establishment controlled by an irresponsible government.... This power is +not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people.... +We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee +of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such +conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people +themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in +accepting."</p> + +<p>There was serpentine wisdom in these words, for their very vagueness +attracted German liberals. Wilson did not demand a republic; he did not +insist upon the Kaiser's abdication, for which Germany was not then +prepared; all that he asked was a government responsible to the people, +and more and more the Germans were demanding that themselves. +<a name="Page_231" id="Page_231"></a>Furthermore, he again laid stress upon the fact that the Germans need not +fear vengeance such as the Allies had threatened. "Punitive damages, the +dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive +economic leagues, we deem inexpedient." The appeal was fruitless in its +immediate effects, for the political party leaders were still dominated +by the military; but ultimately, in conjunction with a dozen other +appeals, its influence acted like a subtle corrosive upon the German will +to conquer.</p> + +<p>Still less successful were the attempts to win Austria away from her ally +by secret diplomatic conversations. In these neither President Wilson nor +his personal adviser, Colonel House, placed great confidence. They had +been undertaken by the French through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, and in +August, 1917, Major Armand of France discussed with the Austrian emissary, +Revertata, possible means of bringing about peace between Austria and the +Allies. Lloyd George enthusiastically approved this attempt to drive a +wedge between Austria and Germany, was anxious to send Lord Reading as +intermediary, and, upon the refusal of the latter to undertake the +mission, actually dispatched General Smuts to Switzerland. <a name="Page_232" id="Page_232"></a>The Emperor +Carl seemed sincerely anxious to make sacrifices for peace and was urged +by liberal counselors, such as Förster and Lammasch, in whom the Allies +had confidence, to meet many of the demands of his discontented Slav +subjects by granting autonomy to the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs. +Negotiations were hampered by the belief of the Italians that immediate +peace with Austria would prevent them from securing the territories they +coveted; by the sullen obstinacy of the Magyars, who were jealous of their +mastery over the Hungarian Slavs, and above all, as Colonel House had +foreseen, by Austria's fear of Germany. In fact it was a stern ultimatum +sent by Ludendorff that brought the wavering Carl back to his allegiance.</p> + +<p>In the autumn of 1917, however, talk of peace was in the air and a +definite demand for its consideration was made in a noteworthy speech by +Lord Lansdowne, a Conservative leader in England. Negotiations were +inaugurated between Germany and the new Bolshevik Government of Russia, +and for a few weeks at the beginning of the new year the war-weary world +seemed close to the possibility of a general understanding. For the first +time Lloyd George outlined in specific language the main terms that would +be considered by the Allies. <a name="Page_233" id="Page_233"></a>It was President Wilson's opportunity. +Careless of securing an overwhelming military victory, indeed unwilling to +crush Germany, anxious to pledge the Entente to his programme in this +moment of their discouragement, he formulated on January 8, 1918, his +Fourteen Points, upon which he declared the final peace settlement should +be based. His speech was at once an appeal to the liberals and +peace-hungry of the Central Empires, a warning to the military clique in +Germany then preparing to enforce degrading terms upon Russia, and a +notification to the Allies that the United States could not be counted +upon to fight for selfish national interests. He reiterated the principles +which had actuated the United States when it entered the war: "What we +demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is +that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it +be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to +live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice +and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and +selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in +this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly <a name="Page_234" id="Page_234"></a>that unless +justice be done to others it will not be done to us."</p> + +<p>Of the Fourteen Points into which he then divided his peace programme, +the first five were general in nature. The first insisted upon open +diplomacy, to begin with the approaching Peace Conference: "Open +covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no +private international understandings of any kind." Next came "absolute +freedom of navigation upon the seas ... alike in peace and in war." Then +"the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace." There followed a demand for the reduction of +armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The +fifth point called for an "impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, +based upon ... the interests of the populations concerned" as well as +"the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined."</p> + +<p>These generalizations were not so much God-given tables which must +determine the international law of the future as they were subtle +inducements to cease fighting; they were idealistic in tone, but +intensely practical in purpose. <a name="Page_240" id="Page_240"></a>They guaranteed to any Germans who +wanted peace that there would be protection against British "navalism," +against the threatened Allied economic boycott, as well as a chance of +the return of the conquered colonies. The force of their seductiveness +was proved, when, many months later, in October, 1918, defeated Germany +grasped at them as a drowning man at a straw. At the same time Wilson +offered to liberals the world over the hope of ending the old-style +secret diplomacy, and to business men and labor the termination of the +system of competitive armaments, with their economic and moral waste. No +one would suggest that Wilson did not believe in the idealism of these +first five points; no one should forget, however, that they were +carefully drafted with the political situation of the moment definitely +in view. They might be construed as a charter for future international +relations, but they were designed primarily to serve as a diplomatic +weapon for the present.</p> + +<p>Each of the succeeding eight points was more special in character, and +dealt with the territorial and political problems of the warring states. +They provided for the evacuation and restoration of all conquered +territories in Europe, including Russia, Belgium, France, and the Balkan +States. <a name="Page_236" id="Page_236"></a>The sovereignty of Belgium should be unlimited in future; the +"wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine +... should be righted"; Italian frontiers should be readjusted "along +clearly recognizable lines of nationality"; the peoples of Austria-Hungary +"should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development"; the +relations of the Balkan States should be determined "along historically +established lines of allegiance and nationality"; nationalities under +Turkish rule should receive opportunity for security of life and +autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened +to all nations under international guarantees; an independent Polish state +should be erected to "include the territories inhabited by indisputably +Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to +the sea."</p> + +<p>Generally speaking these stipulations seemed to guarantee the moderate +war aims of the Entente and corresponded closely to the demands made by +Lloyd George; they certainly repudiated the extreme purposes attributed +to German imperialists. And yet these eight points were so vague and +capable of such diverse interpretation that, like the first five general +points, they might prove not unattractive to liberals in Germany and +Austria. France was not definitely promised Alsace-Lorraine; any hint at +the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was carefully avoided; the +readjustment of Italian frontiers might mean much or little. What were +"historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" in the +Balkans? And if Poland were to include only populations "indisputably +Polish," was it possible to assure them "free and secure access to the +sea"? The political advantage in such generalities was obvious. But there +was also great danger. The time might come when both belligerent camps +would accept the Fourteen Points and would still be uncertain of their +meaning and application. The struggle for definite interpretation would +be the real test. The President's fourteenth and last point, however, was +unmistakable and expressed the ideal nearest his heart: "A general +association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the +purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and +territorial integrity to great and small states alike."</p> + +<p>Later events have magnified the significance of this notable speech of +the 8th of January.<a name="Page_238" id="Page_238"></a> It was a striking bid for peace, which indeed was not +far away and it ultimately formed the general basis of the peace terms +actually drafted. But it contained nothing new. Its definition of the +conditions of peace was vague; its formulation of principles followed +exactly along the lines developed by President Wilson ever since he had +adopted the idea of a League of Nations founded upon international +justice. His summing up of the main principle underlying his whole policy +was merely the echo of his speeches for the past twelve-month: "The +principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to +live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they +be strong or weak." The importance of the speech does not lie in its +novelty but in its timeliness. It came at a moment when the world was +anxiously listening and the undeniable idealism of its content assured to +President Wilson, at least temporarily, the moral leadership of mankind. +Unfortunately as the event proved, it promised more than could ever be +secured by any single man. The President was to pay the price for his +leadership later when he encountered the full force of the reaction.</p> + +<p>As a step toward immediate peace the speech of the Fourteen Points +failed. <a name="Page_239" id="Page_239"></a>What might have been the result had von Hertling, Chancellor of +Germany, and Czernin, in Austria, possessed full powers, it is difficult +to say. But the military masters of Germany could not resist the +temptation which the surrender of Russia brought before their eyes. By +securing the eastern front and releasing prisoners as well as troops +there, they would be able to establish a crushing superiority in the +west; France would be annihilated before the American armies could count, +if indeed they were ever raised. Hence the heavy terms of Brest-Litovsk +and Bucharest and the preparations for the great drive of March. As +Wilson said, "The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany +is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to +prevent what all the world now sees to be just." Thus Germany lost her +last chance to emerge from the war uncrushed.</p> + +<p>The ruthless policy followed by Ludendorff and his associates gave the +President new opportunities to appeal to the peoples of the Central +Empires. He incorporated in his speeches the phrases of the German +Socialists. "Self-Determination" and "No annexations and no indemnities" +were phrases that had been made in Germany before Russia imported them; +and when they formed the text of presidential addresses, many Germans, +despite themselves, doubtless felt a twinge of sympathy. Coupled with +these appeals went the President's warnings that if they persisted in +tying up their fortunes with those of their rulers, they must share the +penalties. If Germany insisted upon making force alone the deciding +element, then he must accept the challenge and abide the issue. "There +is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the +utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force +which shall make Right the law of the world and cast every selfish +dominion down in the dust." Neither the appeals nor the warnings of +Wilson had any effect apparent at the moment, and yet the seed was sown. +During the victorious German drives of March, April, and May, opinion to +the east of the Rhine seemed to have rallied firmly behind the Teuton +Government; but with the first slight setbacks of the following month the +process of crumbling began. An American economist and banker, Henry C. +Emery, then prisoner in Germany, tells of the pessimism prevalent as +early as June and the whispers of the approaching fall of the Kaiser. In +his memoirs Ludendorff lays the failure of the German armies in August to +the complete breakdown of the national spirit.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241"></a>The end came with extraordinary speed. Already in September, after the +defection of Bulgaria and the startling success of Foch's converging +movement on Sedan, Germany knew that she was defeated. The Berlin +Government turned to Wilson and on the 5th of October requested an +armistice. At the same time Austria-Hungary made a similar request +offering to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Wilson's +position was delicate. He knew in September that the end was near and +prepared for the situation in some degree by sending Colonel House abroad +to be ready to discuss armistice terms with the Allies. But the sudden +character of the German collapse had intoxicated public opinion to such +an extent that the political idealism which he had voiced ran the risk of +becoming swamped. If Germany were indeed helpless and the Allies +triumphant, there was the danger that, in the flush of victory, all the +promises of a just peace would be forgotten. He must provide against such +a contingency. On the other hand he must secure guarantees that Germany +had indeed thrown off her militaristic cloak, as Prince Max of Baden, the +new Chancellor, insisted; and also that under cover of an armistice she +might not effect a withdrawal of her defeated armies, only to renew the +struggle under more favorable conditions on her own borders.<a name="Page_242" id="Page_242"></a> He was +caught between the danger of German fraud and Allied exuberance.</p> + +<p>There ensued a month of negotiations, during which the military victory of +the Allies was further assured, as described in the preceding pages. The +German Government was first asked by Wilson if it accepted the Fourteen +Points and the similar stipulations made by the President in subsequent +addresses. Replying in the affirmative, Prince Max then promised to +acquiesce in armistice terms that would leave the military situation +unchanged, and further agreed to order a cessation of unrestricted +submarine warfare and of the wanton destruction caused by the German +armies in their retreat. Finally he declared in answer to Wilson's demand, +that the request for an armistice and peace came from a government "which +is free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence, and is supported +by the approval of an overwhelming majority of the German people." The +President then formally transmitted the correspondence to the Allies, and +Colonel House entered upon discussions to establish with them the +understanding that the basis of the peace negotiations would be the +Wilsonian programme. He was successful; and the <a name="Page_243" id="Page_243"></a>Fourteen Points, with +reservation of the second, "Freedom of the seas," were accepted by the +Allied governments. The Allies, on the other hand, secured President +Wilson's approval of the principle that "compensation will be made by +Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and +their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the +air." Upon this understanding the details of the armistice were left to +the military leaders. The terms as fixed reflected the military situation +on the fighting front and the political situation in Germany and placed +Germany entirely in the power of the victors without possibility of +renewing the war. The conditions laid down were so stringent that until +the last moment a refusal by the German delegates seemed imminent; but on +the 11th of November, just before the expiration of the time limit allowed +them, they accepted the inevitable.</p> + +<p>It is a mistake to regard the armistice as forced upon the Allies by +President Wilson. Many persons abroad, as in this country, felt, it is +true, that it was wrong to permit the peaceful withdrawal of the German +armies, even though the full military advantages of victory were secured +by the armistice conditions; <a name="Page_244" id="Page_244"></a>the Allies ought, they argued, to impress +on the Germans the magnitude of their defeat on the field of battle, and +this could not be done so long as German soil had been free from warfare. +General Pershing was strongly opposed to the granting of an armistice. +The Allied chiefs knew, however, that although the continuation of the +fighting would lead to the surrender of a great German force, every day +would cost the victorious armies a heavy toll of killed and wounded, and +the advantage to be gained thereby was at least questionable. This fact +was emphasized even by Marshal Foch. They hesitated, certainly, to accept +the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace, for they feared lest the +interpretation put upon them at the Peace Conference might rob them of +what they believed to be the just fruits of victory. In both France and +England there was, it is true, a body of liberal opinion which would not +brook open repudiation of the ideals that Wilson had sponsored during the +war and to which Allied ministers had themselves paid tribute. In each +country there was another group demanding a "peace of annihilation," with +the payment of all war costs by the defeated, but Lloyd George and +Clemenceau feared at the moment to raise this issue. <a name="Page_245" id="Page_245"></a>Both England and +France were dependent upon American assistance for the immediate future +as they had been during the war. They needed American food, raw +materials, and money. A break with Wilson, who for the moment was the +popular hero of Europe, taken in conjunction with an economic crisis, +might be the signal for domestic disturbances if not revolution.</p> + +<p>Thus with Germany helpless and the Allies at least outwardly accepting +his peace programme, Woodrow Wilson seemed to be master of the situation. +And yet his power was more apparent than real. Apart from that moral +influence which he exercised over the European liberals and which among +some of the working classes was so extreme that candles were burnt before +his picture, but which also was inevitably unstable and evanescent, +Wilson's power rested upon the fact that he was President of the United +States. But the nation was no longer united behind him or his policy, if +indeed it had ever been so. That hatred and distrust which had marked the +electoral campaign of 1916, and which, stifled for the moment by entrance +into the war, had flamed out early in 1918 in the attack upon his war +administration, now in the autumn threatened an explosion of popular +disapprobation in some parts of the country.<a name="Page_246" id="Page_246"></a> Men had long whispered +"autocrat" but had generally been silenced during the war by the +admonition not to weaken the government by factious criticism. Now they +began to shout it from the house-tops. Because of his inability to grasp +the importance of either tact or tactics, the President made the way of +his opponents easy for them.</p> + +<p>Shortly before the Congressional elections of November, at the moment +when he felt the need of national support in order to strengthen his +position with the Allies, the President was prevailed upon to issue an +appeal to the electors, asking them to vote for Democratic candidates on +the ground that the nation ought to have unified leadership in the coming +moment of crisis, and that a Republican Congress would divide the +leadership. There was nothing novel in such an appeal; in 1898, McKinley +had begged for a Republican Congress on the ground that "this is no time +for divided councils," the same ground as that taken by Wilson in 1918. +Roosevelt in the same year (1898) had said: "Remember that whether you +will or not your votes this year will be viewed by the nations of Europe +from one standpoint only.... A refusal to sustain the President this year +will, in their eyes, be read as a refusal to sustain the war and to +sustain the efforts of the peace commission." <a name="Page_247" id="Page_247"></a>Wilson's appeal in 1918 was +merely an echo of Roosevelt's in 1898. Yet it was a mistake in tactics. +It enabled the Republicans to assert that, whereas they had sunk partisan +differences during the war in order to secure the victory of the nation, +Wilson was now capitalizing the war and foreign problems to win a +partisan advantage. The result of the elections was Republican success, +assuring to that party a slight majority in the Senate and a goodly +majority in the House after March 4, 1919.</p> + +<p>The President made other tactical mistakes. Instead of taking the Senate +into his confidence by entering upon numerous conferences with its +leaders, he stood upon the letter of the Constitution and gave the clear +impression that he would conduct the peace negotiations himself without +Senatorial assistance, leaving the Senators merely their constitutional +privilege of "advice and consent" when a treaty should be laid before +them. He would have done better to remember a remarkable passage in one of +his own lectures, delivered ten years before. Speaking of the difficulty +of bringing pressure to bear upon the Senate, he had said that there is a +"course which the President may follow, and which one or two Presidents +of <a name="Page_248" id="Page_248"></a>unusual political sagacity have followed, with the satisfactory +results that were to have been expected. He may himself be less stiff and +offish, may himself act in the true spirit of the Constitution and +establish intimate relations of confidence with the Senate on his own +initiative, not carrying his plans to completion and then laying them in +final form before the Senate to be accepted or rejected, but keeping +himself in confidential communication with the leaders of the Senate while +his plans are in course, when their advice will be of service to him and +his information of the greatest service to them, in order that there may +be veritable counsel and a real accommodation of views, instead of a final +challenge and contest." Had Wilson in 1918, and after, followed his own +advice, the outcome might have been different. But nothing describes so +perfectly the exact opposite of his attitude as the passage quoted above.</p> + +<p>The President might at least have assuaged the sense of injury that +rankled in the hearts of the Senators by asking for their advice in the +appointment of the Peace Commission. Instead he kept his own counsel. He +decided to go to Paris himself as head of the Commission, and chose for +his associates men who were not qualified to win for him the support +that he needed in the Senate or in the country. <a name="Page_249" id="Page_249"></a>Robert Lansing, as +Secretary of State, was a necessary appointment. Colonel House was +probably the best-fitted man in America for the approaching negotiations, +alike by his temperament, by the breadth of his knowledge of foreign +questions, and by his intimacy with foreign statesmen. But at least two +places on the Commission should have been given to eminent Republicans +and to men universally known and respected. If Wilson was unwilling to +select members of the Senate, he might have heeded public opinion which +called definitely for William Howard Taft and Elihu Root. Both were +pledged to the most important item of Wilson's programme, the League of +Nations; both exercised wide influence in the country and in the +Republican party. The Senate, with a Republican majority, would almost +certainly ratify any treaty which they had signed. But the President, for +reasons of a purely negative character, passed them over and with what +looked to the public like mere carelessness, chose General Tasker Howard +Bliss and Henry White, formerly Ambassador to Rome and Paris under +Presidents Roosevelt and Taft.<a name="Page_250" id="Page_250"></a> Both were men of ability and experience, +but neither enjoyed the particular confidence of the American people; +and what Americans chiefly wanted was the assurance of persons they knew +and trusted, that the peace was right. In the existing state of public +opinion, the assurance of the President was not in itself sufficient.</p> + +<p>President Wilson's decision to go to Paris as a member of the Commission +aroused still fiercer opposition, but had reasons infinitely more cogent. +He knew that there would be great difficulty in translating his ideals +into fact at the Peace Conference. He believed that he could count upon +the support of liberal opinion in Europe, but realized that the leading +politicians had not yet been won sincerely to his policy. The pledge they +had given to accept the Fourteen Points might mean much or little; +everything depended upon interpretation. A peace of justice and a League +of Nations still hung in the balance. At this moment, with Germany clearly +helpless, opinion abroad appeared to be tending, naturally enough, toward +the old-style division of the spoils among the victors. More than one +influential French and British newspaper began to sound the cry <em>Væ +victis</em>. Moreover, in America broke forth a chorus of encouragement to the +Allies to pay no attention to Wilsonian idealism. <a name="Page_251" id="Page_251"></a>On the 27th of +November, shortly before the Commission sailed, Roosevelt wrote: "Our +Allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that +Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at +this time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by +them.... Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementary +points and his five complementary points and all his utterances every +which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted as +expressive of the will of the American people.... Let them [the Allies] +impose their common will on the nations responsible for the hideous +disaster which has almost wrecked mankind." It was frank encouragement to +the Allies, coming from the American who, with Wilson, was best-known +abroad, to divide the spoils and to disregard all promises to introduce a +new international order, and it must have brought joy to Clemenceau and +Sonnino.</p> + +<p>Wilson feared that having won the war the United States might lose the +peace: not by softness towards Germany—as yet there was no danger of +that—but by forgetting the ideals for which it had entered the war, by +forgetting that a peace of injustice sows the seeds of the next war, and +by a<a name="Page_252" id="Page_252"></a> relapse into the old bankrupt system of the Balance of Power. He +realized that the peoples of France, England, and Italy had felt the +pinch of war as the American people had never done, and that it was +demanding too much of human nature to expect that their attitude would be +one of moderation. He knew that in the negotiations Clemenceau and +Sonnino would be definitely opposed to his programme and that he could +not count upon Lloyd George. He decided therefore that he must himself go +to Paris to fight for his ideals. The decision was one of tremendous +significance. At the moment when domestic problems of reconstruction +would be most acute, an American President was going to leave the country +because of the interest of America in European affairs. The United States +was now so much a part of the world system that domestic issues seemed of +less importance than the danger that Europe might fall back into the old +international system which had proved unable to keep the peace. The +President's voyage to France was the clearest manifestation yet +vouchsafed of the settled position of the United States as a world power.</p> + +<p>If the justice of his policy and the necessity of full participation in +the peace as in the war be admitted, Wilson was probably right in going +to Paris.<a name="Page_253" id="Page_253"></a> No one else could have secured so much of his programme. No +one else was possessed of the political power or the personal prestige +which belonged to him. The history of the Conference was to show that +when he absented himself in February and after he left Paris in June, his +subordinates found great difficulty in meeting Allied opposition. But the +decision of the President to attend the Peace Conference furnished fresh +material for criticism at home. It was a new thing in our history; people +did not understand the importance of the issues involved and attributed +his voyage to vanity. Unquestionably it weakened Wilson in America as +much as it strengthened him abroad. When on the 4th of December, the +presidential ship, <em>George Washington</em>, sailed out of New York harbor, +saluted by the wild shrieks of a thousand sirens and the showers of +glittering white papers streaming from the windows of the skyscrapers, +preceded by the battleship <em>Pennsylvania</em>, flanked by destroyers, with +acrobatic airplanes and a stately dirigible overhead, external enthusiasm +was apparently at its height. But Wilson left behind him glowing embers +of intense opposition which, during the next six months, were to be +fanned into a dangerous flame.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<h3>WAYS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254"></a>On Friday, December 13, 1918, the <em>George Washington</em> steamed slowly into +Brest harbor through a long double line of gray battleships and +destroyers, greeted by the thunder of presidential salutes and the blare +of marine bands. Europe thrilled with emotion, which was half curiosity +and half genuine enthusiasm: it was to see and applaud the man who during +the past eighteen months had crystallized in speech the undefined thought +of the Allied world, who represented (at least in European eyes) the +strength and idealism of America, and who stood, for the moment, as the +political Messiah to liberals in every country of the Old World, victors +or defeated. The intensity of the curiosity as well as the sincerity of +the enthusiasm was attested on the following day, when President Wilson +drove through the streets of Paris, welcomed by the vociferous plaudits +of the close-packed crowd. <a name="Page_255" id="Page_255"></a>It was for him a public triumph, no greater +than that accorded to King Albert of Belgium and certainly less +demonstrative than the jubilations of armistice night, but nevertheless +undeniably sweet to the President, who looked to popular opinion as the +bulwark upon which he must rely during the difficult days ahead.</p> + +<p>Further triumphs awaited him in his trips to England and to Italy. In +London and Rome, as in Paris, he was the object of demonstrations which +at times became almost delirious; more than once his admirers must have +been reminded of the Biblical phrase that alludes to the honor of a +prophet outside his own country. The emotion of Europe is not difficult +to understand. The man in the street was ready to shout, for the war was +finished and the miseries of the peace that was no peace were not yet +realized, Wilson stood for Justice above everything, and the people of +each country believed whole-heartedly that their particular demands were +just; the President, therefore, must stand with them. To Frenchmen it was +obvious that he must approve the "simple justice" of the claim that +Germany pay the entire cost of the war; Italians were convinced that he +would sanction their "just" demand for the annexation of Fiume. <a name="Page_256" id="Page_256"></a>So long +as Justice remained something abstract his popularity remained secure. +Could he retain it when concrete issues arose? As early as the beginning +of January ebullitions of approval became less frequent. Discordant +voices were audible suggesting that Wilson was too prone to sacrifice the +material necessities of the war-burdened nations to his idealistic +notions. People asked why he failed to visit Belgium and the devastated +regions of France, so as to see for himself what sufferings had been +endured. And the historian may well inquire if it were because he had not +gauged the depth of feeling aroused by German war practices, or because +he had determined to show the Germans that he would not let his judgment +be clouded by emotion. Whatever the explanation, his popularity suffered.</p> + +<p>Without question the original strength of President Wilson's position, +resting in part upon the warmth of popular feeling, which is ever +uncertain, was undermined by the delays that marked the opening of the +Peace Conference. Such delays may have resulted in part from the purpose +of the Allied leaders, who wished to permit public enthusiasm for Wilson +to cool; they may also have been caused in part by the differences that +developed<a name="Page_257" id="Page_257"></a> over the incorporation of the League of Nations in the Treaty. +But a prime cause of delay is to be found in the fact that a Peace +Conference of this character was a new experience and the statesmen +assembled were not quite sure how to conduct it. Too little thought had +been given to the problem of organization, and the plans which had been +drawn up by the French and Americans were apparently forgotten. The host +of diplomatic attachés and technical advisers, who crowded the Quai +d'Orsay and the hotels of Paris, had only a vague notion as to their +duties and waited uneasily, wondering why their chiefs did not set them +to work. In truth the making of peace was to be characterized by a +looseness of organization, a failure to coördinate, and a waste of time +and energy resulting from slipshod methods. In the deliberations of the +Conference there was a curious mixture of efficiency and ineffectiveness; +a wealth of information upon the topics under discussion and an inability +to concentrate that information. Important decisions were made and +forgotten in the welter of conferential disorganization.</p> + +<p>No one could complain that delays were caused by the kind of gay frivolity +that characterized the Vienna Congress a hundred years ago. <a name="Page_258" id="Page_258"></a>The +atmosphere of the Paris Conference was more like that of a convention of +traveling salesmen. The Hotel Crillon, home of the American Commission, +was gray and gaunt as the State, War, and Navy Building in Washington. +Banquets were rare; state balls unheard of. The President who had separate +headquarters, first in the Parc Monceau and later on the Place des États +Unis, avoided the orthodox diversions of diplomacy and labored with an +intensity that was destined to result in physical collapse. The very dress +of the delegates mirrored their businesslike attitude: high silk hats were +seldom seen; Lloyd George appeared in the plainest of bowlers and Colonel +House in his simple, black felt. Experts worked far into the early morning +hours in order that principals might have statistics; principals labored +even on Easter Day, and were roused from their beds at four in the morning +to answer telegrams. Unique departure in the history of diplomacy: this +was a working Peace Conference!</p> + +<p>Each of the different commissions had brought to Paris a staff of attachés +and experts, upon whom the principal delegates were to rely in questions +of fact, and who were themselves to decide points of detail in drafting +the economic and political clauses <a name="Page_259" id="Page_259"></a>of the treaties and in determining new +boundaries. The expert staff of the American Commission had been carefully +selected and was generally regarded as equal to that of any other power. +Compared with the foreign experts, its members lacked experience in +diplomatic methods, no doubt, but they were as well or better equipped +with exact information. There is an instance of an American expert on a +minor commission asking that a decision be altered in view of new facts +just brought to light, and offering to place those facts in detail before +the commission. "I suggest," said a foreign delegate, "that we accept the +amendment without investigation. Hitherto the facts presented by the +Americans have been irrefutable; it would be waste of time to investigate +them."</p> + +<p>Such men as Hoover, Hurley, and Gompers were at hand to give their expert +opinions on questions which they had mastered during the course of the +war. Norman Davis and Thomas Lamont acted as financial advisers. Baruch +and McCormick brought the wealth of experience which resulted from their +administration of the War Industries and War Trade Boards. The foresight +of Colonel House, furthermore, had gathered together a group of men who, +organized since the summer of 1917 in<a name="Page_260" id="Page_260"></a> what had been called "The +Inquiry," had been studying the conditions that would determine new +political boundaries on the basis of justice and practicability. The +principal delegates could not be expected to know the details that would +decide the disposition of Danzig, the fate of Fiume, the division of the +Banat of Temesvar. They would need some one to tell them the amount of +coal produced in the Saar Basin, the location of mines in Teschen, the +ethnic character of eastern Galicia, the difference between Slovaks and +Ruthenians. It was all very well to come to the Conference with demands +for justice, but our commissioners must have cold facts to support those +demands. The fact that exact information was available, and played a rôle +in the decisions of the Conference, marks a step forward in the history +of diplomatic relations.</p> + +<p>Contrary to general expectation and rumor, Wilson, although he +disregarded the American Commissioners, except Colonel House, made +constant use of the various experts. On the <em>George Washington</em> he had +told a group of them that he would rely absolutely upon the results of +their investigations. "Tell me what's right," he had said, "and I'll +fight for it.<a name="Page_261" id="Page_261"></a> Give me a guaranteed position." During the negotiations he +called in the experts for daily consultations; they sat behind him at the +sessions of the Council of Ten and on the sofa beside him in the Council +of Four. Their advice was not always followed to the letter; in the +Shantung issue it was reluctantly discarded; but in such important +matters as the Fiume problem, Wilson rested his case wholly upon the +knowledge and opinions of the experts.</p> + +<p>In defiance of the example of the Congress of Vienna, which never +formally gathered in plenary session, the Paris Conference met with all +delegates for the first time, on January 18, 1919. It was a picturesque +scene, cast in the long Clock Room of the Quai d'Orsay, the conventional +black of the majority of delegates broken by the horizon-blue uniform of +Marshal Foch, the natty red-trimmed khaki of British staff officers, and +the white flowing robes and golden headdress of the Arabian Emir Faisal; +down the center of the room ran the traditionally diplomatic green baize +tables behind which sat the delegates; attachés and press correspondents +crowded into the corners or peered around the curtains of adjoining +rooms; at the end, in front of the white marble fireplace, sat the +dominating personalities of the Allied world. <a name="Page_262" id="Page_262"></a>But such plenary sessions +were not to witness the actual work of the Conference, nor was Wilson's +demand for "open covenants openly arrived at" to be translated literally +into accomplishment. To conduct the Peace Conference by sessions open to +the public was obviously not feasible. There were too many delegates. +Time, which was precious beyond evaluation, would be lost in the making +of speeches for home consumption. More time would be lost in translation +of the Babel of languages. Frankness and directness of negotiation would +be impossible, for if the papers should print what the delegates said +about each other there would be a national crisis every day. Finally, a +congress is by nature ill-adapted for the study of intricate +international problems, as was later to be illustrated in the history of +the United States Senate.</p> + +<p>The representatives of the larger European Powers had assumed that the +direction of the Conference would be taken by a small executive committee, +corresponding to the Supreme War Council, and to this President Wilson +agreed. Such a committee would necessarily meet in secret, in order that +it might not be hampered by formalities and that there might be frank +speech. Only a brief communiqué, stating the subject of discussion and +the decision reached, would be issued to the press. The committee would +provide for the executive measures that must be taken to oppose the growth +of economic and political anarchy in central and southeastern Europe, +would distribute the problems that were to be studied by special +commissions, and would formulate or approve the solutions to those +problems. It would supervise the drafting of the treaties and present them +to the plenary conference in practically final form. Since the bulk of the +fighting had been carried by the major powers and since they would +guarantee the peace, this supreme council of the Conference was composed +of two representatives of the major five, France, Great Britain, the +United States, Italy, and Japan, the last-named now entering the sacred +coterie of "Great Powers." Among the delegates of the smaller powers there +was lively dissatisfaction at the exclusion from the inner council of such +states as Belgium and Serbia, which had been invaded by the enemy and had +made heavy sacrifices in the war: they complained also that the number of +delegates allotted them was insufficient. Already, it was whispered, the +phrases that dealt with the "rights of small nations" were being +forgotten, and this peace congress was to be but a repetition of those +previous diplomatic assemblies where the spoils went to the strong. <a name="Page_264" id="Page_264"></a>But +Wilson, who was regarded as the defender of the rights of the small +states, agreed with Clemenceau that practical necessity demanded an +executive council of restricted numbers, and felt that such a body could +be trusted to see that effective justice was secured. In truth the +President was almost as much impressed by the extreme nationalistic ardor +of the small powers, as a source of future danger, as he was by the +selfishness of the large.</p> + +<p>The Supreme Council, during the early days of the Conference, was +generally known as the Council of Ten. It met in the study of Stephane +Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, which opened on to the garden of the +French Foreign Office, and which, with its panelled walls, covered with +gorgeous Gobelins picturing Ruben's story of Marie de' Medici, its +stately brocaded chairs, and old-rose and gray Aubusson carpets, was +redolent of old-time diplomacy. In the center, behind a massive desk, sat +the president of the Conference, Georges Clemenceau—short, squat, +round-shouldered, with heavy white eyebrows and mustache serving +perfectly to conceal the expression both of eyes and of mouth. Ordinarily +he rested immobile, his hands folded in the eternal gray gloves, on his +face an expression of bored tolerance, the expression of a man who, after +half a century in the political arena of France, had little to learn +either of men or of affairs, even from a Peace Conference. Skeptical in +attitude, a cold listener, obviously impermeable to mere verbiage and +affected by the logic of facts alone, he had a ruthless finger ready to +poke into the interstices of a loosely-woven argument. Clemenceau spoke +but rarely, in low even tones, with a paucity and awkwardness of gesture +surprising in a Latin; he was chary of eloquence, disdaining the obvious +arts of the rhetor, but he had at his command an endless string of biting +epigrams, and his satire wounded with a touch so sharp that it was +scarcely felt or seen except by the unfortunate recipient. Upon +infrequent occasion, in the course of hot debate, some one would pierce +his armor and touch him upon the unguarded quick; then the man was +transformed, the eyebrows would shoot up, the eyes flash, the mustache +bristle, the voice vibrate, and the invective which he poured forth +scalded like molten lead. One understood at such a moment why he was +called "the Tiger." But such outbursts were rare. More characteristic of +his method of debate was the low-voiced ironical phrase, when his arid +humor crackled like a wireless message.</p> + +<p>Clemenceau dwarfed the other French delegates, with a single exception, +not alone by the magic of his personality but by the grip which he had on +the imagination of France. The people remembered that long career, +beginning with the early days of the Republic and culminating with the +miracle of the political salvation he brought to France in the dark days +of 1917, when the morale of the nation was near the breaking-point, and +which made possible the military victory of Foch. France was grateful. He +had no political party in the Chamber upon which to rely, but the nation +was behind him, at least for the moment. "If I should die now," he is +reported to have said during the early days of the Conference, "France +would give me a great funeral. If I live six months, no one knows what +may happen." For Clemenceau was a realist; he did not permit himself the +luxury of being deceived even by the good qualities of his own +countrymen. If he feared anything it was the domination of politics by +the impractical. Mankind must be taken as it is and not as we should like +it to be. He was troubled by what he called the "noble simplicity" of +Wilson. <a name="Page_267" id="Page_267"></a>Statesmen must be inspired by the sacred egotism which provides +for the material safety and progress of their own nation. Above all, in +his mind, France was particularly vulnerable and thus must insist upon +particular means of defense against the secular enemy across the Rhine.</p> + +<p>Behind Clemenceau, in the Council, hovered his friend and Foreign +Secretary, Stephane Pichon. More in evidence, however, was André Tardieu, +who alone of the French delegates remained undwarfed by the Prime +Minister. Journalist, politician, captain of Blue Devils, Franco-American +Commissioner, now the youngest of the French peace commission, Tardieu, +more than any one else supplied the motive energy that carried the treaty +to completion. Debonair and genial, excessively practical, he was the +"troubleman" of the Conference: when difficulties arose over the Saar, or +Fiume, or reparations, Tardieu was called in to work with a special +committee and find a compromise. Not a regular member of the Council of +Ten, he was nevertheless at Clemenceau's elbow, and especially after the +attempt on the latter's life, he labored day and night on the details +which were too much for the strength and time of the older man.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268"></a>On Clemenceau's right, and half facing him, sat the two American +delegates, Wilson and Lansing. The President, to the surprise of many, was +by no means the awkward college professor lost among practical +politicians. His speech was slow and his manner might almost be called +ponderous, but the advisers who whispered over his shoulder, during the +course of the debate, attested the rapidity with which his mind operates +and his skill in catching the points suggested. There was far less of the +dogmatic doctrinaire in his attitude than had been looked for. +Occasionally his remarks bordered upon the sententious, but he never +"orated," invariably using a conversational tone; many of his points were +driven home by humorous allusions or anecdotes rather than by didactic +logic. Like that of the other delegates his manner was informal. During +the cold days of late January he walked about the room during discussions +in order to keep his feet warm. Indeed the proceedings of the Council of +Ten were characterized by a noted absence of stiffness. It was evidently +expected that the prestige which Wilson possessed among the masses would +evaporate in this inner council; but nothing of the kind was apparent.<a name="Page_269" id="Page_269"></a> It +was not uninteresting to note that when a point was raised every one +looked involuntarily to see how it would be taken by the President; and +when the delegates of the smaller Powers appeared before the Council they +addressed their remarks almost directly at him. Lansing spoke seldom, but +then with force and conviction, and was evidently more troubled than +Wilson by the compromises with expediency which the Americans were +compelled to make. His attention was never distracted by the sketches +which he drew without ceasing, during the course of the debates—grotesque +and humorous figures, much in demand by every one present as mementos of +the Conference.</p> + +<p>Next on the right sat David Lloyd George, with thick gray hair and +snapping Celtic eyes. Alert and magnetic, he was on the edge of his +chair, questioning and interrupting. Frankly ignorant of the details of +continental geography and politics, naïve in his inquiries, he possessed +the capacity for acquiring effective information at lightning speed. +Unfortunately he was not over-critical and the source of his information +was not invariably the highest authority; he was prone to accept the +views of journalists rather than those of his own Foreign Office. +<a name="Page_270" id="Page_270"></a>Effervescent as a bottle just rid of its cork, he was also unstable, +twisting and veering in his suggestions; not so much blown about by the +winds of hostile criticism, to which he paid but little attention, as +carried on by the shifting tides of political events at home. For his eye +was always across the Channel, calculating the domestic effect of each +treaty provision. Few could resist his personal magnetism in conversation +and no one would deny him the title of master-politician of his age. +During the first weeks of the Conference, Wilson seems to have fallen +under the spell of Lloyd George to some extent, who showed himself quite +as liberal as the President in many instances. But Wilson was clearly +troubled by the Welshman's mercurial policy, and before he finally left +for America, found relief in the solid consistency of Clemenceau. He +always knew where the French Premier stood, no matter how much he might +differ from him in point of view.</p> + +<p>Beside Lloyd George, a perfect foil, sat Arthur J. Balfour, assuming the +attitude habitual to him after long years in the House of Commons—head on +the back of his chair, body reclining at a comfortable angle, long legs +stretched in front, hands grasping the lapels of his coat, eyes at +frequent intervals closed. Rising, he overtopped every one present, white +and bent though he was, in physical stature as he did also in pure +intellectual power.<a name="Page_271" id="Page_271"></a> Graceful in tone and expression his outlook was the +philosophical, possibly over-tolerant for the exigencies of the situation, +although upon occasion his judgment proved a valuable counterweight to the +hasty enthusiasm of Lloyd George. But Balfour, like Lansing, was sometimes +treated with scant consideration by his chief and by no means exercised +the influence which his experience and capacity would lead one to expect.</p> + +<p>On the right of the British delegates sat the two Japanese, silent, +observant, their features immobile as the Sphinx. It was a bold man who +would attempt to guess the thoughts masked by their impassive faces. They +waited for the strategic moment when they were to present their special +claims; until then they attended all meetings, scarcely speaking a word, +unwilling to commit themselves. Upon one occasion, in a minor commission, +the Japanese delegate held the deciding vote, the other four delegations +being tied; when asked by the chairman how he voted, whether with the +French and Americans or with the British and Italians, the Japanese +responded simply, "Yes." Next the Japanese, but facing Clemenceau and +about twelve feet from him, were the Italians:<a name="Page_272" id="Page_272"></a> Sonnino with his +close-cropped white bullet head and heavy drooping mustache, his great +Roman nose coming down to meet an equally strong out-jutting chin, his jaw +set like a steel latch. The hawklike appearance of the man was softened in +debate by the urbanity of his manner and the modulations of his voice. +Orlando was less distinctive in appearance and character. Eloquent and +warm-hearted, he was troubled by the consciousness that failure to secure +the full extent of Italian claims spelled the downfall of his ministry in +Rome. It is of some historical importance that Sonnino, who spoke perfect +English with just a trace of Etonian inflection, was the more obstinate in +his demands; Orlando, who showed himself inclined to compromise, spoke no +English and therefore could come into intellectual contact with Wilson and +Lloyd George only through the medium of an interpreter.</p> + +<p>Proceedings were necessarily in both French and English, because none of +the big men except Clemenceau and Sonnino used the two languages with +comfort. The interpreter, Mantoux, who sat behind Clemenceau, was no mere +translator. A few notes scribbled on a pad were sufficient for him to +render the sense of a speech with keen accuracy and frequently with a +fire and a pungency that surpassed the original. <a name="Page_273" id="Page_273"></a>He spoke always in the +first person as though the points made in debate were his own, and the +carrying of each particular point the ideal nearest his heart. Behind the +principals, the "Olympians," as they came to be called, were the experts +and attachés, with long rolls of maps and complex tables of statistics, +ready to answer questions of detailed facts. In truth there was more +reference to sources of exact information by the chief delegates than +would have been expected by the student of former diplomatic practices.</p> + +<p>In the center of the room, facing the Olympians, stood or sat the +particular claimant or expert witness of the séance. Now it might be +Marshal Foch, with wrinkled, weary, war-worn visage, and thin rumpled +hair, in shabby uniform, telling of Germany's failure to fulfill the +armistice conditions; one would meet him later in the corridor +outside—like Grant, he was apt to have the stump of a black cigar in the +corner of his mouth—usually shaking his head ominously over the failure +of the politicians to treat Germany with the requisite severity. Or the +claimant before the Ten might be the grave, self-contained Venizelos, +once outlaw and revolutionary, now, after many turns of fortune's wheel,<a name="Page_274" id="Page_274"></a> +master of Greece and perhaps the greatest statesman of them all. Then +again would appear the boyish Foreign Minister of the Czecho-Slovak +Republic, Edward Benes, winning friends on all sides by his frank +sincerity and ready smile; or, perfect contrast, the blackbearded +Bratiano of Rumania, claiming the enforcement of the secret treaty that +was to double the area of his state. Later, Paderewski came from Warsaw, +his art sacrificed on the altar of patriotism, leonine in appearance, but +surprisingly untemperamental in diplomatic negotiation.</p> + +<p>To each of these and to many others who presented problems for immediate +settlement the Council listened, for it had not merely to draw up +treaties and provide for the future peace of the world, but also to meet +crises of the moment. The starving populations of central and +southeastern Europe must be fed; tiny wars that had sprung up between +smaller nationalities must be attended to and armistice commissions +dispatched; the rehabilitation of railroads and river transportation +demanded attention; coal mines must be operated and labor difficulties +adjusted. This economic renaissance had to be accomplished in face of +nationalistic quarrels and the social unrest that threatened<a name="Page_275" id="Page_275"></a> to spread +the poison of communistic revolution as far west as the Rhine and the +Adriatic.</p> + +<p>From the beginning it was clear that the actual drafting of the treaty +clauses would have to be undertaken by special commissions. The work +could never be completed except by a subdivision of labor and the +assignment of particular problems to especially competent groups. As the +Council of Ten faced the situation, they decided that the number of the +commissions must be increased. By the beginning of February the work was +largely subdivided. There was a commission headed by President Wilson +working on the League of Nations, while others studied such problems as +responsibility for the war, reparations, international labor legislation, +international control of ports, waterways, and railways, financial and +economic problems, military, naval, and aerial questions. When the +Council of Ten found themselves puzzled by the conflicting territorial +claims of different Allied nations, they decided to create also special +territorial commissions to study boundaries and to report their +recommendations back to the Supreme Council. It was President Wilson, +chafing at the early delays of the Conference, who eagerly adopted a +suggestion of Colonel House<a name="Page_276" id="Page_276"></a> to the effect that time might be saved if +the experts of the different states attacked boundary problems and thus +relieved the strain upon the time and nerves of the Olympians, who could +not be expected to know or understand the details of each question. The +suggestion was approved by the chiefs of the Allied governments. There +were five such territorial commissions, which were in turn subdivided, +while a single central territorial commission was appointed to coördinate +the reports.</p> + +<p>The more important commissions, such as that upon the League of Nations, +were composed of plenipotentiaries and included generally representatives +from the smaller states. The reparations, financial, and labor +commissions were made up of business men and financiers, the American +representatives including such figures as Lamont, Norman Davis, Baruch, +and McCormick. The territorial commissions were composed of the +representatives of the four principal Powers; most of the European +delegates, who were in some cases also plenipotentiaries, were chosen +from the staffs of the Foreign Offices, and included such men as Sir Eyre +Crowe, Jules Cambon, Tardieu, and Salvago Raggi. <a name="Page_277" id="Page_277"></a>The American delegates +were generally members of the Inquiry, men who had been working on these +very problems for more than a year. The special commissions worked with +care and assiduity, and their decisions rested generally on facts +established after long discussion. To this extent, at least, the Paris +Conference was characterized by a new spirit in diplomacy.</p> + +<p>Upon the reports of these commissions were based the draft articles of +the treaties, which were then referred back to the Supreme Council. By +the time the reports were finished, that body had divided into two +smaller bodies: the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council of +Premiers, composed of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Orlando. The +latter body, which came to be known as the Council of Four, or, +colloquially, the "Big Four," naturally assumed complete direction. It +was unfortunate certainly that a congress which had started with the cry +of "open covenants" should thus find itself practically resolved into a +committee of four. Disappointed liberals have assumed that the inner +council was formed with the object of separating President Wilson from +contact with popular ideas and bringing him to acceptance of the +old-style peace desired by Clemenceau. <a name="Page_278" id="Page_278"></a>In reality the Council of Four was +simply a revival of the informal committee which had sat during the +autumn of 1918, when Colonel House, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau had met +by themselves to formulate the policy to be adopted when Germany +presented her demand for an armistice. When Wilson left Paris in +February, Colonel House, who became chiefly responsible for the American +side of negotiations, found the Council of Ten unwieldy. It was attended +by as many as thirty or forty persons, some of whom seemed inclined to +spread colored accounts of what was going on, and the very size of the +meeting tended toward the making of speeches and the slowing-down of +progress. Furthermore, at that time Clemenceau, confined to his house by +the wound inflicted by a would-be assassin, was unable to attend the +sessions of the Council of Ten. It was natural, therefore, that the three +statesmen who had worked so effectively the preceding autumn should now +renew their private conferences. When Wilson returned to Paris in March, +and learned from Colonel House how much more rapidly the small committee +was able to dispose of vexatious questions, he readily agreed to it. Nor +is there any valid evidence extant to show that his influence was +seriously impaired by the change, although the sessions of the<a name="Page_279" id="Page_279"></a> Council of +Four took on a greater appearance of secrecy than had been desired by +Colonel House.</p> + +<p>The Council of Four acted as a board of review and direction rather than +of dictators. When the reports of the expert commissions were unanimous +they were generally accepted with little or no alteration. When a divided +report was sent up, the Four were compelled to reach a compromise, since +every delay threatened to give new opportunity to the forces of social +disorder in Germany and southeastern Europe. The Council met ordinarily +in the house used by President Wilson, on the Place des États-Unis. Some +of the conferences were held in a small room downstairs without the +presence of secretaries or advisers; frequently, however, the experts +were called in to meet with the chiefs in the large front room upstairs, +and would often monopolize the discussion, the Four playing the part of +listeners merely. Formality was dispensed with. During a debate upon the +southern boundary of Austria, President Wilson might have been seen on +all fours, kneeling on the floor and tracing out the suggested frontier +on a huge map, while other peace commissioners and experts surrounded +him, also on their hands and knees. Hours of labor were long. <a name="Page_280" id="Page_280"></a>There was, +certainly, much discussion that hinged upon selfish nationalist +interests, but also much that was inspired by a sincere desire to secure +the solution that would permanently restore the tranquillity of Europe.</p> + +<p>The presence of President Wilson did much to maintain the idealism that +jostled national self-seeking in the final drafting of the treaties. +Though he lacked the political brilliance of Lloyd George and had not the +suppressed but irresistible vehemence that characterized Clemenceau, his +very simplicity of argument availed much. He was not destined to carry +through the full programme of idealism as set out in the Fourteen Points, +at least not as interpreted by most liberals. He could not secure the +peace of reconciliation which he had planned, but even with his +popularity in France, Belgium, and Italy lost, and his prestige dimmed, +he retained such a strong position in the Council of Four that he was +able to block some of the more extreme propositions advanced by +imperialist elements, and, more positively, to secure what he had most at +heart, the League of Nations. Whether he yielded more than he gained is a +question which demands more detailed consideration.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<h3>BALANCE OF POWER OR LEAGUE OF NATIONS?</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281"></a>Whatever mistakes President Wilson made at Paris, he did not greatly +underestimate the difficulties of his task when he set forth from the +United States. The liberal utterances of the Allied chiefs during the war +had never succeeded in winning his sincere confidence; more than once he +had even intimated that he did not consider their governments completely +representative of public opinion. He anticipated a struggle with +Clemenceau and Lloyd George over the amount of indemnity which was to be +demanded from Germany, as well as over the territory of which she was to +be deprived. Their formal approval of the Fourteen Points had been a cause +of intense satisfaction to him, but he realized definitely that they would +make every effort to interpret them in terms of purely national +self-interest. This he regarded as the greatest difficulty to be met at +Paris. <a name="Page_282" id="Page_282"></a>The second difficulty lay in the extreme demands that were being +made by the smaller nationalities, now liberated from Teuton dominion or +overlordship. Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Greece, were all asking for +territory which could only be assigned to them on the ancient principle of +the division of spoils among the victors. The spirit of nationalism which +had played a rôle of so much importance in the antecedents of the war, as +well as in the downfall of the Central Empires, now threatened to ruin the +peace. As we have seen, it was partly because of this second danger that +Wilson agreed to the exclusion of the smaller states from the Supreme +Council of the Allies.</p> + +<p>Upon the details of the treaties, whether of an economic or a territorial +character, the President did not at first lay great stress. He was +interested chiefly in the spirit that lay behind the treaties. The peace, +he insisted, must be one of justice and, if possible, one of +reconciliation. More concretely, the great point of importance was the +establishment of a League of Nations; for the President believed that +only through the building up of a new international system, based upon +the concert of all democratic states, could permanent justice and amity +be secured.<a name="Page_283" id="Page_283"></a> Only a new system could suffice to prevent the injustice +that great states work upon small, and to stamp out the germs of future +war. It would be the single specific factor that would make this treaty +different from and better than treaties of the past. The ultimate origin +of the great war was less to be sought in the aspirations and malevolence +of Germany, he believed, than in the disorganized international system of +Europe. Unless that were radically reformed, unless a régime of +diplomatic coöperation were substituted for the Balance of Power, neither +justice nor peace could last. The old system had failed too often.</p> + +<p>Wilson does not seem to have formulated definitely before he reached +Paris the kind of League which he desired to see created. He was opposed +to such intricate machinery as that proposed by the League to Enforce +Peace, and favored an extremely simple organization which might evolve +naturally to meet conditions of the future. The chief organ of a League, +he felt, should be an executive council, possibly composed of the +ambassadors to some small neutral power. If trouble threatened in any +quarter, the council was to interfere at once and propose a settlement. +If this proved unsuccessful, a commercial boycott might be instituted +against the offending state: it was to be outlawed, and, as<a name="Page_284" id="Page_284"></a> Wilson said, +"outlaws are not popular now." He regarded it as important that the +German colonies should not be divided among the Allies, but should be +given to the League, to be administered possibly through some smaller +power; for an institution, he felt, is always stabilized by the +possession of property.</p> + +<p>Such were, broadly speaking, the ideas which seemed uppermost in the +President's mind when he landed in France, and which he was determined +should form the basis of the peace. He anticipated opposition, and he was +in a measure prepared to fight for his ideals. But he failed adequately +to appreciate the confusion which had fallen upon Europe, after four +years and more of war, and which made the need of a speedy settlement so +imperative. If he had gauged more accurately the difficulties of his task +he would have been more insistent upon the drafting of a quick +preliminary peace, embodying merely general articles, and leaving all the +details of the settlement to be worked out by experts at their leisure. +He might thus have utilized his popularity and influence when it was at +its height, and have avoided the loss of prestige which inevitably +followed upon the discussion of specific issues, when he was compelled +to<a name="Page_285" id="Page_285"></a> take a stand opposed to the national aspirations of the various +states. Such a general preliminary treaty would have gone far towards +restoring a basis for the resumption of normal political and economic +activity; it would have permitted Wilson to return to the United States +as the unquestioned leader of the world; it would have blunted the edge +of senatorial opposition; and finally it might have enabled him to avoid +the controversies with Allied leaders which compelled him to surrender +much of his original programme in a series of compromises.</p> + +<p>It is only fair to Wilson to remember that his original plan, in +November, was to secure such a preliminary treaty, which was to embody +merely the general lines of a territorial settlement and the disarmament +of the enemy. The delays which postponed the treaty were not entirely his +fault. Arriving in France on the 13th of December, he expected that the +Conference would convene on the seventeenth, the date originally set. But +days passed and neither the French nor the British took steps toward the +opening of negotiations. They had not even appointed their delegates. +Lloyd George sent messages of welcome from across the Channel, but +explained that domestic affairs detained him in England. <a name="Page_286" id="Page_286"></a>Conscious of the +struggle that was likely to arise between the "practical" aspirations of +Europe and the "idealism" of America, the Allied leaders evidently were +in no hurry to give to the exponent of the ideal the advantage of the +popular support that he enjoyed during the early days following his +arrival upon European shores. Hence it was not until the second week of +January that the delegations began to assemble at Paris. In the interval +Wilson had become involved in various detailed problems and he had lost +the opportunity, if indeed it ever offered, to demand immediate agreement +on preliminary terms of peace.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the delays, the President secured an early triumph in the +matter which he had closest at heart, namely, a League of Nations and its +incorporation in the Treaty. Clemenceau had taken issue publicly with +Wilson. When the President, in the course of his English speeches, +affirmed that this was the first necessity of a world which had seen the +system of alliances fail too often, the French Premier replied in the +Chamber of Deputies, on the 29th of December, that for his part he held +to the old principle of alliances which had saved France in the past and +must save her in the future, and that his sense of the practical would +not be affected by the "<em>noble candeur</em>" of President Wilson.<a name="Page_287" id="Page_287"></a> The polite +sneer that underlay the latter phrase aroused the wrath of the more +radical deputies, but the Chamber gave Clemenceau an overwhelming vote of +confidence as he thus threw down the gage. In the meantime Lloyd George +had shown himself apparently indifferent to the League and much more +interested in what were beginning to be called the "practical issues."</p> + +<p>With the opening of the Conference, however, it soon became apparent that +Wilson had secured the support of the British delegates. It is possible +that a trade had been tacitly consummated. Certain it is that the +"freedom of the seas," which the British delegates were determined should +not enter into the issues of the Peace Conference and which had +threatened to make the chief difficulty between British and Americans, +was never openly discussed. Had Wilson decided to drop or postpone this +most indefinite of his Fourteen Points, on the understanding that the +British would give their support to the League? At all events, the League +of Nations was given an important place on the programme of +deliberations, and at the second of the plenary sessions of the +Conference, held on January 25, 1919, the principle of a League was +approved without a<a name="Page_288" id="Page_288"></a> dissentient voice; it was also decided that the +League should be made an integral part of the Treaty. Wilson, in addition +to acquiring British support had won that of the Italians, to whom he had +promised his aid in securing the Brenner frontier in the Tyrol. +Clemenceau, according to an American delegate, "had climbed on the +band-wagon."</p> + +<p>The President's victory was emphasized when he also won the Europeans and +the representatives of the British overseas Dominions to acceptance of +the principle of "mandatories," according to which the German colonies +were not to be distributed as spoils amongst the victors, but to become +the property of the League and to be administered by the mandatory +states, not for their own benefit but for that of the colonies. The +victory was not complete, since Wilson's first intention had been that +the mandatory states should not be the great powers, but such states as +Holland or one of the Scandinavian nations. He was compelled to admit the +right of the British and French to take over the colonies as mandatories. +Even so, the struggle over the issue was intense, Premier Hughes of +Australia leading the demand that the German colonies should be given +outright to the Allies and<a name="Page_289" id="Page_289"></a> the British self-governing Dominions. Again +the support of Lloyd George brought success to the American policy.</p> + +<p>In order to assure his victory in the foundation of a League of Nations, +it was necessary that before returning home Wilson should see some +definite scheme elaborated. Until the 14th of February he labored with +the special committee appointed to draft a specific plan, which included +much of the best political talent of the world: Lord Robert Cecil, +General Smuts, Venizelos, Léon Bourgeois. In order to avoid the criticism +that consideration of a League was delaying the preparation of peace +terms, the commission met in the evenings so as not to interrupt the +regular meetings of the Council of Ten. It was a <em>tour de force</em>, this +elaboration of a charter for the new international order, in less than +three weeks. At times the task seemed hopeless as one deadlock after +another developed. Wilson, who presided over the commission, lacked the +skill and courage displayed by Clemenceau in his conduct of the plenary +sessions, and proved unable to prevent fruitless discussion; possibly he +feared lest he be regarded as autocratic in pushing his pet plan. At all +events precious moments were dissipated in long speeches, and general +principles threatened to be lost in a maze of details. <a name="Page_290" id="Page_290"></a>With but two days +left before the plenary session of the Conference and the date set for +Wilson's sailing, the commission had approved only six of the +twenty-seven articles of the Covenant. Fortune intervened. The presence +of Wilson was demanded at the Council of Ten and his place as chairman +was taken by Lord Robert Cecil. The latter showed himself effective. Ably +seconded by Colonel House, he passed over all details and pushed the +final stages of the report through at top speed; on the 14th of February +the Covenant of the League was completed. It was sanctioned by the +plenary session of the Conference that afternoon, and in the evening +Wilson left for America with the document in his pocket. Doubtless it +seemed to him that the major portion of his task had been accomplished.</p> + +<p>The mechanism of the League thus proposed is said to have been largely +evolved by Smuts and Cecil, but it coincided roughly with the ideas that +Wilson had already conceived. Much of the language of the Covenant is +Wilson's; its form was mainly determined by the British and American +legal experts, C. J. B. Hurst and D. H. Miller. It provided for an +executive council representing nine powers, and a deliberative assembly +of all the members of the League. The Council must meet annually and +take under advisement any matters threatening to disturb international +peace. Its recommendations must be unanimous. The Assembly was entirely +without executive power. The members of the League were to agree not to +make war without first submitting the matter under dispute to arbitration +or to the consideration of the Council. Failure to abide by this +agreement would constitute an act of war against the League, which upon +recommendation of the Council, might boycott the offending state +economically or exercise military force against it. The Covenant declared +it "to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the +attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever +affecting international relations which threatens to disturb +international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which +peace depends." The members of the League, furthermore, undertook "to +respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial +integrity and existing independence of all members of the League. In case +of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which +this obligation shall be fulfilled" <a name="Page_292" id="Page_292"></a>(Article X). These two provisions +embodied the particular contributions of Wilson to the Covenant, who +believed that the capacity of the League to preserve justice and peace +depended chiefly upon them. The Covenant also provided in some measure +for military and naval disarmament by giving to the Council the right to +recommend the size of the force to be maintained by each member of the +League, and it attacked secret diplomacy by abrogating previous +obligations inconsistent with the Covenant and by providing that every +future treaty must be registered and published.</p> + +<p>If the President expected to be hailed at home as conquering hero, he was +destined to bitter disappointment. He must now pay the price for those +tactical mistakes which had aroused opinion against him in the previous +autumn. The elements which he had antagonized by his war-policies, by his +demand for a Democratic Congress, by his failure to coöperate with the +Senate in the formulation of American policy and in the appointment of +the Peace Commission, and which had opposed his departure in person to +Paris—all those elements now had their chance. Having won a difficult +victory over reactionary forces in Europe, Wilson was now compelled to +begin the struggle over again at home. <a name="Page_293" id="Page_293"></a>And whereas at Paris he had +displayed some skill in negotiation and an attitude of conciliation even +when firm in his principles, upon his return he adopted a tone which +showed that he had failed to gauge the temper of the people. He probably +had behind him the majority of the independent thinkers, even many who +disliked him personally but who appreciated the importance and the value +of the task he was trying to carry through. The mass of the people, +however, understood little of what was going on at Paris. The situation +abroad was complex and it had not been clarified adequately by the press. +Opinion needed to be educated. It wanted to know why a League was +necessary and whether its elaboration was postponing peace and the return +of the doughboys. Why must the League be incorporated in the Treaty? And +did the League put the United States at the mercy of European politicians +and would it involve our country in a series of European wars in which we +had no interest?</p> + +<p>What followed must be counted as little less than a tragedy. The man of +academic antecedents with masterly powers of exposition, who had voiced +popular thought during the years of the war so admirably, now failed +completely as an educator of opinion. <a name="Page_294" id="Page_294"></a>The President might have shown that +the League Covenant, instead of postponing peace, was really essential to +a settlement, since it was to facilitate solutions of various territorial +problems which might otherwise hold the Conference in debate for months. +He could have demonstrated with a dramatic vigor which the facts made +possible, the anarchical condition of Europe and the need for some sort of +international system of coöperation if a new cataclysm was to be avoided, +and he might have pictured the inevitable repercussive effect of such a +cataclysm upon America. He might have shown that in order to give effect +to the terms of the Treaty, it was necessary that the League Covenant +should be included within it. He could have emphasized the fact that the +Covenant took from Congress no constitutional powers, that the Council of +the League, on which the United States was represented, must be unanimous +before taking action, and then could only make recommendations. But the +President failed to explain the situation in terms comprehensible to the +average man. However adequate his addresses seemed to those who understood +the situation abroad, they left the American public cold.<a name="Page_295" id="Page_295"></a> His final speech +in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City was especially +unfortunate, for his statement that he would bring back the Treaty and the +League so intertwined that no one could separate them sounded like a +threat. At the moment when he needed the most enthusiastic support to curb +the opposition of the Senate, he alienated thousands and lost the chance +to convince tens of thousands.</p> + +<p>These developments did not pass unnoticed in Europe. Clemenceau and Lloyd +George had yielded to Wilson during the first weeks of the Conference +because they could not afford to separate their fortunes from the United +States, upon whom they depended for economic support, and because an open +break with Wilson would weaken their own position with liberals in France +and England. But now it became apparent to them that Wilson's position at +home was so unstable that they might be justified in adopting a stronger +tone. Each of them could point to the tangible evidence of victorious +elections and votes of confidence. President Wilson could not. The party +in the Senate which, after the 4th of March, would hold the majority, +expressly repudiated Wilson's policy. When the President returned to +Paris, on the 14th of March, he found a different atmosphere. The League +was no longer the central topic of discussion. <a name="Page_296" id="Page_296"></a>Concrete questions were +uppermost. How much should Germany pay? What territory should be taken +from her? How was the Kaiser to be punished? Wilson had been given the +satisfaction of securing approval for the principle of the League. Now he +must permit the Conference to satisfy the practical aspirations of +France, England, and Italy.</p> + +<p>It is a tribute to the personality of Wilson that by his presence at this +critical juncture, when the attitude of the Allies differed but slightly, +if at all, from that of the powers at the Congress of Vienna, he was able +to bring back something of the spirit of justice which had been so +frequently and loudly declaimed before the armistice, and to repress at +least in some degree the excessive claims which demanded satisfaction in +the treaties. The plans which, during his absence, had been evolved for +the separation of the Covenant from the Treaty and for its postponement, +and which had received the hearty support of several French and British +diplomats, were quickly dropped. Wilson was able to announce without +contradiction, that the Covenant would be an integral part of the Treaty, +as decided on the 25th of January. Far more difficult was the situation +that resulted from French and British plans for indemnities from Germany, +and from the French territorial claims on the Rhine. In each of these +matters Wilson could secure nothing better than a compromise.</p> + +<p>From the day when peace dawned upon Europe, the question that had touched +Allied peoples most closely was, How much will Germany pay? It was not so +much the shout of the brutal victor greedy for loot, as the involuntary +cry of nations which had seen their homes and factories pulverized, their +ships sunk, the flower of their youth killed and maimed, and which now +faced years of crushing taxation. They had carried the load of war +gallantly and they would enter the struggle for recuperation courageously. +But they would not endure that the enemy, which had forced these miseries +upon them, should not make good the material damage that had been done. +What was the meaning of the word justice, if the innocent victors were to +emerge from the war with keener sufferings and more gloomy future than the +guilty defeated? Another question stirred the mind of every Frenchman. For +generations the eastern frontier of France had lain open to the invasion +of the Teuton hordes. The memory of Prussian brutality in 1814 had been +kept alive in every school; the horrors of 1870 had been told and retold +by participants and eye-witnesses; and the world had seen the German +crimes of 1914. From all France the cry went up, How long? It would be the +most criminal stupidity if advantage were not taken of the momentary +helplessness of the inevitable enemy in order to make that vulnerable +frontier secure. This was not the end. Some day the struggle would be +renewed. Already, within two months of the armistice, the French General +Staff were considering mobilization plans for the next war. France must be +made safe while she had the chance.</p> + +<p>These feelings had such a hold on the people that the statesmen of Europe +would have been over-thrown on the day they forgot them. Popular +sentiment was reënforced by practical considerations less justifiable. +Crushing indemnities would not merely ease the load of Allied taxation +and furnish capital for rapid commercial development; they would also +remove Germany as an economic competitor. French control of all territory +west of the Rhine would not only assure France against the danger of +another German invasion, but would also provide her capitalists with a +preponderating economic advantage in regions by no means French in +character. Such selfish interests the Americans strove to set aside, +although they never forgot their desire to secure as complete justice +for the Allies as seemed compatible with a stable and tranquil +settlement.</p> + +<p>In the matter of indemnities, or reparations as they came to be called, +the experts of the various powers soon established the fact that Germany +would be unable to pay the total bill of reparation, even at the most +conservative reckoning. There was a long discussion as to whether or not +the costs of war, aside from material damage done, that had been incurred +by the Allies, should be included in the amount that Germany was to pay. +It was finally determined, in accordance with the arguments of the +American financial delegates who were warmly supported by President +Wilson, that such war costs should be excluded. On the other hand it was +agreed that pensions might properly be made part of Germany's reparation +bill. The two items of damages and pensions were calculated by the +American experts as amounting to a total figure of not less than +$30,000,000,000 present capital sum, which Germany ought to pay.</p> + +<p>The next step was to determine how much Germany could be made to pay. By +drafting too severe terms German trade might be destroyed completely and +Germany left without the economic<a name="Page_300" id="Page_300"></a> capacity to make the money that was to +pay the bill. It was obvious to careful students that the total amount +which she could turn over to the Allies could not be much more than the +excess of her exports over imports; and that even if payments were +extended over twenty or thirty years their value for purposes of +reparation would probably not much exceed twenty-five billion dollars. +Lloyd George in his election pledges had promised that the complete +reparations account would be settled by the enemy; neither he nor +Clemenceau dared to confess that the sum which could be exacted from +Germany would fall far below their early promises. The British experts, +Sumner and Cunliffe, continued to encourage Lloyd George in his belief +that Germany could afford to pay something in the neighborhood of a +hundred billion dollars, and the French Finance Minister, Klotz, was +equally optimistic. At first, accordingly, Allied demands on Germany +seemed likely to be fantastic.</p> + +<p>The Americans, on the other hand, were infinitely more conservative in +their estimates of what Germany could pay. Even after certain Allied +experts, including Montagu and Loucheur, affirmed the necessity of scaling +down the suggested sum of reparations, the difference between<a name="Page_301" id="Page_301"></a> the +American proposals and those of the Allies was serious.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Political +considerations, however, interposed, and preventing the settling of a +definite total sum which Germany must pay. Neither Lloyd George nor +Clemenceau dared to go to their constituents with the truth, namely that +Germany could not possibly pay the enormous indemnities which the +politicians had led the people to expect. (Lloyd George, for example, had +stated the sum that Germany must pay at about $120,000,000,000.) Both the +chiefs of state asserted that they were almost certain to be turned out of +office as a result, with consequent confusion in the Peace Conference, and +a prolongation of the crisis. The only escape seemed to be in a +postponement of the problem by not naming any definite sum which Germany +must pay, but requiring her to acknowledge full liability. The +disadvantages of this method were apparent to the President <a name="Page_302" id="Page_302"></a>and his +financial advisers, for it was clear that the economic stability of the +world could not be restored until the world knew how much Germany was +going to pay.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> At first the French and British refused to name any +specific sum that might be collected from Germany, requesting the +Americans to submit estimates. The latter named $5,000,000,000 as +representing a sum that might be collected prior to May 1, 1921, and +thereafter a capital sum as high as $25,000,000,000, always provided that +the other clauses in the treaty did not too greatly drain Germany's +resources. After some weeks of discussion the French experts stated that +if the figures could be revised up to $40,000,000,000 they would +recommend them to their chiefs. The British refused to accept a figure +below $47,000,000,000.</p></div> + +<p>Equally difficult was the problem of the French frontier. The return of +Alsace-Lorraine to France was unanimously approved. The French claimed in +addition, the districts of the Saar, with their valuable coal-fields, a +portion of which had been left to France after the first abdication of +Napoleon but annexed to Prussia after his defeat at Waterloo; and they +contended that if the German territories west of the Rhine were not to be +annexed to France, they must at least be separated from Germany, which +had secured a threatening military position mainly through their +possession. American experts had felt inclined to grant a part of the +Saar region to France as compensation for the wanton destruction of +French mines at Lens and Valenciennes by the Germans; but both Wilson and +Lloyd George were opposed to absolute annexation of the district which +the French demanded, including, as it did, more than six hundred thousand +Germans and no French. Wilson was definitely hostile to any attempt to +separate from the Fatherland such purely German territory as that on the +left bank of the Rhine.<a name="Page_303" id="Page_303"></a> The Allies, as well as himself, had given +assurances that they did not aim at the dismemberment of Germany, and it +was on the basis of such assurances that the Germans had asked for an +armistice. Wilson admitted that from the point of view of military +strategy the argument of Foch was unanswerable, under the old conditions; +but he insisted that the League of Nations would obviate the necessity of +the strategic protection asked for.</p> + +<p>The struggle over these issues nearly broke the back of the Conference. +If Clemenceau had yielded in January when the League was demanded by +Wilson, it was with the mental reservation that when the "practical" +issues came up, the victory should be his. The French press were not slow +to give support to their Government, and within a short time the +President, so recently a popular idol, found himself anathematized as a +pro-German and the sole obstacle to a speedy and satisfactory peace. The +more noisy section of the British press followed suit. Liberals were +silenced and American idealism was cursed as meddlesome myopia. For some +days the deadlock appeared interminable and likely to become fatal. In a +contest of obstinacy even Wilson could be matched by Clemenceau. The +increasing bitterness of French attacks upon the<a name="Page_304" id="Page_304"></a> Americans began to tell +upon Wilson; for the first time his physical strength seemed likely to +collapse under the strain. Matters were brought to a head by a bold +stroke, on the 7th of April, when Wilson ordered the <em>George Washington</em> +to sail for Brest. The inference was plain: the President would leave the +Conference unless the Allies abated their claims.</p> + +<p>The week of strain was followed by one of adjustment. Fearing an open +break with America, Allied leaders showed themselves anxious to find a +compromise, and Wilson himself was willing to meet them part way, since +he realized that without France and England his new international system +could never operate. Colonel House found opportunity for his tested skill +and common sense as a mediator, and he was assisted by Tardieu, who +proved himself to be fertile in suggestions for a practical middle +course. As in the case of all compromises, the solutions satisfied no one +completely. But clearly some sort of treaty had to be framed, if the +world were to resume normal life and if the spread of social revolution +were to be checked. At least the compromises had the virtue of winning +unanimity, without which Europe could not be saved.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305"></a>The indemnity problem was settled, at least for the moment, by postponing +a final definite statement of the total amount that Germany must pay. It +was decided that the sum of five billion dollars (twenty billion gold +marks), in cash or kind, should be demanded from Germany as an initial +payment, to be made before May 1, 1921. Certain abatements were to be +permitted the Germans, since this sum was to include the expenses of the +army of occupation, which were reckoned as in the neighborhood of a +billion dollars; and supplies of food and raw materials, which Germany +might need to purchase, could be paid for out of that sum. In the second +place, Germany was required to deliver interest-bearing bonds to a further +amount of ten billions; and, if the initial payment of cash fell short of +five billions by reason of permitted deductions, the amount of bonds was +to be so increased as to bring the total payments in cash, kind, or bonds, +up to fifteen billions by May 1, 1921. If a Reparations Commission, the +decisions of which Germany must agree to accept, should be satisfied that +more yet could be paid, a third issue of bonds, amounting to a further ten +billions might be exacted. Even this total of twenty-five billions was not +to be regarded as final, if Germany's capacity to pay more were determined +by the Reparations Commission.<a name="Page_306" id="Page_306"></a> Germany was required to acknowledge full +liability, and the total sum which she might theoretically have to pay was +reckoned by a British expert as between thirty-two and forty-four +billions. The Reparations Commission, however, was given the power to +recommend abatements as well as increased payments; upon the wisdom of its +members the practical application of the treaty would obviously +depend.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> The proposal of a permanent commission for handling the +whole matter of reparations was made first by an American financial +adviser, John Foster Dulles. The idea was accepted by Lloyd George and +Clemenceau as an efficacious method of enabling them to postpone the +decision of a definite sum to be paid by Germany until the political +situation in France and Great Britain should be more favorable.</p></div> + +<p>In truth the reparations clauses of the treaty, which compelled Germany +to hand over what was practically a blank check to the Allies, +represented no victory for Wilson. But he had at least prevented the +imposition of the crushing indemnities that had been proposed, and which +must have been followed by political and economic consequences hardly +short of disastrous. As for the eastern frontier of France, it was agreed +that the right of property in the coal mines of the Saar district should +be given outright to France, as partial but immediate compensation for +the damage done at Lens and elsewhere. But the district itself was to be +placed under the League of Nations and a plebiscite at the end of fifteen +years was to determine its final destiny. The territory on the left bank +of the Rhine was left to Germany, but it was to be demilitarized +entirely, a condition which also applied to a zone fifty kilometers broad +to the east of the Rhine. The bridgeheads on the Rhine, as well as the +German districts to the west of the river, were to be occupied for +periods extending from five to fifteen years, in order to ensure the +execution of the treaty by the Germans. The French press contended that +Clemenceau had made over-great concessions, protesting that the League +would be utterly unable to protect France against sudden attack, +especially since the Covenant had not provided for a general military +force. In return for these concessions by Clemenceau, Wilson gave an +extraordinary <em>quid pro quo</em>. He who had declaimed vigorously against all +special alliances now agreed that until the League was capable of +offering to France the protection she asked, there should be a separate +treaty between France, Great Britain, and the United States, according to +which the two latter powers should promise to come to the defense of +France in case of sudden and unprovoked attack by Germany. The treaty +did not, according to Wilson, constitute a definite alliance but merely +an "undertaking," but it laid him open to the charge of serious +inconsistency.</p> + +<p>Thus was passed, by means of compromise, the most serious crisis of the +Conference. In France Wilson never recovered the popularity which he then +lost by his opposition to French demands. In many quarters of Great +Britain and the United States, on the other hand, he was attacked by +liberals for having surrendered to the forces of reaction. In the +Conference, however, he had maintained his prestige, and most moderates +who understood the situation felt that he had done as well as or better +than could be expected. He had by no means had his way in the matter of +reparations or frontiers, but he had gone far towards a vindication of +his principles by avoiding a defeat under circumstances where the odds +were against him. More he probably could not have obtained and no other +American at that time could have secured so much. The sole alternative +would have been for the American delegates to withdraw from the +Conference. Such a step might have had the most disastrous consequences. +It was true, or Europe believed it to be true, that the Conference +represented for the<a name="Page_309" id="Page_309"></a> moment the single rallying-point of the elements of +social order on the Continent. The withdrawal of the Americans would have +shattered its waning prestige, discouraged liberals in every country, and +perhaps have led to its dissolution. Nearly every one in Paris was +convinced that the break-up of the Conference would be the signal for +widespread communistic revolt throughout central Europe. By his broad +concessions President Wilson had sacrificed some of his principles, but +he had held the Conference together, the supreme importance of which +seemed at the time difficult to over-emphasize. Having weathered this +crisis the Conference could now meet the storms that were to arise from +the demands of the Italians and the Japanese.</p> + +<p>Wilson himself was to be encouraged in the midst of those difficulties by +the triumph accorded him on the 28th of April. On that day the plenary +session of the Conference adopted without a word of dissent the revised +Covenant of the League of Nations, including the amendment that formally +recognized the validity of the Monroe Doctrine.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<h3>THE SETTLEMENT</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310"></a>President Wilson's success in securing approval for the League as the +basis of the Peace Treaty was his greatest triumph at Paris; and it was +accentuated by the acceptance of certain of the amendments that were +demanded in America, while those which the French and Japanese insisted +upon were discarded or postponed. In comparison with this success, he +doubtless regarded his concessions in the matter of reparations and the +special Franco-British-American alliance as mere details. His task, +however, was by no means completed, since Italian and Japanese claims +threatened to bring on crises of almost equal danger.</p> + +<p>From the early days of the Conference there had been interested +speculation in the corridors of the Quai d'Orsay as to whether the +promises made to Italy by the Entente Powers in 1915, which were +incorporated in the secret Treaty of London, would be carried into effect +by the final peace settlement. <a name="Page_311" id="Page_311"></a>That treaty had been conceived in the +spirit of old-time diplomacy and had assigned to Italy districts which +disinterested experts declared could not be hers except upon the principle +of the spoils to the strong. Much of the territories promised in the +Tyrol, along the Julian Alps, and on the Adriatic coast was inhabited +entirely by non-Italians, whose political and economic fortunes were bound +up with states other than Italy; justice and wisdom alike seemed to +dictate a refusal of Italian claims. The annexation of such districts by +Italy, the experts agreed, would contravene directly the right of +self-determination and might lead to serious difficulties in the future. +Would the President sanction the application of treaties consummated +without the knowledge of the United States and in defiance of the +principles upon which he had declared that peace must be made? The +application of the Treaty of London, furthermore, would be at the expense, +chiefly, of the Jugoslavs, that is, a small nation. The Allies, as well as +Wilson, had declared that the war had been waged and that the peace must +be drafted in defense of the rights of smaller nationalities. Justice for +the weak as for the strong was the basis of the new<a name="Page_312" id="Page_312"></a> international order +which Wilson was striving to inaugurate.</p> + +<p>Had the struggle been simply over the validity of the Treaty of London, +Wilson's position would have been difficult enough, for the Premiers of +France and Great Britain had declared that they could do nothing else but +honor the pledges given in 1915. But Italian opinion had been steadily +aroused by a chauvinist press campaign to demand not merely the +application of the Treaty of London but the annexation of Fiume, which +the treaty assigned to the Jugoslavs. To this demand both the British and +French were opposed, although they permitted Wilson to assume the burden +of denying Italian claims to Fiume. As time went on, Orlando and Sonnino +pressed for a decision, even threatening that unless their demands were +satisfied, Italy would have nothing to do with the German treaty. +Finally, on the 23d of April, the crisis came to a head. On that day the +President published a statement setting forth the American position, +which he felt had been entirely misrepresented by a propagandist press. +Emphasizing the fact that Italian claims were inconsistent with the +principles upon which all the Allies had agreed, as necessary to the +future tranquillity of the world,<a name="Page_313" id="Page_313"></a> he appealed directly to the Italian +people to join with the United States in the application of those +principles, even at the sacrifice of what seemed their own interest.</p> + +<p>The appeal was based upon sound facts. Its statements were approved +publicly by allied experts who knew the situation, and privately by +Clemenceau and Lloyd George. It had been discussed in the Council of Four +and by no means took Orlando by surprise. But it gave Orlando an +opportunity for carrying out his threat of retiring from the Conference. +Insisting that Wilson had appealed to the Italian people over his head and +that they must choose between him and the President, he set forth at once +for Rome, followed by the other Italian commissioners, although the +economic experts remained at Paris. Orlando was playing a difficult game. +He was hailed in Rome as the defender of the sacred rights of Italy, but +in Paris he lacked partners. Both the British and French agreed with +Wilson that Italy ought not to have Fiume. They secretly regretted the +promises of the London Treaty, although they were prepared to keep their +word, and they were by no means inclined to make further concessions in +order to bring Orlando and his colleagues back.<a name="Page_314" id="Page_314"></a> After a few days of +hesitation, they decided to go on with the German treaty and to warn the +Italians that, if they persisted in absenting themselves from the +Conference, their withdrawal would be regarded as a breach of the Treaty +of London which stipulated a common peace with the enemy. They also +decided that Italy could not expect to share in German reparations if her +delegates were not present to sign the German treaty. Such arguments could +not fail to weigh heavily with the Italian delegates, even at the moment +when the Italian press and people were giving them enthusiastic +encouragement to persist in their uncompromising course. On the 5th of May +Orlando left Rome to resume his place in the Peace Conference.</p> + +<p>In the meantime the Japanese had taken advantage of the embarrassment +caused by the Italian withdrawal, to put forward their special claims in +the Far East. During the early days of the Conference they had played a +cautious game, as we have seen, attending meetings but taking no decided +stand upon European matters. They had even refused to press to the limit +the amendment to the League Covenant which enunciated their favorite +principle of the equality of races. But now they insisted that on one +point, at least, <a name="Page_315" id="Page_315"></a>Japanese claims must be listened to; their right of +inheritance to the German lease of Kiau-Chau and economic privileges in +the Shantung peninsula must receive recognition. This claim had long been +approved secretly by the British and French; it had even been accepted by +the Chinese at the time when Japan had forced the twenty-one demands upon +her. It was disapproved, however, by the American experts in Paris, and +Wilson argued strongly for more generous treatment of China. His +strategic position, one must admit, was not nearly so strong as in the +Fiume controversy. In the latter he was supported, at least covertly, by +France and England, whose treaty with Italy explicitly denied her claim +to Fiume. The Japanese threat of withdrawal from the Conference, if their +claims were not satisfied, carried more real danger with it than that of +the Italians; if the Japanese delegates actually departed making the +second of the big five to go, the risk of a complete débâcle was by no +means slight. Even assuming that justice demanded as strong a stand for +the Chinese as Wilson had taken for the Jugoslavs, the practical +importance of the Shantung question in Europe was of much less +significance. <a name="Page_316" id="Page_316"></a>The eyes of every small nation of Europe were upon Fiume, +which was regarded as the touchstone of Allied professions of justice. If +the Allied leaders permitted Italy to take Fiume, the small nations would +scoff at all further professions of idealism; they would take no further +interest either in the Conference or its League. Whereas, on the other +hand, the small nationalities of Europe knew and cared little about the +justice of Chinese pleas.</p> + +<p>Such considerations may have been in the mind of the President when he +decided to yield to Japan. The decision throws interesting light upon his +character; he is less the obstinate doctrinaire, more the practical +politician than has sometimes been supposed. The pure idealist would have +remained consistent in the crisis, refused to do an injustice in the Far +East as he had refused in the settlement of the Adriatic, and would have +taken the risk of breaking up the Conference and destroying all chance of +the League of Nations. Instead, Wilson yielded to practical considerations +of the moment. The best that he could secure was the promise of the +Japanese to retire from the peninsula, a promise the fulfillment of which +obviously depended upon the outcome of the struggle between liberal and +conservative forces in Japan, and which accordingly remained uncertain.<a name="Page_317" id="Page_317"></a> He +was willing to do what he admitted was an injustice, in order to assure +what seemed to him the larger and the more certain justice that would +follow the establishment of the League of Nations.</p> + +<p>The settlement of the Shantung problem removed the last great difficulty +in completing the treaty with Germany, and on the 7th of May the German +delegates appeared to receive it. Nearly eight weeks of uncertainty +followed, taken up with the study of German protests, the construction of +the treaty with Austria, and finally the last crisis that preceded the +signature. The terms were drastic and the German Government, in the +persons of Scheidemann, the Premier, and Brockdorff-Rantzau, Minister for +Foreign Affairs, seemed determined that, helpless as she was, Germany +should not accept them without radical modifications. Their protests +touched chiefly upon the economic clauses and reparations, the solution of +the Saar problem, the cession of so much German territory to Poland, and +the exclusion of Germany from the League of Nations. Ample opportunity was +given their delegates to formulate protests, which, although they rarely +introduced new facts or arguments that had not been discussed, were +carefully studied by Allied experts. Week after week passed.<a name="Page_318" id="Page_318"></a> In certain +quarters among the Allies appeared a tendency to make decided concessions +in order to win the consent of the German delegates. No one wanted to +carry out an invasion of the defeated country, and there was no guarantee +that a military invasion would secure acquiescence. Germany's strength was +in sitting still, and she might thus indefinitely postpone the peace. Was +it not the wise course, one heard whispered in Paris, to sugar the +bitterness of the treaty and thus win Germany's immediate signature?</p> + +<p>Early in June, Lloyd George, evidently under pressure from his Cabinet, +declared himself for a decided "softening" of the peace terms in order to +secure the acceptance of the enemy. What would Wilson do? He had been +anathematized at home and abroad as pro-German and desirous of saving +Germany from the consequences of her misdeeds; here was his chance. Would +he join with the British in tearing up this treaty, which after four +months of concentrated effort had just been completed, in order to secure +the soft peace that he was supposed to advocate? His attitude in this +contingency showed his ability to preserve an even balance. In the +meeting of the American delegation that was called to consider the +British proposal,<a name="Page_319" id="Page_319"></a> he pronounced himself as strongly in favor of any +changes that would ensure more complete justice. If the British and +French would consent to a definite and moderate sum of reparations (a +consent which he knew was out of the question) he would gladly agree. But +he would not agree to any concessions to Germany that were not based upon +justice, but merely upon the desire to secure her signature. He was not +in favor of any softening which would mar the justice of the settlement +as drafted. "We did not come over," he said, "simply to get any sort of +peace treaty signed. We came over to do justice. I believe, even, that a +hard peace is a good thing for Germany herself, in order that she may +know what an unjust war means. We must not forget what our soldiers +fought for, even if it means that we may have to fight again." Wilson's +stand for the treaty as drafted proved decisive. Certain modifications in +details were made, but the hasty and unwise enthusiasm of Lloyd George +for scrapping entire sections was not approved. The Conference could +hardly have survived wholesale concessions to Germany: to prolong the +crisis would have been a disastrous confession of incompetence. For what +confidence could have been placed in statesmen who were so patently +unable to make and keep their minds?</p> + +<p><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320"></a>Still the German Government held firm and refused to sign. Foch inspected +the Allied troops on the Rhine and Pershing renounced his trip to +England, in order to be ready for the invasion that had been ordered if +the time limit elapsed without signature. Only at the last moment did the +courage of the Germans fail. A change of ministry brought into power men +who were willing to accept the inevitable humiliation. On the 20th of +June, the guns and sirens of Paris announced Germany's acceptance of the +peace terms and their promise to sign, and, surprising fact, a vast crowd +gathered on the Place de la Concorde to cheer Wilson; despite his loss of +popularity and the antagonism which he had aroused by his opposition to +national aspirations of one sort or another, he was still the man whose +name stood as symbol for peace.</p> + +<p>Eight days later in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where forty-eight +years before had been born the German Empire, the delegates of the Allied +states gathered to celebrate the obsequies of that Empire. It was no +peace of reconciliation, this treaty between the new German Republic and +the victorious Allies. <a name="Page_321" id="Page_321"></a>The hatred and distrust inspired by five years of +war were not so soon to be liquidated. As the German delegates, awkward +and rather defiant in their long black frock coats, marched to the table +to affix their signatures, they were obviously, in the eyes of the Allied +delegates and the hundreds of spectators, always "the enemy." The place +of the Chinese at the treaty table was empty; for them it was no peace of +justice that gave Shantung to the Japanese, and they would not sign. The +South African delegate, General Smuts, could not sign without explaining +the balance of considerations which led him to sanction an international +document containing so many flaws.</p> + +<p>It was not, indeed, the complete peace of justice which Wilson had +promised and which, at times, he has since implied he believed it to be. +Belgians complained that they had not been given the left bank of the +Scheldt; Frenchmen were incensed because their frontier had not been +protected; Italians were embittered by the refusal to approve their +claims on the Adriatic; radical leaders, the world over, were frank in +their expression of disappointment at the failure to inaugurate a new +social order. The acquiescence in Japanese demands for Kiau-Chau was +clearly dictated by expediency rather than by justice. <a name="Page_322" id="Page_322"></a>Austria, reduced +in size and bereft of material resources, was cut off from the sea and +refused the possibility of joining with Germany. The nationalistic +ambitions of the Rumanians, of the Jugoslavs, of the Czechoslovaks, and +of the Poles were aroused to such an extent that conflicts could hardly +be avoided. Hungary, deprived of the rim of subject nationalities, looked +forward to the first opportunity of reclaiming her sovereignty over them. +The Ruthenians complained of Polish domination. Further to the east lay +the great unsettled problem of Russia.</p> + +<p>But the most obvious flaws in the treaty are to be found in the economic +clauses. It was a mistake to compel Germany to sign a blank check in the +matter of reparations. Germany and the world needed to know the exact +amount that was to be paid, in order that international commerce might be +set upon a stable basis. The extent of control granted to the Allies over +German economic life was unwise and unfair.</p> + +<p>Complete justice certainly was not achieved by President Wilson at Paris, +and it may be questioned whether all the decisions can be regarded even +as expedient. The spirit of the Fourteen Points, as commonly interpreted, +had not governed the minds of those who sat at the council table. <a name="Page_323" id="Page_323"></a>The +methods adopted by the Council of Ten and the Council of Four were by no +means those to which the world looked forward when it hailed the ideal +expressed in the phrase, "Open covenants openly arrived at." The "freedom +of the seas," if it meant the disappearance of the peculiar position held +by Great Britain on the seas, was never seriously debated, and Wilson +himself, in an interview given to the London <em>Times</em>, sanctioned +"Britain's peculiar position as an island empire." Adequate guarantees +for the reduction of armaments were certainly not taken at Paris; all +that was definitely stipulated was the disarmament of the enemy, a step +by no means in consonance with the President's earlier policy which aimed +at universal disarmament. An "absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims" was hardly carried out by granting the German colonies +to the great powers, even as mandatories of the League of Nations.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless the future historian will probably hold that the Peace +Conference, with all its selfish interests and mistakes, carried into +effect an amazingly large part of President Wilson's programme, when all +the difficulties of his position are duly weighed. The territorial +settlements, on the whole, translated into fact the demands laid down by +the more special of Wilson's Fourteen Points.<a name="Page_324" id="Page_324"></a> France, Belgium, and the +other invaded countries were, of course, evacuated and their restoration +promised; Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France and the wrong of 1871 +thus righted; an independent Poland was recognized and given the assured +access to the sea that Wilson had insisted upon; the subject nationalities +of Austria-Hungary received not merely autonomy but independence. Even as +regards the larger principles enunciated in the Fourteen Points, it may at +least be argued that President Wilson secured more than he lost. Open +diplomacy in the sense of conducting international negotiations in an open +forum was not the method of the Peace Conference; and it may not be +possible or even desirable. The article in the Covenant, however, which +insists upon the public registration of all treaties before their validity +is recognized, goes far towards a fulfillment of the President's pledge of +open covenants, particularly if his original meaning is liberally +interpreted. Similarly the Covenant makes provision for the reduction of +armaments. If the treaty did not go far in assuring the "removal of +economic barriers," at all events the Conference did much to provide for +an international control of traffic which would ensure to<a name="Page_325" id="Page_325"></a> all European +countries, so far as possible, equal facilities for forwarding their +goods.</p> + +<p>Apart from the Fourteen Points Wilson had emphasized two other principles +as necessary to a just and permanent peace. The first of these was that +the enemy should be treated with a fairness equal to that accorded to the +Allies; the second was the principle that peoples should have the right +to choose the government by which they were to be ruled—the principle of +self-determination. Neither of these principles received full recognition +in the peace settlement. Yet their spirit was infused more completely +throughout the settlement than would have been the case had not Wilson +been at Paris, and to that extent the just and lasting qualities of the +peace were enhanced. In the matter of German reparations the question of +justice was not the point at issue; the damage committed by Germany +surpassed in value anything that the Allies could exact from her. As to +frontiers, the unbiased student will probably admit that full justice was +done Germany when the aspirations of France for annexation of the Saar +district and the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine were +disappointed; it was the barest justice to France, on the other hand, +that she should receive the coal mines of the former district and that +the latter should be demilitarized. <a name="Page_326" id="Page_326"></a>In the question of Danzig, and the +Polish corridor to the sea, it was only fair to Poland that she receive +the adequate outlet which was necessary to her economic life and which +had been promised her, even if it meant the annexation of large German +populations, many of which had been artificially brought in as colonists +by the Berlin Government; and in setting up a free city of Danzig, the +Conference broke with the practices of old style diplomacy and paid a +tribute to the rights of peoples as against expediency. The same may be +said of the decision to provide for plebiscites in East Prussia and in +upper Silesia. On the other hand, the refusal to permit the incorporation +of the new, lesser Austria within Germany was at once unjust and +unwise—a concession to the most shortsighted of old-style diplomatic +principles.</p> + +<p>In the reorganization of the former Hapsburg territories, Wilsonian +principles were always in the minds of the delegates, although in a few +cases they were honored more in the breach than in the observance. Wilson +himself surrendered to Italy extensive territories in the Tyrol south of +the Brenner which, if he had followed his own professions, would have been +left to Austria.<a name="Page_327" id="Page_327"></a> A large Jugoslav population on the Julian Alps and in +Istria was placed under Italian rule. The new Czechoslovak state includes +millions of Germans and Magyars. The boundaries of Rumania were extended +to include many non-Rumanian peoples. Bulgars were sacrificed to Greeks +and to Serbs. In the settlement of each problem the balance always +inclined a little in favor of the victors. But the injustices committed +were far less extensive than might have been expected, and in most cases +where populations were included under alien rule, the decision was based +less on political considerations than on the practical factors of terrain, +rivers, and railroads which must always be taken into consideration in the +drawing of a frontier. Wherever the issue was clean-cut, as for example +between the selfish nationalism of the Italians in their Adriatic demands +and the claim to mere economic life of the Jugoslavs, the old rule which +granted the spoils to the stronger power was vigorously protested.</p> + +<p>Whatever the mistakes of the Conference, Wilson secured that which he +regarded as the point of prime importance, the League of Nations. This, he +believed, would remedy the flaws and eradicate the vices of the treaties. +No settlement, however perfect at the moment, could possibly remain +permanent, in view of the constantly changing conditions.<a name="Page_328" id="Page_328"></a> What was +necessary was an elasticity that would permit change as change became +necessary. If the disposition of the Saar basin, for example, proved to be +so unwise or unjust as to cause danger of violence, the League would take +cognizance of the peril and provide a remedy. If the boundaries of eastern +Germany gave undue advantage to the Poles, the League would find ways and +means of rectifying the frontier peacefully. If Hungary or Czechoslovakia +found themselves cut off from sea-ports, the League could hear and act +upon their demands for freedom of transit or unrestricted access to fair +markets. That the League was necessary for such and other purposes was +recognized by many notable economic experts and statesmen besides the +President. Herbert Hoover insisted upon the necessity of a League if the +food problems of central Europe were to be met, and Venizelos remarked +that "without a League of Nations, Europe would face the future with +despair in its heart." Because he had the covenant of such an association +incorporated in the German treaty, Wilson accepted all the mistakes and +injustices of the treaty as minor details and could say of it, doubtless +in all sincerity, "It's a good job." <a name="Page_329" id="Page_329"></a>Conscious of victory in the matter +which he had held closest to his heart, the President embarked upon the +<em>George Washington</em> on the 29th of June, the day after the signing of the +treaty, and set forth for home. All that was now needed was the +ratification of the treaty by the Senate.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<h3>THE SENATE AND THE TREATY</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330"></a>Neither President Wilson nor those who had been working with him at Paris +seriously feared that, after securing the point of chief importance to +him at the Conference, he would fail to win support for the League of +Nations and the treaty at home. They recognized, of course, that his +political opponents in the Senate would not acquiesce without a struggle. +The Republicans were now in the majority, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the new +chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had gone far in his +efforts to undermine Wilson's policy at Paris. He had encouraged the +Italians in their imperialistic designs in the Adriatic and had done his +best to discredit the League of Nations. Former Progressive Senators, +such as Johnson and Borah, who like Lodge made personal hostility to +Wilson the chief plank in their political programme, had declared +vigorously their determination to prevent the entrance of the United +States into a League. The Senators as a whole were not well-informed upon +foreign conditions and Wilson had done nothing to enlighten them. He had +not asked their advice in the formulation of his policy, nor had he +supplied them with the facts that justified the position he had taken. +Naturally their attitude was not likely to be friendly, now that he +returned to request their consent to the treaty, and the approach of a +presidential election was bound to affect the action of all ardent +partisans.</p> + +<p>Opposition was also to be expected in the country. There was always the +ancient prejudice against participation in European affairs, which had not +been broken even by the events of the past two years. The people, even +more than the Senate, were ignorant of foreign conditions and failed to +understand the character of the obligations which the nation would assume +under the treaty and the covenant of the League. There was genuine fear +lest the United States should become involved in wars and squabbles in +which it had no material interest, and lest it should surrender its +independence of action to a council of foreign powers. This was +accompanied by the belief that an irresponsible President might commit the +country to an <a name="Page_332" id="Page_332"></a>adventurous course of action which could not be controlled +by Congress. The chief opposition to the treaty and covenant, however, +probably resulted from the personal dislike of Wilson. This feeling, which +had always been virulent along the Atlantic coast and in the industrial +centers of the Middle West, had been intensified by the President's +apparent disregard of Congress. More than one man of business argued that +the treaty must be bad because it was Wilson's work and the covenant worst +of all, since it was his pet scheme. One heard daily in the clubs and on +the golf-courses of New England and the Middle Atlantic States the remark: +"I know little about the treaty, but I know Wilson, and I know he must be +wrong."</p> + +<p>And yet the game was probably in the President's hands, had he known how +to play it. Divided as it was on the question of personal devotion to +Wilson, the country was a unit in its desire for immediate peace and +normal conditions. Admitting the imperfections of the treaty, it was +probably the best that could be secured in view of the conflicting +interests of the thirty-one signatory powers, and at least it would bring +peace at once. To cast it aside meant long delays and prolongation of the +economic crisis. <a name="Page_333" id="Page_333"></a>The covenant of the League might not be entirely +satisfactory, but something must be done to prevent war in the future; +and if this League proved unsatisfactory, it could be amended after +trial. Even the opposing Senators did not believe that they could defeat +the treaty outright. They were warned by Republican financiers, who +understood international economic conditions, that the safety and +prosperity of the world demanded ratification, and that the United States +could not afford to assume an attitude of isolation even if it were +possible. Broad-minded statesmen who were able to dissociate partisan +emotion from intellectual judgment, such as ex-President Taft, agreed +that the treaty should be ratified as promptly as possible. All that +Senator Lodge and his associates really hoped for was to incorporate +reservations which would guarantee the independence of American action +and incidentally make it impossible for the President to claim all the +credit for the peace.</p> + +<p>Had the President proved capable of coöperating with the moderate +Republican Senators it would probably have been possible for him to have +saved the fruits of his labor at Paris. An important group honestly +believed that the language of the covenant was ambiguous in certain +respects, particularly as<a name="Page_334" id="Page_334"></a> regards the extent of sovereignty sacrificed +by the national government to the League, and the diminution of +congressional powers. This group was anxious to insert reservations +making plain the right of Congress alone to declare war, defining more +exactly the right of the United States to interpret the Monroe Doctrine, +and specifying what was meant by domestic questions that should be exempt +from the cognizance of the League. Had Wilson at once combined with this +group and agreed to the suggested reservations, he would in all +probability have been able to secure the two-thirds vote necessary to +ratification. The country would have been satisfied; the Republicans +might have contended that they had "Americanized" the treaty; and the +reservations would probably have been accepted by the co-signatories. It +would have been humiliating to go back to the Allies asking special +privileges, but Europe needed American assistance too much to fail to +heed these demands. After all America had gained nothing in the way of +territorial advantage from the war and was asking for nothing in the way +of reparations.</p> + +<p>It was at this crucial moment that Wilson's peculiar temperamental faults +asserted themselves. <a name="Page_335" id="Page_335"></a>Sorely he needed the sane advice of Colonel House, +who would doubtless have found ways of placating the opposition. But that +practical statesman was in London and the President lacked the capacity +to arrange the compromise that House approved.</p> + +<p>President Wilson alone either would not or could not negotiate +successfully with the middle group of Republicans. He went so far as to +initiate private conferences with various Senators, a step indicating his +desire to avoid the appearance of the dictatorship of which he was +accused; but his attitude on reservations that altered the meaning of any +portion of the treaty or covenant was unyielding, and he even insisted +that merely interpretative reservations should not be embodied in the +text of the ratifying resolution. The President evidently hoped that the +pressure of public opinion would compel the Senate to yield to the demand +for immediate peace and for guarantees against future war. His appearance +of rigidity, however, played into the hands of the opponents of the +treaty, who dominated the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. +Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee, adopted a stand which, to the +Administration at least, did not seem to be justified by anything but a +desire to discredit the work of Wilson. <a name="Page_336" id="Page_336"></a>He had, in the previous year, +warmly advocated a League of Nations, but in the spring of 1919 he had +given the impression that he would oppose any League for which Wilson +stood sponsor. Thus he had raised objections to the preliminary draft of +the covenant which Wilson brought from Paris in February; but when Wilson +persuaded the Allies to incorporate some of the amendments then demanded +by Republican Senators, he at once found new objections. He did not dare +attack the League as a principle, in view of the uncertainty of public +opinion on the issue; but he obviously rejoiced in the President's +inability to unite the Democrats with the middle-ground Republicans, for +whom Senator McCumber stood as spokesman.</p> + +<p>On the 19th of August a conference was held at the White House, in which +the President attempted to explain to the Foreign Relations Committee +doubtful points and to give the reasons for various aspects of the +settlement. A careful study of the stenographic report indicates that his +answers to the questions of the Republican Senators were frank, and that +he was endeavoring to remove the unfortunate effects of his former +distant attitude. His manner, however, had in it something of the +schoolmaster, and the conference was fruitless. <a name="Page_337" id="Page_337"></a>Problems which had been +studied for months by experts of all the Powers, and to the solution of +which had been devoted long weeks of intelligent discussion, were now +passed upon superficially by men whose ignorance of foreign questions was +only too evident, and who barely concealed their determination to nullify +everything approved by the President. Hence, when the report of the +committee was finally presented on the 10th of September, the Republican +majority demanded no less than thirty-eight amendments and four +reservations. A quarter of the report was not concerned at all with the +subject under discussion, but was devoted to an attack upon Wilson's +autocratic methods and his treatment of the Senate. As was pointed out by +Senator McCumber, the single Republican who dissented from the majority +report, "not one word is said, not a single allusion made, concerning +either the great purposes of the League of Nations or the methods by +which these purposes are to be accomplished. Irony and sarcasm have been +substituted for argument and positions taken by the press or individuals +outside the Senate seem to command more attention than the treaty +itself."</p> + +<p>The President did not receive the popular support which he expected, and +the burst of popular<a name="Page_338" id="Page_338"></a> wrath which he believed would overwhelm senatorial +opposition was not forthcoming. In truth public opinion was confused. +America was not educated to understand the issues at stake. Wilson's +purposes at Paris had not been well reported in the press, and he himself +had failed to make plain the meaning of his policy. It was easy for +opponents of the treaty to muddy discussion and to arouse emotion where +reason was desirable. The wildest statements were made as to the effect of +the covenant, such as that entrance into the League would at once involve +the United States in war, and that Wilson was sacrificing the interests of +America to the selfish desires of European states. The same men who, a +year before, had complained that Wilson was opposing England and France, +now insisted that he had sold the United States to those nations. They +invented the catchword of "one hundred per cent Americanism," the test of +which was to be opposition to the treaty. They found strange coadjutors. +The German-Americans, suppressed during the war, now dared to emerge, +hoping to save the Fatherland from the effects of defeat by preventing the +ratification of the treaty; the politically active Irish found opportunity +to fulminate against British imperialism and<a name="Page_339" id="Page_339"></a> "tyranny" which they +declared had been sanctioned by the treaty; impractical liberals, who were +disappointed because Wilson had not inaugurated the social millennium, +joined hands with out-and-out reactionaries. But the most discouraging +aspect of the situation was that so many persons permitted their judgment +to be clouded by their dislike of the President's personality. However +much they might disapprove the tactics of Senator Lodge they could not but +sympathize to some extent with the Senate's desire to maintain its +independence, which they believed had been assailed by Wilson. Discussions +which began with the merits of the League of Nations almost invariably +culminated with vitriolic attacks upon the character of Woodrow Wilson.</p> + +<p>In the hope of arousing the country to a clear demand for immediate peace +based upon the Paris settlement, Wilson decided to carry out the plan +formulated some weeks previous and deliver a series of speeches from the +Middle West to the Pacific coast. He set forth on the 3d of September and +made more than thirty speeches. He was closely followed by some of his +fiercest opponents. Senators Johnson and Borah, members of the Foreign +Relations Committee, who might have been expected to remain in Washington +to assist in the<a name="Page_340" id="Page_340"></a> consideration of the treaty by the Senate, followed in +Wilson's wake, attempting to counteract the effect of his addresses, and +incidentally distorting many of the treaty's provisions, which it is +charitable to assume they did not comprehend. The impression produced by +the President was varied, depending largely upon the political character +of his audience. East of the Mississippi he was received with comparative +coolness, but as he approached the coast enthusiasm became high, and at +Seattle and Los Angeles he received notable ovations. And yet in these +hours of triumph as in the previous moments of discouragement, farther +east, he must have felt that the issues were not clear. The struggle was +no longer one for a new international order that would ensure peace, so +much as a personal conflict between Lodge and Wilson. Whether the +President were applauded or anathematized, the personal note was always +present.</p> + +<p>It was evident, during the tour, that the nervous strain was telling upon +Wilson. He had been worn seriously by his exertions in Paris, where he +was described by a foreign plenipotentiary as the hardest worker in the +Conference. The brief voyage home, which was purposely lengthened to give +him better chance of recuperation, proved insufficient. <a name="Page_341" id="Page_341"></a>Forced to resume +the struggle at the moment when he thought victory was his, repudiated +where he expected to find appreciation, the tour proved to be beyond his +physical and nervous strength. At Pueblo, Colorado, on the 25th of +September, he broke down and returned hastily to Washington. Shortly +afterwards the President's condition became so serious that his +physicians forbade all political conferences, insisting upon a period of +complete seclusion and rest, which was destined to continue for many +months.</p> + +<p>Thus at the moment of extreme crisis in the fortunes of the treaty its +chief protagonist was removed from the scene of action and the Democratic +forces fighting for ratification were deprived of effective leadership. +Had there been a real leader in the Senate who could carry on the fight +with vigor and finesse, the treaty might even then have been saved; but +Wilson's system had permitted no understudies. There was no one to lead +and no one to negotiate a compromise. From his sick-room, where his +natural obstinacy seemed to be intensified by his illness, the President +still refused to consider any reservations except of a purely +interpretative character, and the middle-ground Republicans would not +vote to ratify without<a name="Page_342" id="Page_342"></a> "mild reservations," some of which seemed to him +more than interpretative.</p> + +<p>Senatorial forces were roughly divided into four groups. There were the +"bitter-enders," typified by Johnson, Borah, and Brandegee, who frankly +wanted to defeat the treaty and the League outright; there were the +"reservationists," most of whom, like Lodge, wanted the same but did not +dare say so openly; there were the "mild reservationists," most of whom +were Republicans, who sincerely desired immediate peace and asked for no +important changes in the treaty; and finally there were those who desired +to ratify the treaty as it stood. The last-named group, made up of +Democrats, numbered from forty-one to forty-four, and obviously needed +the assistance of the "mild reservationists," if they were to secure a +two-thirds vote of the Senate. During October, all the amendments which +the Foreign Relations Committee brought forward were defeated through the +combination of the last two groups. Early in November, however, fourteen +reservations were adopted, the "mild reservationists" voting with Senator +Lodge, for lack of any basis of compromise with the Democrats. The effect +of these reservations would, undoubtedly, have been to release the +<a name="Page_343" id="Page_343"></a>United States from many of the obligations assumed by other members, +while assuring to it the benefits of the League. The most serious of the +reservations was that concerned with Article X of the covenant, which +stated that the United States would assume no obligations to preserve the +territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or +to interfere in controversies between nations, unless in any particular +case Congress should so provide. From the moment when Wilson first +developed his policy of international service, coöperative interference +in order to prevent acts of aggression by a strong against a weaker power +had been the chief point in his programme. It was contained in his early +Pan-American policy; it ran through his speeches in the campaign of 1916; +it was in the Fourteen Points. It was his specific contribution to the +covenant in Paris. Article X was the one point in the covenant which +Wilson would not consent to modify or, as he expressed it, see +"nullified." Just because it lay nearest Wilson's heart, it was the +article against which the most virulent attacks of the "die-hards" were +directed.</p> + +<p>The President denounced the reservation on Article X, as a "knife-thrust +at the heart of the covenant," and its inclusion in the ratifying<a name="Page_344" id="Page_344"></a> +resolution of the Senate, spelled the defeat of ratification. On the eve +of voting he wrote to Senator Hitchcock, leader of the Democratic forces +in the Senate, "I assume that the Senators only desire my judgment upon +the all-important question of the resolution containing the many +reservations of Senator Lodge. On that I cannot hesitate, for, in my +opinion, the resolution in that form does not provide for ratification +but rather for nullification of the treaty. I sincerely hope that the +friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge +resolution of ratification." The "mild reservationists" led by McCumber +voted with the Lodge group for the resolution; but the "bitter-enders," +combining with the supporters of the original treaty, outnumbered them. +The vote stood thirty-nine in favor of the resolution and fifty-five +against. When a motion for unconditional ratification was offered by +Senator Underwood, it was defeated by a vote of fifty-three to +thirty-eight.</p> + +<p>The Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee had succeeded far +beyond the hopes of their leaders in August. They had killed the treaty, +but in such an indirect fashion as to confuse the public and to fix upon +the President the blame for delaying the peace. <a name="Page_345" id="Page_345"></a>It was easy to picture +the obstinacy of the President as the root of all the evil which +resulted from the political and economic uncertainty overhanging our +European relations. So widespread was this feeling among his natural +opponents, that the Republican Senators began to assume a far loftier +tone, and to laugh at the tardy efforts of the Democrats to arrange a +compromise. When Senator Pomerene, after consultation with Administration +leaders, proposed the appointment of a "committee of conciliation," to +find a basis of ratification that would secure the necessary two-thirds +vote, the motion was killed by forty-eight to forty-two. Senator Lodge +announced that he would support the resolution suggested by Knox, which +would end the war by congressional resolution and thus compel Wilson to +negotiate a separate treaty of peace with Germany.</p> + +<p>Intelligent public opinion, however, was anxious that the quarrels of the +President and the Senate should not be allowed to delay the +settlement<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.<a name="Page_346" id="Page_346"></a> Rightly or wrongly the people felt that the struggle was +largely a personal one between Lodge and Wilson, and insisted that each +must yield something of their contention. On the one hand, ex-President +Taft and others of the more far-seeing Republicans worked anxiously for +compromise, with the assistance of such men as Hoover, who perceived the +necessity of a League, but who were willing to sacrifice its efficiency +to some extent, if only the United States could be brought in. On the +other hand, various Democrats who were less directly under Wilson's +influence wanted to meet these friends of the League half-way. During +December and January unofficial conferences between the senatorial groups +took place and progress towards a settlement seemed likely. The +Republicans agreed to soften the language of their minor reservations, +and Wilson even intimated that he would consent to a mild reservation on +Article X, although as he later wrote to Hitchcock, he felt strongly that +any reservation or resolution stating that the "United States assumes no +obligation under such and such an article unless or except, would chill +our relationship with the nations with whom we expect to be associated in +this great enterprise of maintaining the world's peace." <a name="Page_347" id="Page_347"></a>It was +important "not to create the impression that we are trying to escape +obligations."</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> A straw vote taken in 311 colleges and including 158,000 +students and professors showed an inclination to favor Wilson rather than +Lodge, but the greatest number approved compromise: four per cent favored +a new treaty with Germany; eight per cent favored killing the Versailles +treaty; only seventeen per cent approved the Lodge programme; thirty per +cent approved ratification of the treaty without change; and thirty-eight +per cent favored compromise.</p></div> + +<p>On the 31st of January the country was startled by the publication of a +letter written by Viscount Grey, who had been appointed British Ambassador +to the United States, but who had returned to England after a four months' +stay, during which he had been unable to secure an interview with the sick +President. In this letter he attempted to explain to the British the +causes of American hesitancy to accept the League. He then went on to +state that the success of the League depended upon the adherence of the +United States, and while admitting the serious character of the +reservations proposed by Senator Lodge, insisted that American coöperation +ought not to be refused because conditions were attached. His views were +unofficial, but it seemed clear that they were approved by the British +Cabinet, and they received a chorus of endorsement from the French and +British press.</p> + +<p>The publication of Grey's letter opened a path to peace to both Senate +and President had they been willing to follow it. The Senate, by very +slight verbal softening of the language of its reservations, the +President by taking the British Ambassador at his word, might have +reached an agreement.<a name="Page_348" id="Page_348"></a> The Lodge group, however, which had shown some +indications of a desire for compromise, was threatened by the "die-hards" +who were determined to defeat the treaty; fearing beyond everything to +break party unity, Lodge finally refused to alter the language of the +strong reservation on Article X, which stated that the United States +would assume no obligation to preserve the independence of other nations +by military force or the use of its resources or any form of economic +discrimination, unless Congress should first so provide. Inasmuch as the +economic outlawry of the offending state was the means which Wilson +chiefly counted upon, the reservation took all practical significance +from Article X, since the delays resulting from congressional +deliberation would prevent effective action. The President, possibly +believing that imperialist elements abroad were not sorry to see Article +X nullified, refused to accept the resolution of ratification so long as +it contained this reservation. "The imperialist," he wrote, "wants no +League of Nations, but if, in response to the universal cry of masses +everywhere, there is to be one, he is interested to secure one suited to +his own purposes, one that will permit him to continue the historic game +of pawns and peoples—the juggling of provinces, the old balance of +power, and the inevitable wars attendant upon these things. The +reservation proposed would perpetuate the old order. Does any one really +want to see the old game played again? Can any one really venture to take +part in reviving the old order? The enemies of a League of Nations have +by every true instinct centered their efforts against Article X, for it +is undoubtedly the foundation of the whole structure. It is the bulwark, +and the only bulwark of the rising democracy of the world against the +forces of imperialism and reaction."</p> + +<p>The deadlock was complete, and on March 19, 1920, when the vote on +ratification was taken, the necessary two-thirds were lacking by seven +votes. At the last moment a number of Democrats joined with the +Republican reservationists, making fifty-seven in favor of ratification. +On the other hand the bitter-end Republicans voted against it with the +Democrats who stood by the President, thus throwing thirty-seven votes +against ratification. It had taken the Peace Conference five months to +construct the treaty with Germany in all its complexities, and secure the +unanimous approval of the delegates of thirty-one states. <a name="Page_350" id="Page_350"></a>The Senate had +consumed more than eight months merely in criticizing the treaty and had +finally refused to ratify it.</p> + +<p>We are, perhaps, too close to the event to attempt any apportionment of +responsibility for this failure to cap our military successes by a peace +which—when all has been said—was the nearest possible approach to the +ideal peace. It is clear that the blame is not entirely on one side. +Historians will doubtless level the indictment of ignorance and political +obliquity against the Senators who tried, either directly or indirectly, +to defeat the treaty; they will find much justification for their charge, +although it will be more difficult to determine the dividing line between +mere incapacity to appreciate the necessities of the world, and the +desire to discredit, at any cost, the work of Woodrow Wilson. On the +other hand, the President cannot escape blame, although the charge will +be merely that of tactical incapacity and mistaken judgment. His +inability to combine with the moderate Republican Senators first gave a +chance to those who wanted to defeat the treaty. His obstinate refusal to +accept reservations at the end, when it was clear that the treaty could +not be ratified without them, showed a regard for form, at the expense of +practical benefit. <a name="Page_351" id="Page_351"></a>Granted that the reservations altered the character +of the League or the character of American participation in it, some sort +of a League was essential and the sooner the United States entered the +better it would be. Its success would not rest upon phrases, but upon the +spirit of the nations that composed it; the building-up of a new and +better international order would not be determined by this reservation or +that. Wilson's claim to high rank as a statesmen would probably be more +clear if he had accepted what was possible at the moment, in the hope +that the League would be improved as the country and the world became +better educated.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<h3>CONCLUSION</h3> + + +<p><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352"></a>By the accident of history the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, which he +designed to utilize for a series of social reforms, was characterized by +the supreme importance of foreign affairs. Whatever the significance of +the legislative enactments of his first year of office, he will be +remembered as the neutrality President, the war President, and the peace +President. Each phase of his administration represents a distinct aspect +of his policy and called into prominence distinct aspects of his +character. It is the third, however, which gives to his administration +the place of importance which it will hold in history; not merely because +of the stamp which he attempted to place upon the peace, but because the +two earlier phases are in truth expressive of his whole-hearted devotion +to the cause of peace. The tenacity with which he held to neutrality in +the face of intense provocation resulted less from his<a name="Page_353" id="Page_353"></a> appreciation of +the pacific sentiments of the nation, or a desire to assure its economic +prosperity, than it did from his instinctive abhorrence of war. When +finally forced into war, he based his action upon the hope of securing a +new international order which would make war in the future impossible or +less frequent. In his mind the war was always waged in order to ensure +peace.</p> + +<p>Whatever his mistakes or successes as neutrality President or war +President, therefore, it is as peace President that he will be judged by +history. Inevitably future generations will study with especial attention +the unfolding of his constructive peace policy, from his declaration of +the Fourteen Points to the Peace Conference. In reality his policy of +international service, to be rendered by the strong nations of the world +in behalf of peace and of absolute justice toward the weaker nations, was +developed all through the year 1916. It was then that he seized upon a +League of Nations as the essential instrument. But the true significance +of this policy was hardly perceived before the speech of the Fourteen +Points, in January, 1918. That speech gave to Wilson his position in the +world, as prëeminent exponent of the new ideals of international +relations.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354"></a>What the President demanded was nothing new. The principle of justice, as +the underlying basis of intercourse between nations, has received wide +support at all epochs of history; the cause of international peace, as an +ultimate ideal, has always been advocated in the abstract; the idea of a +League of Nations has frequently been mooted. But it was Wilson's fate to +be ruler of a great nation at the moment when the need of peace, justice, +and international organization was more clearly demonstrated than ever +before in the world's history. Germany's cynical disregard of Belgian +independence, the horrors and waste of the war for which Germany was +chiefly responsible, the diplomatic disorganization of Europe, which +permitted this world disaster, desired by merely a handful of +firebrands—all these tragic and pitiful facts had been burned into the +mind of the age. There was a definite determination that a recurrence of +such catastrophes should not be permitted. The period of the war will be +regarded by future historians as one of transition from the international +chaos of the nineteenth century to an organization of nations, which, +however loose, should crystallize the conscience of the world, preserve +its peace, and translate into international politics the standards of +morality which have been set up for the individual.</p> + +<p>In this transition President Wilson played a part of the first importance. +His rôle was not so much that of the executive leader as of the prophet. +He was not the first to catch the significance of the transition, nor did +he possess the executive qualities which would enable him to break down +all obstacles and translate ideals into facts. But he alone of the notable +statesmen of the world was able to express adequately the ill-defined +hopes of the peoples of all nations. He gave utterance to the words which +the world had been waiting for, and they carried weight because of his +position. Alone of the great powers the United States had no selfish +designs to hide behind fair promises of a better future. As President of +the United States, Woodrow Wilson might look for the confidence of Europe; +there was no European Government which could arouse similar trust. So long +as the war lasted, the President's success as a prophet of the ideal was +assured, alike by his ability to voice inarticulate hopes and by reason of +his position as chief of the most powerful and most disinterested nation +of the world.</p> + +<p>But with the end of the war he faced a new task and one which was +infinitely more difficult. The flush of victory obliterated from the minds +of many in the Allied countries the high ideals which they had nourished +during the bitterness of the struggle. The moment had arrived when +practical advantage might be taken from the defeat of the enemy, and it +seemed madness to surrender such advantage for the sake of quixotic +ideals. The statesmen of Europe once more viewed affairs through the +colored prism of national selfishness. In America, where Wilsonian ideals +had at best been imperfectly appreciated, men were wearied by +international problems and longed for a return to the simple complexity of +the business life which they understood. The President was confronted by a +double problem. He must win from Europe acceptance of his programme, +crystallized in the League of Nations; from his fellow countrymen he must +secure the support necessary if the United States were to continue to play +the rôle in world affairs which she had undertaken during the war, and +which alone would make possible an effective League of Nations. To meet +the difficulties of the task, President Wilson was imperfectly equipped. +He lacked the dynamic qualities of a Roosevelt, which might have enabled +him to carry his opponents off their feet by an overwhelming rush; he was +not endowed with the tactical genius of a skillful negotiator; he was, +above all, handicapped by the personal hostilities which he had aroused at +home.</p> + +<p>In Europe the President achieved at least partial success. He proved +unable to marshal the forces of liberalism in such a way as to carry his +complete programme to victory, and the sacrifices which he made to the +spirit of selfish nationalism cost him the support and the confidence of +many progressive elements, while they did not placate the hostility of +the reactionaries. But he secured the League of Nations, the symbol and +the instrument of the new international organization which he sought. +Thereby at least a beginning was made in concrete form, which might later +be developed, when the force of the post-bellum reaction had wasted +itself.</p> + +<p>At home, however, the forces of opposition proved strong enough to rob +the President of what might have been a triumph. He lacked the capacity +to reconcile his personal and political opponents, as well as the ability +to compromise with the elements that were inclined to meet him half-way. +In accordance with his basic principles he appealed from the politicians +to the people. But here again he failed, whether because of personal +unpopularity, or because of the poor publicity which had been given his +efforts at Paris, or because of the physical breakdown which shattered +his persuasive powers and finally led to his retirement from the +struggle. The vindication which he sought in the presidential election of +1920 was denied him. The country was tired of a Democratic Administration +and gave to the Republican candidate an overwhelming plurality. The sole +comfort that Wilson could take, in the face of the election returns, was +that both candidates had declared for the principle of international +organization and that the most distinguished supporters of the successful +Republican candidate had pledged themselves to a League of Nations.</p> + +<p>The months that followed the President's return from Paris until the close +of his administration thus form a period of personal tragedy. He had +achieved a broad measure of success in Europe, where the difficulties +appeared stupendous, only to have the cup dashed from his lips at the last +moment in his own country. The bitterness of the experience was +intensified by his physical helplessness.<a name="Page_359" id="Page_359"></a> But we should lack perspective +if we made the mistake of confusing personal tragedy with failure. His +work remained uncrowned, but there was much that could never be undone. +The articulate expression of the hopes of the world, which President +Wilson voiced during the war, remains imperishable as a guide to this and +future generations. The League of Nations, weakened by the absence of the +United States but actually organized and in operation, was the President's +work. Whatever the fortunes of this particular League the steps taken +toward international coöperation by its foundation can never be completely +retraced.</p> + +<p>Woodrow Wilson, however, is not to be assessed by his accomplishment. It +is as prophet and not as man of action that he will be regarded by +history. Like the prophets of old, like Luther or Mazzini, he lacked the +capacity for carrying to practical success the ideal which he preached. +But to assume that he must accordingly be adjudged a failure is to ignore +the significance of the ideals to which he awakened the world. Much there +was that was unattainable and intangible, but its value to mankind in the +development of international relations may be inestimable.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Not on the vulgar mass<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Called "work" must sentence pass<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Things done, that took the eye and had the price....<br /></span> +<span class="i0">But all, the world's coarse thumb<br /></span> +<span class="i0">And finger failed to plumb,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">So passed in making up the main account;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All instincts immature,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All purposes unsure,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount.<br /></span> +</div></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="BIBLIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE" id="BIBLIOGRAPHICAL_NOTE"></a>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE</h2> + + +<p><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361"></a>Thus far no adequate biography of President Wilson, covering his career +through the Peace Conference, has been published. The most suggestive is +Henry Jones Ford's <em>Woodrow Wilson: The Man and His Work</em> (1916) which +stops with the close of the first term. The author, a Princeton professor, +is a warm personal and political admirer of the President, but he makes a +definite attempt at critical appreciation. W. E. Dodd's <em>Woodrow Wilson +and His Work</em> (1920) is comprehensive and brings the story to the end of +the Peace Conference, but it is marred by eulogistic interpretation and +anti-capitalistic bias. An interesting effort to interpret the President +to British readers in the form of biography has been made by H. W. Harris +in <em>President Wilson: His Problems and His Policy</em> (1917). W. B. Hale, in +<em>The Story of a Style</em> (1920), attempts to analyze the motives by which +the President is inspired. But the best material to serve this end is to +be found in the President's writings, especially <em>Congressional +Government</em> (1885), <em>An Old Master and Other Political Essays</em> (1893), +<em>Constitutional Government in the United States</em> (1908), <em>The New Freedom</em> +(1913), <em>International Ideals</em> (1919). The two last-named are collections +of addresses made in explanation and advocacy of his plans of domestic and +international reform. <a name="Page_362" id="Page_362"></a>The most convenient edition of the President's +official writings and speeches is Albert Shaw's <em>President Wilson's State +Papers and Addresses</em> (1918), edited with an analytical index.</p> + +<p>For the period of neutrality a storehouse of facts is to be found in <em>The +New York Times Current History</em>, published monthly. The <em>American Year +Book</em> contains a succinct narrative of the events of each year, which may +be supplemented by that in the <em>Annual Register</em> which is written from the +British point of view. A brief résumé of Wilson's first term is contained +in F. A. Ogg's <em>National Progress</em> (1918). More detailed is the first +volume of J. B. McMaster's <em>The United States in the World War</em> (1918), +which is based upon the newspapers and necessarily lacks perspective, but +is comprehensive and extremely useful for purposes of reference. The +clearest outline of President Wilson's treatment of foreign affairs is to +be found in E. E. Robinson and V. J. West's <em>The Foreign Policy of +President Wilson, 1913-1917</em> (1917). The narrative is brief but +interpretative and is followed by numerous excerpts from the President's +speeches and state papers. The tone of the narrative is extremely +favorable and President Wilson is credited with consistency rather than +capacity for development, but the arrangement is excellent. More +comprehensive is the edition by J. B. Scott, entitled <em>President Wilson's +Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers</em> (1918). Johann von +Bernstorff's <em>My Three Years in America</em> (1920) is a well-reasoned +apologia by the German Ambassador, which contains information of much +value; it is not impossible for the critically minded to distinguish the +true from the false. The description of German criminal activities +contained in Horst von der Goltz's <em>My Adventures as a German Secret +Agent</em> (1917), should be checked up with the report of the Senate +Committee of Inquiry into the German propaganda. <em>The Real Colonel House</em>, +by A. D. Howden-Smith (1918), throws useful sidelights on Wilson and +contains valuable material on the activities of Colonel House as +negotiator before the entrance into the war of the United States.</p> + +<p>The best general narrative of America's war effort is J. S. Bassett's +<em>Our War with Germany</em> (1919); it is clear and succinct, beginning with +the early effects of the war on the United States in 1914, and ending +with the Peace Conference. An interesting, but irritating, account is to +be found in George Creel's <em>The War, the World and Wilson</em> (1920), which +is passionate in its defense of the President, and blurs truth with +inaccuracy on almost every page. F. F. Kelly's <em>What America Did</em> (1919) +is a brief popular account of the building of the army at home and abroad +and the organization of industry: clear, inaccurate, uncritical. The most +convenient summary of the organization of national resources is F. L. +Paxson's "The American War Government," in <em>The American Historical +Review</em>, October, 1920, which should be supplemented by the <em>Handbook of +Economic Agencies for the War of 1917</em>, monograph No. 3 of the Historical +Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff (1919). The former contains +many references in footnotes, of which the most important are the <em>Report +of the Chief of Staff</em> (1919) and the <em>Report of the Provost Marshal +General</em> (1919). The published <em>Investigation of the War Department, +Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs</em> (1918) is invaluable +<a name="Page_364" id="Page_364"></a>The most complete information on ordnance is to be found in the report of +General Benedict Crowell, <em>America's Munitions, 1917-1918</em> (1919); it is +an official defense and should be read critically. A graphic picture of +American accomplishments is given in L. P. Ayres's <em>The War with Germany; +A Statistical Summary</em> (1919). The best account of operations in France +is still General Pershing's <em>Report to the Secretary of War</em>, which is +printed in <em>New York Times Current History</em>, January and February, 1920. +It may be supplemented by Shipley Thomas's <em>The History of the A. E. F.</em> +(1920).</p> + +<p>The American point of view on the Peace Conference is set forth +authoritatively in <em>What Really Happened at Paris</em> (1921), a collection +of lectures delivered by members of the American Peace Commission and +edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour. <em>Some Problems of the +Peace Conference</em> (1920), by C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, is an accurate +and comprehensive analysis of the territorial questions settled at Paris. +The British point of view and the most important documents are given in +<em>A History of the Peace Conference of Paris</em> (1920), written chiefly by +British delegates and edited by H. W. V. Temperley. The French point of +view is admirably presented in André Tardieu's <em>The Truth about the +Treaty</em> (1921). An excellent picture of the conflict of interests and the +manner in which they were decided is to be found in C. T. Thompson's <em>The +Peace Conference Day by Day</em> (1920). Robert Lansing's <em>The Peace +Negotiations</em> (1921) is interesting as giving the opinions of an American +Commissioner who disagreed with Mr. Wilson's methods at Paris. J. M. +Keynes's <em>The Economic Consequences of the Peace</em> (1920) contains an +economic analysis which is more trustworthy than his brilliant, but +misleading, picture of the Conference. It should not be read except in +company with the authoritative and accurate <em>The Making of the Reparation +and Economic Clauses</em> (1920), by B. M. Baruch. A clever but superficial +criticism of President Wilson's peace policies is to be found in J. M. +Beck's <em>The Passing of the Freedom</em> (1920).</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 100%;" /> +<h2><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2> + +<div class="figcenter"> +<table style="width:75%;" border="1" summary="Index"> + <tr> + <td> <a href="#IX_A">A</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_B">B</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_C">C</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_D">D</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_E">E</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_F">F</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_G">G</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_H">H</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_I">I</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_J">J</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_K">K</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_L">L</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_M">M</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> <a href="#IX_N">N</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_O">O</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_P">P</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_Q">Q</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_R">R</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_S">S</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_T">T</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_U">U</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_V">V</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_W">W</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_V">-</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_Y">Y</a></td> + <td> <a href="#IX_Z">Z</a></td> + </tr> + +</table></div> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_A">Adams</a>, J. Q., and Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li>Adamson Act, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li>Adriatic coast, Italy's claims on, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Fiume">Fiume</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Aircraft Production Board, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> + +<li>Airplanes, production for army, <a href="#Page_134">134-35</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139-42</a></li> + +<li>Alaska purchased from Russia, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li>Albert, King of Belgium, in Paris, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li>Albert, Dr. H. F., and the <em>Wilhelmina</em>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and German plots, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> + <li>loses portfolio, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Algeciras Conference (1906), <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> + +<li>Alien Property Custodian, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> + +<li>Alsace-Lorraine returned to France, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li> + +<li>American Ambulance in France, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li><a name="American_Expeditionary_Force" id="American_Expeditionary_Force"></a>American Expeditionary Force, no provision at first for, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Pershing sent to France, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li> + <li>plans for, <a href="#Page_124">124-25</a>;</li> + <li>centralization under Pershing, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> + <li>training in France, <a href="#Page_200">200-02</a>;</li> + <li>ports for, <a href="#Page_202">202-03</a>;</li> + <li>supply depots, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> + <li>distribution of supplies, <a href="#Page_203">203-04</a>;</li> + <li>credit due, <a href="#Page_225">225-27</a>;</li> + <li>defects, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Argonne">Argonne</a>, <a href="#Chacircteau-Thierry">Château-Thierry</a>, <a href="#St_Mihiel">St. Mihiel</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>American Federation of Labor, delegates aid in formation of war labor policy, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li>American Protective League, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> + +<li><em>Ancona</em>, torpedoed in Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li><em>Arabia</em>, submarine sinks, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li>Archibald, J. F. J., Dumba makes use of, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> + +<li>Argentine, grain not available for Europe, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li><a name="Argonne" id="Argonne"></a>Argonne, foreign artillery used in, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>plans for advance, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>;</li> + <li>defensive importance for Germans, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</li> + <li>American offensive, <a href="#Page_222">222-23</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Meuse-Argonne">Meuse-Argonne</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Arizona offered by Germany as bribe to Mexico, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li><a name="Armaments_Reduction_of" id="Armaments_Reduction_of"></a>Armaments, Reduction of, guarantees not taken at Paris, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>League Covenant provides, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Armand, Major, discusses separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> + +<li><em>Armenian</em>, submarine attack, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li>Armistice (Nov. 11, 1918), <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>; + <ul> + <li>terms, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Army, General Staff, <a href="#Page_119">119-20</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>American Expeditionary Force, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a> <em>et seq.</em>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200-04</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225-27</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Argonne">Argonne</a>, <a href="#Chacircteau-Thierry">Château-Thierry</a>, <a href="#St_Mihiel">St. Mihiel</a>;</li> + <li>original programme (1917), <a href="#Page_121">121</a>;</li> + <li>Roosevelt's request to command volunteers, <a href="#Page_122">122-23</a>;</li> + <li>Selective Service Act, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126-27</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> + <li>National Army, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> + <li>training, <a href="#Page_128">128-29</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130-32</a>;</li> + <li>cantonments <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a> (note);</li> + <li>supplies, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132-133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134-43</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</li> + <li>democracy of, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> + <li>transportation of troops, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196-97</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Australia, grain not available for Europe, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li><a name="Austria" id="Austria"></a>Austria, Italy's offensive against, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>attempts for separate peace with, <a href="#Page_231">231-32</a>;</li> + <li>treaty, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321-22</a>;</li> + <li>denied right to incorporate with Germany, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Austria-Hungary">Austria-Hungary</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Austria-Hungary" id="Austria-Hungary"></a>Austria-Hungary, + <ul class="IX"> + <li>collapse, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li> + <li>offers to negotiate on basis of Fourteen Points, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li>subject nationalities receive independence, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Austria">Austria</a>, <a href="#Hungary">Hungary</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Ayres, L. P., <em>The War with Germany</em>, cited, <a href="#Page_142">142</a> (note)</li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li><a id="IX_B">Baker</a>, N. D., Secretary of War, as pacifist, <a href="#Page_85">85-86</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117-18</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>delays approving machine gun, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</li> + <li>and Wilson, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> + <li>and coal price agreement, <a href="#Page_166">166-67</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Baldwin Locomotive Works, suspected German plot at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li>Balfour, A. J., Lloyd George and, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_270">270-71</a></li> +</ul></li> + +<li>Baltimore, Democratic convention (1912), <a href="#Page_7">7-8</a></li> + +<li>Banat of Temesvar, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> + +<li>Bapaume, capture of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> + +<li>Bartlett, C. L., introduces bill in House prohibiting sales to belligerents, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li>Baruch, B. M., appointment by Wilson, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> + <li>chairman of War Industries Board, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Belgium, American sympathy for, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson's answer to appeal, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> + <li>relief, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> + <li>effect in America of deportation of civilians, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li>Germans rank United States Army with that of, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> + <li>Hoover in, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> + <li>complaint against treaty, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> + <li>treaty provision regarding, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Belleau Woods, attack on, 214, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li>Benes, Edward, Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovak Republic, and Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li>Benson, Admiral W. S., and Daniels, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li>Bernstorff, Johann von, German Ambassador in Washington, <a href="#Page_41">41-42</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>dismissed, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Bethlehem Steel Company, suspected German plots in plant of, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li>Bethmann-Hollweg and submarine warfare, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li>"Big Four," <em>see</em> <a href="#Council_of_Four">Council of Four</a></li> + +<li>Bliss, General T. H., on Supreme Military Council, <a href="#Page_205">205-206</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Blockade, British blockade of foodstuffs, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>as justification of submarine warfare, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> + <li>effect of submarine warfare upon American ports, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Bolshevik revolution, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> + +<li>Borah, W. E., against treaty and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_330">330-331</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>speech-making tour, <a href="#Page_339">339-40</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Bordeaux, port allotted American Expeditionary Force, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + +<li>Bosch Magneto Company, German intrigue and, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + +<li>Bourgeois, Léon, on committee to draft plan for League of Nations, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li>Boy-Ed, Karl, German naval attaché, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and Mexico, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> + <li>dismissed, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Brandegee, F. B., against treaty and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> + +<li>Bratiano, J. J. C., of Rumania, and Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li>Brest, destroyer base at, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>port allotted American Expeditionary Force, <a href="#Page_202">202-03</a>;</li> + <li><em>George Washington</em> reaches, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Brest-Litovsk treaty, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> + +<li>Bridgeport, German manufacturing company at, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>strikes at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>British Grand Fleet, American battleships join, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li>Brockdorff-Rantzau, U. K. C., graf von, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> + +<li>Browning machine gun, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li>Brusilov attack, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> + +<li>Bryan, W. J., leader in Democratic convention (1912), <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>resigns as Secretary of State, <a href="#Page_53">53-54</a>;</li> + <li>pacifist suggestion, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> + <li>popular with pacifists, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Bryn Mawr College, Wilson professor at, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>Bucharest treaty, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> + +<li>Bulgaria, collapse, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>treaty term regarding, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Burleson, A. S., and Wilson, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Postmaster-General, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Byng, General, at Cambrai, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_C">Caine</a>, Hall, quoted, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li>California and election of Wilson (1916), <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + +<li>Cambon, Jules, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li>Cambrai, German lines broken at, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> + +<li>Canada, Americans in forces of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li>Cantigny, engagement at, <a href="#Page_211">211-212</a></li> + +<li>Caporetto, Italian collapse at, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Foch commands French forces in Italy after, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Carl, Emperor of Austria, desire for separate peace, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li>Carranza, Venustiano, Wilson recognizes, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>protests American expedition, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Carrizal, attack by Carranza's troops at, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> + +<li>Cecil, Lord Robert, on committee to draft plan for League of Nations, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Chamberlain, G. E., and preparedness, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li><a name="Chacircteau-Thierry" id="Chacircteau-Thierry"></a>Château-Thierry, <a href="#Page_212">212-13</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li>Chauchat automatic rifles, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li>Chemical Warfare Service, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li>Chemin des Dames, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Chicago, Wilson speaks at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li><a name="China" id="China"></a>China, American policy toward, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>accepts Japan's Shantung claim, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> + <li>delegates refuse to sign treaty, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Civil War, relations with Great Britain during, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li>Clark, Champ, candidate for Presidential nomination (1912), <a href="#Page_8">8</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and conscription, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Clayton Act, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li>Clemenceau, Georges, treatment of other French delegates at Paris, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>signs plea for American troops, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li>and question of indemnity, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> + <li>opposition to Fourteen Points, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_264">264-67</a>;</li> + <li>languages, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>;</li> + <li>on Council of Premiers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> + <li>helps formulate armistice policy, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li>wounded, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li>and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_286">286-87</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>;</li> + <li>ability to conduct plenary sessions, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> + <li>change in attitude towards Wilson, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>;</li> + <li>and Fiume, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Cleveland, Wilson speaks at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li>Coal, <em>see</em> <a href="#Fuel_Administration">Fuel Administration</a></li> + +<li>Coffin, H. E., chairman Aircraft Production Board, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Colleges, Students' Army Training Corps, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>straw vote on treaty in, <a href="#Page_345">345</a> (note)</li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Colt machine gun, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li>Commerce, British Orders in Council to control, <a href="#Page_42">42-43</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Submarine_warfare">Submarine warfare</a>, <a href="#United_States_Shipping_Board">United States Shipping Board</a>, <a href="#War_Trade_Board">War Trade Board</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Committee on Engineering and Education, <a href="#Page_155">155-56</a></li> + +<li>Congress, Wilson and, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson's appeal for Democratic, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246-47</a>;</li> + <li>and arming of merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_58">58-59</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110-11</a>;</li> + <li>and note to Germany (April 19, 1916), <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> + <li>pacifically-minded, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li>preparedness, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson's speech in Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), <a href="#Page_103">103-05</a>;</li> + <li>announcement of severance of diplomatic relations with Germany to, <a href="#Page_107">107-08</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson's speech (April 2, 1917), <a href="#Page_111">111-13</a>;</li> + <li>declares war, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> + <li>and the army, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> + <li>and conscription, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li> + <li>appropriation for airplanes, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> + <li>Overman Act, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</li> + <li>Lever Act, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li> + <li>proposes control of military affairs, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li>attacks on Wilson's war policies by Senate, <a href="#Page_188">188-89</a>;</li> + <li>Senate and the treaty, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> <em>et seq.</em>;</li> + <li>Foreign Relations Committee meets Wilson at White House, <a href="#Page_336">336-37</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Conscientious objectors, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li>Conscription, <em>see</em> <a href="#Draft">Draft</a></li> + +<li>Contraband, British interpretation of, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Council of Foreign Ministers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> + +<li><a name="Council_of_Four" id="Council_of_Four"></a>Council of Four, <a href="#Page_277">277-80</a></li> + +<li>Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_154">154</a> <em>et seq.</em>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>War Industries Board, <a href="#Page_156">156-59</a>;</li> + <li>food conservation, <a href="#Page_159">159-66</a>;</li> + <li>fuel conservation, <a href="#Page_166">166-71</a>;</li> + <li>Labor Committee, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> + <li>publicity, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> + <li>influence lessened, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Council of Premiers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> + +<li>Council of Ten, experts at meetings of, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>organization of, <a href="#Page_262">262-64</a>;</li> + <li>Supreme Council called, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>;</li> + <li>meetings, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272-74</a>;</li> + <li>personnel, <a href="#Page_264">264-72</a>;</li> + <li>and commissions, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> + <li>becomes unwieldy, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson leaves League committee to attend, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Crillon, Hotel, home of American Commission at Paris, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> + +<li>Crowe, Sir Eyre, on territorial commission, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li>Crowell, Benedict, Assistant Secretary of War, quoted, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> + +<li>Cuba, interest of United States in, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Pershing in, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Cunliffe, British financial expert, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li><em>Cushing</em> attacked by German aeroplane, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li>Czechoslovakia, question of autonomy for Czechs, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> + <li>Germans and Magyars in, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>;</li> + <li>and the League, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Czernin von Chudenitz, Ottokar, count, Austrian Chancellor, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_D">Daniels</a>, Josephus, Secretary of Navy, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li>Danzig, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>treaty provision, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Davis, Norman, financial advisor to Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li>"Daylight saving," <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> + +<li><a name="Democratic_party" id="Democratic_party"></a>Democratic party, Wilson and, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>convention (1912), <a href="#Page_7">7-8</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson makes plea for Democratic Congress, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246-47</a>;</li> + <li>foreign policy, <a href="#Page_25">25-26</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson and machine leaders, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Denman, William, chairman of United States Shipping Board, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> + +<li>Dent, S. H., and conscription, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li>Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, and German propaganda, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> + +<li>Dillon, E. J., on Wilson, <a href="#Page_9">9-10</a></li> + +<li>Disarmament, <em>see</em> <a href="#Armaments_Reduction_of">Armaments, Reduction of</a></li> + +<li><a name="Draft" id="Draft"></a>Draft, Wilson and, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Selective Service Act, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>;</li> + <li>National Army, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> + <li>success of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> + <li>General Staff prepares plans for, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Dulles, J. F., proposes Reparations Commission, <a href="#Page_306">306</a> (note)</li> + +<li>Dumba, Dr. Constantin, Austrian Ambassador at Washington, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>recall requested, <a href="#Page_77">77-78</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Durazzo, navy at, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_E">East</a>, Far, American policy regarding, <a href="#Page_31">31-32</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#China">China</a>, <a href="#Japan">Japan</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Embargo, question of embargo on munitions, <a href="#Page_43">43-45</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li>Emergency Fleet Corporation, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Emery, H. C., on German pessimism in June, 1918, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> + +<li>Enfield rifles, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Entente, American opinion favors, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> Allies, names of countries</li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Erzberger, Matthias, leader of Reichstag revolt, <a href="#Page_229">229-30</a></li> + +<li>Expeditionary Force, <em>see</em> <a href="#American_Expeditionary_Force">American Expeditionary Force</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_F">Faisal</a>, Emir, Arabian representative at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> + +<li><em>Falaba</em> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li>Fayolle, General, French leader, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>supports Foch, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Fiume" id="Fiume"></a>Fiume, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>question of Italian claim, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312-14</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315-16</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Foch, General Ferdinand, Pershing compared with, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on gasoline conservation, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</li> + <li>and American troops, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</li> + <li>made commander-in-chief of Allied armies, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li> + <li>Chemin des Dames, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li>launches counter-offensive (July 18, 1918), <a href="#Page_215">215-216</a>;</li> + <li>political movements supplement victories of, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li> + <li>movement on Sedan, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li>and armistice, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> + <li>and Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> + <li>inspects troops on Rhine, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Food Administration, <a href="#Page_160">160-66</a></li> + +<li>Ford, Henry, sends "Peace Ship" to Europe, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> + +<li>Fore River shipyards, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> + +<li>Förster, Austrian counselor, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li>"Four Minute Men," <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> + +<li>Fourteen Points, Wilson introduces, <a href="#Page_233">233-34</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>discussion of, <a href="#Page_234">234-38</a>;</li> + <li>failure of, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322-23</a>;</li> + <li>Austria-Hungary offers to negotiate on basis of, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li>Germans accept as basis of negotiations, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li> + <li>accepted by Allies, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson goes to Paris to defend, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson's concessions, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>;</li> + <li>territorial settlements carry out, <a href="#Page_323">323-24</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>France, American Expeditionary Force, <em>see</em> <a href="#American_Expeditionary_Force">American Expeditionary Force</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>French army ordered out of Mexico by United States, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</li> + <li>American cause identical with that of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> + <li>messages to Wilson, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> + <li>and Wilson's note (Dec. 18, 1916), <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li> + <li>mission to United States, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li> + <li>French officers instruct in American schools, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> + <li>military disappointment (1917), <a href="#Page_192">192</a>;</li> + <li>morale low, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li> + <li>problem of frontier, <a href="#Page_302">302-03</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306-07</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325-26</a>;</li> + <li>complaint against treaty, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> + <li>Alsace-Lorraine returned to, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Franco-British-American alliance, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li>Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassination, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> + +<li>Freedom of the seas, one of Fourteen Points, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>not discussed at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Freya, German line of defense, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> + +<li><a name="Fuel_Administration" id="Fuel_Administration"></a>Fuel Administration, <a href="#Page_167">167-71</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_G">Galicia</a>, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> + +<li>Gardner, A. P., and preparedness, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li>Garfield, H. A., Wilson and, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Fuel Administrator, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Garrison, L. M., Secretary of War, resigns, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li>Gasoline savings effected by gasless Sundays, <a href="#Page_170">170-71</a></li> + +<li>General Medical Board, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li>General Purchasing Board, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li>General Staff, <a href="#Page_119">119-20</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li><em>George Washington</em>, Wilson's speech on, quoted, <a href="#Page_40">40-41</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>German boat, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson sails on, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson and experts on, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li> + <li>ordered to Brest, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Gerard, J. W., American Ambassador to Germany, recalled, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> + +<li>German-Americans, opposition to Wilson, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson and, <a href="#Page_79">79-80</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> + <li>and the treaty, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Germany, American sympathy, <a href="#Page_37">37-38</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson answer to protest from, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson and mediation, <a href="#Page_41">41-42</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li>Great Britain blockades, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li> + <li>tries to prevent export of American munitions, <a href="#Page_43">43-45</a>;</li> + <li>propaganda in America, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71-74</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> + <li>submarine warfare, <a href="#Page_45">45-46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <em>et seq.</em>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99-100</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106-07</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109-10</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson's reply to submarine threat, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li>sinks <em>Lusitania</em>, <a href="#Page_49">49-50</a>;</li> + <li><em>Lusitania</em> notes, <a href="#Page_54">54-56</a>;</li> + <li>pledges not to sink liners without warning, <a href="#Page_56">56-57</a>;</li> + <li>announcement regarding armed merchantmen, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> + <li><em>Sussex</em> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson's note (April 16, 1916), <a href="#Page_61">61-63</a>;</li> + <li>opinion of United States, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> + <li>secret intrigue in United States, <a href="#Page_74">74-80</a>;</li> + <li>appeal of ninety-three professors, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> + <li>officials dismissed from United States, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> + <li>U-53 off American coast, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> + <li>proposes negotiations (Dec. 12, 1916), <a href="#Page_100">100-01</a>;</li> + <li>peace note to, <a href="#Page_101">101-03</a>;</li> + <li>warning in Wilson's speech (Jan. 22, 1917), <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> + <li>withdraws <em>Sussex</em> pledge, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> + <li>diplomatic relations broken off, <a href="#Page_107">107-08</a>;</li> + <li>overt acts, <a href="#Page_109">109-10</a>;</li> + <li>publication of plans regarding Mexico and Japan, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> + <li>United States declares war on, <a href="#Page_111">111-14</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> + <li>attack (March 21, 1918), <a href="#Page_206">206</a>;</li> + <li>drive along Lys, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li> + <li>fourth and last drive (July 15, 1918), <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</li> + <li>requests armistice, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li>abdication of Kaiser, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li>Reichstag revolt (July, 1917), <a href="#Page_229">229-30</a>;</li> + <li>negotiations with Russia, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson on disposition of colonies, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</li> + <li>delegates at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> + <li>protests treaty terms, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> + <li>accepts treaty, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> + <li>responsibility for war, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Gibraltar, destroyer base at, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li>Godfrey, Hollis, on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li>Goethals, General G. W., head of Emergency Fleet Corporation, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> + +<li>Goltz, von der, plots destruction of Welland Canal, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li>Gompers, Samuel, on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Gore, T. P., introduces Senate resolution regarding armed merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + +<li>Goričar, Dr. Joseph, revelations concerning German intrigue, <a href="#Page_78">78-79</a></li> + +<li>Gough, General, army defeated, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Gouraud, General, supports Foch, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and German drive of July, 1918, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Grandpré, battle around, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> + +<li>Great Britain, relations with United States, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33-34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>American cause identical with that of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> + <li>Orders in Council for control of neutral commerce, <a href="#Page_42">42-43</a>;</li> + <li>United States disputes shipping rights with, <a href="#Page_42">42-43</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65-66</a>;</li> + <li>and Wilson's note (Dec. 18, 1916), <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li> + <li>and Wilson's speech (Jan. 22, 1917), <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> + <li>mission to United States, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li> + <li>British officers instruct in American schools, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> + <li>provides transports for troops, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</li> + <li>American battleships join British Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> Allies, <a href="#Lloyd_George">Lloyd George</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Greece, demand for territory, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>treaty term concerning, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Gregory, T. W., Attorney-General, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> + +<li>Grey, Viscount, British Ambassador to United States, letter concerning League, <a href="#Page_37">347</a></li> + +<li><em>Gulflight</em> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_H">Haig</a>, Sir Douglas, quoted, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> + +<li>Hamburg-American Line, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li>Harvey, Colonel George, mentions Wilson as possible President (1906), <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li>Hertling, von, German Chancellor, <a href="#Page_238">238-39</a></li> + +<li><em>Hesperian</em> sunk by Germans, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li>Hindenburg, General Paul von, retreat on Somme front, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>line broken, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Hitchcock, G. M., Wilson writes to, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> + +<li>Hog Island shipyards, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> + +<li>Holland, agents of General Purchasing Board in, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li>Hoover, H. C., head of Food Administration, <a href="#Page_160">160-64</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>personal characteristics, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> + <li>and morale, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>;</li> + <li>and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Horn, Werner, plans destruction of bridge at Vanceboro (Maine), <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + +<li>House, Colonel E. M., and Wilson, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334-335</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>sent to Europe, (1914-15), <a href="#Page_47">47-49</a>;</li> + <li>personal characteristics, <a href="#Page_47">47-48</a>;</li> + <li>war mission (1917), <a href="#Page_194">194-95</a>;</li> + <li>and appointment of a generalissimo, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li> + <li>and separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li> + <li>sent abroad for armistice plan, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li>on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</li> + <li>and "The Inquiry," <a href="#Page_259">259-60</a>;</li> + <li>suggests territorial commissions, <a href="#Page_275">275-76</a>;</li> + <li>and Council of Four, <a href="#Page_278">278-79</a>;</li> + <li>and League of Nations Covenant, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li>as mediator between Wilson and Allied leaders, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Huerta, Victoriano, German plot to restore, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>at Vera Cruz, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Hughes, C. E., Republican candidate for Presidency (1916), <a href="#Page_91">91-92</a></li> + +<li>Hughes, W. M., Premier of Australia, demands German colonies for Allies, <a href="#Page_288">288-89</a></li> + +<li><a name="Hungary" id="Hungary"></a>Hungary, treaty and, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and League, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Austria-Hungary">Austria-Hungary</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Hurley, E. N., chairman of Shipping Board, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Hurst, C. J. B., legal expert, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_I">Igel</a>, von, German agent, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> + +<li><a name="Indemnities" id="Indemnities"></a>Indemnities, Allies delay raising issue, <a href="#Page_244">244-45</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>question of German, <a href="#Page_296">296-302</a>;</li> + <li>settlement in treaty, <a href="#Page_304">304-06</a>;</li> + <li>flaw in treaty regarding, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> + <li>justice of, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Initiative and referendum in Oregon, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li>"Inquiry, The," Colonel House establishes, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276-277</a></li> + +<li>Interallied Board of Supplies, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li>Irish in United States, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>against Wilson, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Italy, offensive against Austria, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>claims, <a href="#Page_310">310-14</a>;</li> + <li>complaint against treaty, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>;</li> + <li>annexations, <a href="#Page_326">326-27</a></li> + </ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a name="Japan" id="Japan"></a><a id="IX_J">Japan</a>, interest of United States in, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Roosevelt as peacemaker between Russia and, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> + <li>question of immigration from, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</li> + <li>German intrigue concerning, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> + <li>delegates in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> + <li>claims, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315-317</a>;</li> + <li>and League Covenant, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</li> + <li>threatens withdrawal from Conference, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>;</li> + <li>demands acceded to, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Jefferson, Thomas, policy of non-intervention, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li>Joffre, General, J. J. C., with mission to United States, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>battle of the Marne, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Johns Hopkins University, Wilson at, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>Johnson, Hiram, Governor of California, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>as Senator hostile to League and treaty, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339-40</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Jugoslavs, and Wilson, <a href="#Page_228">228-229</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Austria counselled to grant autonomy to, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li> + <li>application of Treaty of London against, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li> + <li>nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> + <li>placed under Italian rule, <a href="#Page_326">326-27</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Julian Alps, Italy's claim, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_K">Kahn</a>, Julius, and conscription, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li>Keynes, J. M., on Wilson, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + +<li>Kiau-Chau, Japan's claim to, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> + +<li>Kitchin, Claude, leader of House, and draft, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li>Klotz, French Finance Minister, and indemnities, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li>Knox, P. C., treaty resolution, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li> + +<li><em>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</em>, voyage of, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_L">Labor</a>, McAdoo's concessions, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and German propaganda, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Labor Department, reorganization, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>national war labor policy, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>La Fayette, Marquis de, emphasis of history on, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>"La Fayette, we are here!" <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Lammasch, Austrian liberal, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li>Lamont, T. W., and Wilson, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on Wilson, <a href="#Page_12">12-13</a> (note);</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Lane, F. K., Secretary of Interior, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> + +<li>Lansdowne, Lord, peace speech (1917), <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li>Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153-54</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson and, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> + <li>proposes ceasing to arm merchantmen, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li> + <li>on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Latin America, United States' relations with, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li>League to Enforce Peace, Wilson's speech before, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Taft president of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson and, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="League_of_Nations" id="League_of_Nations"></a>League of Nations, <a href="#Page_281">281</a> <em>et seq.</em>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>refusal to discuss (1916), <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson and, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>;</li> + <li>Taft and Root pledged to, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson heads commission working on, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> + <li>incorporation in treaty, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287-88</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>;</li> + <li>Covenant completed, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li>mechanism, <a href="#Page_290">290-92</a>;</li> + <li>revised Covenant adopted, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>;</li> + <li>Germany excluded from, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> + <li>opposition to, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> <em>et seq.</em>;</li> + <li>reservations suggested by Senate, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</li> + <li>in operation, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Lever Act, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li><em>Leviathan</em>, <em>Vaterland</em> rechristened, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> + +<li>Lewis machine gun, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li>Liberty Bonds, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184-186</a></li> + +<li>Liberty Motor, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> + +<li><a name="Lloyd_George" id="Lloyd_George"></a>Lloyd George, and Balfour, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>signs plea for American troops, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li>and separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li> + <li>outlines terms of peace (1917), <a href="#Page_232">232-33</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</li> + <li>and indemnity, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> + <li>and Wilson's peace programme, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</li> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_269">269-70</a>;</li> + <li>on Council of Premiers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> + <li>on committee to formulate armistice policy, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>;</li> + <li>delays opening of Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;</li> + <li>and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>;</li> + <li>and "mandatories," <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> + <li>change in attitude toward Wilson, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>;</li> + <li>opposes French annexation of Saar region, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> + <li>and Fiume, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> + <li>on modification of treaty terms, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Lodge, H. C., reservation on Article X of League Covenant, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>opposition to treaty and League, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>;</li> + <li>personal conflict with Wilson, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Lorraine front, Americans on, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> + +<li>Loucheur, financial expert, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li>Louvain library burned, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li>Ludendorff, General Erich von, German leader, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> + +<li><em>Lusitania</em>, Germans sink, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>effect on America, <a href="#Page_50">50-51</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> + <li>notes, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> + <li>German pledge, <a href="#Page_56">56-57</a>;</li> + <li>Germany does not disavow, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + </ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_M">McAdoo</a>, W. G., Secretary of Treasury, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Director-General of Railroads, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> + <li>concessions to labor, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> + <li>and taxation, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>McCormick, Vance, Wilson and, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>heads War Trade Board, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li> + <li>at Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>McCumber, Senator, spokesman in Senate for middle-ground Republicans on treaty, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> + +<li>McKinley, William, and declaration of war on Spain, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>begs for Republican Congress (1898), <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>McLemore, Jeff, introduces House resolution concerning armed merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + +<li>Magyars, and Wilson, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>prevent separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><em>Maine</em>, sinking of (1898), <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> + +<li>"Mandatories," <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> + +<li>Mangin, General, supports Foch, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> + +<li>Mantoux, interpreter for Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_272">272-73</a></li> + +<li>Marne, Foch at battle of the, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Germans reach, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Martin, F. H., on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li>Masaryk, T. G., President of Czecho-Slovak Republic, on Wilson, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li>Max, Prince, of Baden, German Chancellor, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> + +<li>Merchant vessels, submarine warfare against, <a href="#Page_45">45-46</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57-58</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>British arm, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> + <li>question of ceasing to arm, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li> + <li>question of warning Americans from, <a href="#Page_59">59-60</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson asks authority to arm, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Meuse-Argonne" id="Meuse-Argonne"></a>Meuse-Argonne drive, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Browning machine guns used in, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Argonne">Argonne</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Mexico, United States orders French army from, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>problem in 1912, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> + <li>relations (1916), <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> + <li>expedition against Villa, <a href="#Page_87">87-88</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> + <li>German intrigue, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Miller, D. H., legal expert, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Milwaukee, Wilson speaks at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li>Minnesota, election (1916), <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + +<li>Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#Page_30">30-31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103-04</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li>Montagu, financial expert, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li>Munitions, Ministry of, proposed, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li>Münsterberg, Hugo, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_N">National</a> Army, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>cantonments built, <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a> (note)</li> + </ul></li> + +<li>National Guard, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> + +<li>National Industrial Conference Board, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li>National Security League, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li>National War Labor Board, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li>Navy, preparedness, <a href="#Page_143">143-45</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>expansion of, <a href="#Page_145">145-46</a>;</li> + <li>convoy troop ships, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</li> + <li>hunt submarines, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>;</li> + <li>Ordnance Bureau manufactures mines, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</li> + <li>and mine barrage, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><em>Nebraskan</em>, submarine attack on, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li>Neutrality, <a href="#Page_27">27</a> <em>et seq.</em>, <a href="#Page_352">352-53</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>bibliography, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>New Jersey, Wilson as Governor of, <a href="#Page_5">5-7</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> + +<li>New Mexico, promised by Germany as bribe to Mexico, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li>New York (State), election (1916), <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + +<li>New York City, German press bureau in, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson's speech, <a href="#Page_294">294-95</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><em>New York Times</em>, and election (1916), <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + +<li>Nivelle, General R. G., plans French offensive, <a href="#Page_192">192-93</a></li> + +<li>"Non-intervention," policy of, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li>North Sea, American battleships in, <a href="#Page_199">199-200</a></li> + +<li>Notes, protest to British Government, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>warning to Germany of American rights on high seas, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li><em>Lusitania</em> notes, <a href="#Page_53">53-57</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> + <li>to Germany (April 19, 1916), <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + </ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_O">Officers</a>' training camp, <a href="#Page_130">130-131</a></li> + +<li>Olney, Richard, on American foreign policy, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> + +<li><em>Orduna</em>, submarine attack on, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> + +<li>Oregon, question of initiative and referendum in, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li>Orlando, V. E., signs plea for American troops, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>;</li> + <li>on Council of Premiers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> + <li>and Fiume claim, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>;</li> + <li>retires from Conference, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</li> + <li>resumes place in Conference, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Overman Act, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_P">Pacifists</a>, Wilson as pacifist, <a href="#Page_39">39-40</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>organizations, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> + <li>Ford's "Peace Ship," <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li> + <li>oppose preparedness, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> + <li>and Liberty Loans, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Paderewski, I. J., and Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li>Panama Canal, question of tolls, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li>Papen, Franz von, German military attaché, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>letter to his wife, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> + <li>dismissed, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Paris, fears capture (1918), <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Peace_Conference">Peace Conference</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Peace_Conference" id="Peace_Conference"></a>Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_254">254</a> <em>et seq.</em>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson at, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</li> + <li>American Commission, <a href="#Page_248">248-50</a>;</li> + <li>delay in opening, <a href="#Page_256">256-57</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;</li> + <li>lack of organization, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</li> + <li>atmosphere, <a href="#Page_257">257-58</a>;</li> + <li>meets (Jan. 18, 1919), <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> + <li>commissions, <a href="#Page_275">275-76</a>;</li> + <li>German delegates at, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;</li> + <li>bibliography, <a href="#Page_364">364-65</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>"Peace Ship," Henry Ford sends to Europe, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> + +<li><em>Pennsylvania</em>, battleship, precedes <em>George Washington</em> out of New York harbor, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> + +<li>Peronne, capture of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> + +<li>Pershing, General J. J., Mexican expedition, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>commands American Expeditionary Force, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123-24</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> + <li>personal characteristics, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> + <li>calls for replacements, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> + <li>insistent on offensive spirit, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> + <li>and Browning guns, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li> + <li>plea for troops, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> + <li>policy, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li> + <li>policy shattered, <a href="#Page_208">208-09</a>;</li> + <li>confidence in American troops, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>;</li> + <li>on Americans at Soissons, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>;</li> + <li>and armistice, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>;</li> + <li>ready for invasion of Germany, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Pétain, General H. P., Pershing compared with, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>supports Foch, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Philippines, and American foreign policy, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>problem in 1912, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> + <li>Pershing's experience in, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Pichon, Stephane, French Foreign Minister, Council of Ten meets in study of, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Pittsburgh, Wilson speaks at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li>Plattsburg (N. Y.), civilian camp at, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li><a name="Plebiscites" id="Plebiscites"></a>Plebiscites, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Self-determination">Self-determination</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Poland, Austria and Poles, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>claims, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</li> + <li>nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> + <li>independence recognized, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>;</li> + <li>outlet to sea, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> + <li>and League, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Politics, insignificant rôle in Great War, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Democratic_party">Democratic party</a>, <a href="#Republican_party">Republican party</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Pomerene, Atlee, proposes committee of conciliation for treaty, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li> + +<li>Portugal, Germany ranks American army with that of, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> + +<li>Preparedness, <a href="#Page_71">71</a> <em>et seq.</em>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Wilson and, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> + <li>Wood on, <a href="#Page_80">80-81</a>;</li> + <li>of army when war declared, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Princeton University, Wilson at, <a href="#Page_3">3-5</a></li> + +<li>Progressive party, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + +<li>Propaganda, German, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71-74</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> + +<li><em>Punch</em>, cartoon on Wilson's patience, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_Q">Quai</a> d'Orsay, Peace Conference held at, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li>Queenstown, destroyers sent to, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_R">Raggi</a>, Salvago, on territorial commission of Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li>Reading, Lord, refuses mission for separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> + +<li>Red Cross, American help for, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li>Reparations Commission, <a href="#Page_305">305-306</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Indemnities">Indemnities</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Republican_party" id="Republican_party"></a>Republican party, and Wilson, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5-6</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and election of 1916, <a href="#Page_89">89-92</a>;</li> + <li>success (1918), <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Revertata, Austrian emissary, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> + +<li>Rheims cathedral shelled, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li>Rintelen, Franz von, German agent, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> + +<li>Roebling wire-rope shop, suspected German plots in, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li>Roosevelt, F. D., Assistant Secretary of Navy, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li>Roosevelt, Theodore, Wilson contrasted to, <a href="#Page_16">16-17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>as peacemaker between Russia and Japan, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> + <li>on America's policy of non-intervention in Europe, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> + <li>Republicans refuse as candidate (1916), <a href="#Page_90">90-91</a>;</li> + <li>Wilson refuses volunteer command, <a href="#Page_122">122-23</a>;</li> + <li>attack on Wilson's war policies, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li>plea for Republican Congress (1898), <a href="#Page_246">246-47</a>;</li> + <li>on making of the peace, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Root, Elihu, popular demand for membership on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li>Rosenwald, Julius, on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li>Rumania, enters war, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>defeat, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> + <li>demand for territory, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</li> + <li>nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> + <li>boundaries extended, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Russia, Alaska purchased from, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Roosevelt as peacemaker between Japan and, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> + <li>in 1916, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> + <li>wheat supply cut off from Europe, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li> + <li>Bolshevik revolution, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li> + <li>Brusilov attack, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li> + <li>negotiations with Germany, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>;</li> + <li>Brest-Litovsk treaty, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> + <li>problem unsettled, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Ruthenians complain of treaty, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> + +<li>Ryan, J. D., director of aircraft production for army, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_S">S. O. S.</a>, <em>see</em> <a href="#Service_of_Supply">Service of Supply</a></li> + +<li>Saar, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>French claim, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li> + <li>and the League, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>St. Louis, Wilson speaks at, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li><a name="St_Mihiel" id="St_Mihiel"></a>St. Mihiel, battle, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219-20</a></li> + +<li>St. Nazaire, port allotted to American Expeditionary Force, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> + +<li>St. Quentin, American engineering units at, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Hindenburg line broken at, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Scheidemann, Philipp, German premier, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> + +<li>Schwab, C. M., in charge of Emergency Fleet Corporation, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Selective Service Act, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Draft">Draft</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Self-determination" id="Self-determination"></a>Self-determination, principle of, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#Plebiscites">Plebiscites</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Serbia, relief, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>demand for territory, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</li> + <li>treaty term concerning, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="Service_of_Supply" id="Service_of_Supply"></a>Service of Supply, <a href="#Page_202">202-05</a></li> + +<li>Shadowlawn, Wilson's speech at, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> + +<li>Shantung, Japan's claim, <a href="#Page_315">315-317</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Chinese resent settlement, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Shipping Board, <em>see</em> <a href="#United_States_Shipping_Board">United States Shipping Board</a></li> + +<li>Sims, Admiral W. S., commands destroyer flotillas, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>personal characteristics, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</li> + <li>international reputation, <a href="#Page_198">198-99</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Smith, James, Democratic boss of New Jersey, Wilson and, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li>Smuts, General, mission to Switzerland in behalf of peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;</li> + <li>signs treaty, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Soissons, American troops at, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> + +<li>Somme front, Hindenburg's retreat, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> + +<li>Sonnino, S. C., Baron, Italian Peace Commissioner, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>opposed Wilson's programme, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_271">271-72</a>;</li> + <li>languages, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>;</li> + <li>and Fiume, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Spain, war with, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>agent of General Purchasing Board in, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Springfield rifle, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li>Stone, W. J., approves embargo on munitions, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>supports resolutions concerning armed merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Students' Army Training Corps, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li><a name="Submarine_warfare" id="Submarine_warfare"></a>Submarine warfare, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a> <em>et seq.</em>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106-07</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109-10</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> + +<li>Sumner, British financial expert, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li><em>Sussex</em>, torpedoed without warning, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>pledge, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> + <li>feeling in America regarding, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li>withdrawal of pledge, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Switzerland, agent of General Purchasing Board in, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_T">Taft</a>, W. H., attitude toward America's entering war, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>president of League to Enforce Peace, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> + <li>on National War Labor Board, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> + <li>popular demand for membership on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>;</li> + <li>for compromise on treaty, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Tardieu, André, in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on territorial commission, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> + <li>assists House in reconciling Wilson and Allied leaders, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Tauscher, Captain Hans, and German plots, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li>Teschen, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning mines in, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> + +<li>Texas promised by Germany as bribe to Mexico, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li><em>Times</em>, London, Wilson sanctions Britain's position on seas in, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> + +<li>Treaty, flaws in, <a href="#Page_321">321-22</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Senate and, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> <em>et seq.</em>;</li> + <li><em>see also</em> <a href="#League_of_Nations">League of Nations</a>, <a href="#Peace_Conference">Peace Conference</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Treaty of London, <a href="#Page_310">310-11</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> + +<li>Tumulty, J. P., Wilson and, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li>Turkey, collapse, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li>Tyrol, Italian claim in, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>Italy granted territory, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li> + </ul></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_U">Underwood</a>, O. W., motion for ratification of treaty, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> + +<li>United States, foreign policy, <a href="#Page_30">30-36</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>material change due to war (1914-16), <a href="#Page_66">66-68</a>;</li> + <li>blindness to war issues, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> + <li>reasons for entering war, <a href="#Page_114">114-15</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><a name="United_States_Shipping_Board" id="United_States_Shipping_Board"></a>United States Shipping Board, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_V">Vanceboro</a> (Maine), German plot to destroy bridge at, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + +<li><em>Vaterland</em> rechristened <em>Leviathan</em>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> + +<li>Venezuelan crisis, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li>Venizelos, Eleutherios, and Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_273">273-74</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>member of League of Nations commission, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> + <li>on League, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Vera Cruz, occupation of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li>Vickers machine guns, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li><em>Vigilancia</em> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li>Villa, Francisco, expedition against, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_W">War</a> Industries Board, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li>War Labor Policies Board, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li><a name="War_Trade_Board" id="War_Trade_Board"></a>War Trade Board, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> + +<li>Washington, George, warns against entangling alliances, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> + +<li>Welland Canal, German plot to destroy, <a href="#Page_75">75-76</a></li> + +<li>Wesleyan University, Wilson as professor at, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>White, Henry, at Algeciras Conference, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>on Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><em>Wilhelmina</em>, British seize, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> + +<li>Willard, Daniel, on Council of National Defense, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li>Wilson, Woodrow, as an executive, <a href="#Page_1">1</a> <em>et seq.</em>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>elected President, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> + <li>age, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> + <li>early life, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li> + <li>personal characteristics, <a href="#Page_2">2-3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a> <em>et seq.</em>;</li> + <li><em>Congressional Government</em>, thesis, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li>Professor at Princeton, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li>graduate work at Johns Hopkins, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> + <li>President of Princeton, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li> + <li>enters politics, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> + <li>Governor of New Jersey, <a href="#Page_5">5-7</a>;</li> + <li>Presidential nomination, <a href="#Page_7">7-8</a>;</li> + <li>Cabinet, <a href="#Page_13">13-14</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153-54</a>;</li> + <li>appointments, <a href="#Page_13">13-15</a>;</li> + <li>social relations, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</li> + <li>tactical mistakes, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19-20</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247-48</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> + <li>speeches, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> + <li>as phrase-maker, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51-52</a>;</li> + <li>unpopularity, <a href="#Page_19">19-20</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68-70</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245-46</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337-38</a>;</li> + <li>political principles, <a href="#Page_20">20-23</a>;</li> + <li>religious convictions, <a href="#Page_23">23-24</a>;</li> + <li>and foreign affairs, <a href="#Page_25">25-26</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> + <li>and neutrality, <a href="#Page_39">39-41</a>;</li> + <li>and mediation, <a href="#Page_41">41-42</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> + <li>and proposed embargo on munitions, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li> + <li>answer to German submarine proclamation, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li>and House, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</li> + <li>diplomatic struggle with Germany, <a href="#Page_52">52-57</a>;</li> + <li>and right of merchantmen to arm for defense, <a href="#Page_58">58-60</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110-11</a>;</li> + <li><em>Sussex</em> note to Germany, <a href="#Page_61">61-62</a>;</li> + <li>change in foreign policy, <a href="#Page_63">63-65</a>;</li> + <li>on German-Americans, <a href="#Page_79">79-80</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> + <li>and preparedness, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84-85</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117-118</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> + <li>speech-making tour (1916), <a href="#Page_83">83-84</a>;</li> + <li>and Mexico, <a href="#Page_86">86-88</a>;</li> + <li>political strength, <a href="#Page_88">88-89</a>;</li> + <li>reëlection (1916), <a href="#Page_88">88-93</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li>development of international ideal, <a href="#Page_94">94-97</a>;</li> + <li>speech at Omaha, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> + <li>speech at Shadowlawn, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> + <li>peace note (Dec. 18, 1916), <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101-03</a>;</li> + <li>demands definition of war aims, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</li> + <li>speech in Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), <a href="#Page_103">103-05</a>;</li> + <li>severs diplomatic relations with Germany, <a href="#Page_107">107-08</a>;</li> + <li>speech in Congress (Feb. 3, 1917), <a href="#Page_107">107-09</a>;</li> + <li>demand that Congress recognize state of war (April 2, 1917), <a href="#Page_111">111-113</a>;</li> + <li>idealism, <a href="#Page_113">113-14</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>;</li> + <li>policy of centralization, <a href="#Page_119">119-120</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147-49</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152-53</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188-91</a>;</li> + <li>and Pershing, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</li> + <li>and Roosevelt, <a href="#Page_122">122-23</a>;</li> + <li>and draft, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li> + <li>proclamation (May 18, 1917), <a href="#Page_150">150-51</a>;</li> + <li>on coöperation of people, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</li> + <li>and Hoover, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li> + <li>and Garfield, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li> + <li>and revolt in Senate against war policies, <a href="#Page_188">188-189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190-91</a>;</li> + <li>supports appointment of generalissimo, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>;</li> + <li>receives plea for troops from Allies, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> + <li>distribution of speeches in Central Empires, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</li> + <li>Flag Day address, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li>reply to Pope's peace proposals, <a href="#Page_230">230-31</a>;</li> + <li>and question of separate peace with Austria, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</li> + <li>formulates Fourteen Points, <a href="#Page_233">233-38</a>;</li> + <li>appeals to peoples of Central Empire, <a href="#Page_239">239-40</a>;</li> + <li>Germany requests armistice of, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</li> + <li>negotiations with Germany, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>;</li> + <li>responsibility for armistice, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>;</li> + <li>power in situation, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>;</li> + <li>appeal for Democratic Congress, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</li> + <li>appointment of Peace Commission, <a href="#Page_248">248-50</a>;</li> + <li>decision to go to Paris, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251-53</a>;</li> + <li>Roosevelt on, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</li> + <li>arrival in Europe, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;</li> + <li>in Paris, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;</li> + <li>in England, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>;</li> + <li>in Italy, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>;</li> + <li>stands for justice, <a href="#Page_255">255-256</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</li> + <li>popularity wanes, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>;</li> + <li>use of experts, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</li> + <li>in Council of Ten, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>;</li> + <li>and Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</li> + <li>heads League of Nations commission, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</li> + <li>on Council of Premiers, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> + <li>and Council of Four, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>;</li> + <li>difficulties of task, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</li> + <li>and indemnities, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296-97</a>;</li> + <li>and demands of smaller nationalities, <a href="#Page_281">281-82</a>;</li> + <li>and League of Nations, <a href="#Page_282">282-84</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289-90</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343-44</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348-49</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>;</li> + <li>on disposition of German colonies, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>;</li> + <li>original treaty plan, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;</li> + <li>and Clemenceau, <a href="#Page_286">286-287</a>;</li> + <li>British delegates support, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>;</li> + <li>and "mandatories," <a href="#Page_288">288</a>;</li> + <li>returns to United States, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292-95</a>;</li> + <li>failure to convince America of League's value, <a href="#Page_293">293-95</a>;</li> + <li>speech in Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, <a href="#Page_294">294-295</a>;</li> + <li>returns to Paris, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>;</li> + <li>opposes French annexation of Saar region, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> + <li>French attacks on, <a href="#Page_303">303-04</a>;</li> + <li>threatens to leave Conference, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>;</li> + <li>compromises, <a href="#Page_304">304-08</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>;</li> + <li>and Fiume, <a href="#Page_312">312-13</a>;</li> + <li>and Shantung claim, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316-17</a>;</li> + <li>on modification of treaty, <a href="#Page_318">318-19</a>;</li> + <li>cheered upon Germany's acceptance of treaty, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> + <li>returns to United States, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>;</li> + <li>inability to negotiate with Senate, <a href="#Page_333">333-35</a>;</li> + <li>conference at White House, <a href="#Page_336">336-37</a>;</li> + <li>lack of popular support, <a href="#Page_337">337-38</a>;</li> + <li>speech-making tour in West, <a href="#Page_339">339-40</a>;</li> + <li>breakdown, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</li> + <li>and treaty reservations, <a href="#Page_341">341-42</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>;</li> + <li>blame for defeat of treaty, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>;</li> + <li>phases of administration, <a href="#Page_352">352-53</a>;</li> + <li>estimate of achievement, <a href="#Page_353">353-59</a>;</li> + <li>bibliography, <a href="#Page_361">361-62</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Wood, General Leonard, on unpreparedness of army, <a href="#Page_80">80-81</a>; + <ul class="IX"> + <li>at Plattsburg, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li>on failure of American airplane production, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li>Works, J. D., introduces Senate bill prohibiting sale of munitions, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li><em>World</em>, New York, admits Wilson's defeat (1916), <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_Y"><em>Yarrowdale</em></a>, German cruelty to American prisoners on, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li>Yser, battle of the, Foch at, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> +</ul> + + +<ul class="IX"> + +<li><a id="IX_Z">Zeebrugge</a>, naval work at, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li>Zimmermann, A. F. M., German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> +</ul> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Woodrow Wilson and the World War, by +Charles Seymour + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 21877-h.htm or 21877-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/1/8/7/21877/ + +Produced by Anne Storer, Suzanne Shell and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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