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The edition +was the 1886 Cassell & Co. edition. + + + + + +THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS AND SPEECHES + +by Edmund Burke + + + + +Contents + + +Introduction +Thoughts on the Present Discontents +Speech on the Middlesex Election. +Speech on the Powers of Juries in Prosecutions for Libels. +Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments +Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons + + + +INTRODUCTION + + + +Edmund Burke was born at Dublin on the first of January, 1730. His +father was an attorney, who had fifteen children, of whom all but +four died in their youth. Edmund, the second son, being of delicate +health in his childhood, was taught at home and at his grandfather's +house in the country before he was sent with his two brothers +Garrett and Richard to a school at Ballitore, under Abraham +Shackleton, a member of the Society of Friends. For nearly forty +years afterwards Burke paid an annual visit to Ballitore. + +In 1744, after leaving school, Burke entered Trinity College, +Dublin. He graduated B.A. in 1748; M.A., 1751. In 1750 he came to +London, to the Middle Temple. In 1756 Burke became known as a +writer, by two pieces. One was a pamphlet called "A Vindication of +Natural Society." This was an ironical piece, reducing to absurdity +those theories of the excellence of uncivilised humanity which were +gathering strength in France, and had been favoured in the +philosophical works of Bolingbroke, then lately published. Burke's +other work published in 1756, was his "Essay on the Sublime and +Beautiful." + +At this time Burke's health broke down. He was cared for in the +house of a kindly physician, Dr. Nugent, and the result was that in +the spring of 1757 he married Dr. Nugent's daughter. In the +following year Burke made Samuel Johnson's acquaintance, and +acquaintance ripened fast into close friendship. In 1758, also, a +son was born; and, as a way of adding to his income, Burke suggested +the plan of "The Annual Register." + +In 1761 Burke became private secretary to William Gerard Hamilton, +who was then appointed Chief Secretary to Ireland. In April, 1763, +Burke's services were recognised by a pension of 300 pounds a year; +but he threw this up in April, 1765, when he found that his services +were considered to have been not only recognised, but also bought. +On the 10th of July in that year (1765) Lord Rockingham became +Premier, and a week later Burke, through the good offices of an +admiring friend who had come to know him in the newly-founded Turk's +Head Club, became Rockingham's private secretary. He was now the +mainstay, if not the inspirer, of Rockingham's policy of pacific +compromise in the vexed questions between England and the American +colonies. Burke's elder brother, who had lately succeeded to his +father's property, died also in 1765, and Burke sold the estate in +Cork for 4,000 pounds. + +Having become private secretary to Lord Rockingham, Burke entered +Parliament as member for Wendover, and promptly took his place among +the leading speakers in the House. + +On the 30th of July, 1766, the Rockingham Ministry went out, and +Burke wrote a defence of its policy in "A Short Account of a late +Short Administration." In 1768 Burke bought for 23,000 pounds an +estate called Gregories or Butler's Court, about a mile from +Beaconsfield. He called it by the more territorial name of +Beaconsfield, and made it his home. Burke's endeavours to stay the +policy that was driving the American colonies to revolution, caused +the State of New York, in 1771, to nominate him as its agent. About +May, 1769, Edmund Burke began the pamphlet here given, Thoughts on +the Present Discontents. It was published in 1770, and four +editions of it were issued before the end of the year. It was +directed chiefly against Court influence, that had first been used +successfully against the Rockingham Ministry. Allegiance to +Rockingham caused Burke to write the pamphlet, but he based his +argument upon essentials of his own faith as a statesman. It was +the beginning of the larger utterance of his political mind. + +Court influence was strengthened in those days by the large number +of newly-rich men, who bought their way into the House of Commons +for personal reasons and could easily be attached to the King's +party. In a population of 8,000,000 there were then but 160,000 +electors, mostly nominal. The great land-owners generally held the +counties. When two great houses disputed the county of York, the +election lasted fourteen days, and the costs, chiefly in bribery, +were said to have reached three hundred thousand pounds. Many seats +in Parliament were regarded as hereditary possessions, which could +be let at rental, or to which the nominations could be sold. Town +corporations often let, to the highest bidders, seats in Parliament, +for the benefit of the town funds. The election of John Wilkes for +Middlesex, in 1768, was taken as a triumph of the people. The King +and his ministers then brought the House of Commons into conflict +with the freeholders of Westminster. Discontent became active and +general. "Junius" began, in his letters, to attack boldly the +King's friends, and into the midst of the discontent was thrown a +message from the Crown asking for half a million, to make good a +shortcoming in the Civil List. Men asked in vain what had been done +with the lost money. Confusion at home was increased by the great +conflict with the American colonies; discontents, ever present, were +colonial as well as home. In such a time Burke endeavoured to show +by what pilotage he would have men weather the storm. + +H. M. + + + +THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS + + + +It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy to examine into the +cause of public disorders. If a man happens not to succeed in such +an inquiry, he will be thought weak and visionary; if he touches the +true grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to persons +of weight and consequence, who will rather be exasperated at the +discovery of their errors than thankful for the occasion of +correcting them. If he should be obliged to blame the favourites of +the people, he will be considered as the tool of power; if he +censures those in power, he will be looked on as an instrument of +faction. But in all exertions of duty something is to be hazarded. +In cases of tumult and disorder, our law has invested every man, in +some sort, with the authority of a magistrate. When the affairs of +the nation are distracted, private people are, by the spirit of that +law, justified in stepping a little out of their ordinary sphere. +They enjoy a privilege of somewhat more dignity and effect than that +of idle lamentation over the calamities of their country. They may +look into them narrowly; they may reason upon them liberally; and if +they should be so fortunate as to discover the true source of the +mischief, and to suggest any probable method of removing it, though +they may displease the rulers for the day, they are certainly of +service to the cause of Government. Government is deeply interested +in everything which, even through the medium of some temporary +uneasiness, may tend finally to compose the minds of the subjects, +and to conciliate their affections. I have nothing to do here with +the abstract value of the voice of the people. But as long as +reputation, the most precious possession of every individual, and as +long as opinion, the great support of the State, depend entirely +upon that voice, it can never be considered as a thing of little +consequence either to individuals or to Government. Nations are not +primarily ruled by laws; less by violence. Whatever original energy +may be supposed either in force or regulation, the operation of both +is, in truth, merely instrumental. Nations are governed by the same +methods, and on the same principles, by which an individual without +authority is often able to govern those who are his equals or his +superiors, by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious +management of it; I mean, when public affairs are steadily and +quietly conducted: not when Government is nothing but a continued +scuffle between the magistrate and the multitude, in which sometimes +the one and sometimes the other is uppermost--in which they +alternately yield and prevail, in a series of contemptible victories +and scandalous submissions. The temper of the people amongst whom +he presides ought therefore to be the first study of a statesman. +And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means impossible for +him to attain, if he has not an interest in being ignorant of what +it is his duty to learn. + +To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present +possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant +hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greater part +of mankind--indeed, the necessary effects of the ignorance and +levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and humours have existed in +all times; yet as all times have NOT been alike, true political +sagacity manifests itself, in distinguishing that complaint which +only characterises the general infirmity of human nature from those +which are symptoms of the particular distemperature of our own air +and season. + + +Nobody, I believe, will consider it merely as the language of spleen +or disappointment, if I say that there is something particularly +alarming in the present conjuncture. There is hardly a man, in or +out of power, who holds any other language. That Government is at +once dreaded and contemned; that the laws are despoiled of all their +respected and salutary terrors; that their inaction is a subject of +ridicule, and their exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office, +and title, and all the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost +their reverence and effect; that our foreign politics are as much +deranged as our domestic economy; that our dependencies are +slackened in their affection, and loosened from their obedience; +that we know neither how to yield nor how to enforce; that hardly +anything above or below, abroad or at home, is sound and entire; but +that disconnection and confusion, in offices, in parties, in +families, in Parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the disorders +of any former time: these are facts universally admitted and +lamented. + +This state of things is the more extraordinary, because the great +parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to +be in a manner entirely dissolved. No great external calamity has +visited the nation; no pestilence or famine. We do not labour at +present under any scheme of taxation new or oppressive in the +quantity or in the mode. Nor are we engaged in unsuccessful war, in +which our misfortunes might easily pervert our judgment, and our +minds, sore from the loss of national glory, might feel every blow +of fortune as a crime in Government. + + +It is impossible that the cause of this strange distemper should not +sometimes become a subject of discourse. It is a compliment due, +and which I willingly pay, to those who administer our affairs, to +take notice in the first place of their speculation. Our Ministers +are of opinion that the increase of our trade and manufactures, that +our growth by colonisation and by conquest, have concurred to +accumulate immense wealth in the hands of some individuals; and this +again being dispersed amongst the people, has rendered them +universally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable; that the insolence +of some from their enormous wealth, and the boldness of others from +a guilty poverty, have rendered them capable of the most atrocious +attempts; so that they have trampled upon all subordination, and +violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free Government--barriers +too feeble against the fury of a populace so fierce and licentious +as ours. They contend that no adequate provocation has been given +for so spreading a discontent, our affairs having been conducted +throughout with remarkable temper and consummate wisdom. The wicked +industry of some libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few +disappointed politicians, have, in their opinion, been able to +produce this unnatural ferment in the nation. + +Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the present convulsions of +this country, if the above account be a true one. I confess I shall +assent to it with great reluctance, and only on the compulsion of +the clearest and firmest proofs; because their account resolves +itself into this short but discouraging proposition, "That we have a +very good Ministry, but that we are a very bad people;" that we set +ourselves to bite the hand that feeds us; that with a malignant +insanity we oppose the measures, and ungratefully vilify the +persons, of those whose sole object is our own peace and prosperity. +If a few puny libellers, acting under a knot of factious +politicians, without virtue, parts, or character (such they are +constantly represented by these gentlemen), are sufficient to excite +this disturbance, very perverse must be the disposition of that +people amongst whom such a disturbance can be excited by such means. +It is besides no small aggravation of the public misfortune that the +disease, on this hypothesis, appears to be without remedy. If the +wealth of the nation be the cause of its turbulence, I imagine it is +not proposed to introduce poverty as a constable to keep the peace. +If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank +luxuriance of sedition, it is not intended to cut them off in order +to famish the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive +power, there is no design, I hope, to call in the aid of despotism +to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, these +things are not yet professed. We seem therefore to be driven to +absolute despair, for we have no other materials to work upon but +those out of which God has been pleased to form the inhabitants of +this island. If these be radically and essentially vicious, all +that can be said is that those men are very unhappy to whose fortune +or duty it falls to administer the affairs of this untoward people. +I hear it indeed sometimes asserted that a steady perseverance in +the present measures, and a rigorous punishment of those who oppose +them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these +disorders. But this, in my opinion, is said without much +observation of our present disposition, and without any knowledge at +all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this +nation is composed be so very fermentable as these gentlemen +describe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it up, as long as +discontent, revenge, and ambition have existence in the world. +Particular punishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the +State; they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from +the settled mismanagement of the Government, or from a natural ill +disposition in the people. It is of the utmost moment not to make +mistakes in the use of strong measures, and firmness is then only a +virtue when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom. In truth, +inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance. + +I am not one of those who think that the people are never in the +wrong. They have been so, frequently and outrageously, both in +other countries and in this. But I do say that in all disputes +between them and their rulers the presumption is at least upon a par +in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps justify me in going +further. When popular discontents have been very prevalent, it may +well be affirmed and supported that there has been generally +something found amiss in the constitution or in the conduct of +Government. The people have no interest in disorder. When they do +wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the +governing part of the State it is far otherwise. They certainly may +act ill by design, as well as by mistake. "Les revolutions qui +arrivent dans les grands etats ne sont point un effect du hasard, ni +du caprice des peuples. Rien ne revolte les grands d'un royaume +comme un Gouvernoment foible et derange. Pour la populace, ce n'est +jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle se souleve, mais par impatience +de souffrir." These are the words of a great man, of a Minister of +State, and a zealous assertor of Monarchy. They are applied to the +system of favouritism which was adopted by Henry the Third of +France, and to the dreadful consequences it produced. What he says +of revolutions is equally true of all great disturbances. If this +presumption in favour of the subjects against the trustees of power +be not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable +speculation, because it is more easy to change an Administration +than to reform a people. + + +Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the cause, +the presumptions stand equally balanced between the parties, there +seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing who +attempts some other scheme besides that easy one which is +fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account for the +present discontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no +grievance, because our grievances are not of the same sort with +those under which we laboured formerly--not precisely those which we +bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stuarts. A great change +has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the silent +lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought +about in the policy and character of governments and nations as +those which have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions. + +It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings +concerning public misconduct; as rare to be right in their +speculation upon the cause of it. I have constantly observed that +the generality of people are fifty years, at least, behindhand in +their politics. There are but very few who are capable of comparing +and digesting what passes before their eyes at different times and +occasions, so as to form the whole into a distinct system. But in +books everything is settled for them, without the exertion of any +considerable diligence or sagacity. For which reason men are wise +with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the +business of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and +tolerably enlightened judges of the transactions of past ages; where +no passions deceive, and where the whole train of circumstances, +from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is set in an orderly +series before us. Few are the partisans of departed tyranny; and to +be a Whig on the business of a hundred years ago is very consistent +with every advantage of present servility. This retrospective +wisdom and historical patriotism are things of wonderful +convenience, and serve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel +between speculation and practice. Many a stern republican, after +gorging himself with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian +commonwealths and of our true Saxon constitution, and discharging +all the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and +King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and +homeliest job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no +professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments of the +last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there, I +dare say, to be found a single advocate for the favourites of +Richard the Second. + +No complaisance to our Court, or to our age, can make me believe +nature to be so changed but that public liberty will be among us, as +among our ancestors, obnoxious to some person or other, and that +opportunities will be furnished for attempting, at least, some +alteration to the prejudice of our constitution. These attempts +will naturally vary in their mode, according to times and +circumstances. For ambition, though it has ever the same general +views, has not at all times the same means, nor the same particular +objects. A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn +to rags; the rest is entirely out of fashion. Besides, there are +few statesmen so very clumsy and awkward in their business as to +fall into the identical snare which has proved fatal to their +predecessors. When an arbitrary imposition is attempted upon the +subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of +SHIP-MONEY. There is no danger that an extension of the FOREST LAWS +should be the chosen mode of oppression in this age. And when we +hear any instance of ministerial rapacity to the prejudice of the +rights of private life, it will certainly not be the exaction of two +hundred pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her +own husband. + +Every age has its own manners, and its politics dependent upon them; +and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully +formed and matured, that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or +to resist its growth during its infancy. + +Against the being of Parliament, I am satisfied, no designs have +ever been entertained since the Revolution. Every one must perceive +that it is strongly the interest of the Court to have some second +cause interposed between the Ministers and the people. The +gentlemen of the House of Commons have an interest equally strong in +sustaining the part of that intermediate cause. However they may +hire out the usufruct of their voices, they never will part with the +FEE AND INHERITANCE. Accordingly those who have been of the most +known devotion to the will and pleasure of a Court, have at the same +time been most forward in asserting a high authority in the House of +Commons. When they knew who were to use that authority, and how it +was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. +It must be always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman, that a +House of Commons who are entirely dependent upon him, should have +every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. +It was soon discovered that the forms of a free, and the ends of an +arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible. + +The power of the Crown, almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has +grown up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, under +the name of Influence. An influence which operated without noise +and without violence; an influence which converted the very +antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained in itself a +perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the +distresses and the prosperity of the country equally tended to +augment, was an admirable substitute for a prerogative that, being +only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded in its +original stamina irresistible principles of decay and dissolution. +The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary system; +the interest of active men in the State is a foundation perpetual +and infallible. However, some circumstances, arising, it must be +confessed, in a great degree from accident, prevented the effects of +this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable +of exciting any serious apprehensions. Although Government was +strong and flourished exceedingly, the COURT had drawn far less +advantage than one would imagine from this great source of power. + + +At the Revolution, the Crown, deprived, for the ends of the +Revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to +struggle against all the difficulties which pressed so new and +unsettled a Government. The Court was obliged therefore to delegate +a part of its powers to men of such interest as could support, and +of such fidelity as would adhere to, its establishment. Such men +were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common +defence. This connection, necessary at first, continued long after +convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in all situations, +be a useful instrument of Government. At the same time, through the +intervention of men of popular weight and character, the people +possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in the +State. But as the title to the Crown grew stronger by long +possession, and by the constant increase of its influence, these +helps have of late seemed to certain persons no better than +incumbrances. The powerful managers for Government were not +sufficiently submissive to the pleasure of the possessors of +immediate and personal favour, sometimes from a confidence in their +own strength, natural and acquired; sometimes from a fear of +offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, +which gave them a consideration independent of the Court. Men acted +as if the Court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. +The influence of Government, thus divided in appearance between the +Court and the leaders of parties, became in many cases an accession +rather to the popular than to the royal scale; and some part of that +influence, which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of +mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean +from whence it arose, and circulated among the people. This method +therefore of governing by men of great natural interest or great +acquired consideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the +true lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of despotism to +abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure; and to +annihilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on +its own part, and total debility on the part of the people. + +To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and +TO SECURE TO THE COURT THE UNLIMITED AND UNCONTROLLED USE OF ITS OWN +VAST INFLUENCE, UNDER THE SOLE DIRECTION OF ITS OWN PRIVATE FAVOUR, +has for some years past been the great object of policy. If this +were compassed, the influence of the Crown must of course produce +all the effects which the most sanguine partisans of the Court could +possibly desire. Government might then be carried on without any +concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the +dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower sorts. A +new project was therefore devised by a certain set of intriguing +men, totally different from the system of Administration which had +prevailed since the accession of the House of Brunswick. This +project, I have heard, was first conceived by some persons in the +Court of Frederick, Prince of Wales. + +The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to set up +for Minister a person, in rank indeed respectable, and very ample in +fortune; but who, to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation, +was little known or considered in the kingdom. To him the whole +nation was to yield an immediate and implicit submission. But +whether it was from want of firmness to bear up against the first +opposition, or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this +method was not found the most eligible, that idea was soon +abandoned. The instrumental part of the project was a little +altered, to accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more +gradually and more surely to the one great end proposed. + +The first part of the reformed plan was to draw A LINE WHICH SHOULD +SEPARATE THE COURT FROM THE MINISTRY. Hitherto these names had been +looked upon as synonymous; but, for the future, Court and +Administration were to be considered as things totally distinct. By +this operation, two systems of Administration were to be formed: +one which should be in the real secret and confidence; the other +merely ostensible, to perform the official and executory duties of +Government. The latter were alone to be responsible; whilst the +real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed +from all the danger. + +Secondly, A PARTY UNDER THESE LEADERS WAS TO BE FORMED IN FAVOUR OF +THE COURT AGAINST THE MINISTRY: this party was to have a large +share in the emoluments of Government, and to hold it totally +separate from, and independent of, ostensible Administration. + +The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme +ultimately depended, was TO BRING PARLIAMENT TO AN ACQUIESCENCE IN +THIS PROJECT. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a +total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, +connections, and character of the Ministers of the Crown. By means +of a discipline, on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was +to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most +discordant politics. All connections and dependencies among +subjects were to be entirely dissolved. As hitherto business had +gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents +to conciliate the people, and to engage their confidence, now the +method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no +sort of consideration or credit in the country. This want of +natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. +Members of parliament were to be hardened into an insensibility to +pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty sentiments, which +are the great support of independence, were to be let down +gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be +regarded in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to +be avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the King might appoint +one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for Minister; and that +he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first +name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look +on, as if perfectly unconcerned while a cabal of the closet and +back-stairs was substituted in the place of a national +Administration. + +With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any Court might +well be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much +the most flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be +obtained. Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the +country to the personal favour and inclination of the Prince. This +favour would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure +by which it was to be held: so that no person looking towards +another, and all looking towards the Court, it was impossible but +that the motive which solely influenced every man's hopes must come +in time to govern every man's conduct; till at last the servility +became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or +institutions whatsoever. + +How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon +such a project of Government, may at first view appear surprising. +But the fact is that opportunities very inviting to such an attempt +have offered; and the scheme itself was not destitute of some +arguments, not wholly unplausible, to recommend it. These +opportunities and these arguments, the use that has been made of +both, the plan for carrying this new scheme of government into +execution, and the effects which it has produced, are in my opinion +worthy of our serious consideration. + +His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more +advantages than any of his predecessors since the Revolution. +Fourth in descent, and third in succession of his Royal family, even +the zealots of hereditary right, in him, saw something to flatter +their favourite prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their +attachments, without a change in their principles. The person and +cause of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title disowned +throughout Europe, his party disbanded in England. His Majesty came +indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, victorious in every +part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negotiate, +but to dictate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him +from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the +Civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but +definite sum, was ample, without being invidious; his influence, by +additions from conquest, by an augmentation of debt, by an increase +of military and naval establishment, much strengthened and extended. +And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as +from affection there was a strong dislike, so from dread there +seemed to be a general averseness from giving anything like offence +to a monarch against whose resentment opposition could not look for +a refuge in any sort of reversionary hope. + +These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a more +ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national +freedom to which he owed a situation so full of glory. But to +others it suggested sentiments of a very different nature. They +thought they now beheld an opportunity (by a certain sort of +statesman never long undiscovered or unemployed) of drawing to +themselves, by the aggrandisement of a Court faction, a degree of +power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence +or from honourable service; and which it was impossible they could +hold with the least security, whilst the system of Administration +rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution +of their design, it was necessary to make many alterations in +political arrangement, and a signal change in the opinions, habits, +and connections of the greater part of those who at that time acted +in public. + +In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, to +destroy everything of strength which did not derive its principal +nourishment from the immediate pleasure of the Court. The greatest +weight of popular opinion and party connection were then with the +Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt. Neither of these held his +importance by the NEW TENURE of the Court; they were not, therefore, +thought to be so proper as others for the services which were +required by that tenure. It happened very favourably for the new +system, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable +alienation and disgust between the parties which composed the +Administration. Mr. Pitt was first attacked. Not satisfied with +removing him from power, they endeavoured by various artifices to +ruin his character. The other party seemed rather pleased to get +rid of so oppressive a support; not perceiving that their own fall +was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reasons +prevented them from daring to look their true situation in the face. +To the great Whig families it was extremely disagreeable, and seemed +almost unnatural, to oppose the Administration of a Prince of the +House of Brunswick. Day after day they hesitated, and doubted, and +lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place; and were +slow to be persuaded that all which had been done by the Cabal was +the effect, not of humour, but of system. It was more strongly and +evidently the interest of the new Court faction to get rid of the +great Whig connections than to destroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that +gentleman was vast indeed, and merited; but it was in a great degree +personal, and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted in the +country. For, with a good deal less of popularity, they possessed a +far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of +Government; vast property; obligations of favours given and +received; connection of office; ties of blood, of alliance, of +friendship (things at that time supposed of some force); the name of +Whig, dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early begun and +steadily continued to the Royal Family; all these together formed a +body of power in the nation, which was criminal and devoted. The +great ruling principle of the Cabal, and that which animated and +harmonised all their proceedings, how various soever they may have +been, was to signify to the world that the Court would proceed upon +its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any +other into its service was an affront to it, and not a support. +Therefore when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, +the whole party was put under a proscription, so general and severe +as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest officers, in a +manner which had never been known before, even in general +revolutions. But it was thought necessary effectually to destroy +all dependencies but one, and to show an example of the firmness and +rigour with which the new system was to be supported. + +Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig +leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in spite of the services of the one at the +accession of the Royal Family, and the recent services of the other +in the war), the TWO ONLY SECURITIES FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF THE +PEOPLE: POWER ARISING FROM POPULARITY, AND POWER ARISING FROM +CONNECTION. Here and there indeed a few individuals were left +standing, who gave security for their total estrangement from the +odious principles of party connection and personal attachment; and +it must be confessed that most of them have religiously kept their +faith. Such a change could not, however, be made without a mighty +shock to Government. + +To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, +principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great +zeal. Every one must remember that the Cabal set out with the most +astonishing prudery, both moral and political. Those who in a few +months after soused over head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest +pits of corruption, cried out violently against the indirect +practices in the electing and managing of Parliaments, which had +formerly prevailed. This marvellous abhorrence which the Court had +suddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in +conversation through the kingdom, but pompously announced to the +public, with many other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet which +had all the appearance of a manifesto preparatory to some +considerable enterprise. Throughout, it was a satire, though in +terms managed and decent enough, on the politics of the former +reign. It was indeed written with no small art and address. + +In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system; there +first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of SEPARATING THE +COURT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION; of carrying everything from national +connection to personal regards; and of forming a regular party for +that purpose, under the name of KING'S MEN. + +To recommend this system to the people, a perspective view of the +Court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was +exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done +away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from +Court, as Ate was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the +chosen residence of public spirit; and no one was to be supposed +under any sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to +be in disgrace at Court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and +all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realised in a +Monarchy, far beyond the visionary Republic of Plato. The whole +scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, whose +credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty +politicians. Indeed, there was wherewithal to charm everybody, +except those few who are not much pleased with professions of +supernatural virtue, who know of what stuff such professions are +made, for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure +constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking +prose all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began +at last to open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute +their not having been Lords of the Treasury and Lords of Trade many +years before merely to the prevalence of party, and to the +Ministerial power, which had frustrated the good intentions of the +Court in favour of their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the +sealed fountain of Royal bounty, which had been infamously +monopolised and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the +whole people. The time was come to restore Royalty to its original +splendour. Mettre le Roy hors de page, became a sort of watchword. +And it was constantly in the mouths of all the runners of the Court, +that nothing could preserve the balance of the constitution from +being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but +to free the Sovereign effectually from that Ministerial tyranny +under which the Royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of +his Majesty's grandfather. + +These were some of the many artifices used to reconcile the people +to the great change which was made in the persons who composed the +Ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its +constitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with +them, in order so thoroughly to disunite every party, and even every +family, that NO CONCERT, ORDER, OR EFFECT, MIGHT APPEAR IN ANY +FUTURE OPPOSITION. And in this manner an Administration without +connection with the people, or with one another, was first put in +possession of Government. What good consequences followed from it, +we have all seen; whether with regard to virtue, public or private; +to the ease and happiness of the Sovereign; or to the real strength +of Government. But as so much stress was then laid on the necessity +of this new project, it will not be amiss to take a view of the +effects of this Royal servitude and vile durance, which was so +deplored in the reign of the late Monarch, and was so carefully to +be avoided in the reign of his successor. The effects were these. + +In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George +the Second maintained the dignity of his Crown connected with the +liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the +space of thirty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, +abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms; +and thereby destroyed the seeds of all future rebellion that could +arise upon the same principle. He carried the glory, the power, the +commerce of England, to a height unknown even to this renowned +nation in the times of its greatest prosperity: and he left his +succession resting on the true and only true foundation of all +national and all regal greatness; affection at home, reputation +abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. The most ardent +lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate +than to continue as she was then left. A people emulous as we are +in affection to our present Sovereign, know not how to form a prayer +to Heaven for a greater blessing upon his virtues, or a higher state +of felicity and glory, than that he should live, and should reign, +and, when Providence ordains it, should die, exactly like his +illustrious predecessor. + +A great Prince may be obliged (though such a thing cannot happen +very often) to sacrifice his private inclination to his public +interest. A wise Prince will not think that such a restraint +implies a condition of servility; and truly, if such was the +condition of the last reign, and the effects were also such as we +have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the Sovereign whom +we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, +before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face +of this great body of strong and recent experience. + +One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much +employed by that political school, is an effectual terror of the +growth of an aristocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the +Crown, and the balance of the constitution. Any new powers +exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by +the Crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious +jealousy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented course of +action in the whole Legislature, without great and evident reason, +may be a subject of just uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there +may not have lately appeared in the House of Lords a disposition to +some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If any +such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from a power +properly aristocratic, but from the same influence which is charged +with having excited attempts of a similar nature in the House of +Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an +unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and involved in a charge +of the very same nature, could have neither power nor inclination to +repel such attempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords +can no more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings +with regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can +with any sense be called democratical. + +It is true, that the Peers have a great influence in the kingdom, +and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of +property, it is impossible to prevent it, except by such means as +must prevent all property from its natural operation: an event not +easily to be compassed, while property is power; nor by any means to +be wished, while the least notion exists of the method by which the +spirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which it is preserved. +If any particular Peers, by their uniform, upright, constitutional +conduct, by their public and their private virtues, have acquired an +influence in the country; the people on whose favour that influence +depends, and from whom it arose, will never be duped into an +opinion, that such greatness in a Peer is the despotism of an +aristocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge +of their own importance. + +I am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that +word is usually understood. If it were not a bad habit to moot +cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, I should be free to +declare, that if it must perish, I would rather by far see it +resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and insolent +domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon +that quarter. The question, on the influence of a Court, and of a +Peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the most eligible, but +which is the most imminent. He is but a poor observer, who has not +seen, that the generality of Peers, far from supporting themselves +in a state of independent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an +oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abject +servitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of our Peers +were too much spirit! It is worthy of some observation, that these +gentlemen, so jealous of aristocracy, make no complaints of the +power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable) who are always +in the train of a Court, and whose whole weight must be considered +as a portion of the settled influence of the Crown. This is all +safe and right; but if some Peers (I am very sorry they are not as +many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of +Peers and Commons, against a back-stairs influence and clandestine +government, then the alarm begins; then the constitution is in +danger of being forced into an aristocracy. + +I rest a little the longer on this Court topic, because it was much +insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since +frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilst +they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob- +government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto +with little success) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny +in the Nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle of +disunion, of sowing jealousies amongst the different orders of the +State, and of disjointing the natural strength of the kingdom; that +it may be rendered incapable of resisting the sinister designs of +wicked men, who have engrossed the Royal power. + + +Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their +system; it will be necessary to open a little more at large the +nature of that party which was formed for its support. Without +this, the whole would have been no better than a visionary +amusement, like the scheme of Harrington's political club, and not a +business in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful +party, and a party constructed on a new principle, it is a very +inviting object of curiosity. + +It must be remembered, that since the Revolution, until the period +we are speaking of, the influence of the Crown had been always +employed in supporting the Ministers of State, and in carrying on +the public business according to their opinions. But the party now +in question is formed upon a very different idea. It is to +intercept the favour, protection, and confidence of the Crown in the +passage to its Ministers; it is to come between them and their +importance in Parliament; it is to separate them from all their +natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the control, +not the support, of Administration. The machinery of this system is +perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It is +formed on a supposition that the King is something external to his +government; and that he may be honoured and aggrandised, even by its +debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of +enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of +weakening the State in order to strengthen the Court. The scheme +depending entirely on distrust, on disconnection, on mutability by +principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is +impossible that the total result should be substantial strength of +any kind. + +As a foundation of their scheme, the Cabal have established a sort +of Rota in the Court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have +been brought into Administration, from whence few have had the good +fortune to escape without disgrace; none at all without considerable +losses. In the beginning of each arrangement no professions of +confidence and support are wanting, to induce the leading men to +engage. But while the Ministers of the day appear in all the pomp +and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to +the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of +Royal favour, in a short time they find, they know not how, a +current, which sets directly against them; which prevents all +progress, and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and +mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only +serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance. +They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or +to see themselves opposed by the natural instruments of their +office. With the loss of their dignity, they lose their temper. In +their turn they grow troublesome to that Cabal, which, whether it +supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It +is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of Administration; +but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten +members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to +persuade several to continue in office without their leaders. By +this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is +only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power. +Besides, if by accident, or in course of changes, that power should +be recovered, the Junto have thrown up a retrenchment of these +carcases, which may serve to cover themselves in a day of danger. +They conclude, not unwisely, that such rotten members will become +the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient +connections. + +They contrive to form in the outward Administration two parties at +the least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are +both competitors for the favour and protection of the Cabal; and, by +their emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into +the hands of the interior managers. + +A Minister of State will sometimes keep himself totally estranged +from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their counsels, +will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He +will, however, continue in his employment. Instead of suffering any +mark of displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded +profusion of Court rewards and caresses; because he does what is +expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to +keep some form of Administration in being, and keeps it at the same +time as weak and divided as possible. + +However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine that +such persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them, +Administration is convinced of its insignificancy, they are soon to +be convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in +their opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that +neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, +counsel, skill, or union, are of the least importance; but that the +mere influence of the Court, naked of all support, and destitute of +all management, is abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes. + +When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the Cabal seldom +appear in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom +the party entertains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavour +to delude with various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, +and then to quarrel with his friends; among whom, by the same arts, +they excite a similar diffidence of him; so that in this mutual fear +and distrust, he may suffer himself to be employed as the instrument +in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to +destroy him in his turn; by setting up in his place some person in +whom he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves +to carry on a considerable part of his adherents. + +When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections, he +is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous personal +hostility against some of them (such as an attempt to strip a +particular friend of his family estate), by which the Cabal hope to +render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so +contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the +subordinate instruments than to the principal movers. + +As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not +immediately belonging to their corps, so in advancing their own +friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them +to considerable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the +recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible +Ministry: such a recommendation might, however, appear to the world +as some proof of the credit of Ministers, and some means of +increasing their strength. To prevent this, the persons so advanced +are directed in all companies, industriously to declare, that they +are under no obligations whatsoever to Administration; that they +have received their office from another quarter; that they are +totally free and independent. + +When the Faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to +perpetrate, their way is, to select, for the execution, those very +persons to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, +such proceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse; at once +to render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more +dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence +in any appearance of private friendship, or public principle. + +If the Administration seem now and then, from remissness, or from +fear of making themselves disagreeable, to suffer any popular +excesses to go unpunished, the Cabal immediately sets up some +creature of theirs to raise a clamour against the Ministers, as +having shamefully betrayed the dignity of Government. Then they +compel the Ministry to become active in conferring rewards and +honours on the persons who have been the instruments of their +disgrace; and, after having first vilified them with the higher +orders for suffering the laws to sleep over the licentiousness of +the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their +former inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which renders +them completely abhorred by the people. They who remember the riots +which attended the Middlesex Election; the opening of the present +Parliament; and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, +will not be at a loss for an application of these remarks. + +That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its +institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and +responsible offices of the State. They are distributed with art and +judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of +office, and through the households of all the branches of the Royal +Family: so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the Throne; +and on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any +measure, according to their own interests. For with the credit and +support which they are known to have, though for the greater part in +places which are only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all +the influence of the highest posts; and they dictate publicly in +almost everything, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever they +dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the +trained part of the Senate, instinctively in the secret, is sure to +follow them; provided the leaders, sensible of their situation, do +not of themselves recede in time from their most declared opinions. +This latter is generally the case. It will not be conceivable to +any one who has not seen it, what pleasure is taken by the Cabal in +rendering these heads of office thoroughly contemptible and +ridiculous. And when they are become so, they have then the best +chance, for being well supported. + +The members of the Court faction are fully indemnified for not +holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by +the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which +they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous, situations. +Their places are, in express legal tenure, or in effect, all of them +for life. Whilst the first and most respectable persons in the +kingdom are tossed about like tennis balls, the sport of a blind and +insolent caprice, no Minister dares even to cast an oblique glance +at the lowest of their body. If an attempt be made upon one of this +corps, immediately he flies to sanctuary, and pretends to the most +inviolable of all promises. No conveniency of public arrangement is +available to remove any one of them from the specific situation he +holds; and the slightest attempt upon one of them, by the most +powerful Minister, is a certain preliminary to his own destruction. + +Conscious of their independence, they bear themselves with a lofty +air to the exterior Ministers. Like Janissaries, they derive a kind +of freedom from the very condition of their servitude. They may act +just as they please; provided they are true to the great ruling +principle of their institution. It is, therefore, not at all +wonderful, that people should be so desirous of adding themselves to +that body, in which they may possess and reconcile satisfactions the +most alluring, and seemingly the most contradictory; enjoying at +once all the spirited pleasure of independence, and all the gross +lucre and fat emoluments of servitude. + +Here is a sketch, though a slight one, of the constitution, laws, +and policy, of this new Court corporation. The name by which they +choose to distinguish themselves, is that of KING'S MEN, or the +KING'S FRIENDS, by an invidious exclusion of the rest of his +Majesty's most loyal and affectionate subjects. The whole system, +comprehending the exterior and interior Administrations, is commonly +called, in the technical language of the Court, DOUBLE CABINET; in +French or English, as you choose to pronounce it. + +Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain, or the invention +of a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, must be +judged by the appearances which things have worn for eight years +past. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a single public man, +in or out of office, who has not, at some time or other, borne +testimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, +no persons have been more strong in their assertions, and louder and +more indecent in their complaints, than those who compose all the +exterior part of the present Administration; in whose time that +faction has arrived at such a height of power, and of boldness in +the use of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total +destruction. + +It is true, that about four years ago, during the administration of +the Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made to carry on +Government without their concurrence. However, this was only a +transient cloud; they were hid but for a moment; and their +constellation blazed out with greater brightness, and a far more +vigorous influence, some time after it was blown over. An attempt +was at that time made (but without any idea of proscription) to +break their corps, to discountenance their doctrines, to revive +connections of a different kind, to restore the principles and +policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cause of Liberty by +Ministerial countenance; and then for the first time were men seen +attached in office to every principle they had maintained in +opposition. No one will doubt, that such men were abhorred and +violently opposed by the Court faction, and that such a system could +have but a short duration. + +It may appear somewhat affected, that in so much discourse upon this +extraordinary party, I should say so little of the Earl of Bute, who +is the supposed head of it. But this was neither owing to +affectation nor inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the +introduction of personal reflections of any kind. Much the greater +part of the topics which have been used to blacken this nobleman are +either unjust or frivolous. At best, they have a tendency to give +the resentment of this bitter calamity a wrong direction, and to +turn a public grievance into a mean personal, or a dangerous +national, quarrel. Where there is a regular scheme of operations +carried on, it is the system, and not any individual person who acts +in it, that is truly dangerous. This system has not risen solely +from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumstances which +favoured it, and from an indifference to the constitution which had +been for some time growing among our gentry. We should have been +tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never existed; and it will +want neither a contriving head nor active members, when the Earl of +Bute exists no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, +but firmly to embody against this Court party and its practices, +which can afford us any prospect of relief in our present condition. + +Another motive induces me to put the personal consideration of Lord +Bute wholly out of the question. He communicates very little in a +direct manner with the greater part of our men of business. This +has never been his custom. It is enough for him that he surrounds +them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have +a very good excuse for doing all the work of this faction, when they +have no personal connection with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a +party to an Administration, composed of insulated individuals, +without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an Administration +constitutionally impotent, because supported by no party in the +nation; he who contributes to destroy the connections of men and +their trust in one another, or in any sort to throw the dependence +of public counsels upon private will and favour, possibly may have +nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he +be the friend or the enemy of that particular person. But let him +be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is driving hard to +the ruin of his country. He is sapping the foundation of its +liberty, disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity, +weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from +all its importance in the system of Europe. + +It is this unnatural infusion of a SYSTEM OF FAVOURITISM into a +Government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, +that has raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, +without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive +its effects, in much violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and +a general disorder in all the functions of Government. I keep my +eye solely on this system; if I speak of those measures which have +arisen from it, it will be so far only as they illustrate the +general scheme. This is the fountain of all those bitter waters of +which, through a hundred different conducts, we have drunk until we +are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the Crown in the +formation of Ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise to +a system, which, without directly violating the letter of any law, +operates against the spirit of the whole constitution. + +A plan of Favouritism for our executory Government is essentially at +variance with the plan of our Legislature. One great end +undoubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, composed of Monarchy, +and of controls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is +that the Prince shall not be able to violate the laws. This is +useful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at first view, is no +more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defensive. It is +therefore next in order, and equal in importance, THAT THE +DISCRETIONARY POWERS WHICH ARE NECESSARILY VESTED IN THE MONARCH, +WHETHER FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS, OR FOR THE NOMINATION TO +MAGISTRACY AND OFFICE, OR FOR CONDUCTING THE AFFAIRS OF PEACE AND +WAR, OR FOR ORDERING THE REVENUE, SHOULD ALL BE EXERCISED UPON +PUBLIC PRINCIPLES AND NATIONAL GROUNDS, AND NOT ON THE LIKINGS OR +PREJUDICES, THE INTRIGUES OR POLICIES OF A COURT. This, I said, is +equal in importance to the securing a Government according to law. +The laws reach but a very little way. Constitute Government how you +please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the +exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and +uprightness of Ministers of State. Even all the use and potency of +the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no +better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living, active, effective +constitution. It is possible, that through negligence, or +ignorance, or design artfully conducted, Ministers may suffer one +part of Government to languish, another to be perverted from its +purposes: and every valuable interest of the country to fall into +ruin and decay, without possibility of fixing any single act on +which a criminal prosecution can be justly grounded. The due +arrangement of men in the active part of the state, far from being +foreign to the purposes of a wise Government, ought to be among its +very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors of +new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is +nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are no-ways +concerned in it; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult +us in this manner, that, of all things, we ought to be the most +concerned, who and what sort of men they are, that hold the trust of +everything that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of +indifference to the nation, but what must either render us totally +desperate, or soothe us into the security of idiots. We must soften +into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all men +virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to +believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in +public life as in private--some good, some evil. The elevation of +the one, and the depression of the other, are the first objects of +all true policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its +direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived +to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands, but has left +its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the +uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, +is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but +consequentially erroneous in every part of it. + +In arbitrary Governments, the constitution of the Ministry follows +the constitution of the Legislature. Both the Law and the +Magistrate are the creatures of Will. It must be so. Nothing, +indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable consideration of +this matter, than that EVERY SORT OF GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO HAVE ITS +ADMINISTRATION CORRESPONDENT TO ITS LEGISLATURE. If it should be +otherwise, things must fall into a hideous disorder. The people of +a free Commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should +be the result of general consent, cannot be so senseless as to +suffer their executory system to be composed of persons on whom they +have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and +confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the use of which +the very being of the State depends. + +The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of +rewards and honours, is one of the first advantages of a free State. +Without it, or something equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot +long enjoy the substance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying +energy of good Government. The frame of our Commonwealth did not +admit of such an actual election: but it provided as well, and +(while the spirit of the constitution is preserved) better, for all +the effects of it, than by the method of suffrage in any democratic +State whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first +duty of Parliament TO REFUSE TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT, UNTIL POWER WAS +IN THE HANDS OF PERSONS WHO WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, OR WHILE +FACTIONS PREDOMINATED IN THE COURT IN WHICH THE NATION HAD NO +CONFIDENCE. Thus all the good effects of popular election were +supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs attending on +perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvass for every particular +office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble +and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their +representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative +power in making laws; the King with the control of his negative. +The King was intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election +to office; the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refusal to +support. Formerly this power of control was what kept Ministers in +awe of Parliaments, and Parliaments in reverence with the people. +If the use of this power of control on the system and persons of +Administration is gone, everything is lost, Parliament and all. We +may assure ourselves, that if Parliament will tamely see evil men +take possession of all the strongholds of their country, and allow +them time and means to fortify themselves, under a pretence of +giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discovering, whether +they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures will +not be better than their morals; such a Parliament will give +countenance to their measures also, whatever that Parliament may +pretend, and whatever those measures may be. + +Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as +well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude +bad men from Government, and not to trust for the safety of the +State to subsequent punishment alone--punishment which has ever been +tardy and uncertain, and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, +may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal. + +Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the State, they +ought by their conduct to have obtained such a degree of estimation +in their country as may be some sort of pledge and security to the +public that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean +security for a proper use of power, that a man has shown by the +general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, +the confidence of his fellow-citizens have been among the principal +objects of his life, and that he has owed none of the gradations of +his power or fortune to a settled contempt or occasional forfeiture +of their esteem. + +That man who, before he comes into power, has no friends, or who, +coming into power, is obliged to desert his friends, or who, losing +it, has no friends to sympathise with him, he who has no sway among +any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole +importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it, is +a person who ought never to be suffered by a controlling Parliament, +to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and +direction of all our public affairs; because such a man HAS NO +CONNECTION WITH THE SENTIMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THE PEOPLE. + +Those knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly without +any public principle, in order to sell their conjunct iniquity at +the higher rate, and are therefore universally odious, ought never +to be suffered to domineer in the State; because they have NO +CONNECTION WITH THE SENTIMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THE PEOPLE. + +These are considerations which, in my opinion, enforce the necessity +of having some better reason, in a free country and a free +Parliament, for supporting the Ministers of the Crown, than that +short one, THAT THE KING HAS THOUGHT PROPER TO APPOINT THEM. There +is something very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant +with all sorts of mischief, in a constitution like ours, to turn the +views of active men from the country to the Court. Whatever be the +road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion +of the country be of no use as a means of power or consideration, +the qualities which usually procure that opinion will be no longer +cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a State so popular in +its constitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, +and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of +Kings and Ministers, and public men, must be submitted to the +judgment and good sense of the people of England. + + +Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without directly +controverting the principle, to raise objections from the difficulty +under which the Sovereign labours to distinguish the genuine voice +and sentiments of his people from the clamour of a faction, by which +it is so easily counterfeited. The nation, they say, is generally +divided into parties, with views and passions utterly +irreconcilable. If the King should put his affairs into the hands +of any one of them, he is sure to disgust the rest; if he select +particular men from among them all, it is a hazard that he disgusts +them all. Those who are left out, however divided before, will soon +run into a body of opposition, which, being a collection of many +discontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent +enough. Faction will make its cries resound through the nation, as +if the whole were in an uproar, when by far the majority, and much +the better part, will seem for awhile, as it were, annihilated by +the quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy +the blessings of Government. Besides that, the opinion of the mere +vulgar is a miserable rule even with regard to themselves, on +account of their violence and instability. So that if you were to +gratify them in their humour to-day, that very gratification would +be a ground of their dissatisfaction on the next. Now as all these +rules of public opinion are to be collected with great difficulty, +and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the effect, what +better can a King of England do than to employ such men as he finds +to have views and inclinations most conformable to his own, who are +least infected with pride and self-will, and who are least moved by +such popular humours as are perpetually traversing his designs, and +disturbing his service; trusting that when he means no ill to his +people he will be supported in his appointments, whether he chooses +to keep or to change, as his private judgment or his pleasure leads +him? He will find a sure resource in the real weight and influence +of the Crown, when it is not suffered to become an instrument in the +hands of a faction. + +I will not pretend to say that there is nothing at all in this mode +of reasoning, because I will not assert that there is no difficulty +in the art of government. Undoubtedly the very best Administration +must encounter a great deal of opposition, and the very worst will +find more support than it deserves. Sufficient appearances will +never be wanting to those who have a mind to deceive themselves. It +is a fallacy in constant use with those who would level all things, +and confound right with wrong, to insist upon the inconveniences +which are attached to every choice, without taking into +consideration the different weight and consequence of those +inconveniences. The question is not concerning absolute discontent +or perfect satisfaction in Government, neither of which can be pure +and unmixed at any time or upon any system. The controversy is +about that degree of good-humour in the people, which may possibly +be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. While some +politicians may be waiting to know whether the sense of every +individual be against them, accurately distinguishing the vulgar +from the better sort, drawing lines between the enterprises of a +faction and the efforts of a people, they may chance to see the +Government, which they are so nicely weighing, and dividing, and +distinguishing, tumble to the ground in the midst of their wise +deliberation. Prudent men, when so great an object as the security +of Government, or even its peace, is at stake, will not run the risk +of a decision which may be fatal to it. They who can read the +political sky will seen a hurricane in a cloud no bigger than a hand +at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the first +harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. +They are a matter incapable of exact definition. But, though no man +can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light +and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distinguishable. Nor will +it be impossible for a Prince to find out such a mode of government, +and such persons to administer it, as will give a great degree of +content to his people, without any curious and anxious research for +that abstract, universal, perfect harmony, which, while he is +seeking, he abandons those means of ordinary tranquillity which are +in his power without any research at all. + +It is not more the duty than it is the interest of a Prince to aim +at giving tranquillity to his Government. If those who advise him +may have an interest in disorder and confusion. If the opinion of +the people is against them, they will naturally wish that it should +have no prevalence. Here it is that the people must on their part +show themselves sensible of their own value. Their whole +importance, in the first instance, and afterwards their whole +freedom, is at stake. Their freedom cannot long survive their +importance. Here it is that the natural strength of the kingdom, +the great peers, the leading landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants +and manufacturers, the substantial yeomanry, must interpose, to +rescue their Prince, themselves, and their posterity. + +We are at present at issue upon this point. We are in the great +crisis of this contention, and the part which men take, one way or +other, will serve to discriminate their characters and their +principles. Until the matter is decided, the country will remain in +its present confusion. For while a system of Administration is +attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of the people, and not +conformable to the plan of their Government, everything must +necessarily be disordered for a time, until this system destroys the +constitution, or the constitution gets the better of this system. + +There is, in my opinion, a peculiar venom and malignity in this +political distemper beyond any that I have heard or read of. In +former lines the projectors of arbitrary Government attacked only +the liberties of their country, a design surely mischievous enough +to have satisfied a mind of the most unruly ambition. But a system +unfavourable to freedom may be so formed as considerably to exalt +the grandeur of the State, and men may find in the pride and +splendour of that prosperity some sort of consolation for the loss +of their solid privileges. Indeed, the increase of the power of the +State has often been urged by artful men, as a pretext for some +abridgment of the public liberty. But the scheme of the junto under +consideration not only strikes a palsy into every nerve of our free +constitution, but in the same degree benumbs and stupefies the whole +executive power, rendering Government in all its grand operations +languid, uncertain, ineffective, making Ministers fearful of +attempting, and incapable of executing, any useful plan of domestic +arrangement, or of foreign politics. It tends to produce neither +the security of a free Government, nor the energy of a Monarchy that +is absolute. Accordingly, the Crown has dwindled away in proportion +to the unnatural and turgid growth of this excrescence on the Court. + +The interior Ministry are sensible that war is a situation which +sets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people, and they +well know that the beginning of the importance of the people must be +the end of theirs. For this reason they discover upon all occasions +the utmost fear of everything which by possibility may lead to such +an event. I do not mean that they manifest any of that pious fear +which is backward to commit the safety of the country to the dubious +experiment of war. Such a fear, being the tender sensation of +virtue, excited, as it is regulated, by reason, frequently shows +itself in a seasonable boldness, which keeps danger at a distance, +by seeming to despise it. Their fear betrays to the first glance of +the eye its true cause and its real object. Foreign powers, +confident in the knowledge of their character, have not scrupled to +violate the most solemn treaties; and, in defiance of them, to make +conquests in the midst of a general peace, and in the heart of +Europe. Such was the conquest of Corsica, by the professed enemies +of the freedom of mankind, in defiance of those who were formerly +its professed defenders. We have had just claims upon the same +powers--rights which ought to have been sacred to them as well as to +us, as they had their origin in our lenity and generosity towards +France and Spain in the day of their great humiliation. Such I call +the ransom of Manilla, and the demand on France for the East India +prisoners. But these powers put a just confidence in their resource +of the double Cabinet. These demands (one of them, at least) are +hastening fast towards an acquittal by prescription. Oblivion +begins to spread her cobwebs over all our spirited remonstrances. +Some of the most valuable branches of our trade are also on the +point of perishing from the same cause. I do not mean those +branches which bear without the hand of the vine-dresser; I mean +those which the policy of treaties had formerly secured to us; I +mean to mark and distinguish the trade of Portugal, the loss of +which, and the power of the Cabal, have one and the same era. + +If, by any chance, the Ministers who stand before the curtain +possess or affect any spirit, it makes little or no impression. +Foreign Courts and Ministers, who were among the first to discover +and to profit by this invention of the DOUBLE CABINET, attended very +little to their remonstrances. They know that those shadows of +Ministers have nothing to do in the ultimate disposal of things. +Jealousies and animosities are sedulously nourished in the outward +Administration, and have been even considered as a causa sine qua +non in its constitution: thence foreign Courts have a certainty, +that nothing can be done by common counsel in this nation. If one +of those Ministers officially takes up a business with spirit, it +serves only the better to signalise the meanness of the rest, and +the discord of them all. His colleagues in office are in haste to +shake him off, and to disclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of +this nature was that astonishing transaction, in which Lord +Rochford, our Ambassador at Paris, remonstrated against the attempt +upon Corsica, in consequence of a direct authority from Lord +Shelburne. This remonstrance the French Minister treated with the +contempt that was natural; as he was assured, from the Ambassador of +his Court to ours, that these orders of Lord Shelburne were not +supported by the rest of the (I had like to have said British) +Administration. Lord Rochford, a man of spirit, could not endure +this situation. The consequences were, however, curious. He +returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger. Lord Shelburne, +who gave the orders, is obliged to give up the seals. Lord +Rochford, who obeyed these orders, receives them. He goes, however, +into another department of the same office, that he might not be +obliged officially to acquiesce in one situation, under what he had +officially remonstrated against in another. At Paris, the Duke of +Choiseul considered this office arrangement as a compliment to him: +here it was spoke of as an attention to the delicacy of Lord +Rochford. But whether the compliment was to one or both, to this +nation it was the same. By this transaction the condition of our +Court lay exposed in all its nakedness. Our office correspondence +has lost all pretence to authenticity; British policy is brought +into derision in those nations, that a while ago trembled at the +power of our arms, whilst they looked up with confidence to the +equity, firmness, and candour, which shone in all our negotiations. +I represent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been +universally received. + + +Such has been the aspect of our foreign politics under the influence +of a DOUBLE CABINET. With such an arrangement at Court, it is +impossible it should have been otherwise. Nor is it possible that +this scheme should have a better effect upon the government of our +dependencies, the first, the dearest, and most delicate objects of +the interior policy of this empire. The Colonies know that +Administration is separated from the Court, divided within itself, +and detested by the nation. The double Cabinet has, in both the +parts of it, shown the most malignant dispositions towards them, +without being able to do them the smallest mischief. + +They are convinced, by sufficient experience, that no plan, either +of lenity or rigour, can be pursued with uniformity and +perseverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great +Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendship nor +apprehension from enmity. They look to themselves, and their own +arrangements. They grow every day into alienation from this +country; and whilst they are becoming disconnected with our +Government, we have not the consolation to find that they are even +friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal the futility, +the weakness, the rashness, the timidity, the perpetual +contradiction, in the management of our affairs in that part of the +world. A volume might be written on this melancholy subject; but it +were better to leave it entirely to the reflections of the reader +himself, than not to treat it in the extent it deserves. + +In what manner our domestic economy is affected by this system, it +is needless to explain. It is the perpetual subject of their own +complaints. + +The Court party resolve the whole into faction. Having said +something before upon this subject, I shall only observe here, that, +when they give this account of the prevalence of faction, they +present no very favourable aspect of the confidence of the people in +their own Government. They may be assured, that however they amuse +themselves with a variety of projects for substituting something +else in the place of that great and only foundation of Government, +the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their +condition worse. When men imagine that their food is only a cover +for poison, and when they neither love nor trust the hand that +serves it, it is not the name of the roast beef of Old England that +will persuade them to sit down to the table that is spread for them. +When the people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular +assemblies, are perverted from the ends of their institution, they +find in those names of degenerated establishments only new motives +to discontent. Those bodies, which, when full of life and beauty, +lay in their arms and were their joy and comfort; when dead and +putrid, become but the more loathsome from remembrance of former +endearments. A sullen gloom, and furious disorder, prevail by fits: +the nation loses its relish for peace and prosperity, as it did in +that season of fulness which opened our troubles in the time of +Charles the First. A species of men to whom a state of order would +become a sentence of obscurity, are nourished into a dangerous +magnitude by the heat of intestine disturbances; and it is no wonder +that, by a sort of sinister piety, they cherish, in their turn, the +disorders which are the parents of all their consequence. +Superficial observers consider such persons as the cause of the +public uneasiness, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the +effect of it. Good men look upon this distracted scene with sorrow +and indignation. Their hands are tied behind them. They are +despoiled of all the power which might enable them to reconcile the +strength of Government with the rights of the people. They stand in +a most distressing alternative. But in the election among evils +they hope better things from temporary confusion, than from +established servitude. In the mean time, the voice of law is not to +be heard. Fierce licentiousness begets violent restraints. The +military arm is the sole reliance; and then, call your constitution +what you please, it is the sword that governs. The civil power, +like every other that calls in the aid of an ally stronger than +itself, perishes by the assistance it receives. But the contrivers +of this scheme of Government will not trust solely to the military +power, because they are cunning men. Their restless and crooked +spirit drives them to rake in the dirt of every kind of expedient. +Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour to raise divisions +amongst them. One mob is hired to destroy another; a procedure +which at once encourages the boldness of the populace, and justly +increases their discontent. Men become pensioners of state on +account of their abilities in the array of riot, and the discipline +of confusion. Government is put under the disgraceful necessity of +protecting from the severity of the laws that very licentiousness, +which the laws had been before violated to repress. Everything +partakes of the original disorder. Anarchy predominates without +freedom, and servitude without submission or subordination. These +are the consequences inevitable to our public peace, from the scheme +of rendering the executory Government at once odious and feeble; of +freeing Administration from the constitutional and salutary control +of Parliament, and inventing for it a new control, unknown to the +constitution, an INTERIOR Cabinet; which brings the whole body of +Government into confusion and contempt. + + +After having stated, as shortly as I am able, the effects of this +system on our foreign affairs, on the policy of our Government with +regard to our dependencies, and on the interior economy of the +Commonwealth; there remains only, in this part of my design, to say +something of the grand principle which first recommended this system +at Court. The pretence was to prevent the King from being enslaved +by a faction, and made a prisoner in his closet. This scheme might +have been expected to answer at least its own end, and to indemnify +the King, in his personal capacity, for all the confusion into which +it has thrown his Government. But has it in reality answered this +purpose? I am sure, if it had, every affectionate subject would +have one motive for enduring with patience all the evils which +attend it. + +In order to come at the truth in this matter, it may not be amiss to +consider it somewhat in detail. I speak here of the King, and not +of the Crown; the interests of which we have already touched. +Independent of that greatness which a King possesses merely by being +a representative of the national dignity, the things in which he may +have an individual interest seem to be these: wealth accumulated; +wealth spent in magnificence, pleasure, or beneficence; personal +respect and attention; and above all, private ease and repose of +mind. These compose the inventory of prosperous circumstances, +whether they regard a Prince or a subject; their enjoyments +differing only in the scale upon which they are formed. + +Suppose then we were to ask, whether the King has been richer than +his predecessors in accumulated wealth, since the establishment of +the plan of Favouritism? I believe it will be found that the +picture of royal indigence which our Court has presented until this +year, has been truly humiliating. Nor has it been relieved from +this unseemly distress, but by means which have hazarded the +affection of the people, and shaken their confidence in Parliament. +If the public treasures had been exhausted in magnificence and +splendour, this distress would have been accounted for, and in some +measure justified. Nothing would be more unworthy of this nation, +than with a mean and mechanical rule, to mete out the splendour of +the Crown. Indeed, I have found very few persons disposed to so +ungenerous a procedure. But the generality of people, it must be +confessed, do feel a good deal mortified, when they compare the +wants of the Court with its expenses. They do not behold the cause +of this distress in any part of the apparatus of Royal magnificence. +In all this, they see nothing but the operations of parsimony, +attended with all the consequences of profusion. Nothing expended, +nothing saved. Their wonder is increased by their knowledge, that +besides the revenue settled on his Majesty's Civil List to the +amount of 800,000 pounds a year, he has a farther aid, from a large +pension list, near 90,000 pounds a year, in Ireland; from the +produce of the Duchy of Lancaster (which we are told has been +greatly improved); from the revenue of the Duchy of Cornwall; from +the American quit-rents; from the four and a half per cent. duty in +the Leeward Islands; this last worth to be sure considerably more +than 40,000 pounds a year. The whole is certainly not much short of +a million annually. + +These are revenues within the knowledge and cognizance of our +national Councils. We have no direct right to examine into the +receipts from his Majesty's German Dominions, and the Bishopric of +Osnaburg. This is unquestionably true. But that which is not +within the province of Parliament, is yet within the sphere of every +man's own reflection. If a foreign Prince resided amongst us, the +state of his revenues could not fail of becoming the subject of our +speculation. Filled with an anxious concern for whatever regards +the welfare of our Sovereign, it is impossible, in considering the +miserable circumstances into which he has been brought, that this +obvious topic should be entirely passed over. There is an opinion +universal, that these revenues produce something not inconsiderable, +clear of all charges and establishments. This produce the people do +not believe to be hoarded, nor perceive to be spent. It is +accounted for in the only manner it can, by supposing that it is +drawn away, for the support of that Court faction, which, whilst it +distresses the nation, impoverishes the Prince in every one of his +resources. I once more caution the reader, that I do not urge this +consideration concerning the foreign revenue, as if I supposed we +had a direct right to examine into the expenditure of any part of +it; but solely for the purpose of showing how little this system of +Favouritism has been advantageous to the Monarch himself; which, +without magnificence, has sunk him into a state of unnatural +poverty; at the same time that he possessed every means of +affluence, from ample revenues, both in this country and in other +parts of his dominions. + +Has this system provided better for the treatment becoming his high +and sacred character, and secured the King from those disgusts +attached to the necessity of employing men who are not personally +agreeable? This is a topic upon which for many reasons I could wish +to be silent; but the pretence of securing against such causes of +uneasiness, is the corner-stone of the Court party. It has however +so happened, that if I were to fix upon any one point, in which this +system has been more particularly and shamefully blameable, the +effects which it has produced would justify me in choosing for that +point its tendency to degrade the personal dignity of the Sovereign, +and to expose him to a thousand contradictions and mortifications. +It is but too evident in what manner these projectors of Royal +greatness have fulfilled all their magnificent promises. Without +recapitulating all the circumstances of the reign, every one of +which is more or less a melancholy proof of the truth of what I have +advanced, let us consider the language of the Court but a few years +ago, concerning most of the persons now in the external +Administration: let me ask, whether any enemy to the personal +feelings of the Sovereign, could possibly contrive a keener +instrument of mortification, and degradation of all dignity, than +almost every part and member of the present arrangement? Nor, in +the whole course of our history, has any compliance with the will of +the people ever been known to extort from any Prince a greater +contradiction to all his own declared affections and dislikes, than +that which is now adopted, in direct opposition to every thing the +people approve and desire. + +An opinion prevails, that greatness has been more than once advised +to submit to certain condescensions towards individuals, which have +been denied to the entreaties of a nation. For the meanest and most +dependent instrument of this system knows, that there are hours when +its existence may depend upon his adherence to it; and he takes his +advantage accordingly. Indeed it is a law of nature, that whoever +is necessary to what we have made our object, is sure, in some way, +or in some time or other, to become our master. All this however is +submitted to, in order to avoid that monstrous evil of governing in +concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it seems to be laid +down as a maxim, that a King has some sort of interest in giving +uneasiness to his subjects: that all who are pleasing to them, are +to be of course disagreeable to him: that as soon as the persons +who are odious at Court are known to be odious to the people, it is +snatched at as a lucky occasion of showering down upon them all +kinds of emoluments and honours. None are considered as well- +wishers to the Crown, but those who advised to some unpopular course +of action; none capable of serving it, but those who are obliged to +call at every instant upon all its power for the safety of their +lives. None are supposed to be fit priests in the temple of +Government, but the persons who are compelled to fly into it for +sanctuary. Such is the effect of this refined project; such is ever +the result of all the contrivances which are used to free men from +the servitude of their reason, and from the necessity of ordering +their affairs according to their evident interests. These +contrivances oblige them to run into a real and ruinous servitude, +in order to avoid a supposed restraint that might be attended with +advantage. + +If therefore this system has so ill answered its own grand pretence +of saving the King from the necessity of employing persons +disagreeable to him, has it given more peace and tranquillity to his +Majesty's private hours? No, most certainly. The father of his +people cannot possibly enjoy repose, while his family is in such a +state of distraction. Then what has the Crown or the King profited +by all this fine-wrought scheme? Is he more rich, or more splendid, +or more powerful, or more at his ease, by so many labours and +contrivances? Have they not beggared his Exchequer, tarnished the +splendour of his Court, sunk his dignity, galled his feelings, +discomposed the whole order and happiness of his private life? + +It will be very hard, I believe, to state in what respect the King +has profited by that faction which presumptuously choose to call +themselves HIS FRIENDS. + +If particular men had grown into an attachment, by the distinguished +honour of the society of their Sovereign, and, by being the +partakers of his amusements, came sometimes to prefer the +gratification of his personal inclinations to the support of his +high character, the thing would be very natural, and it would be +excusable enough. But the pleasant part of the story is, that these +KING'S FRIENDS have no more ground for usurping such a title, than a +resident freeholder in Cumberland or in Cornwall. They are only +known to their Sovereign by kissing his hand, for the offices, +pensions, and grants into which they have deceived his benignity. +May no storm ever come, which will put the firmness of their +attachment to the proof; and which, in the midst of confusions and +terrors, and sufferings, may demonstrate the eternal difference +between a true and severe friend to the Monarchy, and a slippery +sycophant of the Court; Quantum infido scurrae distabit amicus! + + +So far I have considered the effect of the Court system, chiefly as +it operates upon the executive Government, on the temper of the +people and on the happiness of the Sovereign. It remains that we +should consider, with a little attention, its operation upon +Parliament. + +Parliament was indeed the great object of all these politics, the +end at which they aimed, as well as the instrument by which they +were to operate. But, before Parliament could be made subservient +to a system, by which it was to be degraded from the dignity of a +national council, into a mere member of the Court, it must be +greatly changed from its original character. + +In speaking of this body, I have my eye chiefly on the House of +Commons. I hope I shall be indulged in a few observations on the +nature and character of that assembly; not with regard to its LEGAL +FORM AND POWER, but to its SPIRIT, and to the purposes it is meant +to answer in the constitution. + +The House of Commons was supposed originally to be NO PART OF THE +STANDING GOVERNMENT OF THIS COUNTRY. It was considered as a +control, issuing immediately from the people, and speedily to be +resolved into the mass from whence it arose. In this respect it was +in the higher part of Government what juries are in the lower. The +capacity of a magistrate being transitory, and that of a citizen +permanent, the latter capacity it was hoped would of course +preponderate in all discussions, not only between the people and the +standing authority of the Crown, but between the people and the +fleeting authority of the House of Commons itself. It was hoped +that, being of a middle nature between subject and Government, they +would feel with a more tender and a nearer interest everything that +concerned the people, than the other remoter and more permanent +parts of Legislature. + +Whatever alterations time and the necessary accommodation of +business may have introduced, this character can never be sustained, +unless the House of Commons shall be made to bear some stamp of the +actual disposition of the people at large. It would (among public +misfortunes) be an evil more natural and tolerable, that the House +of Commons should be infected with every epidemical frenzy of the +people, as this would indicate some consanguinity, some sympathy of +nature with their constituents, than that they should in all cases +be wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out +of doors. By this want of sympathy they would cease to be a House +of Commons. For it is not the derivation of the power of that House +from the people, which makes it in a distinct sense their +representative. The King is the representative of the people; so +are the Lords; so are the Judges. They all are trustees for the +people, as well as the Commons; because no power is given for the +sole sake of the holder; and although Government certainly is an +institution of Divine authority, yet its forms, and the persons who +administer it, all originate from the people. + +A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteristical +distinction of a popular representative. This belongs equally to +all parts of Government, and in all forms. The virtue, spirit, and +essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express +image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a +control upon the people, as of late it has been taught, by a +doctrine of the most pernicious tendency. It was designed as a +control FOR the people. Other institutions have been formed for the +purpose of checking popular excesses; and they are, I apprehend, +fully adequate to their object. If not, they ought to be made so. +The House of Commons, as it was never intended for the support of +peace and subordination, is miserably appointed for that service; +having no stronger weapon than its Mace, and no better officer than +its Serjeant-at-Arms, which it can command of its own proper +authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial +magistracy; an anxious care of public money, an openness, +approaching towards facility, to public complaint; these seem to be +the true characteristics of a House of Commons. But an addressing +House of Commons, and a petitioning nation; a House of Commons full +of confidence, when the nation is plunged in despair; in the utmost +harmony with Ministers, whom the people regard with the utmost +abhorrence; who vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them +for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice +demands account; who, in all disputes between the people and +Administration, presume against the people; who punish their +disorder, but refuse even to inquire into the provocations to them; +this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in this +constitution. Such an Assembly may be a great, wise, awful senate; +but it is not, to any popular purpose, a House of Commons. This +change from an immediate state of procuration and delegation to a +course of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the +popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their +purposes. It is indeed their greatest and sometimes their incurable +corruption. For there is a material distinction between that +corruption by which particular points are carried against reason +(this is a thing which cannot be prevented by human wisdom, and is +of less consequence), and the corruption of the principle itself. +For then the evil is not accidental, but settled. The distemper +becomes the natural habit. + +For my part, I shall be compelled to conclude the principle of +Parliament to be totally corrupted, and therefore its ends entirely +defeated, when I see two symptoms: first, a rule of indiscriminate +support to all Ministers; because this destroys the very end of +Parliament as a control, and is a general previous sanction to +misgovernment; and secondly, the setting up any claims adverse to +the right of free election; for this tends to subvert the legal +authority by which the House of Commons sits. + +I know that, since the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many +useful powers of Government have been weakened. It is absolutely +necessary to have frequent recourse to the Legislature. Parliaments +must therefore sit every year, and for great part of the year. The +dreadful disorders of frequent elections have also necessitated a +septennial instead of a triennial duration. These circumstances, I +mean the constant habit of authority, and the infrequency of +elections, have tended very much to draw the House of Commons +towards the character of a standing Senate. It is a disorder which +has arisen from the cure of greater disorders; it has arisen from +the extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchical +Government, with external strength and with internal tranquillity. + +It is very clear that we cannot free ourselves entirely from this +great inconvenience; but I would not increase an evil, because I was +not able to remove it; and because it was not in my power to keep +the House of Commons religiously true to its first principles, I +would not argue for carrying it to a total oblivion of them. This +has been the great scheme of power in our time. They who will not +conform their conduct to the public good, and cannot support it by +the prerogative of the Crown, have adopted a new plan. They have +totally abandoned the shattered and old-fashioned fortress of +prerogative, and made a lodgment in the stronghold of Parliament +itself. If they have any evil design to which there is no ordinary +legal power commensurate, they bring it into Parliament. In +Parliament the whole is executed from the beginning to the end. In +Parliament the power of obtaining their object is absolute, and the +safety in the proceeding perfect: no rules to confine, no after +reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot with any great propriety +punish others for things in which they themselves have been +accomplices. Thus the control of Parliament upon the executory +power is lost; because Parliament is made to partake in every +considerable act of Government. IMPEACHMENT, THAT GREAT GUARDIAN OF +THE PURITY OF THE CONSTITUTION, IS IN DANGER OF BEING LOST, EVEN TO +THE IDEA OF IT. + +By this plan several important ends are answered to the Cabal. If +the authority of Parliament supports itself, the credit of every act +of Government, which they contrive, is saved; but if the act be so +very odious that the whole strength of Parliament is insufficient to +recommend it, then Parliament is itself discredited; and this +discredit increases more and more that indifference to the +constitution, which it is the constant aim of its enemies, by their +abuse of Parliamentary powers, to render general among the people. +Whenever Parliament is persuaded to assume the offices of executive +Government, it will lose all the confidence, love, and veneration +which it has ever enjoyed, whilst it was supposed the CORRECTIVE and +CONTROL of the acting powers of the State. This would be the event, +though its conduct in such a perversion of its functions should be +tolerably just and moderate; but if it should be iniquitous, +violent, full of passion, and full of faction, it would be +considered as the most intolerable of all the modes of tyranny. + +For a considerable time this separation of the representatives from +their constituents went on with a silent progress; and had those, +who conducted the plan for their total separation, been persons of +temper and abilities any way equal to the magnitude of their design, +the success would have been infallible; but by their precipitancy +they have laid it open in all its nakedness; the nation is alarmed +at it; and the event may not be pleasant to the contrivers of the +scheme. In the last session, the corps called the KING'S FRIENDS +made a hardy attempt all at once, TO ALTER THE RIGHT OF ELECTION +ITSELF; to put it into the power of the House of Commons to disable +any person disagreeable to them from sitting in Parliament, without +any other rule than their own pleasure; to make incapacities, either +general for descriptions of men, or particular for individuals; and +to take into their body, persons who avowedly had never been chosen +by the majority of legal electors, nor agreeably to any known rule +of law. + +The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated, are +not my business here. Never has a subject been more amply and more +learnedly handled, nor upon one side, in my opinion, more +satisfactorily; they who are not convinced by what is already +written would not receive conviction THOUGH ONE AROSE FROM THE DEAD. + +I too have thought on this subject; but my purpose here, is only to +consider it as a part of the favourite project of Government; to +observe on the motives which led to it; and to trace its political +consequences. + +A violent rage for the punishment of Mr. Wilkes was the pretence of +the whole. This gentleman, by setting himself strongly in +opposition to the Court Cabal, had become at once an object of their +persecution, and of the popular favour. The hatred of the Court +party pursuing, and the countenance of the people protecting him, it +very soon became not at all a question on the man, but a trial of +strength between the two parties. The advantage of the victory in +this particular contest was the present, but not the only, nor by +any means, the principal, object. Its operation upon the character +of the House of Commons was the great point in view. The point to +be gained by the Cabal was this: that a precedent should be +established, tending to show, THAT THE FAVOUR OF THE PEOPLE WAS NOT +SO SURE A ROAD AS THE FAVOUR OF THE COURT EVEN TO POPULAR HONOURS +AND POPULAR TRUSTS. A strenuous resistance to every appearance of +lawless power; a spirit of independence carried to some degree of +enthusiasm; an inquisitive character to discover, and a bold one to +display, every corruption and every error of Government; these are +the qualities which recommend a man to a seat in the House of +Commons, in open and merely popular elections. An indolent and +submissive disposition; a disposition to think charitably of all the +actions of men in power, and to live in a mutual intercourse of +favours with them; an inclination rather to countenance a strong use +of authority, than to bear any sort of licentiousness on the part of +the people; these are unfavourable qualities in an open election for +Members of Parliament. + +The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the +former, is justified by reason; because a man of such a character, +even in its exorbitancies, does not directly contradict the purposes +of a trust, the end of which is a control on power. The latter +character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this +trust but very imperfectly; and, if deviating to the least excess, +will certainly frustrate instead of forwarding the purposes of a +control on Government. But when the House of Commons was to be new +modelled, this principle was not only to be changed, but reversed. +Whist any errors committed in support of power were left to the law, +with every advantage of favourable construction, of mitigation, and +finally of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty, or in +pursuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and +privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known +law, but by a DISCRETIONARY proceeding, which brought on THE LOSS OF +THE POPULAR OBJECT ITSELF. Popularity was to be rendered, if not +directly penal, at least highly dangerous. The favour of the people +might lead even to a disqualification of representing them. Their +odium might become, strained through the medium of two or three +constructions, the means of sitting as the trustee of all that was +dear to them. This is punishing the offence in the offending part. +Until this time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an +Assembly, still in some sort popular, led to the greatest honours +and emoluments in the gift of the Crown. Now the principle is +reversed; and the favour of the Court is the only sure way of +obtaining and holding those honours which ought to be in the +disposal of the people. + +It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. +Example, the only argument of effect in civil life, demonstrates the +truth of my proposition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning +the pernicious tendency of this example, until I see some man for +his indiscretion in the support of power, for his violent and +intemperate servility, rendered incapable of sitting in parliament. +For as it now stands, the fault of overstraining popular qualities, +and, irregularly if you please, asserting popular privileges, has +led to disqualification; the opposite fault never has produced the +slightest punishment. Resistance to power has shut the door of the +House of Commons to one man; obsequiousness and servility, to none. + +Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any disorder. But I +would leave such offences to the law, to be punished in measure and +proportion. The laws of this country are for the most part +constituted, and wisely so, for the general ends of Government, +rather than for the preservation of our particular liberties. +Whatever therefore is done in support of liberty, by persons not in +public trust, or not acting merely in that trust, is liable to be +more or less out of the ordinary course of the law; and the law +itself is sufficient to animadvert upon it with great severity. +Nothing indeed can hinder that severe letter from crushing us, +except the temperaments it may receive from a trial by jury. But if +the habit prevails of GOING BEYOND THE LAW, and superseding this +judicature, of carrying offences, real or supposed, into the +legislative bodies, who shall establish themselves into COURTS OF +CRIMINAL EQUITY, (so THE STAR CHAMBER has been called by Lord +Bacon,) all the evils of the STAR Chamber are revived. A large and +liberal construction in ascertaining offences, and a discretionary +power in punishing them, is the idea of criminal equity; which is in +truth a monster in Jurisprudence. It signifies nothing whether a +court for this purpose be a Committee of Council, or a House of +Commons, or a House of Lords; the liberty of the subject will be +equally subverted by it. The true end and purpose of that House of +Parliament which entertains such a jurisdiction will be destroyed by +it. + +I will not believe, what no other man living believes, that Mr. +Wilkes was punished for the indecency of his publications, or the +impiety of his ransacked closet. If he had fallen in a common +slaughter of libellers and blasphemers, I could well believe that +nothing more was meant than was pretended. But when I see, that, +for years together, full as impious, and perhaps more dangerous +writings to religion, and virtue, and order, have not been punished, +nor their authors discountenanced; that the most audacious libels on +Royal Majesty have passed without notice; that the most treasonable +invectives against the laws, liberties, and constitution of the +country, have not met with the slightest animadversion; I must +consider this as a shocking and shameless pretence. Never did an +envenomed scurrility against everything sacred and civil, public and +private, rage through the kingdom with such a furious and unbridled +licence. All this while the peace of the nation must be shaken, to +ruin one libeller, and to tear from the populace a single favourite. + +Nor is it that vice merely skulks in an obscure and contemptible +impunity. Does not the public behold with indignation, persons not +only generally scandalous in their lives, but the identical persons +who, by their society, their instruction, their example, their +encouragement, have drawn this man into the very faults which have +furnished the Cabal with a pretence for his persecution, loaded with +every kind of favour, honour, and distinction, which a Court can +bestow? Add but the crime of servility (the foedum crimem +servitutis) to every other crime, and the whole mass is immediately +transmuted into virtue, and becomes the just subject of reward and +honour. When therefore I reflect upon this method pursued by the +Cabal in distributing rewards and punishments, I must conclude that +Mr. Wilkes is the object of persecution, not on account of what he +has done in common with others who are the objects of reward, but +for that in which he differs from many of them: that he is pursued +for the spirited dispositions which are blended with his vices; for +his unconquerable firmness, for his resolute, indefatigable, +strenuous resistance against oppression. + +In this case, therefore, it was not the man that was to be punished, +nor his faults that were to be discountenanced. Opposition to acts +of power was to be marked by a kind of civil proscription. The +popularity which should arise from such an opposition was to be +shown unable to protect it. The qualities by which court is made to +the people, were to render every fault inexpiable, and every error +irretrievable. The qualities by which court is made to power, were +to cover and to sanctify everything. He that will have a sure and +honourable seat, in the House of Commons, must take care how he +adventures to cultivate popular qualities; otherwise he may, +remember the old maxim, Breves et infaustos populi Romani amores. +If, therefore, a pursuit of popularity expose a man to greater +dangers than a disposition to servility, the principle which is the +life and soul of popular elections will perish out of the +Constitution. + +It behoves the people of England to consider how the House of +Commons under the operation of these examples must of necessity be +constituted. On the side of the Court will be, all honours, +offices, emoluments; every sort of personal gratification to avarice +or vanity; and, what is of more moment to most gentlemen, the means +of growing, by innumerable petty services to individuals, into a +spreading interest in their country. On the other hand, let us +suppose a person unconnected with the Court, and in opposition to +its system. For his own person, no office, or emolument, or title; +no promotion ecclesiastical, or civil, or military, or naval, for +children, or brothers, or kindred. In vain an expiring interest in +a borough calls for offices, or small livings, for the children of +mayors, and aldermen, and capital burgesses. His court rival has +them all. He can do an infinite number of acts of generosity and +kindness, and even of public spirit. He can procure indemnity from +quarters. He can procure advantages in trade. He can get pardons +for offences. He can obtain a thousand favours, and avert a +thousand evils. He may, while he betrays every valuable interest of +the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian angel, +to his borough. The unfortunate independent member has nothing to +offer, but harsh refusal, or pitiful excuse, or despondent +representation of a hopeless interest. Except from his private +fortune, in which he may be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his Court +competitor, he has no way of showing any one good quality, or of +making a single friend. In the House, he votes for ever in a +dispirited minority. If he speaks, the doors are locked. A body of +loquacious placemen go out to tell the world, that all he aims at, +is to get into office. If he has not the talent of elocution, which +is the case of many as wise and knowing men as any in the House, he +is liable to all these inconveniences, without the eclat which +attends upon any tolerably successful exertion of eloquence. Can we +conceive a more discouraging post of duty than this? Strip it of +the poor reward of popularity; suffer even the excesses committed in +defence of the popular interest to become a ground for the majority +of that House to form a disqualification out of the line of the law, +and at their pleasure, attended not only with the loss of the +franchise, but with every kind of personal disgrace; if this shall +happen, the people of this kingdom may be assured that they cannot +be firmly or faithfully served by any man. It is out of the nature +of men and things that they should; and their presumption will be +equal to their folly, if they expect it. The power of the people, +within the laws, must show itself sufficient to protect every +representative in the animated performance of his duty, or that duty +cannot be performed. The House of Commons can never be a control on +other parts of Government, unless they are controlled themselves by +their constituents; and unless these constituents possess some right +in the choice of that House, which it is not in the power of that +House to take away. If they suffer this power of arbitrary +incapacitation to stand, they have utterly perverted every other +power of the House of Commons. The late proceeding, I will not say, +IS contrary to law; it MUST be so; for the power which is claimed +cannot, by any possibility, be a legal power in any limited member +of Government. + +The power which they claim, of declaring incapacities, would not be +above the just claims of a final judicature, if they had not laid it +down as a leading principle, that they had no rule in the exercise +of this claim but their own DISCRETION. Not one of their abettors +has ever undertaken to assign the principle of unfitness, the +species or degree of delinquency, on which the House of Commons will +expel, nor the mode of proceeding upon it, nor the evidence upon +which it is established. The direct consequence of which is, that +the first franchise of an Englishman, and that on which all the rest +vitally depend, is to be forfeited for some offence which no man +knows, and which is to be proved by no known rule whatsoever of +legal evidence. This is so anomalous to our whole constitution, +that I will venture to say, the most trivial right, which the +subject claims, never was, nor can be, forfeited in such a manner. + +The whole of their usurpation is established upon this method of +arguing. We do not make laws. No; we do not contend for this +power. We only declare law; and, as we are a tribunal both +competent and supreme, what we declare to be law becomes law, +although it should not have been so before. Thus the circumstance +of having no appeal from their jurisdiction is made to imply that +they have no rule in the exercise of it: the judgment does not +derive its validity from its conformity to the law; but +preposterously the law is made to attend on the judgment; and the +rule of the judgment is no other than the OCCASIONAL WILL OF THE +HOUSE. An arbitrary discretion leads, legality follows; which is +just the very nature and description of a legislative act. + +This claim in their hands was no barren theory. It was pursued into +its utmost consequences; and a dangerous principle has begot a +correspondent practice. A systematic spirit has been shown upon +both sides. The electors of Middlesex chose a person whom the House +of Commons had voted incapable; and the House of Commons has taken +in a member whom the electors of Middlesex had not chosen. By a +construction on that legislative power which had been assumed, they +declared that the true legal sense of the country was contained in +the minority, on that occasion; and might, on a resistance to a vote +of incapacity, be contained in any minority. + +When any construction of law goes against the spirit of the +privilege it was meant to support, it is a vicious construction. It +is material to us to be represented really and bona fide, and not in +forms, in types, and shadows, and fictions of law. The right of +election was not established merely as a MATTER OF FORM, to satisfy +some method and rule of technical reasoning; it was not a principle +which might substitute a Titius or a Maevius, a John Doe or Richard +Roe, in the place of a man specially chosen; not a principle which +was just as well satisfied with one man as with another. It is a +right, the effect of which is to give to the people that man, and +that man only, whom by their voices, actually, not constructively +given, they declare that they know, esteem, love, and trust. This +right is a matter within their own power of judging and feeling; not +an ens rationis and creature of law: nor can those devices, by +which anything else is substituted in the place of such an actual +choice, answer in the least degree the end of representation. + +I know that the courts of law have made as strained constructions in +other cases. Such is the construction in common recoveries. The +method of construction which in that case gives to the persons in +remainder, for their security and representative, the door-keeper, +crier, or sweeper of the Court, or some other shadowy being without +substance or effect, is a fiction of a very coarse texture. This +was however suffered, by the acquiescence of the whole kingdom, for +ages; because the evasion of the old Statute of Westminster, which +authorised perpetuities, had more sense and utility than the law +which was evaded. But an attempt to turn the right of election into +such a farce and mockery as a fictitious fine and recovery, will, I +hope, have another fate; because the laws which give it are +infinitely dear to us, and the evasion is infinitely contemptible. + +The people indeed have been told, that this power of discretionary +disqualification is vested in hands that they may trust, and who +will be sure not to abuse it to their prejudice. Until I find +something in this argument differing from that on which every mode +of despotism has been defended, I shall not be inclined to pay it +any great compliment. The people are satisfied to trust themselves +with the exercise of their own privileges, and do not desire this +kind intervention of the House of Commons to free them from the +burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought not to trust +the House of Commons with a power over their franchises; because the +constitution, which placed two other co-ordinate powers to control +it, reposed no such confidence in that body. It were a folly well +deserving servitude for its punishment, to be full of confidence +where the laws are full of distrust; and to give to an House of +Commons, arrogating to its sole resolution the most harsh and odious +part of legislative authority, that degree of submission which is +due only to the Legislature itself. + +When the House of Commons, in an endeavour to obtain new advantages +at the expense of the other orders of the State, for the benefits of +the COMMONS AT LARGE, have pursued strong measures; if it were not +just, it was at least natural, that the constituents should connive +at all their proceedings; because we were ourselves ultimately to +profit. But when this submission is urged to us, in a contest +between the representatives and ourselves, and where nothing can be +put into their scale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to +be children when they tell us they are our representatives, our own +flesh and blood, and that all the stripes they give us are for our +good. The very desire of that body to have such a trust contrary to +law reposed in them, shows that they are not worthy of it. They +certainly will abuse it; because all men possessed of an +uncontrolled discretionary power leading to the aggrandisement and +profit of their own body have always abused it: and I see no +particular sanctity in our times, that is at all likely, by a +miraculous operation, to overrule the course of nature. + +But we must purposely shut our eyes, if we consider this matter +merely as a contest between the House of Commons and the Electors. +The true contest is between the Electors of the Kingdom and the +Crown; the Crown acting by an instrumental House of Commons. It is +precisely the same, whether the Ministers of the Crown can +disqualify by a dependent House of Commons, or by a dependent court +of STAR CHAMBER, or by a dependent court of King's Bench. If once +Members of Parliament can be practically convinced that they do not +depend on the affection or opinion of the people for their political +being, they will give themselves over, without even an appearance of +reserve, to the influence of the Court. + +Indeed, a Parliament unconnected with the people, is essential to a +Ministry unconnected with the people; and therefore those who saw +through what mighty difficulties the interior Ministry waded, and +the exterior were dragged, in this business, will conceive of what +prodigious importance, the new corps of KING'S MEN held this +principle of occasional and personal incapacitation, to the whole +body of their design. + +When the House of Commons was thus made to consider itself as the +master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to secure +that House against all possible future deviation towards popularity; +an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure +of the Court. + + +To complete the scheme of bringing our Court to a resemblance to the +neighbouring Monarchies, it was necessary, in effect, to destroy +those appropriations of revenue, which seem to limit the property, +as the other laws had done the powers, of the Crown. An opportunity +for this purpose was taken, upon an application to Parliament for +payment of the debts of the Civil List; which in 1769 had amounted +to 513,000 pounds. Such application had been made upon former +occasions; but to do it in the former manner would by no means +answer the present purpose. + +Whenever the Crown had come to the Commons to desire a supply for +the discharging of debts due on the Civil List, it was always asked +and granted with one of the three following qualifications; +sometimes with all of them. Either it was stated that the revenue +had been diverted from its purposes by Parliament; or that those +duties had fallen short of the sum for which they were given by +Parliament, and that the intention of the Legislature had not been +fulfilled; or that the money required to discharge the Civil List +debt was to be raised chargeable on the Civil List duties. In the +reign of Queen Anne, the Crown was found in debt. The lessening and +granting away some part of her revenue by Parliament was alleged as +the cause of that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground (such it +certainly was), for discharging it. It does not appear that the +duties which wore then applied to the ordinary Government produced +clear above 580,000 pounds a year; because, when they were +afterwards granted to George the First, 120,000 pounds was added, to +complete the whole to 700,000 pounds a year. Indeed it was then +asserted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the nett +produce did not amount to above 550,000 pounds. The Queen's +extraordinary charges were besides very considerable; equal, at +least, to any we have known in our time. The application to +Parliament was not for an absolute grant of money, but to empower +the Queen to raise it by borrowing upon the Civil List funds. + +The Civil List debt was twice paid in the reign of George the First. +The money was granted upon the same plan which had been followed in +the reign of Queen Anne. The Civil List revenues were then +mortgaged for the sum to be raised, and stood charged with the +ransom of their own deliverance. + +George the Second received an addition to his Civil List. Duties +were granted for the purpose of raising 800,000 pounds a year. It +was not until he had reigned nineteen years, and after the last +rebellion, that he called upon Parliament for a discharge of the +Civil List debt. The extraordinary charges brought on by the +rebellion, account fully for the necessities of the Crown. However, +the extraordinary charges of Government were not thought a ground +fit to be relied on. A deficiency of the Civil List duties for +several years before was stated as the principal, if not the sole, +ground on which an application to Parliament could be justified. +About this time the produce of these duties had fallen pretty low; +and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced +800,000 pounds a year clear to the Treasury. + +That Prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new +demands were made, but with so much good order were his revenues and +expenses regulated, that, although many parts of the establishment +of the Court were upon a larger and more liberal scale than they +have been since, there was a considerable sum in hand, on his +decease, amounting to about 170,000 pounds, applicable to the +service of the Civil List of his present Majesty. So that, if this +reign commenced with a greater charge than usual, there was enough, +and more than enough, abundantly to supply all the extraordinary +expense. That the Civil List should have been exceeded in the two +former reigns, especially in the reign of George the First, was not +at all surprising. His revenue was but 700,000 pounds annually; if +it ever produced so much clear. The prodigious and dangerous +disaffection to the very being of the establishment, and the cause +of a Pretender then powerfully abetted from abroad, produced many +demands of an extraordinary nature both abroad and at home. Much +management and great expenses were necessary. But the throne of no +Prince has stood upon more unshaken foundations than that of his +present Majesty. + +To have exceeded the sum given for the Civil List, and to have +incurred a debt without special authority of Parliament, was, prima +facie, a criminal act: as such Ministers ought naturally rather to +have withdrawn it from the inspection, than to have exposed it to +the scrutiny, of Parliament. Certainly they ought, of themselves, +officially to have come armed with every sort of argument, which, by +explaining, could excuse a matter in itself of presumptive guilt. +But the terrors of the House of Commons are no longer for Ministers. + +On the other hand, the peculiar character of the House of Commons, +as trustee of the public purse, would have led them to call with a +punctilious solicitude for every public account, and to have +examined into them with the most rigorous accuracy. + +The capital use of an account is, that the reality of the charge, +the reason of incurring it, and the justice and necessity of +discharging it, should all appear antecedent to the payment. No man +ever pays first, and calls for his account afterwards; because he +would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and indeed only +effectual, means of compelling a full and fair one. But, in +national business, there is an additional reason for a previous +production of every account. It is a cheek, perhaps the only one, +upon a corrupt and prodigal use of public money. An account after +payment is to no rational purpose an account. However, the House of +Commons thought all these to be antiquated principles; they were of +opinion that the most Parliamentary way of proceeding was, to pay +first what the Court thought proper to demand, and to take its +chance for an examination into accounts at some time of greater +leisure. + +The nation had settled 800,000 pounds a year on the Crown, as +sufficient for the purpose of its dignity, upon the estimate of its +own Ministers. When Ministers came to Parliament, and said that +this allowance had not been sufficient for the purpose, and that +they had incurred a debt of 500,000 pounds, would it not have been +natural for Parliament first to have asked, how, and by what means, +their appropriated allowance came to be insufficient? Would it not +have savoured of some attention to justice, to have seen in what +periods of Administration this debt had been originally incurred; +that they might discover, and if need were, animadvert on the +persons who were found the most culpable? To put their hands upon +such articles of expenditure as they thought improper or excessive, +and to secure, in future, against such misapplication or exceeding? +Accounts for any other purposes are but a matter of curiosity, and +no genuine Parliamentary object. All the accounts which could +answer any Parliamentary end were refused, or postponed by previous +questions. Every idea of prevention was rejected, as conveying an +improper suspicion of the Ministers of the Crown. + +When every leading account had been refused, many others were +granted with sufficient facility. + +But with great candour also, the House was informed, that hardly any +of them could be ready until the next session; some of them perhaps +not so soon. But, in order firmly to establish the precedent of +PAYMENT PREVIOUS TO ACCOUNT, and to form it into a settled rule of +the House, the god in the machine was brought down, nothing less +than the wonder-working LAW OF PARLIAMENT. It was alleged, that it +is the law of Parliament, when any demand comes from the Crown, that +the House must go immediately into the Committee of Supply; in which +Committee it was allowed, that the production and examination of +accounts would be quite proper and regular. It was therefore +carried that they should go into the Committee without delay, and +without accounts, in order to examine with great order and +regularity things that could not possibly come before them. After +this stroke of orderly and Parliamentary wit and humour, they went +into the Committee, and very generously voted the payment. + +There was a circumstance in that debate too remarkable to be +overlooked. This debt of the Civil List was all along argued upon +the same footing as a debt of the State, contracted upon national +authority. Its payment was urged as equally pressing upon the +public faith and honour; and when the whole year's account was +stated, in what is called THE BUDGET, the Ministry valued themselves +on the payment of so much public debt, just as if they had +discharged 500,000 pounds of navy or exchequer bills. Though, in +truth, their payment, from the Sinking Fund, of debt which was never +contracted by Parliamentary authority, was, to all intents and +purposes, so much debt incurred. But such is the present notion of +public credit and payment of debt. No wonder that it produces such +effects. + +Nor was the House at all more attentive to a provident security +against future, than it had been to a vindictive retrospect to past, +mismanagements. I should have thought indeed that a Ministerial +promise, during their own continuance in office, might have been +given, though this would have been but a poor security for the +public. Mr. Pelham gave such an assurance, and he kept his word. +But nothing was capable of extorting from our Ministers anything +which had the least resemblance to a promise of confining the +expenses of the Civil List within the limits which had been settled +by Parliament. This reserve of theirs I look upon to be equivalent +to the clearest declaration that they were resolved upon a contrary +course. + +However, to put the matter beyond all doubt, in the Speech from the +Throne, after thanking Parliament for the relief so liberally +granted, the Ministers inform the two Houses that they will +ENDEAVOUR to confine the expenses of the Civil Government--within +what limits, think you? those which the law had prescribed? Not in +the least--"such limits as the HONOUR OF THE CROWN can possibly +admit." + +Thus they established an arbitrary standard for that dignity which +Parliament had defined and limited to a legal standard. They gave +themselves, under the lax and indeterminate idea of the HONOUR OF +THE CROWN, a full loose for all manner of dissipation, and all +manner of corruption. This arbitrary standard they were not afraid +to hold out to both Houses; while an idle and inoperative Act of +Parliament, estimating the dignity of the Crown at 800,000 pounds, +and confining it to that sum, adds to the number of obsolete +statutes which load the shelves of libraries without any sort of +advantage to the people. + +After this proceeding, I suppose that no man can be so weak as to +think that the Crown is limited to any settled allowance whatsoever. +For if the Ministry has 800,000 pounds a year by the law of the +land, and if by the law of Parliament all the debts which exceed it +are to be paid previous to the production of any account, I presume +that this is equivalent to an income with no other limits than the +abilities of the subject and the moderation of the Court--that is to +say, it is such in income as is possessed by every absolute Monarch +in Europe. It amounts, as a person of great ability said in the +debate, to an unlimited power of drawing upon the Sinking Fund. Its +effect on the public credit of this kingdom must be obvious; for in +vain is the Sinking Fund the great buttress of all the rest, if it +be in the power of the Ministry to resort to it for the payment of +any debts which they may choose to incur, under the name of the +Civil List, and through the medium of a committee, which thinks +itself obliged by law to vote supplies without any other account +than that of the more existence of the debt. + +Five hundred thousand pounds is a serious sum. But it is nothing to +the prolific principle upon which the sum was voted--a principle +that may be well called, THE FRUITFUL MOTHER OF A HUNDRED MORE. +Neither is the damage to public credit of very great consequence +when compared with that which results to public morals and to the +safety of the Constitution, from the exhaustless mine of corruption +opened by the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle of the +late payment of the debts of the Civil List. The power of +discretionary disqualification by one law of Parliament, and the +necessity of paying every debt of the Civil List by another law of +Parliament, if suffered to pass unnoticed, must establish such a +fund of rewards and terrors as will make Parliament the best +appendage and support of arbitrary power that ever was invented by +the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun between the +Representatives and the People. The Court Faction have at length +committed them. + +In such a strait the wisest may well be perplexed, and the boldest +staggered. The circumstances are in a great measure new. We have +hardly any landmarks from the wisdom of our ancestors to guide us. +At best we can only follow the spirit of their proceeding in other +cases. I know the diligence with which my observations on our +public disorders have been made. I am very sure of the integrity of +the motives on which they are published: I cannot be equally +confident in any plan for the absolute cure of those disorders, or +for their certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter +into more public discussion. Let the sagacity of others work upon +it. It is not uncommon for medical writers to describe histories of +diseases, very accurately, on whose cure they can say but very +little. + +The first ideas which generally suggest themselves for the cure of +Parliamentary disorders are, to shorten the duration of Parliaments, +and to disqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a seat in +the House of Commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in those +remedies, I am sure in the present state of things it is impossible +to apply them. A restoration of the right of free election is a +preliminary indispensable to every other reformation. What +alterations ought afterwards to be made in the constitution is a +matter of deep and difficult research. + +If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be +as little troublesome to me as to another to extol these remedies, +so famous in speculation, but to which their greatest admirers have +never attempted seriously to resort in practice. I confess them, +that I have no sort of reliance upon either a Triennial Parliament +or a Place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps, it might +rather serve to counteract than to promote the ends that are +proposed by it. To say nothing of the horrible disorders among the +people attending frequent elections, I should be fearful of +committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the +country into a contest with the Treasury. It is easy to see which +of the contending parties would be ruined first. Whoever has taken +a careful view of public proceedings, so as to endeavour to ground +his speculations on his experience, must have observed how +prodigiously greater the power of Ministry is in the first and last +session of a Parliament, than it is in the intermediate periods, +when Members sit a little on their seats. The persons of the +greatest Parliamentary experience, with whom I have conversed, did +constantly, in canvassing the fate of questions, allow something to +the Court side, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. +The evil complained of, if it exists in the present state of things, +would hardly be removed by a triennial Parliament: for, unless the +influence of Government in elections can be entirely taken away, the +more frequently they return, the more they will harass private +independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the +settled systematic interest of Government, and to the resources of a +boundless Civil List. Certainly something may be done, and ought to +be done, towards lessening that influence in elections; and this +will be necessary upon a plan either of longer or shorter duration +of Parliament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, as not +to render such contentions, foot frequently repeated, utterly +ruinous, first to independence of fortune, and then to independence +of spirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at +all debating it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in +another observation. With great truth I may aver that I never +remember to have talked on this subject with any man much conversant +with public business who considered short Parliaments as a real +improvement of the Constitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular +cause, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of such +persons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one +hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with +the, means of better information. The authority of such persons +will always have some weight. It may stand upon a par with the +speculations of those who are less practised in business; and who, +with perhaps purer intentions, have not so effectual means of +judging. It is besides an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to +imagine that every Statesman is of course corrupt: and that his +opinion, upon every constitutional point, is solely formed upon some +sinister interest. + +The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The same principle +guides in both: I mean the opinion which is entertained by many of +the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public +distempers. Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are +unwisely confident, I will only say, that this also is a matter very +well worthy of serious and mature reflection. It is not easy to +foresee what the effect would be of disconnecting with Parliament, +the greatest part of those who hold civil employments, and of such +mighty and important bodies as the military and naval +establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a +corrupt interest in the forms of the constitution, than they should +have none at all. This is a question altogether different from the +disqualification of a particular description of Revenue Officers +from seats in Parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower sorts of +them from votes in elections. In the former case, only the few are +affected; in the latter, only the inconsiderable. But a great +official, a great professional, a great military and naval interest, +all necessarily comprehending many people of the first weight, +ability, wealth, and spirit, has been gradually formed in the +kingdom. These new interests must be let into a share of +representation, else possibly they may be inclined to destroy those +institutions of which they are not permitted to partake. This is +not a thing to be trifled with: nor is it every well-meaning man +that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other serious +considerations occur. I do not open them here, because they are not +directly to my purpose; proposing only to give the reader some taste +of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the +Constitution; just to hint the uncertainty, to say no worse, of +being able to prevent the Court, as long as it has the means of +influence abundantly in its power, from applying that influence to +Parliament; and perhaps, if the public method were precluded, of +doing it in some worse and more dangerous method. Underhand and +oblique ways would be studied. The science of evasion, already +tolerably understood, would then be brought to the greatest +perfection. It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know how +much of an evil ought to be tolerated; lest, by attempting a degree +of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead of +cutting off the subsisting ill practices, new corruptions might be +produced for the concealment and security of the old. It were +better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind +of a Member of Parliament. But of all modes of influence, in my +opinion, a place under the Government is the least disgraceful to +the man who holds it, and by far the most safe to the country. I +would not shut out that sort of influence which is open and visible, +which is connected with the dignity and the service of the State, +when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of +subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods of +clandestine corruption, which are abundantly in the hands of the +Court, and which will be applied as long as these means of +corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have existence +amongst us. Our Constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep +precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it +from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risk of +oversetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in +a Government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with +external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of +difficulties; in which a considerate man will not be too ready to +decide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honest man too +ready to promise. They do not respect the public nor themselves, +who engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, +or that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, weak +perhaps, but honest and unbiassed; and submitted entirely to the +opinion of grave men, well affected to the constitution of their +country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it. + +Indeed, in the situation in which we stand, with an immense revenue, +an enormous debt, mighty establishments, Government itself a great +banker and a great merchant, I see no other way for the preservation +of a decent attention to public interest in the Representatives, but +THE INTERPOSITION OF THE BODY OF THE PEOPLE ITSELF, whenever it +shall appear, by some flagrant and notorious act, by some capital +innovation, that these Representatives are going to over-leap the +fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This +interposition is a most unpleasant remedy. But, if it be a legal +remedy, it is intended on some occasion to be used; to be used then +only, when it is evident that nothing else can hold the Constitution +to its true principles. + + +The distempers of Monarchy were the great subjects of apprehension +and redress, in the last century; in this, the distempers of +Parliament. It is not in Parliament alone that the remedy for +Parliamentary disorders can be completed; hardly, indeed, can it +begin there. Until a confidence in Government is re-established, +the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed +attention to the conduct of their Representatives. Standards, for +judging more systematically upon their conduct, ought to be settled +in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and correct +lists of the voters in all important questions ought to be procured. + +By such means something may be done. By such means it may appear +who those are, that, by an indiscriminate support of all +Administrations, have totally banished all integrity and confidence +out of public proceedings; have confounded the best men with the +worst; and weakened and dissolved, instead of strengthening and +compacting, the general frame of Government. If any person is more +concerned for government and order than for the liberties of his +country, even he is equally concerned to put an end to this course +of indiscriminate support. It is this blind and undistinguishing +support that feeds the spring of those very disorders, by which he +is frighted into the arms of the faction which contains in itself +the source of all disorders, by enfeebling all the visible and +regular authority of the State. The distemper is increased by his +injudicious and preposterous endeavours, or pretences, for the cure +of it. + +An exterior Administration, chosen for its impotency, or after it is +chosen purposely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered +subservient, will not be obeyed. The laws themselves will not be +respected, when those who execute them are despised: and they will +be despised, when their power is not immediate from the Crown, or +natural in the kingdom. Never were Ministers better supported in +Parliament. Parliamentary support comes and goes with office, +totally regardless of the man, or the merit. Is Government +strengthened? It grows weaker and weaker. The popular torrent +gains upon it every hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is +not support that is wanting to Government, but reformation. When +Ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not indeed built upon a +rock of adamant; it has, however, some stability. But when it +stands upon private humour, its structure is of stubble, and its +foundation is on quicksand. I repeat it again--He that supports +every Administration, subverts all Government. The reason is this. +The whole business in which a Court usually takes an interest goes +on at present equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, +wise or foolish, scandalous or reputable; there is nothing, +therefore, to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one +consistent scheme of politics. Nothing interposes to prevent the +full operation of all the caprices and all the passions of a Court +upon the servants of the public. The system of Administration is +open to continual shocks and changes, upon the principles of the +meanest cabal, and the most contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be +solid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horror from +such a service. Men of rank and ability, with the spirit which +ought to animate such men in a free state, while they decline the +jurisdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes, +will, for both, cheerfully put themselves upon their country. They +will trust an inquisitive and distinguishing Parliament; because it +does inquire, and does distinguish. If they act well, they know +that, in such a Parliament, they will be supported against any +intrigue; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can protect +them. This situation, however awful, is honourable. But in one +hour, and in the self-same Assembly, without any assigned or +assignable cause, to be precipitated from the highest authority to +the most marked neglect, possibly into the greatest peril of life +and reputation, is a situation full of danger, and destitute of +honour. It will be shunned equally by every man of prudence, and +every man of spirit. + +Such are the consequences of the division of Court from the +Administration; and of the division of public men among themselves. +By the former of these, lawful Government is undone; by the latter, +all opposition to lawless power is rendered impotent. Government +may in a great measure be restored, if any considerable bodies of +men have honesty and resolution enough never to accept +Administration, unless this garrison of KING'S MEN, which is +stationed, as in a citadel, to control and enslave it, be entirely +broken and disbanded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled +with the ground. The disposition of public men to keep this corps +together, and to act under it, or to co-operate with it, is a +touchstone by which every Administration ought in future to be +tried. There has not been one which has not sufficiently +experienced the utter incompatibility of that faction with the +public peace, and with all the ends of good Government; since, if +they opposed it, they soon lost every power of serving the Crown; if +they submitted to it they lost all the esteem of their country. +Until Ministers give to the public a full proof of their entire +alienation from that system, however plausible their pretences, we +may be sure they are more intent on the emoluments than the duties +of office. If they refuse to give this proof, we know of what stuff +they are made. In this particular, it ought to be the electors' +business to look to their Representatives. The electors ought to +esteem it no less culpable in their Member to give a single vote in +Parliament to such an Administration, than to take an office under +it; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious infidelity and +versatility of Members of Parliament, in their opinions of men and +things, ought in a particular manner to be considered by the +electors in the inquiry which is recommended to them. This is one +of the principal holdings of that destructive system which has +endeavoured to unhinge all the virtuous, honourable, and useful +connections in the kingdom. + +This cabal has, with great success, propagated a doctrine which +serves for a colour to those acts of treachery; and whilst it +receives any degree of countenance, it will be utterly senseless to +look for a vigorous opposition to the Court Party. The doctrine is +this: That all political connections are in their nature factious, +and as such ought to be dissipated and destroyed; and that the rule +for forming Administrations is mere personal ability, rated by the +judgment of this cabal upon it, and taken by drafts from every +division and denomination of public men. This decree was solemnly +promulgated by the head of the Court corps, the Earl of Bute +himself, in a speech which he made, in the year 1766, against the +then Administration, the only Administration which, he has ever been +known directly and publicly to oppose. + +It is indeed in no way wonderful, that such persons should make such +declarations. That connection and faction are equivalent terms, is +an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by +unconstitutional Statesmen. The reason is evident. Whilst men are +linked together, they easily and speedily communicate the alarm of +an evil design. They are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, +and to oppose it with united strength. Whereas, when they lie +dispersed, without concert, order, or discipline, communication is +uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance impracticable. Where +men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced +in each other's talents, nor at all practised in their mutual +habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business; no personal +confidence, no friendship, no common interest, subsisting among +them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part +with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a connection, the +most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has +his value, and his use; out of it, the greatest talents are wholly +unserviceable to the public. No man, who is not inflamed by +vainglory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself that his single, +unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavours, are of power to +defeat, the subtle designs and united cabals of ambitious citizens. +When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall, +one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle. + +It is not enough in a situation of trust in the commonwealth, that a +man means well to his country; it is not enough that in his single +person he never did an evil act, but always voted according to his +conscience, and even harangued against every design which he +apprehended to he prejudicial to the interests of his country. This +innoxious and ineffectual character, that seems formed upon a plan +of apology and disculpation, falls miserably short of the mark of +public duty. That duty demands and requires, that what is right +should not only be made known, but made prevalent; that what is evil +should not only be detected, but defeated. When the public man +omits to put himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, +it is an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost +as much as if he had formally betrayed it. It is surely no very +rational account of a man's life that he has always acted right; but +has taken special care to act in such a manner that his endeavours +could not possibly be productive of any consequence. + +I do not wonder that the behaviour of many parties should have made +persons of tender and scrupulous virtue somewhat out of humour with +all sorts of connection in politics. I admit that people frequently +acquire in such confederacies a narrow, bigoted, and proscriptive +spirit; that they are apt to sink the idea of the general good in +this circumscribed and partial interest. But, where duty renders a +critical situation a necessary one, it is our business to keep free +from the evils attendant upon it, and not to fly from the situation +itself. If a fortress is seated in an unwholesome air, an officer +of the garrison is obliged to be attentive to his health, but he +must not desert his station. Every profession, not excepting the +glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable +to its own particular vices; which, however, form no argument +against those ways of life; nor are the vices themselves inevitable +to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are +connections in politics; essentially necessary for the full +performance of our public duty, accidentally liable to degenerate +into faction. Commonwealths are made of families, free +Commonwealths of parties also; and we may as well affirm, that our +natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad +citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken those by which we +are held to our country. + +Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality in party a crime +against the State. I do not know whether this might not have been +rather to overstrain the principle. Certain it is, the best +patriots in the greatest commonwealths have always commanded and +promoted such connections. Idem sentire de republica, was with them +a principal ground of friendship and attachment; nor do I know any +other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more +honourable, and more virtuous habitudes. The Romans carried this +principle a great way. Even the holding of offices together, the +disposition of which arose from chance, not selection, gave rise to +a relation which continued for life. It was called necessitudo +sortis; and it was looked upon with a sacred reverence. Breaches of +any of these kinds of civil relation were considered as acts of the +most distinguished turpitude. The whole people was distributed into +political societies, in which they acted in support of such +interests in the State as they severally affected. For it was then +thought no crime, to endeavour by every honest means to advance to +superiority and power those of your own sentiments and opinions. +This wise people was far from imagining that those connections had +no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that men might quit them without +shame, upon every call of interest. They believed private honour to +be the great foundation of public trust; that friendship was no mean +step towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of +life, showed he regarded somebody besides himself, when he came to +act in a public situation, might probably consult some other +interest than his own. Never may we become plus sages que les +sages, as the French comedian has happily expressed it--wiser than +all the wise and good men who have lived before us. It was their +wish, to see public and private virtues, not dissonant and jarring, +and mutually destructive, but harmoniously combined, growing out of +one another in a noble and orderly gradation, reciprocally +supporting and supported. In one of the most fortunate periods of +our history this country was governed by a connection; I mean the +great connection of Whigs in the reign of Queen Anne. They were +complimented upon the principle of this connection by a poet who was +in high esteem with them. Addison, who knew their sentiments, could +not praise them for what they considered as no proper subject of +commendation. As a poet who knew his business, he could not applaud +them for a thing which in general estimation was not highly +reputable. Addressing himself to Britain, + + +"Thy favourites grow not up by fortune's sport, +Or from the crimes or follies of a Court; +On the firm basis of desert they rise, +From long-tried faith, and friendship's holy ties." + + +The Whigs of those days believed that the only proper method of +rising into power was through bard essays of practised friendship +and experimented fidelity. At that time it was not imagined that +patriotism was a bloody idol, which required the sacrifice of +children and parents, or dearest connections in private life, and of +all the virtues that rise from those relations. They were not of +that ingenious paradoxical morality to imagine that a spirit of +moderation was properly shown in patiently bearing the sufferings of +your friends, or that disinterestedness was clearly manifested at +the expense of other people's fortune. They believed that no men +could act with effect who did not act in concert; that no men could +act in concert who did not act with confidence; that no men could +act with confidence who were not bound together by common opinions, +common affections, and common interests. + +These wise men, for such I must call Lord Sunderland, Lord +Godolphin, Lord Somers, and Lord Marlborough, were too well +principled in these maxims, upon which the whole fabric of public +strength is built, to be blown off their ground by the breath of +every childish talker. They were not afraid that they should be +called an ambitious Junto, or that their resolution to stand or fall +together should, by placemen, be interpreted into a scuffle for +places. + +Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint +endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in +which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to +conceive that any one believes in his own politics, or thinks them +to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them +reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative +philosopher to mark the proper ends of Government. It is the +business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to +find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with +effect. Therefore, every honourable connection will avow it as +their first purpose to pursue every just method to put the men who +hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to +carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and +authority of the State. As this power is attached to certain +situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. +Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their +own party the preference in all things, and by no means, for private +considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole +body is not included, nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be +controlled, or to be over-balanced, in office or in council, by +those who contradict, the very fundamental principles on which their +party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connection +must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and +honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and +interested struggle for place and emolument. The very style of such +persons will serve to discriminate them from those numberless +impostors who have deluded the ignorant with professions +incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them +by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude. + +It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals that their +maxims have a plausible air, and, on a cursory view, appear equal to +first principles. They are light and portable. They are as current +as copper coin, and about as valuable. They serve equally the first +capacities and the lowest, and they are, at least, as useful to the +worst men as the best. Of this stamp is the cant of NOT MEN, BUT +MEASURES; a sort of charm, by which many people got loose from every +honourable engagement. When I see a man acting this desultory and +disconnected part, with as much detriment to his own fortune as +prejudice to the cause of any party, I am not persuaded that he is +right, but I am ready to believe he is in earnest. I respect virtue +in all its situations, even when it is found in the unsuitable +company of weakness. I lament to see qualities, rare and valuable, +squandered away without any public utility. But when a gentleman +with great visible emoluments abandons the party in which he has +long acted, and tells you it is because he proceeds upon his own +judgment that he acts on the merits of the several measures as they +arise, and that he is obliged to follow his own conscience, and not +that of others, he gives reasons which it is impossible to +controvert, and discovers a character which it is impossible to +mistake. What shall we think of him who never differed from a +certain set of men until the moment they lost their power, and who +never agreed with them in a single instance afterwards? Would not +such a coincidence of interest and opinion be rather fortunate? +Would it not be an extraordinary cast upon the dice that a man's +connections should degenerate into faction, precisely at the +critical moment when they lose their power or he accepts a place? +When people desert their connections, the desertion is a manifest +fact, upon which a direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. +Whether a MEASURE of Government be right or wrong is NO MATTER OF +FACT, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they do, +dispute and wrangle without end. But whether the individual thinks +the measure right or wrong is a point at still a greater distance +from the reach of all human decision. It is therefore very +convenient to politicians not to put the judgment of their conduct +on overt acts, cognisable in any ordinary court, but upon such a +matter as can be triable only in that secret tribunal, where they +are sure of being heard with favour, or where at worst the sentence +will be only private whipping. + +I believe the reader would wish to find no substance in a doctrine +which has a tendency to destroy all test of character as deduced +from conduct. He will therefore excuse my adding something more +towards the further clearing up a point which the great convenience +of obscurity to dishonesty has been able to cover with some degree +of darkness and doubt. + +In order to throw an odium on political connection, these +politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it that you are +blindly to follow the opinions of your party when in direct +opposition to your own clear ideas, a degree of servitude that no +worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to, and such as, I +believe, no connections (except some Court factions) ever could be +so senselessly tyrannical as to impose. Men thinking freely will, +in particular instances, think differently. But still, as the +greater Part of the measures which arise in the course of public +business are related to, or dependent on, some great leading general +principles in Government, a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in +the choice of his political company if he does not agree with them +at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these general +principles upon which the party is founded, and which necessarily +draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from the +beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his +opinions. When the question is in its nature doubtful, or not very +material, the modesty which becomes an individual, and (in spite of +our Court moralists) that partiality which becomes a well-chosen +friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence in the general +sentiment. Thus the disagreement will naturally be rare; it will be +only enough to indulge freedom, without violating concord or +disturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was required for +a character of the greatest uniformity and steadiness in connection. +How men can proceed without any connection at all is to me utterly +incomprehensible. Of what sort of materials must that man be made, +how must he be tempered and put together, who can sit whole years in +Parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his fellow-citizens, +amidst the storm of such tempestuous passions, in the sharp conflict +of so many wits, and tempers, and characters, in the agitation of +such mighty questions, in the discussion of such vast and ponderous +interests, without seeing any one sort of men, whose character, +conduct, or disposition would lead him to associate himself with +them, to aid and be aided, in any one system of public utility? + +I remember an old scholastic aphorism, which says that "the man who +lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a +devil." When I see in any of these detached gentlemen of our times +the angelic purity, power, and beneficence, I shall admit them to be +angels. In the meantime, we are born only to be men. We shall do +enough if we form ourselves to be good ones. It is therefore our +business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most +perfect vigour and maturity, every sort of generous and honest +feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the, dispositions that +are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the +commonwealth; so to be patriots, as not to forget we are gentlemen. +To cultivate friendships, and to incur enmities. To have both +strong, but both selected: in the one, to be placable; in the +other, immovable. To model our principles to our duties and our +situation. To be fully persuaded that all virtue which is +impracticable is spurious, and rather to run the risk of falling +into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy +than to loiter out our days without blame and without use. Public +life is a situation of power and energy; he trespasses against his +duty who sleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the +enemy. + +There is, however, a time for all things. It is not every +conjuncture which calls with equal force upon the activity of honest +men; but critical exigences now and then arise, and I am mistaken if +this be not one of them. Men will see the necessity of honest +combination, but they may see it when it is too late. They may +embody when it will be ruinous to themselves, and of no advantage to +the country; when, for want of such a timely union as may enable +them to oppose in favour of the laws, with the laws on their side, +they may at length find themselves under the necessity of +conspiring, instead of consulting. The law, for which they stand, +may become a weapon in the hands of its bitterest enemies; and they +will be cast, at length, into that miserable alternative, between +slavery and civil confusion, which no good man can look upon without +horror, an alternative in which it is impossible he should take +either part with a conscience perfectly at repose. To keep that +situation of guilt and remorse at the utmost distance is, therefore, +our first obligation. Early activity may prevent late and fruitless +violence. As yet we work in the light. The scheme of the enemies +of public tranquillity has disarranged, it has not destroyed us. + +If the reader believes that there really exists such a Faction as I +have described, a Faction ruling by the private inclinations of a +Court, against the general sense of the people; and that this +Faction, whilst it pursues a scheme for undermining all the +foundations of our freedom, weakens (for the present at least) all +the powers of executory Government, rendering us abroad +contemptible, and at home distracted; he will believe, also, that +nothing but a firm combination of public men against this body, and +that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the people at +large, can possibly get the better of it. The people will see the +necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public +opinion, and of restoring the Constitution to its original +principles. Above all, they will endeavour to keep the House of +Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it. They +will endeavour to keep that House, for its existence for its powers, +and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent +upon themselves, as possible. This servitude is to a House of +Commons (like obedience to the Divine law), "perfect freedom." For +if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience, +having deserted the only proper foundation of their power, they must +seek a support in an abject and unnatural dependence somewhere else. +When, through the medium of this just connection with their +constituents, the genuine dignity of the House of Commons is +restored, it will begin to think of casting from it, with scorn, as +badges of servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with +which it has been, for some time, disgraced. It will begin to think +of its old office of CONTROL. It will not suffer that last of evils +to predominate in the country; men without popular confidence, +public opinion, natural connection, or natural trust, invested with +all the powers of Government. + +When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be willing +and able to teach the Court, that it is the true interest of the +Prince to have but one Administration; and that one composed of +those who recommend themselves to their Sovereign through the +opinion of their country, and not by their obsequiousness to a +favourite. Such men will serve their Sovereign with affection and +fidelity; because his choice of them, upon such principles, is a +compliment to their virtue. They will be able to serve him +effectually; because they will add the weight of the country to the +force of the executory power. They will be able to serve their King +with dignity; because they will never abuse his name to the +gratification of their private spleen or avarice. This, with +allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general character +of a Ministry, which thinks itself accountable to the House of +Commons, when the House of Commons thinks itself accountable to its +constituents. If other ideas should prevail, things must remain in +their present confusion, until they are hurried into all the rage of +civil violence; or until they sink into the dead repose of +despotism. + + + +SPEECH ON THE MIDDLESEX ELECTION +FEBRUARY, 1771 + + + +Mr. Speaker,--In every complicated Constitution (and every free +Constitution is complicated) cases will arise, when the several +orders of the State will clash with one another, and disputes will +arise about the limits of their several rights and privileges. It +may be almost impossible to reconcile them. + +Carry the principle on by which you expelled Mr. Wilkes, there is +not a man in the House, hardly a man in the nation, who may not be +disqualified. That this House should have no power of expulsion is +a hard saying. That this House should have a general discretionary +power of disqualification is a dangerous saying. That the people +should not choose their own representative, is a saying that shakes +the Constitution. That this House should name the representative, +is a saying which, followed by practice, subverts the constitution. +They have the right of electing, you have a right of expelling; they +of choosing, you of judging, and only of judging, of the choice. +What bounds shall be set to the freedom of that choice? Their right +is prior to ours, we all originate there. They are the mortal +enemies of the House of Commons, who would persuade them to think or +to act as if they were a self-originated magistracy, independent of +the people and unconnected with their opinions and feelings. Under +a pretence of exalting the dignity, they undermine the very +foundations of this House. When the question is asked here, what +disturbs the people, whence all this clamour, we apply to the +treasury-bench, and they tell us it is from the efforts of libellers +and the wickedness of the people, a worn-out ministerial pretence. +If abroad the people are deceived by popular, within we are deluded +by ministerial, cant. The question amounts to this, whether you +mean to be a legal tribunal, or an arbitrary and despotic assembly. +I see and I feel the delicacy and difficulty of the ground upon +which we stand in this question. I could wish, indeed, that they +who advised the Crown had not left Parliament in this very +ungraceful distress, in which they can neither retract with dignity +nor persist with justice. Another parliament might have satisfied +the people without lowering themselves. But our situation is not in +our own choice: our conduct in that situation is all that is in our +own option. The substance of the question is, to put bounds to your +own power by the rules and principles of law. This is, I am +sensible, a difficult thing to the corrupt, grasping, and ambitious +part of human nature. But the very difficulty argues and enforces +the necessity of it. First, because the greater the power, the more +dangerous the abuse. Since the Revolution, at least, the power of +the nation has all flowed with a full tide into the House of +Commons. Secondly, because the House of Commons, as it is the most +powerful, is the most corruptible part of the whole Constitution. +Our public wounds cannot be concealed; to be cured, they must be +laid open. The public does think we are a corrupt body. In our +legislative capacity we are, in most instances, esteemed a very wise +body. In our judicial, we have no credit, no character at, all. +Our judgments stink in the nostrils of the people. They think us to +be not only without virtue, but without shame. Therefore, the +greatness of our power, and the great and just opinion of our +corruptibility and our corruption, render it necessary to fix some +bound, to plant some landmark, which we are never to exceed. That +is what the bill proposes. First, on this head, I lay it down as a +fundamental rule in the law and constitution of this country, that +this House has not by itself alone a legislative authority in any +case whatsoever. I know that the contrary was the doctrine of the +usurping House of Commons which threw down the fences and bulwarks +of law, which annihilated first the lords, then the Crown, then its +constituents. But the first thing that was done on the restoration +of the Constitution was to settle this point. Secondly, I lay it +down as a rule, that the power of occasional incapacitation, on +discretionary grounds, is a legislative power. In order to +establish this principle, if it should not be sufficiently proved by +being stated, tell me what are the criteria, the characteristics, by +which you distinguish between a legislative and a juridical act. It +will be necessary to state, shortly, the difference between a +legislative and a juridical act. A legislative act has no reference +to any rule but these two: original justice, and discretionary +application. Therefore, it can give rights; rights where no rights +existed before; and it can take away rights where they were before +established. For the law, which binds all others, does not and +cannot bind the law-maker; he, and he alone, is above the law. But +a judge, a person exercising a judicial capacity, is neither to +apply to original justice, nor to a discretionary application of it. +He goes to justice and discretion only at second hand, and through +the medium of some superiors. He is to work neither upon his +opinion of the one nor of the other; but upon a fixed rule, of which +he has not the making, but singly and solely the application to the +case. + +The power assumed by the House neither is, nor can be, judicial +power exercised according to known law. The properties of law are, +first, that it should be known; secondly, that it should be fixed +and not occasional. First, this power cannot be according to the +first property of law; because no man does or can know it, nor do +you yourselves know upon what grounds you will vote the incapacity +of any man. No man in Westminster Hall, or in any court upon earth, +will say that is law, upon which, if a man going to his counsel +should say to him, "What is my tenure in law of this estate?" he +would answer, "Truly, sir, I know not; the court has no rule but its +own discretion: they will determine." It is not a, fixed law, +because you profess you vary it according to the occasion, exercise +it according to your discretion; no man can call for it as a right. +It is argued that the incapacity is not originally voted, but a +consequence of a power of expulsion: but if you expel, not upon +legal, but upon arbitrary, that is, upon discretionary grounds, and +the incapacity is ex vi termini and inclusively comprehended in the +expulsion, is not the incapacity voted in the expulsion? Are they +not convertible terms? and, if incapacity is voted to be inherent in +expulsion, if expulsion be arbitrary, incapacity is arbitrary also. +I have, therefore, shown that the power of incapacitation is a +legislative power; I have shown that legislative power does not +belong to the House of Commons; and, therefore, it follows that the +House of Commons has not a power of incapacitation. + +I know not the origin of the House of Commons, but am very sure that +it did not create itself; the electors wore prior to the elected; +whose rights originated either from the people at large, or from +some other form of legislature, which never could intend for the +chosen a power of superseding the choosers. + +If you have not a power of declaring an incapacity simply by the +mere act of declaring it, it is evident to the most ordinary reason +you cannot have a right of expulsion, inferring, or rather, +including, an incapacity, For as the law, when it gives any direct +right, gives also as necessary incidents all the means of acquiring +the possession of that right, so where it does not give a right +directly, it refuses all the means by which such a right may by any +mediums be exercised, or in effect be indirectly acquired. Else it +is very obvious that the intention of the law in refusing that right +might be entirely frustrated, and the whole power of the legislature +baffled. If there be no certain invariable rule of eligibility, it +were better to get simplicity, if certainty is not to be had; and to +resolve all the franchises of the subject into this one short +proposition--the will and pleasure of the House of Commons. + +The argument, drawn from the courts of law, applying the principles +of law to new cases as they emerge, is altogether frivolous, +inapplicable, and arises from a total ignorance of the bounds +between civil and criminal jurisdiction, and of the separate maxims +that govern these two provinces of law, that are eternally separate. +Undoubtedly the courts of law, where a new case comes before them, +as they do every hour, then, that there may be no defect in justice, +call in similar principles, and the example of the nearest +determination, and do everything to draw the law to as near a +conformity to general equity and right reason as they can bring it +with its being a fixed principle. Boni judicis est ampliare +justitiam--that is, to make open and liberal justice. But in +criminal matters this parity of reason, and these analogies, ever +have been, and ever ought to be, shunned. + +Whatever is incident to a court of judicature, is necessary to the +House of Commons, as judging in elections. But a power of making +incapacities is not necessary to a court of judicature; therefore a +power of making incapacities is not necessary to the House of +Commons. + +Incapacity, declared by whatever authority, stands upon two +principles: first, an incapacity arising from the supposed +incongruity of two duties in the commonwealth; secondly, an +incapacity arising from unfitness by infirmity of nature, or the +criminality of conduct. As to the first class of incapacities, they +have no hardship annexed to them. The persons so incapacitated are +paid by one dignity for what they abandon in another, and, for the +most part, the situation arises from their own choice. But as to +the second, arising from an unfitness not fixed by nature, but +superinduced by some positive acts, or arising from honourable +motives, such as an occasional personal disability, of all things it +ought to be defined by the fixed rule of law--what Lord Coke calls +the Golden Metwand of the Law, and not by the crooked cord of +discretion. Whatever is general is better born. We take our common +lot with men of the same description. But to be selected and marked +out by a particular brand of unworthiness among our fellow-citizens, +is a lot of all others the hardest to be borne: and consequently is +of all others that act which ought only to be trusted to the +legislature, as not only legislative in its nature, but of all parts +of legislature the most odious. The question is over, if this is +shown not to be a legislative act. But what is very usual and +natural, is to corrupt judicature into legislature. On this point +it is proper to inquire whether a court of judicature, which decides +without appeal, has it as a necessary incident of such judicature, +that whatever it decides de jure is law. Nobody will, I hope, +assert this, because the direct consequence would be the entire +extinction of the difference between true and false judgments. For, +if the judgment makes the law, and not the law directs the judgment, +it is impossible there could be such a thing as an illegal judgment +given. + +But, instead of standing upon this ground, they introduce another +question, wholly foreign to it, whether it ought not to be submitted +to as if it were law. And then the question is, By the Constitution +of this country, what degree of submission is due to the +authoritative acts of a limited power? This question of submission, +determine it how you please, has nothing to do in this discussion +and in this House. Here it is not how long the people are bound to +tolerate the illegality of our judgments, but whether we have a +right to substitute our occasional opinion in the place of law, so +as to deprive the citizen of his franchise. + + + +SPEECH ON THE POWERS OF JURIES IN PROSECUTIONS FOR LIBELS +MARCH, 1771 + + + +I have always understood that a superintendence over the doctrines, +as well as the proceedings, of the courts of justice, was a +principal object of the constitution of this House; that you were to +watch at once over the lawyer and the law; that there should he an +orthodox faith as well as proper works: and I have always looked +with a degree of reverence and admiration on this mode of +superintendence. For being totally disengaged from the detail of +juridical practice, we come to something, perhaps, the better +qualified, and certainly much the better disposed to assert the +genuine principle of the laws; in which we can, as a body, have no +other than an enlarged and a public interest. We have no common +cause of a professional attachment, or professional emulations, to +bias our minds; we have no foregone opinions, which, from obstinacy +and false point of honour, we think ourselves at all events obliged +to support. So that with our own minds perfectly disengaged from +the exercise, we may superintend the execution of the national +justice; which from this circumstance is better secured to the +people than in any other country under heaven it can be. As our +situation puts us in a proper condition, our power enables us to +execute this trust. We may, when we see cause of complaint, +administer a remedy; it is in our choice by an address to remove an +improper judge, by impeachment before the peers to pursue to +destruction a corrupt judge, or by bill to assert, to explain, to +enforce, or to reform the law, just as the occasion and necessity of +the case shall guide us. We stand in a situation very honourable to +ourselves, and very useful to our country, if we do not abuse or +abandon the trust that is placed in us. + +The question now before you is upon the power of juries in +prosecuting for libels. There are four opinions. 1. That the +doctrine as held by the courts is proper and constitutional, and +therefore should not be altered. 2. That it is neither proper nor +constitutional, but that it will be rendered worse by your +interference. 3. That it is wrong, but that the only remedy is a +bill of retrospect. 4. The opinion of those who bring in the bill; +that the thing is wrong, but that it is enough to direct the +judgment of the court in future. + +The bill brought in is for the purpose of asserting and securing a +great object in the juridical constitution of this kingdom; which, +from a long series of practices and opinions in our judges, has, in +one point, and in one very essential point, deviated from the true +principle. + +It is the very ancient privilege of the people of England that they +shall be tried, except in the known exceptions, not by judges +appointed by the Crown, but by their own fellow-subjects, the peers +of that county court at which they owe their suit and service; out +of this principle trial by juries has grown. This principle has +not, that I can find, been contested in any case, by any authority +whatsoever; but there is one case, in which, without directly +contesting the principle, the whole substance, energy, acid virtue +of the privilege, is taken out of it; that is, in the case of a +trial by indictment or information for libel. The doctrine in that +case laid down by several judges amounts to this, that the jury have +no competence where a libel is alleged, except to find the gross +corporeal facts of the writing and the publication, together with +the identity of the things and persons to which it refers; but that +the intent and the tendency of the work, in which intent and +tendency the whole criminality consists, is the sole and exclusive +province of the judge. Thus having reduced the jury to the +cognisance of facts, not in themselves presumptively criminal, but +actions neutral and indifferent the whole matter, in which the +subject has any concern or interest, is taken out of the hands of +the jury: and if the jury take more upon themselves, what they so +take is contrary to their duty; it is no moral, but a merely natural +power; the same, by which they may do any other improper act, the +same, by which they may even prejudice themselves with regard to any +other part of the issue before them. Such is the matter as it now +stands, in possession of your highest criminal courts, handed down +to them from very respectable legal ancestors. If this can once be +established in this case, the application in principle to other +cases will be easy; and the practice will run upon a descent, until +the progress of an encroaching jurisdiction (for it is in its nature +to encroach, when once it has passed its limits) coming to confine +the juries, case after case, to the corporeal fact, and to that +alone, and excluding the intention of mind, the only source of merit +and demerit, of reward or punishment, juries become a dead letter in +the constitution. + +For which reason it is high time to take this matter into the +consideration of Parliament, and for that purpose it will be +necessary to examine, first, whether there is anything in the +peculiar nature of this crime that makes it necessary to exclude the +jury from considering the intention in it, more than in others. So +far from it, that I take it to be much less so from the analogy of +other criminal cases, where no such restraint is ordinarily put upon +them. The act of homicide is prima facie criminal. The intention +is afterwards to appear, for the jury to acquit or condemn. In +burglary do they insist that the jury have nothing to do but to find +the taking of goods, and that, if they do, they must necessarily +find the party guilty, and leave the rest to the judge; and that +they have nothing to do with the word felonice in the indictment? + +The next point is to consider it as a question of constitutional +policy, that is, whether the decision of the question of libel ought +to be left to the judges as a presumption of law, rather than to the +jury as matter of popular judgment, as the malice in the case of +murder, the felony in the case of stealing. If the intent and +tendency are not matters within the province of popular judgment, +but legal and technical conclusions, formed upon general principles +of law, let us see what they are. Certainly they are most +unfavourable, indeed, totally adverse, to the Constitution of this +country. + +Here we must have recourse to analogies, for we cannot argue on +ruled cases one way or the other. See the history. The old books, +deficient in general in Crown cases furnish us with little on this +head. As to the crime, in the very early Saxon Law, I see an +offence of this species, called Folk-leasing, made a capital +offence, but no very precise definition of the crime, and no trial +at all: see the statute of 3rd Edward I. cap. 34. The law of +libels could not have arrived at a very early period in this +country. It is no wonder that we find no vestige of any +constitution from authority, or of any deductions from legal science +in our old books and records upon that subject. The statute of +scandalum magnatum is the oldest that I know, and this goes but a +little way in this sort of learning. Libelling is not the crime of +an illiterate people. When they were thought no mean clerks who +could read and write, when he who could read and write was +presumptively a person in holy orders, libels could not be general +or dangerous; and scandals merely oral could spread little, and must +perish soon. It is writing, it is printing more emphatically, that +imps calumny with those eagle wings, on which, as the poet says, +"immortal slanders fly." By the press they spread, they last, they +leave the sting in the wound. Printing was not known in England +much earlier than the reign of Henry VII., and in the third year of +that reign the Court of Star Chamber was established. The press and +its enemy are nearly coeval. As no positive law against libels +existed, they fell under the indefinite class of misdemeanours. For +the trial of misdemeanours that court was instituted, their tendency +to produce riots and disorders was a main part of the charge, and +was laid, in order to give the court jurisdiction chiefly against +libels. The offence was new. Learning of their own upon the +subject they had none, and they were obliged to resort to the only +emporium where it was to be had, the Roman Law. After the Star +Chamber was abolished in the 10th of Charles I. its authority indeed +ceased, but its maxims subsisted and survived it. The spirit of the +Star Chamber has transmigrated and lived again, and Westminster Hall +was obliged to borrow from the Star Chamber, for the same reasons as +the Star Chamber had borrowed from the Roman Forum, because they had +no law, statute, or tradition of their own. Thus the Roman Law took +possession of our courts, I mean its doctrine, not its sanctions; +the severity of capital punishment was omitted, all the rest +remained. The grounds of these laws are just and equitable. +Undoubtedly the good fame of every man ought to be under the +protection of the laws as well as his life, and liberty, and +property. Good fame is an outwork, that defends them all, and +renders them all valuable. The law forbids you to revenge; when it +ties up the hands of some, it ought to restrain the tongues of +others. The good fame of government is the same, it ought not to be +traduced. This is necessary in all government, and if opinion be +support, what takes away this destroys that support; but the liberty +of the press is necessary to this government. + +The wisdom, however, of government is of more importance than the +laws. I should study the temper of the people before I ventured on +actions of this kind. I would consider the whole of the prosecution +of a libel of such importance as Junius, as one piece, as one +consistent plan of operations; and I would contrive it so that, if I +were defeated, I should not be disgraced; that even my victory +should not be more ignominious than my defeat; I would so manage, +that the lowest in the predicament of guilt should not be the only +one in punishment. I would not inform against the mere vender of a +collection of pamphlets. I would not put him to trial first, if I +could possibly avoid it. I would rather stand the consequences of +my first error, than carry it to a judgment that must disgrace my +prosecution, or the court. We ought to examine these things in a +manner which becomes ourselves, and becomes the object of the +inquiry; not to examine into the most important consideration which +can come before us, with minds heated with prejudice and filled with +passions, with vain popular opinions and humours, and when we +propose to examine into the justice of others, to be unjust +ourselves. + +An inquiry is wished, as the most effectual way of putting an end to +the clamours and libels, which are the disorder and disgrace of the +times. For people remain quiet, they sleep secure, when they +imagine that the vigilant eye of a censorial magistrate watches over +all the proceedings of judicature, and that the sacred fire of an +eternal constitutional jealousy, which is the guardian of liberty, +law, and justice, is alive night and day, and burning in this house. +But when the magistrate gives up his office and his duty, the people +assume it, and they inquire too much, and too irreverently, because +they think their representatives do not inquire at all. + +We have in a libel, 1st. The writing. 2nd. The communication, +called by the lawyers the publication. 3rd. The application to +persons and facts. 4th. The intent and tendency. 5th. The +matter--diminution of fame. The law presumptions on all these are +in the communication. No intent can, make a defamatory publication +good, nothing can make it have a good tendency; truth is not +pleadable. Taken juridically, the foundation of these law +presumptions is not unjust; taken constitutionally, they are +ruinous, and tend to the total suppression of all publication. If +juries are confined to the fact, no writing which censures, however +justly, or however temperately, the conduct of administration, can +be unpunished. Therefore, if the intent and tendency be left to the +judge, as legal conclusions growing from the fact, you may depend +upon it you can have no public discussion of a public measure, which +is a point which even those who are most offended with the +licentiousness of the press (and it is very exorbitant, very +provoking) will hardly contend for. + +So far as to the first opinion, that the doctrine is right and needs +no alteration. 2nd. The next is, that it is wrong, but that we are +not in a condition to help it. I admit, it is true, that there are +cases of a nature so delicate and complicated, that an Act of +Parliament on the subject may become a matter of great difficulty. +It sometimes cannot define with exactness, because the subject- +matter will not bear an exact definition. It may seem to take away +everything which it does not positively establish, and this might be +inconvenient; or it may seem vice versa to establish everything +which it does not expressly take away. It may be more advisable to +leave such matters to the enlightened discretion of a judge, awed by +a censorial House of Commons. But then it rests upon those who +object to a legislative interposition to prove these inconveniences +in the particular case before them. For it would be a most +dangerous, as it is a most idle and most groundless, conceit to +assume as a general principle, that the rights and liberties of the +subject are impaired by the care and attention of the legislature to +secure them. If so, very ill would the purchase of Magna Charta +have merited the deluge of blood, which was shed in order to have +the body of English privileges defined by a positive written law. +This charter, the inestimable monument of English freedom, so long +the boast and glory of this nation, would have been at once an +instrument of our servitude, and a monument of our folly, if this +principle were true. The thirty four confirmations would have been +only so many repetitions of their absurdity, so many new links in +the chain, and so many invalidations of their right. + +You cannot open your statute book without seeing positive provisions +relative to every right of the subject. This business of juries is +the subject of not fewer than a dozen. To suppose that juries are +something innate in the Constitution of Great Britain, that they +have jumped, like Minerva, out of the head of Jove in complete +armour, is a weak fancy, supported neither by precedent nor by +reason. Whatever is most ancient and venerable in our Constitution, +royal prerogative, privileges of parliament, rights of elections, +authority of courts, juries, must have been modelled according to +the occasion. I spare your patience, and I pay a compliment to your +understanding, in not attempting to prove that anything so elaborate +and artificial as a jury was not the work of chance, but a matter of +institution, brought to its present state by the joint efforts of +legislative authority and juridical prudence. It need not be +ashamed of being (what in many parts of it at least it is) the +offspring of an Act of Parliament, unless it is a shame for our laws +to be the results of our legislature. Juries, which sensitively +shrank from the rude touch of parliamentary remedy, have been the +subject of not fewer than, I think, forty-three Acts of Parliament, +in which they have been changed with all the authority of a creator +over its creature, from Magna Charta to the great alterations which +were made in the 29th of George II. + +To talk of this matter in any other way is to turn a rational +principle into an idle and vulgar superstition, like the antiquary, +Dr. Woodward, who trembled to have his shield scoured, for fear it +should be discovered to be no better than an old pot-lid. This +species of tenderness to a jury puts me in mind of a gentleman of +good condition, who had been reduced to great poverty and distress; +application was made to some rich fellows in his neighbourhood to +give him some assistance; but they begged to be excused for fear of +affronting a person of his high birth; and so the poor gentleman was +left to starve out of pure respect to the antiquity of his family. +From this principle has risen an opinion that I find current amongst +gentlemen, that this distemper ought to be left to cure itself; that +the judges having been well exposed, and something terrified on +account of these clamours, will entirely change, if not very much +relax from their rigour; if the present race should not change, that +the chances of succession may put other more constitutional judges +in their place; lastly, if neither should happen, yet that the +spirit of an English jury will always be sufficient for the +vindication of its own rights, and will not suffer itself to be +overborne by the bench. I confess that I totally dissent from all +these opinions. These suppositions become the strongest reasons +with me to evince the necessity of some clear and positive +settlement of this question of contested jurisdiction. If judges +are so full of levity, so full of timidity, if they are influenced +by such mean and unworthy passions, that a popular clamour is +sufficient to shake the resolution they build upon the solid basis +of a legal principle, I would endeavour to fix that mercury by a +positive law. If to please an administration the judges can go one +way to-day, and to please the crowd they can go another to-morrow; +if they will oscillate backward and forward between power and +popularity, it is high time to fix the law in such a manner as to +resemble, as it ought, the great Author of all law, in "whom there +is no variableness nor shadow of turning." + +As to their succession, I have just the same opinion. I would not +leave it to the chances of promotion, or to the characters of +lawyers, what the law of the land, what the rights of juries, or +what the liberty of the press should be. My law should not depend +upon the fluctuation of the closet, or the complexion of men. +Whether a black-haired man or a fair-haired man presided in the +Court of King's Bench, I would have the law the same: the same +whether he was born in domo regnatrice, and sucked from his infancy +the milk of courts, or was nurtured in the rugged discipline of a +popular opposition. This law of court cabal and of party, this mens +quaedam nullo perturbata affectu, this law of complexion, ought not +to be endured for a moment in a country whose being depends upon the +certainty, clearness, and stability of institutions. + +Now I come to the last substitute for the proposed bill, the spirit +of juries operating their own jurisdiction. This, I confess, I +think the worst of all, for the same reasons on which I objected to +the others, and for other weighty reasons besides which are separate +and distinct. First, because juries, being taken at random out of a +mass of men infinitely large, must be of characters as various as +the body they arise from is large in its extent. If the judges +differ in their complexions, much more will a jury. A timid jury +will give way to an awful judge delivering oracularly the law, and +charging them on their oaths, and putting it home to their +consciences, to beware of judging where the law had given them no +competence. We know that they will do so, they have done so in a +hundred instances; a respectable member of your own house, no vulgar +man, tells you that on the authority of a judge he found a man +guilty, in whom, at the same time, he could find no guilt. But +supposing them full of knowledge and full of manly confidence in +themselves, how will their knowledge, or their confidence, inform or +inspirit others? They give no reason for their verdict, they can +but condemn or acquit; and no man can tell the motives on which they +have acquitted or condemned. So that this hope of the power of +juries to assert their own jurisdiction must be a principle blind, +as being without reason, and as changeable as the complexion of men +and the temper of the times. + +But, after all, is it fit that this dishonourable contention between +the court and juries should subsist any longer? On what principle +is it that a jury refuses to be directed by the court as to his +competence? Whether a libel or no libel be a question of law or of +fact may be doubted, but a question of jurisdiction and competence +is certainly a question of law; on this the court ought undoubtedly +to judge, and to judge solely and exclusively. If they judge wrong +from excusable error, you ought to correct it, as to-day it is +proposed, by an explanatory bill; or if by corruption, by bill of +penalties declaratory, and by punishment. What does a juror say to +a judge when he refuses his opinion upon a question of judicature? +You are so corrupt, that I should consider myself a partaker of your +crime, were I to be guided by your opinion; or you are so grossly +ignorant, that I, fresh from my bounds, from my plough, my counter, +or my loom, am fit to direct you in your profession. This is an +unfitting, it is a dangerous, state of things. The spirit of any +sort of men is not a fit rule for deciding on the bounds of their +jurisdiction. First, because it is different in different men, and +even different in the same at different times; and can never become +the proper directing line of law; next, because it is not reason, +but feeling; and when once it is irritated, it is not apt to confine +itself within its proper limits. If it becomes, not difference in +opinion upon law, but a trial of spirit between parties, our courts +of law are no longer the temple of justice, but the amphitheatre for +gladiators. No--God forbid! Juries ought to take their law from +the bench only; but it is our business that they should hear nothing +from the bench but what is agreeable to the principles of the +Constitution. The jury are to hear the judge, the judge is to hear +the law where it speaks plain; where it does not, he is to hear the +legislature. As I do not think these opinions of the judges to be +agreeable to those principles, I wish to take the only method in +which they can or ought to be corrected, by bill. + +Next, my opinion is, that it ought to be rather by a bill for +removing controversies than by a bill in the state of manifest and +express declaration, and in words de praeterito. I do this upon +reasons of equity and constitutional policy. I do not want to +censure the present judges. I think them to be excused for their +error. Ignorance is no excuse for a judge: it is changing the +nature of his crime--it is not absolving. It must be such error as +a wise and conscientious judge may possibly fall into, and must +arise from one or both these causes: first, a plausible principle +of law; secondly, the precedents of respectable authorities, and in +good times. In the first, the principle of law, that the judge is +to decide on law, the jury to decide on fact, is an ancient and +venerable principle and maxim of the law, and if supported in this +application by precedents of good times and of good men, the judge, +if wrong, ought to be corrected; he ought not to be reproved, or to +be disgraced, or the authority or respect to your tribunals to be +impaired. In cases in which declaratory bills have been made, where +by violence and corruption some fundamental part of the Constitution +has been struck at; where they would damn the principle, censure the +persons, and annul the acts; but where the law having been, by the +accident of human frailty, depraved, or in a particular instance +misunderstood, where you neither mean to rescind the acts, nor to +censure the persons, in such cases you have taken the explanatory +mode, and, without condemning what is done, you direct the future +judgment of the court. + +All bills for the reformation of the law must be according to the +subject-matter, the circumstances, and the occasion, and are of four +kinds:- 1. Either the law is totally wanting, and then a new +enacting statute must be made to supply that want; or, 2. It is +defective, then a new law must be made to enforce it. 3. Or it is +opposed by power or fraud, and then an act must be made to declare +it. 4 Or it is rendered doubtful and controverted, and then a law +must be made to explain it. These must be applied according to the +exigence of the case; one is just as good as another of them. +Miserable, indeed, would be the resources, poor and unfurnished the +stores and magazines of legislation, if we were bound up to a little +narrow form, and not able to frame our acts of parliament according +to every disposition of our own minds, and to every possible +emergency of the commonwealth; to make them declaratory, enforcing, +explanatory, repealing, just in what mode, or in what degree we +please. + +Those who think that the judges, living and dead, are to be +condemned, that your tribunals of justice are to be dishonoured, +that their acts and judgments on this business are to be rescinded, +they will undoubtedly vote against this bill, and for another sort. + +I am not of the opinion of those gentlemen who are against +disturbing the public repose; I like a clamour whenever there is an +abuse. The fire-bell at midnight disturbs your sleep, but it keeps +you from being burned in your bed. The hue and cry alarms the +county, but it preserves all the property of the province. All +these clamours aim at redress. But a clamour made merely for the +purpose of rendering the people discontented with their situation, +without an endeavour to give them a practical remedy, is indeed one +of the worst acts of sedition. + +I have read and heard much upon the conduct of our courts in the +business of libels. I was extremely willing to enter into, and very +free to act as facts should turn out on that inquiry, aiming +constantly at remedy as the end of all clamour, all debate, all +writing, and all inquiry; for which reason I did embrace, and do now +with joy, this method of giving quiet to the courts, jurisdiction to +juries, liberty to the press, and satisfaction to the people. I +thank my friends for what they have done; I hope the public will one +day reap the benefit of their pious and judicious endeavours. They +have now sown the seed; I hope they will live to see the flourishing +harvest. Their bill is sown in weakness; it will, I trust, be +reaped in power; and then, however, we shall have reason to apply to +them what my Lord Coke says was an aphorism continually in the mouth +of a great sage of the law, "Blessed be not the complaining tongue, +but blessed be the amending hand." + + + +SPEECH ON A BILL FOR SHORTENING THE DURATION OF PARLIAMENTS + + + +It is always to be lamented when men are driven to search into the +foundations of the commonwealth. It is certainly necessary to +resort to the theory of your government whenever you propose any +alteration in the frame of it, whether that alteration means the +revival of some former antiquated and forsaken constitution of +state, or the introduction of some new improvement in the +commonwealth. The object of our deliberation is, to promote the +good purposes for which elections have been instituted, and to +prevent their inconveniences. If we thought frequent elections +attended with no inconvenience, or with but a trifling +inconvenience, the strong overruling principle of the Constitution +would sweep us like a torrent towards them. But your remedy is to +be suited to your disease--your present disease, and to your whole +disease. That man thinks much too highly, and therefore he thinks +weakly and delusively, of any contrivance of human wisdom, who +believes that it can make any sort of approach to perfection. There +is not, there never was, a principle of government under heaven, +that does not, in the very pursuit of the good it proposes, +naturally and inevitably lead into some inconvenience, which makes +it absolutely necessary to counterwork and weaken the application of +that first principle itself; and to abandon something of the extent +of the advantage you proposed by it, in order to prevent also the +inconveniences which have arisen from the instrument of all the good +you had in view. + +To govern according to the sense and agreeably to the interests of +the people is a great and glorious object of government. This +object cannot be obtained but through the medium of popular +election, and popular election is a mighty evil. It is such, and so +great an evil, that though there are few nations whose monarchs were +not originally elective, very few are now elected. They are the +distempers of elections, that have destroyed all free states. To +cure these distempers is difficult, if not impossible; the only +thing therefore left to save the commonwealth is to prevent their +return too frequently. The objects in view are, to have parliaments +as frequent as they can be without distracting them in the +prosecution of public business; on one hand, to secure their +dependence upon the people, on the other to give them that quiet in +their minds, and that ease in their fortunes, as to enable them to +perform the most arduous and most painful duty in the world with +spirit, with efficiency, with independency, and with experience, as +real public counsellors, not as the canvassers at a perpetual +election. It is wise to compass as many good ends as possibly you +can, and seeing there are inconveniences on both sides, with +benefits on both, to give up a part of the benefit to soften the +inconvenience. The perfect cure is impracticable, because the +disorder is dear to those from whom alone the cure can possibly be +derived. The utmost to be done is to palliate, to mitigate, to +respite, to put off the evil day of the Constitution to its latest +possible hour, and may it be a very late one! + +This bill, I fear, would precipitate one of two consequences, I know +not which most likely, or which most dangerous: either that the +Crown by its constant stated power, influence, and revenue, would +wear out all opposition in elections, or that a violent and furious +popular spirit would arise. I must see, to satisfy me, the +remedies; I must see, from their operation in the cure of the old +evil, and in the cure of those new evils, which are inseparable from +all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total +result. The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is to have +but one thing before you, but he forms the best judgment in all +moral disquisitions, who has the greatest number and variety of +considerations, in one view before him, and can take them in with +the best possible consideration of the middle results of all. + +We of the opposition, who are not friends to the bill, give this +pledge at least of our integrity and sincerity to the people, that +in our situation of systematic opposition to the present ministers, +in which all our hope of rendering it effectual depends upon popular +interest and favour, we will not flatter them by a surrender of our +uninfluenced judgment and opinion; we give a security, that if ever +we should be in another situation, no flattery to any other sort of +power and influence would induce us to act against the true +interests of the people. + +All are agreed that parliaments should not be perpetual; the only +question is, what is the most convenient time for their duration? +On which there are three opinions. We are agreed, too, that the +term ought not to be chosen most likely in its operation to spread +corruption, and to augment the already overgrown influence of the +crown. On these principles I mean to debate the question. It is +easy to pretend a zeal for liberty. Those who think themselves not +likely to be encumbered with the performance of their promises, +either from their known inability, or total indifference about the +performance, never fail to entertain the most lofty ideas. They are +certainly the most specious, and they cost them neither reflection +to frame, nor pains to modify, nor management to support. The task +is of another nature to those who mean to promise nothing that it is +not in their intentions, or may possibly be in their power to +perform; to those who are bound and principled no more to delude the +understandings than to violate the liberty of their fellow-subjects. +Faithful watchmen we ought to be over the rights and privileges of +the people. But our duty, if we are qualified for it as we ought, +is to give them information, and not to receive it from them; we are +not to go to school to them to learn the principles of law and +government. In doing so we should not dutifully serve, but we +should basely and scandalously betray, the people, who are not +capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance called to it +by the Constitution. I reverentially look up to the opinion of the +people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious. I should be +ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground, as they +cried up or cried down men, or things, or opinions; if I wavered and +shifted about with every change, and joined in it, or opposed, as +best answered any low interest or passion; if I held them up hopes, +which I knew I never intended, or promised what I well knew I could +not perform. Of all these things they are perfect sovereign judges +without appeal; but as to the detail of particular measures, or to +any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough of +speculation in the closet, nor of experience in business, to decide +upon it. They can well see whether we are tools of a court, or +their honest servants. Of that they can well judge; and I wish that +they always exercised their judgment; but of the particular merits +of a measure I have other standards. That the frequency of +elections proposed by this bill has a tendency to increase the power +and consideration of the electors, not lessen corruptibility, I do +most readily allow; so far as it is desirable, this is what it has; +I will tell you now what it has not: 1st. It has no sort of +tendency to increase their integrity and public spirit, unless an +increase of power has an operation upon voters in elections, that it +has in no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of +mankind. 2nd. This bill has no tendency to limit the quantity of +influence in the Crown, to render its operation more difficult, or +to counteract that operation, which it cannot prevent, in any way +whatsoever. It has its full weight, its full range, and its +uncontrolled operation on the electors exactly as it had before. +3rd. Nor, thirdly, does it abate the interest or inclination of +Ministers to apply that influence to the electors: on the contrary, +it renders it much more necessary to them, if they seek to have a +majority in parliament, to increase the means of that influence, and +redouble their diligence, and to sharpen dexterity in the +application. The whole effect of the bill is therefore the removing +the application of some part of the influence from the elected to +the electors, and further to strengthen and extend a court interest +already great and powerful in boroughs; here to fix their magazines +and places of arms, and thus to make them the principal, not the +secondary, theatre of their manoeuvres for securing a determined +majority in parliament. + +I believe nobody will deny that the electors are corruptible. They +are men; it is saying nothing worse of them; many of them are but +ill-informed in their minds, many feeble in their circumstances, +easily over-reached, easily seduced. If they are many, the wages of +corruption are the lower; and would to God it were not rather a +contemptible and hypocritical adulation than a charitable sentiment, +to say that there is already no debauchery, no corruption, no +bribery, no perjury, no blind fury, and interested faction among the +electors in many parts of this kingdom: nor is it surprising, or at +all blamable, in that class of private men, when they see their +neighbours aggrandised, and themselves poor and virtuous, without +that eclat or dignity which attends men in higher stations. + +But admit it were true that the great mass of the electors were too +vast an object for court influence to grasp, or extend to, and that +in despair they must abandon it; he must be very ignorant of the +state of every popular interest, who does not know that in all the +corporations, all the open boroughs--indeed, in every district of +the kingdom--there is some leading man, some agitator, some wealthy +merchant, or considerable manufacturer, some active attorney, some +popular preacher, some money-lender, &c., &c., who is followed by +the whole flock. This is the style of all free countries. + + +- Multum in Fabia valet hic, valet ille Velina; +Cuilibet hic fasces dabit eripietque curule. + + +These spirits, each of which informs and governs his own little orb, +are neither so many, nor so little powerful, nor so incorruptible, +but that a Minister may, as he does frequently, find means of +gaining them, and through them all their followers. To establish, +therefore, a very general influence among electors will no more be +found an impracticable project, than to gain an undue influence over +members of parliament. Therefore I am apprehensive that this bill, +though it shifts the place of the disorder, does by no means relieve +the Constitution. I went through almost every contested election in +the beginning of this parliament, and acted as a manager in very +many of them: by which, though at a school of pretty severe and +ragged discipline, I came to have some degree of instruction +concerning the means by which parliamentary interests are in general +procured and supported. + +Theory, I know, would suppose, that every general election is to the +representative a day of judgment, in which he appears before his +constituents to account for the use of the talent with which they +entrusted him, and of the improvement he had made of it for the +public advantage. It would be so, if every corruptible +representative were to find an enlightened and incorruptible +constituent. But the practice and knowledge of the world will not +suffer us to be ignorant, that the Constitution on paper is one +thing, and in fact and experience is another. We must know that the +candidate, instead of trusting at his election to the testimony of +his behaviour in parliament, must bring the testimony of a large sum +of money, the capacity of liberal expense in entertainments, the +power of serving and obliging the rulers of corporations, of winning +over the popular leaders of political clubs, associations, and +neighbourhoods. It is ten thousand times more necessary to show +himself a man of power, than a man of integrity, in almost all the +elections with which I have been acquainted. Elections, therefore, +become a matter of heavy expense; and if contests are frequent, to +many they will become a matter of an expense totally ruinous, which +no fortunes can bear; but least of all the landed fortunes, +encumbered as they often, indeed as they mostly are, with debts, +with portions, with jointures; and tied up in the hands of the +possessor by the limitations of settlement. It is a material, it is +in my opinion a lasting, consideration, in all the questions +concerning election. Let no one think the charges of election a +trivial matter. + +The charge, therefore, of elections ought never to be lost sight of, +in a question concerning their frequency, because the grand object +you seek is independence. Independence of mind will ever be more or +less influenced by independence of fortune; and if, every three +years, the exhausting sluices of entertainments, drinkings, open +houses, to say nothing of bribery, are to be periodically drawn up +and renewed--if government favours, for which now, in some shape or +other, the whole race of men are candidates, are to be called for +upon every occasion, I see that private fortunes will be washed +away, and every, even to the least, trace of independence, borne +down by the torrent. I do not seriously think this Constitution, +even to the wrecks of it, could survive five triennial elections. +If you are to fight the battle, you must put on the armour of the +Ministry; you must call in the public, to the aid of private, money. +The expense of the last election has been computed (and I am +persuaded that it has not been overrated) at 1,500,000 pounds; three +shillings in the pound more on the Land Tax. About the close of the +last Parliament, and the beginning of this, several agents for +boroughs went about, and I remember well that it was in every one of +their mouths--"Sir, your election will cost you three thousand +pounds, if you are independent; but if the Ministry supports you, it +may be done for two, and perhaps for less;" and, indeed, the thing +spoke itself. Where a living was to be got for one, a commission in +the army for another, a post in the navy for a third, and Custom- +house offices scattered about without measure or number, who doubts +but money may be saved? The Treasury may even add money; but, +indeed, it is superfluous. A gentleman of two thousand a year, who +meets another of the same fortune, fights with equal arms; but if to +one of the candidates you add a thousand a year in places for +himself, and a power of giving away as much among others, one must, +or there is no truth in arithmetical demonstration, ruin his +adversary, if he is to meet him and to fight with him every third +year. It will be said, I do not allow for the operation of +character; but I do; and I know it will have its weight in most +elections; perhaps it may be decisive in some. But there are few in +which it will prevent great expenses. + +The destruction of independent fortunes will be the consequence on +the part of the candidate. What will be the consequence of +triennial corruption, triennial drunkenness, triennial idleness, +triennial law-suits, litigations, prosecutions, triennial frenzy; of +society dissolved, industry interrupted, ruined; of those personal +hatreds that will never be suffered to soften; those animosities and +feuds, which will be rendered immortal; those quarrels, which are +never to be appeased; morals vitiated and gangrened to the vitals? +I think no stable and useful advantages were ever made by the money +got at elections by the voter, but all he gets is doubly lost to the +public; it is money given to diminish the general stock of the +community, which is the industry of the subject. I am sure that it +is a good while before he or his family settle again to their +business. Their heads will never cool; the temptations of elections +will be for ever glittering before their eyes. They will all grow +politicians; every one, quitting his business, will choose to enrich +himself by his vote. They will take the gauging-rod; new places +will be made for them; they will run to the Custom-house quay, their +looms and ploughs will be deserted. + +So was Rome destroyed by the disorders of continual elections, +though those of Rome were sober disorders. They had nothing but +faction, bribery, bread, and stage plays to debauch them. We have +the inflammation of liquor superadded, a fury hotter than any of +them. There the contest was only between citizen and citizen; here +you have the contests of ambitious citizens on one side, supported +by the Crown, to oppose to the efforts (let it be so) of private and +unsupported ambition on the other. Yet Rome was destroyed by the +frequency and charge of elections, and the monstrous expense of an +unremitted courtship to the people. I think, therefore, the +independent candidate and elector may each be destroyed by it, the +whole body of the community be an infinite sufferer, and a vicious +Ministry the only gainer. Gentlemen, I know, feel the weight of +this argument; they agree that this would be the consequence of more +frequent elections, if things were to continue as they are. But +they think the greatness and frequency of the evil would itself be a +remedy for it; that, sitting but for a short time, the member would +not find it worth while to make such vast expenses, while the fear +of their constituents will hold them the more effectually to their +duty. + +To this I answer, that experience is full against them. This is no +new thing; we have had triennial parliaments; at no period of time +were seats more eagerly contested. The expenses of elections ran +higher, taking the state of all charges, than they do now. The +expense of entertainments was such, that an Act, equally severe and +ineffectual, was made against it; every monument of the time bears +witness of the expense, and most of the Acts against corruption in +elections were then made; all the writers talked of it and lamented +it. Will any one think that a corporation will be contented with a +bowl of punch, or a piece of beef the less, because elections are +every three, instead of every seven years? Will they change their +wine for ale, because they are to get more ale three years hence? +Do not think it. Will they make fewer demands for the advantages of +patronage in favours and offices, because their member is brought +more under their power? We have not only our own historical +experience in England upon this subject, but we have the experience +co-existing with us in Ireland, where, since their Parliament has +been shortened, the expense of elections has been so far from being +lowered that it has been very near doubled. Formerly they sat for +the king's life; the ordinary charge of a seat in Parliament was +then 1,500 pounds. They now sit eight years, four sessions: it is +now 2,500 pounds and upwards. The spirit of emulation has also been +extremely increased, and all who are acquainted with the tone of +that country have no doubt that the spirit is still growing, that +new candidates will take the field, that the contests will be more +violent, and the expenses of elections larger than ever. + +It never can be otherwise. A seat in this House, for good purposes, +for bad purposes, for no purpose at all (except the mere +consideration derived from being concerned in the public councils) +will ever be a first-rate object of ambition in England. Ambition +is no exact calculator. Avarice itself does not calculate strictly +when it games. One thing is certain, that in this political game +the great lottery of power is that into which men will purchase with +millions of chances against them. In Turkey, where the place, where +the fortune, where the head itself, are so insecure, that scarcely +any have died in their beds for ages, so that the bowstring is the +natural death of Bashaws, yet in no country is power and distinction +(precarious enough, God knows, in all) sought for with such +boundless avidity, as if the value of place was enhanced by the +danger and insecurity of its tenure. Nothing will ever make a seat +in this House not an object of desire to numbers by any means or at +any charge, but the depriving it of all power and all dignity. This +would do it. This is the true and only nostrum for that purpose. +But a House of Commons without power and without dignity, either in +itself or its members, is no House of Commons for the purposes of +this Constitution. + +But they will be afraid to act ill, if they know that the day of +their account is always near. I wish it were true, but it is not; +here again we have experience, and experience is against us. The +distemper of this age is a poverty of spirit and of genius; it is +trifling, it is futile, worse than ignorant, superficially taught, +with the politics and morals of girls at a boarding-school, rather +than of men and statesmen; but it is not yet desperately wicked, or +so scandalously venal as in former times. Did not a triennial +parliament give up the national dignity, approve the Peace of +Utrecht, and almost give up everything else in taking every step to +defeat the Protestant succession? Was not the Constitution saved by +those who had no election at all to go to, the Lords, because the +Court applied to electors, and by various means carried them from +their true interests; so that the Tory Ministry had a majority +without an application to a single member? Now, as to the conduct +of the members, it was then far from pure and independent. Bribery +was infinitely more flagrant. A predecessor of yours, Mr. Speaker, +put the question of his own expulsion for bribery. Sir William +Musgrave was a wise man, a grave man, an independent man, a man of +good fortune and good family; however, he carried on while in +opposition a traffic, a shameful traffic with the Ministry. Bishop +Burnet knew of 6,000 pounds which he had received at one payment. I +believe the payment of sums in hard money--plain, naked bribery--is +rare amongst us. It was then far from uncommon. + +A triennial was near ruining, a septennial parliament saved, your +Constitution; nor perhaps have you ever known a more flourishing +period for the union of national prosperity, dignity, and liberty, +than the sixty years you have passed under that Constitution of +parliament. + +The shortness of time, in which they are to reap the profits of +iniquity, is far from checking the avidity of corrupt men; it +renders them infinitely more ravenous. They rush violently and +precipitately on their object, they lose all regard to decorum. The +moments of profit are precious; never are men so wicked as during a +general mortality. It was so in the great plague at Athens, every +symptom of which (and this its worst amongst the rest) is so finely +related by a great historian of antiquity. It was so in the plague +of London in 1665. It appears in soldiers, sailors, &c. Whoever +would contrive to render the life of man much shorter than it is, +would, I am satisfied, find the surest recipe for increasing the +wickedness of our nature. + +Thus, in my opinion, the shortness of a triennial sitting would have +the following ill effects:- It would make the member more +shamelessly and shockingly corrupt, it would increase his dependence +on those who could best support him at his election, it would wrack +and tear to pieces the fortunes of those who stood upon their own +fortunes and their private interest, it would make the electors +infinitely more venal, and it would make the whole body of the +people, who are, whether they have votes or not, concerned in +elections, more lawless, more idle, more debauched; it would utterly +destroy the sobriety, the industry, the integrity, the simplicity of +all the people, and undermine, I am much afraid, the deepest and +best laid foundations of the commonwealth. + +Those who have spoken and written upon this subject without doors, +do not so much deny the probable existence of these inconveniences +in their measure, as they trust for the prevention to remedies of +various sorts, which they propose. First, a place bill; but if this +will not do, as they fear it will not, then, they say, we will have +a rotation, and a certain number of you shall be rendered incapable +of being elected for ten years. Then, for the electors, they shall +ballot; the members of parliament also shall decide by ballot; and a +fifth project is the change of the present legal representation of +the kingdom. On all this I shall observe, that it will be very +unsuitable to your wisdom to adopt the project of a bill, to which +there are objections insuperable by anything in the bill itself, +upon the hope that those objections may be removed by subsequent +projects; every one of which is full of difficulties of its own, and +which are all of them very essential alterations in the +Constitution. This seems very irregular and unusual. If anything +should make this a very doubtful measure, what can make it more so +than that, in the opinion of its advocates, it would aggravate all +our old inconveniences in such a manner as to require a total +alteration in the Constitution of the kingdom? If the remedies are +proper in a triennial, they will not be less so in septennial +elections; let us try them first, see how the House relishes them, +see how they will operate in the nation; and then, having felt your +way, you will be prepared against these inconveniences. + +The honourable gentleman sees that I respect the principle upon +which he goes, as well as his intentions and his abilities. He will +believe that I do not differ from him wantonly, and on trivial +grounds. He is very sure that it was not his embracing one way +which determined me to take the other. I have not, in newspapers, +to derogate from his fair fame with the nation, printed the first +rude sketch of his bill with ungenerous and invidious comments. I +have not, in conversations industriously circulated about the town, +and talked on the benches of this House, attributed his conduct to +motives low and unworthy, and as groundless as they are injurious. +I do not affect to be frightened with this proposition, as if some +hideous spectre had started from hell, which was to be sent back +again by every form of exorcism, and every kind of incantation. I +invoke no Acheron to overwhelm him in the whirlpools of his muddy +gulf. I do not tell the respectable mover and seconder, by a +perversion of their sense and expressions, that their proposition +halts between the ridiculous and the dangerous. I am not one of +those who start up three at a time, and fall upon and strike at him +with so much eagerness, that our daggers hack one another in his +sides. My honourable friend has not brought down a spirited imp of +chivalry, to win the first achievement and blazon of arms on his +milk-white shield in a field listed against him, nor brought out the +generous offspring of lions, and said to them, "Not against that +side of the forest, beware of that--here is the prey where you are +to fasten your paws;" and seasoning his unpractised jaws with blood, +tell him, "This is the milk for which you are to thirst hereafter." +We furnish at his expense no holiday, nor suspend hell that a crafty +Ixion may have rest from his wheel; nor give the common adversary, +if he be a common adversary, reason to say, "I would have put in my +word to oppose, but the eagerness of your allies in your social war +was such that I could not break in upon you." I hope he sees and +feels, and that every member sees and feels along with him, the +difference between amicable dissent and civil discord. + + + +SPEECH ON REFORM OF REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS +June, 1784 + + + +Mr. Speaker,--We have now discovered, at the close of the eighteenth +century, that the Constitution of England, which for a series of +ages had been the proud distinction of this country, always the +admiration, and sometimes the envy, of the wise and learned in every +other nation--we have discovered that this boasted Constitution, in +the most boasted part of it, is a gross imposition upon the +understanding of mankind, an insult to their feelings, and acting by +contrivances destructive to the best and most valuable interests of +the people. Our political architects have taken a survey of the +fabric of the British Constitution. It is singular that they report +nothing against the Crown, nothing against the Lords; but in the +House of Commons everything is unsound; it is ruinous in every part. +It is infested by the dry rot, and ready to tumble about our ears +without their immediate help. You know by the faults they find what +are their ideas of the alteration. As all government stands upon +opinion, they know that the way utterly to destroy it is to remove +that opinion, to take away all reverence, all confidence from it; +and then, at the first blast of public discontent and popular +tumult, it tumbles to the ground. + +In considering this question, they who oppose it, oppose it on +different grounds; one is in the nature of a previous question--that +some alterations may be expedient, but that this is not the time for +making them. The other is, that no essential alterations are at all +wanting, and that neither now, nor at any time, is it prudent or +safe to be meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient +tried usages of our Constitution--that our representation is as +nearly perfect as the necessary imperfection of human affairs and of +human creatures will suffer it to be; and that it is a subject of +prudent and honest use and thankful enjoyment, and not of captious +criticism and rash experiment. + +On the other side, there are two parties, who proceed on two +grounds--in my opinion, as they state them, utterly irreconcilable. +The one is juridical, the other political. The one is in the nature +of a claim of right, on the supposed rights of man as man; this +party desire the decision of a suit. The other ground, as far as I +can divine what it directly means, is, that the representation is +not so politically framed as to answer the theory of its +institution. As to the claim of right, the meanest petitioner, the +most gross and ignorant, is as good as the best; in some respects +his claim is more favourable on account of his ignorance; his +weakness, his poverty and distress only add to his titles; he sues +in forma pauperis: he ought to be a favourite of the Court. But +when the other ground is taken, when the question is political, when +a new Constitution is to be made on a sound theory of government, +then the presumptuous pride of didactic ignorance is to be excluded +from the council in this high and arduous matter, which often bids +defiance to the experience of the wisest. The first claims a +personal representation; the latter rejects it with scorn and +fervour. The language of the first party is plain and intelligible; +they who plead an absolute right, cannot be satisfied with anything +short of personal representation, because all natural rights must be +the rights of individuals: as by nature there is no such thing as +politic or corporate personality; all these ideas are mere fictions +of law, they are creatures of voluntary institution; men as men are +individuals, and nothing else. They, therefore, who reject the +principle of natural and personal representation, are essentially +and eternally at variance with those who claim it. As to the first +sort of reformers, it is ridiculous to talk to them of the British +Constitution upon any or all of its bases; for they lay it down, +that every man ought to govern himself, and that where he cannot go +himself he must send his representative; that all other government +is usurpation, and is so far from having a claim to our obedience, +that it is not only our right, but our duty, to resist it. Nine- +tenths of the reformers argue thus--that is, on the natural right. +It is impossible not to make some reflection on the nature of this +claim, or avoid a comparison between the extent of the principle and +the present object of the demand. If this claim be founded, it is +clear to what it goes. The House of Commons, in that light, +undoubtedly is no representative of the people as a collection of +individuals. Nobody pretends it, nobody can justify such an +assertion. When you come to examine into this claim of right, +founded on the right of self-government in each individual, you find +the thing demanded infinitely short of the principle of the demand. +What! one-third only of the legislature, of the government no share +at all? What sort of treaty of partition is this for those who have +no inherent right to the whole? Give them all they ask, and your +grant is still a cheat; for how comes only a third to be their +younger children's fortune in this settlement? How came they +neither to have the choice of kings, or lords, or judges, or +generals, or admirals, or bishops, or priests, or ministers, or +justices of peace? Why, what have you to answer in favour of the +prior rights of the Crown and peerage but this--our Constitution is +a proscriptive Constitution; it is a Constitution whose sole +authority is, that it has existed time out of mind. It is settled +in these two portions against one, legislatively; and in the whole +of the judicature, the whole of the federal capacity, of the +executive, the prudential and the financial administration, in one +alone. Nor were your House of Lords and the prerogatives of the +Crown settled on any adjudication in favour of natural rights, for +they could never be so portioned. Your king, your lords, your +judges, your juries, grand and little, all are prescriptive; and +what proves it is the disputes not yet concluded, and never near +becoming so, when any of them first originated. Prescription is the +most solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is to +secure that property, to government. They harmonise with each +other, and give mutual aid to one another. It is accompanied with +another ground of authority in the constitution of the human mind-- +presumption. It is a presumption in favour of any settled scheme of +government against any untried project, that a nation has long +existed and flourished under it. It is a better presumption even of +the choice of a nation, far better than any sudden and temporary +arrangement by actual election. Because a nation is not an idea +only of local extent, and individual momentary aggregation, but it +is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in +numbers and in space. And this is a choice not of one day, or one +set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate +election of ages and of generations; it is a Constitution made by +what is ten thousand times better than choice--it is made by the +peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, +civil, and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves +only in a long space of time. It is a vestment, which accommodates +itself to the body. Nor is prescription of government formed upon +blind, unmeaning prejudices--for man is a most unwise, and a most +wise being. The individual is foolish. The multitude, for the +moment, are foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the +species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it +almost always acts right. + +The reason for the Crown as it is, for the Lords as they are, is my +reason for the Commons as they are, the electors as they are. Now, +if the Crown and the Lords, and the judicatures, are all +prescriptive, so is the House of Commons of the very same origin, +and of no other. We and our electors have powers and privileges +both made and circumscribed by prescription, as much to the full as +the other parts; and as such we have always claimed them, and on no +other title. The House of Commons is a legislative body corporate +by prescription, not made upon any given theory, but existing +prescriptively--just like the rest. This prescription has made it +essentially what it is--an aggregate collection of three parts-- +knights, citizens, burgesses. The question is, whether this has +been always so, since the House of Commons has taken its present +shape and circumstances, and has been an essential operative part of +the Constitution; which, I take it, it has been for at least five +hundred years. + +This I resolve to myself in the affirmative: and then another +question arises; whether this House stands firm upon its ancient +foundations, and is not, by time and accidents, so declined from its +perpendicular as to want the hand of the wise and experienced +architects of the day to set it upright again, and to prop and +buttress it up for duration;--whether it continues true to the +principles upon which it has hitherto stood;--whether this be de +facto the Constitution of the House of Commons as it has been since +the time that the House of Commons has, without dispute, become a +necessary and an efficient part of the British Constitution? To ask +whether a thing, which has always been the same, stands to its usual +principle, seems to me to be perfectly absurd; for how do you know +the principles but from the construction? and if that remains the +same, the principles remain the same. It is true, that to say your +Constitution is what it has been, is no sufficient defence for those +who say it is a bad Constitution. It is an answer to those who say +that it is a degenerate Constitution. To those who say it is a bad +one, I answer, Look to its effects. In all moral machinery the +moral results are its test. + +On what grounds do we go to restore our Constitution to what it has +been at some given period, or to reform and reconstruct it upon +principles more conformable to a sound theory of government? A +prescriptive government, such as ours, never was the work of any +legislator, never was made upon any foregone theory. It seems to me +a preposterous way of reasoning, and a perfect confusion of ideas, +to take the theories, which learned and speculative men have made +from that government, and then, supposing it made on these theories, +which were made from it, to accuse the government as not +corresponding with them. I do not vilify theory and speculation-- +no, because that would be to vilify reason itself. "Neque decipitur +ratio, neque decipit unquam." No; whenever I speak against theory, +I mean always a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded, or imperfect +theory; and one of the ways of discovering that it is a false theory +is by comparing it with practice. This is the true touchstone of +all theories which regard man and the affairs of men: Does it suit +his nature in general?--does it suit his nature as modified by his +habits? + +The more frequently this affair is discussed, the stronger the case +appears to the sense and the feelings of mankind. I have no more +doubt than I entertain of my existence, that this very thing, which +is stated as a horrible thing, is the means of the preservation of +our Constitution whilst it lasts: of curing it of many of the +disorders which, attending every species of institution, would +attend the principle of an exact local representation, or a +representation on the principle of numbers. If you reject personal +representation, you are pushed upon expedience; and then what they +wish us to do is, to prefer their speculations on that subject to +the happy experience of this country of a growing liberty and a +growing prosperity for five hundred years. Whatever respect I have +for their talents, this, for one, I will not do. Then what is the +standard of expedience? Expedience is that which is good for the +community, and good for every individual in it. Now this expedience +is the desideratum to be sought, either without the experience of +means, or with that experience. If without, as in the case of the +fabrication of a new commonwealth, I will hear the learned arguing +what promises to be expedient; but if we are to judge of a +commonwealth actually existing, the first thing I inquire is, What +has been found expedient or inexpedient? And I will not take their +promise rather than the performance of the Constitution. + +But no; this was not the cause of the discontents. I went through +most of the northern parts--the Yorkshire election was then raging; +the year before, through most of the western counties--Bath, +Bristol, Gloucester--not one word, either in the towns or country, +on the subject of representation; much on the receipt tax, something +on Mr. Fox's ambition; much greater apprehension of danger from +thence than from want of representation. One would think that the +ballast of the ship was shifted with us, and that our Constitution +had the gunnel under water. But can you fairly and distinctly point +out what one evil or grievance has happened, which you can refer to +the representative not following the opinion of his constituents? +What one symptom do we find of this inequality? But it is not an +arithmetical inequality with which we ought to trouble ourselves. +If there be a moral, a political equality, this is the desideratum +in our Constitution, and in every Constitution in the world. Moral +inequality is as between places and between classes. Now, I ask, +what advantage do you find, that the places which abound in +representation possess over others in which it is more scanty, in +security for freedom, in security for justice, or in any one of +those means of procuring temporal prosperity and eternal happiness, +the ends for which society was formed? Are the local interests of +Cornwall and Wiltshire, for instance--their roads, canals, their +prisons, their police--better than Yorkshire, Warwickshire, or +Staffordshire? Warwick has members; is Warwick or Stafford more +opulent, happy, or free, than Newcastle or than Birmingham? Is +Wiltshire the pampered favourite, whilst Yorkshire, like the child +of the bondwoman, is turned out to the desert? This is like the +unhappy persons who live, if they can be said to live, in the +statical chair; who are ever feeling their pulse, and who do not +judge of health by the aptitude of the body to perform its +functions, but by their ideas of what ought to be the true balance +between the several secretions. Is a committee of Cornwall, &c., +thronged, and the others deserted? No. You have an equal +representation, because you have men equally interested in the +prosperity of the whole, who are involved in the general interest +and the general sympathy; and perhaps these places, furnishing a +superfluity of public agents and administrators (whether, in +strictness, they are representatives or not, I do not mean to +inquire, but they are agents and administrators), will stand clearer +of local interests, passions, prejudices, and cabals than the +others, and therefore preserve the balance of the parts, and with a +more general view and a more steady hand than the rest. + +In every political proposal we must not leave out of the question +the political views and object of the proposer; and these we +discover, not by what he says, but by the principles he lays down. +"I mean," says he, "a moderate and temperate reform;" that is, "I +mean to do as little good as possible. If the Constitution be what +you represent it, and there be no danger in the change, you do wrong +not to make the reform commensurate to the abuse." Fine reformer, +indeed! generous donor! What is the cause of this parsimony of the +liberty which you dole out to the people? Why all this limitation +in giving blessings and benefits to mankind? You admit that there +is an extreme in liberty, which may be infinitely noxious to those +who are to receive it, and which in the end will leave them no +liberty at all. I think so too; they know it, and they feel it. +The question is, then, What is the standard of that extreme? What +that gentleman, and the associations, or some parts of their +phalanxes, think proper. Then our liberties are in their pleasure; +it depends on their arbitrary will how far I shall be free. I will +have none of that freedom. If, therefore, the standard of +moderation be sought for, I will seek for it. Where? Not in their +fancies, nor in my own: I will seek for it where I know it is to be +found--in the Constitution I actually enjoy. Here it says to an +encroaching prerogative--"Your sceptre has its length; you cannot +add a hair to your head, or a gem to your crown, but what an eternal +law has given to it." Here it says to an overweening peerage--"Your +pride finds banks that it cannot overflow;" here to a tumultuous and +giddy people--"There is a bound to the raging of the sea." Our +Constitution is like our island, which uses and restrains its +subject sea; in vain the waves roar. In that Constitution I know, +and exultingly I feel, both that I am free and that I am not free +dangerously to myself or to others. I know that no power on earth, +acting as I ought to do, can touch my life, my liberty, or my +property. I have that inward and dignified consciousness of my own +security and independence, which constitutes, and is the only thing +which does constitute, the proud and comfortable sentiment of +freedom in the human breast. I know, too, and I bless God for my +safe mediocrity; I know that if I possessed all the talents of the +gentlemen on the side of the House I sit, and on the other, I +cannot, by royal favour, or by popular delusion, or by oligarchical +cabal, elevate myself above a certain very limited point, so as to +endanger my own fall or the ruin of my country. I know there is an +order that keeps things fast in their place; it is made to us, and +we are made to it. Why not ask another wife, other children, +another body, another mind? + +The great object of most of these reformers is to prepare the +destruction of the Constitution, by disgracing and discrediting the +House of Commons. For they think--prudently, in my opinion--that if +they can persuade the nation that the House of Commons is so +constituted as not to secure the public liberty; not to have a +proper connection with the public interests; so constituted as not, +either actually or virtually, to be the representative of the +people, it will be easy to prove that a government composed of a +monarchy, an oligarchy chosen by the Crown, and such a House of +Commons, whatever good can be in such a system, can by no means be a +system of free government. + +The Constitution of England is never to have a quietus; it is to be +continually vilified, attacked, reproached, resisted; instead of +being the hope and sure anchor in all storms, instead of being the +means of redress to all grievances, itself is the grand grievance of +the nation, our shame instead of our glory. If the only specific +plan proposed--individual, personal representation--is directly +rejected by the person who is looked on as the great support of this +business, then the only way of considering it is as a question of +convenience. An honourable gentleman prefers the individual to the +present. He therefore himself sees no middle term whatsoever, and +therefore prefers of what he sees the individual; this is the only +thing distinct and sensible that has been advocated. He has then a +scheme, which is the individual representation; he is not at a loss, +not inconsistent--which scheme the other right honourable gentleman +reprobates. Now, what does this go to, but to lead directly to +anarchy? For to discredit the only government which he either +possesses or can project, what is this but to destroy all +government; and this is anarchy. My right honourable friend, in +supporting this motion, disgraces his friends and justifies his +enemies, in order to blacken the Constitution of his country, even +of that House of Commons which supported him. There is a difference +between a moral or political exposure of a public evil, relative to +the administration of government, whether in men or systems, and a +declaration of defects, real or supposed, in the fundamental +Constitution of your country. The first may be cured in the +individual by the motives of religion, virtue, honour, fear, shame, +or interest. Men may be made to abandon, also, false systems by +exposing their absurdity or mischievous tendency to their own better +thoughts, or to the contempt or indignation of the public; and after +all, if they should exist, and exist uncorrected, they only disgrace +individuals as fugitive opinions. But it is quite otherwise with +the frame and Constitution of the State; if that is disgraced, +patriotism is destroyed in its very source. No man has ever +willingly obeyed, much less was desirous of defending with his +blood, a mischievous and absurd scheme of government. Our first, +our dearest, most comprehensive relation, our country, is gone. + +It suggests melancholy reflections, in consequence of the strange +course we have long held, that we are now no longer quarrelling +about the character, or about the conduct of men, or the tenor of +measures; but we are grown out of humour with the English +Constitution itself; this is become the object of the animosity of +Englishmen. This Constitution in former days used to be the +admiration and the envy of the world; it was the pattern for +politicians; the theme of the eloquent; the meditation of the +philosopher in every part of the world. As to Englishmen, it was +their pride, their consolation. By it they lived, for it they were +ready to die. Its defects, if it had any, were partly covered by +partiality, and partly borne by prudence. Now all its excellencies +are forgotten, its faults are now forcibly dragged into day, +exaggerated by every artifice of representation. It is despised and +rejected of men; and every device and invention of ingenuity, or +idleness, set up in opposition or in preference to it. It is to +this humour, and it is to the measures growing out of it, that I set +myself (I hope not alone) in the most determined opposition. Never +before did we at any time in this country meet upon the theory of +our frame of government, to sit in judgment on the Constitution of +our country, to call it as a delinquent before us, and to accuse it +of every defect and every vice; to see whether it, an object of our +veneration, even our adoration, did or did not accord with a +preconceived scheme in the minds of certain gentlemen. Cast your +eyes on the journals of Parliament. It is for fear of losing the +inestimable treasure we have, that I do not venture to game it out +of my hands for the vain hope of improving it. I look with filial +reverence on the Constitution of my country, and never will cut it +in pieces, and put it into the kettle of any magician, in order to +boil it, with the puddle of their compounds, into youth and vigour. +On the contrary, I will drive away such pretenders; I will nurse its +venerable age, and with lenient arts extend a parent's breath. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg Etext Thoughts on Present Discontents by Burke + |