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diff --git a/2173-h/2173-h.htm b/2173-h/2173-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43c3771 --- /dev/null +++ b/2173-h/2173-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5112 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Thoughts on the Present Discontents</title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + H1, H2 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + } + H3, H4 { + text-align: left; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + TD { vertical-align: top; } + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + color: gray;} + + .citation {vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h2> +<a href="#startoftext">Thoughts on the Present Discontents, by Edmund Burke</a> +</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, by +Edmund Burke, Edited by Henry Morley + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Thoughts on the Present Discontents + and Speeches + + +Author: Edmund Burke + +Editor: Henry Morley + +Release Date: May 7, 2007 [eBook #2173] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT +DISCONTENTS*** +</pre> +<p><a name="startoftext"></a></p> +<p>Transcribed from the 1886 Cassell & Company edition by +David Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org and proofing by David, Terry +L. Jeffress, Edgar A. Howard.</p> +<h1>THOUGHTS<br /> +ON THE<br /> +PRESENT DISCONTENTS,<br /> +AND<br /> +SPEECHES</h1> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="smcap">by</span><br /> +EDMUND BURKE.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">CASSELL & COMPANY, <span +class="smcap">Limited</span>:<br /> +<span class="smcap"><i>london</i></span>, <span +class="smcap"><i>paris</i></span>, <span class="smcap"><i>new +york & melbourne</i></span>.<br /> +1886.</p> +<p>Contents</p> +<p>Introduction<br /> +Thoughts on the Present Discontents<br /> +Speech on the Middlesex Election.<br /> +Speech on the Powers of Juries in Prosecutions for Libels.<br /> +Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments<br /> +Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons</p> +<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> +<p>Edmund Burke was born at Dublin on the first of January, +1730. His father was an attorney, who had fifteen children, +of whom all but four died in their youth. Edmund, the +second son, being of delicate health in his childhood, was taught +at home and at his grandfather’s house in the country +before he was sent with his two brothers Garrett and Richard to a +school at Ballitore, under Abraham Shackleton, a member of the +Society of Friends. For nearly forty years afterwards Burke +paid an annual visit to Ballitore.</p> +<p>In 1744, after leaving school, Burke entered Trinity College, +Dublin. He graduated B.A. in 1748; M.A., 1751. In +1750 he came to London, to the Middle Temple. In 1756 Burke +became known as a writer, by two pieces. One was a pamphlet +called “A Vindication of Natural Society.” This +was an ironical piece, reducing to absurdity those theories of +the excellence of uncivilised humanity which were gathering +strength in France, and had been favoured in the philosophical +works of Bolingbroke, then lately published. Burke’s +other work published in 1756, was his “Essay on the Sublime +and Beautiful.”</p> +<p>At this time Burke’s health broke down. He was +cared for in the house of a kindly physician, Dr. Nugent, and the +result was that in the spring of 1757 he married Dr. +Nugent’s daughter. In the following year Burke made +Samuel Johnson’s acquaintance, and acquaintance ripened +fast into close friendship. In 1758, also, a son was born; +and, as a way of adding to his income, Burke suggested the plan +of “The Annual Register.”</p> +<p>In 1761 Burke became private secretary to William Gerard +Hamilton, who was then appointed Chief Secretary to +Ireland. In April, 1763, Burke’s services were +recognised by a pension of £300 a year; but he threw this +up in April, 1765, when he found that his services were +considered to have been not only recognised, but also +bought. On the 10th of July in that year (1765) Lord +Rockingham became Premier, and a week later Burke, through the +good offices of an admiring friend who had come to know him in +the newly-founded Turk’s Head Club, became +Rockingham’s private secretary. He was now the +mainstay, if not the inspirer, of Rockingham’s policy of +pacific compromise in the vexed questions between England and the +American colonies. Burke’s elder brother, who had +lately succeeded to his father’s property, died also in +1765, and Burke sold the estate in Cork for £4,000.</p> +<p>Having become private secretary to Lord Rockingham, Burke +entered Parliament as member for Wendover, and promptly took his +place among the leading speakers in the House.</p> +<p>On the 30th of July, 1766, the Rockingham Ministry went out, +and Burke wrote a defence of its policy in “A Short Account +of a late Short Administration.” In 1768 Burke bought +for £23,000 an estate called Gregories or Butler’s +Court, about a mile from Beaconsfield. He called it by the +more territorial name of Beaconsfield, and made it his +home. Burke’s endeavours to stay the policy that was +driving the American colonies to revolution, caused the State of +New York, in 1771, to nominate him as its agent. About May, +1769, Edmund Burke began the pamphlet here given, <i>Thoughts on +the Present Discontents</i>. It was published in 1770, and +four editions of it were issued before the end of the year. +It was directed chiefly against Court influence, that had first +been used successfully against the Rockingham Ministry. +Allegiance to Rockingham caused Burke to write the pamphlet, but +he based his argument upon essentials of his own faith as a +statesman. It was the beginning of the larger utterance of +his political mind.</p> +<p>Court influence was strengthened in those days by the large +number of newly-rich men, who bought their way into the House of +Commons for personal reasons and could easily be attached to the +King’s party. In a population of 8,000,000 there were +then but 160,000 electors, mostly nominal. The great +land-owners generally held the counties. When two great +houses disputed the county of York, the election lasted fourteen +days, and the costs, chiefly in bribery, were said to have +reached three hundred thousand pounds. Many seats in +Parliament were regarded as hereditary possessions, which could +be let at rental, or to which the nominations could be +sold. Town corporations often let, to the highest bidders, +seats in Parliament, for the benefit of the town funds. The +election of John Wilkes for Middlesex, in 1768, was taken as a +triumph of the people. The King and his ministers then +brought the House of Commons into conflict with the freeholders +of Westminster. Discontent became active and general. +“Junius” began, in his letters, to attack boldly the +King’s friends, and into the midst of the discontent was +thrown a message from the Crown asking for half a million, to +make good a shortcoming in the Civil List. Men asked in +vain what had been done with the lost money. Confusion at +home was increased by the great conflict with the American +colonies; discontents, ever present, were colonial as well as +home. In such a time Burke endeavoured to show by what +pilotage he would have men weather the storm.</p> +<p style="text-align: right">H. M.</p> +<h2>THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS</h2> +<p>It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy to examine +into the cause of public disorders. If a man happens not to +succeed in such an inquiry, he will be thought weak and +visionary; if he touches the true grievance, there is a danger +that he may come near to persons of weight and consequence, who +will rather be exasperated at the discovery of their errors than +thankful for the occasion of correcting them. If he should +be obliged to blame the favourites of the people, he will be +considered as the tool of power; if he censures those in power, +he will be looked on as an instrument of faction. But in +all exertions of duty something is to be hazarded. In cases +of tumult and disorder, our law has invested every man, in some +sort, with the authority of a magistrate. When the affairs +of the nation are distracted, private people are, by the spirit +of that law, justified in stepping a little out of their ordinary +sphere. They enjoy a privilege of somewhat more dignity and +effect than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of their +country. They may look into them narrowly; they may reason +upon them liberally; and if they should be so fortunate as to +discover the true source of the mischief, and to suggest any +probable method of removing it, though they may displease the +rulers for the day, they are certainly of service to the cause of +Government. Government is deeply interested in everything +which, even through the medium of some temporary uneasiness, may +tend finally to compose the minds of the subjects, and to +conciliate their affections. I have nothing to do here with +the abstract value of the voice of the people. But as long +as reputation, the most precious possession of every individual, +and as long as opinion, the great support of the State, depend +entirely upon that voice, it can never be considered as a thing +of little consequence either to individuals or to +Government. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws; less +by violence. Whatever original energy may be supposed +either in force or regulation, the operation of both is, in +truth, merely instrumental. Nations are governed by the +same methods, and on the same principles, by which an individual +without authority is often able to govern those who are his +equals or his superiors, by a knowledge of their temper, and by a +judicious management of it; I mean, when public affairs are +steadily and quietly conducted: not when Government is nothing +but a continued scuffle between the magistrate and the multitude, +in which sometimes the one and sometimes the other is +uppermost—in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a +series of contemptible victories and scandalous +submissions. The temper of the people amongst whom he +presides ought therefore to be the first study of a +statesman. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no +means impossible for him to attain, if he has not an interest in +being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.</p> +<p>To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present +possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant +hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greater +part of mankind—indeed, the necessary effects of the +ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and +humours have existed in all times; yet as all times have +<i>not</i> been alike, true political sagacity manifests itself, +in distinguishing that complaint which only characterises the +general infirmity of human nature from those which are symptoms +of the particular distemperature of our own air and season.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>Nobody, I believe, will consider it merely as the language of +spleen or disappointment, if I say that there is something +particularly alarming in the present conjuncture. There is +hardly a man, in or out of power, who holds any other +language. That Government is at once dreaded and contemned; +that the laws are despoiled of all their respected and salutary +terrors; that their inaction is a subject of ridicule, and their +exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office, and title, and all +the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost their reverence +and effect; that our foreign politics are as much deranged as our +domestic economy; that our dependencies are slackened in their +affection, and loosened from their obedience; that we know +neither how to yield nor how to enforce; that hardly anything +above or below, abroad or at home, is sound and entire; but that +disconnection and confusion, in offices, in parties, in families, +in Parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the disorders of any +former time: these are facts universally admitted and +lamented.</p> +<p>This state of things is the more extraordinary, because the +great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are +known to be in a manner entirely dissolved. No great +external calamity has visited the nation; no pestilence or +famine. We do not labour at present under any scheme of +taxation new or oppressive in the quantity or in the mode. +Nor are we engaged in unsuccessful war, in which our misfortunes +might easily pervert our judgment, and our minds, sore from the +loss of national glory, might feel every blow of fortune as a +crime in Government.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>It is impossible that the cause of this strange distemper +should not sometimes become a subject of discourse. It is a +compliment due, and which I willingly pay, to those who +administer our affairs, to take notice in the first place of +their speculation. Our Ministers are of opinion that the +increase of our trade and manufactures, that our growth by +colonisation and by conquest, have concurred to accumulate +immense wealth in the hands of some individuals; and this again +being dispersed amongst the people, has rendered them universally +proud, ferocious, and ungovernable; that the insolence of some +from their enormous wealth, and the boldness of others from a +guilty poverty, have rendered them capable of the most atrocious +attempts; so that they have trampled upon all subordination, and +violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free +Government—barriers too feeble against the fury of a +populace so fierce and licentious as ours. They contend +that no adequate provocation has been given for so spreading a +discontent, our affairs having been conducted throughout with +remarkable temper and consummate wisdom. The wicked +industry of some libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few +disappointed politicians, have, in their opinion, been able to +produce this unnatural ferment in the nation.</p> +<p>Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the present +convulsions of this country, if the above account be a true +one. I confess I shall assent to it with great reluctance, +and only on the compulsion of the clearest and firmest proofs; +because their account resolves itself into this short but +discouraging proposition, “That we have a very good +Ministry, but that we are a very bad people;” that we set +ourselves to bite the hand that feeds us; that with a malignant +insanity we oppose the measures, and ungratefully vilify the +persons, of those whose sole object is our own peace and +prosperity. If a few puny libellers, acting under a knot of +factious politicians, without virtue, parts, or character (such +they are constantly represented by these gentlemen), are +sufficient to excite this disturbance, very perverse must be the +disposition of that people amongst whom such a disturbance can be +excited by such means. It is besides no small aggravation +of the public misfortune that the disease, on this hypothesis, +appears to be without remedy. If the wealth of the nation +be the cause of its turbulence, I imagine it is not proposed to +introduce poverty as a constable to keep the peace. If our +dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank +luxuriance of sedition, it is not intended to cut them off in +order to famish the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the +executive power, there is no design, I hope, to call in the aid +of despotism to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever +may be intended, these things are not yet professed. We +seem therefore to be driven to absolute despair, for we have no +other materials to work upon but those out of which God has been +pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these be +radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said is that +those men are very unhappy to whose fortune or duty it falls to +administer the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it +indeed sometimes asserted that a steady perseverance in the +present measures, and a rigorous punishment of those who oppose +them, will in course of time infallibly put an end to these +disorders. But this, in my opinion, is said without much +observation of our present disposition, and without any knowledge +at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of +which this nation is composed be so very fermentable as these +gentlemen describe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it +up, as long as discontent, revenge, and ambition have existence +in the world. Particular punishments are the cure for +accidental distempers in the State; they inflame rather than +allay those heats which arise from the settled mismanagement of +the Government, or from a natural ill disposition in the +people. It is of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in +the use of strong measures, and firmness is then only a virtue +when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom. In truth, +inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective of folly and +ignorance.</p> +<p>I am not one of those who think that the people are never in +the wrong. They have been so, frequently and outrageously, +both in other countries and in this. But I do say that in +all disputes between them and their rulers the presumption is at +least upon a par in favour of the people. Experience may +perhaps justify me in going further. When popular +discontents have been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed and +supported that there has been generally something found amiss in +the constitution or in the conduct of Government. The +people have no interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it +is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing +part of the State it is far otherwise. They certainly may +act ill by design, as well as by mistake. “Les +révolutions qui arrivent dans les grands états ne +sont point un effect du hasard, ni du caprice des peuples. +Rien ne révolte les grands d’un royaume comme un +Gouvernoment foible et dérangé. Pour la +populace, ce n’est jamais par envie d’attaquer +qu’elle se soulève, mais par impatience de +souffrir.” These are the words of a great man, of a +Minister of State, and a zealous assertor of Monarchy. They +are applied to the system of favouritism which was adopted by +Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful consequences it +produced. What he says of revolutions is equally true of +all great disturbances. If this presumption in favour of +the subjects against the trustees of power be not the more +probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation, +because it is more easy to change an Administration than to +reform a people.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the +cause, the presumptions stand equally balanced between the +parties, there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a +fair hearing who attempts some other scheme besides that easy one +which is fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account +for the present discontents. It is not to be argued that we +endure no grievance, because our grievances are not of the same +sort with those under which we laboured formerly—not +precisely those which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on +the Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs +of this country. For in the silent lapse of events as +material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the +policy and character of governments and nations as those which +have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions.</p> +<p>It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings +concerning public misconduct; as rare to be right in their +speculation upon the cause of it. I have constantly +observed that the generality of people are fifty years, at least, +behindhand in their politics. There are but very few who +are capable of comparing and digesting what passes before their +eyes at different times and occasions, so as to form the whole +into a distinct system. But in books everything is settled +for them, without the exertion of any considerable diligence or +sagacity. For which reason men are wise with but little +reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of +all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and +tolerably enlightened judges of the transactions of past ages; +where no passions deceive, and where the whole train of +circumstances, from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is +set in an orderly series before us. Few are the partisans +of departed tyranny; and to be a Whig on the business of a +hundred years ago is very consistent with every advantage of +present servility. This retrospective wisdom and historical +patriotism are things of wonderful convenience, and serve +admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between speculation and +practice. Many a stern republican, after gorging himself +with a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and +of our true Saxon constitution, and discharging all the splendid +bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, +sits down perfectly satisfied to the coarsest work and homeliest +job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no +professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments of +the last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was +there, I dare say, to be found a single advocate for the +favourites of Richard the Second.</p> +<p>No complaisance to our Court, or to our age, can make me +believe nature to be so changed but that public liberty will be +among us, as among our ancestors, obnoxious to some person or +other, and that opportunities will be furnished for attempting, +at least, some alteration to the prejudice of our +constitution. These attempts will naturally vary in their +mode, according to times and circumstances. For ambition, +though it has ever the same general views, has not at all times +the same means, nor the same particular objects. A great +deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags; the +rest is entirely out of fashion. Besides, there are few +statesmen so very clumsy and awkward in their business as to fall +into the identical snare which has proved fatal to their +predecessors. When an arbitrary imposition is attempted +upon the subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead +the name of <i>Ship-money</i>. There is no danger that an +extension of the <i>Forest laws</i> should be the chosen mode of +oppression in this age. And when we hear any instance of +ministerial rapacity to the prejudice of the rights of private +life, it will certainly not be the exaction of two hundred +pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her own +husband.</p> +<p>Every age has its own manners, and its politics dependent upon +them; and the same attempts will not be made against a +constitution fully formed and matured, that were used to destroy +it in the cradle, or to resist its growth during its infancy.</p> +<p>Against the being of Parliament, I am satisfied, no designs +have ever been entertained since the Revolution. Every one +must perceive that it is strongly the interest of the Court to +have some second cause interposed between the Ministers and the +people. The gentlemen of the House of Commons have an +interest equally strong in sustaining the part of that +intermediate cause. However they may hire out the +<i>usufruct</i> of their voices, they never will part with the +<i>fee and inheritance</i>. Accordingly those who have been +of the most known devotion to the will and pleasure of a Court, +have at the same time been most forward in asserting a high +authority in the House of Commons. When they knew who were +to use that authority, and how it was to be employed, they +thought it never could be carried too far. It must be +always the wish of an unconstitutional statesman, that a House of +Commons who are entirely dependent upon him, should have every +right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. +It was soon discovered that the forms of a free, and the ends of +an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether +incompatible.</p> +<p>The power of the Crown, almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, +has grown up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, +under the name of Influence. An influence which operated +without noise and without violence; an influence which converted +the very antagonist into the instrument of power; which contained +in itself a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and +which the distresses and the prosperity of the country equally +tended to augment, was an admirable substitute for a prerogative +that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had +moulded in its original stamina irresistible principles of decay +and dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom +but for a temporary system; the interest of active men in the +State is a foundation perpetual and infallible. However, +some circumstances, arising, it must be confessed, in a great +degree from accident, prevented the effects of this influence for +a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any +serious apprehensions. Although Government was strong and +flourished exceedingly, the <i>Court</i> had drawn far less +advantage than one would imagine from this great source of +power.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>At the Revolution, the Crown, deprived, for the ends of the +Revolution itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to +struggle against all the difficulties which pressed so new and +unsettled a Government. The Court was obliged therefore to +delegate a part of its powers to men of such interest as could +support, and of such fidelity as would adhere to, its +establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater +number to a concurrence in the common defence. This +connection, necessary at first, continued long after convenient; +and properly conducted might indeed, in all situations, be a +useful instrument of Government. At the same time, through +the intervention of men of popular weight and character, the +people possessed a security for their just proportion of +importance in the State. But as the title to the Crown grew +stronger by long possession, and by the constant increase of its +influence, these helps have of late seemed to certain persons no +better than incumbrances. The powerful managers for +Government were not sufficiently submissive to the pleasure of +the possessors of immediate and personal favour, sometimes from a +confidence in their own strength, natural and acquired; sometimes +from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead +in the country, which gave them a consideration independent of +the Court. Men acted as if the Court could receive, as well +as confer, an obligation. The influence of Government, thus +divided in appearance between the Court and the leaders of +parties, became in many cases an accession rather to the popular +than to the royal scale; and some part of that influence, which +would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of mortmain and +unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence +it arose, and circulated among the people. This method +therefore of governing by men of great natural interest or great +acquired consideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by +the true lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of +despotism to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary +pleasure; and to annihilate all intermediate situations between +boundless strength on its own part, and total debility on the +part of the people.</p> +<p>To get rid of all this intermediate and independent +importance, and <i>to secure to the Court the unlimited and +uncontrolled use of its own vast influence</i>, <i>under the sole +direction of its own private favour</i>, has for some years past +been the great object of policy. If this were compassed, +the influence of the Crown must of course produce all the effects +which the most sanguine partisans of the Court could possibly +desire. Government might then be carried on without any +concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to +the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower +sorts. A new project was therefore devised by a certain set +of intriguing men, totally different from the system of +Administration which had prevailed since the accession of the +House of Brunswick. This project, I have heard, was first +conceived by some persons in the Court of Frederick, Prince of +Wales.</p> +<p>The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to +set up for Minister a person, in rank indeed respectable, and +very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vast and +sudden elevation, was little known or considered in the +kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate +and implicit submission. But whether it was from want of +firmness to bear up against the first opposition, or that things +were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the +most eligible, that idea was soon abandoned. The +instrumental part of the project was a little altered, to +accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually +and more surely to the one great end proposed.</p> +<p>The first part of the reformed plan was to draw <i>a line +which should separate the Court from the Ministry</i>. +Hitherto these names had been looked upon as synonymous; but, for +the future, Court and Administration were to be considered as +things totally distinct. By this operation, two systems of +Administration were to be formed: one which should be in the real +secret and confidence; the other merely ostensible, to perform +the official and executory duties of Government. The latter +were alone to be responsible; whilst the real advisers, who +enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the +danger.</p> +<p>Secondly, <i>a party under these leaders was to be formed in +favour of the Court against the Ministry</i>: this party was to +have a large share in the emoluments of Government, and to hold +it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible +Administration.</p> +<p>The third point, and that on which the success of the whole +scheme ultimately depended, was <i>to bring Parliament to an +acquiescence in this project</i>. Parliament was therefore +to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, +rank, influence, abilities, connections, and character of the +Ministers of the Crown. By means of a discipline, on which +I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the +most opposite interests, and the most discordant politics. +All connections and dependencies among subjects were to be +entirely dissolved. As hitherto business had gone through +the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to +conciliate the people, and to engage their confidence, now the +method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of +no sort of consideration or credit in the country. This +want of natural importance was to be their very title to +delegated power. Members of parliament were to be hardened +into an insensibility to pride as well as to duty. Those +high and haughty sentiments, which are the great support of +independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of +honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in +Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to be +avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the King might appoint +one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for Minister; and +that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as +the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus +Parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned while a +cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substituted in the place +of a national Administration.</p> +<p>With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any Court +might well be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital +objects, and by much the most flattering characteristics of +arbitrary power, would be obtained. Everything would be +drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favour and +inclination of the Prince. This favour would be the sole +introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be +held: so that no person looking towards another, and all looking +towards the Court, it was impossible but that the motive which +solely influenced every man’s hopes must come in time to +govern every man’s conduct; till at last the servility +became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or +institutions whatsoever.</p> +<p>How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture +upon such a project of Government, may at first view appear +surprising. But the fact is that opportunities very +inviting to such an attempt have offered; and the scheme itself +was not destitute of some arguments, not wholly unplausible, to +recommend it. These opportunities and these arguments, the +use that has been made of both, the plan for carrying this new +scheme of government into execution, and the effects which it has +produced, are in my opinion worthy of our serious +consideration.</p> +<p>His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more +advantages than any of his predecessors since the +Revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in succession of +his Royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, +saw something to flatter their favourite prejudices; and to +justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in +their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender +were become contemptible; his title disowned throughout Europe, +his party disbanded in England. His Majesty came indeed to +the inheritance of a mighty war; but, victorious in every part of +the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negotiate, but +to dictate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew +him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue +for the Civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a +large, but definite sum, was ample, without being invidious; his +influence, by additions from conquest, by an augmentation of +debt, by an increase of military and naval establishment, much +strengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the +prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a +strong dislike, so from dread there seemed to be a general +averseness from giving anything like offence to a monarch against +whose resentment opposition could not look for a refuge in any +sort of reversionary hope.</p> +<p>These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a +more ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that +national freedom to which he owed a situation so full of +glory. But to others it suggested sentiments of a very +different nature. They thought they now beheld an +opportunity (by a certain sort of statesman never long +undiscovered or unemployed) of drawing to themselves, by the +aggrandisement of a Court faction, a degree of power which they +could never hope to derive from natural influence or from +honourable service; and which it was impossible they could hold +with the least security, whilst the system of Administration +rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the +execution of their design, it was necessary to make many +alterations in political arrangement, and a signal change in the +opinions, habits, and connections of the greater part of those +who at that time acted in public.</p> +<p>In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, +to destroy everything of strength which did not derive its +principal nourishment from the immediate pleasure of the +Court. The greatest weight of popular opinion and party +connection were then with the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. +Pitt. Neither of these held his importance by the <i>new +tenure</i> of the Court; they were not, therefore, thought to be +so proper as others for the services which were required by that +tenure. It happened very favourably for the new system, +that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable +alienation and disgust between the parties which composed the +Administration. Mr. Pitt was first attacked. Not +satisfied with removing him from power, they endeavoured by +various artifices to ruin his character. The other party +seemed rather pleased to get rid of so oppressive a support; not +perceiving that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved +in it. Many other reasons prevented them from daring to +look their true situation in the face. To the great Whig +families it was extremely disagreeable, and seemed almost +unnatural, to oppose the Administration of a Prince of the House +of Brunswick. Day after day they hesitated, and doubted, +and lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place; and +were slow to be persuaded that all which had been done by the +Cabal was the effect, not of humour, but of system. It was +more strongly and evidently the interest of the new Court faction +to get rid of the great Whig connections than to destroy Mr. +Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vast indeed, and +merited; but it was in a great degree personal, and therefore +transient. Theirs was rooted in the country. For, +with a good deal less of popularity, they possessed a far more +natural and fixed influence. Long possession of Government; +vast property; obligations of favours given and received; +connection of office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship +(things at that time supposed of some force); the name of Whig, +dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early begun and +steadily continued to the Royal Family; all these together formed +a body of power in the nation, which was criminal and +devoted. The great ruling principle of the Cabal, and that +which animated and harmonised all their proceedings, how various +soever they may have been, was to signify to the world that the +Court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the +pretence of bringing any other into its service was an affront to +it, and not a support. Therefore when the chiefs were +removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party was put +under a proscription, so general and severe as to take their +hard-earned bread from the lowest officers, in a manner which had +never been known before, even in general revolutions. But +it was thought necessary effectually to destroy all dependencies +but one, and to show an example of the firmness and rigour with +which the new system was to be supported.</p> +<p>Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig +leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in spite of the services of the one at +the accession of the Royal Family, and the recent services of the +other in the war), the <i>two only securities for the importance +of the people</i>: <i>power arising from popularity</i>, <i>and +power arising from connection</i>. Here and there indeed a +few individuals were left standing, who gave security for their +total estrangement from the odious principles of party connection +and personal attachment; and it must be confessed that most of +them have religiously kept their faith. Such a change could +not, however, be made without a mighty shock to Government.</p> +<p>To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, +principles correspondent to them had been preached up with great +zeal. Every one must remember that the Cabal set out with +the most astonishing prudery, both moral and political. +Those who in a few months after soused over head and ears into +the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried out violently +against the indirect practices in the electing and managing of +Parliaments, which had formerly prevailed. This marvellous +abhorrence which the Court had suddenly taken to all influence, +was not only circulated in conversation through the kingdom, but +pompously announced to the public, with many other extraordinary +things, in a pamphlet which had all the appearance of a manifesto +preparatory to some considerable enterprise. Throughout, it +was a satire, though in terms managed and decent enough, on the +politics of the former reign. It was indeed written with no +small art and address.</p> +<p>In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system; +there first appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of +<i>separating the Court from the Administration</i>; of carrying +everything from national connection to personal regards; and of +forming a regular party for that purpose, under the name of +<i>King’s men</i>.</p> +<p>To recommend this system to the people, a perspective view of +the Court, gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from +within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to +be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption +was to be cast down from Court, as <i>Atè</i> was from +heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence +of public spirit; and no one was to be supposed under any +sinister influence, except those who had the misfortune to be in +disgrace at Court, which was to stand in lieu of all vices and +all corruptions. A scheme of perfection to be realised in a +Monarchy, far beyond the visionary Republic of Plato. The +whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate those good souls, +whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure to crafty +politicians. Indeed, there was wherewithal to charm +everybody, except those few who are not much pleased with +professions of supernatural virtue, who know of what stuff such +professions are made, for what purposes they are designed, and in +what they are sure constantly to end. Many innocent +gentlemen, who had been talking prose all their lives without +knowing anything of the matter, began at last to open their eyes +upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having been +Lords of the Treasury and Lords of Trade many years before merely +to the prevalence of party, and to the Ministerial power, which +had frustrated the good intentions of the Court in favour of +their abilities. Now was the time to unlock the sealed +fountain of Royal bounty, which had been infamously monopolised +and huckstered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole +people. The time was come to restore Royalty to its +original splendour. <i>Mettre le Roy hors de page</i>, +became a sort of watchword. And it was constantly in the +mouths of all the runners of the Court, that nothing could +preserve the balance of the constitution from being overturned by +the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the +Sovereign effectually from that Ministerial tyranny under which +the Royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his +Majesty’s grandfather.</p> +<p>These were some of the many artifices used to reconcile the +people to the great change which was made in the persons who +composed the Ministry, and the still greater which was made and +avowed in its constitution. As to individuals, other +methods were employed with them, in order so thoroughly to +disunite every party, and even every family, that <i>no +concert</i>, <i>order</i>, <i>or effect</i>, <i>might appear in +any future opposition</i>. And in this manner an +Administration without connection with the people, or with one +another, was first put in possession of Government. What +good consequences followed from it, we have all seen; whether +with regard to virtue, public or private; to the ease and +happiness of the Sovereign; or to the real strength of +Government. But as so much stress was then laid on the +necessity of this new project, it will not be amiss to take a +view of the effects of this Royal servitude and vile durance, +which was so deplored in the reign of the late Monarch, and was +so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his successor. +The effects were these.</p> +<p>In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, +George the Second maintained the dignity of his Crown connected +with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but +improved, for the space of thirty-three years. He overcame +a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in +the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby destroyed the seeds of all +future rebellion that could arise upon the same principle. +He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to a +height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its +greatest prosperity: and he left his succession resting on the +true and only true foundation of all national and all regal +greatness; affection at home, reputation abroad, trust in allies, +terror in rival nations. The most ardent lover of his +country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate than to +continue as she was then left. A people emulous as we are +in affection to our present Sovereign, know not how to form a +prayer to Heaven for a greater blessing upon his virtues, or a +higher state of felicity and glory, than that he should live, and +should reign, and, when Providence ordains it, should die, +exactly like his illustrious predecessor.</p> +<p>A great Prince may be obliged (though such a thing cannot +happen very often) to sacrifice his private inclination to his +public interest. A wise Prince will not think that such a +restraint implies a condition of servility; and truly, if such +was the condition of the last reign, and the effects were also +such as we have described, we ought, no less for the sake of the +Sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments +convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that +reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent +experience.</p> +<p>One of the principal topics which was then, and has been +since, much employed by that political school, is an effectual +terror of the growth of an aristocratic power, prejudicial to the +rights of the Crown, and the balance of the constitution. +Any new powers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House +of Commons, or by the Crown, ought certainly to excite the +vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people. Even a new +and unprecedented course of action in the whole Legislature, +without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just +uneasiness. I will not affirm, that there may not have +lately appeared in the House of Lords a disposition to some +attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the subject. If +any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not from a power +properly aristocratic, but from the same influence which is +charged with having excited attempts of a similar nature in the +House of Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed +into an unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and involved +in a charge of the very same nature, could have neither power nor +inclination to repel such attempts in others. Those +attempts in the House of Lords can no more be called aristocratic +proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of +Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any sense be called +democratical.</p> +<p>It is true, that the Peers have a great influence in the +kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While +they are men of property, it is impossible to prevent it, except +by such means as must prevent all property from its natural +operation: an event not easily to be compassed, while property is +power; nor by any means to be wished, while the least notion +exists of the method by which the spirit of liberty acts, and of +the means by which it is preserved. If any particular +Peers, by their uniform, upright, constitutional conduct, by +their public and their private virtues, have acquired an +influence in the country; the people on whose favour that +influence depends, and from whom it arose, will never be duped +into an opinion, that such greatness in a Peer is the despotism +of an aristocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect +and pledge of their own importance.</p> +<p>I am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which +that word is usually understood. If it were not a bad habit +to moot cases on the supposed ruin of the constitution, I should +be free to declare, that if it must perish, I would rather by far +see it resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere +and insolent domination. But, whatever my dislikes may be, +my fears are not upon that quarter. The question, on the +influence of a Court, and of a Peerage, is not, which of the two +dangers is the most eligible, but which is the most +imminent. He is but a poor observer, who has not seen, that +the generality of Peers, far from supporting themselves in a +state of independent greatness, are but too apt to fall into an +oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an +abject servitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault +of our Peers were too much spirit! It is worthy of some +observation, that these gentlemen, so jealous of aristocracy, +make no complaints of the power of those peers (neither few nor +inconsiderable) who are always in the train of a Court, and whose +whole weight must be considered as a portion of the settled +influence of the Crown. This is all safe and right; but if +some Peers (I am very sorry they are not as many as they ought to +be) set themselves, in the great concern of Peers and Commons, +against a back-stairs influence and clandestine government, then +the alarm begins; then the constitution is in danger of being +forced into an aristocracy.</p> +<p>I rest a little the longer on this Court topic, because it was +much insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been +since frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: +for, whilst they are terrifying the great and opulent with the +horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting +(though hitherto with little success) to alarm the people with a +phantom of tyranny in the Nobles. All this is done upon +their favourite principle of disunion, of sowing jealousies +amongst the different orders of the State, and of disjointing the +natural strength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered +incapable of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who +have engrossed the Royal power.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend +their system; it will be necessary to open a little more at large +the nature of that party which was formed for its support. +Without this, the whole would have been no better than a +visionary amusement, like the scheme of Harrington’s +political club, and not a business in which the nation had a real +concern. As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a +new principle, it is a very inviting object of curiosity.</p> +<p>It must be remembered, that since the Revolution, until the +period we are speaking of, the influence of the Crown had been +always employed in supporting the Ministers of State, and in +carrying on the public business according to their +opinions. But the party now in question is formed upon a +very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, +protection, and confidence of the Crown in the passage to its +Ministers; it is to come between them and their importance in +Parliament; it is to separate them from all their natural and +acquired dependencies; it is intended as the control, not the +support, of Administration. The machinery of this system is +perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle. It +is formed on a supposition that the King is something external to +his government; and that he may be honoured and aggrandised, even +by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly +on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It +proceeds on the idea of weakening the State in order to +strengthen the Court. The scheme depending entirely on +distrust, on disconnection, on mutability by principle, on +systematic weakness in every particular member; it is impossible +that the total result should be substantial strength of any +kind.</p> +<p>As a foundation of their scheme, the Cabal have established a +sort of <i>Rota</i> in the Court. All sorts of parties, by +this means, have been brought into Administration, from whence +few have had the good fortune to escape without disgrace; none at +all without considerable losses. In the beginning of each +arrangement no professions of confidence and support are wanting, +to induce the leading men to engage. But while the +Ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, +while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and +every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of Royal +favour, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, +which sets directly against them; which prevents all progress, +and even drives them backwards. They grow ashamed and +mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only +serves to remind them the more strongly of their +insignificance. They are obliged either to execute the +orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the +natural instruments of their office. With the loss of their +dignity, they lose their temper. In their turn they grow +troublesome to that Cabal, which, whether it supports or opposes, +equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon +found necessary to get rid of the heads of Administration; but it +is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten +members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to +persuade several to continue in office without their +leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than +it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary +possession of power. Besides, if by accident, or in course +of changes, that power should be recovered, the Junto have thrown +up a retrenchment of these carcases, which may serve to cover +themselves in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwisely, +that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust +and resentment to their ancient connections.</p> +<p>They contrive to form in the outward Administration two +parties at the least; which, whilst they are tearing one another +to pieces, are both competitors for the favour and protection of +the Cabal; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw +everything more and more into the hands of the interior +managers.</p> +<p>A Minister of State will sometimes keep himself totally +estranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their +counsels, will privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their +measures. He will, however, continue in his +employment. Instead of suffering any mark of displeasure, +he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of Court +rewards and caresses; because he does what is expected, and all +that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some +form of Administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as +weak and divided as possible.</p> +<p>However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine +that such persons have any weight in their opposition. +When, by them, Administration is convinced of its insignificancy, +they are soon to be convinced of their own. They never are +suffered to succeed in their opposition. They and the world +are to be satisfied, that neither office, nor authority, nor +property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or union, are +of the least importance; but that the mere influence of the +Court, naked of all support, and destitute of all management, is +abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.</p> +<p>When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the Cabal +seldom appear in the work themselves. They find out some +person of whom the party entertains a high opinion. Such a +person they endeavour to delude with various pretences. +They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel with his +friends; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar +diffidence of him; so that in this mutual fear and distrust, he +may suffer himself to be employed as the instrument in the change +which is brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy +him in his turn; by setting up in his place some person in whom +he had himself reposed the greatest confidence, and who serves to +carry on a considerable part of his adherents.</p> +<p>When such a person has broke in this manner with his +connections, he is soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of +iniquitous personal hostility against some of them (such as an +attempt to strip a particular friend of his family estate), by +which the Cabal hope to render the parties utterly +irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived matters, +that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate instruments +than to the principal movers.</p> +<p>As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments +not immediately belonging to their corps, so in advancing their +own friends they pursue exactly the same method. To promote +any of them to considerable rank or emolument, they commonly take +care that the recommendation shall pass through the hands of the +ostensible Ministry: such a recommendation might, however, appear +to the world as some proof of the credit of Ministers, and some +means of increasing their strength. To prevent this, the +persons so advanced are directed in all companies, industriously +to declare, that they are under no obligations whatsoever to +Administration; that they have received their office from another +quarter; that they are totally free and independent.</p> +<p>When the Faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of +vengeance to perpetrate, their way is, to select, for the +execution, those very persons to whose habits, friendships, +principles, and declarations, such proceedings are publicly known +to be the most adverse; at once to render the instruments the +more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the +people from ever reposing a confidence in any appearance of +private friendship, or public principle.</p> +<p>If the Administration seem now and then, from remissness, or +from fear of making themselves disagreeable, to suffer any +popular excesses to go unpunished, the Cabal immediately sets up +some creature of theirs to raise a clamour against the Ministers, +as having shamefully betrayed the dignity of Government. +Then they compel the Ministry to become active in conferring +rewards and honours on the persons who have been the instruments +of their disgrace; and, after having first vilified them with the +higher orders for suffering the laws to sleep over the +licentiousness of the populace, they drive them (in order to make +amends for their former inactivity) to some act of atrocious +violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the +people. They who remember the riots which attended the +Middlesex Election; the opening of the present Parliament; and +the transactions relative to Saint George’s Fields, will +not be at a loss for an application of these remarks.</p> +<p>That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its +institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and +responsible offices of the State. They are distributed with +art and judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, +departments of office, and through the households of all the +branches of the Royal Family: so as on one hand to occupy all the +avenues to the Throne; and on the other to forward or frustrate +the execution of any measure, according to their own +interests. For with the credit and support which they are +known to have, though for the greater part in places which are +only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence +of the highest posts; and they dictate publicly in almost +everything, even with a parade of superiority. Whenever +they dissent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, +the trained part of the Senate, instinctively in the secret, is +sure to follow them; provided the leaders, sensible of their +situation, do not of themselves recede in time from their most +declared opinions. This latter is generally the case. +It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen it, what +pleasure is taken by the Cabal in rendering these heads of office +thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous. And when they are +become so, they have then the best chance, for being well +supported.</p> +<p>The members of the Court faction are fully indemnified for not +holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only +by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in +which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous, +situations. Their places are, in express legal tenure, or +in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the first and most +respectable persons in the kingdom are tossed about like tennis +balls, the sport of a blind and insolent caprice, no Minister +dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their +body. If an attempt be made upon one of this corps, +immediately he flies to sanctuary, and pretends to the most +inviolable of all promises. No conveniency of public +arrangement is available to remove any one of them from the +specific situation he holds; and the slightest attempt upon one +of them, by the most powerful Minister, is a certain preliminary +to his own destruction.</p> +<p>Conscious of their independence, they bear themselves with a +lofty air to the exterior Ministers. Like Janissaries, they +derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their +servitude. They may act just as they please; provided they +are true to the great ruling principle of their +institution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that +people should be so desirous of adding themselves to that body, +in which they may possess and reconcile satisfactions the most +alluring, and seemingly the most contradictory; enjoying at once +all the spirited pleasure of independence, and all the gross +lucre and fat emoluments of servitude.</p> +<p>Here is a sketch, though a slight one, of the constitution, +laws, and policy, of this new Court corporation. The name +by which they choose to distinguish themselves, is that of +<i>King’s men</i>, or the <i>King’s friends</i>, by +an invidious exclusion of the rest of his Majesty’s most +loyal and affectionate subjects. The whole system, +comprehending the exterior and interior Administrations, is +commonly called, in the technical language of the Court, +<i>Double Cabinet</i>; in French or English, as you choose to +pronounce it.</p> +<p>Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain, or the +invention of a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, +must be judged by the appearances which things have worn for +eight years past. Thus far I am certain, that there is not +a single public man, in or out of office, who has not, at some +time or other, borne testimony to the truth of what I have now +related. In particular, no persons have been more strong in +their assertions, and louder and more indecent in their +complaints, than those who compose all the exterior part of the +present Administration; in whose time that faction has arrived at +such a height of power, and of boldness in the use of it, as may, +in the end, perhaps bring about its total destruction.</p> +<p>It is true, that about four years ago, during the +administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made +to carry on Government without their concurrence. However, +this was only a transient cloud; they were hid but for a moment; +and their constellation blazed out with greater brightness, and a +far more vigorous influence, some time after it was blown +over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any +idea of proscription) to break their corps, to discountenance +their doctrines, to revive connections of a different kind, to +restore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the +cause of Liberty by Ministerial countenance; and then for the +first time were men seen attached in office to every principle +they had maintained in opposition. No one will doubt, that +such men were abhorred and violently opposed by the Court +faction, and that such a system could have but a short +duration.</p> +<p>It may appear somewhat affected, that in so much discourse +upon this extraordinary party, I should say so little of the Earl +of Bute, who is the supposed head of it. But this was +neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence. I have +carefully avoided the introduction of personal reflections of any +kind. Much the greater part of the topics which have been +used to blacken this nobleman are either unjust or +frivolous. At best, they have a tendency to give the +resentment of this bitter calamity a wrong direction, and to turn +a public grievance into a mean personal, or a dangerous national, +quarrel. Where there is a regular scheme of operations +carried on, it is the system, and not any individual person who +acts in it, that is truly dangerous. This system has not +risen solely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the +circumstances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the +constitution which had been for some time growing among our +gentry. We should have been tried with it, if the Earl of +Bute had never existed; and it will want neither a contriving +head nor active members, when the Earl of Bute exists no +longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but +firmly to embody against this Court party and its practices, +which can afford us any prospect of relief in our present +condition.</p> +<p>Another motive induces me to put the personal consideration of +Lord Bute wholly out of the question. He communicates very +little in a direct manner with the greater part of our men of +business. This has never been his custom. It is +enough for him that he surrounds them with his creatures. +Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excuse for +doing all the work of this faction, when they have no personal +connection with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to +an Administration, composed of insulated individuals, without +faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an Administration +constitutionally impotent, because supported by no party in the +nation; he who contributes to destroy the connections of men and +their trust in one another, or in any sort to throw the +dependence of public counsels upon private will and favour, +possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It +matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that +particular person. But let him be who or what he will, he +abets a faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his +country. He is sapping the foundation of its liberty, +disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity, weakening +its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its +importance in the system of Europe.</p> +<p>It is this unnatural infusion of a <i>system of +Favouritism</i> into a Government which in a great part of its +constitution is popular, that has raised the present ferment in +the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its +principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, +in a great spirit of innovation, and a general disorder in all +the functions of Government. I keep my eye solely on this +system; if I speak of those measures which have arisen from it, +it will be so far only as they illustrate the general +scheme. This is the fountain of all those bitter waters of +which, through a hundred different conducts, we have drunk until +we are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the Crown +in the formation of Ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has +given rise to a system, which, without directly violating the +letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole +constitution.</p> +<p>A plan of Favouritism for our executory Government is +essentially at variance with the plan of our Legislature. +One great end undoubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, +composed of Monarchy, and of controls, on the part of the higher +people and the lower, is that the Prince shall not be able to +violate the laws. This is useful indeed and +fundamental. But this, even at first view, is no more than +a negative advantage; an armour merely defensive. It is +therefore next in order, and equal in importance, <i>that the +discretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the +Monarch</i>, <i>whether for the execution of the laws</i>, <i>or +for the nomination to magistracy and office</i>, <i>or for +conducting the affairs of peace and war</i>, <i>or for ordering +the revenue</i>, <i>should all be exercised upon public +principles and national grounds</i>, <i>and not on the likings or +prejudices</i>, <i>the intrigues or policies of a +Court</i>. This, I said, is equal in importance to the +securing a Government according to law. The laws reach but +a very little way. Constitute Government how you please, +infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise +of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and +uprightness of Ministers of State. Even all the use and +potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your +Commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a +living, active, effective constitution. It is possible, +that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully +conducted, Ministers may suffer one part of Government to +languish, another to be perverted from its purposes: and every +valuable interest of the country to fall into ruin and decay, +without possibility of fixing any single act on which a criminal +prosecution can be justly grounded. The due arrangement of +men in the active part of the state, far from being foreign to +the purposes of a wise Government, ought to be among its very +first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors of +new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is +nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are +no-ways concerned in it; we must tell those who have the +impudence to insult us in this manner, that, of all things, we +ought to be the most concerned, who and what sort of men they +are, that hold the trust of everything that is dear to us. +Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, +but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe us +into the security of idiots. We must soften into a +credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all men +virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly +diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and +corrupt. Men are in public life as in private—some +good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the +depression of the other, are the first objects of all true +policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its +direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has +contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy hands, +but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of +agreeably to the uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however +excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in +that member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of +it.</p> +<p>In arbitrary Governments, the constitution of the Ministry +follows the constitution of the Legislature. Both the Law +and the Magistrate are the creatures of Will. It must be +so. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any +tolerable consideration of this matter, than that <i>every sort +of Government ought to have its Administration correspondent to +its Legislature</i>. If it should be otherwise, things must +fall into a hideous disorder. The people of a free +Commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should be +the result of general consent, cannot be so senseless as to +suffer their executory system to be composed of persons on whom +they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love +and confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the use of +which the very being of the State depends.</p> +<p>The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition +of rewards and honours, is one of the first advantages of a free +State. Without it, or something equivalent to it, perhaps +the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom; certainly +none of the vivifying energy of good Government. The frame +of our Commonwealth did not admit of such an actual election: but +it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the constitution is +preserved) better, for all the effects of it, than by the method +of suffrage in any democratic State whatsoever. It had +always, until of late, been held the first duty of Parliament +<i>to refuse to support Government</i>, <i>until power was in the +hands of persons who were acceptable to the people</i>, <i>or +while factions predominated in the Court in which the nation had +no confidence</i>. Thus all the good effects of popular +election were supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs +attending on perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvass for every +particular office throughout the body of the people. This +was the most noble and refined part of our constitution. +The people, by their representatives and grandees, were intrusted +with a deliberative power in making laws; the King with the +control of his negative. The King was intrusted with the +deliberative choice and the election to office; the people had +the negative in a Parliamentary refusal to support. +Formerly this power of control was what kept Ministers in awe of +Parliaments, and Parliaments in reverence with the people. +If the use of this power of control on the system and persons of +Administration is gone, everything is lost, Parliament and +all. We may assure ourselves, that if Parliament will +tamely see evil men take possession of all the strongholds of +their country, and allow them time and means to fortify +themselves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and +upon a hope of discovering, whether they will not be reformed by +power, and whether their measures will not be better than their +morals; such a Parliament will give countenance to their measures +also, whatever that Parliament may pretend, and whatever those +measures may be.</p> +<p>Every good political institution must have a preventive +operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural +tendency to exclude bad men from Government, and not to trust for +the safety of the State to subsequent punishment +alone—punishment which has ever been tardy and uncertain, +and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to +fall rather on the injured than the criminal.</p> +<p>Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the State, +they ought by their conduct to have obtained such a degree of +estimation in their country as may be some sort of pledge and +security to the public that they will not abuse those +trusts. It is no mean security for a proper use of power, +that a man has shown by the general tenor of his actions, that +the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his +fellow-citizens have been among the principal objects of his +life, and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or +fortune to a settled contempt or occasional forfeiture of their +esteem.</p> +<p>That man who, before he comes into power, has no friends, or +who, coming into power, is obliged to desert his friends, or who, +losing it, has no friends to sympathise with him, he who has no +sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but +whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to +end with it, is a person who ought never to be suffered by a +controlling Parliament, to continue in any of those situations +which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; +because such a man <i>has no connection with the sentiments and +opinions of the people</i>.</p> +<p>Those knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly +without any public principle, in order to sell their conjunct +iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore universally +odious, ought never to be suffered to domineer in the State; +because they have <i>no connection with the sentiments and +opinions of the people</i>.</p> +<p>These are considerations which, in my opinion, enforce the +necessity of having some better reason, in a free country and a +free Parliament, for supporting the Ministers of the Crown, than +that short one, <i>That the King has thought proper to appoint +them</i>. There is something very courtly in this. +But it is a principle pregnant with all sorts of mischief, in a +constitution like ours, to turn the views of active men from the +country to the Court. Whatever be the road to power, that +is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the +country be of no use as a means of power or consideration, the +qualities which usually procure that opinion will be no longer +cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a State so +popular in its constitution as ours, to leave ambition without +popular motives, and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue +in the minds of Kings and Ministers, and public men, must be +submitted to the judgment and good sense of the people of +England.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without directly +controverting the principle, to raise objections from the +difficulty under which the Sovereign labours to distinguish the +genuine voice and sentiments of his people from the clamour of a +faction, by which it is so easily counterfeited. The +nation, they say, is generally divided into parties, with views +and passions utterly irreconcilable. If the King should put +his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is sure to +disgust the rest; if he select particular men from among them +all, it is a hazard that he disgusts them all. Those who +are left out, however divided before, will soon run into a body +of opposition, which, being a collection of many discontents into +one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. +Faction will make its cries resound through the nation, as if the +whole were in an uproar, when by far the majority, and much the +better part, will seem for awhile, as it were, annihilated by the +quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy +the blessings of Government. Besides that, the opinion of +the mere vulgar is a miserable rule even with regard to +themselves, on account of their violence and instability. +So that if you were to gratify them in their humour to-day, that +very gratification would be a ground of their dissatisfaction on +the next. Now as all these rules of public opinion are to +be collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal +uncertainty as to the effect, what better can a King of England +do than to employ such men as he finds to have views and +inclinations most conformable to his own, who are least infected +with pride and self-will, and who are least moved by such popular +humours as are perpetually traversing his designs, and disturbing +his service; trusting that when he means no ill to his people he +will be supported in his appointments, whether he chooses to keep +or to change, as his private judgment or his pleasure leads +him? He will find a sure resource in the real weight and +influence of the Crown, when it is not suffered to become an +instrument in the hands of a faction.</p> +<p>I will not pretend to say that there is nothing at all in this +mode of reasoning, because I will not assert that there is no +difficulty in the art of government. Undoubtedly the very +best Administration must encounter a great deal of opposition, +and the very worst will find more support than it deserves. +Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to those who have a +mind to deceive themselves. It is a fallacy in constant use +with those who would level all things, and confound right with +wrong, to insist upon the inconveniences which are attached to +every choice, without taking into consideration the different +weight and consequence of those inconveniences. The +question is not concerning absolute discontent or perfect +satisfaction in Government, neither of which can be pure and +unmixed at any time or upon any system. The controversy is +about that degree of good-humour in the people, which may +possibly be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. +While some politicians may be waiting to know whether the sense +of every individual be against them, accurately distinguishing +the vulgar from the better sort, drawing lines between the +enterprises of a faction and the efforts of a people, they may +chance to see the Government, which they are so nicely weighing, +and dividing, and distinguishing, tumble to the ground in the +midst of their wise deliberation. Prudent men, when so +great an object as the security of Government, or even its peace, +is at stake, will not run the risk of a decision which may be +fatal to it. They who can read the political sky will seen +a hurricane in a cloud no bigger than a hand at the very edge of +the horizon, and will run into the first harbour. No lines +can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. They are a +matter incapable of exact definition. But, though no man +can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet +light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably +distinguishable. Nor will it be impossible for a Prince to +find out such a mode of government, and such persons to +administer it, as will give a great degree of content to his +people, without any curious and anxious research for that +abstract, universal, perfect harmony, which, while he is seeking, +he abandons those means of ordinary tranquillity which are in his +power without any research at all.</p> +<p>It is not more the duty than it is the interest of a Prince to +aim at giving tranquillity to his Government. If those who +advise him may have an interest in disorder and confusion. +If the opinion of the people is against them, they will naturally +wish that it should have no prevalence. Here it is that the +people must on their part show themselves sensible of their own +value. Their whole importance, in the first instance, and +afterwards their whole freedom, is at stake. Their freedom +cannot long survive their importance. Here it is that the +natural strength of the kingdom, the great peers, the leading +landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufacturers, the +substantial yeomanry, must interpose, to rescue their Prince, +themselves, and their posterity.</p> +<p>We are at present at issue upon this point. We are in +the great crisis of this contention, and the part which men take, +one way or other, will serve to discriminate their characters and +their principles. Until the matter is decided, the country +will remain in its present confusion. For while a system of +Administration is attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of +the people, and not conformable to the plan of their Government, +everything must necessarily be disordered for a time, until this +system destroys the constitution, or the constitution gets the +better of this system.</p> +<p>There is, in my opinion, a peculiar venom and malignity in +this political distemper beyond any that I have heard or read +of. In former lines the projectors of arbitrary Government +attacked only the liberties of their country, a design surely +mischievous enough to have satisfied a mind of the most unruly +ambition. But a system unfavourable to freedom may be so +formed as considerably to exalt the grandeur of the State, and +men may find in the pride and splendour of that prosperity some +sort of consolation for the loss of their solid privileges. +Indeed, the increase of the power of the State has often been +urged by artful men, as a pretext for some abridgment of the +public liberty. But the scheme of the junto under +consideration not only strikes a palsy into every nerve of our +free constitution, but in the same degree benumbs and stupefies +the whole executive power, rendering Government in all its grand +operations languid, uncertain, ineffective, making Ministers +fearful of attempting, and incapable of executing, any useful +plan of domestic arrangement, or of foreign politics. It +tends to produce neither the security of a free Government, nor +the energy of a Monarchy that is absolute. Accordingly, the +Crown has dwindled away in proportion to the unnatural and turgid +growth of this excrescence on the Court.</p> +<p>The interior Ministry are sensible that war is a situation +which sets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people, +and they well know that the beginning of the importance of the +people must be the end of theirs. For this reason they +discover upon all occasions the utmost fear of everything which +by possibility may lead to such an event. I do not mean +that they manifest any of that pious fear which is backward to +commit the safety of the country to the dubious experiment of +war. Such a fear, being the tender sensation of virtue, +excited, as it is regulated, by reason, frequently shows itself +in a seasonable boldness, which keeps danger at a distance, by +seeming to despise it. Their fear betrays to the first +glance of the eye its true cause and its real object. +Foreign powers, confident in the knowledge of their character, +have not scrupled to violate the most solemn treaties; and, in +defiance of them, to make conquests in the midst of a general +peace, and in the heart of Europe. Such was the conquest of +Corsica, by the professed enemies of the freedom of mankind, in +defiance of those who were formerly its professed +defenders. We have had just claims upon the same +powers—rights which ought to have been sacred to them as +well as to us, as they had their origin in our lenity and +generosity towards France and Spain in the day of their great +humiliation. Such I call the ransom of Manilla, and the +demand on France for the East India prisoners. But these +powers put a just confidence in their resource of the double +Cabinet. These demands (one of them, at least) are +hastening fast towards an acquittal by prescription. +Oblivion begins to spread her cobwebs over all our spirited +remonstrances. Some of the most valuable branches of our +trade are also on the point of perishing from the same +cause. I do not mean those branches which bear without the +hand of the vine-dresser; I mean those which the policy of +treaties had formerly secured to us; I mean to mark and +distinguish the trade of Portugal, the loss of which, and the +power of the Cabal, have one and the same era.</p> +<p>If, by any chance, the Ministers who stand before the curtain +possess or affect any spirit, it makes little or no +impression. Foreign Courts and Ministers, who were among +the first to discover and to profit by this invention of the +<i>double Cabinet</i>, attended very little to their +remonstrances. They know that those shadows of Ministers +have nothing to do in the ultimate disposal of things. +Jealousies and animosities are sedulously nourished in the +outward Administration, and have been even considered as a +<i>causa sine qua non</i> in its constitution: thence foreign +Courts have a certainty, that nothing can be done by common +counsel in this nation. If one of those Ministers +officially takes up a business with spirit, it serves only the +better to signalise the meanness of the rest, and the discord of +them all. His colleagues in office are in haste to shake +him off, and to disclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of +this nature was that astonishing transaction, in which Lord +Rochford, our Ambassador at Paris, remonstrated against the +attempt upon Corsica, in consequence of a direct authority from +Lord Shelburne. This remonstrance the French Minister +treated with the contempt that was natural; as he was assured, +from the Ambassador of his Court to ours, that these orders of +Lord Shelburne were not supported by the rest of the (I had like +to have said British) Administration. Lord Rochford, a man +of spirit, could not endure this situation. The +consequences were, however, curious. He returns from Paris, +and comes home full of anger. Lord Shelburne, who gave the +orders, is obliged to give up the seals. Lord Rochford, who +obeyed these orders, receives them. He goes, however, into +another department of the same office, that he might not be +obliged officially to acquiesce in one situation, under what he +had officially remonstrated against in another. At Paris, +the Duke of Choiseul considered this office arrangement as a +compliment to him: here it was spoke of as an attention to the +delicacy of Lord Rochford. But whether the compliment was +to one or both, to this nation it was the same. By this +transaction the condition of our Court lay exposed in all its +nakedness. Our office correspondence has lost all pretence +to authenticity; British policy is brought into derision in those +nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, +whilst they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmness, +and candour, which shone in all our negotiations. I +represent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been +universally received.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>Such has been the aspect of our foreign politics under the +influence of a <i>double Cabinet</i>. With such an +arrangement at Court, it is impossible it should have been +otherwise. Nor is it possible that this scheme should have +a better effect upon the government of our dependencies, the +first, the dearest, and most delicate objects of the interior +policy of this empire. The Colonies know that +Administration is separated from the Court, divided within +itself, and detested by the nation. The double Cabinet has, +in both the parts of it, shown the most malignant dispositions +towards them, without being able to do them the smallest +mischief.</p> +<p>They are convinced, by sufficient experience, that no plan, +either of lenity or rigour, can be pursued with uniformity and +perseverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from +Great Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendship +nor apprehension from enmity. They look to themselves, and +their own arrangements. They grow every day into alienation +from this country; and whilst they are becoming disconnected with +our Government, we have not the consolation to find that they are +even friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal +the futility, the weakness, the rashness, the timidity, the +perpetual contradiction, in the management of our affairs in that +part of the world. A volume might be written on this +melancholy subject; but it were better to leave it entirely to +the reflections of the reader himself, than not to treat it in +the extent it deserves.</p> +<p>In what manner our domestic economy is affected by this +system, it is needless to explain. It is the perpetual +subject of their own complaints.</p> +<p>The Court party resolve the whole into faction. Having +said something before upon this subject, I shall only observe +here, that, when they give this account of the prevalence of +faction, they present no very favourable aspect of the confidence +of the people in their own Government. They may be assured, +that however they amuse themselves with a variety of projects for +substituting something else in the place of that great and only +foundation of Government, the confidence of the people, every +attempt will but make their condition worse. When men +imagine that their food is only a cover for poison, and when they +neither love nor trust the hand that serves it, it is not the +name of the roast beef of Old England that will persuade them to +sit down to the table that is spread for them. When the +people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular +assemblies, are perverted from the ends of their institution, +they find in those names of degenerated establishments only new +motives to discontent. Those bodies, which, when full of +life and beauty, lay in their arms and were their joy and +comfort; when dead and putrid, become but the more loathsome from +remembrance of former endearments. A sullen gloom, and +furious disorder, prevail by fits: the nation loses its relish +for peace and prosperity, as it did in that season of fulness +which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the First. +A species of men to whom a state of order would become a sentence +of obscurity, are nourished into a dangerous magnitude by the +heat of intestine disturbances; and it is no wonder that, by a +sort of sinister piety, they cherish, in their turn, the +disorders which are the parents of all their consequence. +Superficial observers consider such persons as the cause of the +public uneasiness, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the +effect of it. Good men look upon this distracted scene with +sorrow and indignation. Their hands are tied behind +them. They are despoiled of all the power which might +enable them to reconcile the strength of Government with the +rights of the people. They stand in a most distressing +alternative. But in the election among evils they hope +better things from temporary confusion, than from established +servitude. In the mean time, the voice of law is not to be +heard. Fierce licentiousness begets violent +restraints. The military arm is the sole reliance; and +then, call your constitution what you please, it is the sword +that governs. The civil power, like every other that calls +in the aid of an ally stronger than itself, perishes by the +assistance it receives. But the contrivers of this scheme +of Government will not trust solely to the military power, +because they are cunning men. Their restless and crooked +spirit drives them to rake in the dirt of every kind of +expedient. Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour to +raise divisions amongst them. One mob is hired to destroy +another; a procedure which at once encourages the boldness of the +populace, and justly increases their discontent. Men become +pensioners of state on account of their abilities in the array of +riot, and the discipline of confusion. Government is put +under the disgraceful necessity of protecting from the severity +of the laws that very licentiousness, which the laws had been +before violated to repress. Everything partakes of the +original disorder. Anarchy predominates without freedom, +and servitude without submission or subordination. These +are the consequences inevitable to our public peace, from the +scheme of rendering the executory Government at once odious and +feeble; of freeing Administration from the constitutional and +salutary control of Parliament, and inventing for it a new +control, unknown to the constitution, an <i>interior</i> Cabinet; +which brings the whole body of Government into confusion and +contempt.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>After having stated, as shortly as I am able, the effects of +this system on our foreign affairs, on the policy of our +Government with regard to our dependencies, and on the interior +economy of the Commonwealth; there remains only, in this part of +my design, to say something of the grand principle which first +recommended this system at Court. The pretence was to +prevent the King from being enslaved by a faction, and made a +prisoner in his closet. This scheme might have been +expected to answer at least its own end, and to indemnify the +King, in his personal capacity, for all the confusion into which +it has thrown his Government. But has it in reality +answered this purpose? I am sure, if it had, every +affectionate subject would have one motive for enduring with +patience all the evils which attend it.</p> +<p>In order to come at the truth in this matter, it may not be +amiss to consider it somewhat in detail. I speak here of +the King, and not of the Crown; the interests of which we have +already touched. Independent of that greatness which a King +possesses merely by being a representative of the national +dignity, the things in which he may have an individual interest +seem to be these: wealth accumulated; wealth spent in +magnificence, pleasure, or beneficence; personal respect and +attention; and above all, private ease and repose of mind. +These compose the inventory of prosperous circumstances, whether +they regard a Prince or a subject; their enjoyments differing +only in the scale upon which they are formed.</p> +<p>Suppose then we were to ask, whether the King has been richer +than his predecessors in accumulated wealth, since the +establishment of the plan of Favouritism? I believe it will +be found that the picture of royal indigence which our Court has +presented until this year, has been truly humiliating. Nor +has it been relieved from this unseemly distress, but by means +which have hazarded the affection of the people, and shaken their +confidence in Parliament. If the public treasures had been +exhausted in magnificence and splendour, this distress would have +been accounted for, and in some measure justified. Nothing +would be more unworthy of this nation, than with a mean and +mechanical rule, to mete out the splendour of the Crown. +Indeed, I have found very few persons disposed to so ungenerous a +procedure. But the generality of people, it must be +confessed, do feel a good deal mortified, when they compare the +wants of the Court with its expenses. They do not behold +the cause of this distress in any part of the apparatus of Royal +magnificence. In all this, they see nothing but the +operations of parsimony, attended with all the consequences of +profusion. Nothing expended, nothing saved. Their +wonder is increased by their knowledge, that besides the revenue +settled on his Majesty’s Civil List to the amount of +£800,000 a year, he has a farther aid, from a large pension +list, near £90,000 a year, in Ireland; from the produce of +the Duchy of Lancaster (which we are told has been greatly +improved); from the revenue of the Duchy of Cornwall; from the +American quit-rents; from the four and a half per cent. duty in +the Leeward Islands; this last worth to be sure considerably more +than £40,000 a year. The whole is certainly not much +short of a million annually.</p> +<p>These are revenues within the knowledge and cognizance of our +national Councils. We have no direct right to examine into +the receipts from his Majesty’s German Dominions, and the +Bishopric of Osnaburg. This is unquestionably true. +But that which is not within the province of Parliament, is yet +within the sphere of every man’s own reflection. If a +foreign Prince resided amongst us, the state of his revenues +could not fail of becoming the subject of our speculation. +Filled with an anxious concern for whatever regards the welfare +of our Sovereign, it is impossible, in considering the miserable +circumstances into which he has been brought, that this obvious +topic should be entirely passed over. There is an opinion +universal, that these revenues produce something not +inconsiderable, clear of all charges and establishments. +This produce the people do not believe to be hoarded, nor +perceive to be spent. It is accounted for in the only +manner it can, by supposing that it is drawn away, for the +support of that Court faction, which, whilst it distresses the +nation, impoverishes the Prince in every one of his +resources. I once more caution the reader, that I do not +urge this consideration concerning the foreign revenue, as if I +supposed we had a direct right to examine into the expenditure of +any part of it; but solely for the purpose of showing how little +this system of Favouritism has been advantageous to the Monarch +himself; which, without magnificence, has sunk him into a state +of unnatural poverty; at the same time that he possessed every +means of affluence, from ample revenues, both in this country and +in other parts of his dominions.</p> +<p>Has this system provided better for the treatment becoming his +high and sacred character, and secured the King from those +disgusts attached to the necessity of employing men who are not +personally agreeable? This is a topic upon which for many +reasons I could wish to be silent; but the pretence of securing +against such causes of uneasiness, is the corner-stone of the +Court party. It has however so happened, that if I were to +fix upon any one point, in which this system has been more +particularly and shamefully blameable, the effects which it has +produced would justify me in choosing for that point its tendency +to degrade the personal dignity of the Sovereign, and to expose +him to a thousand contradictions and mortifications. It is +but too evident in what manner these projectors of Royal +greatness have fulfilled all their magnificent promises. +Without recapitulating all the circumstances of the reign, every +one of which is more or less a melancholy proof of the truth of +what I have advanced, let us consider the language of the Court +but a few years ago, concerning most of the persons now in the +external Administration: let me ask, whether any enemy to the +personal feelings of the Sovereign, could possibly contrive a +keener instrument of mortification, and degradation of all +dignity, than almost every part and member of the present +arrangement? Nor, in the whole course of our history, has +any compliance with the will of the people ever been known to +extort from any Prince a greater contradiction to all his own +declared affections and dislikes, than that which is now adopted, +in direct opposition to every thing the people approve and +desire.</p> +<p>An opinion prevails, that greatness has been more than once +advised to submit to certain condescensions towards individuals, +which have been denied to the entreaties of a nation. For +the meanest and most dependent instrument of this system knows, +that there are hours when its existence may depend upon his +adherence to it; and he takes his advantage accordingly. +Indeed it is a law of nature, that whoever is necessary to what +we have made our object, is sure, in some way, or in some time or +other, to become our master. All this however is submitted +to, in order to avoid that monstrous evil of governing in +concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it seems to +be laid down as a maxim, that a King has some sort of interest in +giving uneasiness to his subjects: that all who are pleasing to +them, are to be of course disagreeable to him: that as soon as +the persons who are odious at Court are known to be odious to the +people, it is snatched at as a lucky occasion of showering down +upon them all kinds of emoluments and honours. None are +considered as well-wishers to the Crown, but those who advised to +some unpopular course of action; none capable of serving it, but +those who are obliged to call at every instant upon all its power +for the safety of their lives. None are supposed to be fit +priests in the temple of Government, but the persons who are +compelled to fly into it for sanctuary. Such is the effect +of this refined project; such is ever the result of all the +contrivances which are used to free men from the servitude of +their reason, and from the necessity of ordering their affairs +according to their evident interests. These contrivances +oblige them to run into a real and ruinous servitude, in order to +avoid a supposed restraint that might be attended with +advantage.</p> +<p>If therefore this system has so ill answered its own grand +pretence of saving the King from the necessity of employing +persons disagreeable to him, has it given more peace and +tranquillity to his Majesty’s private hours? No, most +certainly. The father of his people cannot possibly enjoy +repose, while his family is in such a state of distraction. +Then what has the Crown or the King profited by all this +fine-wrought scheme? Is he more rich, or more splendid, or +more powerful, or more at his ease, by so many labours and +contrivances? Have they not beggared his Exchequer, +tarnished the splendour of his Court, sunk his dignity, galled +his feelings, discomposed the whole order and happiness of his +private life?</p> +<p>It will be very hard, I believe, to state in what respect the +King has profited by that faction which presumptuously choose to +call themselves <i>his friends</i>.</p> +<p>If particular men had grown into an attachment, by the +distinguished honour of the society of their Sovereign, and, by +being the partakers of his amusements, came sometimes to prefer +the gratification of his personal inclinations to the support of +his high character, the thing would be very natural, and it would +be excusable enough. But the pleasant part of the story is, +that these <i>King’s friends</i> have no more ground for +usurping such a title, than a resident freeholder in Cumberland +or in Cornwall. They are only known to their Sovereign by +kissing his hand, for the offices, pensions, and grants into +which they have deceived his benignity. May no storm ever +come, which will put the firmness of their attachment to the +proof; and which, in the midst of confusions and terrors, and +sufferings, may demonstrate the eternal difference between a true +and severe friend to the Monarchy, and a slippery sycophant of +the Court; <i>Quantum infido scurræ distabit +amicus</i>!</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>So far I have considered the effect of the Court system, +chiefly as it operates upon the executive Government, on the +temper of the people and on the happiness of the Sovereign. +It remains that we should consider, with a little attention, its +operation upon Parliament.</p> +<p>Parliament was indeed the great object of all these politics, +the end at which they aimed, as well as the instrument by which +they were to operate. But, before Parliament could be made +subservient to a system, by which it was to be degraded from the +dignity of a national council, into a mere member of the Court, +it must be greatly changed from its original character.</p> +<p>In speaking of this body, I have my eye chiefly on the House +of Commons. I hope I shall be indulged in a few +observations on the nature and character of that assembly; not +with regard to its <i>legal form and power</i>, but to its +<i>spirit</i>, and to the purposes it is meant to answer in the +constitution.</p> +<p>The House of Commons was supposed originally to be <i>no part +of the standing Government of this country</i>. It was +considered as a control, issuing immediately from the people, and +speedily to be resolved into the mass from whence it arose. +In this respect it was in the higher part of Government what +juries are in the lower. The capacity of a magistrate being +transitory, and that of a citizen permanent, the latter capacity +it was hoped would of course preponderate in all discussions, not +only between the people and the standing authority of the Crown, +but between the people and the fleeting authority of the House of +Commons itself. It was hoped that, being of a middle nature +between subject and Government, they would feel with a more +tender and a nearer interest everything that concerned the +people, than the other remoter and more permanent parts of +Legislature.</p> +<p>Whatever alterations time and the necessary accommodation of +business may have introduced, this character can never be +sustained, unless the House of Commons shall be made to bear some +stamp of the actual disposition of the people at large. It +would (among public misfortunes) be an evil more natural and +tolerable, that the House of Commons should be infected with +every epidemical frenzy of the people, as this would indicate +some consanguinity, some sympathy of nature with their +constituents, than that they should in all cases be wholly +untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out of +doors. By this want of sympathy they would cease to be a +House of Commons. For it is not the derivation of the power +of that House from the people, which makes it in a distinct sense +their representative. The King is the representative of the +people; so are the Lords; so are the Judges. They all are +trustees for the people, as well as the Commons; because no power +is given for the sole sake of the holder; and although Government +certainly is an institution of Divine authority, yet its forms, +and the persons who administer it, all originate from the +people.</p> +<p>A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteristical +distinction of a popular representative. This belongs +equally to all parts of Government, and in all forms. The +virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its +being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It +was not instituted to be a control upon the people, as of late it +has been taught, by a doctrine of the most pernicious +tendency. It was designed as a control <i>for</i> the +people. Other institutions have been formed for the purpose +of checking popular excesses; and they are, I apprehend, fully +adequate to their object. If not, they ought to be made +so. The House of Commons, as it was never intended for the +support of peace and subordination, is miserably appointed for +that service; having no stronger weapon than its Mace, and no +better officer than its Serjeant-at-Arms, which it can command of +its own proper authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over +executory and judicial magistracy; an anxious care of public +money, an openness, approaching towards facility, to public +complaint; these seem to be the true characteristics of a House +of Commons. But an addressing House of Commons, and a +petitioning nation; a House of Commons full of confidence, when +the nation is plunged in despair; in the utmost harmony with +Ministers, whom the people regard with the utmost abhorrence; who +vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them for +impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice +demands account; who, in all disputes between the people and +Administration, presume against the people; who punish their +disorder, but refuse even to inquire into the provocations to +them; this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in this +constitution. Such an Assembly may be a great, wise, awful +senate; but it is not, to any popular purpose, a House of +Commons. This change from an immediate state of procuration +and delegation to a course of acting as from original power, is +the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have +been perverted from their purposes. It is indeed their +greatest and sometimes their incurable corruption. For +there is a material distinction between that corruption by which +particular points are carried against reason (this is a thing +which cannot be prevented by human wisdom, and is of less +consequence), and the corruption of the principle itself. +For then the evil is not accidental, but settled. The +distemper becomes the natural habit.</p> +<p>For my part, I shall be compelled to conclude the principle of +Parliament to be totally corrupted, and therefore its ends +entirely defeated, when I see two symptoms: first, a rule of +indiscriminate support to all Ministers; because this destroys +the very end of Parliament as a control, and is a general +previous sanction to misgovernment; and secondly, the setting up +any claims adverse to the right of free election; for this tends +to subvert the legal authority by which the House of Commons +sits.</p> +<p>I know that, since the Revolution, along with many dangerous, +many useful powers of Government have been weakened. It is +absolutely necessary to have frequent recourse to the +Legislature. Parliaments must therefore sit every year, and +for great part of the year. The dreadful disorders of +frequent elections have also necessitated a septennial instead of +a triennial duration. These circumstances, I mean the +constant habit of authority, and the infrequency of elections, +have tended very much to draw the House of Commons towards the +character of a standing Senate. It is a disorder which has +arisen from the cure of greater disorders; it has arisen from the +extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchical +Government, with external strength and with internal +tranquillity.</p> +<p>It is very clear that we cannot free ourselves entirely from +this great inconvenience; but I would not increase an evil, +because I was not able to remove it; and because it was not in my +power to keep the House of Commons religiously true to its first +principles, I would not argue for carrying it to a total oblivion +of them. This has been the great scheme of power in our +time. They who will not conform their conduct to the public +good, and cannot support it by the prerogative of the Crown, have +adopted a new plan. They have totally abandoned the +shattered and old-fashioned fortress of prerogative, and made a +lodgment in the stronghold of Parliament itself. If they +have any evil design to which there is no ordinary legal power +commensurate, they bring it into Parliament. In Parliament +the whole is executed from the beginning to the end. In +Parliament the power of obtaining their object is absolute, and +the safety in the proceeding perfect: no rules to confine, no +after reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot with any +great propriety punish others for things in which they themselves +have been accomplices. Thus the control of Parliament upon +the executory power is lost; because Parliament is made to +partake in every considerable act of Government. +<i>Impeachment</i>, <i>that great guardian of the purity of the +Constitution</i>, <i>is in danger of being lost</i>, <i>even to +the idea of it</i>.</p> +<p>By this plan several important ends are answered to the +Cabal. If the authority of Parliament supports itself, the +credit of every act of Government, which they contrive, is saved; +but if the act be so very odious that the whole strength of +Parliament is insufficient to recommend it, then Parliament is +itself discredited; and this discredit increases more and more +that indifference to the constitution, which it is the constant +aim of its enemies, by their abuse of Parliamentary powers, to +render general among the people. Whenever Parliament is +persuaded to assume the offices of executive Government, it will +lose all the confidence, love, and veneration which it has ever +enjoyed, whilst it was supposed the <i>corrective</i> and +<i>control</i> of the acting powers of the State. This +would be the event, though its conduct in such a perversion of +its functions should be tolerably just and moderate; but if it +should be iniquitous, violent, full of passion, and full of +faction, it would be considered as the most intolerable of all +the modes of tyranny.</p> +<p>For a considerable time this separation of the representatives +from their constituents went on with a silent progress; and had +those, who conducted the plan for their total separation, been +persons of temper and abilities any way equal to the magnitude of +their design, the success would have been infallible; but by +their precipitancy they have laid it open in all its nakedness; +the nation is alarmed at it; and the event may not be pleasant to +the contrivers of the scheme. In the last session, the +corps called the <i>King’s friends</i> made a hardy attempt +all at once, <i>to alter the right of election itself</i>; to put +it into the power of the House of Commons to disable any person +disagreeable to them from sitting in Parliament, without any +other rule than their own pleasure; to make incapacities, either +general for descriptions of men, or particular for individuals; +and to take into their body, persons who avowedly had never been +chosen by the majority of legal electors, nor agreeably to any +known rule of law.</p> +<p>The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated, +are not my business here. Never has a subject been more +amply and more learnedly handled, nor upon one side, in my +opinion, more satisfactorily; they who are not convinced by what +is already written would not receive conviction <i>though one +arose from the dead</i>.</p> +<p>I too have thought on this subject; but my purpose here, is +only to consider it as a part of the favourite project of +Government; to observe on the motives which led to it; and to +trace its political consequences.</p> +<p>A violent rage for the punishment of Mr. Wilkes was the +pretence of the whole. This gentleman, by setting himself +strongly in opposition to the Court Cabal, had become at once an +object of their persecution, and of the popular favour. The +hatred of the Court party pursuing, and the countenance of the +people protecting him, it very soon became not at all a question +on the man, but a trial of strength between the two +parties. The advantage of the victory in this particular +contest was the present, but not the only, nor by any means, the +principal, object. Its operation upon the character of the +House of Commons was the great point in view. The point to +be gained by the Cabal was this: that a precedent should be +established, tending to show, <i>That the favour of the people +was not so sure a road as the favour of the Court even to popular +honours and popular trusts</i>. A strenuous resistance to +every appearance of lawless power; a spirit of independence +carried to some degree of enthusiasm; an inquisitive character to +discover, and a bold one to display, every corruption and every +error of Government; these are the qualities which recommend a +man to a seat in the House of Commons, in open and merely popular +elections. An indolent and submissive disposition; a +disposition to think charitably of all the actions of men in +power, and to live in a mutual intercourse of favours with them; +an inclination rather to countenance a strong use of authority, +than to bear any sort of licentiousness on the part of the +people; these are unfavourable qualities in an open election for +Members of Parliament.</p> +<p>The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of +the former, is justified by reason; because a man of such a +character, even in its exorbitancies, does not directly +contradict the purposes of a trust, the end of which is a control +on power. The latter character, even when it is not in its +extreme, will execute this trust but very imperfectly; and, if +deviating to the least excess, will certainly frustrate instead +of forwarding the purposes of a control on Government. But +when the House of Commons was to be new modelled, this principle +was not only to be changed, but reversed. Whist any errors +committed in support of power were left to the law, with every +advantage of favourable construction, of mitigation, and finally +of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty, or in pursuit of +popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, +were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known law, but +by a <i>discretionary</i> proceeding, which brought on <i>the +loss of the popular object itself</i>. Popularity was to be +rendered, if not directly penal, at least highly dangerous. +The favour of the people might lead even to a disqualification of +representing them. Their odium might become, strained +through the medium of two or three constructions, the means of +sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This +is punishing the offence in the offending part. Until this +time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an +Assembly, still in some sort popular, led to the greatest honours +and emoluments in the gift of the Crown. Now the principle +is reversed; and the favour of the Court is the only sure way of +obtaining and holding those honours which ought to be in the +disposal of the people.</p> +<p>It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled +away. Example, the only argument of effect in civil life, +demonstrates the truth of my proposition. Nothing can alter +my opinion concerning the pernicious tendency of this example, +until I see some man for his indiscretion in the support of +power, for his violent and intemperate servility, rendered +incapable of sitting in parliament. For as it now stands, +the fault of overstraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if +you please, asserting popular privileges, has led to +disqualification; the opposite fault never has produced the +slightest punishment. Resistance to power has shut the door +of the House of Commons to one man; obsequiousness and servility, +to none.</p> +<p>Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any +disorder. But I would leave such offences to the law, to be +punished in measure and proportion. The laws of this +country are for the most part constituted, and wisely so, for the +general ends of Government, rather than for the preservation of +our particular liberties. Whatever therefore is done in +support of liberty, by persons not in public trust, or not acting +merely in that trust, is liable to be more or less out of the +ordinary course of the law; and the law itself is sufficient to +animadvert upon it with great severity. Nothing indeed can +hinder that severe letter from crushing us, except the +temperaments it may receive from a trial by jury. But if +the habit prevails of <i>going beyond the law</i>, and +superseding this judicature, of carrying offences, real or +supposed, into the legislative bodies, who shall establish +themselves into <i>courts of criminal equity</i>, (so <i>the Star +Chamber</i> has been called by Lord Bacon,) all the evils of the +<i>Star</i> Chamber are revived. A large and liberal +construction in ascertaining offences, and a discretionary power +in punishing them, is the idea of criminal equity; which is in +truth a monster in Jurisprudence. It signifies nothing +whether a court for this purpose be a Committee of Council, or a +House of Commons, or a House of Lords; the liberty of the subject +will be equally subverted by it. The true end and purpose +of that House of Parliament which entertains such a jurisdiction +will be destroyed by it.</p> +<p>I will not believe, what no other man living believes, that +Mr. Wilkes was punished for the indecency of his publications, or +the impiety of his ransacked closet. If he had fallen in a +common slaughter of libellers and blasphemers, I could well +believe that nothing more was meant than was pretended. But +when I see, that, for years together, full as impious, and +perhaps more dangerous writings to religion, and virtue, and +order, have not been punished, nor their authors discountenanced; +that the most audacious libels on Royal Majesty have passed +without notice; that the most treasonable invectives against the +laws, liberties, and constitution of the country, have not met +with the slightest animadversion; I must consider this as a +shocking and shameless pretence. Never did an envenomed +scurrility against everything sacred and civil, public and +private, rage through the kingdom with such a furious and +unbridled licence. All this while the peace of the nation +must be shaken, to ruin one libeller, and to tear from the +populace a single favourite.</p> +<p>Nor is it that vice merely skulks in an obscure and +contemptible impunity. Does not the public behold with +indignation, persons not only generally scandalous in their +lives, but the identical persons who, by their society, their +instruction, their example, their encouragement, have drawn this +man into the very faults which have furnished the Cabal with a +pretence for his persecution, loaded with every kind of favour, +honour, and distinction, which a Court can bestow? Add but +the crime of servility (the <i>foedum crimem servitutis</i>) to +every other crime, and the whole mass is immediately transmuted +into virtue, and becomes the just subject of reward and +honour. When therefore I reflect upon this method pursued +by the Cabal in distributing rewards and punishments, I must +conclude that Mr. Wilkes is the object of persecution, not on +account of what he has done in common with others who are the +objects of reward, but for that in which he differs from many of +them: that he is pursued for the spirited dispositions which are +blended with his vices; for his unconquerable firmness, for his +resolute, indefatigable, strenuous resistance against +oppression.</p> +<p>In this case, therefore, it was not the man that was to be +punished, nor his faults that were to be discountenanced. +Opposition to acts of power was to be marked by a kind of civil +proscription. The popularity which should arise from such +an opposition was to be shown unable to protect it. The +qualities by which court is made to the people, were to render +every fault inexpiable, and every error irretrievable. The +qualities by which court is made to power, were to cover and to +sanctify everything. He that will have a sure and +honourable seat, in the House of Commons, must take care how he +adventures to cultivate popular qualities; otherwise he may, +remember the old maxim, <i>Breves et infaustos populi Romani +amores</i>. If, therefore, a pursuit of popularity expose a +man to greater dangers than a disposition to servility, the +principle which is the life and soul of popular elections will +perish out of the Constitution.</p> +<p>It behoves the people of England to consider how the House of +Commons under the operation of these examples must of necessity +be constituted. On the side of the Court will be, all +honours, offices, emoluments; every sort of personal +gratification to avarice or vanity; and, what is of more moment +to most gentlemen, the means of growing, by innumerable petty +services to individuals, into a spreading interest in their +country. On the other hand, let us suppose a person +unconnected with the Court, and in opposition to its +system. For his own person, no office, or emolument, or +title; no promotion ecclesiastical, or civil, or military, or +naval, for children, or brothers, or kindred. In vain an +expiring interest in a borough calls for offices, or small +livings, for the children of mayors, and aldermen, and capital +burgesses. His court rival has them all. He can do an +infinite number of acts of generosity and kindness, and even of +public spirit. He can procure indemnity from +quarters. He can procure advantages in trade. He can +get pardons for offences. He can obtain a thousand favours, +and avert a thousand evils. He may, while he betrays every +valuable interest of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a +father, a guardian angel, to his borough. The unfortunate +independent member has nothing to offer, but harsh refusal, or +pitiful excuse, or despondent representation of a hopeless +interest. Except from his private fortune, in which he may +be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his Court competitor, he has no +way of showing any one good quality, or of making a single +friend. In the House, he votes for ever in a dispirited +minority. If he speaks, the doors are locked. A body +of loquacious placemen go out to tell the world, that all he aims +at, is to get into office. If he has not the talent of +elocution, which is the case of many as wise and knowing men as +any in the House, he is liable to all these inconveniences, +without the eclat which attends upon any tolerably successful +exertion of eloquence. Can we conceive a more discouraging +post of duty than this? Strip it of the poor reward of +popularity; suffer even the excesses committed in defence of the +popular interest to become a ground for the majority of that +House to form a disqualification out of the line of the law, and +at their pleasure, attended not only with the loss of the +franchise, but with every kind of personal disgrace; if this +shall happen, the people of this kingdom may be assured that they +cannot be firmly or faithfully served by any man. It is out +of the nature of men and things that they should; and their +presumption will be equal to their folly, if they expect +it. The power of the people, within the laws, must show +itself sufficient to protect every representative in the animated +performance of his duty, or that duty cannot be performed. +The House of Commons can never be a control on other parts of +Government, unless they are controlled themselves by their +constituents; and unless these constituents possess some right in +the choice of that House, which it is not in the power of that +House to take away. If they suffer this power of arbitrary +incapacitation to stand, they have utterly perverted every other +power of the House of Commons. The late proceeding, I will +not say, <i>is</i> contrary to law; it <i>must</i> be so; for the +power which is claimed cannot, by any possibility, be a legal +power in any limited member of Government.</p> +<p>The power which they claim, of declaring incapacities, would +not be above the just claims of a final judicature, if they had +not laid it down as a leading principle, that they had no rule in +the exercise of this claim but their own <i>discretion</i>. +Not one of their abettors has ever undertaken to assign the +principle of unfitness, the species or degree of delinquency, on +which the House of Commons will expel, nor the mode of proceeding +upon it, nor the evidence upon which it is established. The +direct consequence of which is, that the first franchise of an +Englishman, and that on which all the rest vitally depend, is to +be forfeited for some offence which no man knows, and which is to +be proved by no known rule whatsoever of legal evidence. +This is so anomalous to our whole constitution, that I will +venture to say, the most trivial right, which the subject claims, +never was, nor can be, forfeited in such a manner.</p> +<p>The whole of their usurpation is established upon this method +of arguing. We do not make laws. No; we do not +contend for this power. We only declare law; and, as we are +a tribunal both competent and supreme, what we declare to be law +becomes law, although it should not have been so before. +Thus the circumstance of having no appeal from their jurisdiction +is made to imply that they have no rule in the exercise of it: +the judgment does not derive its validity from its conformity to +the law; but preposterously the law is made to attend on the +judgment; and the rule of the judgment is no other than the +<i>occasional will of the House</i>. An arbitrary +discretion leads, legality follows; which is just the very nature +and description of a legislative act.</p> +<p>This claim in their hands was no barren theory. It was +pursued into its utmost consequences; and a dangerous principle +has begot a correspondent practice. A systematic spirit has +been shown upon both sides. The electors of Middlesex chose +a person whom the House of Commons had voted incapable; and the +House of Commons has taken in a member whom the electors of +Middlesex had not chosen. By a construction on that +legislative power which had been assumed, they declared that the +true legal sense of the country was contained in the minority, on +that occasion; and might, on a resistance to a vote of +incapacity, be contained in any minority.</p> +<p>When any construction of law goes against the spirit of the +privilege it was meant to support, it is a vicious +construction. It is material to us to be represented really +and bona fide, and not in forms, in types, and shadows, and +fictions of law. The right of election was not established +merely as a <i>matter of form</i>, to satisfy some method and +rule of technical reasoning; it was not a principle which might +substitute a <i>Titius</i> or a <i>Maevius</i>, a <i>John Doe</i> +or <i>Richard Roe</i>, in the place of a man specially chosen; +not a principle which was just as well satisfied with one man as +with another. It is a right, the effect of which is to give +to the people that man, and that man only, whom by their voices, +actually, not constructively given, they declare that they know, +esteem, love, and trust. This right is a matter within +their own power of judging and feeling; not an <i>ens +rationis</i> and creature of law: nor can those devices, by which +anything else is substituted in the place of such an actual +choice, answer in the least degree the end of representation.</p> +<p>I know that the courts of law have made as strained +constructions in other cases. Such is the construction in +common recoveries. The method of construction which in that +case gives to the persons in remainder, for their security and +representative, the door-keeper, crier, or sweeper of the Court, +or some other shadowy being without substance or effect, is a +fiction of a very coarse texture. This was however +suffered, by the acquiescence of the whole kingdom, for ages; +because the evasion of the old Statute of Westminster, which +authorised perpetuities, had more sense and utility than the law +which was evaded. But an attempt to turn the right of +election into such a farce and mockery as a fictitious fine and +recovery, will, I hope, have another fate; because the laws which +give it are infinitely dear to us, and the evasion is infinitely +contemptible.</p> +<p>The people indeed have been told, that this power of +discretionary disqualification is vested in hands that they may +trust, and who will be sure not to abuse it to their +prejudice. Until I find something in this argument +differing from that on which every mode of despotism has been +defended, I shall not be inclined to pay it any great +compliment. The people are satisfied to trust themselves +with the exercise of their own privileges, and do not desire this +kind intervention of the House of Commons to free them from the +burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought +not to trust the House of Commons with a power over their +franchises; because the constitution, which placed two other +co-ordinate powers to control it, reposed no such confidence in +that body. It were a folly well deserving servitude for its +punishment, to be full of confidence where the laws are full of +distrust; and to give to an House of Commons, arrogating to its +sole resolution the most harsh and odious part of legislative +authority, that degree of submission which is due only to the +Legislature itself.</p> +<p>When the House of Commons, in an endeavour to obtain new +advantages at the expense of the other orders of the State, for +the benefits of the <i>Commons at large</i>, have pursued strong +measures; if it were not just, it was at least natural, that the +constituents should connive at all their proceedings; because we +were ourselves ultimately to profit. But when this +submission is urged to us, in a contest between the +representatives and ourselves, and where nothing can be put into +their scale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to be +children when they tell us they are our representatives, our own +flesh and blood, and that all the stripes they give us are for +our good. The very desire of that body to have such a trust +contrary to law reposed in them, shows that they are not worthy +of it. They certainly will abuse it; because all men +possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power leading to the +aggrandisement and profit of their own body have always abused +it: and I see no particular sanctity in our times, that is at all +likely, by a miraculous operation, to overrule the course of +nature.</p> +<p>But we must purposely shut our eyes, if we consider this +matter merely as a contest between the House of Commons and the +Electors. The true contest is between the Electors of the +Kingdom and the Crown; the Crown acting by an instrumental House +of Commons. It is precisely the same, whether the Ministers +of the Crown can disqualify by a dependent House of Commons, or +by a dependent court of <i>Star Chamber</i>, or by a dependent +court of King’s Bench. If once Members of Parliament +can be practically convinced that they do not depend on the +affection or opinion of the people for their political being, +they will give themselves over, without even an appearance of +reserve, to the influence of the Court.</p> +<p>Indeed, a Parliament unconnected with the people, is essential +to a Ministry unconnected with the people; and therefore those +who saw through what mighty difficulties the interior Ministry +waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this business, will +conceive of what prodigious importance, the new corps of +<i>King’s men</i> held this principle of occasional and +personal incapacitation, to the whole body of their design.</p> +<p>When the House of Commons was thus made to consider itself as +the master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to +secure that House against all possible future deviation towards +popularity; an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according +to the pleasure of the Court.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>To complete the scheme of bringing our Court to a resemblance +to the neighbouring Monarchies, it was necessary, in effect, to +destroy those appropriations of revenue, which seem to limit the +property, as the other laws had done the powers, of the +Crown. An opportunity for this purpose was taken, upon an +application to Parliament for payment of the debts of the Civil +List; which in 1769 had amounted to £513,000. Such +application had been made upon former occasions; but to do it in +the former manner would by no means answer the present +purpose.</p> +<p>Whenever the Crown had come to the Commons to desire a supply +for the discharging of debts due on the Civil List, it was always +asked and granted with one of the three following qualifications; +sometimes with all of them. Either it was stated that the +revenue had been diverted from its purposes by Parliament; or +that those duties had fallen short of the sum for which they were +given by Parliament, and that the intention of the Legislature +had not been fulfilled; or that the money required to discharge +the Civil List debt was to be raised chargeable on the Civil List +duties. In the reign of Queen Anne, the Crown was found in +debt. The lessening and granting away some part of her +revenue by Parliament was alleged as the cause of that debt, and +pleaded as an equitable ground (such it certainly was), for +discharging it. It does not appear that the duties which +wore then applied to the ordinary Government produced clear above +£580,000 a year; because, when they were afterwards granted +to George the First, £120,000 was added, to complete the +whole to £700,000 a year. Indeed it was then +asserted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the +nett produce did not amount to above £550,000. The +Queen’s extraordinary charges were besides very +considerable; equal, at least, to any we have known in our +time. The application to Parliament was not for an absolute +grant of money, but to empower the Queen to raise it by borrowing +upon the Civil List funds.</p> +<p>The Civil List debt was twice paid in the reign of George the +First. The money was granted upon the same plan which had +been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The Civil List +revenues were then mortgaged for the sum to be raised, and stood +charged with the ransom of their own deliverance.</p> +<p>George the Second received an addition to his Civil +List. Duties were granted for the purpose of raising +£800,000 a year. It was not until he had reigned +nineteen years, and after the last rebellion, that he called upon +Parliament for a discharge of the Civil List debt. The +extraordinary charges brought on by the rebellion, account fully +for the necessities of the Crown. However, the +extraordinary charges of Government were not thought a ground fit +to be relied on. A deficiency of the Civil List duties for +several years before was stated as the principal, if not the +sole, ground on which an application to Parliament could be +justified. About this time the produce of these duties had +fallen pretty low; and even upon an average of the whole reign +they never produced £800,000 a year clear to the +Treasury.</p> +<p>That Prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new +demands were made, but with so much good order were his revenues +and expenses regulated, that, although many parts of the +establishment of the Court were upon a larger and more liberal +scale than they have been since, there was a considerable sum in +hand, on his decease, amounting to about £170,000, +applicable to the service of the Civil List of his present +Majesty. So that, if this reign commenced with a greater +charge than usual, there was enough, and more than enough, +abundantly to supply all the extraordinary expense. That +the Civil List should have been exceeded in the two former +reigns, especially in the reign of George the First, was not at +all surprising. His revenue was but £700,000 +annually; if it ever produced so much clear. The prodigious +and dangerous disaffection to the very being of the +establishment, and the cause of a Pretender then powerfully +abetted from abroad, produced many demands of an extraordinary +nature both abroad and at home. Much management and great +expenses were necessary. But the throne of no Prince has +stood upon more unshaken foundations than that of his present +Majesty.</p> +<p>To have exceeded the sum given for the Civil List, and to have +incurred a debt without special authority of Parliament, was, +<i>prima facie</i>, a criminal act: as such Ministers ought +naturally rather to have withdrawn it from the inspection, than +to have exposed it to the scrutiny, of Parliament. +Certainly they ought, of themselves, officially to have come +armed with every sort of argument, which, by explaining, could +excuse a matter in itself of presumptive guilt. But the +terrors of the House of Commons are no longer for Ministers.</p> +<p>On the other hand, the peculiar character of the House of +Commons, as trustee of the public purse, would have led them to +call with a punctilious solicitude for every public account, and +to have examined into them with the most rigorous accuracy.</p> +<p>The capital use of an account is, that the reality of the +charge, the reason of incurring it, and the justice and necessity +of discharging it, should all appear antecedent to the +payment. No man ever pays first, and calls for his account +afterwards; because he would thereby let out of his hands the +principal, and indeed only effectual, means of compelling a full +and fair one. But, in national business, there is an +additional reason for a previous production of every +account. It is a cheek, perhaps the only one, upon a +corrupt and prodigal use of public money. An account after +payment is to no rational purpose an account. However, the +House of Commons thought all these to be antiquated principles; +they were of opinion that the most Parliamentary way of +proceeding was, to pay first what the Court thought proper to +demand, and to take its chance for an examination into accounts +at some time of greater leisure.</p> +<p>The nation had settled £800,000 a year on the Crown, as +sufficient for the purpose of its dignity, upon the estimate of +its own Ministers. When Ministers came to Parliament, and +said that this allowance had not been sufficient for the purpose, +and that they had incurred a debt of £500,000, would it not +have been natural for Parliament first to have asked, how, and by +what means, their appropriated allowance came to be +insufficient? Would it not have savoured of some attention +to justice, to have seen in what periods of Administration this +debt had been originally incurred; that they might discover, and +if need were, animadvert on the persons who were found the most +culpable? To put their hands upon such articles of +expenditure as they thought improper or excessive, and to secure, +in future, against such misapplication or exceeding? +Accounts for any other purposes are but a matter of curiosity, +and no genuine Parliamentary object. All the accounts which +could answer any Parliamentary end were refused, or postponed by +previous questions. Every idea of prevention was rejected, +as conveying an improper suspicion of the Ministers of the +Crown.</p> +<p>When every leading account had been refused, many others were +granted with sufficient facility.</p> +<p>But with great candour also, the House was informed, that +hardly any of them could be ready until the next session; some of +them perhaps not so soon. But, in order firmly to establish +the precedent of <i>payment previous to account</i>, and to form +it into a settled rule of the House, the god in the machine was +brought down, nothing less than the wonder-working <i>Law of +Parliament</i>. It was alleged, that it is the law of +Parliament, when any demand comes from the Crown, that the House +must go immediately into the Committee of Supply; in which +Committee it was allowed, that the production and examination of +accounts would be quite proper and regular. It was +therefore carried that they should go into the Committee without +delay, and without accounts, in order to examine with great order +and regularity things that could not possibly come before +them. After this stroke of orderly and Parliamentary wit +and humour, they went into the Committee, and very generously +voted the payment.</p> +<p>There was a circumstance in that debate too remarkable to be +overlooked. This debt of the Civil List was all along +argued upon the same footing as a debt of the State, contracted +upon national authority. Its payment was urged as equally +pressing upon the public faith and honour; and when the whole +year’s account was stated, in what is called <i>The +Budget</i>, the Ministry valued themselves on the payment of so +much public debt, just as if they had discharged £500,000 +of navy or exchequer bills. Though, in truth, their +payment, from the Sinking Fund, of debt which was never +contracted by Parliamentary authority, was, to all intents and +purposes, so much debt incurred. But such is the present +notion of public credit and payment of debt. No wonder that +it produces such effects.</p> +<p>Nor was the House at all more attentive to a provident +security against future, than it had been to a vindictive +retrospect to past, mismanagements. I should have thought +indeed that a Ministerial promise, during their own continuance +in office, might have been given, though this would have been but +a poor security for the public. Mr. Pelham gave such an +assurance, and he kept his word. But nothing was capable of +extorting from our Ministers anything which had the least +resemblance to a promise of confining the expenses of the Civil +List within the limits which had been settled by +Parliament. This reserve of theirs I look upon to be +equivalent to the clearest declaration that they were resolved +upon a contrary course.</p> +<p>However, to put the matter beyond all doubt, in the Speech +from the Throne, after thanking Parliament for the relief so +liberally granted, the Ministers inform the two Houses that they +will <i>endeavour</i> to confine the expenses of the Civil +Government—within what limits, think you? those which the +law had prescribed? Not in the least—“such +limits as the <i>honour of the Crown</i> can possibly +admit.”</p> +<p>Thus they established an arbitrary standard for that dignity +which Parliament had defined and limited to a legal +standard. They gave themselves, under the lax and +indeterminate idea of the <i>honour of the Crown</i>, a full +loose for all manner of dissipation, and all manner of +corruption. This arbitrary standard they were not afraid to +hold out to both Houses; while an idle and inoperative Act of +Parliament, estimating the dignity of the Crown at +£800,000, and confining it to that sum, adds to the number +of obsolete statutes which load the shelves of libraries without +any sort of advantage to the people.</p> +<p>After this proceeding, I suppose that no man can be so weak as +to think that the Crown is limited to any settled allowance +whatsoever. For if the Ministry has £800,000 a year +by the law of the land, and if by the law of Parliament all the +debts which exceed it are to be paid previous to the production +of any account, I presume that this is equivalent to an income +with no other limits than the abilities of the subject and the +moderation of the Court—that is to say, it is such in +income as is possessed by every absolute Monarch in Europe. +It amounts, as a person of great ability said in the debate, to +an unlimited power of drawing upon the Sinking Fund. Its +effect on the public credit of this kingdom must be obvious; for +in vain is the Sinking Fund the great buttress of all the rest, +if it be in the power of the Ministry to resort to it for the +payment of any debts which they may choose to incur, under the +name of the Civil List, and through the medium of a committee, +which thinks itself obliged by law to vote supplies without any +other account than that of the more existence of the debt.</p> +<p>Five hundred thousand pounds is a serious sum. But it is +nothing to the prolific principle upon which the sum was +voted—a principle that may be well called, <i>the fruitful +mother of a hundred more</i>. Neither is the damage to +public credit of very great consequence when compared with that +which results to public morals and to the safety of the +Constitution, from the exhaustless mine of corruption opened by +the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle of the late +payment of the debts of the Civil List. The power of +discretionary disqualification by one law of Parliament, and the +necessity of paying every debt of the Civil List by another law +of Parliament, if suffered to pass unnoticed, must establish such +a fund of rewards and terrors as will make Parliament the best +appendage and support of arbitrary power that ever was invented +by the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun +between the Representatives and the People. The Court +Faction have at length committed them.</p> +<p>In such a strait the wisest may well be perplexed, and the +boldest staggered. The circumstances are in a great measure +new. We have hardly any landmarks from the wisdom of our +ancestors to guide us. At best we can only follow the +spirit of their proceeding in other cases. I know the +diligence with which my observations on our public disorders have +been made. I am very sure of the integrity of the motives +on which they are published: I cannot be equally confident in any +plan for the absolute cure of those disorders, or for their +certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter +into more public discussion. Let the sagacity of others +work upon it. It is not uncommon for medical writers to +describe histories of diseases, very accurately, on whose cure +they can say but very little.</p> +<p>The first ideas which generally suggest themselves for the +cure of Parliamentary disorders are, to shorten the duration of +Parliaments, and to disqualify all, or a great number of +placemen, from a seat in the House of Commons. Whatever +efficacy there may be in those remedies, I am sure in the present +state of things it is impossible to apply them. A +restoration of the right of free election is a preliminary +indispensable to every other reformation. What alterations +ought afterwards to be made in the constitution is a matter of +deep and difficult research.</p> +<p>If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would +indeed be as little troublesome to me as to another to extol +these remedies, so famous in speculation, but to which their +greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to resort in +practice. I confess them, that I have no sort of reliance +upon either a Triennial Parliament or a Place-bill. With +regard to the former, perhaps, it might rather serve to +counteract than to promote the ends that are proposed by +it. To say nothing of the horrible disorders among the +people attending frequent elections, I should be fearful of +committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the +country into a contest with the Treasury. It is easy to see +which of the contending parties would be ruined first. +Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, so as to +endeavour to ground his speculations on his experience, must have +observed how prodigiously greater the power of Ministry is in the +first and last session of a Parliament, than it is in the +intermediate periods, when Members sit a little on their +seats. The persons of the greatest Parliamentary +experience, with whom I have conversed, did constantly, in +canvassing the fate of questions, allow something to the Court +side, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. +The evil complained of, if it exists in the present state of +things, would hardly be removed by a triennial Parliament: for, +unless the influence of Government in elections can be entirely +taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will +harass private independence; the more generally men will be +compelled to fly to the settled systematic interest of +Government, and to the resources of a boundless Civil List. +Certainly something may be done, and ought to be done, towards +lessening that influence in elections; and this will be necessary +upon a plan either of longer or shorter duration of +Parliament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, +as not to render such contentions, foot frequently repeated, +utterly ruinous, first to independence of fortune, and then to +independence of spirit. As I am only giving an opinion on +this point, and not at all debating it in an adverse line, I hope +I may be excused in another observation. With great truth I +may aver that I never remember to have talked on this subject +with any man much conversant with public business who considered +short Parliaments as a real improvement of the +Constitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular cause, are ready +enough to attribute all the declarations of such persons to +corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, +it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with +the, means of better information. The authority of such +persons will always have some weight. It may stand upon a +par with the speculations of those who are less practised in +business; and who, with perhaps purer intentions, have not so +effectual means of judging. It is besides an effect of +vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine that every Statesman is +of course corrupt: and that his opinion, upon every +constitutional point, is solely formed upon some sinister +interest.</p> +<p>The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The same +principle guides in both: I mean the opinion which is entertained +by many of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure +of public distempers. Without being as unreasonably +doubtful as many are unwisely confident, I will only say, that +this also is a matter very well worthy of serious and mature +reflection. It is not easy to foresee what the effect would +be of disconnecting with Parliament, the greatest part of those +who hold civil employments, and of such mighty and important +bodies as the military and naval establishments. It were +better, perhaps, that they should have a corrupt interest in the +forms of the constitution, than they should have none at +all. This is a question altogether different from the +disqualification of a particular description of Revenue Officers +from seats in Parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower sorts of +them from votes in elections. In the former case, only the +few are affected; in the latter, only the inconsiderable. +But a great official, a great professional, a great military and +naval interest, all necessarily comprehending many people of the +first weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has been gradually +formed in the kingdom. These new interests must be let into +a share of representation, else possibly they may be inclined to +destroy those institutions of which they are not permitted to +partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with: nor is it +every well-meaning man that is fit to put his hands to it. +Many other serious considerations occur. I do not open them +here, because they are not directly to my purpose; proposing only +to give the reader some taste of the difficulties that attend all +capital changes in the Constitution; just to hint the +uncertainty, to say no worse, of being able to prevent the Court, +as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its power, +from applying that influence to Parliament; and perhaps, if the +public method were precluded, of doing it in some worse and more +dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be +studied. The science of evasion, already tolerably +understood, would then be brought to the greatest +perfection. It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know +how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; lest, by attempting a +degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, +instead of cutting off the subsisting ill practices, new +corruptions might be produced for the concealment and security of +the old. It were better, undoubtedly, that no influence at +all could affect the mind of a Member of Parliament. But of +all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place under the +Government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it, and +by far the most safe to the country. I would not shut out +that sort of influence which is open and visible, which is +connected with the dignity and the service of the State, when it +is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of +subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods +of clandestine corruption, which are abundantly in the hands of +the Court, and which will be applied as long as these means of +corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have existence +amongst us. Our Constitution stands on a nice equipoise, +with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. +In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there +may be a risk of oversetting it on the other. Every project +of a material change in a Government so complicated as ours, +combined at the same time with external circumstances still more +complicated, is a matter full of difficulties; in which a +considerate man will not be too ready to decide; a prudent man +too ready to undertake; or an honest man too ready to +promise. They do not respect the public nor themselves, who +engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, or +that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, +weak perhaps, but honest and unbiassed; and submitted entirely to +the opinion of grave men, well affected to the constitution of +their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt +it.</p> +<p>Indeed, in the situation in which we stand, with an immense +revenue, an enormous debt, mighty establishments, Government +itself a great banker and a great merchant, I see no other way +for the preservation of a decent attention to public interest in +the Representatives, but <i>the interposition of the body of the +people itself</i>, whenever it shall appear, by some flagrant and +notorious act, by some capital innovation, that these +Representatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and +to introduce an arbitrary power. This interposition is a +most unpleasant remedy. But, if it be a legal remedy, it is +intended on some occasion to be used; to be used then only, when +it is evident that nothing else can hold the Constitution to its +true principles.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">* * * * *</p> +<p>The distempers of Monarchy were the great subjects of +apprehension and redress, in the last century; in this, the +distempers of Parliament. It is not in Parliament alone +that the remedy for Parliamentary disorders can be completed; +hardly, indeed, can it begin there. Until a confidence in +Government is re-established, the people ought to be excited to a +more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their +Representatives. Standards, for judging more systematically +upon their conduct, ought to be settled in the meetings of +counties and corporations. Frequent and correct lists of +the voters in all important questions ought to be procured.</p> +<p>By such means something may be done. By such means it +may appear who those are, that, by an indiscriminate support of +all Administrations, have totally banished all integrity and +confidence out of public proceedings; have confounded the best +men with the worst; and weakened and dissolved, instead of +strengthening and compacting, the general frame of +Government. If any person is more concerned for government +and order than for the liberties of his country, even he is +equally concerned to put an end to this course of indiscriminate +support. It is this blind and undistinguishing support that +feeds the spring of those very disorders, by which he is frighted +into the arms of the faction which contains in itself the source +of all disorders, by enfeebling all the visible and regular +authority of the State. The distemper is increased by his +injudicious and preposterous endeavours, or pretences, for the +cure of it.</p> +<p>An exterior Administration, chosen for its impotency, or after +it is chosen purposely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered +subservient, will not be obeyed. The laws themselves will +not be respected, when those who execute them are despised: and +they will be despised, when their power is not immediate from the +Crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never were Ministers +better supported in Parliament. Parliamentary support comes +and goes with office, totally regardless of the man, or the +merit. Is Government strengthened? It grows weaker +and weaker. The popular torrent gains upon it every +hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is not +support that is wanting to Government, but reformation. +When Ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not indeed built +upon a rock of adamant; it has, however, some stability. +But when it stands upon private humour, its structure is of +stubble, and its foundation is on quicksand. I repeat it +again—He that supports every Administration, subverts all +Government. The reason is this. The whole business in +which a Court usually takes an interest goes on at present +equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wise or +foolish, scandalous or reputable; there is nothing, therefore, to +hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one consistent +scheme of politics. Nothing interposes to prevent the full +operation of all the caprices and all the passions of a Court +upon the servants of the public. The system of +Administration is open to continual shocks and changes, upon the +principles of the meanest cabal, and the most contemptible +intrigue. Nothing can be solid and permanent. All +good men at length fly with horror from such a service. Men +of rank and ability, with the spirit which ought to animate such +men in a free state, while they decline the jurisdiction of dark +cabal on their actions and their fortunes, will, for both, +cheerfully put themselves upon their country. They will +trust an inquisitive and distinguishing Parliament; because it +does inquire, and does distinguish. If they act well, they +know that, in such a Parliament, they will be supported against +any intrigue; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can +protect them. This situation, however awful, is +honourable. But in one hour, and in the self-same Assembly, +without any assigned or assignable cause, to be precipitated from +the highest authority to the most marked neglect, possibly into +the greatest peril of life and reputation, is a situation full of +danger, and destitute of honour. It will be shunned equally +by every man of prudence, and every man of spirit.</p> +<p>Such are the consequences of the division of Court from the +Administration; and of the division of public men among +themselves. By the former of these, lawful Government is +undone; by the latter, all opposition to lawless power is +rendered impotent. Government may in a great measure be +restored, if any considerable bodies of men have honesty and +resolution enough never to accept Administration, unless this +garrison of <i>King’s</i> meat, which is stationed, as in a +citadel, to control and enslave it, be entirely broken and +disbanded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled with +the ground. The disposition of public men to keep this +corps together, and to act under it, or to co-operate with it, is +a touchstone by which every Administration ought in future to be +tried. There has not been one which has not sufficiently +experienced the utter incompatibility of that faction with the +public peace, and with all the ends of good Government; since, if +they opposed it, they soon lost every power of serving the Crown; +if they submitted to it they lost all the esteem of their +country. Until Ministers give to the public a full proof of +their entire alienation from that system, however plausible their +pretences, we may be sure they are more intent on the emoluments +than the duties of office. If they refuse to give this +proof, we know of what stuff they are made. In this +particular, it ought to be the electors’ business to look +to their Representatives. The electors ought to esteem it +no less culpable in their Member to give a single vote in +Parliament to such an Administration, than to take an office +under it; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious +infidelity and versatility of Members of Parliament, in their +opinions of men and things, ought in a particular manner to be +considered by the electors in the inquiry which is recommended to +them. This is one of the principal holdings of that +destructive system which has endeavoured to unhinge all the +virtuous, honourable, and useful connections in the kingdom.</p> +<p>This cabal has, with great success, propagated a doctrine +which serves for a colour to those acts of treachery; and whilst +it receives any degree of countenance, it will be utterly +senseless to look for a vigorous opposition to the Court +Party. The doctrine is this: That all political connections +are in their nature factious, and as such ought to be dissipated +and destroyed; and that the rule for forming Administrations is +mere personal ability, rated by the judgment of this cabal upon +it, and taken by drafts from every division and denomination of +public men. This decree was solemnly promulgated by the +head of the Court corps, the Earl of Bute himself, in a speech +which he made, in the year 1766, against the then Administration, +the only Administration which, he has ever been known directly +and publicly to oppose.</p> +<p>It is indeed in no way wonderful, that such persons should +make such declarations. That connection and faction are +equivalent terms, is an opinion which has been carefully +inculcated at all times by unconstitutional Statesmen. The +reason is evident. Whilst men are linked together, they +easily and speedily communicate the alarm of an evil +design. They are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, +and to oppose it with united strength. Whereas, when they +lie dispersed, without concert, order, or discipline, +communication is uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance +impracticable. Where men are not acquainted with each +other’s principles, nor experienced in each other’s +talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and +dispositions by joint efforts in business; no personal +confidence, no friendship, no common interest, subsisting among +them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part +with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a +connection, the most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight +of the whole, has his value, and his use; out of it, the greatest +talents are wholly unserviceable to the public. No man, who +is not inflamed by vainglory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself +that his single, unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavours, +are of power to defeat, the subtle designs and united cabals of +ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good must +associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice +in a contemptible struggle.</p> +<p>It is not enough in a situation of trust in the commonwealth, +that a man means well to his country; it is not enough that in +his single person he never did an evil act, but always voted +according to his conscience, and even harangued against every +design which he apprehended to be prejudicial to the interests of +his country. This innoxious and ineffectual character, that +seems formed upon a plan of apology and disculpation, falls +miserably short of the mark of public duty. That duty +demands and requires, that what is right should not only be made +known, but made prevalent; that what is evil should not only be +detected, but defeated. When the public man omits to put +himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, it is an +omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost as much +as if he had formally betrayed it. It is surely no very +rational account of a man’s life that he has always acted +right; but has taken special care to act in such a manner that +his endeavours could not possibly be productive of any +consequence.</p> +<p>I do not wonder that the behaviour of many parties should have +made persons of tender and scrupulous virtue somewhat out of +humour with all sorts of connection in politics. I admit +that people frequently acquire in such confederacies a narrow, +bigoted, and proscriptive spirit; that they are apt to sink the +idea of the general good in this circumscribed and partial +interest. But, where duty renders a critical situation a +necessary one, it is our business to keep free from the evils +attendant upon it, and not to fly from the situation +itself. If a fortress is seated in an unwholesome air, an +officer of the garrison is obliged to be attentive to his health, +but he must not desert his station. Every profession, not +excepting the glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a +priest, is liable to its own particular vices; which, however, +form no argument against those ways of life; nor are the vices +themselves inevitable to every individual in those +professions. Of such a nature are connections in politics; +essentially necessary for the full performance of our public +duty, accidentally liable to degenerate into faction. +Commonwealths are made of families, free Commonwealths of parties +also; and we may as well affirm, that our natural regards and +ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that +the bonds of our party weaken those by which we are held to our +country.</p> +<p>Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality in party a +crime against the State. I do not know whether this might +not have been rather to overstrain the principle. Certain +it is, the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths have +always commanded and promoted such connections. <i>Idem +sentire de republica</i>, was with them a principal ground of +friendship and attachment; nor do I know any other capable of +forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable, and more +virtuous habitudes. The Romans carried this principle a +great way. Even the holding of offices together, the +disposition of which arose from chance, not selection, gave rise +to a relation which continued for life. It was called +<i>necessitudo sortis</i>; and it was looked upon with a sacred +reverence. Breaches of any of these kinds of civil relation +were considered as acts of the most distinguished +turpitude. The whole people was distributed into political +societies, in which they acted in support of such interests in +the State as they severally affected. For it was then +thought no crime, to endeavour by every honest means to advance +to superiority and power those of your own sentiments and +opinions. This wise people was far from imagining that +those connections had no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that +men might quit them without shame, upon every call of +interest. They believed private honour to be the great +foundation of public trust; that friendship was no mean step +towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of +life, showed he regarded somebody besides himself, when he came +to act in a public situation, might probably consult some other +interest than his own. Never may we become <i>plus sages +que les sages</i>, as the French comedian has happily expressed +it—wiser than all the wise and good men who have lived +before us. It was their wish, to see public and private +virtues, not dissonant and jarring, and mutually destructive, but +harmoniously combined, growing out of one another in a noble and +orderly gradation, reciprocally supporting and supported. +In one of the most fortunate periods of our history this country +was governed by a connection; I mean the great connection of +Whigs in the reign of Queen Anne. They were complimented +upon the principle of this connection by a poet who was in high +esteem with them. Addison, who knew their sentiments, could +not praise them for what they considered as no proper subject of +commendation. As a poet who knew his business, he could not +applaud them for a thing which in general estimation was not +highly reputable. Addressing himself to Britain,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Thy favourites grow not up by +fortune’s sport,<br /> +Or from the crimes or follies of a Court;<br /> +On the firm basis of desert they rise,<br /> +From long-tried faith, and friendship’s holy +ties.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>The Whigs of those days believed that the only proper method +of rising into power was through bard essays of practised +friendship and experimented fidelity. At that time it was +not imagined that patriotism was a bloody idol, which required +the sacrifice of children and parents, or dearest connections in +private life, and of all the virtues that rise from those +relations. They were not of that ingenious paradoxical +morality to imagine that a spirit of moderation was properly +shown in patiently bearing the sufferings of your friends, or +that disinterestedness was clearly manifested at the expense of +other people’s fortune. They believed that no men +could act with effect who did not act in concert; that no men +could act in concert who did not act with confidence; that no men +could act with confidence who were not bound together by common +opinions, common affections, and common interests.</p> +<p>These wise men, for such I must call Lord Sunderland, Lord +Godolphin, Lord Somers, and Lord Marlborough, were too well +principled in these maxims, upon which the whole fabric of public +strength is built, to be blown off their ground by the breath of +every childish talker. They were not afraid that they +should be called an ambitious Junto, or that their resolution to +stand or fall together should, by placemen, be interpreted into a +scuffle for places.</p> +<p>Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint +endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle +in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it +impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own politics, +or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the +means of having them reduced into practice. It is the +business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends +of Government. It is the business of the politician, who is +the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those +ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore, every +honourable connection will avow it as their first purpose to +pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions +into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common +plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the +State. As this power is attached to certain situations, it +is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a +proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party +the preference in all things, and by no means, for private +considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole +body is not included, nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to +be controlled, or to be over-balanced, in office or in council, +by those who contradict, the very fundamental principles on which +their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair +connection must stand. Such a generous contention for +power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be +distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and +emolument. The very style of such persons will serve to +discriminate them from those numberless impostors who have +deluded the ignorant with professions incompatible with human +practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below +the level of vulgar rectitude.</p> +<p>It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals that +their maxims have a plausible air, and, on a cursory view, appear +equal to first principles. They are light and +portable. They are as current as copper coin, and about as +valuable. They serve equally the first capacities and the +lowest, and they are, at least, as useful to the worst men as the +best. Of this stamp is the cant of <i>Not men</i>, <i>but +measures</i>; a sort of charm, by which many people got loose +from every honourable engagement. When I see a man acting +this desultory and disconnected part, with as much detriment to +his own fortune as prejudice to the cause of any party, I am not +persuaded that he is right, but I am ready to believe he is in +earnest. I respect virtue in all its situations, even when +it is found in the unsuitable company of weakness. I lament +to see qualities, rare and valuable, squandered away without any +public utility. But when a gentleman with great visible +emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and +tells you it is because he proceeds upon his own judgment that he +acts on the merits of the several measures as they arise, and +that he is obliged to follow his own conscience, and not that of +others, he gives reasons which it is impossible to controvert, +and discovers a character which it is impossible to +mistake. What shall we think of him who never differed from +a certain set of men until the moment they lost their power, and +who never agreed with them in a single instance afterwards? +Would not such a coincidence of interest and opinion be rather +fortunate? Would it not be an extraordinary cast upon the +dice that a man’s connections should degenerate into +faction, precisely at the critical moment when they lose their +power or he accepts a place? When people desert their +connections, the desertion is a manifest fact, upon which a +direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a +<i>measure</i> of Government be right or wrong is <i>no matter of +fact</i>, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they +do, dispute and wrangle without end. But whether the +individual thinks the measure right or wrong is a point at still +a greater distance from the reach of all human decision. It +is therefore very convenient to politicians not to put the +judgment of their conduct on overt acts, cognisable in any +ordinary court, but upon such a matter as can be triable only in +that secret tribunal, where they are sure of being heard with +favour, or where at worst the sentence will be only private +whipping.</p> +<p>I believe the reader would wish to find no substance in a +doctrine which has a tendency to destroy all test of character as +deduced from conduct. He will therefore excuse my adding +something more towards the further clearing up a point which the +great convenience of obscurity to dishonesty has been able to +cover with some degree of darkness and doubt.</p> +<p>In order to throw an odium on political connection, these +politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it that you are +blindly to follow the opinions of your party when in direct +opposition to your own clear ideas, a degree of servitude that no +worthy man could bear the thought of submitting to, and such as, +I believe, no connections (except some Court factions) ever could +be so senselessly tyrannical as to impose. Men thinking +freely will, in particular instances, think differently. +But still, as the greater Part of the measures which arise in the +course of public business are related to, or dependent on, some +great leading general principles in Government, a man must be +peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political company if +he does not agree with them at least nine times in ten. If +he does not concur in these general principles upon which the +party is founded, and which necessarily draw on a concurrence in +their application, he ought from the beginning to have chosen +some other, more conformable to his opinions. When the +question is in its nature doubtful, or not very material, the +modesty which becomes an individual, and (in spite of our Court +moralists) that partiality which becomes a well-chosen +friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence in the +general sentiment. Thus the disagreement will naturally be +rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom, without +violating concord or disturbing arrangement. And this is +all that ever was required for a character of the greatest +uniformity and steadiness in connection. How men can +proceed without any connection at all is to me utterly +incomprehensible. Of what sort of materials must that man +be made, how must he be tempered and put together, who can sit +whole years in Parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his +fellow-citizens, amidst the storm of such tempestuous passions, +in the sharp conflict of so many wits, and tempers, and +characters, in the agitation of such mighty questions, in the +discussion of such vast and ponderous interests, without seeing +any one sort of men, whose character, conduct, or disposition +would lead him to associate himself with them, to aid and be +aided, in any one system of public utility?</p> +<p>I remember an old scholastic aphorism, which says that +“the man who lives wholly detached from others must be +either an angel or a devil.” When I see in any of +these detached gentlemen of our times the angelic purity, power, +and beneficence, I shall admit them to be angels. In the +meantime, we are born only to be men. We shall do enough if +we form ourselves to be good ones. It is therefore our +business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most +perfect vigour and maturity, every sort of generous and honest +feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the, +dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and +conduct of the commonwealth; so to be patriots, as not to forget +we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendships, and to incur +enmities. To have both strong, but both selected: in the +one, to be placable; in the other, immovable. To model our +principles to our duties and our situation. To be fully +persuaded that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious, and +rather to run the risk of falling into faults in a course which +leads us to act with effect and energy than to loiter out our +days without blame and without use. Public life is a +situation of power and energy; he trespasses against his duty who +sleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the +enemy.</p> +<p>There is, however, a time for all things. It is not +every conjuncture which calls with equal force upon the activity +of honest men; but critical exigences now and then arise, and I +am mistaken if this be not one of them. Men will see the +necessity of honest combination, but they may see it when it is +too late. They may embody when it will be ruinous to +themselves, and of no advantage to the country; when, for want of +such a timely union as may enable them to oppose in favour of the +laws, with the laws on their side, they may at length find +themselves under the necessity of conspiring, instead of +consulting. The law, for which they stand, may become a +weapon in the hands of its bitterest enemies; and they will be +cast, at length, into that miserable alternative, between slavery +and civil confusion, which no good man can look upon without +horror, an alternative in which it is impossible he should take +either part with a conscience perfectly at repose. To keep +that situation of guilt and remorse at the utmost distance is, +therefore, our first obligation. Early activity may prevent +late and fruitless violence. As yet we work in the +light. The scheme of the enemies of public tranquillity has +disarranged, it has not destroyed us.</p> +<p>If the reader believes that there really exists such a Faction +as I have described, a Faction ruling by the private inclinations +of a Court, against the general sense of the people; and that +this Faction, whilst it pursues a scheme for undermining all the +foundations of our freedom, weakens (for the present at least) +all the powers of executory Government, rendering us abroad +contemptible, and at home distracted; he will believe, also, that +nothing but a firm combination of public men against this body, +and that, too, supported by the hearty concurrence of the people +at large, can possibly get the better of it. The people +will see the necessity of restoring public men to an attention to +the public opinion, and of restoring the Constitution to its +original principles. Above all, they will endeavour to keep +the House of Commons from assuming a character which does not +belong to it. They will endeavour to keep that House, for +its existence for its powers, and its privileges, as independent +of every other, and as dependent upon themselves, as +possible. This servitude is to a House of Commons (like +obedience to the Divine law), “perfect +freedom.” For if they once quit this natural, +rational, and liberal obedience, having deserted the only proper +foundation of their power, they must seek a support in an abject +and unnatural dependence somewhere else. When, through the +medium of this just connection with their constituents, the +genuine dignity of the House of Commons is restored, it will +begin to think of casting from it, with scorn, as badges of +servility, all the false ornaments of illegal power, with which +it has been, for some time, disgraced. It will begin to +think of its old office of CONTROL. It will not suffer that +last of evils to predominate in the country; men without popular +confidence, public opinion, natural connection, or natural trust, +invested with all the powers of Government.</p> +<p>When they have learned this lesson themselves, they will be +willing and able to teach the Court, that it is the true interest +of the Prince to have but one Administration; and that one +composed of those who recommend themselves to their Sovereign +through the opinion of their country, and not by their +obsequiousness to a favourite. Such men will serve their +Sovereign with affection and fidelity; because his choice of +them, upon such principles, is a compliment to their +virtue. They will be able to serve him effectually; because +they will add the weight of the country to the force of the +executory power. They will be able to serve their King with +dignity; because they will never abuse his name to the +gratification of their private spleen or avarice. This, +with allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general +character of a Ministry, which thinks itself accountable to the +House of Commons, when the House of Commons thinks itself +accountable to its constituents. If other ideas should +prevail, things must remain in their present confusion, until +they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence; or until +they sink into the dead repose of despotism.</p> +<h2>SPEECH ON THE MIDDLESEX ELECTION<br /> +<span class="smcap">February</span>, 1771</h2> +<p>Mr. Speaker,—In every complicated Constitution (and +every free Constitution is complicated) cases will arise, when +the several orders of the State will clash with one another, and +disputes will arise about the limits of their several rights and +privileges. It may be almost impossible to reconcile +them.</p> +<p>Carry the principle on by which you expelled Mr. Wilkes, there +is not a man in the House, hardly a man in the nation, who may +not be disqualified. That this House should have no power +of expulsion is a hard saying. That this House should have +a general discretionary power of disqualification is a dangerous +saying. That the people should not choose their own +representative, is a saying that shakes the Constitution. +That this House should name the representative, is a saying +which, followed by practice, subverts the constitution. +They have the right of electing, you have a right of expelling; +they of choosing, you of judging, and only of judging, of the +choice. What bounds shall be set to the freedom of that +choice? Their right is prior to ours, we all originate +there. They are the mortal enemies of the House of Commons, +who would persuade them to think or to act as if they were a +self-originated magistracy, independent of the people and +unconnected with their opinions and feelings. Under a +pretence of exalting the dignity, they undermine the very +foundations of this House. When the question is asked here, +what disturbs the people, whence all this clamour, we apply to +the treasury-bench, and they tell us it is from the efforts of +libellers and the wickedness of the people, a worn-out +ministerial pretence. If abroad the people are deceived by +popular, within we are deluded by ministerial, cant. The +question amounts to this, whether you mean to be a legal +tribunal, or an arbitrary and despotic assembly. I see and +I feel the delicacy and difficulty of the ground upon which we +stand in this question. I could wish, indeed, that they who +advised the Crown had not left Parliament in this very ungraceful +distress, in which they can neither retract with dignity nor +persist with justice. Another parliament might have +satisfied the people without lowering themselves. But our +situation is not in our own choice: our conduct in that situation +is all that is in our own option. The substance of the +question is, to put bounds to your own power by the rules and +principles of law. This is, I am sensible, a difficult +thing to the corrupt, grasping, and ambitious part of human +nature. But the very difficulty argues and enforces the +necessity of it. First, because the greater the power, the +more dangerous the abuse. Since the Revolution, at least, +the power of the nation has all flowed with a full tide into the +House of Commons. Secondly, because the House of Commons, +as it is the most powerful, is the most corruptible part of the +whole Constitution. Our public wounds cannot be concealed; +to be cured, they must be laid open. The public does think +we are a corrupt body. In our legislative capacity we are, +in most instances, esteemed a very wise body. In our +judicial, we have no credit, no character at, all. Our +judgments stink in the nostrils of the people. They think +us to be not only without virtue, but without shame. +Therefore, the greatness of our power, and the great and just +opinion of our corruptibility and our corruption, render it +necessary to fix some bound, to plant some landmark, which we are +never to exceed. That is what the bill proposes. +First, on this head, I lay it down as a fundamental rule in the +law and constitution of this country, that this House has not by +itself alone a legislative authority in any case +whatsoever. I know that the contrary was the doctrine of +the usurping House of Commons which threw down the fences and +bulwarks of law, which annihilated first the lords, then the +Crown, then its constituents. But the first thing that was +done on the restoration of the Constitution was to settle this +point. Secondly, I lay it down as a rule, that the power of +occasional incapacitation, on discretionary grounds, is a +legislative power. In order to establish this principle, if +it should not be sufficiently proved by being stated, tell me +what are the criteria, the characteristics, by which you +distinguish between a legislative and a juridical act. It +will be necessary to state, shortly, the difference between a +legislative and a juridical act. A legislative act has no +reference to any rule but these two: original justice, and +discretionary application. Therefore, it can give rights; +rights where no rights existed before; and it can take away +rights where they were before established. For the law, +which binds all others, does not and cannot bind the law-maker; +he, and he alone, is above the law. But a judge, a person +exercising a judicial capacity, is neither to apply to original +justice, nor to a discretionary application of it. He goes +to justice and discretion only at second hand, and through the +medium of some superiors. He is to work neither upon his +opinion of the one nor of the other; but upon a fixed rule, of +which he has not the making, but singly and solely the +application to the case.</p> +<p>The power assumed by the House neither is, nor can be, +judicial power exercised according to known law. The +properties of law are, first, that it should be known; secondly, +that it should be fixed and not occasional. First, this +power cannot be according to the first property of law; because +no man does or can know it, nor do you yourselves know upon what +grounds you will vote the incapacity of any man. No man in +Westminster Hall, or in any court upon earth, will say that is +law, upon which, if a man going to his counsel should say to him, +“What is my tenure in law of this estate?” he would +answer, “Truly, sir, I know not; the court has no rule but +its own discretion: they will determine.” It is not +a, fixed law, because you profess you vary it according to the +occasion, exercise it according to your discretion; no man can +call for it as a right. It is argued that the incapacity is +not originally voted, but a consequence of a power of expulsion: +but if you expel, not upon legal, but upon arbitrary, that is, +upon discretionary grounds, and the incapacity is <i>ex vi +termini</i> and inclusively comprehended in the expulsion, is not +the incapacity voted in the expulsion? Are they not +convertible terms? and, if incapacity is voted to be inherent in +expulsion, if expulsion be arbitrary, incapacity is arbitrary +also. I have, therefore, shown that the power of +incapacitation is a legislative power; I have shown that +legislative power does not belong to the House of Commons; and, +therefore, it follows that the House of Commons has not a power +of incapacitation.</p> +<p>I know not the origin of the House of Commons, but am very +sure that it did not create itself; the electors wore prior to +the elected; whose rights originated either from the people at +large, or from some other form of legislature, which never could +intend for the chosen a power of superseding the choosers.</p> +<p>If you have not a power of declaring an incapacity simply by +the mere act of declaring it, it is evident to the most ordinary +reason you cannot have a right of expulsion, inferring, or +rather, including, an incapacity, For as the law, when it gives +any direct right, gives also as necessary incidents all the means +of acquiring the possession of that right, so where it does not +give a right directly, it refuses all the means by which such a +right may by any mediums be exercised, or in effect be indirectly +acquired. Else it is very obvious that the intention of the +law in refusing that right might be entirely frustrated, and the +whole power of the legislature baffled. If there be no +certain invariable rule of eligibility, it were better to get +simplicity, if certainty is not to be had; and to resolve all the +franchises of the subject into this one short +proposition—the will and pleasure of the House of +Commons.</p> +<p>The argument, drawn from the courts of law, applying the +principles of law to new cases as they emerge, is altogether +frivolous, inapplicable, and arises from a total ignorance of the +bounds between civil and criminal jurisdiction, and of the +separate maxims that govern these two provinces of law, that are +eternally separate. Undoubtedly the courts of law, where a +new case comes before them, as they do every hour, then, that +there may be no defect in justice, call in similar principles, +and the example of the nearest determination, and do everything +to draw the law to as near a conformity to general equity and +right reason as they can bring it with its being a fixed +principle. <i>Boni judicis est ampliare +justitiam</i>—that is, to make open and liberal +justice. But in criminal matters this parity of reason, and +these analogies, ever have been, and ever ought to be, +shunned.</p> +<p>Whatever is incident to a court of judicature, is necessary to +the House of Commons, as judging in elections. But a power +of making incapacities is not necessary to a court of judicature; +therefore a power of making incapacities is not necessary to the +House of Commons.</p> +<p>Incapacity, declared by whatever authority, stands upon two +principles: first, an incapacity arising from the supposed +incongruity of two duties in the commonwealth; secondly, an +incapacity arising from unfitness by infirmity of nature, or the +criminality of conduct. As to the first class of +incapacities, they have no hardship annexed to them. The +persons so incapacitated are paid by one dignity for what they +abandon in another, and, for the most part, the situation arises +from their own choice. But as to the second, arising from +an unfitness not fixed by nature, but superinduced by some +positive acts, or arising from honourable motives, such as an +occasional personal disability, of all things it ought to be +defined by the fixed rule of law—what Lord Coke calls the +Golden Metwand of the Law, and not by the crooked cord of +discretion. Whatever is general is better born. We +take our common lot with men of the same description. But +to be selected and marked out by a particular brand of +unworthiness among our fellow-citizens, is a lot of all others +the hardest to be borne: and consequently is of all others that +act which ought only to be trusted to the legislature, as not +only legislative in its nature, but of all parts of legislature +the most odious. The question is over, if this is shown not +to be a legislative act. But what is very usual and +natural, is to corrupt judicature into legislature. On this +point it is proper to inquire whether a court of judicature, +which decides without appeal, has it as a necessary incident of +such judicature, that whatever it decides <i>de jure</i> is +law. Nobody will, I hope, assert this, because the direct +consequence would be the entire extinction of the difference +between true and false judgments. For, if the judgment +makes the law, and not the law directs the judgment, it is +impossible there could be such a thing as an illegal judgment +given.</p> +<p>But, instead of standing upon this ground, they introduce +another question, wholly foreign to it, whether it ought not to +be submitted to as if it were law. And then the question +is, By the Constitution of this country, what degree of +submission is due to the authoritative acts of a limited +power? This question of submission, determine it how you +please, has nothing to do in this discussion and in this +House. Here it is not how long the people are bound to +tolerate the illegality of our judgments, but whether we have a +right to substitute our occasional opinion in the place of law, +so as to deprive the citizen of his franchise.</p> +<h2>SPEECH ON THE POWERS OF JURIES IN PROSECUTIONS FOR LIBELS<br +/> +<span class="smcap">March</span>, 1771</h2> +<p>I have always understood that a superintendence over the +doctrines, as well as the proceedings, of the courts of justice, +was a principal object of the constitution of this House; that +you were to watch at once over the lawyer and the law; that there +should he an orthodox faith as well as proper works: and I have +always looked with a degree of reverence and admiration on this +mode of superintendence. For being totally disengaged from +the detail of juridical practice, we come to something, perhaps, +the better qualified, and certainly much the better disposed to +assert the genuine principle of the laws; in which we can, as a +body, have no other than an enlarged and a public interest. +We have no common cause of a professional attachment, or +professional emulations, to bias our minds; we have no foregone +opinions, which, from obstinacy and false point of honour, we +think ourselves at all events obliged to support. So that +with our own minds perfectly disengaged from the exercise, we may +superintend the execution of the national justice; which from +this circumstance is better secured to the people than in any +other country under heaven it can be. As our situation puts +us in a proper condition, our power enables us to execute this +trust. We may, when we see cause of complaint, administer a +remedy; it is in our choice by an address to remove an improper +judge, by impeachment before the peers to pursue to destruction a +corrupt judge, or by bill to assert, to explain, to enforce, or +to reform the law, just as the occasion and necessity of the case +shall guide us. We stand in a situation very honourable to +ourselves, and very useful to our country, if we do not abuse or +abandon the trust that is placed in us.</p> +<p>The question now before you is upon the power of juries in +prosecuting for libels. There are four opinions. 1. +That the doctrine as held by the courts is proper and +constitutional, and therefore should not be altered. 2. +That it is neither proper nor constitutional, but that it will be +rendered worse by your interference. 3. That it is wrong, +but that the only remedy is a bill of retrospect. 4. The +opinion of those who bring in the bill; that the thing is wrong, +but that it is enough to direct the judgment of the court in +future.</p> +<p>The bill brought in is for the purpose of asserting and +securing a great object in the juridical constitution of this +kingdom; which, from a long series of practices and opinions in +our judges, has, in one point, and in one very essential point, +deviated from the true principle.</p> +<p>It is the very ancient privilege of the people of England that +they shall be tried, except in the known exceptions, not by +judges appointed by the Crown, but by their own fellow-subjects, +the peers of that county court at which they owe their suit and +service; out of this principle trial by juries has grown. +This principle has not, that I can find, been contested in any +case, by any authority whatsoever; but there is one case, in +which, without directly contesting the principle, the whole +substance, energy, acid virtue of the privilege, is taken out of +it; that is, in the case of a trial by indictment or information +for libel. The doctrine in that case laid down by several +judges amounts to this, that the jury have no competence where a +libel is alleged, except to find the gross corporeal facts of the +writing and the publication, together with the identity of the +things and persons to which it refers; but that the intent and +the tendency of the work, in which intent and tendency the whole +criminality consists, is the sole and exclusive province of the +judge. Thus having reduced the jury to the cognisance of +facts, not in themselves presumptively criminal, but actions +neutral and indifferent the whole matter, in which the subject +has any concern or interest, is taken out of the hands of the +jury: and if the jury take more upon themselves, what they so +take is contrary to their duty; it is no moral, but a merely +natural power; the same, by which they may do any other improper +act, the same, by which they may even prejudice themselves with +regard to any other part of the issue before them. Such is +the matter as it now stands, in possession of your highest +criminal courts, handed down to them from very respectable legal +ancestors. If this can once be established in this case, +the application in principle to other cases will be easy; and the +practice will run upon a descent, until the progress of an +encroaching jurisdiction (for it is in its nature to encroach, +when once it has passed its limits) coming to confine the juries, +case after case, to the corporeal fact, and to that alone, and +excluding the intention of mind, the only source of merit and +demerit, of reward or punishment, juries become a dead letter in +the constitution.</p> +<p>For which reason it is high time to take this matter into the +consideration of Parliament, and for that purpose it will be +necessary to examine, first, whether there is anything in the +peculiar nature of this crime that makes it necessary to exclude +the jury from considering the intention in it, more than in +others. So far from it, that I take it to be much less so +from the analogy of other criminal cases, where no such restraint +is ordinarily put upon them. The act of homicide is +<i>primâ facie</i> criminal. The intention is +afterwards to appear, for the jury to acquit or condemn. In +burglary do they insist that the jury have nothing to do but to +find the taking of goods, and that, if they do, they must +necessarily find the party guilty, and leave the rest to the +judge; and that they have nothing to do with the word +<i>felonicé</i> in the indictment?</p> +<p>The next point is to consider it as a question of +constitutional policy, that is, whether the decision of the +question of libel ought to be left to the judges as a presumption +of law, rather than to the jury as matter of popular judgment, as +the malice in the case of murder, the felony in the case of +stealing. If the intent and tendency are not matters within +the province of popular judgment, but legal and technical +conclusions, formed upon general principles of law, let us see +what they are. Certainly they are most unfavourable, +indeed, totally adverse, to the Constitution of this country.</p> +<p>Here we must have recourse to analogies, for we cannot argue +on ruled cases one way or the other. See the history. +The old books, deficient in general in Crown cases furnish us +with little on this head. As to the crime, in the very +early Saxon Law, I see an offence of this species, called +Folk-leasing, made a capital offence, but no very precise +definition of the crime, and no trial at all: see the statute of +3rd Edward I. cap. 34. The law of libels could not have +arrived at a very early period in this country. It is no +wonder that we find no vestige of any constitution from +authority, or of any deductions from legal science in our old +books and records upon that subject. The statute of +<i>scandalum magnatum</i> is the oldest that I know, and this +goes but a little way in this sort of learning. Libelling +is not the crime of an illiterate people. When they were +thought no mean clerks who could read and write, when he who +could read and write was presumptively a person in holy orders, +libels could not be general or dangerous; and scandals merely +oral could spread little, and must perish soon. It is +writing, it is printing more emphatically, that imps calumny with +those eagle wings, on which, as the poet says, “immortal +slanders fly.” By the press they spread, they last, +they leave the sting in the wound. Printing was not known +in England much earlier than the reign of Henry VII., and in the +third year of that reign the Court of Star Chamber was +established. The press and its enemy are nearly +coeval. As no positive law against libels existed, they +fell under the indefinite class of misdemeanours. For the +trial of misdemeanours that court was instituted, their tendency +to produce riots and disorders was a main part of the charge, and +was laid, in order to give the court jurisdiction chiefly against +libels. The offence was new. Learning of their own +upon the subject they had none, and they were obliged to resort +to the only emporium where it was to be had, the Roman Law. +After the Star Chamber was abolished in the 10th of Charles I. +its authority indeed ceased, but its maxims subsisted and +survived it. The spirit of the Star Chamber has +transmigrated and lived again, and Westminster Hall was obliged +to borrow from the Star Chamber, for the same reasons as the Star +Chamber had borrowed from the Roman Forum, because they had no +law, statute, or tradition of their own. Thus the Roman Law +took possession of our courts, I mean its doctrine, not its +sanctions; the severity of capital punishment was omitted, all +the rest remained. The grounds of these laws are just and +equitable. Undoubtedly the good fame of every man ought to +be under the protection of the laws as well as his life, and +liberty, and property. Good fame is an outwork, that +defends them all, and renders them all valuable. The law +forbids you to revenge; when it ties up the hands of some, it +ought to restrain the tongues of others. The good fame of +government is the same, it ought not to be traduced. This +is necessary in all government, and if opinion be support, what +takes away this destroys that support; but the liberty of the +press is necessary to this government.</p> +<p>The wisdom, however, of government is of more importance than +the laws. I should study the temper of the people before I +ventured on actions of this kind. I would consider the +whole of the prosecution of a libel of such importance as Junius, +as one piece, as one consistent plan of operations; and I would +contrive it so that, if I were defeated, I should not be +disgraced; that even my victory should not be more ignominious +than my defeat; I would so manage, that the lowest in the +predicament of guilt should not be the only one in +punishment. I would not inform against the mere vender of a +collection of pamphlets. I would not put him to trial +first, if I could possibly avoid it. I would rather stand +the consequences of my first error, than carry it to a judgment +that must disgrace my prosecution, or the court. We ought +to examine these things in a manner which becomes ourselves, and +becomes the object of the inquiry; not to examine into the most +important consideration which can come before us, with minds +heated with prejudice and filled with passions, with vain popular +opinions and humours, and when we propose to examine into the +justice of others, to be unjust ourselves.</p> +<p>An inquiry is wished, as the most effectual way of putting an +end to the clamours and libels, which are the disorder and +disgrace of the times. For people remain quiet, they sleep +secure, when they imagine that the vigilant eye of a censorial +magistrate watches over all the proceedings of judicature, and +that the sacred fire of an eternal constitutional jealousy, which +is the guardian of liberty, law, and justice, is alive night and +day, and burning in this house. But when the magistrate +gives up his office and his duty, the people assume it, and they +inquire too much, and too irreverently, because they think their +representatives do not inquire at all.</p> +<p>We have in a libel, 1st. The writing. 2nd. +The communication, called by the lawyers the publication. +3rd. The application to persons and facts. 4th. +The intent and tendency. 5th. The +matter—diminution of fame. The law presumptions on +all these are in the communication. No intent can, make a +defamatory publication good, nothing can make it have a good +tendency; truth is not pleadable. Taken juridically, the +foundation of these law presumptions is not unjust; taken +constitutionally, they are ruinous, and tend to the total +suppression of all publication. If juries are confined to +the fact, no writing which censures, however justly, or however +temperately, the conduct of administration, can be +unpunished. Therefore, if the intent and tendency be left +to the judge, as legal conclusions growing from the fact, you may +depend upon it you can have no public discussion of a public +measure, which is a point which even those who are most offended +with the licentiousness of the press (and it is very exorbitant, +very provoking) will hardly contend for.</p> +<p>So far as to the first opinion, that the doctrine is right and +needs no alteration. 2nd. The next is, that it is wrong, +but that we are not in a condition to help it. I admit, it +is true, that there are cases of a nature so delicate and +complicated, that an Act of Parliament on the subject may become +a matter of great difficulty. It sometimes cannot define +with exactness, because the subject-matter will not bear an exact +definition. It may seem to take away everything which it +does not positively establish, and this might be inconvenient; or +it may seem <i>vice versâ</i> to establish everything which +it does not expressly take away. It may be more advisable +to leave such matters to the enlightened discretion of a judge, +awed by a censorial House of Commons. But then it rests +upon those who object to a legislative interposition to prove +these inconveniences in the particular case before them. +For it would be a most dangerous, as it is a most idle and most +groundless, conceit to assume as a general principle, that the +rights and liberties of the subject are impaired by the care and +attention of the legislature to secure them. If so, very +ill would the purchase of Magna Charta have merited the deluge of +blood, which was shed in order to have the body of English +privileges defined by a positive written law. This charter, +the inestimable monument of English freedom, so long the boast +and glory of this nation, would have been at once an instrument +of our servitude, and a monument of our folly, if this principle +were true. The thirty four confirmations would have been +only so many repetitions of their absurdity, so many new links in +the chain, and so many invalidations of their right.</p> +<p>You cannot open your statute book without seeing positive +provisions relative to every right of the subject. This +business of juries is the subject of not fewer than a +dozen. To suppose that juries are something innate in the +Constitution of Great Britain, that they have jumped, like +Minerva, out of the head of Jove in complete armour, is a weak +fancy, supported neither by precedent nor by reason. +Whatever is most ancient and venerable in our Constitution, royal +prerogative, privileges of parliament, rights of elections, +authority of courts, juries, must have been modelled according to +the occasion. I spare your patience, and I pay a compliment +to your understanding, in not attempting to prove that anything +so elaborate and artificial as a jury was not the work of chance, +but a matter of institution, brought to its present state by the +joint efforts of legislative authority and juridical +prudence. It need not be ashamed of being (what in many +parts of it at least it is) the offspring of an Act of +Parliament, unless it is a shame for our laws to be the results +of our legislature. Juries, which sensitively shrank from +the rude touch of parliamentary remedy, have been the subject of +not fewer than, I think, forty-three Acts of Parliament, in which +they have been changed with all the authority of a creator over +its creature, from Magna Charta to the great alterations which +were made in the 29th of George II.</p> +<p>To talk of this matter in any other way is to turn a rational +principle into an idle and vulgar superstition, like the +antiquary, Dr. Woodward, who trembled to have his shield scoured, +for fear it should be discovered to be no better than an old +pot-lid. This species of tenderness to a jury puts me in +mind of a gentleman of good condition, who had been reduced to +great poverty and distress; application was made to some rich +fellows in his neighbourhood to give him some assistance; but +they begged to be excused for fear of affronting a person of his +high birth; and so the poor gentleman was left to starve out of +pure respect to the antiquity of his family. From this +principle has risen an opinion that I find current amongst +gentlemen, that this distemper ought to be left to cure itself; +that the judges having been well exposed, and something terrified +on account of these clamours, will entirely change, if not very +much relax from their rigour; if the present race should not +change, that the chances of succession may put other more +constitutional judges in their place; lastly, if neither should +happen, yet that the spirit of an English jury will always be +sufficient for the vindication of its own rights, and will not +suffer itself to be overborne by the bench. I confess that +I totally dissent from all these opinions. These +suppositions become the strongest reasons with me to evince the +necessity of some clear and positive settlement of this question +of contested jurisdiction. If judges are so full of levity, +so full of timidity, if they are influenced by such mean and +unworthy passions, that a popular clamour is sufficient to shake +the resolution they build upon the solid basis of a legal +principle, I would endeavour to fix that mercury by a positive +law. If to please an administration the judges can go one +way to-day, and to please the crowd they can go another +to-morrow; if they will oscillate backward and forward between +power and popularity, it is high time to fix the law in such a +manner as to resemble, as it ought, the great Author of all law, +in “whom there is no variableness nor shadow of +turning.”</p> +<p>As to their succession, I have just the same opinion. I +would not leave it to the chances of promotion, or to the +characters of lawyers, what the law of the land, what the rights +of juries, or what the liberty of the press should be. My +law should not depend upon the fluctuation of the closet, or the +complexion of men. Whether a black-haired man or a +fair-haired man presided in the Court of King’s Bench, I +would have the law the same: the same whether he was born in +<i>domo regnatrice</i>, and sucked from his infancy the milk of +courts, or was nurtured in the rugged discipline of a popular +opposition. This law of court cabal and of party, this +<i>mens quædam nullo perturbata affectu</i>, this law of +complexion, ought not to be endured for a moment in a country +whose being depends upon the certainty, clearness, and stability +of institutions.</p> +<p>Now I come to the last substitute for the proposed bill, the +spirit of juries operating their own jurisdiction. This, I +confess, I think the worst of all, for the same reasons on which +I objected to the others, and for other weighty reasons besides +which are separate and distinct. First, because juries, +being taken at random out of a mass of men infinitely large, must +be of characters as various as the body they arise from is large +in its extent. If the judges differ in their complexions, +much more will a jury. A timid jury will give way to an +awful judge delivering oracularly the law, and charging them on +their oaths, and putting it home to their consciences, to beware +of judging where the law had given them no competence. We +know that they will do so, they have done so in a hundred +instances; a respectable member of your own house, no vulgar man, +tells you that on the authority of a judge he found a man guilty, +in whom, at the same time, he could find no guilt. But +supposing them full of knowledge and full of manly confidence in +themselves, how will their knowledge, or their confidence, inform +or inspirit others? They give no reason for their verdict, +they can but condemn or acquit; and no man can tell the motives +on which they have acquitted or condemned. So that this +hope of the power of juries to assert their own jurisdiction must +be a principle blind, as being without reason, and as changeable +as the complexion of men and the temper of the times.</p> +<p>But, after all, is it fit that this dishonourable contention +between the court and juries should subsist any longer? On +what principle is it that a jury refuses to be directed by the +court as to his competence? Whether a libel or no libel be +a question of law or of fact may be doubted, but a question of +jurisdiction and competence is certainly a question of law; on +this the court ought undoubtedly to judge, and to judge solely +and exclusively. If they judge wrong from excusable error, +you ought to correct it, as to-day it is proposed, by an +explanatory bill; or if by corruption, by bill of penalties +declaratory, and by punishment. What does a juror say to a +judge when he refuses his opinion upon a question of +judicature? You are so corrupt, that I should consider +myself a partaker of your crime, were I to be guided by your +opinion; or you are so grossly ignorant, that I, fresh from my +bounds, from my plough, my counter, or my loom, am fit to direct +you in your profession. This is an unfitting, it is a +dangerous, state of things. The spirit of any sort of men +is not a fit rule for deciding on the bounds of their +jurisdiction. First, because it is different in different +men, and even different in the same at different times; and can +never become the proper directing line of law; next, because it +is not reason, but feeling; and when once it is irritated, it is +not apt to confine itself within its proper limits. If it +becomes, not difference in opinion upon law, but a trial of +spirit between parties, our courts of law are no longer the +temple of justice, but the amphitheatre for gladiators. +No—God forbid! Juries ought to take their law from +the bench only; but it is our business that they should hear +nothing from the bench but what is agreeable to the principles of +the Constitution. The jury are to hear the judge, the judge +is to hear the law where it speaks plain; where it does not, he +is to hear the legislature. As I do not think these +opinions of the judges to be agreeable to those principles, I +wish to take the only method in which they can or ought to be +corrected, by bill.</p> +<p>Next, my opinion is, that it ought to be rather by a bill for +removing controversies than by a bill in the state of manifest +and express declaration, and in words <i>de +præterito</i>. I do this upon reasons of equity and +constitutional policy. I do not want to censure the present +judges. I think them to be excused for their error. +Ignorance is no excuse for a judge: it is changing the nature of +his crime—it is not absolving. It must be such error +as a wise and conscientious judge may possibly fall into, and +must arise from one or both these causes: first, a plausible +principle of law; secondly, the precedents of respectable +authorities, and in good times. In the first, the principle +of law, that the judge is to decide on law, the jury to decide on +fact, is an ancient and venerable principle and maxim of the law, +and if supported in this application by precedents of good times +and of good men, the judge, if wrong, ought to be corrected; he +ought not to be reproved, or to be disgraced, or the authority or +respect to your tribunals to be impaired. In cases in which +declaratory bills have been made, where by violence and +corruption some fundamental part of the Constitution has been +struck at; where they would damn the principle, censure the +persons, and annul the acts; but where the law having been, by +the accident of human frailty, depraved, or in a particular +instance misunderstood, where you neither mean to rescind the +acts, nor to censure the persons, in such cases you have taken +the explanatory mode, and, without condemning what is done, you +direct the future judgment of the court.</p> +<p>All bills for the reformation of the law must be according to +the subject-matter, the circumstances, and the occasion, and are +of four kinds:—1. Either the law is totally wanting, +and then a new enacting statute must be made to supply that want; +or, 2. It is defective, then a new law must be made to +enforce it. 3. Or it is opposed by power or fraud, and then +an act must be made to declare it. 4 Or it is rendered +doubtful and controverted, and then a law must be made to explain +it. These must be applied according to the exigence of the +case; one is just as good as another of them. Miserable, +indeed, would be the resources, poor and unfurnished the stores +and magazines of legislation, if we were bound up to a little +narrow form, and not able to frame our acts of parliament +according to every disposition of our own minds, and to every +possible emergency of the commonwealth; to make them declaratory, +enforcing, explanatory, repealing, just in what mode, or in what +degree we please.</p> +<p>Those who think that the judges, living and dead, are to be +condemned, that your tribunals of justice are to be dishonoured, +that their acts and judgments on this business are to be +rescinded, they will undoubtedly vote against this bill, and for +another sort.</p> +<p>I am not of the opinion of those gentlemen who are against +disturbing the public repose; I like a clamour whenever there is +an abuse. The fire-bell at midnight disturbs your sleep, +but it keeps you from being burned in your bed. The hue and +cry alarms the county, but it preserves all the property of the +province. All these clamours aim at redress. But a +clamour made merely for the purpose of rendering the people +discontented with their situation, without an endeavour to give +them a practical remedy, is indeed one of the worst acts of +sedition.</p> +<p>I have read and heard much upon the conduct of our courts in +the business of libels. I was extremely willing to enter +into, and very free to act as facts should turn out on that +inquiry, aiming constantly at remedy as the end of all clamour, +all debate, all writing, and all inquiry; for which reason I did +embrace, and do now with joy, this method of giving quiet to the +courts, jurisdiction to juries, liberty to the press, and +satisfaction to the people. I thank my friends for what +they have done; I hope the public will one day reap the benefit +of their pious and judicious endeavours. They have now sown +the seed; I hope they will live to see the flourishing +harvest. Their bill is sown in weakness; it will, I trust, +be reaped in power; and then, however, we shall have reason to +apply to them what my Lord Coke says was an aphorism continually +in the mouth of a great sage of the law, “Blessed be not +the complaining tongue, but blessed be the amending +hand.”</p> +<h2>SPEECH ON A BILL FOR SHORTENING THE DURATION OF +PARLIAMENTS</h2> +<p>It is always to be lamented when men are driven to search into +the foundations of the commonwealth. It is certainly +necessary to resort to the theory of your government whenever you +propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that +alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and +forsaken constitution of state, or the introduction of some new +improvement in the commonwealth. The object of our +deliberation is, to promote the good purposes for which elections +have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniences. +If we thought frequent elections attended with no inconvenience, +or with but a trifling inconvenience, the strong overruling +principle of the Constitution would sweep us like a torrent +towards them. But your remedy is to be suited to your +disease—your present disease, and to your whole +disease. That man thinks much too highly, and therefore he +thinks weakly and delusively, of any contrivance of human wisdom, +who believes that it can make any sort of approach to +perfection. There is not, there never was, a principle of +government under heaven, that does not, in the very pursuit of +the good it proposes, naturally and inevitably lead into some +inconvenience, which makes it absolutely necessary to counterwork +and weaken the application of that first principle itself; and to +abandon something of the extent of the advantage you proposed by +it, in order to prevent also the inconveniences which have arisen +from the instrument of all the good you had in view.</p> +<p>To govern according to the sense and agreeably to the +interests of the people is a great and glorious object of +government. This object cannot be obtained but through the +medium of popular election, and popular election is a mighty +evil. It is such, and so great an evil, that though there +are few nations whose monarchs were not originally elective, very +few are now elected. They are the distempers of elections, +that have destroyed all free states. To cure these +distempers is difficult, if not impossible; the only thing +therefore left to save the commonwealth is to prevent their +return too frequently. The objects in view are, to have +parliaments as frequent as they can be without distracting them +in the prosecution of public business; on one hand, to secure +their dependence upon the people, on the other to give them that +quiet in their minds, and that ease in their fortunes, as to +enable them to perform the most arduous and most painful duty in +the world with spirit, with efficiency, with independency, and +with experience, as real public counsellors, not as the +canvassers at a perpetual election. It is wise to compass +as many good ends as possibly you can, and seeing there are +inconveniences on both sides, with benefits on both, to give up a +part of the benefit to soften the inconvenience. The +perfect cure is impracticable, because the disorder is dear to +those from whom alone the cure can possibly be derived. The +utmost to be done is to palliate, to mitigate, to respite, to put +off the evil day of the Constitution to its latest possible hour, +and may it be a very late one!</p> +<p>This bill, I fear, would precipitate one of two consequences, +I know not which most likely, or which most dangerous: either +that the Crown by its constant stated power, influence, and +revenue, would wear out all opposition in elections, or that a +violent and furious popular spirit would arise. I must see, +to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see, from their operation in +the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils, +which are inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each +other, and what is the total result. The excellence of +mathematics and metaphysics is to have but one thing before you, +but he forms the best judgment in all moral disquisitions, who +has the greatest number and variety of considerations, in one +view before him, and can take them in with the best possible +consideration of the middle results of all.</p> +<p>We of the opposition, who are not friends to the bill, give +this pledge at least of our integrity and sincerity to the +people, that in our situation of systematic opposition to the +present ministers, in which all our hope of rendering it +effectual depends upon popular interest and favour, we will not +flatter them by a surrender of our uninfluenced judgment and +opinion; we give a security, that if ever we should be in another +situation, no flattery to any other sort of power and influence +would induce us to act against the true interests of the +people.</p> +<p>All are agreed that parliaments should not be perpetual; the +only question is, what is the most convenient time for their +duration? On which there are three opinions. We are +agreed, too, that the term ought not to be chosen most likely in +its operation to spread corruption, and to augment the already +overgrown influence of the crown. On these principles I +mean to debate the question. It is easy to pretend a zeal +for liberty. Those who think themselves not likely to be +encumbered with the performance of their promises, either from +their known inability, or total indifference about the +performance, never fail to entertain the most lofty ideas. +They are certainly the most specious, and they cost them neither +reflection to frame, nor pains to modify, nor management to +support. The task is of another nature to those who mean to +promise nothing that it is not in their intentions, or may +possibly be in their power to perform; to those who are bound and +principled no more to delude the understandings than to violate +the liberty of their fellow-subjects. Faithful watchmen we +ought to be over the rights and privileges of the people. +But our duty, if we are qualified for it as we ought, is to give +them information, and not to receive it from them; we are not to +go to school to them to learn the principles of law and +government. In doing so we should not dutifully serve, but +we should basely and scandalously betray, the people, who are not +capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance called to +it by the Constitution. I reverentially look up to the +opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost +superstitious. I should be ashamed to show my face before +them, if I changed my ground, as they cried up or cried down men, +or things, or opinions; if I wavered and shifted about with every +change, and joined in it, or opposed, as best answered any low +interest or passion; if I held them up hopes, which I knew I +never intended, or promised what I well knew I could not +perform. Of all these things they are perfect sovereign +judges without appeal; but as to the detail of particular +measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither +enough of speculation in the closet, nor of experience in +business, to decide upon it. They can well see whether we +are tools of a court, or their honest servants. Of that +they can well judge; and I wish that they always exercised their +judgment; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other +standards. That the frequency of elections proposed by this +bill has a tendency to increase the power and consideration of +the electors, not lessen corruptibility, I do most readily allow; +so far as it is desirable, this is what it has; I will tell you +now what it has not: 1st. It has no sort of tendency to +increase their integrity and public spirit, unless an increase of +power has an operation upon voters in elections, that it has in +no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of +mankind. 2nd. This bill has no tendency to limit the +quantity of influence in the Crown, to render its operation more +difficult, or to counteract that operation, which it cannot +prevent, in any way whatsoever. It has its full weight, its +full range, and its uncontrolled operation on the electors +exactly as it had before. 3rd. Nor, thirdly, does it abate +the interest or inclination of Ministers to apply that influence +to the electors: on the contrary, it renders it much more +necessary to them, if they seek to have a majority in parliament, +to increase the means of that influence, and redouble their +diligence, and to sharpen dexterity in the application. The +whole effect of the bill is therefore the removing the +application of some part of the influence from the elected to the +electors, and further to strengthen and extend a court interest +already great and powerful in boroughs; here to fix their +magazines and places of arms, and thus to make them the +principal, not the secondary, theatre of their manoeuvres for +securing a determined majority in parliament.</p> +<p>I believe nobody will deny that the electors are +corruptible. They are men; it is saying nothing worse of +them; many of them are but ill-informed in their minds, many +feeble in their circumstances, easily over-reached, easily +seduced. If they are many, the wages of corruption are the +lower; and would to God it were not rather a contemptible and +hypocritical adulation than a charitable sentiment, to say that +there is already no debauchery, no corruption, no bribery, no +perjury, no blind fury, and interested faction among the electors +in many parts of this kingdom: nor is it surprising, or at all +blamable, in that class of private men, when they see their +neighbours aggrandised, and themselves poor and virtuous, without +that <i>éclat</i> or dignity which attends men in higher +stations.</p> +<p>But admit it were true that the great mass of the electors +were too vast an object for court influence to grasp, or extend +to, and that in despair they must abandon it; he must be very +ignorant of the state of every popular interest, who does not +know that in all the corporations, all the open +boroughs—indeed, in every district of the +kingdom—there is some leading man, some agitator, some +wealthy merchant, or considerable manufacturer, some active +attorney, some popular preacher, some money-lender, &c., +&c., who is followed by the whole flock. This is the +style of all free countries.</p> +<blockquote><p>—Multùm in Fabiâ valet hic, +valet ille Velinâ;<br /> +Cuilibet hic fasces dabit eripietque curule.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>These spirits, each of which informs and governs his own +little orb, are neither so many, nor so little powerful, nor so +incorruptible, but that a Minister may, as he does frequently, +find means of gaining them, and through them all their +followers. To establish, therefore, a very general +influence among electors will no more be found an impracticable +project, than to gain an undue influence over members of +parliament. Therefore I am apprehensive that this bill, +though it shifts the place of the disorder, does by no means +relieve the Constitution. I went through almost every +contested election in the beginning of this parliament, and acted +as a manager in very many of them: by which, though at a school +of pretty severe and ragged discipline, I came to have some +degree of instruction concerning the means by which parliamentary +interests are in general procured and supported.</p> +<p>Theory, I know, would suppose, that every general election is +to the representative a day of judgment, in which he appears +before his constituents to account for the use of the talent with +which they entrusted him, and of the improvement he had made of +it for the public advantage. It would be so, if every +corruptible representative were to find an enlightened and +incorruptible constituent. But the practice and knowledge +of the world will not suffer us to be ignorant, that the +Constitution on paper is one thing, and in fact and experience is +another. We must know that the candidate, instead of +trusting at his election to the testimony of his behaviour in +parliament, must bring the testimony of a large sum of money, the +capacity of liberal expense in entertainments, the power of +serving and obliging the rulers of corporations, of winning over +the popular leaders of political clubs, associations, and +neighbourhoods. It is ten thousand times more necessary to +show himself a man of power, than a man of integrity, in almost +all the elections with which I have been acquainted. +Elections, therefore, become a matter of heavy expense; and if +contests are frequent, to many they will become a matter of an +expense totally ruinous, which no fortunes can bear; but least of +all the landed fortunes, encumbered as they often, indeed as they +mostly are, with debts, with portions, with jointures; and tied +up in the hands of the possessor by the limitations of +settlement. It is a material, it is in my opinion a +lasting, consideration, in all the questions concerning +election. Let no one think the charges of election a +trivial matter.</p> +<p>The charge, therefore, of elections ought never to be lost +sight of, in a question concerning their frequency, because the +grand object you seek is independence. Independence of mind +will ever be more or less influenced by independence of fortune; +and if, every three years, the exhausting sluices of +entertainments, drinkings, open houses, to say nothing of +bribery, are to be periodically drawn up and renewed—if +government favours, for which now, in some shape or other, the +whole race of men are candidates, are to be called for upon every +occasion, I see that private fortunes will be washed away, and +every, even to the least, trace of independence, borne down by +the torrent. I do not seriously think this Constitution, +even to the wrecks of it, could survive five triennial +elections. If you are to fight the battle, you must put on +the armour of the Ministry; you must call in the public, to the +aid of private, money. The expense of the last election has +been computed (and I am persuaded that it has not been overrated) +at £1,500,000; three shillings in the pound more on the +Land Tax. About the close of the last Parliament, and the +beginning of this, several agents for boroughs went about, and I +remember well that it was in every one of their +mouths—“Sir, your election will cost you three +thousand pounds, if you are independent; but if the Ministry +supports you, it may be done for two, and perhaps for +less;” and, indeed, the thing spoke itself. Where a +living was to be got for one, a commission in the army for +another, a post in the navy for a third, and Custom-house offices +scattered about without measure or number, who doubts but money +may be saved? The Treasury may even add money; but, indeed, +it is superfluous. A gentleman of two thousand a year, who +meets another of the same fortune, fights with equal arms; but if +to one of the candidates you add a thousand a year in places for +himself, and a power of giving away as much among others, one +must, or there is no truth in arithmetical demonstration, ruin +his adversary, if he is to meet him and to fight with him every +third year. It will be said, I do not allow for the +operation of character; but I do; and I know it will have its +weight in most elections; perhaps it may be decisive in +some. But there are few in which it will prevent great +expenses.</p> +<p>The destruction of independent fortunes will be the +consequence on the part of the candidate. What will be the +consequence of triennial corruption, triennial drunkenness, +triennial idleness, triennial law-suits, litigations, +prosecutions, triennial frenzy; of society dissolved, industry +interrupted, ruined; of those personal hatreds that will never be +suffered to soften; those animosities and feuds, which will be +rendered immortal; those quarrels, which are never to be +appeased; morals vitiated and gangrened to the vitals? I +think no stable and useful advantages were ever made by the money +got at elections by the voter, but all he gets is doubly lost to +the public; it is money given to diminish the general stock of +the community, which is the industry of the subject. I am +sure that it is a good while before he or his family settle again +to their business. Their heads will never cool; the +temptations of elections will be for ever glittering before their +eyes. They will all grow politicians; every one, quitting +his business, will choose to enrich himself by his vote. +They will take the gauging-rod; new places will be made for them; +they will run to the Custom-house quay, their looms and ploughs +will be deserted.</p> +<p>So was Rome destroyed by the disorders of continual elections, +though those of Rome were sober disorders. They had nothing +but faction, bribery, bread, and stage plays to debauch +them. We have the inflammation of liquor superadded, a fury +hotter than any of them. There the contest was only between +citizen and citizen; here you have the contests of ambitious +citizens on one side, supported by the Crown, to oppose to the +efforts (let it be so) of private and unsupported ambition on the +other. Yet Rome was destroyed by the frequency and charge +of elections, and the monstrous expense of an unremitted +courtship to the people. I think, therefore, the +independent candidate and elector may each be destroyed by it, +the whole body of the community be an infinite sufferer, and a +vicious Ministry the only gainer. Gentlemen, I know, feel +the weight of this argument; they agree that this would be the +consequence of more frequent elections, if things were to +continue as they are. But they think the greatness and +frequency of the evil would itself be a remedy for it; that, +sitting but for a short time, the member would not find it worth +while to make such vast expenses, while the fear of their +constituents will hold them the more effectually to their +duty.</p> +<p>To this I answer, that experience is full against them. +This is no new thing; we have had triennial parliaments; at no +period of time were seats more eagerly contested. The +expenses of elections ran higher, taking the state of all +charges, than they do now. The expense of entertainments +was such, that an Act, equally severe and ineffectual, was made +against it; every monument of the time bears witness of the +expense, and most of the Acts against corruption in elections +were then made; all the writers talked of it and lamented +it. Will any one think that a corporation will be contented +with a bowl of punch, or a piece of beef the less, because +elections are every three, instead of every seven years? +Will they change their wine for ale, because they are to get more +ale three years hence? Do not think it. Will they +make fewer demands for the advantages of patronage in favours and +offices, because their member is brought more under their +power? We have not only our own historical experience in +England upon this subject, but we have the experience co-existing +with us in Ireland, where, since their Parliament has been +shortened, the expense of elections has been so far from being +lowered that it has been very near doubled. Formerly they +sat for the king’s life; the ordinary charge of a seat in +Parliament was then £1,500. They now sit eight years, +four sessions: it is now £2,500 and upwards. The +spirit of emulation has also been extremely increased, and all +who are acquainted with the tone of that country have no doubt +that the spirit is still growing, that new candidates will take +the field, that the contests will be more violent, and the +expenses of elections larger than ever.</p> +<p>It never can be otherwise. A seat in this House, for +good purposes, for bad purposes, for no purpose at all (except +the mere consideration derived from being concerned in the public +councils) will ever be a first-rate object of ambition in +England. Ambition is no exact calculator. Avarice +itself does not calculate strictly when it games. One thing +is certain, that in this political game the great lottery of +power is that into which men will purchase with millions of +chances against them. In Turkey, where the place, where the +fortune, where the head itself, are so insecure, that scarcely +any have died in their beds for ages, so that the bowstring is +the natural death of Bashaws, yet in no country is power and +distinction (precarious enough, God knows, in all) sought for +with such boundless avidity, as if the value of place was +enhanced by the danger and insecurity of its tenure. +Nothing will ever make a seat in this House not an object of +desire to numbers by any means or at any charge, but the +depriving it of all power and all dignity. This would do +it. This is the true and only nostrum for that +purpose. But a House of Commons without power and without +dignity, either in itself or its members, is no House of Commons +for the purposes of this Constitution.</p> +<p>But they will be afraid to act ill, if they know that the day +of their account is always near. I wish it were true, but +it is not; here again we have experience, and experience is +against us. The distemper of this age is a poverty of +spirit and of genius; it is trifling, it is futile, worse than +ignorant, superficially taught, with the politics and morals of +girls at a boarding-school, rather than of men and statesmen; but +it is not yet desperately wicked, or so scandalously venal as in +former times. Did not a triennial parliament give up the +national dignity, approve the Peace of Utrecht, and almost give +up everything else in taking every step to defeat the Protestant +succession? Was not the Constitution saved by those who had +no election at all to go to, the Lords, because the Court applied +to electors, and by various means carried them from their true +interests; so that the Tory Ministry had a majority without an +application to a single member? Now, as to the conduct of +the members, it was then far from pure and independent. +Bribery was infinitely more flagrant. A predecessor of +yours, Mr. Speaker, put the question of his own expulsion for +bribery. Sir William Musgrave was a wise man, a grave man, +an independent man, a man of good fortune and good family; +however, he carried on while in opposition a traffic, a shameful +traffic with the Ministry. Bishop Burnet knew of +£6,000 which he had received at one payment. I +believe the payment of sums in hard money—plain, naked +bribery—is rare amongst us. It was then far from +uncommon.</p> +<p>A triennial was near ruining, a septennial parliament saved, +your Constitution; nor perhaps have you ever known a more +flourishing period for the union of national prosperity, dignity, +and liberty, than the sixty years you have passed under that +Constitution of parliament.</p> +<p>The shortness of time, in which they are to reap the profits +of iniquity, is far from checking the avidity of corrupt men; it +renders them infinitely more ravenous. They rush violently +and precipitately on their object, they lose all regard to +decorum. The moments of profit are precious; never are men +so wicked as during a general mortality. It was so in the +great plague at Athens, every symptom of which (and this its +worst amongst the rest) is so finely related by a great historian +of antiquity. It was so in the plague of London in +1665. It appears in soldiers, sailors, &c. +Whoever would contrive to render the life of man much shorter +than it is, would, I am satisfied, find the surest recipe for +increasing the wickedness of our nature.</p> +<p>Thus, in my opinion, the shortness of a triennial sitting +would have the following ill effects:—It would make the +member more shamelessly and shockingly corrupt, it would increase +his dependence on those who could best support him at his +election, it would wrack and tear to pieces the fortunes of those +who stood upon their own fortunes and their private interest, it +would make the electors infinitely more venal, and it would make +the whole body of the people, who are, whether they have votes or +not, concerned in elections, more lawless, more idle, more +debauched; it would utterly destroy the sobriety, the industry, +the integrity, the simplicity of all the people, and undermine, I +am much afraid, the deepest and best laid foundations of the +commonwealth.</p> +<p>Those who have spoken and written upon this subject without +doors, do not so much deny the probable existence of these +inconveniences in their measure, as they trust for the prevention +to remedies of various sorts, which they propose. First, a +place bill; but if this will not do, as they fear it will not, +then, they say, we will have a rotation, and a certain number of +you shall be rendered incapable of being elected for ten +years. Then, for the electors, they shall ballot; the +members of parliament also shall decide by ballot; and a fifth +project is the change of the present legal representation of the +kingdom. On all this I shall observe, that it will be very +unsuitable to your wisdom to adopt the project of a bill, to +which there are objections insuperable by anything in the bill +itself, upon the hope that those objections may be removed by +subsequent projects; every one of which is full of difficulties +of its own, and which are all of them very essential alterations +in the Constitution. This seems very irregular and +unusual. If anything should make this a very doubtful +measure, what can make it more so than that, in the opinion of +its advocates, it would aggravate all our old inconveniences in +such a manner as to require a total alteration in the +Constitution of the kingdom? If the remedies are proper in +a triennial, they will not be less so in septennial elections; +let us try them first, see how the House relishes them, see how +they will operate in the nation; and then, having felt your way, +you will be prepared against these inconveniences.</p> +<p>The honourable gentleman sees that I respect the principle +upon which he goes, as well as his intentions and his +abilities. He will believe that I do not differ from him +wantonly, and on trivial grounds. He is very sure that it +was not his embracing one way which determined me to take the +other. I have not, in newspapers, to derogate from his fair +fame with the nation, printed the first rude sketch of his bill +with ungenerous and invidious comments. I have not, in +conversations industriously circulated about the town, and talked +on the benches of this House, attributed his conduct to motives +low and unworthy, and as groundless as they are injurious. +I do not affect to be frightened with this proposition, as if +some hideous spectre had started from hell, which was to be sent +back again by every form of exorcism, and every kind of +incantation. I invoke no Acheron to overwhelm him in the +whirlpools of his muddy gulf. I do not tell the respectable +mover and seconder, by a perversion of their sense and +expressions, that their proposition halts between the ridiculous +and the dangerous. I am not one of those who start up three +at a time, and fall upon and strike at him with so much +eagerness, that our daggers hack one another in his sides. +My honourable friend has not brought down a spirited imp of +chivalry, to win the first achievement and blazon of arms on his +milk-white shield in a field listed against him, nor brought out +the generous offspring of lions, and said to them, “Not +against that side of the forest, beware of that—here is the +prey where you are to fasten your paws;” and seasoning his +unpractised jaws with blood, tell him, “This is the milk +for which you are to thirst hereafter.” We furnish at +his expense no holiday, nor suspend hell that a crafty Ixion may +have rest from his wheel; nor give the common adversary, if he be +a common adversary, reason to say, “I would have put in my +word to oppose, but the eagerness of your allies in your social +war was such that I could not break in upon you.” I +hope he sees and feels, and that every member sees and feels +along with him, the difference between amicable dissent and civil +discord.</p> +<h2>SPEECH ON REFORM OF REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS<br +/> +<span class="smcap">June</span>, 1784</h2> +<p>Mr. Speaker,—We have now discovered, at the close of the +eighteenth century, that the Constitution of England, which for a +series of ages had been the proud distinction of this country, +always the admiration, and sometimes the envy, of the wise and +learned in every other nation—we have discovered that this +boasted Constitution, in the most boasted part of it, is a gross +imposition upon the understanding of mankind, an insult to their +feelings, and acting by contrivances destructive to the best and +most valuable interests of the people. Our political +architects have taken a survey of the fabric of the British +Constitution. It is singular that they report nothing +against the Crown, nothing against the Lords; but in the House of +Commons everything is unsound; it is ruinous in every part. +It is infested by the dry rot, and ready to tumble about our ears +without their immediate help. You know by the faults they +find what are their ideas of the alteration. As all +government stands upon opinion, they know that the way utterly to +destroy it is to remove that opinion, to take away all reverence, +all confidence from it; and then, at the first blast of public +discontent and popular tumult, it tumbles to the ground.</p> +<p>In considering this question, they who oppose it, oppose it on +different grounds; one is in the nature of a previous +question—that some alterations may be expedient, but that +this is not the time for making them. The other is, that no +essential alterations are at all wanting, and that neither now, +nor at any time, is it prudent or safe to be meddling with the +fundamental principles and ancient tried usages of our +Constitution—that our representation is as nearly perfect +as the necessary imperfection of human affairs and of human +creatures will suffer it to be; and that it is a subject of +prudent and honest use and thankful enjoyment, and not of +captious criticism and rash experiment.</p> +<p>On the other side, there are two parties, who proceed on two +grounds—in my opinion, as they state them, utterly +irreconcilable. The one is juridical, the other +political. The one is in the nature of a claim of right, on +the supposed rights of man as man; this party desire the decision +of a suit. The other ground, as far as I can divine what it +directly means, is, that the representation is not so politically +framed as to answer the theory of its institution. As to +the claim of right, the meanest petitioner, the most gross and +ignorant, is as good as the best; in some respects his claim is +more favourable on account of his ignorance; his weakness, his +poverty and distress only add to his titles; he sues <i>in +formâ pauperis</i>: he ought to be a favourite of the +Court. But when the other ground is taken, when the +question is political, when a new Constitution is to be made on a +sound theory of government, then the presumptuous pride of +didactic ignorance is to be excluded from the council in this +high and arduous matter, which often bids defiance to the +experience of the wisest. The first claims a personal +representation; the latter rejects it with scorn and +fervour. The language of the first party is plain and +intelligible; they who plead an absolute right, cannot be +satisfied with anything short of personal representation, because +all natural rights must be the rights of individuals: as by +nature there is no such thing as politic or corporate +personality; all these ideas are mere fictions of law, they are +creatures of voluntary institution; men as men are individuals, +and nothing else. They, therefore, who reject the principle +of natural and personal representation, are essentially and +eternally at variance with those who claim it. As to the +first sort of reformers, it is ridiculous to talk to them of the +British Constitution upon any or all of its bases; for they lay +it down, that every man ought to govern himself, and that where +he cannot go himself he must send his representative; that all +other government is usurpation, and is so far from having a claim +to our obedience, that it is not only our right, but our duty, to +resist it. Nine-tenths of the reformers argue +thus—that is, on the natural right. It is impossible +not to make some reflection on the nature of this claim, or avoid +a comparison between the extent of the principle and the present +object of the demand. If this claim be founded, it is clear +to what it goes. The House of Commons, in that light, +undoubtedly is no representative of the people as a collection of +individuals. Nobody pretends it, nobody can justify such an +assertion. When you come to examine into this claim of +right, founded on the right of self-government in each +individual, you find the thing demanded infinitely short of the +principle of the demand. What! one-third only of the +legislature, of the government no share at all? What sort +of treaty of partition is this for those who have no inherent +right to the whole? Give them all they ask, and your grant +is still a cheat; for how comes only a third to be their younger +children’s fortune in this settlement? How came they +neither to have the choice of kings, or lords, or judges, or +generals, or admirals, or bishops, or priests, or ministers, or +justices of peace? Why, what have you to answer in favour +of the prior rights of the Crown and peerage but this—our +Constitution is a proscriptive Constitution; it is a Constitution +whose sole authority is, that it has existed time out of +mind. It is settled in these two portions against one, +legislatively; and in the whole of the judicature, the whole of +the federal capacity, of the executive, the prudential and the +financial administration, in one alone. Nor were your House +of Lords and the prerogatives of the Crown settled on any +adjudication in favour of natural rights, for they could never be +so portioned. Your king, your lords, your judges, your +juries, grand and little, all are prescriptive; and what proves +it is the disputes not yet concluded, and never near becoming so, +when any of them first originated. Prescription is the most +solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is to +secure that property, to government. They harmonise with +each other, and give mutual aid to one another. It is +accompanied with another ground of authority in the constitution +of the human mind—presumption. It is a presumption in +favour of any settled scheme of government against any untried +project, that a nation has long existed and flourished under +it. It is a better presumption even of the choice of a +nation, far better than any sudden and temporary arrangement by +actual election. Because a nation is not an idea only of +local extent, and individual momentary aggregation, but it is an +idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers +and in space. And this is a choice not of one day, or one +set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a +deliberate election of ages and of generations; it is a +Constitution made by what is ten thousand times better than +choice—it is made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, +tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of +the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of +time. It is a vestment, which accommodates itself to the +body. Nor is prescription of government formed upon blind, +unmeaning prejudices—for man is a most unwise, and a most +wise being. The individual is foolish. The multitude, +for the moment, are foolish, when they act without deliberation; +but the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a +species it almost always acts right.</p> +<p>The reason for the Crown as it is, for the Lords as they are, +is my reason for the Commons as they are, the electors as they +are. Now, if the Crown and the Lords, and the judicatures, +are all prescriptive, so is the House of Commons of the very same +origin, and of no other. We and our electors have powers +and privileges both made and circumscribed by prescription, as +much to the full as the other parts; and as such we have always +claimed them, and on no other title. The House of Commons +is a legislative body corporate by prescription, not made upon +any given theory, but existing prescriptively—just like the +rest. This prescription has made it essentially what it +is—an aggregate collection of three parts—knights, +citizens, burgesses. The question is, whether this has been +always so, since the House of Commons has taken its present shape +and circumstances, and has been an essential operative part of +the Constitution; which, I take it, it has been for at least five +hundred years.</p> +<p>This I resolve to myself in the affirmative: and then another +question arises; whether this House stands firm upon its ancient +foundations, and is not, by time and accidents, so declined from +its perpendicular as to want the hand of the wise and experienced +architects of the day to set it upright again, and to prop and +buttress it up for duration;—whether it continues true to +the principles upon which it has hitherto stood;—whether +this be <i>de facto</i> the Constitution of the House of Commons +as it has been since the time that the House of Commons has, +without dispute, become a necessary and an efficient part of the +British Constitution? To ask whether a thing, which has +always been the same, stands to its usual principle, seems to me +to be perfectly absurd; for how do you know the principles but +from the construction? and if that remains the same, the +principles remain the same. It is true, that to say your +Constitution is what it has been, is no sufficient defence for +those who say it is a bad Constitution. It is an answer to +those who say that it is a degenerate Constitution. To +those who say it is a bad one, I answer, Look to its +effects. In all moral machinery the moral results are its +test.</p> +<p>On what grounds do we go to restore our Constitution to what +it has been at some given period, or to reform and reconstruct it +upon principles more conformable to a sound theory of +government? A prescriptive government, such as ours, never +was the work of any legislator, never was made upon any foregone +theory. It seems to me a preposterous way of reasoning, and +a perfect confusion of ideas, to take the theories, which learned +and speculative men have made from that government, and then, +supposing it made on these theories, which were made from it, to +accuse the government as not corresponding with them. I do +not vilify theory and speculation—no, because that would be +to vilify reason itself. “<i>Neque decipitur +ratio</i>, <i>neque decipit unquam</i>.” No; whenever +I speak against theory, I mean always a weak, erroneous, +fallacious, unfounded, or imperfect theory; and one of the ways +of discovering that it is a false theory is by comparing it with +practice. This is the true touchstone of all theories which +regard man and the affairs of men: Does it suit his nature in +general?—does it suit his nature as modified by his +habits?</p> +<p>The more frequently this affair is discussed, the stronger the +case appears to the sense and the feelings of mankind. I +have no more doubt than I entertain of my existence, that this +very thing, which is stated as a horrible thing, is the means of +the preservation of our Constitution whilst it lasts: of curing +it of many of the disorders which, attending every species of +institution, would attend the principle of an exact local +representation, or a representation on the principle of +numbers. If you reject personal representation, you are +pushed upon expedience; and then what they wish us to do is, to +prefer their speculations on that subject to the happy experience +of this country of a growing liberty and a growing prosperity for +five hundred years. Whatever respect I have for their +talents, this, for one, I will not do. Then what is the +standard of expedience? Expedience is that which is good +for the community, and good for every individual in it. Now +this expedience is the <i>desideratum</i> to be sought, either +without the experience of means, or with that experience. +If without, as in the case of the fabrication of a new +commonwealth, I will hear the learned arguing what promises to be +expedient; but if we are to judge of a commonwealth actually +existing, the first thing I inquire is, What has been found +expedient or inexpedient? And I will not take their promise +rather than the performance of the Constitution.</p> +<p>But no; this was not the cause of the discontents. I +went through most of the northern parts—the Yorkshire +election was then raging; the year before, through most of the +western counties—Bath, Bristol, Gloucester—not one +word, either in the towns or country, on the subject of +representation; much on the receipt tax, something on Mr. +Fox’s ambition; much greater apprehension of danger from +thence than from want of representation. One would think +that the ballast of the ship was shifted with us, and that our +Constitution had the gunnel under water. But can you fairly +and distinctly point out what one evil or grievance has happened, +which you can refer to the representative not following the +opinion of his constituents? What one symptom do we find of +this inequality? But it is not an arithmetical inequality +with which we ought to trouble ourselves. If there be a +moral, a political equality, this is the <i>desideratum</i> in +our Constitution, and in every Constitution in the world. +Moral inequality is as between places and between classes. +Now, I ask, what advantage do you find, that the places which +abound in representation possess over others in which it is more +scanty, in security for freedom, in security for justice, or in +any one of those means of procuring temporal prosperity and +eternal happiness, the ends for which society was formed? +Are the local interests of Cornwall and Wiltshire, for +instance—their roads, canals, their prisons, their +police—better than Yorkshire, Warwickshire, or +Staffordshire? Warwick has members; is Warwick or Stafford +more opulent, happy, or free, than Newcastle or than +Birmingham? Is Wiltshire the pampered favourite, whilst +Yorkshire, like the child of the bondwoman, is turned out to the +desert? This is like the unhappy persons who live, if they +can be said to live, in the statical chair; who are ever feeling +their pulse, and who do not judge of health by the aptitude of +the body to perform its functions, but by their ideas of what +ought to be the true balance between the several +secretions. Is a committee of Cornwall, &c., thronged, +and the others deserted? No. You have an equal +representation, because you have men equally interested in the +prosperity of the whole, who are involved in the general interest +and the general sympathy; and perhaps these places, furnishing a +superfluity of public agents and administrators (whether, in +strictness, they are representatives or not, I do not mean to +inquire, but they are agents and administrators), will stand +clearer of local interests, passions, prejudices, and cabals than +the others, and therefore preserve the balance of the parts, and +with a more general view and a more steady hand than the +rest.</p> +<p>In every political proposal we must not leave out of the +question the political views and object of the proposer; and +these we discover, not by what he says, but by the principles he +lays down. “I mean,” says he, “a moderate +and temperate reform;” that is, “I mean to do as +little good as possible. If the Constitution be what you +represent it, and there be no danger in the change, you do wrong +not to make the reform commensurate to the abuse.” +Fine reformer, indeed! generous donor! What is the cause of +this parsimony of the liberty which you dole out to the +people? Why all this limitation in giving blessings and +benefits to mankind? You admit that there is an extreme in +liberty, which may be infinitely noxious to those who are to +receive it, and which in the end will leave them no liberty at +all. I think so too; they know it, and they feel it. +The question is, then, What is the standard of that +extreme? What that gentleman, and the associations, or some +parts of their phalanxes, think proper. Then our liberties +are in their pleasure; it depends on their arbitrary will how far +I shall be free. I will have none of that freedom. +If, therefore, the standard of moderation be sought for, I will +seek for it. Where? Not in their fancies, nor in my +own: I will seek for it where I know it is to be found—in +the Constitution I actually enjoy. Here it says to an +encroaching prerogative—“Your sceptre has its length; +you cannot add a hair to your head, or a gem to your crown, but +what an eternal law has given to it.” Here it says to +an overweening peerage—“Your pride finds banks that +it cannot overflow;” here to a tumultuous and giddy +people—“There is a bound to the raging of the +sea.” Our Constitution is like our island, which uses +and restrains its subject sea; in vain the waves roar. In +that Constitution I know, and exultingly I feel, both that I am +free and that I am not free dangerously to myself or to +others. I know that no power on earth, acting as I ought to +do, can touch my life, my liberty, or my property. I have +that inward and dignified consciousness of my own security and +independence, which constitutes, and is the only thing which does +constitute, the proud and comfortable sentiment of freedom in the +human breast. I know, too, and I bless God for my safe +mediocrity; I know that if I possessed all the talents of the +gentlemen on the side of the House I sit, and on the other, I +cannot, by royal favour, or by popular delusion, or by +oligarchical cabal, elevate myself above a certain very limited +point, so as to endanger my own fall or the ruin of my +country. I know there is an order that keeps things fast in +their place; it is made to us, and we are made to it. Why +not ask another wife, other children, another body, another +mind?</p> +<p>The great object of most of these reformers is to prepare the +destruction of the Constitution, by disgracing and discrediting +the House of Commons. For they think—prudently, in my +opinion—that if they can persuade the nation that the House +of Commons is so constituted as not to secure the public liberty; +not to have a proper connection with the public interests; so +constituted as not, either actually or virtually, to be the +representative of the people, it will be easy to prove that a +government composed of a monarchy, an oligarchy chosen by the +Crown, and such a House of Commons, whatever good can be in such +a system, can by no means be a system of free government.</p> +<p>The Constitution of England is never to have a quietus; it is +to be continually vilified, attacked, reproached, resisted; +instead of being the hope and sure anchor in all storms, instead +of being the means of redress to all grievances, itself is the +grand grievance of the nation, our shame instead of our +glory. If the only specific plan proposed—individual, +personal representation—is directly rejected by the person +who is looked on as the great support of this business, then the +only way of considering it is as a question of convenience. +An honourable gentleman prefers the individual to the +present. He therefore himself sees no middle term +whatsoever, and therefore prefers of what he sees the individual; +this is the only thing distinct and sensible that has been +advocated. He has then a scheme, which is the individual +representation; he is not at a loss, not inconsistent—which +scheme the other right honourable gentleman reprobates. +Now, what does this go to, but to lead directly to anarchy? +For to discredit the only government which he either possesses or +can project, what is this but to destroy all government; and this +is anarchy. My right honourable friend, in supporting this +motion, disgraces his friends and justifies his enemies, in order +to blacken the Constitution of his country, even of that House of +Commons which supported him. There is a difference between +a moral or political exposure of a public evil, relative to the +administration of government, whether in men or systems, and a +declaration of defects, real or supposed, in the fundamental +Constitution of your country. The first may be cured in the +individual by the motives of religion, virtue, honour, fear, +shame, or interest. Men may be made to abandon, also, false +systems by exposing their absurdity or mischievous tendency to +their own better thoughts, or to the contempt or indignation of +the public; and after all, if they should exist, and exist +uncorrected, they only disgrace individuals as fugitive +opinions. But it is quite otherwise with the frame and +Constitution of the State; if that is disgraced, patriotism is +destroyed in its very source. No man has ever willingly +obeyed, much less was desirous of defending with his blood, a +mischievous and absurd scheme of government. Our first, our +dearest, most comprehensive relation, our country, is gone.</p> +<p>It suggests melancholy reflections, in consequence of the +strange course we have long held, that we are now no longer +quarrelling about the character, or about the conduct of men, or +the tenor of measures; but we are grown out of humour with the +English Constitution itself; this is become the object of the +animosity of Englishmen. This Constitution in former days +used to be the admiration and the envy of the world; it was the +pattern for politicians; the theme of the eloquent; the +meditation of the philosopher in every part of the world. +As to Englishmen, it was their pride, their consolation. By +it they lived, for it they were ready to die. Its defects, +if it had any, were partly covered by partiality, and partly +borne by prudence. Now all its excellencies are forgotten, +its faults are now forcibly dragged into day, exaggerated by +every artifice of representation. It is despised and +rejected of men; and every device and invention of ingenuity, or +idleness, set up in opposition or in preference to it. It +is to this humour, and it is to the measures growing out of it, +that I set myself (I hope not alone) in the most determined +opposition. Never before did we at any time in this country +meet upon the theory of our frame of government, to sit in +judgment on the Constitution of our country, to call it as a +delinquent before us, and to accuse it of every defect and every +vice; to see whether it, an object of our veneration, even our +adoration, did or did not accord with a preconceived scheme in +the minds of certain gentlemen. Cast your eyes on the +journals of Parliament. It is for fear of losing the +inestimable treasure we have, that I do not venture to game it +out of my hands for the vain hope of improving it. I look +with filial reverence on the Constitution of my country, and +never will cut it in pieces, and put it into the kettle of any +magician, in order to boil it, with the puddle of their +compounds, into youth and vigour. On the contrary, I will +drive away such pretenders; I will nurse its venerable age, and +with lenient arts extend a parent’s breath.</p> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT +DISCONTENTS***</p> +<pre> + +***** This file should be named 2173-h.htm or 2173-h.zip****** + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/1/7/2173 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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