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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/18160-8.txt b/18160-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d47491 --- /dev/null +++ b/18160-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,15420 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of In the World War, by Count Ottokar Czernin + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: In the World War + +Author: Count Ottokar Czernin + +Release Date: April 12, 2006 [EBook #18160] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE WORLD WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jeannie Howse, Thierry Alberto, Henry Craig +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + * * * * * + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | A number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected | + | in this text. For a complete list, please see the bottom of | + | this document. | + | | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + +[Illustration: COUNT CZERNIN] + + * * * * * + + + + +IN THE WORLD WAR + +BY COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN + + + +_WITH FOUR PLATES_ + + + +CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD +London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne + +Copyright in Great Britain. + + + + +PREFACE + + +It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World +War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of +this book. + +Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe +separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and individuals +with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe +closely; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama. + +By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of +the war as a whole, which may, nevertheless, differ in many respects +from the hitherto recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war. + +Everyone regards people and events from his own point of view; it is +inevitable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was in close touch; +of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression +on me; and finally, of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I +endeavour to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to +describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description +appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely +formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the +capacity for judging. + +Not everything could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it +could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those +events to justify the lifting of the veil from all that happened. + +But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture, +which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind. + +OTTOKAR CZERNIN. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER PAGE + + 1. INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 1 + + 2. KONOPISCHT 34 + + 3. WILLIAM II 52 + + 4. ROUMANIA 77 + + 5. THE U-BOAT WARFARE 114 + + 6. ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 134 + + 7. WILSON 188 + + 8. IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 195 + + 9. POLAND 200 + +10. BREST-LITOVSK 211 + +11. THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST 258 + +12. FINAL REFLECTIONS 271 + + APPENDIX 275 + + + + +LIST OF PLATES + + +COUNT CZERNIN _Frontispiece_ + + FACING PAGE + +THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND 48 + +COUNT TISZA 128 + +GENERAL HOFFMANN 240 + + + + +IN THE WORLD WAR + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS + + +1 + +The bursting of a thunderstorm is preceded by certain definite +phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the +storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be +repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through +outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less +threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is +bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts. + +For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of +Foreign Affairs had stood at "storm." It rose periodically, to fall +again; it varied--naturally; but for years everything had pointed to +the fact that the peace of the world was in danger. + +The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several +years: to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand England's dread of +the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand Berlin's politics, +which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief +that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in +Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but +partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence; these +fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII., and thus was +started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward +VII. made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor +Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the +Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor +Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate +of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent +masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany; +without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through +the Alliance. + +I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war, +it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had +eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her +dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the +Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm +conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the +situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany, +the unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention +the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in +Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise, +and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this, +the greatest misfortune of all time--and such is this war--lies in the +fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation +created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals +keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and +statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as +much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable +difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither +France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the +thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no +intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary--as she did fifty +years ago--left the decisive moment for entering into war to the +future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite +of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed +her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not +know what he wanted, and the military party urged unceasingly for +war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a +declaration of war. + +The states that followed after--Italy and Roumania--entered into the +war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of +course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to +pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than +Roumania. + +But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the +growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already +brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of +Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the +Prussians throughout the world--whether in the case of a general at +Potsdam or a _commis voyageur_ out in East Africa--these Prussian +manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting +of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the +whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral +coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly +practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that +German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the +world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention +of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in +the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was +undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German +provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence +created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition +policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war. + +It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans +of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the +sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan +of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by +King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English +motives. + +Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for +armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to +possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried +to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had +become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been +obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be +pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary +and general disarmament, or war. + +A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through +negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, +but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for +peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she +was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the +Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion. + +I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British +points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral +state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American +steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German +industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German was a great talker +and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating +on the "uprising" of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for +expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of +impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made +in all these endeavours. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of +German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns +where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how +"Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world, +and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on +solid foundations upheld by military support. Such was the German. +When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and +asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered: "There is no need +for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us." Such +was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind. +It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was +reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic, +because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of +the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe. + +The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the +Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest +strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world +regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy +was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action +would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of +anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and +closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way. + + +2 + +I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while +there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the +Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador +there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by +his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to +put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as +follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not +intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he +considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in +our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and +leaving the field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own +mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great +Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was +preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterwards I +repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, +and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of +Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion. +The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with +the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I +had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his +intention of discussing the matter with the monarch. + +The two Balkan wars were as summer lightning before the coming +European thunderstorm. It was obvious to anyone acquainted with Balkan +conditions that the peace there had produced no definite result, and +the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, so enthusiastically acclaimed by +Roumania, carried the germ of death at its birth. Bulgaria was +humiliated and reduced; Roumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out +of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description. +Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy, +was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars. +In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the +separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred +came to an outburst in the world war the most terrible scenes were +enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Roumanians tore +their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the +Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Roumanian prisoners to death +in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war +can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph +clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely +a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for +Bucharest in 1913 I was received in audience by the aged emperor, who +said to me: "The Peace of Bucharest is untenable, and we are faced by +a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia, +which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being +satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of +becoming a Great Power. + +Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before +the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed +almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade. +But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent +asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the +world. The stone had started rolling. + +At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able +from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin. +Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with +numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been +able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no +doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought +of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all, +was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German +Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war +against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe +that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the +ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this +is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which +would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and +then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and +France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It +cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of +errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count +Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to +the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German +promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators +and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated. + +Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war +would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent +by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no +doubt on the matter. + +Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian +war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment +extremely important events took place. + +On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram +received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the +following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was +very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the +situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had +intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a +position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested +England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities +to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as +it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after +occupying Belgrade, would state her terms. + +To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention +to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would +facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would +inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved. +Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very +favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was +difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy. + +Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that +he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting +negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without +a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future. + +Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by +Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the +Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this +information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position +was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the +evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation +was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him +whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in +view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the +different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was +obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the +day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to +incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun +without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they +were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary +would be too late. + +I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material +placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire +into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the +Emperor Francis Joseph. + +On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz, +communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince +Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:-- + + "Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to + concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly + desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war + should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting + to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if + Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade + and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for + satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile + suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his + great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus + proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent + what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I + am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to + preserve peace of Europe. + + GEORGE." + +Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject +to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy +London. + +In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to +Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party +working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an +accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop +mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with +defence. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their +Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their +personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly +weighed in the balance. + +This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn +hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours +merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was +the result. + +Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war. + +Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all +these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen +Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw +a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread +errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the +war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but +because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance +would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the +Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which +then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before +we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning +the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German +Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a +distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as +I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various +steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have +alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the +language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky +specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to +interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in +the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy. + +There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private +speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and +it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be +"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point +of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would +prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff +appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was +firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go +through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the +year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason, +because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of +either Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very +important point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy +into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and +peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany +on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he +wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of +Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his +policy, and not Bethmann's. + +This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy +conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been confirmed +from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in +behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of +activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this +to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was +never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war, +but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic +representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government +to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his +instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete +anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy +expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his Government; +and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain +circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all +events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's +private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy. + +In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark +a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there +for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to +return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before +leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at +Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite +briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a +war, I could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the +affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any +guarantee was impossible. + + +3 + +Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately +preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence +of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we +granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing +the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before +action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them +also. + +I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in +Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In +all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of +renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious +feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would +strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour. + +Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings. + +Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian +Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared +that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case +there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest +had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His +efforts were crowned with success. + +On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold: + + "The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet + Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty + into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that + no party could undertake the responsibility of such action. + + "The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither + notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in + Belgrade no casus foederis exists_. The Cabinet Council further + resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier + be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the + Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its + frontiers would thereby be covered. + + "The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to + strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general + mobilisation would follow. + + "The Government intends only to publish a short communiqué + relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the + country." + +Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up +as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for +war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870 +Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a +different character. + +In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have +been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto +were favourably disposed towards us. + +Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and +confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not +inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending +over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a +very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung +the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe. + +It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the +Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new +conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the +year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the +ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side. + +At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution, +and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was +the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We +also succeeded, but in an opposite sense. + + +4 + +Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium. + +Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his +book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how +on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English +Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would +respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already +on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but, +returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in +before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into +Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his +passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and +the consequence was a declaration of war by England. + +That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would +resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is +fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English +Ambassador. + +Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave +France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian +neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action +against France. The contradiction between both points of view is +clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation +is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of +August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the +evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of +making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext +for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also +that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do +so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying +her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On +the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the +decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with +Germany._ + +Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of +the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom. +That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the +diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power. + +The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious +onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne. + +In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage +left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a +lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually +forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but +Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans, +though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently +competent to lead them therein. + +Bismarck created the German Empire out of Düppel, Königgrätz and +Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years +that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the +mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but +Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial +efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means. +Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when +he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no +desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the +first week had already created political situations which were beyond +her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the +Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose +against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over +the world. + +At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would +have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to +fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then +at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to +join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How +far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to +a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but +this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right +remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or +small. + +The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian +policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who +were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating +consequences. + +Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command +made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than +useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable +and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that +Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would +not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of +noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare were +means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women +and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany +must be annihilated. + +When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it was +only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of +such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war +of annihilation. + +England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic +than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the +present case England originally had no intention of joining in the +conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own +confederates. + +So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the +wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors +in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final +decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was +taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign +Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence, +but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor +political complications, carried everything before them. + +It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits +of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both +encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and +very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs. +Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into +subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made +manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had +possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had +the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have +been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the +abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the +Central Powers. + +From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the +hands of his generals. + +The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much +else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant, +inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people +believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms +of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing +the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William +allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their +tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a +godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war +long since had assumed a totally different character, when the troops +were made stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were +constantly rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally +America appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve +miracles of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the +eyes of the German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and +hoped for victory through them alone. They were more powerful than +the Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose +them. + +Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power +direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt +that they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering +people clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could +give them victory. + + +5 + +Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy, +and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours +had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought +about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling +herself on the Central Powers. + +That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning +of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources +may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of +the case. + +The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They +maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of +Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as +punishment. + +A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their +own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge +and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of +State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view +of the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that +"three Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the +war."[1] + +Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of +blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war +without being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true, +there could only have been a question of some plot laid by the +Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case Germany, +being the vastly superior military element, would undoubtedly have +assumed the rôle of leader. + +Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace +were right. + + +6 + +While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would +have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had attempts +at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we should +have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as we were +united together in a war of defence and not in a war of conquest. +Although the German military party both dreamed and talked incessantly +of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a misunderstanding of the +situation, that was by no means the exclusive reason why peace could +not be attained. It simply was because on no consideration could the +Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have already mentioned this in +my speech of December 11, 1918,[2] in which I discoursed on politics +in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of France +and England. None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for +victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long +as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with +Germany _inter pares_, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part +of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to +do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we +ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to +conclude a _status quo_ peace with Germany, we would have been +relieved of our moral obligations. Against this may be quoted: "_Salus +rei publicas supreme lex_"--in order to save the Monarchy Germany +would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be +inquired into as to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate +peace really did exist. I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid +speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after +the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America +into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian +idea. But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished +the hope of a _peace of understanding_ from month to month, from week +to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would +arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the +sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end +which practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of affairs. A +catastrophe of such magnitude and such dimensions was never what I +feared. This is confirmed in the published report of my aforesaid +speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are +therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial +offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose +out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the +Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for +_endurable_ sacrifices. + +It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in +shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a +separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of +London of April 26, 1915. + +The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's +entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they +included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into +a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times +when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the +resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on +both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired +advances to us. + +As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this +strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we +obtain the authentic whole, when the Russian revolutionary Government +published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was +reproduced in our papers. + +I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,[3] as, in spite of +its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate +attention on the part of the public. + +According to the settlements, which were binding on the four +States--England, France, Russia, and Italy--the last-named was awarded +the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass, +Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of +islands, also Dalmatia. + +In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises +to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of +the Monarchy. + +Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace +was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the +reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming +neutral--reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change +our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with +Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It +must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held +office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German +troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial +German Command. We had no army of our own in the East--not in the true +sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army. That +was a consequence of our military inferiority. Again and again we +resorted to German aid. We called repeatedly for help in Serbia, +Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by +giving up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only in very +slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it +emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs. We entered +the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various +Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect. +The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for years because their +national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social +Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting +therein plans for attack and not defence. + +Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were, of course, +exceptions, but they only prove the rule. What was chiefly wanting was +contact with the troops. These gentlemen sat with their backs turned +and gave their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the front +or where the bullets whistled. During the war the troops learned to +_hate_ the General Staff. It was very different in the German army. +The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much; +above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example. +Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liége, accompanied by a couple of men! +In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were +quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes +Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions. The first of +these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a +leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany, +and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph. He always acted +correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties. What +was left of our independence was lost after Luck. + +To return, therefore, to the plan developed above: a separate peace +that would have contained an order for our troops on the Eastern front +to lay down their arms or to march back would immediately have led to +conflict at the front. Following on the violent opposition that such +an order would naturally have aroused in the German leaders, orders +from Vienna and counter-orders from Berlin would have led to a state +of complete disorganisation, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it was +out of the question to look for a peaceful and bloodless unravelment +at the front. I state this in order to explain my firm conviction that +the idea that such a separating of the two armies could have been +carried out in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous +premises, and also to prove that we have here the first factor +showing that we would not have ended the war by a separate peace, but +would, on the contrary, have been entangled in a new one. + +But what would have been enacted at the front would also, and in +aggravated fashion, have been repeated throughout the entire country: +a civil war would have been inevitable. + +I must here explain a second misunderstanding, resulting also from my +speech of December 11, which is due to my statement that "if we came +out Germany could not carry on the war." I admit that this statement +is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as though I had intended +to say that if we came out the immediate collapse of Germany was a +foregone conclusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or +mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Germany would render +impossible a victorious ending of the war, or even a lasting +successful continuance of the war; that Germany through this would be +faced by the alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the +Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers and +suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the same fate as Roumania +met with. I meant to say that Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the +Entente troops to enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany +that she would be compelled to use every means to forestall us and +paralyse the move. Whoever imagines that the German military leaders +would not have seized the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and +has a poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to form an +objective judgment of this train of thought one should be able to +enter into the spirit of the situation. In April, 1916, when I sent in +my resignation for other reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was +stronger than ever. The Eastern front was free: Russia and Roumania +were out of action. The troops were bound westward, and no one who +knew the situation as it was then can repudiate my assertion that the +German military leaders believed themselves then to be nearer than +ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they would take both +Paris and Calais and force the Entente to its knees. It is out of the +question that at such a moment and under such conditions they could +have replied to the falling away of Austria-Hungary otherwise than by +violence. + +All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to a fact which it +would be difficult to evade. Six months afterwards, when there was +already clear evidence of the German collapse, when Andrassy declared +a separate peace, the _Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into +the Tyrol_. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated, and ruined, +with revolution at their back, still held firmly to this decision and +endeavoured to make a battlefield on Austrian territory, how much more +would they have done that six months earlier, when they still stood +full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of victory and +triumph? What I, secondly, also would maintain is that the immediate +consequence of a separate peace would have been the conversion of +Austria-Hungary into a theatre of war. The Tyrol, as well as Bohemia, +would have become fields of battle. + +If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion from the war that +prevailed throughout the Monarchy before April, 1917, had caused the +entire population of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister +who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious or unconscious +untruth. Certainly the Czechs were decidedly against Germany, and it +would not have been reasons of political alliance that would have +prevented them from agreeing. But I would like to know what the Czech +people would have said if Bohemia had been turned into a theatre of +war and exposed to all the sufferings endured by this and all other +peoples, and when to it had been added the devastation of the +fatherland, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops advancing +with flying colours from Saxony would have made their way to Prague +and penetrated even farther. We had no military forces in Bohemia; we +should not have been able to check the advance, and quicker than +either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth mentioning to +Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops from their wellnigh +inexhaustible reserves, would have marched either against us or +against the Entente on our territory. The German-Austrian public would +not have been in agreement with such a Minister; the German +Nationalists and the German _bourgeoisie_ have no say in the matter. + +On October 28 the German Nationalists published their own particular +point of view in the following manner: + + "The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly + indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's + Note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to any + agreement with the Imperial German Government nor with the + representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the + Note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed + and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count + Andrassy in dispatching the Note to Wilson without previous + arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest + indignation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation + from the German Executive Committee was in Berlin and was + favourably received by the German Imperial Government in the + matter of providing for German-Austria. Although German soldiers + fought by the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the + alliance has now been violated by this effort to approach Wilson + without the consent of the German Empire, as is expressly stated + in the Note. Besides which, no previous agreement with the + representatives of the German Executive Committee was sought for. + They were ignored and the answer was sent to Wilson. The German + Nationalist parties strongly protest against such an + _unqualifiable act_ and will insist in the German Executive + Committee that German-Austria's right of self-determination be + unconditionally upheld and peace be secured in concert with the + German Empire." + +Neither would the German-Austrian Social Democrats have been a party +to such a movement. + +A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact lies before us if +it be maintained to-day that either the National Assembly or the +Austrian Social Democrats would have approved of and supported such +policy. I again have in mind the Andrassy days. + +On October 30 the National Assembly took up its position for action. +Dr. Sylvester drew up the report and pointed out the following: + + "It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the + attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between + German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the + future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly + asserts that the Note of October 27 from the Royal and Imperial + Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and dispatched to + President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with + the representatives of the German-Austrian people. The National + Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding + as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs + belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National + Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to + represent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to + foreign affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations." + +The protest met with no opposition in the National Assembly. + +Afterwards the chairman, Dr. Ellenbogen, the Social Democrat, spoke as +follows: + + "Instead of now telling the German Emperor that his remaining in + office is the greatest obstacle to peace" (loud applause from the + Social Democrats), "and if there ever were an object in Curtius's + famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German + Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes + the present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so + attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived too + late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is the + _bare and shameful breach of faith_, the thanks of the House of + Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet." (Applause from + the Social Democrats and the German Radicals.) + +It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished the exceptional +opportunity for Social Democrats and German Radicals to unite in +common applause, probably the first instance of such a thing in all +these years of war. + +If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that +there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding +together with Germany--what would have happened, I ask, at a time +when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the +population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at +least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together +with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding? +Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all, +civil war in the interior--such would have been the result of a +separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose on us the +resolutions passed in London! For never--as I shall presently +show--had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to +Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have +been as suicide from the sheer fear of death. + +In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor +Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a +separate peace. + +Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with +Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was +then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of +our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has +arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war." + +Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war--and a +separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with +Germany. + +In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he +was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together. +As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the +carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and +richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia, +Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that +the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without +putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the +circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the +whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I +took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on +the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans +were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet +without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to +cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce +an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities +were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in +London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never +could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the +Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we +must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many +different currents of feeling--but the moment that Vienna prepared to +sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man +against such action. In that respect there was no difference between +him--Tisza--and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before +the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of +Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's +back she would separate from Austria and act independently. + +I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany +or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear +as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the +German lust of conquest. + +Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was +not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in +London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian +territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the +Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and +both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give +Hungary a guarantee for the _status quo ante_ and to desist from any +internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must +declare against any attempt at peace. + +The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing +particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a +Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, though he maintained +that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms +appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than +Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make +peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to +bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's +advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was +fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be +lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German +politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as +England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory, +Germany was the only protection against these plans. + +Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from +Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new +states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary. + +After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the +following policy: + + + (1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in + London, i.e. the destruction of the Monarchy, continues to + be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the certain + hope of crushing that spirit of destruction. + + (2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no + account be carried on for purposes of conquest. + + (3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must be + avoided. + + (4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without + the knowledge of the Prime Minister. + + (5) Should the Austrian Ministry agree with the Foreign Minister + respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hungarian + Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce. + +When the conference in London and the destruction of the Monarchy came +into question, Tisza was entirely in the right, and that he otherwise +to the end adhered to his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his +last visit to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request of +the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and when in the most +marked manner he showed himself to be opposed to the aspirations of +the Southern Slavs. + +Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must not, when looking +back from to-day, relegate all that has since happened to former +discernible facts, but should consider that, in spite of all pessimism +and all fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding, even +though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that it was impossible +to plunge the Monarchy into a catastrophe at once for fear of its +coming later. + +If the situation is described to-day as though the inhabitants of the +Monarchy, and especially the Social Democrats, were favourably +disposed for any eventuality, even for a separate peace, I must again +most emphatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social Democracy +without doubt was the party most strongly in favour of peace, and also +that Social Democracy in Germany, as with us, repeatedly stated that +there were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German Social +Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine ought to be given up, and +never have our Social Democrats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen and +Meran. This would in any case have been the price of peace--and also +the price of a separate peace--for, as I have already pointed out, at +the conference in London, which dates back to 1915, binding +obligations had been entered into for the partition of the Monarchy, +while all that had been promised to Italy. + +The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the +separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente +ranks--for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians, +and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would +have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I +doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings +would have recommended it to the special protection of the Entente. +It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to +believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and +especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any +strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian +Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in +the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material +advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the +decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire +political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union +with Germany--how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which, +without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to +a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the +upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the +opposite? + +But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my +resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not +pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is +of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near +a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would +throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end +before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as +we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory +was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany +against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant +influence. + +As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign +policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of +renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several +men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I +feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I +came to the firm conclusion that the Entente--England above all--from +the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to +shatter Germany. + +From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief +characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further +with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to +earth. It makes no difference in the matter that the German military +party--though for other reasons--from a total misconception of their +chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a +time when it might have been possible. This is an historical fact, but +as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether +concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. _We_ could have +gone over to the enemy--in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought +against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would +doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the wounds which +Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been +less serious than those from which she is now suffering: she would +have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as +perished in her fight allied with Germany. + +_Austria-Hungary's watch had run down._ Among the few statesmen who in +1914 wished for war--like Tschirsky, for instance--there can have been +none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views. +They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe to-day, +nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would +have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first +step. + +The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of Greater Serbia's +aspirations; but these aspirations, which led to the breaking away of +our Southern Slav provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on +the contrary, would have largely increased and asserted themselves, +and would have strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of other +peoples within the Monarchy. + +Lightning at night reveals the country for a second, and the same +effect was produced by the shots fired at Sarajevo. It became obvious +that the signal for the fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells +of Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the murder, +sounded the death knell of the Monarchy. + +The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially at Vienna, was +very general that the outrage at Sarajevo was a matter of more +importance than the murder of an Imperial prince and his wife, and +that it was the alarm signal for the ruin of the Habsburg Empire. + +I have been told that during the period between the assassination and +the war, warlike demonstrations were daily occurrences in the Viennese +restaurants and people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were +sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not "exert himself +to take any energetic steps." This must not be taken as an excuse for +any eventual mistakes on the part of the leaders of the nation, for a +leading statesman ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the +man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit developed in +1914 appears to have been very general. And it may perhaps be +permitted to add this comment: how many of those who then clamoured +for war and revenge and demanded "energy," would, now that the +experiment has totally failed, severely criticise and condemn +Berchtold's "criminal behaviour"? + +It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the fall of the +Monarchy would have occurred had war been averted. Certainly in a less +terrible fashion than was the case through the war. Probably much more +slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole world into the +whirlpool. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the +manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible. + +Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the outbreak of war. +We were transformed from a subject into an object. + +This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless to end it. At the +conference in London the death sentence had been passed on the Empire +of the Habsburgs and a separate peace would have been no easier a form +of death than that involved in holding out at the side of our Allies. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza and Stürgkh and General +Conrad von Hohendorf. + +[2] See Appendix, p. 325. + +[3] See page 275. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +KONOPISCHT + + +1 + +Konopischt has become the cradle of manifold legends. The lord of the +castle was the first victim of the terrible world conflagration, and +the part that he played before the war has been the subject of much +and partly erroneous commentary. + +The Archduke and heir to the throne was a man of a very peculiar +nature. The main feature of his character was a great lack of balance. +He knew no middle course and was just as eager to hate as to love. He +was unbalanced in everything; he did nothing like other people, and +what he did was done in superhuman dimensions. His passion for buying +and collecting antiquities was proverbial and fabulous. A first-rate +shot, sport was for him a question of murdering _en masse_, and the +number of game shot by him reached hundreds of thousands. A few years +before his death he shot his 5,000th stag. + +His ability as a good shot was phenomenal. When in India, during his +voyage round the world, and while staying with a certain Maharajah, an +Indian marksman gave an exhibition of his skill. Coins were thrown +into the air which the man hit with bullets. The Archduke tried the +same and beat the Indian. Once when I was staying with him at +Eckartsau he made a _coup double_ at a stag and a hare as they ran; he +had knocked over a fleeing stag, and when, startled by the shot, a +hare jumped up, he killed it with the second bullet. He scorned all +modern appliances for shooting, such as telescopic sights or automatic +rifles; he invariably used a short double-barrelled rifle, and his +exceptionally keen sight rendered glasses unnecessary. + +The artistic work of laying out parks and gardens became in latter +years his dominating passion. He knew every tree and every bush at +Konopischt, and loved his flowers above everything. He was his own +gardener. Every bed and every group was designed according to his +exact orders. He knew the conditions essential to the life of each +individual plant, the quality of the soil required; and even the +smallest spot to be laid out or altered was done according to his +minute instructions. But here, too, everything was carried out on the +same gigantic lines, and the sums spent on that park must have been +enormous. Few people had the varied artistic knowledge possessed by +the Archduke; no dealer could palm off on him any modern article as an +antique, and he had just as good taste as understanding. On the other +hand, music to him was simply a disagreeable noise, and he had an +unspeakable contempt for poets. He could not bear Wagner, and Goethe +left him quite cold. His lack of any talent for languages was +peculiar. He spoke French tolerably, but otherwise no other language, +though he had a smattering of Italian and Czech. For years--indeed, to +the end of his life--he struggled with the greatest energy to learn +Hungarian. He had a priest living permanently in the house to give him +Hungarian lessons. This priest accompanied him on his travels, and at +St. Moritz, for instance, Franz Ferdinand had a Hungarian lesson every +day; but, in spite of this, he continued to suffer from the feeling +that he would never be able to learn the language, and he vented his +annoyance at this on the entire Hungarian people. "Their very language +makes me feel antipathy for them," was a remark I constantly heard him +make. His judgment of people was not a well-balanced one; he could +either love or hate, and unfortunately the number of those included in +the latter category was considerably the greater. + +There is no doubt about it that there was a very hard strain in Franz +Ferdinand's mentality, and those who only knew him slightly felt that +this hardness of character was the most notable feature in him and his +great unpopularity can doubtless be attributed to this cause. The +public never knew the splendid qualities of the Archduke, and +misjudged him accordingly. + +Apparently he was not always like that. He suffered in his youth from +severe lung trouble, and for long was given up by the doctors. He +often spoke to me of that time and all that he had gone through, and +referred with intense bitterness to the people who were only waiting +day by day to put him altogether on one side. As long as he was looked +upon as the heir to the throne, and people reckoned on him for the +future, he was the centre of all possible attention; but when he fell +ill and his case was considered hopeless, the world fluctuated from +hour to hour and paid homage to his younger brother Otto. I do not for +a moment doubt that there was a great deal of truth in what the late +Archduke told me; and no one knowing the ways of the world can deny +the wretched, servile egotism that is almost always at the bottom of +the homage paid to those in high places. More deeply than in the +hearts of others was this resentment implanted in the heart of Franz +Ferdinand, and he never forgave the world what he suffered and went +through in those distressful months. It was chiefly the ostensible +vacillation of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count +Goluchowski, that had so deeply hurt the Archduke, who had always +imagined that Goluchowski was deeply attached to him. According to +Franz Ferdinand's account, Goluchowski is supposed to have said to the +Emperor Francis Joseph that the Archduke Otto ought now to be given +the retinue and household suitable for the heir to the throne as +he--Franz Ferdinand--"was in any case lost." It was not so much the +fact as the manner in which Goluchowski tried "to bury him while still +living" that vexed and hurt him whom a long illness had made +irritable. But besides Goluchowski, there were numberless others whose +behaviour at that time he took greatly amiss, and his unparalleled +contempt of the world which, when I knew him, was one of his most +characteristic features, appears--partly, at any rate--to date from +his experiences during that illness. + +In connection with politics, too, this bitterness exercised a lasting +influence on his entire mental outlook. I have been told by an +authentic witness that the Archduke, when suffering and combating his +terrible disease, saw one day an article in a Hungarian paper which, +in brutal and derisive tones, spoke of the Archduke's expectations of +future government as laid aside, and gloated openly, with malicious +delight, over the probable event. The Archduke, who while reading the +article had turned ashen grey with rage and indignation, remained +silent for a moment and then made the following characteristic remark: +"Now I must get better. I shall live from now only for my health. I +must get better in order to show them that their joy is premature." +And though this may not have been the only reason for his violent +antipathy to everything Hungarian, there is no doubt that the episode +influenced his mind considerably. The Archduke was a "good hater"; he +did not easily forget, and woe betide those upon whom he vented his +hatred. On the other hand, though but few knew it, he had an +uncommonly warm corner in his heart; he was an ideal husband, the best +of fathers, and a faithful friend. But the number of those he despised +was incomparably greater than those who gained his affection, and he +himself was in no doubt whatever as to his being the most unpopular +person in the Monarchy. But there was a certain grandeur in this very +contempt of popularity. He never could bring himself to make any +advances to newspapers or other organs that are in the habit of +influencing public opinion either favourably or unfavourably. He was +too proud to sue for popularity, and too great a despiser of men to +attach any importance to their judgment. + +The Archduke's antipathy to Hungary runs like a scarlet thread through +the political chain of his thoughts. I have been told that at the time +when the Crown Prince Rudolf was frequently in Hungary shooting, the +Archduke was often with him, and that the Hungarian gentlemen took a +pleasure in teasing and ridiculing the young Archduke in the presence +and to the delight of the considerably older Crown Prince. Ready as I +am to believe that the Crown Prince Rudolf enjoyed the jokes--and +little do I doubt that there were men there who would act in such +fashion so as to curry favour with the Crown Prince--I still think +that these unpleasant incidents in his youth weighed less in the +balance with Franz Ferdinand than the already-mentioned occurrences +during his illness. + +Apart from his personal antipathies, which he transferred from a few +Hungarians to the entire nation, there were also various far-reaching +and well-founded political reasons which strengthened the Archduke in +his antagonistic relations with Hungary. Franz Ferdinand possessed an +exceptionally fine political _flair_, and this enabled him to see that +Hungarian policy was a vital danger to the existence of the whole +Habsburg Empire. His desire to overthrow the predominance of the +Magyars and to help the nationalities to obtain their rights was +always in his thoughts, and influenced his judgment on all political +questions. He was the steady representative of the Roumanians, the +Slovaks, and other nationalities living in Hungary, and went so far in +that respect that he would have treated every question at once from an +anti-Magyar point of view without inquiring into it in an objective +and expert manner. These tendencies of his were no secret in Hungary, +and the result was a strong reaction among the Magyar magnates, which +he again took as purely personal antagonism to himself, and as the +years went on existing differences increased automatically, until +finally, under the Tisza régime, they led to direct hostility. + +The Archduke's antipathy to party leaders in Hungary was even stronger +than that he felt for Tisza, and he showed it particularly to one of +the most prominent figures of that time. I do not know for certain +what took place between them; I only know that several years before +the catastrophe the gentleman in question was received in audience at +the Belvedere, and that the interview came to a very unsatisfactory +end. The Archduke told me that his visitor arrived bringing a whole +library with him in order to put forward legal proofs that the +Magyar's standpoint was the right one. He, the Archduke, snapped his +fingers at their laws, and said so. It came to a violent scene, and +the gentleman, pale as death, tottered from the room. + +Certain it is that Ministers and other officials rarely waited on the +Archduke without beating hearts. He was capable of flying out at +people and terrifying them to such a degree that they lost their heads +completely. He often took their fright to be obstinacy and passive +resistance, and it irritated him all the more. + +On the other hand, it was extremely easy to get on with him if one +knew him well and did not stand in awe of him. I had many scenes with +him and often lost my temper, too; but there was never any lasting +ill-feeling. Once when at Konopischt we had a scene one evening after +dinner because, he said, I always worked in opposition to him and +rewarded his friendship by treachery. I broke off the conversation, +remarking that, if he could say such things, any further serious +conversation would be impossible, and I also stated my intention of +leaving the next morning. We separated without saying good night to +each other. Quite early next morning--I was still in bed--he appeared +in my room and asked me to forget what he had said the previous +evening, that he had not meant it seriously, and thus completely +disarmed my still prevailing vexation. + +A despiser of men, with his wits sharpened by his own experiences, he +never allowed himself to be fooled by servile cringing and flattery. +He listened to people, but how often have I heard him say: "He is no +good; he is a toady." Such people never found favour with him, as he +always mistrusted them at the outset. He was protected more than +others in such high spheres from the poison of servility that attacks +all monarchs. + +His two best friends, and the men to whom--after his own nearest +relations--he was most attached, were his brother-in-law Albrecht von +Würtemberg and the Prince Karl of Schwarzenberg. + +The former, a man of charming personality, great intelligence, and +equally efficient in political as in military matters, lived on a +footing of true brotherly unity with Franz Ferdinand, and also, +naturally, on terms of perfect equality. + +Karl of Schwarzenberg was the most sincere, honourable and +straightforward character I have ever encountered; a man who concealed +the truth from no one. Rich, independent, and devoid of personal +ambition, it was quite immaterial to him whether the Archduke was +pleased with what he asserted or no. He was his _friend_, and +considered it his duty to be honest and open--and if necessary, +disagreeable. The Archduke understood, appreciated, and valued this +attitude. I do not think there are many monarchs or heirs to the +throne who would have suffered, as the Archduke did, Schwarzenberg's +sayings and doings. + +Franz Ferdinand was on very bad terms with Aehrenthal, who easily +became abrupt and repellent. Still, there was another reason why two +such hard millstones could not grind together. I do not believe that +the many reproaches launched against Aehrenthal by the Archduke were +consequent on political differences; it was more Aehrenthal's manner +that invariably irritated the Archduke. I had occasion to read some of +Aehrenthal's letters to Franz Ferdinand which, perhaps unintentionally, +had a slight ironical flavour which made the Archduke feel he was not +being taken seriously. He was particularly sensitive in this respect. + +When Aehrenthal fell ill the Archduke made unkind remarks about the +dying man, and there was great and general indignation at the want of +feeling shown by him. He represented the Emperor at the first part of +the funeral service, and afterwards received me at the Belvedere. We +were standing in the courtyard when the procession, with the hearse, +passed on the way to the station. The Archduke disappeared quickly +into a cottage close by, the windows of which looked on to the road, +and there, concealed behind the window curtain, he watched the +procession pass. He said not a word, but his eyes were full of tears. +When he saw that I noticed his emotion he turned away angrily, vexed +at having given proof of his weakness. It was just like him. He would +rather be considered hard and heartless than soft and weak, and +nothing was more repugnant to him than the idea that he had aroused +suspicion of striving to enact a touching scene. I have no doubt that +at that moment he was suffering the torture of self-reproach, and +probably suffered the more through being so reserved and unable to +give free play to his feelings. + +The Archduke could be extremely gay, and possessed an exceptionally +strong sense of humour. In his happiest years he could laugh like any +youth, and carried his audience with him by his unaffected merriment. + +Some years ago a German prince, who was unable to distinguish between +the numerous archdukes, came to Vienna. A dinner was given in his +honour at the Hofburg, where he was seated next to Franz Ferdinand. +Part of the programme was that he was to have gone the next morning +with the Archduke to shoot in the neighbourhood. The German prince, +who mistook the Archduke Franz Ferdinand for someone else, said to him +during dinner: "I am to go out shooting to-morrow, and I hear it is to +be with that tiresome Franz Ferdinand; I hope the plan will be +changed." As far as I know, the expedition did not take place; but I +never heard whether the prince discovered his mistake. The Archduke, +however, laughed heartily for days at the episode. + +The Archduke invariably spoke of his nephew, the present Emperor +Charles, with great affection. The relations between the two were, +however, always marked by the absolute subordination of the nephew to +the uncle. In all political discussions, too, the Archduke Charles was +always the listener, absorbing the precepts expounded by Franz +Ferdinand. + +Charles's marriage met with the full approval of his uncle. The +Duchess of Hohenberg, too, entertained the warmest affection for the +young couple. + +The Archduke was a firm partisan of the Great-Austria programme. His +idea was to convert the Monarchy into numerous more or less +independent National States, having in Vienna a common central +organisation for all important and absolutely necessary affairs--in +other words to substitute Federalisation for Dualism. Now that, after +terrible military and revolutionary struggles, the development of the +former Monarchy has been accomplished in a national spirit, there +cannot be many to contend that the plan is Utopian. At that time, +however, it had many opponents who strongly advised against dissecting +the State in order to erect in its place something new and "presumably +better," and the Emperor Francis Joseph was far too conservative and +far too old to agree to his nephew's plans. This direct refusal of the +idea cherished by the Archduke offended him greatly, and he complained +often in bitter terms that the Emperor turned a deaf ear to him as +though he were the "lowest serving man at Schönbrunn." + +The Archduke lacked the knowledge of how to deal with people. He +neither could nor would control himself, and, charming though he could +be when his natural heartiness was allowed free scope, just as little +could he conceal his anger and ill-humour. Thus it came about that the +relations between him and the aged Emperor grew more and more +strained. There were doubtless faults on both sides. The standpoint of +the old Emperor, that as long as he lived no one else should +interfere, was in direct opposition to that of the Archduke, who held +that he would one day have to suffer for the present faults in the +administration, and anyone acquainted with life at court will know +that such differences between the highest individuals are quickly +raked together and exaggerated. At every court there are men who seek +to gain their master's favour by pouring oil on the flames, and who, +by gossip and stories of all kinds, add to the antipathy that +prevails. Thus it was in this case, and, instead of being drawn closer +together, the two became more and more estranged. + +The Archduke had but few friends, and under the old monarch +practically none at all. That was one of the reasons for the advances +he made to the Emperor William. In reality, they were men of such a +different type that there could be no question of friendship in the +true sense of the word, or any real understanding between him and the +Emperor William, and the question was never mooted practically. The +only point common to both their characters was a strongly defined +autocratic trait. The Archduke had no sympathy with the speeches of +the Emperor William, nor yet with his obvious desire for popularity, +which the Archduke could not understand. The Emperor William, on his +part, undoubtedly grew more attached to the Archduke during his latter +years than he had been originally. Franz Ferdinand was not on such +good terms with the Crown Prince of Germany. They spent some weeks +together at St. Moritz in Switzerland, without learning to know each +other any better; but this can readily be explained by the difference +in age and also by the much more serious views of life held by the +Archduke. + +The isolation and retirement in which the Archduke lived, and the +regrettably restricted intercourse he had with other circles, gave +rise to the circulation of some true, besides numerous false, rumours. +One of these rumours, which is still obstinately kept up, was to the +effect that the Archduke was a fanatic for war and looked upon war as +a necessary aid to the realisation of his plans for the future. +Nothing could be more untrue, and, although the Archduke never openly +admitted it to me, I am convinced that he had an instinctive feeling +that the Monarchy would never be able to bear the terrible test of +strength of a war, and the fact is that, instead of working to +encourage war, his activities lay all in the opposite direction. I +recollect an extremely symptomatic episode: I do not remember the +exact date, but it was some time before the death of the Archduke. One +of the well-known Balkan turmoils threw the Monarchy into a state of +agitation, and the question whether to mobilise or not became the +order of the day. I chanced to be in Vienna, where I had an interview +with Berchtold who spoke of the situation with much concern and +complained that the Archduke was acting in a warlike spirit. I offered +to draw the Archduke's attention to the danger of the proceeding, and +put myself in telegraphic communication with him. I arranged to join +his train that same day when he passed through Wessely on his way to +Konopischt. I only had the short time between the two stations for my +conversation. I therefore at once took the bull by the horns and told +him of the rumours current about him in Vienna and of the danger of +promoting a conflict with Russia by too strong action in the Balkans. +I did not meet with the slightest opposition from the Archduke, and in +his usual expeditious way he wrote, while still in the train, a +telegram to Berchtold in which he expressed his perfect agreement in +maintaining a friendly attitude and repudiated all the reports of his +having been opposed to it. It is a fact that certain of the military +party, who were anxious for war, made use of the Archduke, or rather +misused him, in order to carry on a military propaganda in his name +and thus gave rise to so wrongful an estimate of him. Several of these +men died a hero's death in the war; others have disappeared and are +forgotten. Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, was never among those +who misused the Archduke. He could never have done such a thing. He +carried out himself what he considered necessary and did it openly and +in face of everybody. + +In connection with these reports about the Archduke there is one +remarkable detail that is worthy of note. He told me himself how a +fortune-teller once predicted that "he would one day let loose a world +war." Although to a certain extent this prophecy flattered him, +containing as it did the unspoken recognition that the world would +have to reckon on him as a powerful factor, still he emphatically +pointed out how mad such a prophecy was. It was fulfilled, however, +later, though very differently from what was meant originally, and +never was prince more innocent of causing blood to flow than the +unhappy victim of Sarajevo. + +The Archduke suffered most terribly under the conditions resulting +from his unequal marriage. The sincere and true love he felt for his +wife kept alive in him the wish to raise her to his rank and +privileges, and the constant obstacles that he encountered at all +court ceremonies embittered and angered him inexpressibly. The +Archduke was firmly resolved that when he came to the throne he would +give to his wife, not the title of Empress, but a position which, +though without the title, would bestow upon her the highest rank. His +argument was that wherever he was she would be the mistress of the +house, and as such was entitled to the highest position, "therefore +she will take precedence of all the archduchesses." Never did the +Archduke show the slightest wish to alter the succession and put his +son in place of the Archduke Charles. On the contrary, he was resolved +that his first official act on coming to the throne would be to +publish a solemn declaration containing his intention, in order to +counteract the ever-recurring false and biassed statements. As regards +his children, for whom he did everything that a loving father's heart +could devise, his greatest wish was to see them become wealthy, +independent private individuals, and able to enjoy life without any +material cares. His plan was to secure the title of Duke of Hohenberg +for his eldest son. It was, therefore, in harmony with this intention +that the Emperor Charles conferred the title on the youth. + +One fine quality in the Archduke was his fearlessness. He was quite +clear that the danger of an attempt to take his life would always be +present, and he often spoke quite simply and openly of such a +possibility. A year before the outbreak of war he informed me that the +Freemasons had resolved to kill him. He even gave me the name of the +town where the resolution was passed--it has escaped my memory +now--and mentioned the names of several Austrian and Hungarian +politicians who must have been in the secret. He also told me that +when he went to the coronation in Spain he was to have made the +journey with a Russian Grand Duke, but shortly before the train +started the news came that the Grand Duke had been murdered on the +way. He did not deny that it was with mixed feelings that he stepped +into his compartment. When at St. Moritz news was sent him that two +Turkish anarchists had arrived in Switzerland intending to murder him, +that every effort was being made to capture them, but that so far no +trace of them had been discovered, and he was advised to be on his +guard. The Archduke showed me the telegram at the time. He laid it +aside without the slightest sign of fear, saying that such events, +when announced beforehand, seldom were carried out. The Duchess +suffered all the more in her fears for his life, and I think that in +imagination the poor lady often went through the catastrophe of which +she and her husband were the victims. Another praiseworthy feature in +the Archduke was that, out of consideration for his wife's anxiety, he +tolerated the constant presence of a detective, which not only bored +him terribly but in his opinion was absurd. He was afraid that if the +fact became known it would be imputed to timidity on his part, and he +conceded the point solely with the view of calming his wife's fears. + +But he anxiously concealed all his good qualities and took an +obstinate pleasure in being hard and disagreeable. I will not +endeavour here to excuse certain traits in his character. His strongly +pronounced egotism cannot be denied any more than the hardness of +character, which made him insensible to the sufferings of all who were +not closely connected with him. He also made himself hated by his +severe financial proceedings and his inexorable judgment on any +subordinate whom he suspected of the slightest dishonesty. In this +connection there are hundreds of anecdotes, some true, some false. +These petty traits in his character injured him in the eyes of the +great public, while the really great and manly qualities he possessed +were unknown to them, and were not weighed in the balance in his +favour. For those who knew him well his great and good qualities +outweighed the bad ones a hundredfold. + +The Emperor was always very perturbed concerning the Archduke's plans +for the future. There was a stern trait also in the old monarch's +character, and in the interests of the Monarchy he feared the +impetuosity and obstinacy of his nephew. Nevertheless, he often took a +very magnanimous view of the matter. For instance, Count Stürgkh, the +murdered Prime Minister, gave me details respecting my nomination to +the Herrenhaus which are very characteristic of the old monarch. It +was Franz Ferdinand's wish that I should be in the Herrenhaus, as he +was anxious for me to be one of a delegation and also to profit by my +extensive training in the province of foreign policy. I must mention +here that it had been impressed on the Emperor on all sides that the +Archduke's friends and trusted men were working against him; a version +of affairs which to a certain degree he obviously believed, owing to +his numerous disputes with Franz Ferdinand. On Stürgkh mentioning my +name as a candidate for the Herrenhaus, the Emperor hesitated a moment +and then said: "Ah, yes. That is the man who is to be Minister for +Foreign Affairs when I am dead. Let him go to the Herrenhaus that he +may learn a little more." + +Political discussions with the Emperor Francis Joseph were often very +difficult, as he kept strictly to the Government department in +question and only discussed what referred thereto. While I was +ambassador the Emperor would discourse to me on Roumania and the +Balkans, but on nothing else. Meanwhile, the different questions were +often so closely interwoven that it was impossible to separate them. I +remember at one audience where I submitted to the Emperor the +Roumanian plans for a closer connection with the Monarchy--plans which +I shall allude to in a later chapter--and in doing so I was naturally +bound to state what the Roumanians proposed respecting the closer +connection with Hungary, and also what changes would be necessitated +thereby in the Hungarian administration. The Emperor at once broke off +the conversation, saying that it was a matter of Hungarian internal +policy. + +The old Emperor was almost invariably kind and friendly, and to the +very last his knowledge of the smallest details was astonishing. He +never spoke of the different Roumanian Ministers as the Minister of +Agriculture, of Trade, or whatever it might be, but mentioned them all +by name and never made a mistake. + +I saw him for the last time in October, 1916, after my definite return +from Roumania, and found him then quite clear and sound mentally, +though failing in bodily health. + +The Emperor Francis Joseph was a "Grand Seigneur" in the true sense of +the word. He was an Emperor and remained always unapproachable. +Everyone left his presence feeling he had stood before an Emperor. His +dignity in representing the monarchical idea was unsurpassed by any +sovereign in Europe. + +He was borne to his grave at a time of great military successes for +the Central Powers. He lies now in the Imperial vault, and a century +seems to have elapsed since his death; the world is changed. + +Day by day streams of people pass by the little church, but no one +probably gives a thought to him who lies in peace and forgotten, and +yet he, through many long years, embodied Austria, and his person was +a common centre for the State that so rapidly was falling asunder. + +He is now at rest, free from all care and sorrow; he saw his wife, his +son, his friends all die, but Fate spared him the sight of his +expiring Empire. + + * * * * * + +[Illustration: THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND _Photo: Pietzner, Vienna._] + +Franz Ferdinand's character held many sharply defined corners and +edges; judging him objectively, no one can deny his great faults. +Though the circumstances of his death were so tragic, it may well be +that for him it was a blessing. It is hardly conceivable that, once on +the throne, the Archduke would have been able to carry out his plans. +The structure of the Monarchy which he was so anxious to strengthen +and support was already so rotten that it could not have stood any +great innovations, and if not the war, then probably the Revolution, +would have shattered it. On the other hand, there seems to be no doubt +that the Archduke, with all the vehemence and impulsiveness of his +character, would have made the attempt to rebuild the entire structure +of the Monarchy. It is futile to comment on the chances of his +success, but according to human foresight the experiment would not +have succeeded, and he would have succumbed beneath the ruins of the +falling Monarchy. + +It is also futile to conjecture how the Archduke would have acted had +he lived to see the war and the upheaval. I think that in two respects +his attitude would have differed from that taken. In the first place, +he never would have agreed to our army being under German control. It +would not have been consistent with his strongly developed autocratic +tendencies, and he was too clever politically not to see that we +should thereby lose all political freedom of action. In the second +place, he would not, like the Emperor Charles, have yielded to +revolution. He would have gathered his faithful followers round him +and would have fallen fighting, sword in hand. He would have fallen as +did his greatest and most dangerous enemy, Stephen Tisza. + +But he died the death of a hero on the field of honour, valiantly and +in harness. The golden rays of the martyr's crown surrounded his dying +head. Many there were who breathed more freely on hearing the news of +his death. At the court in Vienna and in society at Budapest there was +more joy than sorrow, the former having rightly foreseen that he would +have dealt hardly with them. None of them could guess that the fall of +the strong man would carry them all with it and engulf them in a world +catastrophe. + +Franz Ferdinand will remain portrayed in history as a man who either +loved or hated. But his tragic end at the side of his wife, who would +not allow death to separate them, throws a mild and conciliatory light +on the whole life of this extraordinary man, whose warm heart to the +very last was devoted to his Fatherland and duty. + + +2 + +There was a widely-spread but entirely wrongful idea in the Monarchy +that the Archduke had drawn up a programme of his future activities. +This was not the case. He had very definite and pronounced ideas for +the reorganisation of the Monarchy, but the ideas never developed into +a concrete plan--they were more like the outline of a programme that +never was completed in detail. The Archduke was in touch with experts +from the different departments; he expounded the fundamental views of +his future programme to prominent military and political officials, +receiving from them hints on how to materialise these views; but a +really finished and thought-out programme was never actually produced. +The ground lines of his programme were, as already mentioned, the +abolition of the dualism and the reorganisation of the Monarchy to +form a federative state. He was not clear himself into how many states +the Habsburg Monarchy should be converted, but the principle was the +rebuilding of the Monarchy on a national basis. Having always in view +that prosperity depended on the weakening of the Magyar influence, the +Archduke was in favour of a strong preference for the different +nationalities living in Hungary, the Roumanians in particular. Not +until my return to Bucharest and following on my reports did the +Archduke conceive the plan of ceding Transylvania to Roumania and thus +adding Greater Roumania to the Habsburg Empire. + +His idea was to make of Austria separate German, Czech, Southern Slav +and Polish states, which in some respects would be autonomous; in +others, would be dependent on Vienna as the centre. But, so far as I +know, his programme was never quite clearly defined, and was subject +to various modifications. + +The Archduke had a great dislike for the Germans, especially the +northern Bohemians, who were partisans of the Pan-Germanic tendencies, +and he never forgave the attitude of the Deputy Schönerer. He had a +decided preference for all Germans in the Alpine countries, and +generally his views were very similar to those of the Christian +Socialists. His political ideal was Lueger. When Lueger was lying ill +the Archduke said to me: "If God will only spare this man, no better +Prime Minister could be found." Franz Ferdinand had a keen desire for +a more centralised army. He was a violent opponent of the endeavours +of the Magyars whose aim was an independent Hungarian army, and the +question of rank, word of command, and other incidental matters could +never be settled as long as he lived, because he violently resisted +all Hungarian advances. + +The Archduke had a special fondness for the navy. His frequent visits +to Brioni brought him into close touch with our navy. He was always +anxious to transform the Austrian Navy into one worthy of a Great +Power. In regard to foreign policy, the Archduke was always in favour +of a Triple Alliance of the three Emperors. The chief motive of this +idea must have been that, in the three then apparently so powerful +monarchs at Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, he saw the strongest +support against revolution, and wished thereby to build up a strong +barrier against disorganisation. He saw great danger to the friendly +relations between Russia and ourselves in the rivalry between Vienna +and Petersburg in the Balkans, and contrary to the reports that have +been spread about him, he was rather a partisan than an opposer of +Serbia. He was in favour of the Serbians because he felt assured that +the petty agrarian policy of the Magyars was responsible for the +constant annoyance of the Serbians. He favoured meeting Serbia +half-way, because he considered that the Serbian question was a source +of discord between Vienna and Petersburg. Another reason was that he +was no friend of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who constantly pursued an +anti-Serbian policy. I believe that if those who were responsible for +the organisation of the assassination of the Archduke had known what +little justification there was for supposing him to be the man they +thought him, they would have desisted. + +Franz Ferdinand had a very pronounced feeling that in spite of all +alliances the Monarchy must remain independent. He was opposed to any +closer combine with Germany, not wishing to be bound to Germany more +than to Russia, and the plan that was formulated later as "Central +Europe" was always far removed from his wishes and endeavours. + +His plans for the future were not worked out, not complete, but they +were sound. This, however, is not sufficient to enable one to say that +they could have been successfully carried out. In certain +circumstances more harm than good will result from energy devoid of +the necessary calm prudence, wisdom and, above all, patience. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +WILLIAM II + + +1 + +The Emperor William has been for so long the centre of historic +events, so much has been written about him, that apparently he should +be known to all the world; and yet I believe he has often been +misrepresented. + +It is well known that the scarlet thread running through the whole +character of William II. was his firm conviction that he was the +"elect of God," and that the dynasty was inextricably bound to the +German people. Bismarck also believed in the dynastic fidelity of the +Germans. It seems to me that there is just as little dynastic as +republican spirit in nations--just as little in the Germans as in +others. There is merely a feeling of content or discontent which +manifests itself either for or against the dynasty and the form of +government. Bismarck himself was a proof of the justice of this +argument. As he himself always maintained, he was thoroughly +dynastic--but only during the lifetime of the Emperor William I. He +had no love for William II., who had treated him badly, and made no +secret of his feelings. He hung the picture of the "young man" in the +scullery and wrote a book about him which, owing to its contents, +could not be published. + +The Monarchists who derive benefit from their attachment to the +reigning monarch deceive themselves as to their true feelings. They +are Monarchists because they consider that form of government the most +satisfactory one. The Republicans, who apparently glorify the majesty +of the people, really mean themselves. But in the long run a people +will always recognise that form of government which soonest can give +it order, work, prosperity and contentment. In ninety-nine per cent. +of the population the patriotism and enthusiasm for one or other form +of government is nothing but a matter of material considerations. They +prefer a good king to a bad republic, and vice versa; the form of +government is the means to the end, but the end is the contentment of +the people governed. Nor has the liberty of those governed anything to +do with the form of government. Monarchical England is just as free as +Republican America, and the Bolshevists have demonstrated _ad oculus_ +to the whole world that the proletariat exercises the greatest +tyranny. + +The war that was lost swept away the monarchs, but the Republics will +only be maintained if they can convince the people that they are more +successful in satisfying the masses than the monarchs were, a proof +which--it seems to me--the German-Austrian Republic, at any rate, has +hitherto failed to give. + +The conviction that these questionable statements not only are false +but also objectionable and criminal errors; that the Divine Will has +placed the monarch at his post and keeps him there--this conviction +was systematically imprinted in the German people, and formed an +integral part of the views attributed to the Emperor. All his +pretensions are based on this; they all breathe the same idea. Every +individual, however, is the product of his birth, his education and +his experience. In judging William II. it must be borne in mind that +from his youth upwards he was deceived and shown a world which never +existed. All monarchs should be taught that their people do not love +them; that they are quite indifferent to them; that it is not love +that makes them follow them and look up to them, but merely curiosity; +that they do not acclaim them from enthusiasm, but for their own +amusement, and would as soon hiss at them as cheer them. The loyalty +of subjects can never be depended on; it is not their intention to be +loyal, but only contented; they only tolerate the monarchs as long as +they themselves are contented, or as long as they have not enough +strength to abolish them. That is the truth, a knowledge of which +would prevent monarchs from arriving at unavoidably false +conclusions. + +The Emperor William is an example of this. I do not think there is +another ruler who had better intentions than he had. He lived only for +his calling--as he viewed it. All his thoughts and longings were +centred round Germany. His relations, pleasures and amusements were +all subservient to the one idea of making and keeping the German +people great and happy, and if good will were sufficient to achieve +great things William II. would have achieved them. From the very +beginning he was misunderstood. He made statements and gestures +intended not only to win his listeners but the whole world, which had +just the contrary effect. But he never was conscious of the practical +effect of his actions, because he was systematically misled, not only +by those in his immediate presence, but by the entire German people. +How many millions, who to-day fling curses at him, could not bow low +enough when he appeared on the horizon in all his splendour; how many +felt overjoyed if the Imperial glance fell on them!--and none of them +realise that they themselves are to blame for having shown the Emperor +a world which never existed, and driven him into a course which he +otherwise would never have taken. It certainly cannot be denied that +the whole nature of the Emperor was peculiarly susceptible to this +characteristically German attitude, and that monarchs less talented, +less keen, less ready, and above all, less impregnated with the idea +of self-sufficiency, are not so exposed to the poison of popularity as +he was. + +I once had the opportunity of studying the Emperor William in a very +important phase of his life. I met him at the house of a friend in the +celebrated days of November, 1908, when great demonstrations against +the Emperor occurred in the Reichstag, and when the then Imperial +Chancellor, Prince Bülow, exposed him. Although he did not allude to +the matter to us with whom he was not familiar, the powerful +impression made upon him by these events in Berlin was very obvious, +and I felt that in William II. I saw a man who, for the first time in +his life, with horror-stricken eyes, looked upon the world as it +really was. He saw brutal reality in close proximity. For the first +time in his life, perhaps, he felt his position on his throne to be a +little insecure. He forgot his lesson too quickly. Had the +overwhelming impression which prevailed for several days been a +lasting one it might perhaps have induced him to descend from the +clouds to which his courtiers and his people had raised him, and once +more feel firm ground beneath his feet. On the other hand, had the +German people often treated the German Emperor as they did then it +might have cured him. + +A remarkable incident which occurred on this occasion is +characteristic of the way in which the Emperor was treated by many of +the gentlemen of his suite. I had opportunity, while waiting at a +German station restaurant for the arrival of the next train, to watch +and study the excitement of the population at the events in Berlin, +which bore signs of a revolutionary character. The densely crowded +restaurant re-echoed with discussion and criticisms of the Emperor, +when suddenly one of the men stood up on a table and delivered a fiery +speech against the head of the Government. With the impression of this +scene fresh in my mind, I described it to the members of the Emperor's +suite, who were just as disagreeably affected by the episode, and it +was suggested that nothing should be said about it to the Emperor. One +of them, however, protested most energetically and declared that, on +the contrary, every detail should be told to the Emperor, and, so far +as I know, he himself probably undertook this disagreeable task. This +case is characteristic of the desire to keep all unpleasantness from +the Emperor and to spare him even the most well-founded criticisms; to +praise and exalt him, but never to show that he was being blamed. This +systematic putting forward of the Emperor's divine attributes, which +in reality was neither due to love of his personality nor any other +dynastic cause, but to the purely egotistical wish not to get into +disfavour themselves or expose themselves to unpleasantness; this +unwholesome state must in the long run act on mind and body as an +enervating poison. I readily believe that the Emperor William, +unaccustomed to so great an extent to all criticism, did not make it +easy for those about him to be open and frank. It was, nevertheless, +true that the enervating atmosphere by which he was surrounded was the +cause of all the evil at his court. In his youth the Emperor William +did not always adhere strictly to the laws of the Constitution; he +subsequently cured himself of this failing and never acted +independently of his counsellors. At the time when I had official +dealings with him he might have served as a model of constitutional +conduct. + +In the case of so young and inexperienced a man as the Emperor Charles +it was doubly necessary to uphold the principle of ministerial +responsibility to the fullest extent. As according to our Constitution +the Emperor is not responsible to the law, it was of the greatest +importance to carry out the principle that he could undertake no +administrative act without the cognisance and sanction of the +responsible Ministers, and the Emperor Francis Joseph adhered to this +principle as though it were gospel. + +The Emperor Charles, though full of good intentions, was devoid of all +political training and experience, and ought to have been brought up +to understand the principles of the Constitution. This, however, had +never been taken into consideration. + +After my resignation in April, 1918, a deputation from the +Constitutional and Central Party in the Herrenhaus waited on the Prime +Minister, Dr. von Seidler, and pointed out the importance of a +severely constitutional régime, whereupon Dr. von Seidler declared +that he took upon himself the full responsibility of the "letter +incident." + +This was quite preposterous. Dr. von Seidler could not be responsible +for events that had occurred a year before--at a time when he was not +Minister--apart from its being an established fact that during his +tenure of office he was not aware of what had happened, and not until +after my resignation did he learn the Imperial views on the situation. +He might just as well have accepted responsibility for the Seven Years +War or for the battle of Königgrätz. + +In 1917 and '18, when I had certain official dealings with the Emperor +William, his horror of an unpleasant discussion was so great that it +was a matter of extreme difficulty to impart the necessary information +to him. I recollect how once, at the cost of the consideration due to +an Emperor, I was compelled to extract a direct statement from him. I +was with the Emperor Charles on the Eastern front, but left him at +Lemberg and, joining the Emperor William in his train, travelled with +him for a couple of hours. I had certain things to submit to him, none +of which was of an unpleasant nature. I do not know why it was, but it +was obvious that the Emperor was expecting to hear some disagreeable +statements, and offered a passive resistance to the request for a +private interview. He invited me to breakfast with him in his +dining-car, where he sat in the company of ten other gentlemen, and +there was no possibility of beginning the desired conversation. +Breakfast had been over some time, but the Emperor made no sign of +moving. I was several times obliged to request him to grant me a +private interview before he rose from the table, and even then he took +with him an official from the Foreign Ministry to be present at our +conversation as though to have some protection against anticipated +troubles. The Emperor William was never rude to strangers, though he +often was so to his own people. + +With regard to the Emperor Charles, the situation was very different. +He was never anything but friendly; in fact I never saw him angry or +vexed. There was no need for any special courage in making an +unpleasant statement to him, as there was no danger of receiving a +violent answer or any other disagreeable consequences. And yet the +desire to believe only what was agreeable and to put from him anything +disagreeable was very strong in the Emperor Charles, and neither +criticism nor blame made any lasting impression on him. But in his +case, too, the atmosphere that surrounded him rendered it impossible +to convince him of the brutal realities prevailing. On one occasion, +when I returned from the front, I had a long conversation with him. I +reproached him for some act of administration and asserted that not +only on me but on the whole Monarchy his action had made a most +unfavourable impression. I told him in the course of the conversation +that he must remember how, when he came to the throne, the whole +Monarchy had looked to him with great hopes, but that now he had +already lost 80 per cent. of his popularity. The interview ended +without incident; the Emperor preserved, as usual, a friendly +demeanour, though my remarks must have affected him unpleasantly. Some +hours later we passed through a town where not only the station but +all buildings were black with people, standing even on the roofs, +waving handkerchiefs and loudly welcoming the Imperial train as it +passed through. The same scenes were repeated again and again at other +stations that we passed. The Emperor turned to me with a smile and a +look that showed me he was firmly convinced everything I had told him +as to his dwindling popularity was false, the living picture before +our eyes proving the contrary. + +When I was at Brest-Litovsk disturbances began in Vienna owing to the +lack of food. In view of the whole situation, we did not know what +dimensions they would assume, and it was considered that they were of +a threatening nature. When discussing the situation with the Emperor, +he remarked with a smile: "The only person who has nothing to fear is +myself. If it happens again I will go out among the people and you +will see the welcome they will give me." Some few months later this +same Emperor disappeared silently and utterly out of the picture, and +among all the thousands who had acclaimed him, and whose enthusiasm he +had thought genuine, not one would have lifted a little finger on his +behalf. I have witnessed scenes of enthusiasm which would have +deceived the boldest and most sceptical judge of the populace. I saw +the Emperor and the Empress surrounded by weeping women and men +wellnigh smothered in a rain of flowers; I saw the people on their +knees with uplifted hands, as though worshipping a Divinity; and I +cannot wonder that the objects of such enthusiastic homage should have +taken dross for pure gold in the firm belief that they _personally_ +were beloved of the people, even as children love their own parents. +It is easy to understand that after such scenes the Emperor and +Empress looked upon all the criticism of themselves and the discontent +among the people as idle talk, and held firmly to the belief that +grave disturbances might occur elsewhere but not in their own country. +Any simple citizen who has held for a time a higher position +experiences something of the kind, though in a lesser degree. I could +mention names of many men who could not bow low enough as long as I +was in power, but after my resignation would cross the street to avoid +a bow, fearing that Imperial disfavour might react on them. But years +before his rise the simple citizen has an opportunity of learning to +know the world, and, if he be a man of normal temperament, will feel +the same contempt for the servility shown during his time in office as +for the behaviour he meets with afterwards. Monarchs are without +training in the school of life, and therefore usually make a false +estimate of the psychology of humanity. But in this tragi-comedy it is +they who are led astray. + +It is less easy, however, to understand that responsible advisers, who +are bound to distinguish between reality and comedy, should also allow +themselves to be deceived and draw false political conclusions from +such events. In 1918 the Emperor, accompanied by the Prime Minister, +Dr. von Seidler, went to the South Slav provinces to investigate +matters there. He found, of course, the same welcome there as +everywhere, curiosity brought the people out to see him; pressure from +the authorities on the one hand, and hope of Imperial favours on the +other, brought about ovations similar to those in the undoubtedly +dynastic provinces. And not only the Emperor, but von Seidler returned +in triumph, firmly convinced that everything stated in Parliament or +written in the papers respecting the separatist tendencies of the +South Slavs was pure invention and nonsense, and that they would never +agree to a separation from the Habsburg Empire. + +The objects of these demonstrations of enthusiasm and dynastic +loyalty were deceived by them, but I repeat that those who were to +blame were not the monarchs, but those who were the instigators and +organisers of such scenes and who omitted to enlighten the monarchs on +the matter. But any such explanation could only be effectual if all +those in the immediate neighbourhood of the ruler concurred in a +similar reckless disregard of truth. For if one out of ten people +declares such scenes to be not genuine and the others contradict him +and assert that the demonstrations of the "love of the people" are +overwhelming, the monarch will always be more inclined to listen to +the many pleasant rather than to the few unpleasant counsels. +Willingly or unwillingly, all monarchs try, very humanly, to resist +awakening out of this hypnotic complacency. Naturally, there were men +in the entourage of the German Emperor whose pride kept them from +making too large an offering to the throne, but as a rule their +suffering in the Byzantine atmosphere of Germany was greater than +their enjoyment. I always considered that the greatest sycophants were +not those living at court, but generals, admirals, professors, +officials, representatives of the people and men of learning--people +whom the Emperor met infrequently. + +During the second half of the war, however, the leading men around the +Kaiser were not Byzantine--Ludendorff certainly was not. His whole +nature was devoid of Byzantine characteristics. Energetic, brave, sure +of himself and his aims, he brooked no opposition and was not +fastidious in his choice of language. To him it was a matter of +indifference whether he was confronted by his Emperor or anyone +else--he spoke unrestrainedly to all who came in his way. + +The numerous burgomasters, town councillors, professors of the +universities, deputies--in short, men of the people and of +science--had for years prostrated themselves before the Emperor +William; a word from him intoxicated them--but how many of them are +there now amongst those who condemn the former régime with its abuses +and, above all, the Emperor himself! + +His political advisers experienced great difficulty in their business +dealings with the Emperor William during the war, as he was generally +at Headquarters and seldom in Berlin. The Emperor Charles's absence +from Vienna was also at times most inconvenient. + +In the summer of 1917, for instance, he was at Reichenau, which +necessitated a two hours' motor drive; I had to go there twice or +three times a week, thus losing five or six hours which had to be made +good by prolonged night work. On no account would he come to Vienna, +in spite of the efforts made by his advisers to persuade him to do so. +From certain remarks the Emperor let fall I gathered that the reason +of this persistent refusal was anxiety concerning the health of the +children. He himself was so entirely free from pretensions that it +cannot have been a question of his own comfort that prevented his +coming. + +The Emperor's desire to restore the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to a +post of command was for me a source of much unpleasantness. The +Archduke is said to have been to blame for the Luck failure. I cannot +judge whether wrongly--as the Emperor maintained--or rightly; but the +fact remains that the public no longer had confidence in him. Quite +accidentally I learnt that his reinstatement was imminent. As a matter +of fact, this purely military proceeding in no way concerned me, but I +had to reckon with the feeling of the populace, who were in no mood +for further burdens, and also with the fact that, since Conrad had +gone, none of those in the Emperor's entourage showed the slightest +disposition to acquaint him with the truth. The only general who, to +my personal knowledge, was in the habit of speaking frankly to the +Emperor, was Alvis Schonburg, and he was at this time somewhere on the +Italian front. I therefore told the Emperor that the reinstatement was +an impossibility, giving as my reason the fact that the Archduke had +forfeited the confidence of the country, and that no mother could be +expected to give up her son to serve under a general whom everyone +held to be guilty of the Luck catastrophe. The Emperor insisted that +this view was unjust, and that the Archduke was not culpable. I +replied that, even so, the Archduke would have to submit. Everyone had +lost confidence in him, and the most strenuous exertions of the people +could neither be expected nor obtained if the command were handed to +generals who were unanimously regarded as unworthy of the confidence +placed in them. + +My efforts were vain. + +I then adopted another course. I sent an official from the Department +of Foreign Affairs to the Archduke with the request that he would +resign voluntarily. + +It must be admitted that Joseph Ferdinand took both a loyal and a +dignified attitude, as he himself notified the Emperor that he would +relinquish his command at the front. A short correspondence followed +between the Archduke and myself, which on his side was couched in an +indignant and not over-polite tone; this, however, I did not take +amiss, as my interference had been successful in preventing his +resuming the command. + +His subsequent appointment as Chief of the Air Force was made without +my knowledge; but this was of no importance when compared to the +previous plans. + + * * * * * + +There is no doubt that the Byzantine atmosphere of Berlin took a more +objectionable form than ever was the case in Vienna. The very idea of +high dignitaries kissing the Emperor's hand, as they did in Berlin, +would have been impossible in Vienna. I never heard of anyone, even +among the keenest sycophants, who demeaned themselves by such an act, +which in Berlin, as I know from personal observation, was an everyday +occurrence. For instance, after a trip on the _Meteor_, during the +"Kiel Week," the Emperor presented two German officials with +scarf-pins as a souvenir. He handed the pins to them himself, and +great was my surprise to see them kiss his hand as they thanked him. + +Many foreigners were in the habit of coming for the Kiel Week: +Americans, French, and English. The Emperor paid them much attention, +and they nearly always succumbed to the charm of his personality. +Apparently William II. had a preference for America; on the subject +of his feelings regarding England it is difficult to express an +opinion. My impression always was that the Emperor resented the scant +sympathy shown him in England; he strove to make himself beloved, and +the failure of his efforts caused him a certain annoyance. He was +quite aware that the extent of his popularity in England would +proportionately influence Anglo-German relations, and his desire to +find favour in England did not proceed from personal vanity, but from +political interests. + +King Edward was known to be one of the best judges of men in all +Europe, and his interest in foreign policy was predominant. He would +have been an ideal ambassador. There was never a very good +understanding between uncle and nephew. When the nephew was already +Emperor, and his much older uncle still only a prince, the difference +in their positions was characterised by the satirical Kiderlen-Waechter +in the following terms: "The Prince of Wales cannot forgive his nephew, +eighteen years younger than himself, for making a more brilliant career +than has fallen to his lot." + +Personal sympathy and personal differences in leading circles are +capable of influencing the world's history. Politics are, and always +will be, made by men, and individual personal relations will always +play a certain part in their development. Who can to-day assert that +the course of the world might not have been different had the monarchs +of Germany and England been more alike in temperament? The encircling +policy of King Edward was not brought into play until he was persuaded +that an understanding with the Emperor William was impossible. + +The difficulty the Emperor experienced in adapting himself to the +ideas and views of others increased as the years went by, a state of +things largely the fault of his entourage. + +The atmosphere in which he lived would have killed the hardiest plant. +Whatever the Emperor said or did, whether it was right or wrong, was +received with enthusiastic praise and admiration. Dozens of people +were always at hand to laud him to the skies. + +For instance, a book was published during the war entitled, "Der +Kaiser im Felde," by Dr. Bogdan Kriegen. The Emperor presented me with +a copy when at Kreuznach in May, 1917, and wrote a suitable +inscription inside. The book contained an accurate account of all the +Emperor had done during the campaign--but it was entirely superficial +matter; where he had driven to, where breakfasted, with whom he had +spoken, the jokes he had made, what clothes he wore, the shining light +in his eyes, etc., etc. It also recorded his speeches to the troops; +dull and uninteresting words that he addressed to individual soldiers, +and much more in the same strain. The whole book is impregnated and +permeated with boundless admiration and unqualified praise. The +Emperor gave me the book when I was leaving, and I read it through +when in the train. + +I was asked a few weeks later by a German officer what I thought of +the book. I replied that it was trash and could only harm the Emperor, +and that it should be confiscated. The officer shared my opinion, but +said that the Emperor had been assured on all sides that the book was +a splendid work and helped to fire the spirit of the army; he +therefore had it widely distributed. Once, at a dinner at Count +Hertling's, I called his attention to the book and advised him to +suppress it, as such a production could only be detrimental to the +Emperor. The old gentleman was very angry, and declared: "That was +always the way; people who wished to ingratiate themselves with the +Emperor invariably presented him with such things." A professor from +the University had warmly praised the book to me, but he went on to +say: "The Emperor had, of course, no time to read such stuff and +repudiate the flattery; neither had he himself found time to read it, +but would make a point of doing so now." I did not know much of that +professor, but he certainly was not in frequent touch with the +Emperor, nor was the author of the book. + +In this instance, as in many others, I concluded that many of the +members of the Emperor's suite were far from being in sympathy with +such tendencies. The court was not the principal offender, but was +carried away by the current of sycophancy. + +During my period of office Prince Hohenlohe, the ambassador, had +numerous interviews with the Emperor William, and invariably spoke +most freely and openly to him, and yet always was on the best footing +with him. This was, of course, an easier matter for a foreign +ambassador than for a German of the Empire, but it proves that the +Emperor accepted it when done in proper form. + +In his own country the Emperor was either glorified and exalted to the +skies or else scorned and scoffed at by a minority of the Press in a +prejudicial manner. In the latter case it bore so evidently the stamp +of personal enmity that it was discredited _a priori_. Had there +existed earnest papers and organs that would, in dignified fashion, +have discussed and criticised the Emperor's faults and failings, while +recognising all his great and good qualities, it would have been much +more satisfactory. Had there been more books written about him showing +that the real man is quite different from what he is made to appear to +be; that he is full of the best intentions and inspired with a +passionate love of Germany; that in a true and profound religious +sense he often wrestles with himself and his God, asking himself if he +has chosen the right way; that his love for his people is far more +genuine than that of many of the Germans for him; that he never has +deceived them, but was constantly deceived by them--such literature +would have been more efficacious and, above all, nearer the truth. + +Undoubtedly the German Emperor's gifts and talents were above the +average, and had he been an ordinary mortal would certainly have +become a very competent officer, architect, engineer, or politician. +But for lack of criticism he lost his bearings, and it caused his +undoing. According to all the records the Emperor William I. was of a +very different nature. Yet Bismarck often had a hard task in dealing +with him, though Bismarck's loyalty and subservience to the dynastic +idea made him curb his characteristically ruthless frankness. But +William I. was a self-made man. When he came to the throne and began +to govern his kingdom was tottering. Assisted by the very capable men +he was able to find and to retain, he upheld it, and by means of +Königgrätz and Sedan created the great German Empire. William II. came +to the throne when Germany had reached the zenith of her power. He had +not acquired what he possessed by his own work, as his grandfather +had; it came to him without any effort on his part; a fact which had a +great and far from favourable influence on his whole mental +development. + +The Emperor William was an entertaining and interesting _causeur_. One +could listen to him for hours without wearying. Emperors usually enjoy +the privilege of finding a ready audience, but even had the Emperor +William been an ordinary citizen he would always have spoken to a +crowded house. He could discourse on art, science, politics, music, +religion, and astronomy in a most animated manner. What he said was +not always quite correct; indeed, he often lost himself in very +questionable conclusions; but the fault of boring others, the greatest +of social faults, was not his. + +Although the Emperor was always very powerful in speech and gesture, +still, during the war he was much less independent in his actions than +is usually assumed, and, in my opinion, this is one of the principal +reasons that gave rise to a mistaken understanding of all the +Emperor's administrative activities. Far more than the public imagine +he was a driven rather than a driving factor, and if the Entente +to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge combined in +order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust and an error, +as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William never +played the part attributed to him by the Entente. + +The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in +store for him. He has been carried too high and cannot escape a +terrible fall. Fate seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, +if it exists at all, is not so much his as that of his country and his +times. The Byzantine atmosphere in Germany was the ruin of Emperor +William; it enveloped him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a +vast crowd of flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the +hour of trial. The Emperor William was merely a particularly +distinctive representative of his class. All modern monarchs suffer +from the disease; but it was more highly developed in the Emperor +William and, therefore, more obvious than in others. Accustomed from +his youth to the subtle poison of flattery, at the head of one of the +greatest and mightiest states in the world, possessing almost +unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot that awaits men who +feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who begin to believe +in their Divine semblance. + +He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with +him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the +best. And notwithstanding all that is said and written about William +II. in these days, the beautiful words of the text may be applied to +him: "Peace on earth to men of goodwill."[4] + +In his retirement from the world his good conscience will be his most +precious possession. + +Perhaps in the evening of his days William II. will acknowledge that +there is neither happiness nor unhappiness in mortal life, but only a +difference in the strength to endure one's fate. + + +2 + +War was never in William II.'s programme. I am not able to say where, +in his own mind, he had fixed the limits he proposed for Germany and +whether it was justifiable to reproach him with having gone too far in +his ambition for the Fatherland. He certainly never thought of a +_unified_ German world dominion; he was not so simple as to think he +could achieve that without a war, but his plan undoubtedly was +permanently to establish Germany among the first Powers of the world. +I know for certain that the Emperor's ideal plan was to come to a +world agreement with England and, in a certain sense, to divide the +world with her. In this projected division of the world a certain +part was to be played by Russia and Japan, but he paid little heed to +the other states, especially to France, convinced that they were all +nations of declining power. To maintain that William intentionally +prepared and started this war is in direct opposition to his long +years of peaceful government. Helfferich, in his work "Die +Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," speaks of the Emperor's attitude +during the Balkan troubles, and says: + + A telegram sent by William II. at that time to the Imperial + Chancellor explains the attitude of the German Emperor in this + critical position for German politics, being similar to the + situation in July, 1914. The contents of the telegram are as + follows: "The Alliance with Austria-Hungary compels us to take + action should Austria-Hungary be attacked by Russia. In that case + France would also be involved, and in those circumstances England + would not long remain quiescent. The present prevailing questions + of dispute cannot be compared with that danger. It cannot be the + intention of the Alliance that we, the life interest of our ally + not being endangered, should enter upon a life-and-death conflict + for a caprice of that ally. Should it become evident that the + other side intend to attack, the danger must then be faced." + + This calm and decided standpoint which alone could maintain peace + was also the German policy observed in further developments. It + was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as also + against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in + Vienna. + +Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I cannot say, but I +believe the account is correct. + +It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into +the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their +effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to +terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of _si vis +pacem para bellum_, and by emphasising the military power of Germany +he endeavoured to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from +declaring war on him. + +It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and +mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is +asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the _dolus_ of making war; +that he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up +war. + +Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the +injurious effects of his behaviour and to make him feel the growing +mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two +but dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on +the Emperor. It is quite true that of all the inhabitants of the +earth, the German is the one the least capable of adapting himself to +the mentality of other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were +perhaps but few in the immediate entourage of the Emperor who +recognised the growing anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of those who +so continuously extolled the Emperor were really honestly of opinion +that his behaviour was quite correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible +not to believe that among the many clever German politicians of the +last decade there were some who had a clear grasp of the situation, +and the fact remains that, in order to spare the Emperor and +themselves, they had not the courage to be harsh with him and tell him +the truth to his face. These are not reproaches, but reminiscences +which should not be superfluous at a time when the Emperor is to be +made the scapegoat of the whole world. Certainly, the Emperor, being +such as he is, the experiment would not have passed off without there +being opposition to encounter and overcome. The first among his +subjects to attempt the task of enlightening the Emperor would have +been looked upon with the greatest surprise; hence no one would +undertake it. Had there, however, been men who, regardless of +themselves, would have undertaken to do it, it would certainly have +succeeded, as not only was the Emperor full of good intentions, but he +was also impressionable, and consistent purposefulness on a basis of +fearless honesty would have impressed him. Besides, the Emperor was a +thoroughly kind and good man. It was a genuine pleasure for him to be +able to do good, neither did he hate his enemies. In the summer of +1917 he spoke to me about the fate of the deposed Tsar and of his +desire to help him and subsequently bring him to Germany, a desire due +not to dynastic but to human motives. He stated repeatedly that he had +no desire for revenge, but "only to succour his fallen adversary." + +I firmly believe that the Emperor clearly saw the clouds grow blacker +and blacker on the political horizon, but he was sincerely and +honestly persuaded that it was not through any fault of his that they +had accumulated, that they were caused by envy and jealousy, and that +there was no other way of keeping the threatening war danger at bay +than by an ostentatious attitude of strength and fearlessness. +"Germany's power and might must daily be proclaimed to the world, for +as long as they fear us they will do us no harm"--that was the +doctrine that obtained on the Spree. And the echo came back from the +world, "This continued boasting of German power and the perpetual +attempts at intimidation prove that Germany seeks to tyrannise the +world." + +When war broke out the Emperor was firmly convinced that a war of +defence was being forced on him, which conviction was shared by the +great majority of the German people. I draw these conclusions solely +from my knowledge of the Emperor and his entourage and from other +information obtained indirectly. As I have already mentioned, I had +not had the slightest connection with Berlin for some years previous +to the war, and certainly not for two years after it broke out. + +In the winter of 1917, when I met the Emperor again in my capacity as +Minister for Foreign Affairs, I thought he had aged, but was still +full of his former vivacity. In spite of marked demonstrations of the +certainty of victory, I believe that William II. even then had begun +to doubt the result of the war and that his earnest wish was to bring +it to an honourable end. When in the course of one of our first +conversations I urged him to spare no sacrifice to bring it to an end, +he interrupted me, exclaiming: "What would you have me do? Nobody +longs for peace more intensely than I do. But every day we are told +that the others will not hear a word about peace until Germany has +been crushed." It was a true answer, for all statements made by +England culminated in the one sentence _Germanium esse delendam_. I +endeavoured, nevertheless, to induce the Emperor to consent to the +sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, persuaded that if France had obtained +all that she looked upon in the light of a national idea she would not +be inclined to continue the war. I think that, had the Emperor been +positively certain that it would have ended the war, and had he not +been afraid that so distressing an offer would have been considered +unbearable by Germany, he would personally have agreed to it. But he +was dominated by the fear that a peace involving such a loss, and +after the sacrifices already made, would have driven the German people +to despair. Whether he was justified in this fear or not cannot now be +confirmed. In 1917, and 1918 as well, the belief in a victorious end +was still so strong in Germany that it is at least doubtful whether +the German people would have consented to give up Alsace-Lorraine. All +the parties in the Reichstag were opposed to it, including the Social +Democrats. + +A German official of high standing said to me in the spring of 1918: +"I had two sons; one of them fell on the field of battle, but I would +rather part with the other one too than give up Alsace-Lorraine," and +many were of the same opinion. + +In the course of the year and a half when I had frequent opportunities +of meeting the Emperor, his frame of mind had naturally gone through +many different phases. Following on any great military success, and +after the collapse of Russia and Roumania, his generals were always +able to enrol him on their programme of victory, and it is quite a +mistake to imagine that William II. unceasingly clung to the idea of +"Peace above all." He wavered, was sometimes pessimistic, sometimes +optimistic, and his peace aims changed in like manner. Humanly +speaking, it is very comprehensible that the varying situation in the +theatre of war must have influenced the individual mind, and everyone +in Europe experienced such fluctuations. + +Early in September, 1917, he wrote to the Emperor Charles on the +subject of an impending attack on the Italian front, and in this +letter was the following passage: "I trust that the possibility of a +common offensive of our allied armies will raise the spirits of your +Foreign Minister. In my opinion, and in view of the general situation, +there is no reason to be anything but confident." Other letters and +statements prove the Emperor's fluctuating frame of mind. He, as well +as the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse, made use, with regard to the +"war-weary Austria-Hungary," of such tactics as demonstrated a +pronounced certainty of victory in order to strengthen our powers of +resistance. + + * * * * * + +The Archduke Friedrich deserves the greatest praise for having kept up +the friendly relations between Vienna and Berlin. It was not always +easy to settle the delicate questions relating to the conduct of the +war without giving offence. The honest and straightforward nature of +the Archduke and his ever friendly and modest behaviour saved many a +difficult situation. + +After our collapse and overthrow, and when the Imperial family could +be abused with impunity, certain newspapers took a delight in covering +the Archduke Friedrich with contumely. It left him quite indifferent. +The Prince is a distinguished character, of faultless integrity and +always ready to put down abuse. He prevented many disasters, and it +was not his fault if he did not succeed every time. + +When I saw the Crown Prince Wilhelm again after several years, in the +summer of 1917, I found him very tired of war and most anxious for +peace. I had gone to the French front on purpose to meet him and to +try if it were possible through him to exercise some conciliatory +pressure, above all, on the military leaders. A long conversation that +I had with him showed me very clearly that he--if he had ever been of +warlike nature--was then a pronounced pacifist. + + +_Extract from my Diary._ + +"On the Western front, 1917. We drove to the Camp des Romains, but in +detachments in order not to attract the attention of the enemy +artillery to our cars, for in some places the road was visible to the +enemy. I drove together with Bethmann. When discussing the military +leaders, he remarked: 'The generals will probably throw hand grenades +at me when they see me.' + +"An enemy flier cruised high up in the clouds over our heads. He +circled around, paying little heed to the shrapnel bursting on all +sides. The firing ceased, and the human bird soared into +unapproachable heights. The artillery fire a long way off sounded like +distant thunder. + +"The French lines are not more than a couple of hundred metres distant +from the camp. A shot fell here and there and a shell was heard to +whistle; otherwise all was quiet. It was still early. The firing +usually begins at ten and ceases at noon--interval for lunch--and +begins again in the afternoon. + +"Poincaré's villa is visible on the horizon in the green landscape. A +gun has been brought to bear on the house--they mean to destroy it +before leaving--they call this the extreme unction. + +"The daily artillery duel began on our return drive, and kept up an +incessant roar. + + +"_St. Mihiel._ + +"We stopped at St. Mihiel, where many French people still remain. They +were detained as hostages to prevent the town from being fired at. +People were standing about in the streets watching the cars go by. + +"I spoke to an old woman, who sat by herself on her house-steps. She +said: 'This disaster can never be made good, and it cannot well be +worse than it is now. It is quite the same to me what happens. I do +not belong here; my only son has been killed and my house is burnt. +Nothing is left me but my hatred of the Germans, and I bequeath that +to France.' And she gazed past me into vacancy. She spoke quite +without passion, but was terribly sad. + +"This terrible hatred! Generations will go to their graves before the +flood of hatred is abated. Would a settlement, a peace of +understanding, be possible with this spirit of the nations? Will it +not end by one of them being felled to earth and annihilated? + + +"_St. Privat._ + +"We passed through St. Privat on our way to Metz. Monuments that tell +the tale of 1870 stand along the road. Everywhere the soil is +historic, soaked in blood. Every spot, every stone, is reminiscent of +past great times. It was here that the seed was sown that brought +forth the plan of revenge that is being fought for now. + +"Bethmann seemed to divine my thoughts. 'Yes,' he said, 'that +sacrifice would be easier for Germany to bear than to part with +Alsace-Lorraine, which would close one of the most brilliant episodes +in her history.' + + +"_Sedan._ + +"On the way to the Crown Prince's quarters. There stands the little +house where the historic meeting between Napoleon III. and Bismarck +took place. The woman who lived there at the time died only a few +weeks ago. For the second time she saw the Germans arrive, bringing a +Moltke but no Bismarck with them, a detail, however, that cannot +deeply have interested the old lady. + + +"_With the Crown Prince._ + +"A pretty little house outside the town. I found a message from the +Crown Prince asking me to proceed there immediately, where I had +almost an hour's private conversation with him before supper. + +"I do not know if the Crown Prince ever was of a warlike disposition, +as people say, but he is so no longer. He longs for peace, but does +not know how to secure it. He spoke very quietly and sensibly. He was +also in favour of territorial sacrifices, but seemed to think that +Germany would not allow it. The great difficulty lay in the contrast +between the actual military situation, the confident expectations of +the generals, and the fears entertained by the military laymen. +Besides, it is not only Alsace-Lorraine. The suppression of German +militarism spoken of in London means the one-sided disarmament of +Germany. Can an army far advanced on enemy soil whose generals are +confident of final victory, can a people still undefeated tolerate +that? + +"I advised the Crown Prince to speak to his father on the question of +abdication, in which he fully agreed. I then invited him to come to +Vienna on behalf of the Emperor, which he promised to do as soon as he +could get leave." + +On my return the Emperor wrote him a letter, drawn up by me, which +contained the following passage: + + My Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me of the interesting + conversation he had the honour to have with you, and it has been a + great pleasure to me to hear all your statements, which so exactly + reflect my own views of the situation. Notwithstanding the + superhuman exertions of our troops, the situation throughout the + country demands that a stop be put to the war before winter, in + Germany as well as here. Turkey will not be with us much longer, + and with her we shall also lose Bulgaria; we two will then be + alone, and next spring will bring America and a still stronger + Entente. From other sources there are distinct signs that we could + win over France if Germany could make up her mind to certain + territorial sacrifices in Alsace-Lorraine. With France secured to + us we are the conquerors, and Germany will obtain elsewhere ample + compensation. But I cannot allow Germany to be the only one to + make a sacrifice. I too will take the lion's share of sacrifice, + and have informed His Majesty your father that under the above + conditions I am prepared not only to dispense with the whole of + Poland, but to cede Galicia to her and to assist in combining that + state with Germany, who would thus acquire a state in the East + while yielding up a portion of her soil in the West. In 1915, at + the request of Germany and in the interests of our Alliance, we + offered the Trentino to faithless Italy without asking for + compensation in order to avert war. Germany is now in a similar + situation, though with far better prospects. You, as heir to the + German Imperial crown, are privileged to have a say in the matter, + and I know that His Majesty your father entirely shares this view + respecting your co-operation. I beg of you, therefore, in this + decisive hour for Germany and Austria-Hungary, to consider the + whole situation and to unite your efforts with mine to bring the + war to a rapid and honourable end. If Germany persists in her + standpoint of refusal and thus wrecks the hope of a possible peace + the situation in Austria-Hungary will become extremely critical. + + I should be very glad to have a talk with you as soon as possible, + and your promise conveyed through Count Czernin soon to pay us a + visit gives me the greatest pleasure. + +The Crown Prince's answer was very friendly and full of anxiety to +help, though it was also obvious that the German military leaders had +succeeded in nipping his efforts in the bud. When I met Ludendorff +some time afterwards in Berlin this was fully confirmed by the words +he flung at me: "What have you been doing to our Crown Prince? He had +turned very slack, but we have stiffened him up again." + +The game remained the same. The last war period in Germany was +controlled by one will only, and that was Ludendorff's. His thoughts +were centred on fighting, his soul on victory. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] This is a literal rendering of the famous text from the German. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +ROUMANIA + + +1 + +My appointment as ambassador to Bucharest in the autumn of 1913 came +as a complete surprise to me, and was much against my wishes. The +initiative in the matter came from the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. I had +never had any doubt that sooner or later the Archduke would take part +in politics, but it took me by surprise that he should do so in the +Emperor Francis Joseph's lifetime. + +A great difference of opinion prevailed then in Vienna on the +Roumanian question, a pro-Roumanian spirit fighting against an +anti-Roumanian one. The head of the former party was the Archduke +Franz, and with him, though in less marked degree, was Berchtold. +Tisza was the leader on the other side, and carried with him almost +the entire Hungarian Parliament. The pro-Roumanians wished Roumania to +be more closely linked to the Monarchy; the others, to replace that +alliance by one with Bulgaria; but both were unanimous in seeking for +a clear knowledge of how matters stood with the alliance, and whether +we had a friend or a foe on the other side of the Carpathians. My +predecessor, Karl Fürstenberg, had sent in a very clear and correct +report on the subject, but he shared the fate of so many ambassadors: +his word was not believed. + +The actual task assigned to me was, first of all to find out whether +this alliance was of any practical value, and if I thought not to +suggest ways and means of justifying its existence. + +I must mention in this connection that my appointment as ambassador to +Bucharest had raised a perfect storm in the Hungarian Parliament. The +reason for this widely spread indignation in Hungary at my selection +for the post was owing to a pamphlet I had written some years +previously, in which I certainly had attacked the Magyar policy +somewhat vehemently. I maintained the standpoint that a policy of +suppression of the nations was not tenable in the long run, and that +no future was in store for Hungary unless she definitely abolished +that policy and allowed the nations equal rights. This pamphlet gave +serious displeasure in Budapest, and representatives in the Hungarian +Parliament were afraid I should introduce that policy in Roumania, +which, following the spirit of the pamphlet, was directed against the +official policy of Vienna and Budapest. It was at this period that I +made Tisza's acquaintance. I had a long and very frank conversation +with him on the whole subject, and explained to him that I must uphold +the standpoint I put forward in my pamphlet, as it tallied with my +convictions, but that I clearly saw that from the moment I accepted +the post of ambassador I was bound to consider myself as a part of the +great state machinery, and loyally support the policy emanating from +the Ballplatz. I still maintain that my standpoint is perfectly +justifiable. A unified policy would be utterly impossible if every +subordinate official were to publish his own views, whether right or +wrong, and I for my part would never, as Minister, have tolerated an +ambassador who attempted to pursue an independent policy of his own. +Tisza begged me to give my word of honour that I would make no attempt +to introduce a policy opposed to that of Vienna and Budapest, to which +I readily agreed, provided that the Archduke was agreeable to such +decision. I then had a conversation with the latter, and found that he +quite agreed with my action, his argument being that as long as he was +the heir to the throne he would never attempt to introduce a policy +opposed to that of the Emperor; consequently he would not expect it +from me either. But should he come to the throne he would certainly +make an effort to carry out his own views, in which case I should no +longer be at Bucharest, but probably in some post where I would be in +a position to support his efforts. The Archduke begged me for the sake +of my friendship for him to accept the post, which I finally decided +to do after I obtained a promise from Berchtold that, at the end of +two years as the longest term, he would put no obstacle in the way of +my retirement. + +The Archduke Franz drew his pro-Roumanian proclivities from a very +unreliable source. He hardly knew Roumania at all. So far as I know, +he had only once been in the country, and paid a short visit to King +Carol at Sinaia; but the friendly welcome accorded to himself and his +wife by the old King and Queen entirely took his warm heart by storm, +and he mistook King Carol for Roumania. This is again a proof how +greatly the individual relations of great personalities can influence +the policy of nations. The royal couple met the Archduke at the +station; the Queen embraced and kissed the duchess and, placing her at +her right side, drove with her to the castle. In short, it was the +first time that the Duchess of Hohenberg had been treated as enjoying +equal privileges with her husband. During his short stay in Roumania +the Archduke had the pleasure of seeing his wife treated as his equal +and not as a person of slight importance, always relegated to the +background. At the court balls in Vienna the duchess was always +obliged to walk behind all the archduchesses, and never had any +gentleman allotted to her whose arm she could take. In Roumania she +was _his wife_, and etiquette was not concerned with her birth. The +Archduke valued this proof of friendly tactfulness on the part of the +King very highly, and always afterwards Roumania, in his eyes, was +endowed with a special charm. Besides which he very correctly +estimated that a change in certain political relations would effect a +closer alliance between Roumania and ourselves. He felt, rather than +knew, that the Transylvanian question lay like a huge obstacle between +Vienna and Bucharest, and that this obstacle once removed would alter +the entire situation. + +To find out the real condition of the alliance was my first task, and +it was not difficult, as the first lengthy conferences I had with King +Carol left no doubt in my mind that the old King himself considered +the alliance very unsafe. King Carol was an exceptionally clever man, +very cautious and deliberate, and it was not easy to make him talk if +he intended to be silent. The question of the vitality of the alliance +was settled by my suggesting to the King that the alliance should +receive pragmatic sanction, i.e. be ratified by the Parliaments at +Vienna, Budapest, and Bucharest. The alarm evinced by the King at the +suggestion, the very idea that the carefully guarded secret of the +existence of an alliance should be divulged, proved to me how totally +impossible it would be, in the circumstances, to infuse fresh life +into such dead matter. + +My reports sent to the Ballplatz leave no doubt that I answered this +first question by declaring in categorical fashion that the alliance +with Roumania was, under the existing conditions, nothing but a scrap +of paper. + +The second question, as to whether there were ways and means of +restoring vitality to the alliance, and what they were, was +theoretically just as easy to answer as difficult to carry out in +practice. As already mentioned, the real obstacle in the way of closer +relations between Bucharest and Vienna was the question of Great +Roumania; in other words, the Roumanian desire for national union with +her "brothers in Transylvania." This was naturally quite opposed to +the Hungarian standpoint. It is interesting, as well as characteristic +of the then situation, that shortly after my taking up office in +Roumania, Nikolai Filippescu (known later as a war fanatic) proposed +that Roumania should join with Transylvania and the whole of united +Great Roumania enter into relations with the Monarchy similar to the +relation of Bavaria to the German Empire. I admit that I welcomed the +idea warmly, for if it were launched by a party which justly was held +to be antagonistic to the Monarchy there can be no doubt that the +moderate element in Roumania would have accepted it with still greater +satisfaction. I still believe that had this plan been carried out it +would have led to a real linking of Roumania to the Monarchy, that the +notification would have met with no opposition, and consequently the +outbreak of war would have found us very differently situated. +Unfortunately the plan failed at its very first stage owing to +Tisza's strong and obstinate resistance. The Emperor Francis Joseph +held the same standpoint as Tisza, and it was out of the question to +achieve anything by arguing. On the other hand, nobody had any idea +then that the great war, and with it the testing of the alliance, was +so imminent, and I consoled myself for my unsuccessful efforts in the +firm hope that this grand plan, as it seemed to me both then and now, +would be realised one day under the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. + +When I arrived in Roumania a change was proceeding in the Government. +Majorescu's Conservative Ministry gave way to the Liberal Ministry of +Bratianu. King Carol's policy of government was very peculiar. From +the very first his principle was never to proceed with violence or +even much energy against injurious tendencies in his own country; but, +on the contrary, always to yield to the numerous claims made by +extortioners. He knew his people thoroughly, and knew that both +parties, Conservatives and Liberals, must alternately have access to +the manger until thoroughly satisfied and ready to make room the one +for the other. Almost every change in the Government was accomplished +in that manner: the Opposition, desirous of coming into power, began +with threats and hints at revolution. Some highly unreasonable claim +would be put forward and vehemently insisted upon and the people +incited to follow it up; the Government would retire, unable to accede +to the demands, and the Opposition, once in power, would show no +further signs of keeping their promise. The old King was well versed +in the game; he allowed the opposition tide to rise to the highest +possible limit, when he effected the necessary change of individuals +and looked on until the game began again. It is the custom in +Roumania, when a new party comes into power, to change the whole +personnel, even down to the lowest officials. This arrangement, +obviously, has its drawbacks, though on the other hand it cannot be +denied that it is a practical one. + +In this manner the Bratianu Ministry came into office in 1913. +Majorescu's Government gave entire satisfaction to the King and the +moderate elements in the country. In the eyes of the Roumanians he had +just achieved a great diplomatic success by the Peace of Bucharest and +the acquisition of the Dobrudsha, when Bratianu came forward with a +demand for vast agrarian reforms. These reforms are one of the +hobby-horses of Roumanian policy which is always mounted when it is a +question of making use of the poor unfortunate peasants, and the +manoeuvre invariably succeeds, largely owing to the lack of +intelligence prevailing among the peasant population of Roumania, who +are constantly made the tools of one or other party, and simply pushed +on one side when the object has been obtained. Bratianu also, once he +was in office, gave no thought to the fulfilment of his promises, but +calmly proceeded on the lines Majorescu had laid down in his time. + +Still, it was more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement in +foreign affairs with Bratianu than it had been with Majorescu, as the +former was thoroughly conversant with all West European matters, and +at the bottom of his heart was anti-German. One of the distinctions to +be made between Liberals and Conservatives was that the Liberals had +enjoyed a Parisian education: they spoke no German, only French; while +the Conservatives, taking Carp and Majorescu as models, were offshoots +of Berlin. As it was impossible to carry out the plan of firmly and +definitely linking Roumania to us by a change of Hungarian internal +policy, the idea naturally, almost automatically, arose to substitute +Bulgaria for Roumania. This idea, which found special favour with +Count Tisza, could be carried out, both because, since the Bucharest +peace of 1913, it was out of the question to bring Roumania and +Bulgaria under one roof, and because an alliance with Sofia would have +driven Roumania straight into the enemy camp. But Berchtold, as well +as the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was opposed to this latter +eventuality, nor would the Emperor Francis Joseph have approved of +such proceedings. Hence no change was made; Roumania was not won, nor +was Bulgaria substituted for her, and they were content in Vienna to +leave everything to the future. + +In a social sense the year that I spent in Roumania before the war was +not an unpleasant one. The relations of an Austrian-Hungarian +Ambassador with the court, as with the numerous _Bojars_, were +pleasant and friendly, and nobody could then have imagined what +torrents of hatred were so soon to be launched against the +Austro-Hungarian frontiers. + +Social life became less pleasant during the war, as will be seen from +the following instance. There lived at Bucharest a certain +Lieut.-Colonel Prince Sturdza, who was a noted braggart and brawler +and an inveterate enemy of Austria-Hungary. I did not know him +personally, and there was no personal reason for him to begin one day +to abuse me publicly in the papers as being an advocate of the +Monarchy. I naturally took not the slightest notice of his article, +whereupon he addressed an open letter to me in the _Adeverul_, in +which he informed me that he would box my ears at the first +opportunity. I telegraphed to Berchtold and asked the Emperor's +permission to challenge this individual, as, being an officer, he was, +according to our ideas, entitled to satisfaction. The Emperor sent +word that it was out of the question for an ambassador to fight a duel +in the country to which he was accredited, and that I was to complain +to the Roumanian Government. I accordingly went to Bratianu, who +declared that he was totally unable to move in the matter. According +to the laws and regulations of the country it was impossible to +protect a foreign ambassador against such abuse. If Sturdza carried +out his threats he would be arrested. Until then nothing could be +done. + +Upon this I assured Bratianu that if such were the case I would in +future arm myself with a revolver, and if he attacked me shoot the man; +if one lived in a country where the habits of the Wild West obtained, +one must act accordingly. I sent word to the lieutenant-colonel that +each day, at one o'clock, I could be found at the Hotel Boulevard, +where he would find a bullet awaiting him. + +The next time I saw the Emperor Francis Joseph he asked for further +information concerning the episode, and I told him of my conversation +with Bratianu and of my firm intention to be my own helper. The +Emperor rejoined: "Naturally you cannot allow yourself to be beaten. +You are quite right; if he lays hands on you, shoot him." + +I afterwards met Sturdza several times in restaurants and +drawing-rooms without his attempting to carry out his threats. This +man, whose nature was that of a daring adventurer, afterwards deserted +to the Russian army, and fought against us at a time when Roumania +still was neutral. I then completely lost sight of him. + +The absolute freedom of the Press in the Balkan States, combined with +the brutality of the prevailing customs, produced the most varied +results, even going so far as abuse of their own kings. In this +connection King Carol gave me many drastic instances. While King +Ferdinand was still neutral, one of the comic papers contained a +picture of the King taking aim at a hare, while underneath were these +words, supposed to come from the hare: "My friend, you have long ears, +I have long ears; you are a coward, I am a coward. Wherefore would my +brother shoot me?" + +On the day when war broke out this freedom of the Press was diverted +into a different channel and replaced by the severest control and +censorship. + +Roumania is a land of contrasts, both as regards the landscape, the +climate, and social conditions. The mountainous north, with the +wonderful Carpathians, is one of the most beautiful districts. Then +there are the endless, unspeakably monotonous, but fertile plains of +Wallachia, leading into the valley of the Danube, which is a very +Paradise. In spring particularly, when the Danube each year overflows +its banks, the beauty of the landscape baffles description. It is +reminiscent of the tropics, with virgin forests standing in the water, +and islands covered with luxuriant growth scattered here and there. It +is an ideal country for the sportsman. All kinds of birds, herons, +ducks, pelicans, and others, are to be met with, besides wolves and +wild cats, and days may be spent in rowing and walking in this +Paradise without wearying of it. + +The Roumanians usually care but little for sport, being averse to +physical exertion. Whenever they can they leave the country and spend +their time in Paris or on the Riviera. This love of travel is so +strong in them that a law was passed compelling them to spend a +certain portion of the year in their own country or else pay the +penalty of a higher tax. The country people, in their sad poverty, +form a great contrast to the enormously wealthy _Bojars_. Although +very backward in everything relating to culture, the Roumanian peasant +is a busy, quiet, and easily satisfied type, unpretentious to a +touching degree when compared with the upper classes. + +Social conditions among the upper ten thousand have been greatly +complicated owing to the abolition of nobility, whereby the question +of titles plays a part unequalled anywhere else in the world. Almost +every Roumanian has a title derived from one or other source; he +values it highly, and takes it much amiss when a foreigner betrays his +ignorance on the subject. As a rule, it is safer to adopt the plan of +addressing everyone as "_Mon prince_." Another matter difficult for a +foreigner to grasp is the real status of Roumanian society, owing to +the incessant divorce and subsequent remarriages. Nearly every woman +has been divorced at least once and married again, the result being, +on the one hand, the most complicated questions of relationship, and, +on the other, so many breaches of personal relations as to make it the +most difficult task to invite twenty Roumanians, particularly ladies, +to dinner without giving offence in some quarter. + +In the days of the old régime it was one of the duties of the younger +members of the Embassy to develop their budding diplomatic talents by +a clever compilation of the list for such a dinner and a wise +avoidance of any dangerous rock ahead. But as the question of rank in +Roumania is taken just as seriously as though it were authorised, +every lady claims to have first rank--the correct allotment of places +at a dinner is really a question for the most efficient diplomatic +capacities. There were about a dozen ladies in Bucharest who would +actually not accept an invitation unless they were quite sure the +place of honour would be given to them. + +My predecessor cut the Gordian knot of these difficulties by arranging +to have dinner served at small separate tables, thus securing several +places of honour, but not even by these means could he satisfy the +ambition of all. + + +2 + +While at Sinaia I received the news of the assassination of the +Archduke from Bratianu. I was confined to bed, suffering from +influenza, when Bratianu telephoned to ask if I had heard that there +had been an accident to the Archduke's train in Bosnia, and that both +he and the duchess were killed. Soon after this first alarm came +further news, leaving no doubt as to the gravity of the catastrophe. +The first impression in Roumania was one of profound and sincere +sympathy and genuine consternation. Roumania never expected by means +of war to succeed in realising her national ambitions; she only +indulged in the hope that a friendly agreement with the Monarchy would +lead to the union of all Roumanians, and in that connection Bucharest +centred all its hopes in the Archduke and heir to the throne. His +death seemed to end the dream of a Greater Roumania, and the genuine +grief displayed in all circles in Roumania was the outcome of that +feeling. Take Jonescu, on learning the news while in my wife's +drawing-room, wept bitterly; and the condolences that I received were +not of the usual nature of such messages, but were expressions of the +most genuine sorrow. Poklewski, the Russian Ambassador, is said to +have remarked very brutally that there was no reason to make so much +out of the event, and the general indignation that his words aroused +proved how strong was the sympathy felt in the country for the +murdered Archduke. + +When the ultimatum was made known the entire situation changed at +once. I never had any illusions respecting the Roumanian psychology, +and was quite clear in my own mind that the sincere regret at the +Archduke's death was due to egotistical motives and to the fear of +being compelled now to abandon the national ambition. The ultimatum +and the danger of war threatening on the horizon completely altered +the Roumanian attitude, and it was suddenly recognised that Roumania +could achieve its object by other means, not by peace, but by war--not +_with_, but _against_ the Monarchy. I would never have believed it +possible that such a rapid and total change could have occurred +practically within a few hours. Genuine and simulated indignation at +the tone of the ultimatum was the order of the day, and the universal +conclusion arrived at was: _L'Autriche est devenue folle._ Men and +women with whom I had been on a perfectly friendly footing for the +last year suddenly became bitter enemies. Everywhere I noticed a +mixture of indignation and growing eagerness to realise at last their +heart's dearest wish. The feeling in certain circles fluctuated for +some days. Roumanians had a great respect for Germany's military +power, and the year 1870 was still fresh in the memory of many of +them. When England, however, joined the ranks of our adversaries their +fears vanished, and from that moment it became obvious to the large +majority of the Roumanians that the realisation of their aspirations +was merely a question of time and of diplomatic efficiency. The wave +of hatred and lust of conquest that broke over us in the first stage +of the war was much stronger than in later stages, because the +Roumanians made the mistake we all have committed of reckoning on too +short a duration of the war, and therefore imagined the decision to be +nearer at hand than it actually was. After the great German successes +in the West, after Görlitz and the downfall of Serbia, certain +tendencies pointing to a policy of delay became noticeable among the +Roumanians. With the exception of Carp and his little group all were +more or less ready at the very first to fling themselves upon us. + +Like a rock standing in the angry sea of hatred, poor old King Carol +was alone with his German sympathies. I had been instructed to read +the ultimatum to him the moment it was sent to Belgrade, and never +shall I forget the impression it made on the old King when he heard +it. He, wise old politician that he was, recognised at once the +immeasurable possibilities of such a step, and before I had finished +reading the document he interrupted me, exclaiming: "It will be a +world war." It was long before he could collect himself and begin to +devise ways and means by which a peaceful solution might still be +found. I may mention here that a short time previously the Tsar, with +Sassonoff, had been in Constanza for a meeting with the Roumanian +royal family. The day after the Tsar left I went to Constanza myself +to thank the King for having conferred the Grand Cross of one of the +Roumanian orders on me, obviously as a proof that the Russian visit +had not made him forget our alliance, and he gave me some interesting +details of the said visit. Most interesting of all was his account of +the conversations with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. On +asking whether Sassonoff considered the situation in Europe to be as +safe as he (the King) did, Sassonoff answered in the affirmative, +"_pourvu que l'Autriche ne touche pas à la Serbie_." I at once, of +course, reported this momentous statement to Vienna; but neither by +the King nor by myself, nor yet in Vienna, was the train of thought +then fully understood. The relations between Serbia and the Monarchy +were at that time no worse than usual; indeed, they were rather +better, and there was not the slightest intention on our part to +injure the Serbians. But the suspicion that Sassonoff already then was +aware that the Serbians were planning something against us cannot be +got rid of. + +When the King asked me whether I had reported Sassonoff's important +remark to Vienna, I replied that I had done so, and added that this +remark was another reason to make me believe that the assassination +was a crime long since prepared and carried out under Russian +patronage. + +The crime that was enacted at Debruzin, which made such a sensation at +the time, gave rise to suspicions of a Russo-Roumanian attempt at +assassination. + +On February 24, 1914, the Hungarian Correspondence Bureau published +the following piece of news: + + A terrible explosion took place this morning in the official + premises of the newly-instituted Greek-Catholic Hungarian + bishopric, which are on the second floor of the Ministry of Trade + and Commerce in the Franz Deak Street. It occurred in the office + of the bishop's representative, the Vicar Michael Jaczkovics, + whose secretary, Johann Slapowszky, was also present in the room. + Both of them were blown to pieces. The Greek-Catholic bishop, + Stephan Miklossy, was in a neighbouring room, but had a most + marvellous escape. Alexander Csatth, advocate and solicitor to the + bishopric, who was in another room, was mortally wounded by the + explosion. In a third room the bishop's servant with his wife were + both killed. All the walls in the office premises fell in, and the + whole building is very much damaged. The explosion caused such a + panic in the house that all the inhabitants took flight and + vanished. All the windows of the neighbouring Town Hall in the + Verboczy Street were shattered by the concussion. Loose tiles were + hurled into the street and many passers-by were injured. The four + dead bodies and the wounded were taken to the hospital. The + bishop, greatly distressed, left the building and went to a + friend's house. The daughter of the Vicar Jaczkovics went out of + her mind on hearing of her father's tragic death. The cause of the + explosion has not yet been discovered. + +I soon became involved in the affair when Hungary and Roumania began +mutually to blame one another as originators of the outrage. This led +to numerous interventions and adjustments, and my task was intensified +because a presumed accomplice of the murderer Catarau was arrested in +Bucharest, and his extradition to Hungary had to be effected by me. +This man, of the name of Mandazescu, was accused of having obtained a +false passport for Catarau. + +Catarau, who was a Roumanian Russian from Bessarabia, vanished +completely after the murder and left no trace. News came, now from +Serbia, then from Albania, that he had been found, but the rumours +were always false. I chanced to hear something about the matter in +this way. I was on board a Roumanian vessel bound from Constanza to +Constantinople, when I accidentally overheard two Roumanian naval +officers talking together. One of them said: "That was on the day +when the police brought Catarau on board to help him to get away +secretly." + +Catarau was heard of later at Cairo, which he appears to have reached +with the aid of Roumanian friends. + +It cannot be asserted that the Roumanian Government was implicated in +the plot--but the Roumanian authorities certainly were, for in the +Balkans, as in Russia, there are many bands like the _Cerna Ruka_, the +_Narodna Odbrena_, etc., etc., who carry on their activities alongside +the Government. + +It was a crime committed by some Russian or Roumanian secret society, +and the Governments of both countries showed surprisingly little +interest in investigating the matter and delivering the culprits up to +justice. + +On June 15 I heard from a reliable source that Catarau had been seen +in Bucharest. He walked about the streets quite openly in broad +daylight, and no one interfered with him; then he disappeared. + +To return, however, to my interview with the old King. Filled with +alarm, he dispatched that same evening two telegrams, one to Belgrade +and one to Petersburg, urging that the ultimatum be accepted without +fail. + +The terrible distress of mind felt by the King when, like a sudden +flash of lightning from the clouds, he saw before him a picture of the +world war may be accounted for because he felt certain that the +conflict between his personal convictions and his people's attitude +would suddenly be known to all. The poor old King fought the fight to +the best of his ability, but it killed him. King Carol's death was +caused by the war. The last weeks of his life were a torture to him; +each message that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip. I +was enjoined to do all I could to secure Roumania's prompt +co-operation, according to the terms of the Alliance, and I was even +obliged to go so far as to remind him that "a promise given allows of +no prevarication: that a treaty is a treaty, and _his honour_ obliged +him to unsheathe his sword." I recollect one particularly painful +scene, where the King, weeping bitterly, flung himself across his +writing-table and with trembling hands tried to wrench from his neck +his order _Pour le Mérite_. I can affirm without any exaggeration that +I could see him wasting away under the ceaseless moral blows dealt to +him, and that the mental torment he went through undoubtedly shortened +his life. + +Queen Elizabeth was well aware of all, but she never took my action +amiss; she understood that I had to deliver the messages, but that it +was not I who composed them. + +Queen Elizabeth was a good, clever and touchingly simple woman, not a +_poet qui court après l'esprit_, but a woman who looked at the world +through conciliatory and poetical glasses. She was a good +conversationalist, and there was always a poetic charm in all she did. +There hung on the staircase a most beautiful sea picture, which I +greatly admired while the Queen talked to me about the sea, about her +little villa at Constanza, which, built on the extreme end of the +quay, seems almost to lie in the sea. She spoke, too, of her travels +and impressions when on the high seas, and as she spoke the great +longing for all that is good and beautiful made itself felt, and this +is what she said to me: "The sea lives. If there could be found any +symbol of eternity it would be the sea, endless in greatness and +everlasting in movement. The day is dull and stormy. One after another +the glassy billows come rolling in and break with a roar on the rocky +shore. The small white crests of the waves look as if covered with +snow. And the sea breathes and draws its breath with the ebb and flow +of the tide. The tide is the driving power that forces the mighty +waters from Equator to North Pole. And thus it works, day and night, +year by year, century by century. It takes no heed of the perishable +beings who call themselves lords of the world, who live only for a +day, coming and going and vanishing almost as they come. The sea +remains to work. It works for all, for men, for animals, for plants, +for without the sea there could be no organic life in the world. The +sea is like a great filter, which alone can produce the change of +matter that is necessary for life. In the course of a century +numberless rivers carry earth to the sea. Each river carries without +ceasing its burden of earth and sand to the ocean; and the sea +receives the load which is carried by the current far out to sea, and +slowly and by degrees in the course of time the sea dissolves or +crushes all it has received. No matter to the sea if the process lasts +a thousand years or more--it may even last for ages, who can tell? + +"But one day, quite suddenly, the sea begins to wander. Once there was +sea everywhere, and all continents are born from the sea. One day land +arose out of the sea. The birth was of a revolutionary nature, there +were earthquakes, volcanic craters, falling cities and dying men--but +new land was there. Or else it moves slowly, invisibly, a metre or two +in a century, and returns to the land it used to possess. Thus it +restores the soil it stole from it, but cleaner, refined and full of +vitality to live and to create. Such is the sea and its work." + +These are the words of the old half-blind Queen, who can never look +upon the beloved picture again, but she told me how she always +idolised the sea, and how her grand nephews and nieces shared her +feelings, and how she grew young again with them when she told them +tales of olden times. + +One could listen to her for hours without growing weary, and always +there was some beautiful thought or word to carry away and think over. + +Doubtless such knowledge would be more correct were it taken from some +geological work. But Carmen Sylva's words invariably seemed to strike +some poetic chord; that is what made her so attractive. + +She loved to discourse on politics, which for her meant King Carol. He +was her all in all. After his death, when it was said that all states +in the world were losing in the terrible war, she remarked: "Roumania +has already lost her most precious possession." She never spoke of her +own poems and writings. In politics her one thought besides King Carol +was Albania. She was deeply attached to the Princess of Wied, and +showed her strong interest in the country where she lived. Talking +about the Wieds one day afforded me an opportunity of seeing the King +vexed with his wife; it was the only time I ever noticed it. It was +when we were at Sinaia, and I was, as often occurred, sitting with the +King. The Queen came into the room, which she was otherwise not in the +habit of entering, bringing with her a telegram from the Princess of +Wied in which she asked for something--I cannot now remember what--for +Albania. The King refused, but the Queen insisted, until he at last +told her very crossly to leave him in peace, as he had other things to +think of than Albania. + +After King Carol's death she lost all her vital energy, and the change +in the political situation troubled her. She was very fond of her +nephew Ferdinand--hers was a truly loving heart--and she trembled lest +he should commit some act of treachery. I remember once how, through +her tears, she said to me: "Calm my fears. Tell me that he will never +be guilty of such an act." I was unable to reassure her, but a kind +Fate spared her from hearing the declaration of war. + +Later, not long before her death, the old Queen was threatened with +total blindness. She was anxious to put herself in the hands of a +French oculist for an operation for cataract, who would naturally be +obliged to travel through the Monarchy in order to reach Bucharest. At +her desire I mentioned the matter in Vienna, and the Emperor Francis +Joseph at once gave the requisite permission for the journey. + +After a successful operation, the Queen sent a short autograph poem to +one of my children, adding that it was her _first_ letter on +recovering her sight. At the same time she was again very uneasy +concerning politics. + +I wrote her the following letter: + + Your Majesty,--My warmest thanks for the beautiful little poem you + have sent to my boy. That it was granted to me to contribute + something towards the recovery of your sight is in itself a + sufficient reward, and no thanks are needed. That Your Majesty has + addressed the first written lines to my children delights and + touches me. + + Meanwhile Your Majesty must not be troubled regarding politics. It + is of no avail. For the moment Roumania will retain the policy of + the late King, and God alone knows what the future will bring + forth. + + We are all like dust in this terrible hurricane sweeping through + the world. We are tossed helplessly hither and thither and know + not whether we are to face disaster or success. The point is not + whether we live or die, but how it is done. In that respect King + Carol set an example to us all. + + I hope King Ferdinand may never forget that, together with the + throne, his uncle bequeathed to him a political creed, a creed of + honour and loyalty, and I am persuaded that Your Majesty is the + best guardian of the bequest. + + Your Majesty's grateful and devoted + + CZERNIN. + +When I said that King Carol fought the fight to the best of his +ability, I intended to convey that no one could expect him to be +different from what he always was. The King never possessed in any +special degree either energy, strength of action, or adventurous +courage, and at the time I knew him, as an old man, he had none of +those attributes. He was a clever diplomat, a conciliatory power, a +safe mediator, and one who avoided trouble, but not of a nature to +risk all and weather the storm. That was known to all, and no one, +therefore, could think that the King would try to put himself on our +side against the clearly expressed views of all Roumania. My idea is +that if he had been differently constituted he could successfully have +risked the experiment. The King possessed in Carp a man of quite +unusual, even reckless, activity and energy, and from the first moment +he placed himself and his activities at the King's disposal. If the +King, without asking, had ordered mobilisation, Carp's great energy +would have certainly carried it through. But, in the military +situation as it was then, the Roumanian army would have been forced to +the rear of the Russian, and in all probability the first result of +the battlefields would have changed the situation entirely, and the +blood that was shed mutually in victorious battles would have brought +forth the unity that the spirit of our alliance never succeeded in +evolving. But the King was not a man of such calibre. He could not +change his nature, and what he did do entirely concurred with his +methods from the time he ascended the throne. + +As long as the King lived there was the positive assurance that +Roumania would not side against us, for he would have prevented any +mobilisation against us with the same firm wisdom which had always +enabled him to avert any agitation in the land. He would then have +seen that the Roumanians are not a warlike people like the Bulgarians, +and that Roumania had not the slightest intention of risking anything +in the campaign. A policy of procrastination in the wise hands of the +King would have delayed hostilities against us indefinitely. + +Immediately after the outbreak of war Bratianu began his game, which +consisted of entrenching the Roumanian Government firmly and willingly +in a position between the two groups of Powers, and bandying favours +about from one to the other, reaping equal profits from each, until +the moment when the stronger of the two should be recognised as such +and the weaker then attacked. + +Even from 1914-16 Roumania was never really neutral. She always +favoured our enemies, and as far as lay in her power hindered all our +actions. + +The transport of horses and ammunition to Turkey in the summer of 1915 +that was exacted from us was an important episode. Turkey was then in +great danger, and was asking anxiously for munitions. Had the +Roumanian Government adopted the standpoint not to favour any of the +belligerent Powers it would have been a perfectly correct attitude, +viewed from a neutral standpoint, but she never did adopt such +standpoint, as is shown by her allowing the Serbians to receive +transports of Russian ammunition via the Danube, thus showing great +partiality. When all attempts failed, the munitions were transmitted, +partially at any rate, through other means. + +At that time, too, Russian soldiers were allowed in Roumania and were +not molested, whereas ours were invariably interned. + +Two Austrian airmen once landed by mistake in Roumania, and were, of +course, interned immediately. The one was a cadet of the name of +Berthold and a pilot whose name I have forgotten. From their prison +they appealed to me to help them, and I sent word that they must +endeavour to obtain permission to pay me a visit. A few days later the +cadet appeared, escorted by a Roumanian officer as guard. This +officer, not being allowed without special permission to set foot on +Austro-Hungarian soil, was obliged to remain in the street outside the +house. I had the gates closed, put the cadet into one of my cars, sent +him out through the back entrance, and had him driven to Giurgui, +where he got across the Danube, and in two hours was again at liberty. +After a lengthy and futile wait the officer departed. His protests +came too late. + +The unfortunate pilot who was left behind was not allowed to come to +the Embassy. One night, however, he made his escape through the window +and arrived. I kept him concealed for some time, and he eventually +crossed the frontier safely and got away by rail to Hungary. + +Bratianu reproached me later for what I had done, but I told him it +was in consequence of his not having strictly adhered to his +neutrality. Had our soldiers been left unmolested, as in the case of +the Russians, I should not have been compelled to act as I had done. + +Bratianu can never seriously have doubted that the Central Powers +would succumb, and his sympathies were always with the Entente, not +only on account of his bringing up, but also because of that political +speculation. During the course of subsequent events there were times +when Bratianu to a certain extent seemed to vacillate, especially at +the time of our great offensive against Russia. The break through at +Görlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior of Russia had +an astounding effect in Roumania. Bratianu, who obviously knew very +little about strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian +millions, whom he imagined to be in a fair way to Vienna and Berlin, +should suddenly begin to rush back and a fortress like Warsaw be +demolished like a house of cards. He was evidently very anxious then +and must have had many a disturbed night. On the other hand, those who +to begin with, though not for, still were not against Austria began to +raise their heads and breathe more freely. The victory of the Central +Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event. That was the +historic moment when Roumania might have been coerced into active +co-operation, but not the Bratianu Ministry. Bratianu himself would +never in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we could +have made up our minds then to instal a Majorescu or a Marghiloman +Ministry in office, we could have had the Roumanian army with us. In +connection with this were several concrete proposals. In order to +carry out the plan we should have been compelled to make territorial +concessions in Hungary to a Majorescu Ministry--Majorescu demanded it +as a primary condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs, and +this proposal failed owing to Hungary's obstinate resistance. It is a +terrible but a just punishment that poor Hungary, who contributed so +much to our definite defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from +the consequences thereof, and that the Roumanians, so despised and +persecuted by Hungary, should gain the greatest triumphs on her +plains. + +One of the many reproaches that have been brought against me recently +is to the effect that I, as ambassador at Bucharest, should have +resigned if my proposals were not accepted in Vienna. These reproaches +are dictated by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsibility. +It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe the situation as +he sees it and to make such proposals as he considers right, but the +responsibility for the policy is with the Minister for Foreign +Affairs, and it would lead to the most impossible and absurd state of +things if every ambassador whose proposals were rejected were to draw +the conclusion that his resignation was a necessary consequence +thereof. If officials were to resign because they did not agree with +the view of their chief, it would mean that almost all of them would +send in their resignations. + +Espionage and counter-espionage have greatly flourished during the +war. In that connection Russia showed great activity in Roumania. + +In October, 1914, an event occurred which was very unfortunate for me. +I drove from Bucharest to Sinaia, carrying certain political +documents with me in a dispatch-case, which, by mistake, was fastened +on behind instead of being laid in the car. On the way the case was +unstrapped and stolen. I made every effort to get it back, and +eventually recovered it after a search of three weeks, involving much +expense. It was found at last in some peasant's barn, but nothing had +apparently been abstracted save the cigarettes that were in it. + +Nevertheless, after the occupation of Bucharest copies and photographs +of all my papers were found in Bratianu's house. + +After the loss of the dispatch-case I at once tendered my resignation +in Vienna, but it was not accepted by the Emperor. + +The Red Book on Roumania, published by Burian, which contains a +summary of my most important reports, gives a very clear picture of +the several phases of that period and the approaching danger of war. +The several defeats that Roumania suffered justified the fears of all +those who warned her against premature intervention. In order to +render the situation quite clear, it must here be explained that +during the time immediately preceding Roumania's entry into war there +were really only two parties in the country: the one was hostile to us +and wished for an immediate declaration of war, and the other was the +"friendly" one that did not consider the situation ripe for action and +advised waiting until we were weakened still more. During the time of +our successes the "friendly" party carried the day. Queen Marie, I +believe, belonged to the latter. From the beginning of the war, she +was always in favour of "fighting by the side of England," as she +always looked upon herself as an Englishwoman, but, at the last moment +at any rate, she appears to have thought the time for action +premature. A few days before the declaration of war she invited me to +a farewell lunch, which was somewhat remarkable, as we both knew that +in a very few days we should be enemies. After lunch I took the +opportunity of telling her that I _likewise_ was aware of the +situation, but that "the Bulgarians would be in Bucharest before the +Roumanians reached Budapest." She entered into the conversation very +calmly, being of a very frank nature and not afraid of hearing the +truth. A few days later a letter was opened at the censor's office +from a lady-in-waiting who had been present at the lunch. It was +evidently not intended for our eyes; it contained a description of the +_déjeuner fort embêtant_, with some unflattering remarks about me. + +Queen Marie never lost her hope in a final victory. She did not +perhaps agree with Bratianu in all his tactics, but a declaration of +war on us was always an item on her programme. Even in the distressing +days of their disastrous defeat she always kept her head above water. +One of the Queen's friends told me afterwards that when our armies, +from south, north and west, were nearing Bucharest, when day and night +the earth shook with the ceaseless thunder of the guns, the Queen +quietly went on with her preparations for departure, and was firmly +persuaded that she would return as "Empress of all the Roumanians." I +have been told that after the taking of Bucharest Bratianu collapsed +altogether, and it was Queen Marie who comforted and encouraged him. +Her English blood always asserted itself. After we had occupied +Wallachia, I received absolutely reliable information from England, +according to which she had telegraphed to King George from Jassy, +recommending "her little but courageous people" to his further +protection. After the Peace of Bucharest strong pressure was brought +to bear on me to effect the abdication of the King and Queen. It would +not in any way have altered the situation, as the Entente would +naturally have reinstated them when victory was gained; but I opposed +all such efforts, not for the above reason, which I could not foresee, +but from other motives, to be mentioned later, although I was +perfectly certain that Queen Marie would always remain our enemy. + +The declaration of war created a very uncomfortable situation for all +Austro-Hungarians and Germans. I came across several friends in the +Austro-Hungarian colony who had been beaten by the Roumanian soldiers +with the butt-ends of their rifles on their way to prison. I saw wild +scenes of panic and flight that were both grotesque and revolting, and +the cruel sport lasted for days. + +In Vienna all subjects of an enemy state were exempt from deportation. +In my capacity as Minister I ordered reprisals on Roumanian citizens, +as there were no other means to relieve the fate of our poor refugees. +As soon as the neutral Powers notified that the treatment had become +more humane, they were set free. + +If we showed ourselves at the windows or in the garden of the Embassy +the crowd scoffed and jeered at us, and at the station, when we left, +a young official whom I asked for information simply turned his back +on me. + +A year and a half later I was again in Bucharest. The tide of victory +had carried us far, and we came to make peace. We were again subjects +of interest to the crowds in the streets, but in very different +fashion. A tremendous ovation awaited us when we appeared in the +theatre, and I could not show myself in the street without having a +crowd of admirers in my wake. + +Before all this occurred, and when war was first declared, the members +of the Embassy, together with about 150 persons belonging to the +Austro-Hungarian colony, including many children, were interned, and +spent ten very unpleasant days, as we were not sure whether we should +be released or not. We had occasion during that time to witness three +Zeppelin raids over Bucharest, which, seen in the wonderful moonlight, +cloudless nights under the tropical sky, made an unforgettable +impression on us. + +I find the following noted in my diary: + + +"_Bucharest, August, 1916._ + +"The Roumanians have declared war on my wife and daughter too. A +deputation composed of two officials from the Ministry for Foreign +Affairs, in frock-coats and top hats, appeared last night at eleven +o'clock in my villa at Sinaia. My wife was roused out of her sleep, +and by the light of a single candle--more is forbidden on account of +the Zeppelin raids--they informed her that Roumania had declared war +on us. + +"As the speaker put it, '_Vous avez déclaré la guerre_.' He then read +the whole declaration of war aloud to them both. Bratianu sent word +to me that he would have a special train sent to take my wife and +daughter and the whole personnel of the Embassy to Bucharest. + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Roumanians really expected a Zeppelin attack at once. So far it +has not occurred, and they begin to feel more at ease, and say that it +is too far for the Zeppelins to come all the way from Germany. They +seem not to be aware that Mackensen has Zeppelins in Bulgaria. But who +can tell whether they really will come? + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"Last night a Zeppelin did come. About three o'clock we were roused by +the shrill police whistles giving the alarm. The telephone notified us +that a Zeppelin had crossed the Danube, and all the church bells began +to peal. Suddenly darkness and silence reigned, and the whole town, +like some great angry animal, sullen and morose, prepared for the +enemy attack. Nowhere was there light or sound. The town, with a +wonderful starry firmament overhead, waited in expectation. Fifteen, +twenty minutes went by, when suddenly a shot was fired and, as though +it were a signal, firing broke out in every direction. The +anti-aircraft guns fired incessantly, and the police, too, did their +best, firing in the air. But what were they firing at? There was +absolutely nothing to be seen. The searchlights then came into play. +Sweeping the heavens from east to west, from north to south, they +searched the firmament, but could not find the Zeppelin. Was it really +there, or was the whole thing due to excited Roumanian nerves? + +"Suddenly a sound was heard: the noise of the propeller overhead. It +sounded so near in the clear, starry night, we felt we must be able to +see it. But the noise died away in the direction of Colbroceni. Then +we heard the first bomb. Like a gust of wind it whistled through the +air, followed by a crash and an explosion. A second and third came +quickly after. The firing became fiercer, but they can see nothing +and seem to aim at where the sound comes from. The searchlights sway +backwards and forwards. Now one of them has caught the airship, which +looks like a small golden cigar. Both the gondolas can be seen quite +distinctly, and the searchlight keeps it well in view, and now a +second one has caught it. It looks as though this air cruiser is +hanging motionless in the sky, brilliantly lit up by the searchlights +right and left. Then the guns begin in good earnest. Shrapnel bursts +all around, a wonderful display of fireworks, but it is impossible to +say if the aim is good and if the monster is in danger. Smaller and +smaller grows the Zeppelin, climbing rapidly higher and higher, until +suddenly the miniature cigar disappears. Still the searchlights sweep +the skies, hoping to find their prey again. + +"Suddenly utter silence reigns. Have they gone? Is the attack over? +Has one been hit? Forced to land? The minutes go by. We are all now on +the balcony--the women, too--watching the scene. Again comes the +well-known sound--once heard never forgotten--as though the wind were +getting up, then a dull thud and explosion. This time it is farther +away towards the forts. Again the firing breaks out, and machine-guns +bark at the friendly moon; searchlights career across the heavens, but +find nothing. Again there falls a bomb--much nearer this time--and +again comes the noise of the propellers louder and louder. Shrapnel +bursts just over the Embassy, and the Zeppelin is over our heads. We +hear the noise very distinctly, but can see nothing. Again a sudden +silence everywhere, which has a curious effect after the terrible +noise. Time passes, but nothing more is heard. The first rays of dawn +are seen in the east; the stars slowly pale. + +"A child is heard to cry somewhere, far away: strange how clearly it +sounds in the silent night. There is a feeling as though the terrified +town hardly dared breathe or move for fear the monster might return. +And how many more such nights are there in prospect? In the calm of +this fairylike dawn, slowly rising, the crying of the child strikes a +note of discord, infinitely sad. But the crying of the child--does it +not find an echo among the millions whom this terrible war has driven +to desperation? + +"The sun rises like a blood-red ball. For some hours the Roumanians +can take to sleep and gather fresh strength, but they know now that +the Zeppelin's visit will not be the last. + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Press is indignant about the nocturnal attack. Bucharest is +certainly a fortress, but it should be known that the guns are no +longer in the forts. It was stated in the _Adeverul_ that the heroic +resistance put up in defence was most successful. That the airship, +badly damaged, was brought down near Bucharest, and that a commission +started off at once to make sure whether it was an aeroplane or a +Zeppelin! + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Zeppelin returned again this evening and took us by surprise. It +seemed to come from the other side of Plojest, and the sentries on the +Danube must have missed it. Towards morning the night watch at the +Embassy whose duty it is to see that there is no light in the house +saw a huge mass descending slowly over the Embassy till it almost +touched the roof. It hovered there a few minutes, making observations. +No one noticed it until suddenly the engines started again, and it +dropped the first bomb close to the Embassy. A direct hit was made on +the house of the Ambassador Jresnea Crecianu, and twenty gendarmes who +were there were killed. The royal palace was also damaged. The +Government is apparently not satisfied with the anti-aircraft forces, +but concludes that practice will make them perfect. Opportunity for +practice will certainly not be lacking. + +"Our departure is being delayed by every sort of pretext. One moment +it seems as though we should reach home via Bulgaria. This idea suited +Bratianu extremely well, as the Bulgarian willingness to grant +permission was a guarantee that they had no plans of attack. But he +reckoned in this without his host. E. and W. are greatly alarmed +because the Roumanians intend to detain them, and will probably hang +them as spies. I have told them, 'Either we all stay here or we all +start together. No one will be given up.' That appears to have +somewhat quieted their fears. + +"As might be expected, these nocturnal visits had disagreeable +consequences for us. The Roumanians apparently thought that it was not +a question of Zeppelins, but of Austro-Hungarian airships, and that my +presence in the town would afford a certain protection against the +attacks; after the first one they declared that for every Roumanian +killed ten Austrians or Bulgarians would be executed, and the hostile +treatment to which we were subjected grew worse and worse. The food +was cut down and was terribly bad, and finally the water supply was +cut off. With the tropical temperature that prevailed and the +overcrowding of a house that normally was destined to hold twenty, and +now housed 170, persons, the conditions within the space of +twenty-four hours became unbearable and the atmosphere so bad that +several people fell ill with fever, and neither doctor nor medicine +was obtainable. Thanks to the energetic intervention of the Dutch +Ambassador, Herr von Vredenburch, who had undertaken the charge of our +State interests, it was finally possible to alter the conditions and +to avert the outbreak of an epidemic." + + * * * * * + +It was just about that time that our Military Attaché, Lieut.-Colonel +Baron Randa, made a telling remark. One of our Roumanian slave-drivers +was in the habit of paying us a daily visit and talking in the +bombastic fashion the Roumanians adopted when boasting of their +impending victories. The word "Mackensen" occurred in Randa's answer. +The Roumanian was surprised to hear the name, unknown to him, and +said: "Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce Mackensen? Je connais beaucoup +d'Allemands, mais je n'ai jamais fait la connaissance de M. +Mackensen." "Eh bien," replied Randa, patting him on the shoulder, +"vous la ferez cette connaissance, je vous en guarantie." Three months +after that Mackensen had occupied all Wallachia and had his +headquarters at Bucharest. By that time, therefore, his name must have +been more familiar to our Roumanian friend. + +At last we set off for home via Russia and had a very interesting +journey lasting three weeks, via Kieff, Petersburg, Sweden, and +Germany. To spend three weeks in a train would seem very wearisome to +many; but as everything in this life is a matter of habit we soon grew +so accustomed to it that when we arrived in Vienna there were many of +us who could not sleep the first few nights in a proper bed, as we +missed the shaking of the train. Meanwhile, we had every comfort on +the special train, and variety as well, especially when, on Bratianu's +orders, we were detained at a little station called Baratinskaja, near +Kieff. The reason of this was never properly explained, but it was +probably owing to difficulties over the departure of the Roumanian +Ambassador in Sofia and to the wish to treat us as hostages. The +journey right through the enemy country was remarkable. Fierce battles +were just then being fought in Galicia, and day and night we passed +endless trains conveying gay and smiling soldiers to the front, and +others returning full of pale, bandaged wounded men, whose groans we +heard as we passed them. We were greeted everywhere in friendly +fashion by the population, and there was not a trace of the hatred we +had experienced in Roumania. Everything that we saw bore evidence of +the strictest order and discipline. None of us could think it possible +that the Empire was on the eve of a revolution, and when the Emperor +Francis Joseph questioned me on my return as to whether I had reason +to believe that a revolution would occur, I discountenanced the idea +most emphatically. + +This did not please the old Emperor. He said afterwards to one of his +suite: "Czernin has given a correct account of Roumania, but he must +have been asleep when he passed through Russia." + + +3 + +The development of Roumanian affairs during the war occurs in three +phases, the first of which was in King Carol's reign. Then neutrality +was guaranteed. On the other hand, it was not possible during those +months to secure Roumania's co-operation because we, in the first +period of the war, were so unfavourably situated in a military sense +that public opinion in Roumania would not voluntarily have consented +to a war at our side, and, as already mentioned, such forcible action +would not have met with the King's approval. + +In the second phase of the war, dating from King Carol's death to our +defeat at Luck, conditions were quite different. In this second phase +were included the greatest military successes the Central Powers ever +obtained. The downfall of Serbia and the conquest of the whole of +Poland occurred during this period, and, I repeat, in those months we +could have secured the active co-operation of Roumania. Nevertheless, +I must make it clearly understood here that if the political +preliminaries for intervention on the part of Roumania were not +undertaken, the fault must not be ascribed to the then Minister of +Foreign Affairs, but to the _vis major_ which opposed the project +under the form of a Hungarian veto. As previously stated, Majorescu, +as well as Marghiloman, would only have given his consent to +co-operation if Roumania had been given a slice of the Hungarian +state. Thanks to the attitude of absolute refusal observed at the +Ballplatz, the territory in question was never definitely decided on, +but the idea probably was Transylvania and a portion of the Bukovina. +I cannot say whether Count Burian, if he had escaped other influences, +would have adopted the plan, but certain it is that however ready and +willing he was to act he would never have carried out the plan against +the Hungarian Parliament. According to the Constitution, the Hungarian +Parliament is sovereign in the Hungarian State, and without the use of +armed means Hungary could never have been induced to cede any part of +her territory. + +It is obvious, however, that it would have been impossible during the +world war to have stirred up an armed conflict between Vienna and +Budapest. My then German colleague, von dem Busche, entirely agreed +with me that Hungary ought to make some territorial sacrifices in +order to encourage Roumania's intervention. I firmly believe that +then, and similarly before the Italian declaration of war, a certain +pressure was brought to bear direct on Vienna by Berlin to this end--a +pressure which merely contributed to strengthen and intensify Tisza's +opposition. For Germany, the question was far simpler; she had drawn +payment for her great gains from a foreign source. The cession of the +Bukovina might possibly have been effected, as Stürgkh did not object, +but that alone would not have satisfied Roumania. + +It was quite clear that the opposition to the ceding of Transylvania +originated in Hungary. But this opposition was not specially Tisza's, +for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head +of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint. + +I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to +explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the +concession. Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote +me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of +Hungarian territory was out of the question; "whoever attempts to +seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot." + +There was nothing to be done. And still I think that this was one of +the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly +managed, might have influenced the final result. The military advance +on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of +our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it +the clever break through at Görlitz would have had some results; but +as it was, Görlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any +lasting effect. + +The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two +ways: the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to giving up any of +their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe--even to the +very last--that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that +sooner or later we would be forced to fight _against_ Roumania unless +we in good time carried her with us. In this connection Tisza always +maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the +belief that Roumania would not dare take it upon herself to attack us. +This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us +so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry +off so much rich booty. I would have been able to take much better +care of the many Austrians and Hungarians living in Roumania--whose +fate was terrible after the declaration of war, which took them also +by surprise--if I had been permitted to draw their attention more +openly and generally to the coming catastrophe; but in several of his +letters Tisza implored me not to create a panic, "which would bring +incalculable consequences with it." As I neither did, nor could, know +how far this secrecy was in agreement with our military +counter-preparations, I was bound to observe it. Apparently, Burian +believed my reports to a certain extent; at any rate, for some time +before the declaration of war he ordered all the secret documents and +the available money to be conveyed to Vienna, and entrusted to Holland +the care of our citizens; but Tisza told me long after that he +considered my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid to +give orders for the _superfluous_ evacuation of Transylvania. + +After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic and rage ran high in +the Hungarian Parliament. The severest criticism was heaped upon me, +as no one doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my false +reports. Here Tisza was again himself when, in a loud voice, he +shouted out that it was untrue; my reports were correct; I had warned +them in time and no blame could be attached to me; he thus took upon +himself the just blame. Fear was unknown to him, and he never tried to +shield himself behind anyone. When I arrived back in Vienna after a +journey of some weeks in Russia, and only then heard of the incident, +I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the honourable and loyal +manner in which he had defended my cause. He replied with the ironical +smile characteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course. + +But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no means such a matter +of course. We have had so many cowards on the Ministerial benches, so +many men who were brave when dealing with their subordinates, toadied +to their superiors, and were intimidated by strong opposition, that a +man like Tisza, who was such a contrast to these others, has a most +refreshing and invigorating effect. The Roumanians attempted several +times to make the maintenance of their _neutrality_ contingent on +territorial concessions. I was always opposed to this, and at the +Ballplatz they were of the same opinion. The Roumanians would have +appropriated these concessions and simply attacked us later to obtain +more. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to gain _military +co-operation_ a cession of territory would be quite in order, since, +once in the field, the Roumanians could not draw back and their fate +would be permanently bound up with ours. + +Finally, the third phase comprises the comparatively short period +between our defeat at Luck and the outbreak of the war in Roumania, +and was simply the death throes of neutrality. + +War was in the air and could be foreseen with certainty. + +As was to be expected, the inefficient diplomacy displayed in the +preparations for the world war brought down severe criticism of our +diplomatic abilities, and if the intention at the Ballplatz was to +bring about a war, it cannot be denied that the preparations for it +were most inadequate. + +Criticism was not directed towards the Ballplatz only, but entered +into further matters, such as the qualifications of the individual +representatives in foreign countries. I remember an article in one of +the most widely-read Viennese papers, which drew a comparison between +the "excellent" ambassador at Sofia and almost all of the others; that +is, all those whose posts were in countries that either refused their +co-operation or even already were in the field against us. + +In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I wish to state here that in +my opinion our then ambassador to Sofia, Count Tarnowski, was one of +the best and most competent diplomats in Austria-Hungary, but that the +point of view from which such praise was awarded to him was in itself +totally false. Had Count Tarnowski been in Paris, London or Rome, +these states, in spite of his undeniable capabilities, would not have +adopted a different attitude; while, on the other hand, there are +numbers of distinguished members of the diplomatic corps who would +have carried out his task at Sofia just as well as Count Tarnowski. + +In other words, I consider it is making an unwarrantable demand to +expect that a representative in a foreign land should have a leading +influence on the policy of the state to which he is accredited. What +may be demanded of a diplomatic representative is a correct estimate +of the situation. The ambassador must know what the Government of the +state where he is will do. A false diagnosis is discreditable. But it +is impossible for a representative, whoever he may be, to obtain such +power over a foreign state as to be able to guide the policy of that +state into the course desired by him. The policy of a state will +invariably be subservient to such objects as the Government of that +period deem vital, and will always be influenced by factors which are +quite outside the range of the foreign representative. + +In what manner a diplomatic representative obtains his information is +his own affair. He should endeavour to establish intercourse, not only +with a certain class of society, but also with the Press, and also +keep in touch with other classes of the population. + +One of the reproaches made to the "old régime" was the assumed +preference for aristocrats in diplomacy. This was quite a mistake. No +preference was shown for the aristocracy, but it lay in the nature of +the career that wealth and social polish were assets in the exercise +of its duties. An attaché had no salary. He was, therefore, expected +to have a tolerably good income at home in order to be able to live +conformably to his rank when abroad. This system arose out of +necessity, and was also due to the unwillingness of the authorities to +raise salaries in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The consequence +was that only sons of wealthy parents could adopt such a career. I +once told some delegates who interviewed me in connection with the +subject that a change of the system depended entirely on themselves +and their increased munificence. + +A certain amount of social polish was just as necessary for diplomats +of the old régime as was the requisite allowance for their household +and a knowledge of foreign languages. So long as courts exist in +Europe, the court will always be the centre of all social life, and +diplomats must have the entrée to such circles. A young man who does +not know whether to eat with his fork or his knife would play a sorry +part there--his social training is not an indifferent matter. +Preference is, therefore, not given to the aristocracy, but to young +men of wealth familiar with European society etiquette. + +That does not mean that a diplomat is to consider it his duty only to +show himself at all the parties and fêtes given by the upper ten +thousand, but it is one of his duties, as at such places he might gain +information unobtainable elsewhere. A diplomat must be in touch with +all sources from which he can glean information. + +Individual capabilities and zeal will naturally play a great part; but +the means that a Government places at the disposition of its foreign +missions are also of the highest importance. + +There are people in the East--I do not know whether to say in +contradistinction to the West--who are not immune to the influence of +gold. In Roumania, for instance, Russia, before the war, had +completely undermined the whole country and had lavished millions long +before the war in the hope of an understanding with that country. Most +of the newspapers were financed by Russians, and numbers of the +leading politicians were bound by Russian interests, whereas neither +Germany nor Austria-Hungary had made any such preparations. Thus it +happened that, on the outbreak of war, Russia was greatly in advance +of the Central Powers, an advance that was all the more difficult to +overtake as from the first day of war Russia opened still wider the +floodgates of her gold and inundated Roumania with roubles. + +If the fact that the scanty preparation for war is a proof of how +little the Central Powers reckoned on such a contingency it may on the +other hand explain away much apparent inactivity on the part of their +representatives. Karl Fürstenberg, my predecessor at Bucharest, whose +estimate of the situation was a just one, demanded to have more funds +at his disposal, which was refused at Vienna on the plea that there +was no money. After the war began the Ministry stinted us no longer, +but it was too late then for much to be done. + +Whether official Russia, four weeks in advance, had really counted on +the assassination of the Archduke and the outbreak of a war ensuing +therefrom remains an open question. I will not go so far as to assert +it for a fact, but one thing is certain, that Russia within a +measurable space of time had prepared for war as being inevitable and +had endeavoured to secure Roumania's co-operation. When the Tsar was +at Constanza a month before the tragedy at Sarajevo, his Minister for +Foreign Affairs, Sassonoff, paid a visit to Bucharest. When there, he +and Bratianu went on a walking tour together to Transylvania. I did +not hear of this tactless excursion until it was over, but I shared +Berchtold's surprise at such a proceeding on the part of both +Ministers. + +I once, in 1914, overheard by chance a conversation between two +Russians. It was at the Hotel Capsa, known later as a resort for +anti-Austrians. They were sitting at the table next to mine in the +restaurant and were speaking French quite freely and openly. They +appeared to be on good terms with the Russian Ambassador and were +discussing the impending visit of the Tsar to Constanza. I discovered +later that they were officers in mufti. They agreed that the Emperor +Francis Joseph could not live very much longer, and that when his +death occurred and a new ruler came to the throne It would be a +favourable moment for Russia to declare war on us. + +They were evidently exponents of the "loyal" tendency that aimed at +declaring war on us without a preceding murder; and I readily believe +that the majority of the men in Petersburg who were eager for war held +the same view. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE U-BOAT WARFARE + + +1 + +My appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs was thought by many to +indicate that the Emperor Charles was carrying out the political +wishes of his uncle, Ferdinand. Although it had been the Archduke's +intention to have made me his Minister for Foreign Affairs, my +appointment to the post by the Emperor Charles had nothing to do with +that plan. It was due, above all, to his strong desire to get rid of +Count Burian and to the lack of other candidates whom he considered +suitable. The Red Book that was published by Count Burian after the +outbreak of war with Roumania may have attracted the Emperor's +attention to me. + +Although the Emperor, while still Archduke, was for several years my +nearest neighbour in Bohemia--he was stationed at Brandeis, on the +Elbe--we never became more closely acquainted. In all those years he +was not more than once or twice at my house, and they were visits of +no political significance. It was not until the first winter of the +war, when I went from Roumania to the Headquarters at Teschen, that +the then Archduke invited me to make the return journey with him. +During this railway journey that lasted several hours politics formed +the chief subject of conversation, though chiefly concerning Roumania +and the Balkan questions. In any case I was never one of those who +were in the Archduke's confidence, and my call to the Ballplatz came +as a complete surprise. + +At my first audience, too, we conversed at great length on Roumania +and on the question whether the war with Bucharest could have been +averted or not. + +The Emperor was then still under the influence of our first peace +offer so curtly rejected by the Entente. At the German Headquarters at +Pless, where I arrived a few days later, I found the prevailing +atmosphere largely influenced by the Entente's answer. Hindenburg and +Ludendorff, who were apparently opposed to Burian's _démarche_ for +peace, merely remarked to me that a definite victory presented a +possibility of ending the war, and the Emperor William said that he +had offered his hand in peace but that the Entente had given him a +slap in the face, and there was nothing for it now but war to the +uttermost. + +It was at this time that the question of the unrestricted U-boat +warfare began to be mooted. At first it was the German Navy only, and +Tirpitz in particular, who untiringly advocated the plan. +Hohenlohe,[5] who, thanks to his excellent connections, was always +very well informed, wrote, several weeks before the fateful decision +was taken, that the German Navy was determined and bent on that aim. +Bethmann and Zimmermann were both decidedly against it. It was +entirely in keeping with the prudent wisdom of the former not to risk +such experiments; Bethmann was an absolutely dependable, honourable +and capable partner, but the unbounded growth of the military +autocracy must be imputed to his natural tendency to conciliate. He +was powerless against Ludendorff and little by little was turned aside +by him. My first visit to Berlin afforded me the opportunity of +thoroughly discussing the U-boat question with the Imperial +Chancellor, and we were quite agreed in our disapproval of that method +of warfare. At all events, Bethmann pointed out that such essentially +military matters should in the first instance be left to military +decision, as they alone were able to form a correct estimate of the +result, and these reflections made me fear from the very first that +all reasonable political scruples would be upset by military +arguments. On this my first visit to Berlin, when this question +naturally was the dominating one, the Chancellor explained to me how +difficult his position was, because the military leaders, both on land +and at sea, declared that if the unrestricted U-boat warfare were not +carried out they would not be able to guarantee the Western front. +They thus brought an iron pressure to bear on him, for how could he, +the Chancellor, undertake to guarantee that the Western front could +hold out? As a matter of fact, the danger of introducing the +unrestricted U-boat campaign became greater and greater, and the +reports sent by Hohenlohe left no doubt as to the further development +of affairs in Berlin. + +On January 12 he reported as follows: + + The question of the extension of the U-boat warfare, as Your + Excellency is aware from the last discussions in Berlin, becomes + daily more acute. + + On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities insist + on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they + declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand, + all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on + America and other neutrals. + + The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on a + very large scale is imminent in the West and that the armies which + are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the + navy should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at + any rate to decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to + our adversaries. The absence of co-operation on the part of the + navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will + again have to face will have a most _injurious_ effect on their + _moral_. + + The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might + have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that + America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact, + would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United + States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves + what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a + possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily + signify war. + + Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may + be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of + crushing England, at least to be able, _before_ America can come + in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire + will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves + with us at the Conference table. + + To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that + the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves + in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty + promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to + find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the + U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to + _beg_ for peace. + + And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or + against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively + determining which decision was the right one. + + Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be + constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the + question, and it is obvious--whatever the decision may be--that we + also shall be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me + that when the German Government does approach us in that + connection we should act with all possible reserve. As the matter + now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right + one is not possible. I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to + take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the + responsibility from the German Government and render it possible + for them to lay it upon us. + + The Imperial and Royal Ambassador, + + G. HOHENLOHE, M.P. + +The concluding passage of the above cited report had already been +anticipated by me in a telegraphic communication in which I begged the +ambassador with all possible energy to urge the political arguments +opposed to the unrestricted U-boat warfare, which is proved by a +telegram from Hohenlohe on January 13 as follows: + + Reply to yesterday's telegram No. 15. + + In accordance with the telegram mentioned, and after discussing it + with Baron Flotow, I went to the Secretary of State--not being + able to see the Chancellor to-day--and in conformity with Your + Excellency's intentions called his attention to the fact that we + should participate in the results of the U-boat war just as much + as Germany and that, therefore, the German Government is bound to + listen to us also. All the leading German statesmen know that Your + Excellency, during your stay here, expressed _yourself as opposed + to the movement_, but that I had come once more as Your + Excellency's representative to repeat the _warning against too + hasty action_. I further emphasised all the arguments against the + U-boat warfare, but will not trouble Your Excellency with a + repetition of them, nor yet with the counter-arguments, already + known to Your Excellency, that were put forward by the Secretary. + I gave a brief summary of both these standpoints in my yesterday's + report No. 6 P. + + Herr Zimmermann, however, laid special stress on the fact that the + information he was receiving convinced him more and more that + America, especially after the Entente's answer to Mr. Wilson, + which was in the nature of an insult, would very probably not + allow it to come to a breach with the Central Powers. + + I did all I possibly could to impress upon him the responsibility + Germany was taking for herself and for us by her decision in this + question, pointing out very particularly that before any decision + was arrived at our opinion from a nautical-technical standpoint + must also be heard, in which the Secretary of State fully + concurred. + + I have the feeling that the idea of carrying out the U-boat + warfare is more and more favourably received, and Your Excellency + had the same impression also when in Berlin. The last word as to + the final attitude to be adopted by the German Government will no + doubt come from the military side. + + In conformity with the instructions received, _I will nevertheless + uphold with all firmness the political arguments against the + U-boat warfare_. + + Baron Flotow will have occasion to meet the Secretary of State + this afternoon. + +I had sent Baron Flotow, a Chief of Department, to Berlin at the same +time, in order that he might support all Hohenlohe's efforts and spare +no pains to induce Germany to desist from her purpose. + +Flotow sent me the following report on January 15: + + After a two-days' stay in Berlin my impression is that the + question of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought + to the front by the leading men in the German Empire. This + question--according to Herr Zimmermann--under conditions of the + greatest secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under + debate between the heads of the Army and Navy and the Foreign + Office; they insist on a decision. For if the unrestricted U-boat + warfare is to be opened it must be at a time when, in view of the + vast impending Anglo-French offensive on the Western front, it + will make itself felt. The Secretary of State mentioned the month + of February. + + I wish in the following account to summarise the reasons put + forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted + U-boat warfare: + + Time is against us and favours the Entente; if, therefore, the + Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less + prospect of our obtaining a peace on our own terms. The enemy's + last Note to Wilson is again a striking example of their war + energy. + + It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war + after 1917 with any prospect of success. Peace must, therefore, + unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in + the course of this year, which means that we must enforce it. + + The military situation is unfavourable owing to the impending + Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with + great force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme. To + meet the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other + fronts. Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to + bring that enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have + been possible, can no longer be reckoned on. + + If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the East + becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in + the West, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat + warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding + the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral + flag. + + In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat + warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the + transport of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to + such a degree as would render it impossible for the English to + continue the war. In Italy and in France this will be felt no less + severely. The neutrals, too, will be made to suffer, which, + however, might serve as a pretext to bring about peace. + + America will hardly push matters further than breaking off + diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on + a war with the United States. + + It must not be overlooked that the United States--as was the case + in regard to Mexico--are not well prepared for war, that their one + anxiety is Japan. Japan would not allow a European war with + America to pass unheeded. + + But even if America were to enter the war it would be three to + four months before she could be ready, and in that space of time + peace must have been secured in Europe. According to the estimate + of certain experts (among others, some Dutch corn merchants), + England has only provisions sufficient for six weeks, or three + months at the outside. + + It would be possible to carry on the U-boat warfare on England + from fifteen bases in the North Sea, so _that the passage of a + large vessel through to England would be hardly conceivable_. + Traffic in the Channel, even if not entirely stopped, would be + very limited, as travelling conditions in France exclude the + possibility of suitable connection. + + And if the unrestricted U-boat warfare once were started, the + terror caused by it (the sinking of the vessels without warning) + would have such an effect that most vessels would not dare to put + to sea. + + The above already hints at the rejoinder to be put forward to the + arguments advanced by us against the opening of the unrestricted + U-boat warfare, and also combats the view that the corn supply + from the Argentine is not at the present moment so important for + the United States as would be a prompt opening of the U-boat + campaign, which would mean a general stoppage of all traffic. + + The fact that America would not be ready for war before the end of + three months does not exclude the possibility that it might even + be as long as six or eight months, and that she therefore might + join in the European war at a time when, without playing our last + card, it might be possible to end it in a manner that we could + accept. It must not be forgotten, however, that in America we have + to do with an Anglo-Saxon race, which--once it had decided on + war--will enter on it with energy and tenacity, as England did, + who, though unprepared for war as to military matters, can + confront to-day the Germans with an army of millions that commands + respect. I cannot with certainty make any statement as to the + Japanese danger to America at a time when Japan is bound up with + Russia and England through profitable treaties and Germany is shut + out from that part of the world. + + Among other things I referred to the great hopes entertained of + the Zeppelins as an efficient weapon of war. + + Herr Zimmermann said to me: "Believe me, our fears are no less + than yours; they have given me many sleepless nights. There is no + positive certainty as to the result; we can only make our + calculations. We have not yet arrived at any decision. Show me a + way to obtain a reasonable peace and I would be the first to + reject the idea of the U-boat warfare. As matters now stand, both + I and several others have almost been converted to it." + + But whether, in the event of the ruthless U-boat warfare being + decided on, it would be notified in some way, has not yet been + decided. + + Zimmermann told me he was considering the advisability of + approaching Wilson, and, while referring to the contemptuous + attitude of the Entente in the peace question, give the President + an explanation of the behaviour of the German Government, and + request him, for the safety of the life and property of American + citizens, to indicate the steamers and shipping lines by which + traffic between America and other neutrals could be maintained. + + _Vienna, January 15, 1917._ + + FLOTOW, M.P. + +On January 20 Zimmermann and Admiral Holtzendorff arrived in Vienna, +and a council was held, presided over by the Emperor. Besides the +three above-mentioned, Count Tisza, Count Clam-Martinic, Admiral Haus +and I were also present. Holtzendorff expounded his reasons, which I +recapitulate below. With the exception of Admiral Haus, no one gave +unqualified consent. All the arguments which appear in the official +documents and ministerial protocols were advanced but did not make the +slightest impression on the German representatives. The Emperor, who +took no part in the debate, finally declared that he would decide +later. Under his auspices a further conference was held in the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 2 o'clock; the report is as follows: + + Report of a conference held January 20, 1917, in the Imperial and + Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Dr. + Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs + Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval + Staff; Count Czernin, Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign + Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count + Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus, + the German naval attaché in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the + Imperial and Royal naval attaché in Berlin; Count B. + Colloredo-Mannsfeld. + + On January 20 a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs on the question of establishing unrestricted U-boat + warfare. + + As evidenced by Admiral v. Holtzendorff's statements, the German + naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an + absolute necessity for the quickest possible inauguration of an + unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in support of + this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and Royal + Ambassador in Berlin (report of 12/1/17 Nr. 6/P, and telegram of + 13/1 Nr. 22), and may be summarised in the following sentences: + Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central Powers, + progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-French + offensive on the Western front with improved and increased means + for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent or at + least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking, the + impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of + raising the _moral_ of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results + and the use of every available means in war, certainty of the + success of an unrestricted U-boat warfare in view of provisions + in England only being sufficient for two to three months, as well + as the stoppage of the munitions output and industrial production + owing to the lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying + coal to France and Italy, etc., etc. + + Concerning the carrying out of the plan, the German Navy owns at + present for that purpose 120 U-boats of the latest type. In view + of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of + the war, when there were only 19 of an antiquated type, the + present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guarantee of + success. + + February 1 is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date on + which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to + announce the blockade of the English coast and the west coast of + France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed + without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to + reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral + von Holtzendorff _expressis verbis_ guaranteed the results. + + As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading + German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic + views. It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or + Holland will interfere with us, although, in view of the + possibility of such happening, military precautions have been + taken. The measures taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will, + in the opinion of the Germans, hold those countries in check, and + the possibility of sharing the fate of Roumania will frighten + them. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a complete + stoppage of all neutral shipping, which in the matter of supplies + for England amounts to 39 per cent. of the cargo space. Meanwhile + concessions will be granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit + for the withdrawal of such of their vessels as may be at sea on + the opening day of the U-boat warfare. + + With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all + possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central + Powers by adopting a friendly attitude towards America (acting + upon the proposals made at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident), + but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever + attitude America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the + opinion that the United States will not go so far as making a + breach with the Central Powers. If that should occur, America + would be too late and could only come into action after England + had been beaten. America is not prepared for war, which was + clearly shown at the time of the Mexican crisis; she lives in fear + of Japan and has to fight against agricultural and social + difficulties. Besides which, Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the + Germans presume that after his election he will adopt a still + more decided tendency that way, for his election will not be due + to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the + Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the + Irish and Germans. These considerations, together with the + Entente's insulting answer to President Wilson's peace proposal, + do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into + war. + + These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand + for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is + based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign + Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views. + + Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian + Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would + ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral, + agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of + the success of a blockade of England. Count Czernin held that the + Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in + England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war + consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been + reduced by half. Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague + and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities. + It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to + the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons + per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end, + and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best + card until all other means had been tried. The possibility of + being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a + Damocles' sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would + perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the + reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it + the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the effect expected by + Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of + possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the + enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanishing of + the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact. + Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put + forward by the Germans show a complete _novum_, namely, the danger + on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive + that is expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the + attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered + necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy + into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most + certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and + the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be + accepted. Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their + grave doubts in this connection. + + To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the + necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the + neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the + Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to + them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing + unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice + was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as + the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations. + + The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary + steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements + had already been made. + + Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the + German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_ + as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force, + and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a + ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been + practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged + that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the + Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent. + + The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said + that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the + conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th + inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose. + +After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor, +and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare +and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany +had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and +that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to +be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small +number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great +effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I +entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should +separate from Germany on that one point, although I was aware that it +might lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty was that +the U-boat effort would also have to be carried on in the +Mediterranean in order that it should not lose its effect in the +North Sea. If the Mediterranean remained exempt, the transports would +take that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and Dover, and +thus render the northern U-boat warfare of no effect. But in order to +carry it on in the Mediterranean, Germany would need our support in +the Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed her at +those places it involved us in the campaign, and if we refused to let +our few U-boats go out, it would be attacking Germany in the rear and +we should become embroiled with her, which would lead to the definite +severance of the Alliance. + +This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong +and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it +changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally. None +who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart +we gave our consent. Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of +the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was +differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the +German plans. Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that +Bulgaria's not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside +world, and would not help her in any way. Although her relations with +America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of +fact, make her fate easier. + +Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat +warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined +in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of +our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of +Bulgaria. As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict +with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and +artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans. We were +compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already +at war with her. + +It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even +nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her +and Bulgaria to the very end of the war. + +It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact that +the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible +mistake. To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German +military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and +when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was +still that England would be defeated by the naval war. Writing on +December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles +the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however, certainly perceived +definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff +in replying to the reproaches I made to him said: "Everything is risky +in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the +results. I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final +result will show that I was right." In order to exculpate themselves +all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case, +have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last +impetus. Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either +be asserted or denied positively. + +The world has become used to looking upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff as +one; they belonged together. Together they rose to highest power, to +be forcibly separated in their fall. In all business transactions +Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great speaker, but always +in a sharp tone, suggestive of the Prussian military system. It +usually aroused a scene, but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his +anger vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's retiring +modesty made him attractive. Once when we were speaking of the +photographers who besieged every conference in Berlin, the old +gentleman remarked: "I have lived to be seventy, and nobody ever +thought there was anything wonderful about me; now they seem all at +once to have discovered that I have such an interesting head." He was +much more staid and quiet than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to +public opinion as the latter. I remember once how Ludendorff, when I +exhorted him to yield on the peace question, rejoined with vigour: +"The German people wishes for no peace of renunciation, and I do not +intend to end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty would never +survive such a peace." The dynasty has departed, the stones have been +thrown, and the peace of renunciation has become a reality, and is +certainly more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever have +believed! + + +2 + +The rupture between America and Germany occurred on February 3, 1917. + +The Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, remained in Washington, but was not +received by Wilson, and had intercourse with Lansing only. I still +hoped to maintain these semi-official relations with America, in case +America, in breaking off relations with Germany, might be content with +that and not declare war on her. The German Government would have +preferred our breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with +them. + +On February 12 Count Wedel called on me, and his request and my +settlement of it appear in the following telegram to Hohenlohe: + + + _Vienna, Feb. 12, 1917._ + + To notify Your Excellency. + + Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following + three requests from his Government: + + (1) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the + situation between Germany and America is clear. + + (2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his having + tried to make the neutrals turn against Germany. + + (3) On the outbreak of war with Germany Count Tarnowski must be + recalled. + + I have refused the first two items and accepted the last. + +As we should not have been able to prevent Germany from beginning the +U-boat warfare, the only alternative for us was to use all means in +our power to maintain our relations with America, and thus enable us +later to play the part of mediator, although this could only be for +that period during which America, having broken off relations, had not +yet declared war. My answer of March 5, 1917, to America's request +for an explanation of our standpoint was sent with the object of +preventing America from breaking off relations with us, and also to +keep from the public the knowledge of our divergence from Germany. +This will be found noted in the appendix.[6] It met with success so +far that America continued diplomatic relations with us until April 9, +1917. + +[Illustration: COUNT TISZA. _Photo: Stanley's Press Agency._] + +I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen Tisza in consequence +of my answer. I received the following letter on March 3: + + DEAR FRIEND,--In the interests of the cause I can only greatly + regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the definite + sense of our _aide-mémoire_ before it was dispatched. Apart from + other less important matters, I cannot conceal my painful surprise + that we repeatedly and expressly admit having given a promise in + our _Ancona_ Note. I am afraid that we have placed ourselves in a + very awkward position with Wilson, which so easily could have been + avoided, as it was not in accordance with my views that we had + given a promise. + + An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to + detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different + legal character, and from the point of view of a third person has + no legal authority in favour of that person as a promise. + + By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans a + promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them. + In spite of the fine and clever argument in our Note, it will be + easy for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot + be reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a + promise, then the American Government has the right to look for + the fulfilment of it, and we will then be in an awkward + predicament. I remarked in my notification that I would prefer to + omit the admission that we had made any promise; there would have + been the possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in + their hands we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a + checkmate, and I very much fear that we shall greatly regret it. + + Naturally this remains between us. But I was constrained to pour + out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of all + such important State documents which involve such far-reaching + consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and + comment on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the + cause and in every respect can only be for the best. In sincere + friendship, your devoted + + TISZA. + + + _Enclosure._ + + It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace + wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson, + influenced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a + decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my + presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as + possible the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America. + + Therefore the answer to the American _aide-mémoire_, to be + dispatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give + it the appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put + forward on the American side without falling into the trap of the + question put forward in the _aide-mémoire_. + + If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to + avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer we + shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on January 31. + + The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is + provided by the _aide-mémoire_ itself, as it identifies our + statements in the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ question with the attitude + of the German Note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite + consistent if we, as we did in our Note of December 14, 1915, were + to declare that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice. + + In our correspondence with the American Government respecting the + _Ancona_, _Persia_ and _Petrolite_ questions we treated the + concrete case always without going deeper into the individual + principles of legal questions. In our Note of December 29, 1915, + which contains the expression of opinion cited in the + _aide-mémoire_ (it may also be noted that our expression of + opinion was no pledge, as we had promised nothing nor taken any + obligation upon ourselves), the Austrian Government distinctly + stated that they would refer later to the difficult international + questions connected with the U-boat warfare. + + Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion. + In consequence, however, of the dealings of our enemies, events + have occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on + our side also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat + question unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever + attainable, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the + enemy. Our adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most + aggravated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals + offering any resistance. + + The Entente when laying their minefields displayed the same + ruthlessness towards free shipping and the lives of neutrals. + + Mines are considered as a recognised weapon for the definite + protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of + blockading an enemy port. But the use made of them as an + aggressive factor in this war is quite a new feature, for vast + areas of open sea on the route of the world's traffic were + converted into minefields impassable for the neutrals except at + the greatest danger of their lives. + + There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the + freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests + than establishing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited + and clearly marked-out zone, leaving open channels for neutral + shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the + interests of the neutrals. + + Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire + belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our + group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to + conclude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh + and larger minefield was laid down in the North Sea on the route + of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble + initiative of the United States, a war of destruction against our + groups of Powers was announced by the Entente. + + We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American + Government: the quickest possible cessation of the fearful + slaughter of men and the founding of an honourable, lasting and + blessed peace by combating with the greatest energy our enemies' + furious war for conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common + aims of ourselves and the American Government, and we cannot give + up the hope of finding understanding in the people and the + Government of the United States. + + TISZA. + + +I answered as follows: + + + _March 5._ + + DEAR FRIEND,--I cannot agree with you. After the first _Ancona_ + Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that "we + agreed with the German standpoint in the main"--that was an + obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise. + + I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and + if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any + further. + + But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with + words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it; + either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will + avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and + will find it in our Note. + + So much for the merits of the matter. + + What you demand is technically impossible. The Note was not easy + to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His + Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and + sanctioned it. Meanwhile Penfield[7] importuned me and telegraphed + even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans, + too, had to be won over for that particular passage. + + You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but + _ultra posse nemo tenetur_--it was physically impossible to upset + everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views. + + In true friendship, your + + CZERNIN. + +I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza: + + DEAR FRIEND,--I also note with genuine pleasure the success of + your American _aide-mémoire_ (meaning thereby America's resolve + not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter my + opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given. + It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it + would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment. + + Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final + word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think + me better than I am. + + Au revoir, in true friendship, your + + TISZA. + +Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated +it from reasons of _vis major_, because we could not prevent the +German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and +I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no +advantage to us. + +Not until very much later--in fact, not until after the war--did I +learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible +misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more +U-boats during the war. The Secretary of State, Capelle, was +approached by competent naval technical experts, who told him that, by +stopping the building of all other vessels, a fivefold number of +U-boats could be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext +"that nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats when the war +was at an end." Germany had, as mentioned, 100 submarines; had she +possessed 500, she might have achieved her aims. + +I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was from a source from +which I invariably gleaned correct information. + +Seldom has any military action called forth such indignation as the +sinking, without warning, of enemy ships. And yet the observer who +judges from an objective point of view must admit that the waging war +on women and children was not begun by us, but by our enemies when +they enforced the blockade. Millions have perished in the domains of +the Central Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest and +weakest people--the greater part women and children--were the victims. +If, to meet the argument, it be asserted that the Central Powers were +as a besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved Paris in +similar fashion, there is certainly some truth in the argument. But it +is just as true--as stated in the Note of March 5--that in a war on +land no regard is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war +zone, and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should be +subject to different moral conditions. When a town or village is +within the range of battle, the fact has never prevented the artillery +from acting in spite of the danger to the women and children. But in +the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy States who are +in danger can easily escape it by not undertaking a sea voyage. + +Since the débâcle in the winter of 1918, I have thoroughly discussed +the matter with English friends of long standing, and found that their +standpoint was--that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had +roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature of the +proceedings so opposed to international law. Also, the torpedoing of +hospital ships by the Germans, and the firing on passengers seeking to +escape, and so on. These accounts are flatly contradicted by the +Germans, who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English +brutality, as instanced by the _Baralong_ episode. + +There have, of course, been individual cases of shameful brutality in +all the armies; but that such deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the +German or English Supreme Commands I do not believe. + +An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court would be the only +means of bringing light to bear on the matter. + +Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be condemned, no matter who +the perpetrators are; but in itself, the U-boat warfare was an +allowable means of defence. + +The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible and necessary +proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat warfare is stigmatised as a crime +against international law. That is the sentence passed by might but +not by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[5] The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst. + +[6] See p. 279. + +[7] Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +ATTEMPTS AT PEACE + + +1 + +The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary +state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of +representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His +action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of +representatives. If the majority of that body are against the +minister, he must go. + +The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in +the hands of the delegations. + +Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a +regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was +responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently, +the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in +conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and +the Prime Minister." + +It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime +Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's régime it had +become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret +nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought +his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza +possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time +to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding +his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore, +to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign +policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime +Minister. + +Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the +friendship between us, still his constant supervision and +intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of +business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on +top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for +Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified +presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the +Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the +standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar +centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians. +He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism +save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to +keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a +crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of +Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected +cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined +than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the +Tyrol. + +Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for +Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's +internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external +pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of +provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian +Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was +fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any +expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All +his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a +mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at +most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her +over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with +Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He +looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to +the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he +was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian +pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered. +Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in +making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay +much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for +the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite +of eventual disagreement. + +This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was +unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various +disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these +scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty +word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised +never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I +promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after +this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different +reasons. + +I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had +caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a +speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly, +Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the +war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the +Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace +negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the +_status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of +great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become +hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood +in awe of nothing and nobody--and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this +upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth, +and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did. + +I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve +the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never +put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the +strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that +warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle +as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship +with him as with Tisza. + +Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest +reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this +remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years +Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and +manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity +raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with +brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in +Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and +he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of +old were made--heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often +did I reproach him with his unhappy "_puszta_" patriotism, that was +digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change +him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that, +all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy. +Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her +day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this +wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like +none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the +breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful +personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was +one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly +loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand +of some cowardly assassin. + +Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that +his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian. + +I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a +man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar +way of thinking spoilt him. + +Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in +the war. + +Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing +away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love +and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy +settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an +impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the +war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment, +through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was +beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains +true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. +The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition; +therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in +the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more +injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war. +Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder +that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly +linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but +like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck." + +If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would +have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any +sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into +partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion. + +But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was +impossible. + +Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever +be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind +fate preserve us from a return of dualism. + + +2 + +On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received +a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the +tactics to be observed: + + All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously + threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania, + etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour, + and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared + with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried + out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers. + + From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that + our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war + aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a + plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly + desire peace. + + We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to + neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the + necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for + our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from + making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions. + + An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the + belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and + might easily make the situation more strained; _a one-sided + announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the + belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything_. + + It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of + the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially, + but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints + concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting + interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief + aim, _the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the + English at sea_, is in the interests of the entire world, and that + our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the + future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral + side. + + I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest + friendship, your devoted + + TISZA. + +My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace +proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is +still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and +there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I +have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not +have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a +conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not +attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very +arrogant--an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's +speeches in the Hungarian Parliament--I think, nevertheless, that even +had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success. +However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only +strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with +increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a +mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end. + +In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial +concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed +from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private +individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government. +It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A +Government can make use of a private individual to take the first +step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may +also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the +knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the +latter occurred frequently during my term of office. + +I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, +even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should +be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the +above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could +separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her +purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose +aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian +aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her +Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would +have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an +understanding with Germany. + +The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the +extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready +to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a +conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have +brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance. + +I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim +at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of +pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent. + +After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to +judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have +separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further +accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But +it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single +moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her +Allies. + +An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A +person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give +credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral +Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been +instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of +them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions +would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question +of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if +agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the +same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that +_these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and +void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the +hostile country heard of the step_. + +The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final +sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to +negotiate unknown to the others. + +I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my +authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could +not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27 +through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that +Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further +bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as +stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I +drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not +being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for +peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was +constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate +from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as +mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to +conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee +secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our +Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made +clear. + +This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a +direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace +with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made +clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered +at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to +a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I +hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result. + +I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on +March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his +part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier, +would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole +world. + +The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After +all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility +of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that +direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to +make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the +Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve. + +If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted +U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the +altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer +of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all +expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time +there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat +could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to +counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was +only in the course of the summer that the success of the +anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed. + +In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative +to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid, +which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers +returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there +during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there +was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all +the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers; +potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the +majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so +that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and +they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and, +therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no +one to man them. + +This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different +sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came +from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was +noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an +end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of +the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on +into the winter, the result would be as in Russia--a revolution. + +At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy +Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The +Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their +Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of +non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and +his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At +the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety +concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that +she considered the game was lost. The revolution and the collapse of +the army in Russia still continued. + +Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us, +and justified the views of those who had always held that a little +more "endurance"--to use a word since become ominous--would lead to a +decision. + +During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an +important and adequately estimated significance to confidential +reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided +Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is +inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be +accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism. +Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from +political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from +the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own +personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are +apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the +feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies +of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the +leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be +compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved. + +In persons who make this _métier_ their profession, the wish is often +present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give +pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of +losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate +confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as +being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more +pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin, +was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming +from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were +losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to +assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the +politicians looked at the situation _among our opponents_ differently +from us. + +When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he +related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in +England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was +convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no +question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was +whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of +American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not, +but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing +incidents that might have occurred. + +After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that +many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact. +But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how +matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer +of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England +be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide +difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the +one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken +into account by German opinion. + +However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of +the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented +a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it +was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be +brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became +stronger. + +I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make +the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words +that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in +Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with +France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede +Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make +efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to +Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union. + +The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the +proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence +of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor +William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the +conference terminated with a request from the Germans for +consideration of the question. + +In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If +Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with +the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of +London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to +satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the +hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor +Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once, +nevertheless, to take the proposed step. + +I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the +circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an +amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a +definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany. + +In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to +the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting +that he would submit it to the Emperor William. + +The report was as follows:-- + + Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from + the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my + responsible opinion of the situation? + + It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an + end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to + take up Your Majesty's time needlessly. + + I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production + of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and, + above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to + under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of + the sufferings from the war. + + Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few + months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless + quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely + out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in + the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs. + + Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace + negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the + fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a + moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the + coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the + Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the + absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right + time is, therefore, of extreme importance. + + I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the + whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising + on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is + demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been + dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the + strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us + feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: _exempla trahunt_. + Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the + conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly + rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the + possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the + history of the world; it is without example and without precedent. + The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be + vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the + happenings that have now become daily occurrences. + + The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the + dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound + to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be + conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that + factor. + + Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the + town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our + Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for + the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch + whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one + where the people themselves are fighting for their national + independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the + population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your + Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any + day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances + occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal + the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further + efforts to secure peace will be defeated. + + I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely + different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military + circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I + am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached + the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders + in Berlin do not seek to deny it. + + I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark + on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the + interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than + a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central + Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months, + it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide + of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers + fought and died. + + I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your + Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the + Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when + I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very + day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as + convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and + I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the + dangers that I see ahead. + + Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly + aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can + throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact, + the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the + situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies + have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait + longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be + said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is + the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her + motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that + this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless, + that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be + launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we + shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds--and I + reckon it can be done in two or three months--we must then, before + America takes any further military action to our disadvantage, + make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not + shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to + make. + + Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such + hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous + deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that the + tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the + success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been + achieved. + + Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in + Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare + would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty + will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared + that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously + affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by + the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a + half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare + started, and all the information that we get from England is to + the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most + dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of + many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and + consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the + U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German + arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely + necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and + because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately, + would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted + U-boat warfare. + + To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the + U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory + will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that + England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will + lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics + than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more + fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall + a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible + awakening will follow. + + England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay + down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps--and here I + concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in + a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to + continue this war _à l'outrance_, or whether it would not be more + statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central + Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for + great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers. + + Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to + separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the + responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any + dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty + instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that + our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer + Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these + commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for + Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this + one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say: + + We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility + of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed, + then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make + the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has + proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect + from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be + ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected. + + Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to + make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the + Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to + defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with + all the means in your power and to your very last breath. + +On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial +Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor +Charles, and then to me:-- + + In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to + submit the following in answer to the enclosed _exposé_ from the + Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult. + + Since the _exposé_ was drawn up, the French and English on the + Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a + wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous + quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of + the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every + reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the + men and the iron will of their leaders. + + Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may + consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the + same confidence. + + The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political + upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a + large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the + situation would release more men even if it were considered + necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to + guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary + movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West + would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would + also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for + the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front + until the end of the war is reached. + + In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material + for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards + provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out + until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary, + especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken + into consideration. + + The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When + Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic + Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success + for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the + expected military advantages weighed against the political risk. + We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a + blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the + entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling + off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies + would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we + were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the + U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest + share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been + transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where + English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the + resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and + favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined + attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England. + + The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat + warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest + statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing + difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies, + as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include + urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength, + but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the + distress that England is suffering. + + The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head + Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed + account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The + review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of + the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8] + + According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda, + owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to + specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so + restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by + hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from + abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by + cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires + not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for + the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to + enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of + the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country, + it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two + instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it + is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats + reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable + extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope + of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater + number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport + facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries + in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed + with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the + possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo + space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat + warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last + year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if + they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But + they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the + subject have already said quite openly that there are only two + ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build + vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy + the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has + proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than + the new vessels building. + + England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss + of tonnage. + + The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and + on all private and Government activities will be felt more and + more. + + I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare + with the greatest confidence. + + According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister + Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that + France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed + before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since + then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping + up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased. + + The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this + war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after + it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France, + which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable. + + As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the + difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe + fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe + that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without + permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare, + without any further crises and without menace to Government + organisation. + + Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a + favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with + Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as + possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of + our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the + important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and + that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a + time when both political and military initiative are still in our + hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or + three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a + matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of + the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not + having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too + pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to + failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the + hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present + moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to + the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be + tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the + Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as + regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative + necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been + favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within + the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political, + economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day + that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will + be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to + follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in + Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but + yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace + negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any + appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to + find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace + between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have + the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the + general peace. + + As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance + with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an + end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a + prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies. + +This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on +the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also +the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as +Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as +we did. + +I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the +following passage:-- + + The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no + doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all + essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with + _sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a + love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more + peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be + crushed. + + I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your + report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the + leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that + you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both + His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the + world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they + cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not + persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation. + +It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest +efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in +order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to +persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were +prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German +military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of +sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in +the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct +touch with the German Reichstag. + +One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections +with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with +different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the +Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the +Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was +enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have +incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were +thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we +simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been +vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore, +absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had +been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret +from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence +with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the +Ministry eventually to disavow the advances. + +My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency +and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9] +and Südekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now +reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it +was to be peace or war _à l'outrance_. France was tired and not +anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the +latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the +situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey +could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a +successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole +world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war +compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the +recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a +universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered +the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the +war.) + +Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as +Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following: + + (1) No annexations, no indemnities. + + (2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium + (politically and economically). + + (3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be + evacuated as soon as both those States had had their + territories restored to them (including the German + colonies). + + (4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general + disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible. + +Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the +Reichstag, and to be made public. + +The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step. +The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme +Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to +secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable. +When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were +satisfied. + +Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault +at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with +Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the +decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the +entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them +per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with +a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace," +the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the +subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval +of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any +decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a +speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it." + +The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his +very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views +regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to +in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any +rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to +herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic +influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:-- + + _Berlin, August 17, 1917._ + + DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the + liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of + the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your + Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my + activities. + + The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies + me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand + a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than + we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of + the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably + higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less + than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out + economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories, + including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with + regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915. + + There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The + people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is + very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really + morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will + be no worse than it was last year. + + This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the + condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from + the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change + for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary + to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as + would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is + already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly + prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it. + It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war + in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most + earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace + as soon as possible. + + Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to + come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion, + would be a great tactical error. Our _démarche_ for peace last + December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered + by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind + would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any + peace advances must come now from the enemy. + + The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the + watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm + of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal + co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the + spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency + agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our + enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to + agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he + states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into + if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down + there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen + to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations + for peace. + + At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a + proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the + reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on + which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as + follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is + not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is + ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession + of any German territory; with such a conception of the term + "reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very + suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the + desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by + negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close + economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer + to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's + frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the + continent and overseas. + + Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but + must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace + negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of + Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal + grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any + noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine. + + I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the + matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and + economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at + the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until + the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany, + the acquisition of Liége (or a long-term rental thereof)--were + the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The + Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or + similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on + England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and + military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the + matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much + resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to + see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a + prosperous future. + + As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your + Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State + is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France, + which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as + out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent + State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of + November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an + actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the + future will be tested later. There are already many signs of + danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the + Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of + her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in + the administration of the whole state. + + It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger + caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary + through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would + not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the + frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to + grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the + possibility of being joined to Russia. + + The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the + Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in + connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany + respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland. + + It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin, + here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the + questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there + may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling + us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full + agreement. + + With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very + devoted + + MICHAELIS. + +I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course, +the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I +could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing +war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it +imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any +revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would +spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of +Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor +Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore, +conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to +peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, +and I failed to understand it. + +I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the +minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the +question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable +annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers. + +I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German +Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and +that it would be out of the question for the German Government to +ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question +of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and +it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end +the war. + +Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor. + +It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the +situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I +had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I +remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on +me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was +prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of +east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession +of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in +war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the +Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case +for a doctor. + +There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's +ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he +left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling. + +About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the +scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs. + +Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of +persons who, without being in any important position, had access to +diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names, +especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard +the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very +unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the +Entente were slackening.[10] + +It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused +and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early +summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of +the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the +Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of +the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of +our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente +welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance. + +I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear +light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further +development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what +happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with +Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western +Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a +general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the +Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us. + +Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the +time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the +collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to +blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also +suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to +Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by +personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were +repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that +when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of +documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the +matter_, but could not possibly have known. + +Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the +universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I +felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, +from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other +side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to +me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit +of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone +was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination +for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the +alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the +downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a +neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had +heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they +expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of +course, would alter the entire military situation. + +Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral +country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind +the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as +suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, +the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe +about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other +forces were at work. + +The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a +further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet +not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it +lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted +than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to +the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh +instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a +more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In +the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland +myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not +have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it +would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the +mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held +the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert +that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial +Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the +case was different. + +One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the +impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked +everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In +Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were +as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to +Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm +signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that +the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would +have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London. + +The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined +visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs, +separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of +1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less. +It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had +first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final +military victory. + +These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace +wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera +negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment +to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together +with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a +sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the +negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient +agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from +the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace +when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire +group of Powers. + +Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us +from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in +London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we +ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace; +for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see +Germany, her chief enemy, isolated. + +There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the +idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from +the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for +negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being +enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in +any case, would claim the promises made to her. + +In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on +the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify +the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and +insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we +should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the +Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And +secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had +already begun to do so. + +When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags +others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations, +opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the +foregoing events. + +The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was +that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our +Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace. +For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being +crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that +we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance. + +Later I had information from England relating to the official view of +the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic +confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so +strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy +was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made +the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with +her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our +intervention--would have put an end to the war. + +This information was to the effect that England was less than ever +inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been +guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German +militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would +support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was +necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's +military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the +army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military +successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace +resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not +enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in +the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial +collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power. +Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente +said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of +understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate +itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged +against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude +peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that +in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far +as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to +conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises +made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much +territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in +exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states +like Poland. + +This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of +making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the +bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a +more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding +might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military +questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power +proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's +power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then. + +Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the +actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing +misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England +meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy +was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and +Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in +a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened +and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible. + +By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the +strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of +a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best +and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous +without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's +eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat. +According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of +France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed +being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just +as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any +dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the +lust for conquest and the policy of violence. + +The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite +justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the +smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception +that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at +Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not +only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns. + +Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy +continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety +as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the +"hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like +throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, +too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of +settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly +detrimental to all pacifist tendencies. + +In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same +category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest +heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to +irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who +otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he +called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not +the slightest impression on him. + +The _démarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been +published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made +by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter. + +In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at +Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the +representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties +to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear +by the following letter to Tisza. + + (_Not dated._) + + DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of + Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation. + The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission + to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were + there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value + them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two + last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of + peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the + Empire. + + If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor + will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear + friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor + will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that. + + Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my + prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved + to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service + but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war + not coming to an end. + + If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they + would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been + allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace. + + Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the + Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to + "buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if + they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but + that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace. + + I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the + death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in + the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very + indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside + Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam. + + Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the + octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more, + but the contention is false. + + You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we + shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it + is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to + prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the + valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous + steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none + of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of + using _sabotage_ with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps + tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they + understand and have the conviction that it cannot be + otherwise--that a _vis major_ predominates; in other words, that + peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill + will or stupidity of the Ministers. + + The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the + speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we + were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and + made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to + a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm. + + You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's + what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the + slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an + anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the + dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are + always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard + helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this + movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only + way to keep a straight course--he must hold out. Such is the case + of statecraft in Vienna--it is always carried out of the course of + the Alliance. + + It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought + feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully. + Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not + carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing + either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_ + share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk + about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old + + CZERNIN. + +As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be +quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social +Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known. + +As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in +detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the +negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts +were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the +Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in +the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about +the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was +at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and +which finally wrecked them all. + +The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite +correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of +intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, +and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism. +Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany +was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the +Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us +the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could +conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices. +The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted. +Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as +well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the +Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the +Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided +concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, +naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain +premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not +meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however, +the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be +laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but +beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the +frontier posts in the Monarchy. + +It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a +settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals +such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as +was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I +referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone +accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the +future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a +peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in +other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the +Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the +unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine. + +Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were +not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory. +Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in +England especially there were various currents of thought; not +everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to +lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I +seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by +some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable +military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; +she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or +provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea +was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even +unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make +use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She +would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente, +therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even +of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of +German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that +I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be +secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by +Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined +what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the +enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had +to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal. +Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible +and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration +under international control: that, according to my idea, would present +an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in +this, as in the territorial question, would not mete out the same +measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some +guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the +plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a +trial. + +Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question, +which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in +Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred +that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any +further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined +that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the +mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us +to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty +to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost +more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it, +concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military +superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the +Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war. + +I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who +readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations +would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the +war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid +assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and +Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation +that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a +treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies. +Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new +Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have +certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such +relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up +Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and +Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for a vague +promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful +remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by +dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice +Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and +Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the +concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could +understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the +arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be +let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister +who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain +sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living +being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still +more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that +represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out +fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save +himself--but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he +suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the +German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge, +for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but +even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that +deprived us of Bozen and Meran. + +My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to +the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another +ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German +people, for whom no hatred was felt--always the same repetition of +that deceptive argument--but German militarism. England was in a +condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany +were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more +extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would +then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then +England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own +existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard +one, but it would not crush her. In London they cite again the +example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done +man can do again." + +This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and +the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare +ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would +be a great advantage and an important step towards peace. + +My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of +securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that +militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that +direction. + +At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party +leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone +would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At +home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed, +and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting, +and would further check all friendly intentions. + +The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world +organisation is as follows:-- + + The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said: + words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true + respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a + maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are + fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to + know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to + know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet + been made. + + When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly + to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should + tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace + negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of + a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained, + though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian + Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have + reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said + critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness + of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am + that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my + attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called + upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal + Government will deal with the further development of the utterly + distorted European conditions. + + Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation, + preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation, + is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It, + therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme + and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided + us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It + will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear + incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially + Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military + armament, as it is only their military power that has protected + them through these trying years against vastly superior forces. + + Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it + has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the + foundations of former European policy. Among many other political + theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring + state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the + Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and + caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But + having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at + any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on + a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no + hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms. + Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could + not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to + unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the + legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have + been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down + arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration. + This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of + not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of + arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with + all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past. + + After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new + political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This + basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature: + + In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall + be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can + bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will + be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have + undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can + achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is + international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of + the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these + measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate + state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally + to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be + combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all + states in the world must be established on an international basis + and under international control, and the defensive forces limited + to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult + to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny + and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a + path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether + it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to + imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it + left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by + and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could + happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue + after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin + of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be + borne were heavy--though we specially note that Austria-Hungary + was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when + we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during + the war that she resumed her armaments--but after this war an open + competition in armaments would render state burdens all round + simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments + in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold + supply of everything--ten times the artillery, munition factories, + vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to + work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great + Powers would comprise many milliards--it would be impossible with + all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to + bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean + the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively + limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite + impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind + that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred + would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively + low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an + international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no + sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether. + + There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute + international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any + object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world + guarantee the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to + the lowest limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the + interior. This will only be possible on an international basis; + that is, under international control. Every state will have to + cede some of its independence to ensure a world peace. The present + generation will probably not live to see this great pacifist + movement fully completed. It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I + consider it our duty to put ourselves at the head of the movement + and do all that lies in human power to hasten its achievement. The + conclusion of peace will establish the fundamental principles. + + If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory + international arbitration system as well as general disarmament on + land, the second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas + and disarmament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not + extend the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that + special rules and regulations must be laid down for the connecting + sea routes. If these first two factors have been settled and + assured, any reason for territorial adjustments on the plea of + ensuring national safety is done away with, and this forms the + third fundamental principle of the new international basis. This + idea is the gist of the beautiful and sublime Note that His + Holiness the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not gone + to war to make conquests, and we have no aggressive plans. If the + international disarmament that we so heartily are longing for be + adopted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we are in + no need of assurances of territorial safety; in that case, we can + give up the idea of expanding the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, + provided, of course, that the enemy has entirely evacuated our own + territory. + + The fourth principle to enforce in order to ensure a free and + peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have + experienced is the free economic participation by everyone and the + unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature + must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude + peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies + have given up that idea. + + Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world + organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based + on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note, + has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament. + Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted + these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but + agree thoroughly on one--that there nevermore should be a war of + revenge. + +The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most +pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the +subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be +hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment. + +Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a +guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an +opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the +greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was +knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came +from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of +disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only +one way out of it--a fight to the end and then victory. + +Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side +unconditionally with the generals. + +Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as +after my speech--both for and against, with both sides equally +impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn +and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement. + +In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The +U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to +overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the +positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of +their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk +of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign +was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though +mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the +ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse. The +U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western +front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen. + +The military situation underwent a change in the autumn. The end of +the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being +able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the +line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved +the situation. + +It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a +decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was +the new military opinion. Paris and Calais could not be taken. + +In these different phases of military hopes and expectation we floated +like a boat on a stormy sea. In order to land in the haven of peace, +we needed a military wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only +could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would help us to reach +the saving shores. As long as the enemy persisted only in dealing with +the crushed and depopulated Central Powers all was in vain. + +I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare. I believed in a +break-through on the Western front, and during the winter of 1917-1918 +lived in the hope that by such means we might break the obstinate love +of destruction in our enemies. + +As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained the same peace was +impossible, as was also the bringing of any outside pressure to bear +on Germany, for it was true that "the German army was fighting more to +support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own existence." + +Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions of the Pact of +London confronted us. They forced us always to take up arms again, and +drove us back into the field. + + * * * * * + +At the time of writing these lines, in June, 1919, Austria has long +ceased to exist. There is only left now a small, impoverished, +wretched land called German-Austria, a country without army or money; +helpless, starving, and wellnigh in despair. This country has been +told of the peace terms at St. Germain. It has been told it must give +up the Tyrol as to be handed over to Italy. And defenceless and +helpless as it is, it sends up a cry of despair and frantic grief. One +voice only is heard--such peace is impossible! + +How could an Austrian Government accept the dictates of London at a +time when our armies stood far advanced in enemy country, unvanquished +and unbroken, when we had for Ally the strongest land Power in the +world, and when the greatest generals of the war so firmly believed in +the break-through and in final victory? + +To demand that in 1917 or 1918 I should have accepted peace terms +which in 1919 were rejected by the whole of the German-Austrian people +is sheer madness. But it may be there is method in such madness. The +method of using every means to discredit the "old régime." + + * * * * * + +In the beginning of August, 1917, an effort was made at a +_rapprochement_ between England and Germany which, unfortunately, +almost immediately broke down. + +At the suggestion of England a neutral Power had sounded Germany with +regard to Belgium. Germany replied that she was ready for direct +verbal negotiations with England on the Belgian question. In +transmitting this favourable answer, Germany did not entrust it to the +same neutral Power that had brought the message, but for some unknown +reason confided it to a trusted messenger from another neutral +country. This latter appears to have been guilty of some indiscreet +dealings, and when rumours of the affair reached Paris it caused some +anxiety. It was probably thought there that England was more +interested in the Belgian than in the Alsace-Lorraine question. + +The messenger sent from Berlin thought that his task had failed, and +sent word to Berlin that, owing to his errand having been made known, +the opinion among the Entente was that every step taken by Germany was +condemned beforehand to failure. + +The Government which had employed the messenger took up the case on +its own initiative, and transmitted the German reply to London. No +answer was ever received from England. + +This is the account as given to me _post festum_ by Berlin, and +doubtless reflects Berlin's views. Whether the incident in detail was +exactly as described, or whether many more hitherto unknown events +took place, has not been proved. + +During the war all happenings on the other side of the trenches were +looked upon with dim and gloomy eyes as through a veil, and, according +to news received by me later, it was not clear whether England had +sent an answer. Whether it was dispatched and held up on the way, or +what became of it I never knew. It is said never to have reached +Berlin. + +A warlike speech by Asquith on September 27 appears to be connected +with this unsuccessful attempt, and served to calm the Allies. + +It appears extremely doubtful to me, however, whether this advance +would have led to anything, had the occasion been more favourable. The +previously mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis dates +from those August days, a letter referring to Belgian projects which +were very far removed from the English ideas on the subject. And even +if it had been possible to settle the Belgian question, there would +have been that of Alsace-Lorraine, which linked France and England +together, and, first and foremost, the question of disarmament. The +chasm that divided the two camps would have grown so wide that no +bridge could possibly have spanned it. + +Not until January, 1918, did I learn the English version. According to +that, the Germans are said to have taken the first steps, and the +English were not disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It +was stated in _Vorwärts_ that the suggestion was made at the +instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that subsequently military +influence gained the upper hand. The episode did not tend to improve +the frame of mind of the leading men in England. + +In the early summer of 1917 conditions seemed favourable for peace and +the hope of arriving at an understanding, though still far distant, +was not exactly a Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our +group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have contributed to +stiffen the desire for war in the Entente countries cannot definitely +be stated. Both factors had a share in it. Before we came to a +deadlock in the negotiations, the position was such that even in case +of a separate peace we should have been compelled to accept the terms +of the conference of London. Whether the Entente would have abandoned +that basis if we had not veered from the straight course, and by +unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist +desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not +proved, and never will be. After the débâcle in the winter of 1918-19 +it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power +a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question. His +standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed. +Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only +came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and +were beginning to falter. + +With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and England would have +welcomed a separate peace on our part, even during Clemenceau's period +of office; but in that case we should have had to accept the terms of +the London conference. + +Such was the peace question then. How it would have developed if no +misleading policy had come into being naturally cannot be stated. + +I am not putting forward suppositions but confirming facts. And the +fact remains that the failure of the U-boat campaign on the one hand, +and a policy carried on behind the backs of the responsible men on the +other hand, were the reasons why the favourable moment passed and the +peace efforts were checked. And I herewith repeat that this fact does +not in itself prove that peace negotiations would not also have failed +later if the two reasons mentioned above had not existed. + +It became quite clear in the autumn that the war would have to +continue. In my speeches to delegations I endeavoured to leave no +doubt that we were faithful to our Allies. When I said "I see no +difference between Strassburg and Trieste," I said it chiefly for +Sofia and Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple Alliance +was the greatest danger. I still hoped to be able to prop the +trembling foundations of the Alliance policy, and either to secure a +general peace in the East, where the military opposition was giving +way, or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German +break-through on the Western front. + +Several months after my dismissal in the summer of 1918 I spoke in the +Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and warned everyone present against +trying to undermine the Quadruple Alliance. When I declared that +"honour, duty to the Alliance, and the call for self-preservation +compel us to fight by the side of Germany," I was misunderstood. It +did not seem as though the public realised that the moment the Entente +thought the Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that moment +our cause was lost. Had the public no knowledge of the London +agreement? Did they not know that a separate peace would hand us over +totally defenceless to those cruel conditions? Did they not realise +that the German army was the shield that afforded us the last and only +possibility of escaping the fate of being broken up? + +My successor steered the same course as I had done, doubtless from the +same reasons of honour and the call for self-preservation. I have no +particulars as to what occurred in the summer of 1918. + +Afterwards events followed in rapid succession. First came our +terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente break-through on the +Western front, and finally the Bulgarian secession, which had +gradually been approaching since the summer of 1917. + + +3 + +As is the case in all countries, among the Entente during the war +there were many and varied currents of thought. When Clemenceau came +into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war +aim. + +To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a +Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as +though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military +strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I think that +this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when +any such hope was deceptive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote +in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining +influence in England. + +When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to +discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in +Germany was to be or could be guaranteed--and I invariably came to an +_impasse_. It was never explained how England intended to carry out +the proposal. + +The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined +people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly +admitted to us in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not +suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could +lead to a decision. + +Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a +parliamentary régime which would have deprived the Emperor of power +and given it to the Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not +later. The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A disarmament +treaty with Germany would be a treaty between a fox and many geese," +conveyed what he really thought. + +After my Budapest speech, which was treated with such scorn and +contempt in the Press and by public opinion on the other side of the +Channel, word was sent to me from an English source that it was said +the "Czernin scheme" might settle the question. But again it was not +Lloyd George who said that. + +Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the English Prime +Minister, and with them the great majority in France and England, had +of Germany's intentions, no measure could be devised that would have +given London and Paris a sufficient guarantee for a future peaceful +policy. From the summer of 1917, no matter what Germany had proposed, +Lloyd George would always have rejected it as inadequate. + +In consequence of this it was quite immaterial later to the course of +the war that Germany not only did nothing whatever to allay English +fears, but, on the contrary, poured oil in the fire and fanned the +flames. + +Germany, the leading military Power in the war, never for one moment +thought of agreeing to disarmament under international control. After +my speech in Budapest I was received in Berlin not in an unfriendly +manner, but with a sort of pity, as some poor insane person might be +treated. The subject was avoided as much as possible. Erzberger alone +told me of his complete agreement with me. + +Had Germany been victorious her militarism would have increased +enormously. In the summer of 1917 I spoke to several generals of high +standing on the Western front, who unanimously declared that after the +war armaments must be maintained, but on a very much greater scale. +They compared this war with the first Punic War. It would be continued +and its continuation be prepared for; in short, the tactics of +Versailles. The standard of violence must be planted, and would be the +banner of the generals, the Pan-Germans, the Fatherland Party, etc. +etc. They thought as little about a reconciliation of the nations +after the war as did the Supreme Council of Four at Versailles, and +Emperor, Government and Reichstag floundered helplessly in this +torrent of violent purpose. + +The military spirit flourished on the Spree as it is doing now on the +Seine and the Thames. Lloyd George and Unter den Linden in Berlin. +The only difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that the one is a +Frenchman and the other a German; as men they are as like as two peas. + +The Entente is victorious, and many millions are delighted and declare +that the policy of Might is justified. The future only can show +whether this is not a terrible mistake. The lives of hundreds of +thousands of young, hopeful men who have fallen might have been saved +if in 1917 peace had been made possible for us. The triumph of victory +cannot call them back to life again. It appears to me that the Entente +has conquered too much, too thoroughly. The madness of expiring +militarism, in spite of all its orgies, has perhaps celebrated its +last triumph at Versailles. + + +Postscript. + +Taking it altogether, the real historical truth concerning the peace +movement is that, in general, neither the Entente nor the ruling, +all-powerful military party in Germany wished for a peace of +understanding. They both wished to be victorious and to enforce a +peace of violence on the defeated adversary. The leading men in +Germany--Ludendorff above all--never had a genuine intention of +releasing Belgium in an economic and political sense; neither would +they agree to any sacrifices. They wished to conquer in the East and +the West, and their arbitrary tendencies counteracted the pacifist +leaning of the Entente as soon as there were the slightest indications +of it. On the other hand, the leading men in the Entente--Clemenceau +from the first and Lloyd George later--were firmly resolved to crush +Germany, and therefore profited by the continuous German threats to +suppress all pacifist movements in their own countries, always ready +to prove that a peace of understanding with Berlin would be a "pact +between the fox and the geese." + +Thanks to the attitude of the leading Ministers in Germany, the +Entente was fully persuaded that an understanding with Germany was +quite out of the question, and insisted obstinately on peace terms +which could not be accepted by a Germany still unbeaten. This closes +the _circular vitiosus_ which paralysed all negotiating activities. + +_We_ were wedged in between these two movements and unable to strike +out for ourselves, because the Entente, bound by their promises to +their Allies, had already disposed of us by the Pact of London and the +undertakings to Roumania and Serbia. We therefore _could_ not exercise +extreme pressure on Germany, as we were unable to effect the annulment +of those treaties. + +In the early summer of 1917 the possibility of an understanding +_seemed_ to show itself on the horizon, but it was wrecked by the +previously mentioned events. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] Helfferich's _exposé_ is reproduced in the Appendix. (See p. 288.) + +[9] At this time I did not know that my secret report to the Emperor +was handed over to Herr Erzberger and not kept secret by him. (Later it +was made public through the revelations of Count Wedel.) + +[10] The disclosures made by Count Wedel and Helfferich concerning +Erzberger are only a link in the chain. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +WILSON + + +Through the dwindling away of the inclination for peace in the enemy +camp we were faced in the autumn of 1917 by the prospect either of +concluding separate peace and accepting the many complicated +consequences of a war with Germany and the ensuing mutilation of the +Monarchy under the terms of the Pact of London, or else fighting on +and, aided by our Allies, breaking the will for destruction of our +enemies. + +If Russia was the one to let loose war, it was Italy who perpetually +stood in the way of a peace of understanding, insisting upon obtaining +under all circumstances the whole of the Austrian territory promised +to her in 1915. The Entente during the war assigned the several parts +to be enacted. France was to shed the most blood; England, besides her +fabulous military action, to finance the war, together with America, +and diplomatic affairs to be in Italy's hands. Far too little is known +as yet, and will only later be public knowledge, as to the extent to +which Italian diplomacy dominated affairs during the war. Our +victories in Italy would only have changed the situation if the +defeats that were suffered had led to an Italian revolution and a +complete overthrow of the régime existing there. In other words, the +Royal Government would not be influenced in its attitude by our +victories. Even had our armies advanced much farther than they did, it +would have held to its standpoint in the expectation that, perhaps not +Italy herself, but her Allies, would secure final victory. + +Such was the situation in the autumn of 1917 when Wilson came forward +with his Fourteen Points. + +The advantage of the Wilson programme in the eyes of the whole world +was its violent contrast to the terms of the Pact of London. The right +of self-determination for the nations had been utterly ignored in +London by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy. Wilson forbade this +and declared that nations could not be treated against their will and +moved hither and thither like the pieces in a game of chess. Wilson +said that every solution of a territorial question arising out of this +war must be arrived at in the interests and in favour of the peoples +concerned, and not as a mere balancing or compromise of claims from +rival sources; and further, that all clearly stated national claims +would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be afforded them, +without admitting new factors or the perpetuation of old disputes or +oppositions, which in all probability would soon again disturb the +peace of Europe and the whole world. A general peace, established on +such a basis could be discussed--and more in the same strain. + +The publication of this clear and absolutely acceptable programme +seemed from day to day to render possible a peaceful solution of the +world conflict. In the eyes of millions of people this programme +opened up a world of hope. A new star had risen on the other side of +the ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction. A mighty man +had come forward and with one powerful act had upset the London +resolutions and, in so doing, had reopened the gates for a peace of +understanding. + +From the first moment the main question was, so it seemed, what hopes +were there of Wilson's programme being carried out in London, Paris +and, above all, in Rome? + +Secret information sent to me from the Entente countries seemed to +suggest that the Fourteen Points were decidedly not drawn up in +agreement with England, France and Italy. On the other hand I was, and +still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken honestly and +sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed that his programme could +be carried out. + +Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual +distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his +surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and +especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly +weaken his position and his influence on his Allies. There would be +no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly introducing Wilson into the +international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong +directions, so that he could not find his way out again. To begin +with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step further. + +The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in +Austria-Hungary. Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed +than it is now. Nations were still sleeping--the Czechs, Slovaks and +Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to +national life. Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between +what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting. The union between +Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of--or was +perhaps the first sign of--the world-movement. At all events it was in +the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of +international politics. + +The world's racial problems found a centre in Austria-Hungary, whose +affairs, therefore, became very prominent. A chemist can enclose in +his retorts different substances and observe how, following the +eternal laws of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a +similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved racial +antagonisms might have been studied within the Habsburg Monarchy and +the inevitable explosion anticipated, instead of its being allowed to +culminate in the world war. + +In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson obviously felt the +necessity of settling the world problem of nationality and recognised +that the Habsburg Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as +a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a terrifying +example. But to begin with, he overlooked the fact that in the +settling of national questions there must be neither adversary nor +ally, as those reflect passing differences, whereas the problem of +nationality is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that what +applies to the Czechs applies also to Ireland, that the Armenians as +well as the Ukrainians desire to live their own national life, and +that the coloured peoples of Africa and India are human beings with +the same rights as white people. He also failed to see that good will +and the desire for justice are far from being sufficient in themselves +to solve the problem of nationality. Thus it was that under his +patronage, and presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the +question of nationality was not solved but simply turned round where +not actually left untouched. If Germans and Magyars had hitherto been +the dominating races they would now become the oppressed. By the terms +settled at Versailles they were to be handed over to states of other +nationality. Ten years hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as +they exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations will have +appeared and become dominant. The explosive power of unsolved +questions will continue to take effect and within a measurable space +of time again blow up the world. + +Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the programme of the +Pact of London, though not attaching sufficient importance to the +national difficulties, probably hoped to be able to effect a +compromise between the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal +policy. In this connection, however, no bridge existed between Rome +and Washington. Conquests are made by right of the conqueror--such was +Clemenceau's and Orlando's policy--or else the world is ruled on the +principles of national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal, +however, will not be attained--no ideal is attainable; but it will be +brought very much nearer. Might or Right, the one alone can conquer. +But Czechs, Poles and others cannot be freed while at the same time +Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans and Transylvanian-Hungarians are +handed over to foreign states. It cannot be done from the point of +view of justice or with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles +and St. Germain have proved that it can be done by might, and as a +temporary measure. + +The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which +all Franz Ferdinand's political interests were centred during his +lifetime. Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he +certainly did try. The Emperor Charles, too, was not averse to the +movement. The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative +to make the experiment. His idea was _quieta non movere_. Without +powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the +German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible. Therefore, when +Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the +scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the +German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread. + +I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions +entertained by Wilson--nor do I doubt them now--but my doubts as to +his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced. +It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger +than when he took part in the Peace Conference. As long as fighting +proceeded Wilson was master of the world. He had only to call back his +troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be +placed in a most difficult position. It has always been +incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not +have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to +preserve his own war aims. + +The secret information that I received soon after the publication of +the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the +situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect +for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated +France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition. The logical and +practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the +public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to +understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace +negotiations. Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between +Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open. + +On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I +spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them +to be--in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies--a +suitable basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took steps +to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in a practical way the +fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out. The +negotiations were then by no means hopeless. + +Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding. Although that +episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot +have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise +that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought +against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply +to Vienna. On February 12--thus, _after_ the conclusion of the Brest +peace--the President, in his speech to Congress, said: + + Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace + foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an + independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish + inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for + European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium + must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and + concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be + satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of + Europe and humanity. + + Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with + the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is + only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances + to defer to Germany and Turkey. Recognising and agreeing with the + important principles in question and the necessity of converting + them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more + easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by + the United States. He would probably have gone even further had he + not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and + the country's dependence on Germany. + +In the same speech the President goes on to say: + + Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8 + is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements a + sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own + Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a + thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims. + +And again: + + I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most + confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say + what it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone + from that of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very + different object in view. + +There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us +speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he +has the best intentions of coming to an understanding. My efforts in +this connection were interrupted by my dismissal. + +In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had +definitely lost faith in me. This was not due to the Wilson question, +nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy. A +difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's +entourage and myself was the real reason. The situation became so +strained as to make it unbearable. The forces that conspired against +me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my +objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be +obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence. + +In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not +intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by +accounts derived from reliable sources. I am still convinced to this +day that morally I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form, +because I was neither clever nor patient enough to _bend_ the +opposition, but would have _broken_ it, by reducing the situation to a +case of "either--or". + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS + + +1 + +In the autumn of 1917 I had a visit from a subject of a neutral state, +who is a pronounced upholder of general disarmament and world +pacifism. We began, of course, to discuss the theme of free +competition in armaments, of militarism, which in England prevails on +the sea and in Germany on land, and my visitor entered upon the +various possibilities likely to occur when the war was at an end. He +had no faith in the destruction of England, nor had I; but he thought +it possible that France and Italy might collapse. The French and +Italians could not possibly bear any heavier burdens than already were +laid on them; in Paris and Rome, he thought, revolution was not far +distant, and a fresh phase of the war would then ensue. England and +America would continue to fight on alone, for ten, perhaps even +twenty, years. England was not to be considered just a little island, +but comprised Australia, India, Canada, and the sea. "_L'Angleterre +est imbattable_," he repeated, and America likewise. On the other +hand, the German army was also invincible. The secession of France and +Italy would greatly hinder the cruel blockade, for the resources of +those two countries--once they were conquered by the Central +Powers--were very vast, and in that case he could not see any end to +the war. Finally, the world would collapse from the general state of +exhaustion. My visitor cited the fable in which two goats met on a +narrow bridge; neither would give way to the other, and they fought +until they both fell into the water and were drowned. The victory of +one group as in previous wars, he continued, where the conqueror +gleaned a rich harvest of gains and the vanquished had to bear all +the losses, was out of the question in this present war. _Tout le +monde perdra, et à la fin il n'y aura que des vaincus._ + +I often recalled that interview later. Much that was false and yet, as +it seemed to me, much that was true lay in my friend's words. France +and Italy did not break down; the end of the war came quicker than he +thought; and the invincible Germany was defeated. And still I think +that the conclusions he arrived at came very near the truth. + +The conquerors' finances are in a very precarious state, particularly +in Italy and France; unrest prevails; wages are exorbitant; discontent +is general; the phantom of Bolshevism leers at them; and they live in +the hope that the defeated Central Powers will have to pay, and they +will thus be saved. It was set forth in the peace terms, but _ultra +posse nemo tenetur_, and the future will show to what extent the +Central Powers can fulfil the conditions dictated to them. + +Since the opening of the Peace Congress at Versailles continuous war +in Europe has been seen: Russians against the whole world, Czechs +against Hungarians, Roumanians against Hungarians, Poles against +Ukrainians, Southern Slavs against Germans, Communists against +Socialists. Three-fourths of Europe is turned into a witch's cauldron +where everything is concocted except work and production, and it is +futile to ask how this self-lacerated Europe will be able to find the +war expenses laid upon her. According to human reckoning, the +conquerors cannot extract even approximate compensation for their +losses from the defeated states, and their victory will terminate with +a considerable deficit. If that be the case, then my visitor will be +right--there will only be the vanquished. + +If our plan in 1917, namely, Germany to cede Alsace-Lorraine to France +in exchange for the annexation of all Poland, together with Galicia, +and all states to disarm; if that plan had been accepted in Berlin and +sanctioned by the Entente--unless the _non possumus_ in Berlin and +opposition in Rome to a change in the Pact of London had hindered any +action--it seems to me the advantage would not only have been on the +side of the Central Powers. + +Pyrrhus also conquered at Asculum. + + * * * * * + +My visitor was astonished at Vienna. The psychology of no city that he +had seen during the war could compare with that of Vienna. An amazing +apathy prevailed. In Paris there was a passionate demand for +Alsace-Lorraine; in Berlin the contrary was demanded just as eagerly; +in England the destruction of Germany was the objective; in Sofia the +conquest of the Dobrudsha; in Rome they clamoured for all possible and +impossible things; in Vienna nothing at all was demanded. In Cracow +they called for a Great Poland; in Budapest for an unmolested Hungary; +in Prague for a united Czech State; and in Innsbruck the descendants +of Andreas Hofer were fighting as they did in his day for their sacred +land, Tyrol. In Vienna they asked only for peace and quiet. + +Old men and children would fight the arch-enemy in Tyrol, but if the +Italians were to enter Vienna and bring bread with them they would be +received with shouts of enthusiasm. And yet Berlin and Innsbruck were +just as hungry as Vienna. _C'est une ville sans âme._ + +My visitor compared the Viennese to a pretty, gay, and frivolous woman, +whose aim in life is pleasure and only pleasure. She must dance, sing, +and enjoy life, and will do so under any circumstances--_sans âme_. + +This pleasure-loving good nature of the Viennese has its admirable +points. For instance, all enemy aliens were better treated in Vienna +than anywhere else. Not the slightest trace of enmity was shown to +those who were the first to attack and then starve the city. + +Stronger than anything else in Vienna was the desire for sensation, +pleasure, and a gay life. My friend once saw a piece acted at one of +the theatres in Vienna called, I believe, _Der Junge Medardus_. The +scene is laid during the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon. Viennese +citizens condemned to death for intriguing with the enemy are led away +by the French. In a most thrilling scene weeping women and children +bid them farewell. A vast crowd witnesses the affair. A boy suddenly +rushes in shouting: "Napoleon is coming." The crowd hurries away to +see him, and cries of "Long live Napoleon" are heard in the distance. + +Such was Vienna a hundred years ago, and it is still the same. _Une +ville sans âme._ + +I pass on the criticism without comment. + + +2 + +In different circles which justly and unjustly intervened in politics +during my time of office, the plan was suggested of driving a wedge +between North and South Germany, and converting the latter to the +peaceful policy of Vienna in contradistinction to Prussian militarism. + +The plan was a faulty one from the very first. To begin with, as +already stated, the most pronounced obstacle to peace was not only the +Prussian spirit, but the Entente programme for our disruption, which a +closer connection with Bavaria and Saxony would not have altered. +Secondly, Austria-Hungary, obviously falling more and more to pieces, +formed no point of attraction for Munich and Dresden, who, though not +Prussian, yet were German to the very backbone. The vague and +irresponsible plan of returning to the conditions of the period before +1866 was an anachronism. Thirdly and chiefly, all experiments were +dangerous which might create the impression in the Entente that the +Quadruple Alliance was about to be dissolved. In a policy of that +nature executive ability was of supreme importance, and that was +exactly what was usually lacking. + +The plan was not without good features. The appointment of the +Bavarian Count Hertling to be Imperial Chancellor was not due to +Viennese influence, though a source of the greatest pleasure to us, +and the fact of making a choice that satisfied Vienna played a great +part with the Emperor William. Two Bavarians, Hertling and Kühlmann, +had taken over the leadership of the German Empire, and they, apart +from their great personal qualities, presented a certain natural +counter-balance to Prussian hegemony through their Bavarian origin; +but only so far as it was still possible in general administration +which then was in a disturbed state. But farther they could not go +without causing injury. + +Count Hertling and I were on very good terms. This wise and +clear-sighted old man, whose only fault was that he was too old and +physically incapable of offering resistance, would have saved Germany, +if she possibly could have been saved, in 1917. In the rushing torrent +that whirled her away to her fall, he found no pillar to which he +could cling. + +Latterly his sight began to fail and give way. He suffered from +fatigue, and the conferences and councils lasting often for hours and +hours were beyond his strength. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +POLAND + + +1 + +By letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Emperors declared +Poland's existence as a Kingdom. + +When I came into office, I found the situation to be that the Poles +were annoyed with my predecessor because, they declared, Germany had +wanted to cede the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and Count +Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there is some +misunderstanding in this version of the case, as Burian says it is not +correctly rendered. + +There were three reasons that made the handling of the Polish question +one of the greatest difficulty. The first was the totally different +views of the case held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian +Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favour of the so-called +Austro-Polish solution, Count Tisza was strongly opposed to it. His +standpoint was that the political structure of the Monarchy ought not +to undergo any change through the annexation of Poland, and that Poland +eventually might be joined to the Monarchy as an Austrian province, but +never as a partner in a tripartite Monarchy. + +A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on February 22, 1917, was +characteristic of his train of thought. It was as follows: + + YOUR EXCELLENCY,--Far be it from me to raise a discussion on + questions which to-day are without actual value and most probably + will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other hand, I + wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken + conclusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest + certain statements that appeared in the correspondence of our + diplomatic representatives. + + Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the + attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the so-called + Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question has repeatedly (as + in telegram Nr. 63 from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the + "tripartite solution." + + With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out the + fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the + Austro-Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent + circles in the Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland + to the Monarchy must on no account affect its _dualistic + structure_. + + This principle was distinctly recognised by the then leaders in + the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers; + it was also recognised and sanctioned by His late Majesty the + Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this + view is shared by Your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid + misunderstanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian Government + considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political + system, from which, in no circumstances, would it be in a position + to deviate. + + It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The + uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian State, where the + German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a + very unsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that + easily might gain the upper hand should a relatively small number + of the Germans, whether from social-democratic, + political-reactionary or doctrinary reasons, separate from the + other German parties. The establishment of the new Polish element + as a third factor with Austria-Hungary in our constitutional + organism would represent an element so unsafe, and would be + combined with such risks for the further development of the policy + of the Habsburg Great Power, that, in view of the position of the + Monarchy as such, I should feel the greatest anxiety lest the new + and unreliable Russian-Polish element, so different from us in + many respects, should play too predominant a part. + + The firm retention of dualism, according to which half the + political influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and + _the Hungarian and German element in common furnish a safe + majority_ in the delegation, alone can secure for the dynasty and + the two States under its sceptre an adequate guarantee for the + future. + + There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital + interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the + Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose clear + perception of that fact may have become dulled during the last + peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realisation of + it by the present war. + + The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and active + Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condition + for the existence of the Hungarian State. It was fatal for all of + us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative + qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all State and + national aims, have for centuries past not been able to devote + themselves to the common cause. The striving for a solution of the + world racial problem and the necessity of combining the + responsibilities of a Great Power with the independence of the + Hungarian State have caused heavy trials and century-long friction + and fighting. + + Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of + efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for + liberty did not attack the continuance of the Habsburg Empire as a + Great Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle + they never followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown + a guarantee for their chartered rights. + + Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the sceptre + of the Habsburgs; she did not wish to come under any foreign rule, + but to be a free nation governed by her own king and her own laws + and not subordinate to any other ruler. This principle was + repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723 and + 1791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was found + which endowed it with life and ensured its being carried out in a + manner favourable for the position of a great nation. + + In the period of preparation for the agreement of 1867 Hungary was + a poor and, comparatively speaking, small part of the then + Monarchy, and the great statesmen of Hungary based their + administrative plan on dualism and equality as being the only + possible way for ensuring that Hungarian independence, recognised + and appealed to on many occasions, should materialise in a + framework of modern constitutional practice. + + A political structure for the Monarchy which would make it + possible for Hungary to be outvoted on the most important + questions of State affairs, and therefore subject to a foreign + will, would again have nullified all that had been achieved after + so much striving and suffering, so much futile waste of strength + for the benefit of us all, which even in this war, too, would have + brought its blessings. All those, therefore, who have always stood + up firmly and loyally for the agreement of 1867 must put their + whole strength into resisting any tripartite experiments. + + I would very much regret if, in connection with this question, + differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible + leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it + unnecessary to give publicity to a question that is not pressing. + At all events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be + avoided which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event + of a resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken + expectations in them which could only lead to the most complicated + consequences. + + The more moderate Poles had made up their minds that the dualistic + structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact, and that + the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the Austrian + State, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have to be the + consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent and + injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realisation of which + seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view but + from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy. + + I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest + esteem. + + TISZA. + + _Budapest, February 22, 1917._ + + + +The question as to what was to be Poland's future position with regard +to the Monarchy remained still unsolved. I continued to press the +point that Poland should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza +wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dismissed him, although +he was favoured by the majority of the Parliament, it did not alter +the situation in regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as +in almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views; otherwise, +he would have been in the minority. + +The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the question of +electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to +Tisza's instructions. For, as leader of the majority, which he +continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could +be carried out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the +Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which +he considered quite logical, though not agreeable. + +The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland. At +the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the +Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country. Always and +everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield, and the +consequence was that they claimed the lion's share of all the +successes gained. This was in reality quite natural, but it greatly +added to all diplomatic and political activities, which were +invariably prejudiced and hindered by military facts. When I entered +upon office, Germany's standpoint was that she had a far superior +right to Poland, and that the simplest solution would be for us to +evacuate the territory we had occupied. It was, of course, obvious +that I could not accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the +point that under no circumstances would our troops leave Lublin. After +much controversy, the Germans agreed, _tant bien que mal_, to this +solution. The further development of the affair showed that the German +standpoint went through many changes. In general, it fluctuated +between two extremes: either Poland must unite herself to Germany--the +German-Polish solution, or else vast portions of her territory must be +ceded to Germany to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained +would be either for us or for Poland herself. Neither solution could +be accepted by us. The first one for this reason, that the Polish +question being in the foreground made that of Galicia very acute, as +it would have been quite impossible to retain Galicia in the Monarchy +when separated from the rest of Poland. We were obliged to oppose the +German-Polish solution, not from any desire for conquest, but to +prevent the sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose. + +The second German suggestion was just as impossible to carry out, +because Poland, crippled beyond recognition by the frontier +readjustment, even though united with Galicia, would have been so +unsatisfactory a factor that there would never have been any prospect +of harmonious dealings with her. + +The third difficulty was presented by the Poles themselves, as they +naturally wished to secure the greatest possible profit out of their +release by the Central Powers, even though it did not contribute much +to their future happiness so far as military support was concerned. +There were many different parties among them: first of all, one for +the Entente; a second, Bilinski's party; above all, one for the +Central Powers, especially when we gained military successes. + +On the whole, Polish policy was to show their hand as little as +possible to any particular group, and in the end range themselves on +the side of the conquerors. It must be admitted that these tactics +were successful. + +In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost always in +Polish political circles a certain nervous excitement, which made it +extremely difficult to enter into any calm and essential negotiations. +At the very beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the Polish +leaders and myself with regard to what I proposed to do; +misunderstandings which, toward the end of my term of office, +developed into the most bitter enmity towards me on the part of the +Poles. On February 10, 1917, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk, I +received the news from Warsaw that Herr von Bilinski, apparently +misunderstanding my standpoint, evolved from the facts, considered +that hopes represented promises, and in so doing raised Polish +expectations to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed thereupon to our +representative as follows: + + _February 16, 1917._ + + I have informed Herr von Bilinski, together with other Poles, that + it is impossible in the present unsettled European situation to + make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I have + told them that I sympathise with the Austro-Polish solution longed + for by all our Poles, but that I am not in the position to say + whether this solution will be attainable, though I am equally + unable to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared + that our whole policy where Poland is concerned can only consist + in our leaving a door open for all future transactions. + +I added that our representative must quote my direct orders in +settling the matter. + +In January, 1917, a conference was held respecting the Polish +question: a conference which aimed at laying down a broad line of +action for the policy to be adopted. I first of all referred to the +circumstances connected with the previously-mentioned German request +for us to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not agreeing +to the demand. I pointed out that it did not seem probable to me that +the war would end with a dictated peace on our side, and that, with +reference to Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish +question without the co-operation of the Entente, and that there was +not much object so long as the war lasted in endeavouring to secure +_faits accomplis_. The main point was that we remain in the country, +and on the conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the +Entente and the Allies to secure a solution of the Austro-Polish +question. That should be the gist of our policy. Count Tisza spoke +after me and agreed with me that we must not yield to the German +demand for our evacuation of Lublin. As regards the future, the +Hungarian Prime Minister stated that he had always held the view that +we should cede to Germany our claim to Poland in exchange for economic +and financial compensation; but that, at the present time, he did not +feel so confident about it. The conditions then prevailing were +unbearable, chiefly owing to the variableness of German policy, and +he, Count Tisza, returned to his former, oft-repeated opinion that we +should strive as soon as possible to withdraw with honour out of the +affair; impose no conditions that would lead to further friction, but +the surrendering to Germany of our share in Poland in exchange for +economic compensation. + +The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Clam, opposed this from the +Austrian point of view, which supported the union of all the Poles +under the Habsburg sceptre as being the one and only desirable +solution. + +The feeling during the debate was that the door must be closed against +the Austro-Polish proposals, and that, in view of the impossibility of +an immediate definite solution, we must adhere firmly to the policy +that rendered possible the union of all the Poles under the Habsburg +rule. + +After Germany's refusal of the proposal to accept Galicia as +compensation for Alsace-Lorraine, this programme was adhered to +through various phases and vicissitudes until the ever-increasing +German desire for frontier readjustment created a situation which made +the achievement of the Austro-Polish project very doubtful. Unless we +could secure a Poland which, thanks to the unanimity of the great +majority of all Poles, would willingly and cheerfully join the +Monarchy, the Austro-Polish solution would not have been a happy one, +as in that case we should only have increased the number of +discontented elements in the Monarchy, already very high, by adding +fresh ones to them. As it proved impossible to break the resistance +put up by General Ludendorff, the idea presented itself at a later +stage to strive for the annexation of Roumania instead of Poland. It +was a return to the original idea of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the +union of Roumania with Transylvania, closely linked to the Monarchy. +In that case we should have lost Galicia to Poland, but a certain +compensation would have been conceded to us in Roumania with her corn +and oil springs, and for the Monarchy, as for the Poles, it appeared +better to unite the latter collectively with Germany rather than to +divide them, as suggested in the Vienna-Berlin dispute. + +The plan for the annexation of Roumania presented wellnigh +insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing to her geographical +position, Roumania ought naturally to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza, +who was not in favour of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to +it if the annexed country had been administered from Budapest and in +the Magyar spirit, which meant that it would be incorporated in +Hungary. This, for obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the +plan, for the Roumanians would gain no advantage from the annexation +if it was to be at the sacrifice of their national independence. On +the other hand, the Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable +objections to the suggestion of a future combination that would add a +rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria would be reduced in +proportion, and compensation in one or other form was demanded. +Another, but tentative, plan was to make over Bosnia and the +Herzegovina definitely by way of compensation to Austria. All these +ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory nature, evoked by the +constantly recurring difficulties in Berlin and Warsaw, and they +invariably fell through when it was seen that the obstacles arising +from dualism were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish +solution was taken up again, although it was impossible to extort +from the Germans a definite statement as to a reasonable western +frontier for Poland. In the very last term of my office the Roumanian +plan again came up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles +on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims made by Germany, +which rendered the Austro-Polish solution impossible. + +Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the future organisation +of the Monarchy was being considered. The Emperor adhered to the +correct standpoint, as I still consider it to be, that the structure +of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the war, would have to +be altered, and reconstruction on a far more pronounced national basis +be necessary. As applied to the Poles, this project would entail the +dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent position for the +Ruthenian Poles. + +When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the hunger riots that +were beginning, I refused to agree to the Ukrainian demands, but +consented to submit the question of the division of Galicia to the +Austrian Crown Council. I was impelled thereto by the conviction that +we were adhering strictly to the programme as it had been planned for +the Monarchy. + +I will give fuller details respecting this question in the next +chapter, but will merely relate the following incident as an example +to show the degree of hostile persecution to which I was exposed. The +rumour was spread on all sides that the Emperor had told the Poles +that "I had concluded peace with the Ukraine without his knowledge and +against his will." It is quite out of the question that the Emperor +can have made such a statement, as the peace conditions at Kieff were +a result of a council convoked _ad hoc_, where--as the protocol +proves--the Emperor and Dr. von Seidler were responsible for the +terms. + +The great indignation of the Poles at my conduct at Brest-Litovsk was +quite unfounded. I never promised the Poles that they were to have the +Cholm district, and never alluded to any definite frontiers. Had I +done so the capable political leaders in Poland would never have +listened to me, as they knew very well that the frontiers, only in a +very slight degree, depended on the decisions at Vienna. If we lost +the war we had nothing more to say in the matter; if a peace of +agreement was concluded, then Berlin would be the strongest side, +having occupied the largest portion of the country; the question would +then have to be decided at the general Conference. + +I always told the Polish leaders that I hoped to secure a Poland +thoroughly satisfied, also with respect to her frontier claims, and +there were times when we seemed to be very near the accomplishment of +such an aim; but I never concealed the fact that there were many +influences at work restricting my wishes and keeping them very much +subdued. + +The partition of Galicia was an internal Austrian question. Dr. von +Seidler took up the matter most warmly, and at the Council expressed +the hope of being able to carry out these measures by parliamentary +procedure and against the opposition of the Poles. + +I will allude to this question also in my next chapter. + +Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called +Central-European project. + +For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly +interested in a scheme for closer union. I was always full of the idea +of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment +as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting +a peace of understanding. + +During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to +secure a revision of the Pact of London. I hoped, as already +mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted +for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach +the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would +greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London. +When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to +the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any +change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military +force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail, +and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the +right moment had arrived to make the offer. + +In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was +unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and +closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the +armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them +after the war. I was convinced that a peace of understanding would +bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military +settlements would be influenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of +peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and +that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined +in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those +relating to economic questions. + +The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent +opposition on the part of the Emperor. He was particularly opposed to +all military _rapprochement_. + +When the attempt to approach the question failed through the +resistance from the crown, I arranged on my own initiative for a +debate on the economic question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in +which he forbade any further dealings in the matter. I answered his +letter by a business report, pointing out the necessity of continuing +the negotiations. + +The question then became a sore point between the Emperor and myself. +He did not give his permission for further negotiations, but I +continued them notwithstanding. The Emperor knew of it, but did not +make further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put forward by +the Germans made the negotiations extremely difficult, and with long +intervals and at a very slow pace they dragged on until I left office. + +Afterwards the Emperor went with Burian to the German Headquarters. +Following that, the Salzburg negotiations were proceeded with and, +apparently, at greater speed. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +BREST-LITOVSK + + +1 + +In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest +a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report +dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as +follows: + + The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the + following state of affairs: + + At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as + to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies + and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches + throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists + under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a + definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the + Mensheviks as well, _i.e._ Tscheidse's party, to which the present + Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to + the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is + threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained + with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled + Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old + _Internationale_, also called _Zimmerwalder_ or _Kienthaler_, and + led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned + from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from + Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of + Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government, + decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this + reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social + Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too + little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory. + He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the + Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their + Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either + as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the + official organ of the Mensheviks, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, is + forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for + instance, frequent articles against the offensive. + + There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the + Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is, + perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having + succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its + course--at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the + peasants' deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social + Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants' + Deputies' Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem, + the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to + any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the + party, _Delo Naroda_ and _Zemlja i Wolja_. Only a small and + apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ _Volja + Naroda_, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for + an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group. + Kerenski's party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People's + Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food, + Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here + or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press, + as, for instance, the _Retch_, assert that Kerenski's health gives + grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The + official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council, + the _Isvestia_, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great + emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is + characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture, + Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning + that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to + justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that + such had been his meaning. + + While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question + of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined + to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the + Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with + satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are + against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among + the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery. + It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war. + These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by + success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the + revolutionary régime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that + while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property + exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all, + every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is + constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land + question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of + the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also + that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of + the Tsar. + + Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the + following details: + + At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers' + Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd + Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the _Retch_ of May + 1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following + characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the + disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires + connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers + will not remain _more than one month_ at the front, but will go + home." + + It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from + the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority + Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the _Rabocaja + Gazeta_, May 18 and 19--this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e. + that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente + Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness + that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the + imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the + transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to + the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a + speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist + delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of + feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that + they should undertake to make known the result of their experience + in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some + very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives + from the Russian front spoke openly of America's policy of + exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that + an international Socialist conference should be convened at the + earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French + majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the + French and English Socialists were given the following reply: + + "Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your + Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We + will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be + Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement + between the workers of all countries for the termination of the + war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued, + prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude + any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims + as soon as possible." + + According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether + converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case, + from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and + Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other + hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined + somewhat toward the Russian point of view. + + Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in + this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the + Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at + the Russian front. + + The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or + soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for + May 26, as follows: + + "The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye, + even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts), + is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it + passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and + in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army + fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse + this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy + fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war. + + The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates' + Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg + June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the + following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for + peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a + declaration with regard to the answer already received at the + beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This + congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination + for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals + with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out + between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and + the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of + the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an + "Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the + conflict. + + With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing + seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in + connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed + report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded + later. + +Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following +letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my +estimate of the situation at the time: + + _Vienna, November 17, 1917._ + + MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and + toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very + noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my + thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at + least, to forget the wretchedness of every day. + + You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well + between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am + sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the + friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree. + As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast + enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed + strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing + my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I + myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is + something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the + lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to + increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of + admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine? + + Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture. + + And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of + those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of + political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted + because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my + influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly + negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly. + + In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief + is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia + quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all + round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the + Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as + possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can + throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of + being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly + threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to + peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of + conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after + losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter + pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in + that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he + promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes + in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted, + of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace + with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step + on the way to the peace of the world. + + I have during the last few days received reliable information + about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews, + with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country + that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the + most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make + peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for + they cannot carry on the war. + + In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines + to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage, + the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless + unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the + third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I + _will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of + his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's + period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent + Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a + Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had. + + The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea + of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons + already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the + case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds + the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can + see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up + "something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there, + and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even + though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen + for oneself. + + It is impossible to get any exact information about these + Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information + available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this: + everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture + must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and + equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only + a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The + Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly + as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like + sheep. + + True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had + the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to + force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would + be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to + march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the + power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our + own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get + to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front + is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German + military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether + illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal + grounds. + + I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this + to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which + you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate + peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this + would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could + not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under + some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to + make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a + division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would + avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to + receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the + remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish, + Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact + between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would + mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be + hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must + fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of + course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy. + The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the + Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to + make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of + bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one + opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto + spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to + be wrecked completely in the end. + + On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure + peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual + understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out + successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage, + one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that + manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the + confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy, + then let him do it--_le remède sera pire que le mal_--but to be + for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the + pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as + prudent policy. + + I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding; + we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain + nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the + entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the + _fédération Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly + rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the + Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I + hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the + London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into + Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that + they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly + determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the + _peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to + fight on for conquest or if they will have peace. + + To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through + the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to + make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which + I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading" + men--with the exception of the Emperor Karl--will demand a "good" + peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of + having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself. + + So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled. + But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in + throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my + Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically + on all sides. + + This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. _Lebe + wohl_, and let me hear from you again soon.--In friendship as of + old, yours + + (Signed) CZERNIN. + +With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave +my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may +appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have +not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I +believe will be a clear picture of the development. + +"_December 19, 1917._--Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th. + +"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already assembled there: +Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut. +Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden. + +"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of +my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my +opinion Russia would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must of +course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a +general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long +time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be +open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with +Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day. + +"_December 20, 1917._--Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At +the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten +of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I +greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into +the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few +days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the +situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we +should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters +satisfactorily. + +"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me +some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates, +and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had +the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy +with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian +brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians, +despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of +truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in, +and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance. + +"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of +nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable +pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince +sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew called Joffe, +recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other +delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the +delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister, +Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison +during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate +is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a +minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary +movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor +of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the +Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a +petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general +began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the +spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at +first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier +conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This +remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to +read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words +should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian +proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined +set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All +that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with +indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the +International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression +alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand +and preparing to fall upon it and rend it. + +"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His +whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of +self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the +world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual +love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war +throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war, +as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end +worth all it would cost. I contented myself with telling him that he +must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier +age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be +won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by +example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to +adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without +indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the +development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the +Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn +something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force +Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was +a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we +should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods, +and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs: +this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry +out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had +better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question +of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft +eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring +tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be +able to raise the revolution in your country too.' + +"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in +bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage +that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms. + +"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom +and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and +unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history +has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and +their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with +Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity +surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress +decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the +universal blessing of freedom--it is sheer lying. + +"_December 21, 1917._--I went with all my party to lunch at noon with +the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an +hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military +matters, and is very busy. + +"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast +our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a +small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite +close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could +be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and +in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three +Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kühlmann alone, and at +once declared positively that the Russians would propose a _general_ +peace, and that we must accept it. Kühlmann is half disposed to take +my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand +annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have +an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they +will. + +"_December 22, 1917._--The forenoon was devoted to the first +discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as +discussed with Kühlmann being then academically laid down. In the +afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being +opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kühlmann. It was +decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order +of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche, +etc. Dr. Kühlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on +which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian +delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from +the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a +reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among +ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief +sitting of the peace congress. + +"_December 23, 1917._--Kühlmann and I prepared our answer early. It +will be generally known from the newspaper reports. It cost us much +heavy work to get it done. Kühlmann is personally an advocate of +general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do +not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is +done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They +declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian +troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the +conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree, +as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland, +Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never +consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last +succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second +Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly +declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal +affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs +in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian +intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting, +he also could be content. + +"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of +Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all, +some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole +proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the +24th. + +"_December 24, 1917._--Morning and afternoon, long conferences with +the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kühlmann and I on the one hand +and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with +considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause +should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation +principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian +and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a +clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void, +and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was +attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian +delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give +way. Kühlmann and my humble self remained perfectly firm, and told +them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they +could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the +proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which +we, Kühlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived +at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian +delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions. + +"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we +had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty +about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far +as that goes. + +"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Germans. The German +military party 'fear' that the Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to +agree to a general peace, and could not think of ending the war in +this 'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to listen to +such twaddle. + +"If the great victories which the German generals are hoping for on +the Western front should be realised, there will be no bounds to their +demands, and the difficulty of all negotiations will be still further +increased. + +"_December 25, 1917._--The plenary sitting took place to-day, when we +gave the Russians our answer to their peace proposals. I was +presiding, and delivered the answer, and Joffe replied. _The general +offer of peace is thus to be made, and we must await the result._ In +order to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters concerning +Russia are being continued meanwhile. We have thus made a good step +forward, and _perhaps_ got over the worst. It is impossible to say +whether yesterday may not have been a decisive turning point in the +history of the world. + +"_December 26, 1917._--The special negotiations began at 9 A.M. The +programme drawn up by Kühlmann, chiefly questions of economical matters +and representation, were dealt with so rapidly and smoothly that by 11 +o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of further matter to discuss. +This is perhaps a good omen. Our people are using to-day to enter the +results of the discussion in a report of proceedings, as the sitting +is to be continued to-morrow, when territorial questions will be +brought up. + +"_December 26, 1917._--I have been out for a long walk alone. + +"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting in the gutter, +weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did not even look at me, only wept +and wept, and could not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me +his story--Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together. + +"Well, he had a store--heaven knows where, but somewhere in the war +zone. First came the Cossacks. They took all he had--his goats and his +clothes, and everything in the place--and then they beat him. Then the +Russians retired, beat him again, _en passant_ as it were, and then +came the Germans. They fired his house with their guns, pulled off his +boots, and beat him. Then he entered the service of the Germans, +carrying water and wood, and received his food and beatings in return. +But to-day he had got into trouble with them in some incomprehensible +fashion; no food after that, only the beatings; and was thrown into +the street. + +"The beatings he referred to as something altogether natural. They +were for him the natural accompaniment to any sort of action--but he +could not live on beatings alone. + +"I gave him what I had on me--money and cigars--told him the number of +my house, and said he could come to-morrow, when I could get him a +pass to go off somewhere where there were no Germans and no Russians, +and try to get him a place of some sort where he would be fed and not +beaten. He took the money and cigars thankfully enough; the story of +the railway pass and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway +travelling was for soldiers, and an existence without beatings seemed +an incredible idea. + +"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight, waving his hand, and +thanking me in his German-Russian gibberish. + +"A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but worst of all in +one's own country. We at home suffer hunger and cold, but at least we +have been spared up to now the presence of the enemy hordes. + +"This is a curious place--melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An +endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean +set fast, wave behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things +grey, dead grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds +race across the sky, the wind lashing them on. + +"This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed the Russians of the +German plans with regard to the outer provinces. The position is this: +As long as the war in the West continues, the Germans cannot evacuate +Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact that they must be +held as security for the general peace negotiations, these countries +form part of the German munition establishment. The railway material, +the factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable as long +as the war lasts. That they cannot now withdraw from there at once is +clear enough. If peace is signed, then the self-determination of the +people in the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the +great difficulty: how this right of self-determination is to be +exercised. + +"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be taken while the +German bayonets are still in the country, and the Germans reply that +the unexampled terrorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election +result, since the 'bourgeois,' according to Bolshevist ideas, are not +human beings at all. My idea of having the proceedings controlled by a +_neutral_ Power was not altogether acceptable to anyone. During the +war no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the German +occupation could not be allowed to last until the ultimate end. In +point of fact, both sides are afraid of terrorisation by the opposing +party, and each wishes to apply the same itself. + +"_December 26, 1917._--There is no hurry apparently in this place. Now +it is the Turks who are not ready, now the Bulgarians, then it is the +Russians' turn--and the sitting is again postponed or broken off +almost as soon as commenced. + +"I am reading some memoirs from the French Revolution. A most +appropriate reading at the present time, in view of what is happening +in Russia and may perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no +Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannised the world under the battle-cry +of freedom were to be found in Paris then as well as now in St. +Petersburg. Charlotte Corday said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast +I killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear, and who can +say if there will be a Corday ready for Trotski? + +"Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and the state of things +said to exist there. He spoke with great respect of Nicolai +Nicolaievitch as a thorough man, full of energy and courage, one to be +respected even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he considered +cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a proof of the incapacity of +the bourgeois that they had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all +of them more or less degenerate; he could not understand how anyone +could accept a form of government which involved the risk of having a +degenerate ruler. I answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first +of all one advantage, that there was at least one place in the state +beyond the sphere of personal ambition and intrigues, and as to +degeneration, that was often a matter of opinion: there were also +degenerates to be found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe +considered that there would be no such risk when the people could +choose for themselves. I pointed out that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had +not been 'chosen,' and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial +election would have brought him into power. Possibly there might be +some in Russia who would consider him also degenerate. + +"_December 27, 1917._--The Russians are in despair, and some of them +even talked of withdrawing altogether. They had thought the Germans +would renounce all occupied territory without further parley, or hand +it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the Russians, +Kühlmann, and myself, part of the time with Hoffmann. I drew up the +following:-- + +"1. As long as general peace is not yet declared, we cannot give up +the occupied areas; they form part of our great munition works +(factories, railways, sites with buildings, etc.). + +"2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland, Courland, and +Lithuania is to decide the fate of the people there; as to the form in +which the vote is to be taken, this remains to be further discussed, +in order that the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used. +Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much worse. + +"_Afternoon._--Matters still getting worse. Furious wire from +Hindenburg about "renunciation" of everything; Ludendorff telephoning +every minute; more furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kühlmann +true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians declare they cannot +accept the vague formulas of the Germans with regard to freedom of +choice. + +"I told Kühlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far as possible with them; +but should their endeavours fail, then I would enter into separate +negotiations with the Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were +really both opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary, on the +other hand, desired nothing but final peace. Kühlmann understands my +position, and says he himself would rather _go_ than let it fail. +Asked me to give him my point of view in writing, as it 'would +strengthen his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed it to the +Kaiser. + +"_Evening._--Kühlmann believes matters will be settled--or broken off +altogether--by to-morrow. + +"_December 28, 1917._--General feeling, dull. Fresh outbursts of +violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a wire from Bussche: Hertling had +spoken with the Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kühlmann said to +me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole of Germany.' + +"We have at last agreed about the form of the committee; that is, a +committee _ad hoc_ is to be formed in Brest, to work out a plan for +the evacuation and voting in detail. _Tant bien que mal_, a +provisional expedient. All home to report; next sitting to be held +January 5, 1918. + +"Russians again somewhat more cheerful. + +"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on the part of the +Russians and the four Allies to Prince Leopold. He answered at once, +and very neatly, but told me immediately afterwards that I had taken +him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken by surprise +myself; no notice had been given; it was only during the dinner itself +that the Germans asked me to speak. + +"Left at 10 P.M. for Vienna. + +"From the 29th to the morning of the 3rd I was in Vienna. Two long +audiences with the Emperor gave me the opportunity of telling him what +had passed at Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view +that peace must be made, if at all possible. + +"I have dispatched a trustworthy agent to the outer provinces in order +to ascertain the exact state of feeling there. He reports that _all_ +are against the Bolsheviks except the Bolsheviks themselves. The +entire body of citizens, peasants--in a word, everyone with any +possessions at all--trembles at the thought of these red robbers, and +wishes to go over to Germany. The terrorism of Lenin is said to be +indescribable, and in Petersburg all are absolutely _longing_ for the +entry of the German troops to deliver them. + +"_January 3, 1918._--Return to Brest. + +"On the way, at 6 P.M., I received, at a station, the following +telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch, who had remained at Brest: + + "'Russian delegation received following telegram from Petersburg + this morning: To General Hoffmann. For the representatives of the + German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish delegations. The + Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to carry + on the further negotiations on neutral ground, and proposes + removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the proposals as + formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegation in Points + 1 and 2, the Government of the Russian Republic and the + Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of + Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire + agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the + proposals are contrary to the principle of national + self-determination, even in the restricted form in which it + appears in Point 3 of the reply given by the Four Powers on the + 12th ult. President of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe." Major + Brinkmann has communicated this by telephone to the German + delegation, already on the way here. Herr von Kühlmann has sent a + telephone message in return that he is continuing the journey, and + will arrive at Brest this evening.' + +"I also went on of course, considering this manoeuvre on the part of +the Russians as rather in the nature of bluffing. If they do not come, +then we can treat with the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now. + +"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither, Hauser, Wekerle, +Seidler, and some few others. The opinion of almost all may be summed +up as follows: 'Peace _must_ be arranged, but a separate peace without +Germany is _impossible_.' + +"No one has told me how I am to manage it if neither Germany nor +Russia will listen to reason. + +"_January 4, 1918._--Fearful snowstorm in the night; the heating +apparatus in the train was frozen, and the journey consequently far +from pleasant. On awaking early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians +and Turks were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnificent now: +cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went across to Kühlmann, had +breakfast with him, and talked over events in Berlin. There seems to +have been desperate excitement there. Kühlmann suggested to Ludendorff +that he should come to Brest himself and take part in the +negotiations. After long discussion, however, it appeared that +Ludendorff himself was not quite clear as to what he wanted, and +declared spontaneously that he considered it superfluous for him to go +to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he did.' Heaven +grant the man such gleams of insight again, and often! It seems as if +the whole trouble is more due to feeling against Kühlmann than to +anything in the questions at issue; people do not want the world to +have the impression that the peace was gained by 'adroit diplomacy,' +but by military success alone. General Hoffmann appears to have been +received with marked favour by the Kaiser, and both he and Kühlmann +declare themselves well satisfied with the results of their journey. + +"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg telegram, declining a +conference in Stockholm, and further tactics to be followed in case of +need. We agreed that if the Russians did not come, we must declare the +armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers would say to +that. On this point Kühlmann and I were entirely agreed. Nevertheless, +the feeling, both in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a +little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break off +negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position. The only +way to save the situation is by acting quickly and energetically with +the Ukrainian delegation, and we therefore commenced this work on the +afternoon of the same day. There is thus at least a hope that we may +be able to arrive at positive results with them within reasonable +time. + +"In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from Petersburg announcing +the arrival of the delegation, including the Foreign Minister, +Trotski. It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at +the news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of satisfaction +was it fully apparent how seriously they had been affected by the +thought that the Russians would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great +step forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the way. + +"_January 5, 1918._--At seven this morning a few of us went out +shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria. We went for a distance of 20 +to 30 kilometres by train, and then in open automobiles to a +magnificent primeval forest extending over two to three hundred square +kilometres. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow, and pleasant +company. From the point of view of sport, it was poorer than one could +have expected. One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two +hares, and that was all. Back at 6 P.M. + +"_January 6, 1918._--To-day we had the first discussions with the +Ukrainian delegates, all of whom were present except the leader. The +Ukrainians are very different from the Russian delegates. Far less +revolutionary, and with far more interest in their own country, less +in the progress of Socialism generally. They do not really care about +Russia at all, but think only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are +solely directed towards attaining their own independence as soon as +possible. Whether that independence is to be complete and +international, or only as within the bounds of a Russian federative +state, they do not seem quite to know themselves. Evidently, the very +intelligent Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard +from which they themselves could spring upon the Bolsheviks. Their +idea was that we should acknowledge their independence, and then, with +this as a _fait accompli_, they could face the Bolsheviks and force +them to recognise their equal standing and treat with them on that +basis. Our line of policy, however, must be either to bring over the +Ukrainians to our peace basis, or else to drive a wedge between them +and the Petersburgers. As to their desire for independence, we +declared ourselves willing to recognise this, provided the Ukrainians +on their part would agree to the following three points: 1. The +negotiations to be concluded at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2. +Recognition of the former political frontier between Austria-Hungary +and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any one state in the internal +affairs of another. Characteristically enough, no answer has yet been +received to this proposal! + +"_January 7, 1918._--This forenoon, all the Russians arrived, under +the leadership of Trotski. They at once sent a message asking to be +excused for not appearing at meals with the rest for the future. At +other times also we see nothing of them. The wind seems to be in a +very different quarter now from what it was. The German officer who +accompanied the Russian delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron +Lamezan, gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first +place, he declared that the trenches in front of Dunaburg are entirely +deserted, and save for an outpost or so there were no Russians there +at all; also, that at many stations delegates were waiting for the +deputation to pass, in order to demand that peace should be made. +Trotski had throughout answered them with polite and careful +speeches, but grew ever more and more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the +impression that the Russians were altogether desperate now, having no +choice save between going back with a bad peace or with no peace at +all; in either case with the same result: that they would be swept +away. Kühlmann said: 'Ils n'ont que le choix à quelle sauce ils se +feront manger.' I answered: 'Tout comme chez nous.' + +"A wire has just come in reporting demonstrations in Budapest against +Germany. The windows of the German Consulate were broken, a clear +indication of the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were +to be lost through our demands. + +"_January 8, 1918._--The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived +during the night, and has just been to call on me. He seems +emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in +case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the +foreground and keep out of the way himself. Talaat Pasha is one of the +cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of +them all. + +"Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph +service, and was on the revolutionary committee. In his official +capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed +him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game +be lost unless immediate action were taken. He suppressed the message, +warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their +work at once. The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat +was made Minister of the Interior. With iron energy he then turned his +attention to the suppression of the opposing movement. Later, he +became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the +will and power of Turkey. + +"This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied +delegations and the Russian. Afterwards, plenary sitting. + +"The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still not ready +with their preparations. Late in the evening I had a conversation with +Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics. I +said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands +as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off +the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a +free hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially +Kühlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow +the negotiations to prove fruitless. As to details, we agreed to +demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form +of an ultimatum. + +"_January 9, 1918._--Acting on the principle that attack is the best +defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister +speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum. + +"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was +such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered +state of affairs called for new resolutions. The removal of the +conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, +for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of +all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing +we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the +start--to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take +the lead--would infallibly have taken place. We must now wait to see +what to-morrow brings: either a victory or the final termination of +the negotiations. + +"Adler said to me in Vienna: 'You will certainly get on all right with +Trotski,' and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered: 'Well, +you and I get on quite well together, you know.' + +"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to appreciate the +situation there. These Bolsheviks have no longer anything in common +with Adler; they are brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a +disgrace to the name of freedom. + +"Trotski is undoubtedly an interesting, clever fellow, and a very +dangerous adversary. He is quite exceptionally gifted as a speaker, +with a swiftness and adroitness in retort which I have rarely seen, +and has, moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race. + +"_January 10, 1918._--The sitting has just taken place. Trotski made a +great and, in its way, really fine speech, calculated for the whole of +Europe, in which he gave way entirely. He accepts, he says, the +German-Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk, as he +will not give us the satisfaction of being able to blame Russia for +the continuance of the war. + +"Following on Trotski's speech, the Committee was at once formed to +deal with the difficult questions of territory. I insisted on being on +the Committee myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of +these important negotiations. This was not an easy matter really, as +the questions involved, strictly speaking, concern only Courland and +Lithuania, i.e., they are not our business, but Germany's alone. + +"In the evening I had another long talk with Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in +the course of which the General and the Secretary of State came to +high words between themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our +ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and 'give the +Russians another touch of the whip.' Kühlmann and I took the opposite +view, and insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly, +confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing up point by point +as we went on, and putting all doubtful questions aside. Once we had +got so far, in clearing up things generally, we could then take that +which remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instructions +from the two Emperors for dealing therewith. This is undoubtedly the +surest way to avoid disaster and a fresh breach. + +"A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians. They now demand +recognition of their independence, and declare they will leave if this +is not conceded. + +"Adler told me at Vienna that Trotski had his library, by which he set +great store, somewhere in Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told +Trotski that I would arrange to have the books forwarded to him, if +he cared about it. I then recommended to his consideration certain +prisoners of war, as L. K. and W., all of whom are said to have been +very badly treated. Trotski noted the point, declared that he was +strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and promised to +look into the matter; he wished to point out, however, that in so +doing he was not in the least influenced by the thought of his +library; he would in any case have considered my request. He would be +glad to have the books. + +"_January 11, 1918._--Forenoon and afternoon, long sittings of the +Committee on territorial questions. Our side is represented by +Kühlmann, Hoffmann, Rosenberg, and a secretary, in addition to myself, +Csicserics, Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present, but +without the Ukrainians. I told Kühlmann that I only proposed to attend +as a second, seeing that the German interests were incomparably more +affected than our own. I only interpose now and again. + +"Trotski made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In a speech rising to +violence, he declared that we were playing false; we aimed at +annexations, and were simply trying to cover them with the cloak of +self-determination. He would never agree to this, and would rather +break off altogether than continue in that way. If we were honest, we +should allow representatives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to +come to Brest, and there express their views without being influenced +in any way by ourselves. Now it should here be noted that from the +commencement of the negotiations it has been a point of conflict +whether the legislative bodies at present existing in the occupied +territories are justified in speaking in the name of their respective +peoples, or not. We affirm that they are; the Russians maintain they +are not. We at once accepted Trotski's proposal, that representatives +of these countries should be called, but added that, when we agreed to +accept their testimony, then their judgment if in our favour should be +taken as valid. + +"It was characteristic to see how gladly Trotski would have taken back +what he had said. But he kept his countenance, fell in with the new +situation at once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned for +twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-reaching importance +that he must confer with his colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotski +will make no difficulty now. If the Poles could be called, it would be +an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that Germany, too, would +rather be without them, knowing the anti-Prussian feeling that exists +among the Poles. + +"_January 12, 1918._--Radek has had a scene with the German chauffeur, +which led to something more. General Hoffmann had placed cars at the +disposal of the Russians in case they cared to drive out. On this +occasion it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the proper +time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man and abused him +violently. The chauffeur complained, and Hoffmann took his part. +Trotski seems to consider Hoffmann's action correct, and has +_forbidden_ the entire delegation to go out any more. That settled +them. And serve them right. + +"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a holy fear of Trotski. +At the sittings, too, none of them dare to speak while he is there. + +"_January 12, 1918._--Hoffmann has made his unfortunate speech. He has +been working at it for days, and was very proud of the result. +Kühlmann and I did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it +beyond exciting the people at home against us. This made a certain +impression on him, but it was soon effaced by Ludendorff's +congratulations, which followed promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the +situation more difficult, and there was certainly no need for that. + +"_January 15, 1918._--I had a letter to-day from one of our mayors at +home, calling my attention to the fact that disaster due to lack of +foodstuffs is now imminent. + +"I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows: + + "'I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which + justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to Your + Majesty, and shows that in the question of food supply we are on + the very verge of a catastrophe. The situation _arising out of the + carelessness and incapacity of the Ministers_ is terrible, and I + fear it is already too late to check the total collapse which is + to be expected in the next few weeks. My informant writes: "Only + small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from + Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease + of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must + infallibly perish. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the + Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the + case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic, + would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be + impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse + of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points + he answered yes, that is so, and added that all was being done to + alter the state of affairs, especially as regards the Hungarian + deliveries. But no one, not even His Majesty, has been able to get + anything done. We can only hope that some _deus ex machina_ may + intervene to save us from the worst.'" + +"To this I added: + + "'I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude + of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored Your + Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and _compel_ Seidler, on + the one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in + order. Even from here I have written entreating Your Majesty to + act while there was yet time. But all in vain.' + +"I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the situation would +be to secure temporary assistance from Germany, and then to +requisition by force the stocks that were doubtless still available in +Hungary; finally, I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime +Minister of my telegram. + +"_January 16, 1918._--Despairing appeals from Vienna for food +supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin for aid, otherwise disaster +imminent. I replied to General Landwehr as follows: + + "'Dr. Kühlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope of + success. The only hope now is for His Majesty to do as I have + advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On my + return I propose to put before His Majesty my point of view, that + it is impossible to carry on the foreign policy if the food + question at home is allowed to come to such a state as now. + + "'Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most positively + that we could hold out till the new harvest.' + +"At the same time I wired the Emperor: + + "'Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for us. + Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two + conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that + we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food supply, + which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of + the stocks still existing in Hungary. + + "'I have just explained the entire situation to Dr. Kühlmann, and + he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all sanguine, + as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think the only + way to secure any success from this step would be for Your Majesty + to send at once, through military means, a Hughes telegram to + Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to intervene + himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the outbreak + of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I must, + however, emphatically point out that the commencement of unrest + among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of peace + here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian representatives + perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution, they + will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is + based on this factor.' + +"_January 17, 1918._--Bad news from Vienna and environs: serious +strike movement, due to the reduction of the flour rations and the +tardy progress of the Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna +Ministry seems to be past all understanding. + +"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time to secure some +supplies from the Ukraine, if only we can manage to keep matters quiet +at home for the next few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in +question to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On the same +day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Dr. von Seidler, the Prime +Minister: + + "'I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of + all the errors made by those entrusted with the food resources. + + "'Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us, + having insufficient for itself. + + "'Had your Excellency or your department called attention to the + state of things _in time_, it might still have been possible to + procure supplies from Roumania. As things are now, I can see no + other way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian + grain for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the + Roumanian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come + to hand.' + +[Illustration: GENERAL HOFFMANN (on right) WITH MAJ. BRINKMANN] + +"_January 20, 1918._--The negotiations have now come to this: that +Trotski declares his intention of laying the German proposals before +Petersburg, though he cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in +any case, to return here. As to calling in representatives from the +outer provinces, he will only do this provided he is allowed to choose +them. We cannot agree to this. With the Ukrainians, who, despite their +youth, are showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit by +the situation, negotiations are proceeding but slowly. First they +demanded East Galicia for the new 'Ukrainia.' This could not be +entertained for a moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the +outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they realise our position, +and know that we _must_ make peace in order to get corn. Now they +demand a separate position for East Galicia. The question will have to +be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry will have the final +word. + +"Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that without supplies +of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe is imminent. There _are_ +supplies in the Ukraine; if we can get them, the worst may be avoided. + +"The position now is this: Without help from outside, we shall, +according to Seidler, have thousands perishing in a few weeks. Germany +and Hungary are no longer sending anything. All messages state that +there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question is only whether we +can get it in time. I hope we may. But if we do not make peace _soon_, +then the troubles at home will be repeated, and each demonstration in +Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for Messrs. +Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of our state of famine at +home from these troubles as by a thermometer. If only the people who +create these disturbances know how they are by that very fact +increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from Ukraine! And we +were all but finished! + +"The question of East Galicia I will leave to the Austrian Ministry; +it must be decided in Vienna. I cannot, and dare not, look on and see +hundreds of thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy of +the Poles, so long as there is a possibility of help. + +"_January 21, 1918._--Back to Vienna. The impression of the troubles +here is even greater than I thought, and the effect disastrous. The +Ukrainians no longer treat with us: they _dictate_! + +"On the way, reading through old reports, I came upon the notes +relating to the discussions with Michaelis on August 1. According to +these, Under-Secretary of State von Stumm said at the time: + +"'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with the Ukrainians, and +the separatist movement in Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of +their movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance that they should +be allowed to unite with the Government of Cholm, and with the areas +of East Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs to +Austria, the demand for East Galicia cannot be conceded. It would be +another matter if Galicia were united with Poland; then a cession of +East Galicia might be possible.' + +"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long since been prejudged +by the Germans. + +"On January 22 the Council was held which was to determine the issue +of the Ukrainian question. The Emperor opened the proceedings, and +then called on me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties +that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which will be apparent +from the foregoing entries in this diary. I expressed my doubt as to +whether our group would succeed in concluding general peace with +Petersburg. I then sketched the course of the negotiations with the +Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians had originally demanded the +cession of East Galicia, but that I had refused this. With regard to +the Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made demands which +had been refused by me. At present, they demanded the division of +Galicia into two parts, and the formation of an independent Austrian +province from East Galicia and Bukovina. I pointed out the serious +consequences which the acceptance of the Ukrainian demands would have +upon the further development of the Austro-Polish question. The +concessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to consist in +the inclusion in the peace treaty of a commercial agreement which +should enable us to cover our immediate needs in the matter of grain +supplies. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full +reciprocity for the Poles resident in Ukraine. + +"I pointed out emphatically that I considered it my duty to state the +position of the peace negotiations; that the decision could not lie +with me, but with the Ministry as a whole, in particular with the +Austrian Prime Minister. The Austrian Government would have to decide +whether these sacrifices could be made or not, and here I could leave +them in no doubt that if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should +probably come to no result with that country, and should thus be +compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk without having achieved any +peace settlement at all. + +"When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, rose to +speak. He pointed out first of all the necessity of an immediate +peace, and then discussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian +crown land, especially from the parliamentary point of view. Seidler +believed that despite the active opposition which was to be expected +from the Poles, he would still have a majority of two-thirds in the +House for the acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not blind +to the fact that arrangement would give rise to violent parliamentary +conflicts, but repeated his hope that a two-thirds majority could be +obtained despite the opposition of the Polish Delegation. After +Seidler came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle. He was +particularly pleased to note that no concessions had been made to the +Ukrainians with regard to the Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear +division of the nationalities in Hungary was impracticable. The +Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of culture to enable +them to be given national independence. Dr. Wekerle also laid stress +on the danger, alike in Austria, of allowing any interference from +without; the risk of any such proceeding would be very great, we +should find ourselves on a downward grade by so doing, and we must +hold firmly to the principle that no interference in the affairs of +the Monarchy from without could be tolerated. In summing up, however, +Wekerle opposed the point of view of the Austrian Prime Minister. + +"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was perfectly aware +of the eminent importance and perilous aspects of this step. It was +true that it would bring us on to a down-grade, but from all +appearances, we had been in that position already for a long time, +owing to the war, and could not say how far it might lead us. I put +the positive question to Dr. Wekerle, what was a responsible leader of +our foreign policy to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the +Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hungarian supplies +would only suffice to help us over the next two months, after which +time a collapse would be absolutely unavoidable, unless we could +secure assistance from somewhere in the way of corn? On being +interrupted here by a dissentient observation from Dr. Wekerle, I told +him that if he, Wekerle, could bring corn into Austria I should be the +first to support his point of view, and that with pleasure, but so +long as he stood by his categorical denial, and insisted on his +inability to help us, we were in the position of a man on the third +floor of a burning house who jumps out of the window to save himself. +A man in such a situation would not stop to think whether he risked +breaking his legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the +certainty of the same. If the position really were as stated, that in +a couple of months we should be altogether without food supplies, then +we must take the consequences of such a position. Dr. von Seidler +here once more took up the discussion, and declared himself entirely +in agreement with my remarks. + +"During the further course of the debate, the probability of a +definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solution in connection with +the Ukrainian peace was discussed, and the question was raised as to +what new constellation would arise out of such failure. Sektionschef +Dr. Gratz then took up this question. Dr. Gratz pointed out that the +Austro-Polish solution must fail even without acceptance of the +Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates rendered solution +impossible. The Germans demanded, apart from quite enormous +territorial reductions of Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish +industry, part possession of the Polish railways and State domains, as +well as the imposition of part of the costs of war upon the Poles. We +could not attach ourselves to a Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed, +capable of living at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its +position. Dr. Gratz maintained that it would be wiser to come back to +the programme already discussed in general form; the project, by which +United Poland should be left to Germany, and the attachment of +Roumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Dr. Gratz went at length into +the details of this point of view. The Emperor then summed up the +essence of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that it was +primarily necessary to make peace with Petersburg and the Ukrainians, +and that negotiations should be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the +division of Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish +solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not finally settled, +but shelved for the time being. + +"In conclusion, Dr. Burian, the Minister of Finance, rose to speak, +and pointed out, as Dr. Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian +standpoint. Burian declared that, while the war might doubtless change +the internal structure of the Monarchy, such alteration must be made +from within, not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the +Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the Austrian principle +of the division of Galicia were to be carried through, the _form_ of +so doing would be of great importance. Baron Burian advised that a +clause referring to this should be inserted, not in the instrument of +peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This form was, in his, Burian's, +view, the only possible means of diminishing the serious consequences +of the steps which the Austrian Government wished to take." + +Thus the notes in my diary relative to this Council. The Austrian +Government was thus not only agreed as to the proposed arrangement +with the Ukraine; it was indeed at the direct wish of the Government, +by its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was brought +about. + +"_January 28, 1918._--Reached Brest this evening. + +"_January 29, 1918._--Trotski arrived. + +"_January 30, 1918._--The first plenary session has been held. There +is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in +Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a +general convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of the question +now to come to any peace terms with the Russians. It is evident among +the Russians themselves that they positively expect the outbreak of a +world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their tactics now are +simply to gain time and wait for this to happen. The conference was +not marked by any particular event, only pin-pricks between Kühlmann +and Trotski. To-day is the first sitting of the Committee on +territorial questions, where I am to preside, and deal with our +territorial affairs. + +"The only interesting point about the new constellation seems to be +that the relations between Petersburg and Kieff are considerably worse +than before, and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognised at all by +the Bolsheviks as independent. + +"_February 1, 1918._--Sitting of the Territorial Committee, I myself +presiding, with the Petersburg Russians. My plan is to play the +Petersburgers and the Ukrainians one against the other, and manage at +least to make peace with one of the two parties. I have still some +slight hope that a peace with one may so affect the other that +possibly peace with both may be attained. + +"As was to be expected, Trotski replied to my question, whether he +admitted that the Ukrainians should treat with us alone on questions +dealing with their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after +some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be adjourned, and a +plenary sitting convened, in order that the matter might be dealt with +by the Kieff and Petersburg parties together. + +"_February 2, 1918._--I have tried to get the Ukrainians to talk over +things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well. The +insults hurled by the Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were +simply grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between these two +Governments, and that it is not our fault that we have not been able +to bring them together under one hat on the question of peace. Trotski +was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he stared fixedly +before him, drawing nervously on his blotting paper. Heavy drops of +sweat trickled down his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the +disgrace of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence of the +enemy. + +"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little while ago. The elder +has shot down some sixty, the younger 'only' some thirty enemy +airmen. The elder's face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He +told me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only get as near +to the enemy as possible, from behind, and then keep on shooting, +when the other man would fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over +your own fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your +opponent.--Modern heroes. + +"Two charming stories were told about these two brothers. The English +had put a price on the head of the elder Richthofen. When he learned +of this, he sent down broadsheets informing them that to make matters +easier for them, he would from the following day have his machine +painted bright red. Next morning, going to the shed, he found all the +machines there painted bright red. One for all and all for one. + +"The other story is this: Richthofen and an English airman were +circling round each other and firing furiously. They came closer and +closer, and soon they could distinctly see each other's faces. +Suddenly something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun, and he +could not shoot. The Englishman looked across in surprise, and seeing +what was wrong, waved his hand, turned and flew off. Fair play! I +should like to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is +greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old. + +"_February 3, 1918._--Started for Berlin. Kühlmann, Hoffmann, +Colloredo. + +"_February 4, 1918._--Arrived Berlin. Nothing this afternoon, as the +Germans are holding council among themselves. + +"_February 5, 1918._--Sitting all day. I had several violent passages +of arms with Ludendorff. Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this +is not yet altogether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for +Brest, we have at last to set down _in writing_ that we are only +obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany. Ludendorff +was violently opposed to this, and said, 'If Germany makes peace +without profit, then Germany has lost the war.' + +"The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling +nudged me and whispered: 'Leave him alone, we two will manage it +together without him.' + +"I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to +Hertling. + +"Supper this evening at Höhenlohe. + +"_February 6, 1918._--Arrived Brest this evening. Wiesner has been at +it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier +now. The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived +yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his +Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally, +far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna, +and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I +gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the +Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then in the name of Germany +commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech +with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were possible +or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposition we agreed. + +"_February 7, 1918._--My conversation with Trotski took place. I took +Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him. I began +by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption +of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be +avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken. I therefore +begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what +conditions he would accept. Trotski then declared very frankly and +clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he +knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that +the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian +provinces. He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kühlmann +during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right +of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of +sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force. He would +never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to +this interpretation of the right of self-determination. The Germans +must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he +would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation +and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak to oppose it. Only the +Moon Sound Islands seemed to be more than he could swallow. Secondly, +and this is very characteristic, Trotski said he could never agree to +our making peace with the Ukraine, since the Ukraine was no longer in +the hands of its Rada, but in the hands of his troops. It was a part +of Russia, and to make peace with it would be interfering in the +internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter seems to be +that about nineteen days ago the Russian troops really did enter +Kieff, but were subsequently driven out, the Rada once more coming +into power as before. Whether Trotski was unaware of this latter +development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot say for certain, +but it seems as if the former were the case. + +"The last hope of coming to an understanding with Petersburg has +vanished. An appeal from the Petersburg Government to the German +soldiers has been discovered in Berlin, inciting them to revolt, to +murder the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the soviets. +Following on this came a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm to Kühlmann +ordering him to terminate negotiations at once, by demanding, besides +Courland and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia--all without regard to the right of self-determination of the +peoples concerned. + +"The dastardly behaviour of these Bolsheviks renders negotiation +impossible. I cannot blame Germany for being incensed at such +proceedings, but the instructions from Berlin are hardly likely to be +carried out. We do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia. + +"_February 8, 1918._--This evening the peace with Ukraine is to be +signed. The first peace in this terrible war. I wonder if the Rada is +still really sitting at Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message +dated 6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here, and +Trotski has declined my suggestion to dispatch an officer of the +Austrian General Staff to the spot, in order to bring back reliable +information. Evidently, then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were +already masters of Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me, by the +way, that Trotski, with whom he spoke early this morning, is much +depressed at our intention of concluding peace with Ukraine to-day +after all. This confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz +has convened a meeting with the Petersburgers for to-morrow; this will +clear matters up, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if +we must break off altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that +the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end." + +After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received the following +telegram from the Emperor: + + "'_Court train, February 9, 1918._ + + "'Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace + with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for + your persevering and successful endeavours. + + "'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto far + from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further + continue to aid you on your difficult path--to the benefit of the + Monarchy and of our peoples. + + KARL.' + +"_February 11, 1918._--Trotski declines to sign. The war is over, but +there is no peace. + +"The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna will be seen clearly +from the following message from Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux, +February 12, 1918. Skrzynski writes: + + "'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the + following notification: We were already quite disposed to enter + into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether + Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give + her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which + is perhaps already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And + Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows: + It has been decided to wait for a while.'" + +Our position, then, during the negotiations with Petersburg was as +follows: We could not induce Germany to resign the idea of Courland +and Lithuania. We had not the physical force to do so. The pressure +exerted by the Supreme Army Command on the one hand and the shifty +tactics of the Russians made this impossible. We had then to choose +between leaving Germany to itself, and signing a separate peace, or +acting together with our three Allies and finishing with a peace +including the covert annexation of the Russian outer provinces. + +The former alternative involved the serious risk of making a breach in +the Quadruple Alliance, where some dissension was already apparent. +The Alliance could no longer stand such experiments. We were faced +with the final military efforts now, and the unity of the Allies must +not in any case be further shaken. On the other hand, the danger that +Wilson, the only statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of +a peace on mutual understanding, might from the conclusion of such a +peace obtain an erroneous impression as to our intentions. I hoped +then, and I was not deceived, that this eminently clever man would +see through the situation and recognise that we were forced to act +under pressure of circumstances. His speeches delivered after the +peace at Brest confirmed my anticipation. + +The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine. And +it bears the characteristic marks of such a birth. That is true. But +it is no less true that despite the fact of our having obtained far +less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should, without these +supplies, have been unable to carry on at all until the new harvest. +Statistics show that during the spring and summer of 1918 42,000 +wagon-loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have been +impossible to procure these supplies from anywhere else. Millions of +human beings were thus saved from death by starvation--and let those +who sit in judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind. + +It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks available in +Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity could have been brought into +Austria if the collecting and transport apparatus had worked +differently. + +The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my request, in May, +1919, furnished me with the following statistical data for +publication: + + Brief survey of the organisation of corn imports from Ukraine (on + terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same: + + When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived + at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies, + a mission was dispatched to Kieff, in which not only Government + officials but also the best qualified and most experienced experts + which the Government could procure were represented. + + Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being + persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain + business, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente + grain houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the + leading French corn merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss). + + The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and + commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to + show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties. + + The Ukrainian Government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk that + very great quantities, probably about one million tons, of + surplus foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the meantime + been replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power + evinced no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to + fulfil obligations on this scale, but was more disposed to point + out that it would be altogether impossible, for various reasons, + to do so. + + Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange + system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But + neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in a + position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded) + required in exchange. + + We had then to endeavour to obtain the supplies on credit, and the + Ukrainian Government agreed, after long and far from easy + negotiations, to provide _credit valuta_ (against vouchers for + mark and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this + were finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all 643 + million karbowanez. + + The Rouble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under the + leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, + was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight + activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of + great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost; + and even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with. + Anyhow, it had only procured comparatively small sums of roubles, + so that the purchasing organisation in Ukraine, especially at + first, suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment. + + But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question would + only have improved matters in a few of the best supplied + districts, for the principal obstacle was simply _the lack of + supplies_. The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves + continually in danger of a food crisis is the best indication as + to the state of things. + + In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the + resulting confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the + Bolsheviks (November, 1917, to March, 1918) were conspicuously + apparent; cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but + where supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly + carried off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the + harvest had given certain stocks available in the country, though + these were not extensive, and the organisation of a purchasing + system was now commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and + Germany had originally contemplated could not be carried out in + fact, since the Ukrainian Government declared that it would itself + set up this organisation, and maintained this intention with the + greatest stubbornness. But the authority in the country had been + destroyed by the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion; + the peasantry turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by + revolutionaries and cut up. The power of the Government, then, in + respect of collecting supplies of grain, was altogether + inadequate; on the other hand, however, it was still sufficient + (as some actual instances proved) to place serious, indeed + insuperable, obstacles in our way. It was necessary, therefore, to + co-operate with the Government--that is, to come to a compromise + with it. After weeks of negotiation this was at last achieved, by + strong diplomatic pressure, and, accordingly, the agreement of + April 23, 1918, was signed. + + This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hungarian + Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a great firm + of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed a number + of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of activity + in the business, with Russian grain affairs. + + But while this establishment was still in progress the people in + Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey to + North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no + longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a _civil_ + commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied + by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a + decree from the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain + should be entrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the + districts occupied by them. To carry out this plan a general, who + had up to that time been occupied in Roumania, was dispatched to + Odessa, and now commenced independent military proceedings from + there. For payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War + Grain Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial + instructions to the Government, to place 100 million kronen at the + disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set + aside by the finance section of that department. + + This military action and its execution very seriously affected the + civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired + the value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to + such an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in + circulation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus + into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed to + the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place + there some months later. + + The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great + disapproval by the _Germans_, and when in a time of the greatest + scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Germany + for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition that + independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary should + be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be entrusted to + Germany. + + It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured, + especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established a + collecting organisation, to the demand of which the Roumanian + Government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain, and + in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The + country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies, + and in addition to this the collecting system never really worked + properly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was + frequently upset by overbidding on the part of our own military + section. + + Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the harvest + of 1918. The collecting organisation had become more firmly + established and extended, the necessary personal requirements were + fully complied with, and _it would doubtless have been possible to + bring great quantities out of the country_. But first of all the + demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in + many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian + and finally the very considerable contingents of German and + Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for + these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow + any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree. + + It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout + the whole country had seriously declined--owing to the entire + uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution. + The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were + little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local + embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to + any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves. + + In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which + had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of + the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position + of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was + unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements + throughout the whole country were now working with increasing + success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more + difficult in September and October--and then came the collapse. + + The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had + either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube, + or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient + wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition, + often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways, + incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort. + + However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much + the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have + contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing + of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may + nevertheless maintain that _all that was humanly possible_ was + done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And + in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and + experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were + utilised to the utmost degree. + + Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import + organisation--apart from the before-mentioned interference of the + military department and consequent fluctuations of the system--was + largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on + more particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high + export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian + Government were constantly being overbid. This smuggling was also + in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the + nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and + frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or + upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did + a great deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany + likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted + smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation, + and led to similar conditions on our own side. + + Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen + from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not + inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned, + amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the + quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations. + + + SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCEMENT OF + IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918. + + I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department + (corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds): + + Total imported for the contracting states + (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) 113,421 tons + Of which Austria-Hungary received 57,382 " + Grain and flour amounting to 46,225 " + + II. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company: + + Of which + Austria-Hungary + Total received: + + Butter, fat, bacon 3,329,403 kg. 2,170,437 kg. + Oil, edible oils 1,802,847 " 977,105 " + Cheese, curds 420,818 " 325,103 " + Fish, preserved fish, herrings 1,213,961 " 473,561 " + Cattle 105,542 head 55,421 head + (36,834,885 kg.) (19,505,760 kg.) + Horses 98,976 head 40,027 head + (31,625,172 kg.) (13,165,725 kg.) + Salted meat 2,927,439 " 1,571,569 " + Eggs 75,200 boxes 32,433 boxes + Sugar 66,809,969 kg. 24,973,443 kg. + Various foodstuffs 27,385,095 " 7,836,287 " + ------------- ------------- + Total 172,349,556 " 61,528,220 " + and 75,200 boxes and 32,433 boxes + eggs eggs + (Total, 30,757 wagons) (Total, 13,037 wagons) + + The goods imported under II. represent a value of roughly 450 + _million kronen_. + + The quantities _smuggled_ unofficially into the states concerned + are estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official + imports). + +So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important while we were +living through it, but which was yet nothing but a phase of no great +importance after all, since it produced no lasting effect. + +The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, washing +it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by +the incoming tide. + +Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in the Herrenhaus, +who asserted that I had proved my incapability by my own confession +that the Peace of Brest had not withstood the test of subsequent +events. But should I have shown more capability by asserting, after +the collapse of the Central Powers, that the peace still existed? + +The term "bread peace" (_Brotfrieden_) was not coined by me, but by +Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the +Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives +were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words +without a sneer. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST + + +At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not +intend to continue the war. These rumours assumed a very definite +character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine. That peace, as +well as Trotski's attitude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania +could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia +and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back. I +say in _some_ circles, for there was one group which, to the very last +moment, was all for war. + +While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of +the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace +aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a +peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than +with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians +on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical +frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from +Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, +as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person +with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was +brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far +as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of +acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with +the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his +already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very +distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The _pro-memoria_ +reads as follows: + + Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much + exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy + could wish. + + The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains + in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us + are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her + military situation. + + Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift + offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a + subject for negotiations_. In no case are these negotiations to + assume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses + to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only + be a resumption of hostilities. + + I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will + run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western + Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that + after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back + and give way before our superior forces. + + At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse + of Roumania. + + In all human probability it is almost certain that the development + of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the + peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete + success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier + rectification as _conditio sine qua non_ forms a justifiable + measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a + purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the + entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the + question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up + another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in + the Delegation. + + And, besides, the procedure--to which the greatest importance must + be attached--is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise + the chances of a general peace. + + It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of + the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree + to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and + firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in + this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only + way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude + that will lead them to think differently. + + This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and + undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is + evident that to yield on the frontier question--even for fear of a + breakdown in the negotiations--must have a deplorable effect on + the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right + not to take advantage of Roumania's desperate situation, but to + grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the + principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with + adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the + Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude + a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and + sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to + teach them otherwise. + + TISZA. + + _February 27, 1916._ + +Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of +Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord +on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do +not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time +displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the +feet of General Franchet d'Esperey, dominated. + +Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the +horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace +negotiations must be supported. + +The episode of the Roumanian peace must not be taken out of the great +picture of the war. Like the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanian +peace was necessary from a military point of view, because it seemed +desirable to release troops in the East as quickly as possible and +transfer them to the Western front. It was urgently desired and +repeatedly demanded that we should come to a final settlement with +Roumania as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result I had +already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Emperor to send word +privately to King Ferdinand that he could reckon on an honourable +peace should he wish to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my +advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews with a member of +the immediate entourage of the King. But the German opinion was that +King Ferdinand must be "punished for his treachery" and no +negotiations entered into with him. For this reason, and to avoid +fruitless controversy, I first imparted to Herr von Kühlmann the +accomplished fact and informed him that we had put ourselves secretly +into communication with King Ferdinand. This event was quite in +accordance with the standard of equality in our Federation, by which +every member was privileged to act according to the best of his +ability and was merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the +proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany for permission to +take such a step. + +There was a three-fold reason why I did not share Germany's opinion on +this question. In the first place, my point of view was that it was +not our duty to mete out divine justice and to inflict punishment, +but, on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible. Therefore +my duty was to seize every means possible to prevent a continuance of +the war. I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles +that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were +compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false. The +Roumanians held very strong positions, the _moral_ in the army was +excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen's +troops had suffered very severely. This success turned the Roumanians' +heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian +army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war _à +l'outrance_. They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were +upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the +defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies +on the West would secure victory for them. They were probably afraid, +too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent +disgrace with the Entente--that they would lose the friendship of the +Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools. +The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the +King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most +unwise to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a certain +fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it +might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones. The +third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a +competent representative in Roumania. If we were to depose the King we +should divide Roumania into two camps and would, at the best, only be +able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the +dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly-secured peace could +only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania. + +In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4 +and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy +asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the +step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would +be released. I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied +that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other +Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable +peace, address them accordingly. As to the question of territorial +possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express +any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the +introductory negotiations. + +The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with +Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently +from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the +question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite +justified. Roumania's actions with regard to us were far more +treacherous than those of Italy. Italy, owing to her geographical +position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western +Powers--a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to +their demands--would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in +this world war. Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was +amply provided for through her rich granaries. Apart from the fact +that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that +Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her +into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be +influenced by the Entente than Italy. But neither would the Russian +ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and +willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and +political matters that gave her into Russia's power. Bratianu said to +me in one of our last interviews: "Russia is exactly like a blackcock +dancing before the hens." In admitting the truth of this appropriate +comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to +be embraced, directly provoked violence. + +For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his +own country. Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his +Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had +no effect. + +In Roumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power. On February 24 +Kühlmann and I had our first interview alone with Avarescu at the +castle of Prince Stirbey, at Buftia. At this interview, which was very +short, the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The frontier +rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-Hungarian programme, were +barely alluded to, and the economic questions, which later played a +rather important part, were only hinted at. Avarescu's standpoint was +that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an impossibility, and the +interview ended with a _non possumus_ from the Roumanian general, +which was equivalent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the +Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint. The so-called +"old" Dobrudsha, the portion that Roumania in 1913 had wrested from +Bulgaria, had been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the time +of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their co-operation, and +the area that lies between that frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda +railway line was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They went much +further in their aspirations: they demanded the whole of the +Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, and the great and +numerous disputes that occurred later in this connection show how +insistently and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands. At +the same time, as there was a danger that the Bulgars, thoroughly +disappointed in their aspirations, might secede from us, it became +absolutely impossible to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Roumanians. +All that could be effected was to secure for the Roumanians free +access to Constanza, and, further, to find a way out of the +difficulty existing between Turkey and Bulgaria in connection with the +Dobrudsha. + +In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I suggested to +Avarescu that he should arrange for his King to meet me. My plan was +to make it clear to the King that it would be possible for him now to +conclude a peace, though involving certain losses, but still a peace +that would enable him to keep his crown. On the other hand, by +continuing the war, he could not count on forbearance on the part of +the Central Powers. I trusted that this move on my part would enable +him to continue the peace negotiations. + +I met the King on February 27 at a little station in the occupied +district of Moldavia. + +We arrived at Focsani at noon and continued by motor to the lines, +where Colonel Ressel and a few Roumanian officers were waiting to +receive me. We drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German +car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded as far as the +railway station of Padureni. A saloon carriage in the train had been +reserved for me there, and we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at +5 o'clock. + +The Roumanian royal train arrived a few minutes later, and I at once +went across to the King. + +Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand lasted twenty minutes. + +As the King did not begin the conversation I had to do so, and said +that I had not come to sue for peace but purely as the bearer of a +message from the Emperor Charles, who, in spite of Roumania's +treachery, would show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand +would _at once_ conclude peace under the conditions mutually agreed on +by the Quadruple Alliance Powers. + +Should the King not consent, then a continuance of the war would be +unavoidable and would put an end to Roumania and the dynasty. Our +military superiority was already very considerable, and now that our +front would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it would be +an easy matter for us, in a very short space of time, to increase our +strength still more. We were aware that Roumania would very soon have +no more munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks the +kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist. + +The King did not oppose anything but thought the conditions terribly +hard. Without the Dobrudsha Roumania would hardly be able to draw +breath. At any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding "old" +Dobrudsha again. + +I said to the King that if he complained about hard conditions I could +only ask what would his conditions have been if his troops had reached +Budapest? Meanwhile, I was ready to guarantee that Roumania would not +be cut off from the sea, but would have free access to Constanza. + +Here the King again complained of the hard conditions enforced on him, +and declared he would never be able to find a Ministry who would +accept them. + +I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Roumania's internal +business, but my private opinion was that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in +order to save Roumania, would agree to the conditions laid down. I +could only repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms laid +before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If the King did not accept +them, we should have, in a month's time, a far better peace than the +one which the Roumanians might consider themselves lucky to get +to-day. + +We were ready to give our diplomatic support to Roumania that she +might obtain Bessarabia, and she would, therefore, gain far more than +she would lose. + +The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was +steeped in Bolshevism, and the Dobrudsha could not be given up; +anyhow, it was only under the very greatest pressure that he had +decided to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He began +again, however, to speak of the promised access to the sea, which +apparently made the cession of the Dobrudsha somewhat easier. + +We then entered into details, and I reproached the King for the +dreadful treatment of our people interned in Roumania, which he said +he regretted. + +Finally, I requested that he would give me a clear and decided answer +within forty-eight hours as to whether he would negotiate on the basis +of our proposals or not. + +The result of the interview was the appointment of the Marghiloman +Ministry and the continuation of the negotiations. + +Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet, he approached me to +learn the exact terms. + +He declared himself to be in agreement with the first and hardest of +the conditions--the cession of the Dobrudsha, because he was quicker +than the King in seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation +to Bulgaria in this connection, it could not be otherwise. As to our +territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that I laid chief stress on +entering into friendly and lasting relations with Roumania after peace +was concluded, and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such +measure as Roumania, on her part, would consider bearable. On the +other hand, he, Marghiloman, must understand that I was bound to +consider the Hungarian aspirations to a certain degree, Marghiloman, +who was an old and tried parliamentarian, fully saw in what a +constrained position I was placed. We finally agreed that the cession +of the populated districts and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should +not take place, and, altogether the original claims were reduced to +about half. Marghiloman said he accepted the compromise. + +My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with Roumania played +an important part in the negotiations. It was clear to me that this +demand was in Austrian, but not in Hungarian interests; but I still +think that, even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for both +countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage of provisions made the +opening of the Roumanian granaries very desirable. As was to be +expected, this clause in the negotiations met with the most violent +opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible to see a way out +of the difficulty. I never took back my demand, however, and was +firmly resolved that peace should not be signed if my plan was not +realised. I was dismissed from office in the middle of the +negotiations, and my successor did not attach the same importance to +that particular item as I did. + +On the German side there was at once evidence of that insatiable +appetite which we had already noticed at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans +wished to have a species of war indemnity by compelling Roumania to +cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbours to German +companies, and placing the permanent control of her finances in German +hands. I opposed these demands in the most decided manner from the +very first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude all +possibility of any friendly relations in future. I went so far as to +ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph direct to the Emperor William in +that connection, which met with a certain amount of success. In the +end the German claims were reduced by about fifty per cent., and +accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form. With regard to the +petroleum question, a ninety years' lease was agreed on. In the matter +of the corn supply, Roumania was to bind herself to deliver her +agricultural produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of +years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent control of +Roumanian finances was not carried out. In the question of price, the +Roumanian views held good. The most impossible of the German demands, +namely, the occupation of Roumania for five to six years after the +conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties. This was the +point that was most persistently and energetically insisted on by the +German Supreme Military Command, and it was only with great trouble +and after lengthy explanations and discussions that we settled the +matter on the following lines: That on the conclusion of peace the +entire legislative and executive power of the Roumanian Government +would be restored in principle, and that we should content ourselves +with exercising a certain control through a limited number of agents, +this control not to be continued after the general peace was made. I +cannot say positively whether this standpoint was adhered to by my +successor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only undertook +office on condition that I gave him a guarantee that the plan would be +supported by me. + +As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha had prepared great +difficulties for us in two respects. First of all there was the +relinquishing of their claim which, for the Roumanians, was the +hardest term of all, and imparted to the peace the character of a +peace of violence; and secondly, the matter had precipitated a dispute +between Turkey and Bulgaria. + +The Bulgarians' view was that the entire Dobrudsha, including the +mouth of the Danube, must be promised to them, and they insisted on +their point with an obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come +across. They went so far as to declare that neither the present +Government nor any other would be able to return to Sofia, and allowed +it clearly to be seen that by refusing their claims we could never +again count on Bulgaria. The Turks, on the other hand, protested with +equal vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered by two Turkish +army corps, that it was a moral injustice that the gains chiefly won +by Turkish forces should be given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and +that they would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole of the +Dobrudsha unless compensation was given to them. By way of +compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they +had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but +also a considerable area beyond. + +In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed, +Kühlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making +every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both +saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the +result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble, +we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It +took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to +Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a +possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision +agreed upon later. + +Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor +yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it was the only possible +way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars. + +Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy +through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and +Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to +the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved +later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding. +Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a +state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without +first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to +important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a +burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has +damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was +very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my +predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger. +There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the +Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through +promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the +Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it. + +On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too +severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was +dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret +with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on Talaat and +Enver. Talaat told me in Bucharest, however, quite positively that he +would be forced to send in his resignation if he were to return +empty-handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would be very +probable. + +We tried then at Bucharest to steer our way through the many shoals; +not mortally to offend the Roumanians, to observe as for as possible +the character of a peace of understanding, and yet to keep both Turks +and Bulgars on our side. + +The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard demand to make on the +Roumanians, and was only rendered bearable for them when Kühlmann and +I, with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent +opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free access to the +Black Sea. + +When later, in one breath, we were reproached with having enforced a +peace of violence on the Roumanians and with not having treated the +Bulgarian claims and wishes with sufficient consideration--the answer +to the charge is obvious. _Because_ we were compelled to consider both +Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to demand the Dobrudsha from the +Roumanians and treat them with greater severity than we should have +done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and the Bulgars for +our negotiation plans. Judged according to the Versailles standard, +the Peace of Bucharest would be a peace of understanding, both as +regards form and contents. + +The Central Powers' mediators, both at Versailles and St. Germain, +would have been glad had they been treated in the same way as the +Marghiloman Ministry was treated. + +The Roumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired safe and guaranteed +access to the sea; they lost a district of sparsely populated +mountainous country to us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia. + +They gained far more than they lost. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +FINAL REFLECTIONS + + +The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the +character of the work of individual men. It assumed rather the +character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the +effectiveness of the most powerful individuals. + +All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with +certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation +given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory. +The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing +crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making +each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an +avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and +without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone. + +The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the +world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe +according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That +signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four +different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and +Washington. And the four representatives--"the Big Four," as they were +called--were each individually the slave of his programme, his +pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations +_in camera_, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground +for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there +was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found. + +Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his +programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between +the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but +it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his +will against the three others. We do not know what occurred behind +those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought +weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off +proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the +chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world +if the only one who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest +had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of +Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, +who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the +Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he +had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of +France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had +been told for the last five years: _Que les boches payeront tout_. +What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France +would have dismissed him. + +And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of +approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to +check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national +interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was +much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might +much more probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after final +victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves +of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would +have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the +right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally, +he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the +question here, but rather that neither could have acted very +differently even had he wished to do so. + +It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson +lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the +President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his +Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were +so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held +it. + +And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the +most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a +continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars. + +In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of +all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at +Versailles--the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating +Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory +that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give +themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and +passion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful +paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while +they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but +instruments in a world revolution. + +The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the +blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made +Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its +mother, despair its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in +the veins of Europe for many a long year. + +Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The +war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming +generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the +world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with +the world-war. + +Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done. +The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms +that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible +earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and +again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up +flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of +elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation +through the land--until everything has been swept away that reminds us +of the madness of the war and the French peace. + +Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming +generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad +dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid +in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions, +with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to +devastate and destroy. + +But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will +rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always +after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law +in life. + +Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the +ranks of whoever comes to build the new world. + +_June, 1919._ + + + + +APPENDIX + + +1 + +=Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915=[11] + +On February 28, 1917, the _Isvestia_ published the following text of +this agreement: + +"The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the +instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the +Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Ambassador +in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in London, Count +Benckendorff, the following notable points: + +§1. A _Military Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between +the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This +convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia +against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its +forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly +against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle +questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their +nature come within the scope of the Army Command. + +§2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at +her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against +all countries at war with them. + +§3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy +undiminished, active assistance until the _destruction of the Austrian +fleet_, or until the moment peace is concluded. A _Naval Convention_ +shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and +Italy. + +§4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the +district of the _Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its +natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the +city and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, +the whole of Istria_ as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the +Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of +Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St. +Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands. + +Note: 1. By way of supplement to §4, the frontier shall be drawn +through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a +northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the +watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers +Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the +Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn +southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the +present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it +will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course +along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil, +Mangart and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and +Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction +to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its +sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the +Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua, +Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions. + +§5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its +present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all +possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca +eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the +Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching +at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those +situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised _all the +islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast_, beginning with +the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura, +etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the +islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza +and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as +Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona, +Pua, Solta and Brazza. + +The following are to be _neutralised_: (1) The entire coast from Cape +Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of +Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned +peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning +from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far +as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the +boundaries of the neutralised zone _the whole of the Bay of Cattaro_ +with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo; +this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in +April and May, 1909, as to the rights of _Montenegro_. + +In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only +admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they +shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in +the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the +coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future +neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari, +agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the +islands not accorded to Italy. + +Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the +Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of _Croatia, +Serbia and Montenegro_: In the north of the Adriatic, _the entire +coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca_ on the frontier of Istria +as far as the _northern frontier_ of Dalmatia, including the whole of +the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia, +the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as +also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the +south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the +entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the +principal ports of _Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and +San Giovanni di Medua_, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua, +Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta. + +The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State +of Albania. + +§6. Italy to be given full possession of _Valona, the Island of +Sasseno_, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in +military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north +and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south. + +§7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to §4, Dalmatia and the +islands of the Adriatic according to §5, as well as Valona, is not to +oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain and Russia in case +of the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state in +Albania, as to _division of the northern and southern frontier belts +of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece_. The southern strip +of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as far as +Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralisation. + +Italy has the prospect of _right to determine the foreign policy of +Albania_; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a +sufficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on +the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece and +Serbia. + +§8. Italy to have full possession of all the _islands of the +Dodecanessus_ which it occupies at present. + +§9. France, Great Britain and Russia accept in principle the fact of +_Italy's interest in maintaining political equilibrium_ in the +Mediterranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any _division of +Turkey, to a like portion with themselves_ in the basin of the +Mediterranean, and that in the part adjacent to the _province of +Adalia_, where Italy has already acquired particular rights, and +developed particular interests, to be noted in the Italo-British +Convention. The zone then falling to the possession of Italy will in +due time be determined according to the vital interests of France and +Great Britain. Similarly, the interests of Italy are also to be +considered in case the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should +be maintained by the Powers for a further period, and only a +limitation between the spheres of interest be made. Should, in such +case, any areas of Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain +and Russia during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to +Italy, and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together +with the right to occupy the same. + +§10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto +conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne. + +§11. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall be +commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts. + +§12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, England and +Russia whereby _Arabia and the holy cities of the Mohammedans_ are to +be granted to _an independent Mohammedan Power_. + +§13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial +possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great +Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain +compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in +Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to +the colonies of France and England. + +§14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realisation of _a +loan of not less than 50 million pounds sterling_ in the English +market on favourable conditions. + +§15. France, England and Russia undertake to support Italy in +_preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any +diplomatic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a +peace_, or the regulation of questions connected with the present war. + +§16. The present treaty to be _kept secret_. As regards Italy's +agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration +will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against +Italy. + +The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective authorised +representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, together with the +representative of Italy similarly authorised by his Government for +this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain and Russia declare +their full agreement with the foregoing notable points, as set before +them by the Italian Government. With regard to §§1, 2 and 3, referring +to the agreement upon military and naval undertakings of all four +Powers, _Italy undertakes to commence active operations at the +earliest possible date_, and in any case not later than one month +after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties. + +The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the 26th +April, 1915, and sealed, by + + Sir Edward Grey, + Cambon, + Marchese Imperiali, + Graf Benckendorff." + +After the entry of Roumania into the war (September, 1916) this +programme was further extended. + + +2 + +=Note from Count Czernin to the American Government, dated March 5, +1917= + +From the _aide-mémoire_ of the American Ambassador in Vienna, dated +February 18 of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign +Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet entertains some doubt, +in view of the statements issued by the Imperial and Royal Government +on February 10 and January 11 of this year, as to what attitude +Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting for the future with regard to +submarine warfare, and whether the assurance given by the Austrian +Government to the Washington Cabinet in the course of the proceedings +with regard to the case of the vessels _Ancona_ and _Persia_ might not +be taken as altered or withdrawn by the statements mentioned. + +The Austrian Government is most willing to meet the desire of the +United States Government that this doubt should be removed by a clear +and final declaration. + +It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on the +methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since these +form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare put into +practice by Austria-Hungary and her allies, besides throwing a clear +light upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian Government in +the questions arising therefrom. + +When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central Powers, but a +few years had elapsed since the memorable time when Great Britain +itself, together with the remaining states, had commenced at the Hague +to lay the foundations of a modern code of law for marine warfare. +Shortly after that the English Government had brought about a meeting +of representatives of the principal naval Powers, assembling in +London, in order further to carry forward the work commenced at the +Hague, presumably in a spirit of reasonable compromise between the +interests of belligerents and those of neutrals. The unexpected +success of these endeavours, which aimed at nothing less than +concerted establishment of legal standards calculated to maintain the +freedom of the seas and the interests of neutrals even in time of war, +was not to be long enjoyed by the peoples concerned. + +Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war than it +also began to break through the barriers with which it was confronted +by the standards of international law. While the Central Powers +immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their intention of +observing the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of +the British representative, England discarded the most important +points in that Declaration. In the endeavour to cut off the Central +Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually extended the list +of contraband until it included everything now required by human +beings for the maintenance of life. Great Britain then placed all the +coasts of the North Sea--an important transit-way also for the +maritime trade of Austria-Hungary--under the obstruction of a +so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the entry into Germany of +all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband list, as also to bar all +neutral traffic with those coasts, and prevent any export from the +same. That this method of proceeding stands in the most lurid +contradiction to the standards of blockade law arrived at and +established by international congress has already been admitted by the +President of the United States in words which will live in the history +of the law of nations. By this illegally preventing export of goods +from the Central Powers Great Britain thought to be able to shut down +the innumerable factories and industries which had been set up by +industrious and highly-developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and +to bring the workers to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And +when Austria-Hungary's southern neighbour joined the ranks of the +enemies of the Central Powers her first step was to declare a +blockade of all the coasts of her opponent--following the example, of +course, of her Allies--in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy +had shortly before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to +point out to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of +all legal validity. + +For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until then, and +after long and mature consideration for and against, did they proceed +to answer in like measure and close with their adversaries at sea. As +the only belligerents who had done everything to secure the observance +of the agreement which should provide for freedom of the seas to +neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes to bow to the need of the +moment and attack that freedom; but they took that step in order to +fulfil their urgent duty to their peoples and with the conviction that +the step in question must lead towards the freedom of the seas in the +end. The declarations made by the Central Powers on the last day of +January of this year are only apparently directed against the rights +of neutrals; as a matter of fact, they are working toward the +restitution of those rights which the enemy has constantly infringed +and would, if victorious, annihilate for ever. The submarines, then, +which circle round England's shores, announce to all peoples using and +needing the sea--and who does not need it?--that the day is not far +off when the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly +acquired freedom. + +It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo +wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in +particular by the great people of the United States of America, whose +most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up with +ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all +nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in +mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended not +only to force the Central Powers to submission by starvation but +ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and +thereby ensure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the +other hand the blockading of England and its Allies only serves to +render possible _a peace with honour_ for these Powers and to +guarantee to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritime trade, +thus ensuring their safe existence, then the question as to which of +the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided. +Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further +allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming +that neutrals should appreciate their endeavours to bring to life +again the principles of international law and the equal rights of +nations. + +Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memorandum of +February 18 of this year, already referred to, the Austrian Government +would first of all remark that in the exchange of Notes in the cases +of the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ this Government restricted itself to +consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then arisen, +without setting forth the legal position in point of principle. In the +Note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the _Ancona_ case it +reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of +international law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion +at a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the +question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum is +concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may be +made clear to the American Government that the Austrian Government now +as heretofore _holds immovably by the assurance already given_, and +with the endeavour to avoid any misunderstanding between the Monarchy +and the American Union by clearing up the most important question +arising out of the submarine warfare--most important as it rests on +the dictates of humanity. + +First and foremost the Austrian Government wishes to point out that +the thesis advanced by the American Government and adopted in many +learned works--to the effect that enemy merchant vessels, save in the +event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be destroyed +without provision for the safety of those on board--is also, in the +opinion of the Austrian Government itself, the kernel, so to speak, of +the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view, this theory +can at any rate be considered in connection with possible +circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the +dictates of humanity, which the Austrian Government and the Washington +Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down the +general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy +merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible. +This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before +exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the method +indicated by the theory of the Union Government referred to, according +to which _the commander of the warship himself issues a warning to the +vessel about to be sunk_, so that crew and passengers can be brought +into safety at the last moment; or, on the other hand, the Government +of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an imperative +necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect, _before the +sailing of the vessel_ to be sunk; or, finally, such Government can, +when preparing comprehensive measures against the enemy traffic at +sea, have recourse to _a general warning applicable to all enemy +vessels concerned_. + +That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on board +is liable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union Government +itself. The Austrian Government believes, however, that destruction +without warning is not only justifiable in cases of attempted escape +or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance only, that the +character of the vessel itself should be taken into consideration; +thus merchant ships or other private craft, placed in the service of +war operations, whether as transports or guardships, or with a +military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any kind of +hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be liable to +destruction without notice. The Austrian Government need not go into +the question of how far a belligerent is released from any obligation +as to provision for safety of human life when his opponent sinks enemy +merchant vessels without such previous warning, as in the well-known +cases, previously referred to, of the _Elektra_, _Dubrovnik_, +_Zagreb_, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident right, the +Austrian Government itself has never returned like for like. +Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian warships have +not destroyed a single enemy merchant vessel without previous warning, +though this may have been of a general character. + +The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also +admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance, +whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can +be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or +whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for +example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers +into the boats (the case of the _Ancona_), or when the passengers +themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian +Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of +the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as +otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive +the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should +also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as +to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at +all. + +The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a +vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand, +involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in +certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful +interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied +that saving lives _at sea_ is nearly always a matter of blind +uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a +vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in +small boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore, +far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity _to restrain +people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them +beforehand_. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not +convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions +concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to +immunity when travelling on board enemy ships. + +The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the +freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral +persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly +justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their +power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed +necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the +sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their +purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, _are +enabled to avoid risking their lives_. But even where there is doubt +as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals +threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be +decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being +admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their +military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such +operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken +against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate +claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of +measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may +refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels. + +The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the +Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian +Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the +correctness of these views would imply--and this the Union Government +can hardly intend--that neutrals have the right of interfering in the +military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to +constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be +employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a +neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the +right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or +indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at +the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very +existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all +kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the +bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships +for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact +that subjects of neutral states are themselves responsible for any +harm they may incur _by their presence in any territory on land where +military operations are in progress_. Obviously, there is no ground +for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly +since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the +agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare +upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea. + +From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given +to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to +exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for +instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and +resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others +warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian +Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with +the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of +life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards +some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government +has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds +in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions +with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the +Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated +that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views. +The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington +Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are +inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American +citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in +this direction. + +Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year +concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian +Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the +foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when +only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern +international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an +enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop +the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain, +examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and, +where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with +these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship +has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a +peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance +can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of +offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to +act in such a manner under the guns of an enemy, whatever may be the +purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the +fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all +assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive +purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would +also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship +were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance +on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less +valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the +subjects of a foreign Power. + +The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former +assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to +armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards +prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military +forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable +to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the +_general_ law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified +in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes. +But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it +would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves +with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant +ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and +that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek +to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity. +As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was +discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of +arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the +second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the +laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the +arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual +observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is +characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of +superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre +se propose d'arrêter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le +commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation à la mer, fera tirer un +coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on +puisse donner. _Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons à bord._" +(When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the +commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun +is the best guarantee that can be given. _Merchant vessels do not +carry guns._) + +Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its +assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were +cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods +on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put +into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable +neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally, +the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of +encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to +provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible +to do so in the circumstances. + +The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed +British steamers _Secondo_ and _Welsh Prince_ were sunk without +warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian +Government has in the meantime received information that no +Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of +these vessels. + +The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already +referred to--reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine +warfare referred to in the memorandum--also in its declaration of +January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with +corresponding time limit; indeed, _the whole of the declaration itself +is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect +that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined +therein_. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as +far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in +the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew. +And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports +stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these +waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any +responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all +occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels +encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the +Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and +Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any +action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian +warships. + +After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it +need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as +a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the +destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that +its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from +further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great +Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally +effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered +traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of +isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of +permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of +war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human +control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all +in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the +blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly +attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those +waters._ + +To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance +given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and +renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor +qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31, +1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government +will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to +the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the +pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full +sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself +compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain +areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its +opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be +followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the +persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its +destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate +extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian +Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being +carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation +of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the +idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest +phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part +of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm +in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of +humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests +of neutral peoples. + + +3 + +=Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine +Warfare= + +The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of May 1, 1917, gives the +following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the +economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal +committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given +verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential +statements: + +"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the +technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been +estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in +estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first +month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the +estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly +cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the +economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the +economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set +down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of +tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are +expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the +enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so +to speak, to statistical smoke-screens. + +"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost +say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of +State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the +British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports +on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine +losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but +mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to +general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government +lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six +U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals +from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of +tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted +submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since +February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light +on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports, +the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report, +which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the +next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete; +and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted +that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for +us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a +gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed +that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid +revealing its strength. + +"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an +idea. + +"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two +months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons +were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed +under the British flag. + +"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present +available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the +higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two +months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace +it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In +the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of +1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite +all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in +peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless +to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new +vessels. + +"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British +service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to +the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with +some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for +preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there +is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in +January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into +British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought +up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per +cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping +traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage +frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a +low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as +against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons. +I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information +that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and +leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons +represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting +to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further +progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war +reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based +his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America, +achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that, +even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us. +Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out: +'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right +tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will +depend. + +"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a +thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought +into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save. + +"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible, +despite the English policy of suppression and concealment. + +"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet +available, but those for February tell us enough. + +"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds +sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down +from 46 to 37 millions sterling--imports and exports together showing +a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine +warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the +commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so +that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may +fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and +exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in +the traffic with British ports. + +"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures +rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off +the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt +can only partially succeed. + +"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31 +millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and +luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important +war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and +wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline +of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of +unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to +life and to the purposes of war. + +"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February, +1916, appears as follows: + +"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48 +per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper +and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the +imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures: + +"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent., +refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent., +lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent. + +"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides, +rubber and tin. + +"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the various +sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from +February onwards. + +"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no +complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the +commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when +the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly +weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment +will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the +entire development of the imports during the course of the war. + +"I will here give only the most important figures. + +"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its +position better than in other respects. + +"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons. + +"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons. + +"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons. + +"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons. + +"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons. + +"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months +of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the +imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the +same month in 1916. + + "Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads. + " " 1916, 5.9 " " + " February, 1913, 406,000 loads. + " " 1916, 286,000 " + " " 1917, 167,000 " + +"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from +3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here +December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as +the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a +statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February. + +"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to +the export of coal. + +"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913 +to 461/2 million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were +exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first +time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million +tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January, +1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more +significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of +the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls +again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million +tons in February of the year before), thus almost reaching once more +to the lowest point hitherto recorded--that of December, 1916. And it +should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports, +sunk transports are included in the English statistics. + +"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the +beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous +of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for +the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal +supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of +1916, may be seen from the following figures: + +"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only +1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year; +the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons, +as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly +average for the peace year 1913. + +"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to +give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first +week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous +year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against +2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the +operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war +industries in the countries allied with England. + +"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year, +showed the English how they could protect themselves against the +effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own +country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more +than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies +how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal +supply. + +"I come now to the most important point: _the position of England with +regard to its food supply_. + +"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to +mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of +foodstuffs from overseas. + +"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged +during the last years of peace as follows: + +"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent. + +"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as +substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.; +meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar +consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely +covered by imports from abroad. + +"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns the +food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally +favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been +followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of +45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest +hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of +view, in North America. The effects are now--the rich stocks from the +former harvest having been consumed--becoming more evident every day +and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain. +As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen +from the following figures: + +"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in +the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or +little over 21/2 million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that +date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the +time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or +even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply +of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only +789,000 bushels. + +"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit. +The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic. +Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917, +at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25 +had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4 +cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to +1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted +at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the +peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these +281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of +exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton. + +"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help +England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself! + +"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of +grain. I can, however, state as follows: + +"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917, +England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as +against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From +January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the +stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do +not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks +amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the +requirements for scarcely three weeks. + +"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more +favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import +figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and +fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations +for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as +against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years. + +"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import +value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as +against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the +various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning +with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in +the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain +shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and +Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March +has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing +the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than +in the previous years. + +"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in +February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within +the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of +Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural +congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an +extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far +worse even than then. + +"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department +(_Kriegsernährungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then +consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present +_and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the +consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet. + +"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a +conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that, +according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be +in a complete state of famine. + +"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a +crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of +other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn. + +"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for +many years, with the single exception of September, 1914. + +"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing +only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly +counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort +to introduce. + +"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States, +shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs. +The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning +of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in +the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars. + +"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at +present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a +generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain +Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of +potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted. + +"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the +face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger +by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have +recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late." + +The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures +taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and +thereafter continues: + +"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated +in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of +bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_ +if England should have to resort to compulsion. + +"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not +wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place, +because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to +assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as +we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises +no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too +complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men +and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.' + +"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest +reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a +failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the +purpose is in readiness. + +"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now +being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the +country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the +measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor +can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly +be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not +until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between +then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and +for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply. + +"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the +harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917. +In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are +worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The +winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492 +million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for +1915. + +"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and +offer no hope of salvation to our enemies. + +"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short, +but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that +the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against +those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can +save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across +the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations +by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of +exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation, +into entering into the war against us. + +"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the +neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the +seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by +hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England +that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into +submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic +arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in +crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle? + +"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on +our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the +world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what +our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But +they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so +hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must +do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own +house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence +and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German +people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending +decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence." + + +4 + +=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24, +1918.= + +"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace +negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained +up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical +and justifiable. + +"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of +the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the +difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will +in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties, +but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing +between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which +have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I +am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It +would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the +present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition. +We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new +world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has +destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the +various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors, +the results being first declared to the world when the whole was +completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough, +that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly +over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less +favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the +details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world +at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing +throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite +public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of +this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish +of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to +meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to +conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable +impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of +secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the +negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country +behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be +played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the +peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the +conference. + +"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which +Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian +states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the +programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister, +I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated +to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace. +And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I +am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are +poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest +doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed +myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way, +either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite +of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the +Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate +partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as +innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me; +on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this +serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single +kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if +Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then +peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might +entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards +Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete +frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going +beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any +surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall +continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as +they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek. + +"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground +for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since +the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations +or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various +Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I +then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the +reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all +wished. + +"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_ +Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian +states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely +fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the +following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St. +Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of +Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus. + +"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is +to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or +less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to +Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate +Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with +which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but +which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to +show the extent of the matter to be debated. + +"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that +of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In +the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this +delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no +indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a +settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established +with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this +very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing +difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of +being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with +ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between +their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed, +and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking +part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not +admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This +unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia, +however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these +difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able +once more to resume negotiations. + +"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received +yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two +telegrams: + +"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the +Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the +four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants' +Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates +to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace +negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers', +soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a +supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds +with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive +these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement +is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov, +addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest, +and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only +represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of +acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian +Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge +any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev +without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send +representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a +supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise +as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of +Russia.' + +"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of +the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding +the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two +appendices thereto runs as follows: + +"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation. + +"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by +me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their +mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation, +in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the +right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the +Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the +representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them, +according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace +Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and +Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to +your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most +sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation: +A. JOFFE.' + +"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian +Republic. Declaration. + +"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M. +Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive +Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' +Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for +the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives +of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement +with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of +People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be +acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name +of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare +categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat +without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people, +cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised. + +"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and +thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' +Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace +negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the +Russian Peace Delegation. + +"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following +resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the +Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, +on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918: + +"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew, +President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary +Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace +negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare +categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act +in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary +steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population, +against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine, +and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be +acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the +Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government +regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the +Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on +behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of +the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the +purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada, +will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian +Delegation. + +"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the +Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917. + +"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir +Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore +arrive with us. + +"'January, 1918. + +"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian +Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew. + +"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai. + +"'A true copy of the original. + +"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.' + +"Appendix 2. + +"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council +of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of +the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the +Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and +Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the +People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch +Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, +Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's +Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of +Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace +between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With +this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch +Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch +Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to +issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers' +and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited +representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are +bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the +accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of +People's Commissaries. + +"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International +Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works, +Commissariat. + +"'The Manager of the Secretariat. + +"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918. + +"'In accordance with the copy. + +"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.' + +"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not +interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. + +"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties +to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic +determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the +former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the +Ukraine._ + + +=Poland= + +"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet +been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_. +Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own +fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the +people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the +general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I +desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express +_wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for +lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish +question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single +day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach +us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and +shall not endanger the peace itself_. + +"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to +take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an +independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the +attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak +in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent +to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in +order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of +importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside +all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_. + + +=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas= + +"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been +most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between +our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the +interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian +peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops. +Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory +by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion +is a double one. + +"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous +expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative +corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas +should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people, +to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point +of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree +to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland +and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in +the case of Poland. + +"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take +place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from +the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out +that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would +create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state +of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted +that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the +life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and +telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire +administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands. +The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a +condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_. + +"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which +moreover _must be found_. + +"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion +not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_. + +"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they +take time. + +"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the +general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part +of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable +to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of +negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general +peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary +recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted +without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would +have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited +sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of +treating for a general peace. + +"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of +general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced +that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a +question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable +peace or not. + + +=Wilson's Message= + +"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put +forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole +world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson +sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general +peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to +furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case, +then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be +arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course, +is not so. + +"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on +the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the +Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his +proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_. + +"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, +to begin with, point out two things: + +"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is +made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish +Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am +firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very +last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally +with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete +reciprocity with ourselves. + +"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but +definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal +Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general, +equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic +parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other +constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon +matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only, +because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the +_Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do +so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other +hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state +whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the +remaining Points, to state as follows: + +"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and +the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing +to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public +negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same, +though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things +considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving +at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business. +But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of +commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be +advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In +such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their +demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using +this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other +ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is +arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is +to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with +full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from +passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any +concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced +_for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point +with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered +impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as +in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not +conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary, +_increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the +case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations, +which deal with political matters. + +"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret +compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon +without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the +introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and +adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted +that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be +able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the +fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by +formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never +prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_. + +"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed. + +"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this +postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here +_fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the +President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to +say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is +thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the +sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in +this respect will be ours. + +"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic +war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by +ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark. + +"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in +particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this +present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient +for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly +and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to +express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I +am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought. + +"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that +we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our +neighbours there. + +"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only +repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation. + +"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our +enemies. + +"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies, +who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until +the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such +concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of +being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk. +(_Applause._) + +"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among +his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what +conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the +enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace +negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and +I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for +themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the +continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here +concerned_. + +"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example. +Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial +acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into +the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war +expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its +own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which +it might have won_. + +"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are +adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to +include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this +point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the +President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of +Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part +of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. + +"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. +Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great +principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our +ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are +closely allied_. + +"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a +discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and +bring us closer still. + +"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one +hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great +Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least +opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that +_an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the +natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all +those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations. +(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals. + + +=Petersburg and the Ukraine= + +"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is +perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to +bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg. + +"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our +definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to +the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is +impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing +there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the +Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must +politely decline to receive_. + +"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since +this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the +_general peace_. + +"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of +provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms. +The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the +world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a +burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with +those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our +own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._ +But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to +lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore, +from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few +days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our +people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For +such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian +party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part +wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace. + +"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly +established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable +delay in the negotiations. + + +=Appeal to the Country= + +"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at +once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_, +and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which +they should have gained from the peace. + +"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him +standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in +record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him +for the manner in which it had been carried out. + +"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have +_peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a +single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic. +It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the +war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves +intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the +no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of +'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our +population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and +procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our +partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to +see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_. + +"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the +supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by +speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not +otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are +now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic +gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow. + +"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to +lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and +organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes +you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate +the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You +are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that +peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken. + +"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours +to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave +to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as +_criminal slanderers or as fools_. + +"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different +from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a +Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one +might understand a conflict between the Government and the country. +_But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority +of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable +peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that +Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and +hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the +Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend +to serve and against themselves. + +"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your +duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust +me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must +help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me. +I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the +Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of +confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter +is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought +up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall +at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to +secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less +so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty, +which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the +Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense +of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could +conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the +world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority +among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half +measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must +assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say." + + +5 + +=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk= + +The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at +Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a +peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general +peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a +preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points: + +1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be +concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford +any support to the enemies of the other. + +2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining +the right of determining their own destiny for the future. + +3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military +operations. + +4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by +private persons through the economic war. + +5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on +the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference +subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with +neighbouring countries. + +6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles. + +A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the +occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until +after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose +co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and +Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has +indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the +evacuation. + +In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in +particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of +evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no +evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after +conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in +connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied +districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it +should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within +its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in +question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain +standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through, +although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating +the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a +compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately +arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent +German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation +the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops +before the general peace might be discussed. + +In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this +was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace. +Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no +annexations" would have succeeded throughout. + +Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours +to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German +Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken +telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates +prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being +recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that +German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm +adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only +have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the +negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr +Kühlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise +Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary +would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This +declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not +fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely +responsible for the fact that Kühlmann was able to remain. + +Kühlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered +the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first +officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up +in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward +matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be +evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was +disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the +fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against +this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to +the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already +availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and +allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that +this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be +arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts +at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they +were first interrupted on December 29. + +On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little +changed. Kühlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than +before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German +military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which +Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to +altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of +self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the +distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to +get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made +on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German +and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and +especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial +question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to +the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint +should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the +Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the +case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for +free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long +discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts +prepared by us. + +Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances +arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as +also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been +commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first +discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and +demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more +guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part +of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations +were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis +broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with +the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost +immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening +proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign +Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and +towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which +he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a +degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required +to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask, +but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna +would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the +enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at +home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to +Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour +troubles were well known to that enemy. + +This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and +tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the +supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish +political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to +persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to +arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions +possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious +difficulties of the food situation. + +In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German +delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace +with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies +from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army +Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary +made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if +the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however, +the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation +to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to +the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on +the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled. + +At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were +continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded +in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be +acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine +undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918. +As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have +relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates +refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by +General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much +inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to +accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the +admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had +frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was +the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish +party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that +the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to +those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of +the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the +finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e. +the principle of national boundaries under international protection. +The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the +Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the +autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard +to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that +they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled +the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the +deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that +the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the +failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other. +The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest +difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date. + +At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the +separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results +hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign +Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations +to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his +policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the +concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the +same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme +necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations +with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of +Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all +grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as +the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative. + +On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were +made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what +would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of +the deliberations on this point with Herr Kühlmann we succeeded after +great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to +a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign +Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the +following considerations: + +For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to: + +1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to +be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be +taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken +first; + +2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a +constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct; + +3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and + +4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a +vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in +accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the +decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver +them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should, +also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at +once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated +upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this +temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as +Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the +foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will +of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the +occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the +Russian principles, by free election. + +On February 7, immediately after Herr Kühlmann had agreed to mediation +on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian +delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The +idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's +taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the +handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the +other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new +basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now +found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to +whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be +termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of +the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial +alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes +that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion +of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon +Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the +other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any +separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government +was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some +reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now +anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he +had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kühlmann, while +General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession. + +All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end +owing to the fact that Herr Kühlmann was forced by the German Supreme +Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the +negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when +a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the +German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kühlmann was strictly ordered +not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand +the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had +not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the +treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an +end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign +Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his +discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to +the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in +leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would, +in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers +at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this +cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed +no treaty of peace. + +The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for +further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since +peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on +February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and +Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it +was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the +situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The +one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that +Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at +an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly +against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr +von Kühlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the +peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech. +Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany +declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march +on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the +signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no +part in this action. + + +6 + +=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest= + +The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was +considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at +Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from +taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian +Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King +and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only +intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with +Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the +Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea +seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the +end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in +order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent +Colonel Randa, the former Military Attaché to the Roumanian +Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness +to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace. + +In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in +Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to +prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the +invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbürgen, despite opposition +on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical +frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was +influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line +involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several +valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary +voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion +that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace +not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading +Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared +the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua +non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this +serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire +agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the +negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that +demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle +to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should +only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of +a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary +regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister +with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line +conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be +unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal +politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be +thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would +give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions; +and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it +would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and +that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility. +Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the +frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used +to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a régime amicably +disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was +particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating +a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet +it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and +was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive +concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the +Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he +would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which +he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of +inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he +was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the +Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would, +despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be +reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were +particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga +and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these +negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to +Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru +district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier +question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with +this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless +rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further +telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent +of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely +considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility. + +Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the +Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an +economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of +especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier +question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a +matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact, +did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical +alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before +the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to +overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and +secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with +Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs +alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at +the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the +right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed +their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the +plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter +beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no +part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done +was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private +manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal. +The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the +prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly +advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was +therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the +East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these +deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for +Foreign Affairs resigned his office. + +Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in +Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when +treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection +with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war +indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia +should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of +peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its +railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property, +and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary +opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly +relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had +been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and +Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with +Roumania. + +This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some +success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the +middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German +Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle +in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until +comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of +Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant +discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout +endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to +arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if +Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally +contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably +suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the +Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and +the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to +amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian +harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The +petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years' +tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a +monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management. +Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the +agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of +years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances +was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The +negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these +questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions +especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of +prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the +drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the +Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences +were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of +the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one +hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a +compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in +particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the +original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead +to any result. + +The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for +five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part +at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly +opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an +arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have +all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a +certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but +not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign +Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a +Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an +impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we +were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather +use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania +through the medium of such politicians in that country as were +disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central +Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in +Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be +rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might +gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing +everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the +German Secretary of State, Kühlmann, of the inadvisability of the +demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by +the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of +Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it +impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been +informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command +insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the +assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the +occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did +ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania. + +One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania +was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted +with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum +which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered +chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of +the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been +disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have +on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do +was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the +Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of +Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea. +When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of +the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube" +was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the +territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the +Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and +Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty +that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be +ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was +unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the +preliminary peace again. + +The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his +office. + + +7 + +=Wilson's Fourteen Points= + +I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. + +II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial +waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants. + +III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its +maintenance. + +IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will +be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. + +V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that +in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the Government whose title is to be determined. + +VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of +all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy, +and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations +under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome +assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself +desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the +months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their +comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, +and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. + +VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve +as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired. + +VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the +matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world +for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once +more be made secure in the interests of all. + +IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognisable lines of nationality. + +X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we +wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first +opportunity of autonomous development. + +XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied +territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the +sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another +determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of +allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the +political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the +several Balkan States should be entered into. + +XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are +now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life +and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, +and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to +the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + +XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should +include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, +which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should +be guaranteed by international covenant. + +XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small States +alike. + + +8 + +=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War= + +_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_ + +GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is +my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are +living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest +and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of +the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily +understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours +which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by +misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a +clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really +happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining +the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if +so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the +overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take +the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves +and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will +come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be +made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made +public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day +from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will +refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once +counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it +seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now +paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend +themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the +Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the +former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course, +exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as +everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if +those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But, +believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not +the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so +insignificant a minority. + +But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the +various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two +things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the +war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace" +on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately, +was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly, +that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On +several occasions peace feelers were put forward between +representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however, +these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the +impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany, +but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on +its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed +that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the +war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to +fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to +a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente +never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished +for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its +intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany, +and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult. +We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be +allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire +for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial +concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This, +however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was +primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had +offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that +Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made +peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to +make peace until England and France made peace with Germany. + +When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable, +obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching +that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other, +a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the +former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the +question of separate peace. + +I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not +even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my +inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in +such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the +German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be +contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be +broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten +million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which +could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military +party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and +that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a +few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my +policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to +the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw +salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I +relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was +a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between +Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from +which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the +Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should +be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente +would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the +blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved +also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have +been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no +possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung +several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the +same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy, +Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But +even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led +to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against +their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never +have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common, +and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out +of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against +the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until +Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have +happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy +at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and +prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol, +and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a +conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the +Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And, +gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would +not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war +into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been +much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component +national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only +refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved +by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State +makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a +"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would +have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude +which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister +of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider +dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I +believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In +particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements +by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, +would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria +would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with +Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the +powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been +in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav +question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the +Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven +the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia +and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion +the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace +was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make +peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which +rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our +great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects. +Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In +Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with +the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation +living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play +the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly +when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we +were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply. +Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany, +because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had +brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by +the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on +the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I +remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict +with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from +Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine, +gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a +Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of +our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred +million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of +the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as +urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread. +And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at +peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to +say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The +situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military +success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while +entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being +accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand, +increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless +than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a +policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single +moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had +some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Görlitz. +Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like +houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view. +I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was +then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army +moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of +the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations, +have brought about a complete débâcle. It is not unlikely that the +collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then, +and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the +horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things, +however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded, +as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian +frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the +second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at +all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success, +have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not +called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would +undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been +by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been +possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that +during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost +we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what +superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That +all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was +it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the +leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous +power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to +Kühlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the +military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than +as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kühlmann. The +Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not +understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that +victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that +territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless +securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem +them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section +demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an +indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were +agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German +possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with +the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic +ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world +thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from +the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with +the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the +obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us +remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to +a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then, +the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on +mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a +victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and +the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the +fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way +of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that +Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and +attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step +should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the +will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only +Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not +disinclined to agree to such a solution. + +But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree +of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of +the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible +collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General +Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in +conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man +required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the +Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never +found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved +the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the +people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are +much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke +himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain +equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it +was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for +him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of +Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was +directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot, +desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his +country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all +that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam +glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt +at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who +worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him +now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of +England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for +victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them. +The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on +the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said +this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to +carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the +integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could +never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to +declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for +Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente +so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a +step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in +this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our +military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the +German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is +undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to +such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I +should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity +solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most +valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at +favourable relations with Germany. + +Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the +German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the +serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months +ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he +forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely +of my opinion. + +[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.] + +This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again +expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine +campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to +take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be +calculated to give an impression of weakness. + +As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not +to be thought of. + +As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine +ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the +Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with +Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to +Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in +order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the +German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the +question. + +The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that +if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine; +and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have +restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace +itself. + +When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views +steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the +Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the +Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own +initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less +true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the +views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own +country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the +outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to +their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump" +parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to +bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have +an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical +principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step, +and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed. +It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then +received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic +proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so +incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which +maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means +towards peace. + +It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority +of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically +weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely +powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here +again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation, +had several conversations with Südekum and Erzberger, and encouraged +them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known +peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of +affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry +the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual +understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn +from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment, +to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag +against the German military plans of conquest. + +And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of +that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning +of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many +other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our +own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of +unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The +principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of +the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was +long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to +dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he +was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came +in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff +came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point +of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial +colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in +agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only +one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It +should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time +was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the +suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American +munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the +submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical +military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered +the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; +with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but +little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had +here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the +northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the +Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would +have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern +U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry +on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans +access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing +we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we +did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering +their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct +conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we +agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise. + +And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to +say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the +papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing +disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one +of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these +reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the +last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself +appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give +you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am +most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that +any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would +wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government +must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a +whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the +German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a +dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as +republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great +freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people +itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I +therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the +constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely +at one with the present Government. There are two methods of +ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the +representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a +republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself +will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can +be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I +myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any +co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can, +therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the +old régime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and +its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe +that the majority of German-Austria is against the old régime, and +when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of +democracy is sufficiently assured. + +And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set +before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany, +but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the +German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with +Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have +defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do +not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra +turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how +present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same +experiment been made six months before it would have been war with +Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war. + +There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of +many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come +when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day +comes a better future will dawn. + +The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria. +They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood +and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will +not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold +alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of +the generations to come. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English +text being available. + + + + +INDEX + + +Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27 + and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168 + and Trotski, 234, 235 + +Adrianople, cession of, 268 + +Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40 + policy of expansion, 5 + +Air-raids on England, cause of, 16 + their effect, 167 + +Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92 + +Albrecht von Würtemberg, 39 + +Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74 + cession of, demanded by Entente, 165 + conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15 + Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75 + France insists on restoration of, 170 + Germany and, 71, 158, 159 + +Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110 + +America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120 + enters the war, 17, 148 + rupture with Germany, 127 + shipbuilding programme of, 291 + unpreparedness for war, 122 + (_Cf._ United States) + +American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._ + +Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 + declares a separate peace, 24, 25 + German Nationalist view of his action, 25 + +Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77 + +Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177 + +Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322 + +Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3 + +Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169 + +Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181 + +Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2 + and Albania, 6 + and cession of Galicia, 145 + and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170 + and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334 + ceases to exist, 179 + consequences of a separate peace, 24 + death-blow to Customs dues, 168 + declaration on submarine warfare, 279 + democratic Parliament of, 306 + enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162 + food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 + her army merged into German army, 21 + her position before and after the ultimatum, 13 + heroism of her armies, 336 + impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._ + maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280 + mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9 + obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 + parlous position of, in 1917, 188 + peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318 + peace terms to, 179 + policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325 + racial problems in, 190 + separatist tactics in, 164 + Social Democracy in, 21, 31 + terms on which she could make peace, 29 + the Archdukes, 22 + views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201 + +Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._ + +Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245 + +Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50 + +Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247 + +Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319 + +Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22 + inferiority of, 21 + +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134 + peace idea of, 174 + +Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242 + no bar to peace, 331 + solution of, 200 _et seq._ + +Avarescu, interview with, 263 + retirement of, 323 + + +=B= + +Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230 + +Balkan Wars, the, 6 + +Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68 + +_Baralong_ episode, the, 133 + +Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295 + on an "un-English" system, 296 + +Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18 + +Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235 + +Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27 + +Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14 + +Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180 + +Belgium, England's promise to, 14 + German entry into, 14 + Germany's views regarding, 157, 158 + +Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2 + +Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275 + +Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175 + German reply to, 333 + proposals for peace by, 167, 177 + +Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44 + and the Roumanian question, 77 + criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33 + ultimatum to Serbia, 7 + vacillation of, 10 + +Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66 + the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14 + +Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265 + +Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146 + and the Supreme Military Command, 156 + draws up a peace proposal, 139 + opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334 + optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._ + replies to author's _exposé_, 150 + requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8 + visits Western front, 73 + +Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205 + +Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17 + and William II., 52 + dealings with William I., 65 + heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15 + his policy of "blood and iron," 15 + +Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220 + +Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297 + of Germany, 280 + why established by Great Britain, 281 + +Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24 + +Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245 + +Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249 + destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252 + enter Kieff, 248, 249 + +Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221 + in Bessarabia, 265 + in Russia, 211, 216, 229 + terrorism of, 226 + the Entente and, 273 + +Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207 + +Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173 + +Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112 + apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + collapse of, 99 + Ministry of, 88 + on Russia, 263 + reproaches author, 96 + +"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257 + +Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225 + a victory for German militarism, 193 + answer to Russian peace proposals, 224 + arrival of Trotski at, 232 + conflict with Ukrainians at, 235 + episode of Roumanian peace, 260 + evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312 + first peace concluded at, 249 + frontier question, 208 + further Ukrainian representation at, 300 + heated discussions at, 228 + object of negotiations at, 305 + peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311 + Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227 + territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245 + Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314 + +Briand, peace negotiations with, 182 + +Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German + delegation, 230 + +British losses by submarines, 290 + trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291 + +Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211 + +_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257 + +Bucharest, fall of, 99 + report of peace negotiations at, 318 + Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq. + +Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270 + +Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174 + demonstrations against Germany in, 233 + +Buftea, Treaty of, 323 + +Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268 + and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323 + her relations with America, 125 + humiliation of, 6 + negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269 + question of her neutrality, 10 + secession of, 183 + +Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223 + +Bülow, Prince, exposes William II., 54 + +Burian, Count, 106, 200 + and the division of Galicia, 244 + draws up a peace proposal, 139 + his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114 + succeeded by author, 114 + visits German headquarters, 210 + +Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107 + + +=C= + +Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214 + +Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275 + +Capelle and U-boats, 132 + +Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania) + +Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88 + and Serbia, 12 + last days of, 90 + peculiar policy of Government of, 81 + tactfulness of, 79 + Tsar's visit to, 88 + urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90 + visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79 + +Carp, 82, 87, 94 + +Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89 + +Central-European question, the, 209 + the terror of the Entente, 172 + +Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97 + enemy blockade of, 132 + favourable news in 1917, 143 + why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._ + +Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41 + and problem of nationality, 192 + and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 + and the Ukrainian question, 244 + apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239 + cautions the Kaiser, 321 + communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260 + confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45 + correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164 + frequent absences from Vienna, 61 + his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58 + invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75 + opposes U-boat warfare, 334 + reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 + rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249 + submits author's _exposé_ to William II., 146, 332 + suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75 + visits South Slav provinces, 59 + +Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168 + and U-boat campaign, 121 + attends conference on Polish question, 206 + opposes submarine warfare, 334 + +Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + dominant war aim of, 184, 186 + +Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + attends conference on U-boat question, 121 + meets author, 219 + +Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177 + +Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44 + +Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163 + +Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227 + +Cossacks, the, 212 + +Courland demanded by Germany, 249 + +Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack + on Bucharest, 103 + +Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89 + +Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219 + at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + +Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24 + +Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43 + a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141 + a scene at Konopischt, 39 + abused by a braggart and brawler, 83 + acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239 + activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._ + ambassador to Roumania, 7 + an appeal for confidence, 310 + and American intervention, 123 + and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 + and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian) + answers explanation of an American request, 128 + appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329 + appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77 + apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12 + attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121 + avoided by Pan-Germans, 160 + becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114 + breakfasts with Kühlmann, 230 + confers with Tisza, 27, 28 + conflicts with the Kaiser, 335 + conversation with Trotski, 248 + converses with Crown Prince, 74 + criticises Michaelis, 160 + decorated by King Carol, 88 + disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115 + dismissal of, 183, 194, 266 + extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72 + friction with the Emperor, 210, 215 + his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174, + 209, 217, 331, 333 + imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266 + informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229 + interviews King Ferdinand, 264 + issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 + journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218 + learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86 + loss of a dispatch-case, 98 + loyalty to Germany, 327 + lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222 + meets the Emperor William II., 54 + misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23 + nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46 + note to American Government, 279 + obtains a direct statement from William II., 57 + on a separate peace, 327 + on Austria's policy during war, 325 + on Bolshevism, 216, 221 + on President Wilson's programme, 192 + on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334 + passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247 + peace programme of, 299 + persecution of, 208 + Polish leaders and, 205 + President Wilson on, 193 + private talk with the Emperor, 124 + sends in his resignation, 23 + sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96 + speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._ + threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228 + unfounded charges against, 162 + urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + William II.'s gift to, 64 + with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57 + + +=D= + +Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of + Hungarian State, 202 + dangers of a political structure for, 202 + +Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88 + +Declaration of London, the, 280 + +D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260 + +Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211 + +Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296 + +Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4 + international, 171, 176, 177, 308 + question of, 181 + +Divorces in Roumania, 85 + +Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82 + assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269 + cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323 + King Ferdinand and, 265 + Marghiloman's view on, 266 + question discussed with Avarescu, 263 + Turkish attitude concerning, 268 + +Dualism, the curse of, 137 + + +=E= + + +East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._ + +"Echinstvo" group, the, 211 + +Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2 + and William II., 63 + encircling policy of, 1, 63 + +Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91 + an operation for cataract, 93 + her devotion to King Carol, 92 + +Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168 + plain speaking by, 26 + +England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180 + and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184 + and the elder Richthofen, 246 + attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16 + blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151 + bread shortage in, 295 + declares war on Germany, 14 + discards Declaration of London, 280 + distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145 + distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 + dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1 + Flotow's tribute to, 120 + food supply of, 293 + freedom in, 335 + her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2 + negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4 + public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 + refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170 + shortage of potatoes in, 296 + the Pacifist party in, 167 + "unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71 + +English mentality, a typical instance of, 4 + +English Socialists, 214 + +Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217 + and arming of merchant vessels, 286 + and Italy, 27 + and the trial of William II., 66 + answers President Wilson, 118, 120 + as instruments in a world revolution, 273 + Austria pressed to join, 2 + demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173 + desire of final military victory, 164 + exterminates Prussian militarism, 273 + impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178 + mine-laying by, 130 + peace proposals to, 19, 20 + rejects first peace offer, 115 + suspicious of Germany's plans, 3 + their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326 + views as to peace, 170 + +Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269 + +Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333 + and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note) + +Espionage in Roumania, 97 + +Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 136 + +Esthonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317 + +Eugen, Archduke, 22 + +Europe after the war, 175 + +European tension, beginnings of, 1 + + +=F= + +Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, 12 + +Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, 295 + +Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, 264 + German opinion of, 260 + Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, 93 + +Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, 51 + +Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, 80 + +Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, 117 + reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, 118 + +Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 190 _et seq._, 271, 305, 306, 323 _et seq._ + +France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, 250 + Bethmann's tribute to, 153 + distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 + insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 170 + opening of war a surprise to, 2 + the Pacifist party in, 167 + +Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, 47 + advised to accept negotiations, 8 + and Franz Ferdinand, 42, 46 + and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 + author's audience with, 12 + death of, 48 + gives audience to author, 47 + King Edward VII. and, 1, 2 + on the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + opposes Filippescu's scheme, 81 + +Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, 44 + anti-Magyar point of view of, 38, 50 + antipathy to Hungary, 35, 37, 38 + as gardener, 35 + as husband and father, 44, 45 + dislike for the Germans of, 50 + false rumours concerning, 43 + fearlessness of, 45 + friendships of, 39 + Goluchowski and, 36 + Great-Austrian programme of, 41, 49 + his high opinion of Pallavicini, 5 + his sense of humour, 41 + makes advances to the Kaiser, 42 + marriage of, 41, 44 + mentality of, 35 + personality of, 34 + pro-Roumanian proclivities of, 77, 78, 79 + tragic end of, 49 (_see also_ Sarajevo tragedy) + views on foreign policy of, 51 + +Freedom of the seas, 177 + attacked by Entente, 280, 281 + neutrals and, 284 + President Wilson on, 281, 307 + +French Socialistic Congress, 214 + +Freyburg, Baron von, attends conference on U-boat question, 121 + +Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to, 22 + tact of, 72 + +Frontier rectifications, Hungary and, 258, 266, 319, 330 + +Fürstenberg, Karl, a request of, refused at Vienna, 112 + report on Roumanian question by, 77 + + +=G= + +Galicia, proposed cession of, 20, 75, 145, 159, 173, 332 + partition of, 209 + Tisza and, 135 + +Gas attacks, reason for Germany's use of, 16 + +Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram from, 229 + at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +George, Lloyd, admits grave state of grain supplies, 295 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + author in agreement with, 177-8 + confers with Orlando, 164 + Dr. Helfferich's allusions to, 290 + his desire to crush Germany, 186 + influence of, 184 + on disarmament, 184 + +George V., King, his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, 9 + +German army, the General Staff, 22 + +German-Austria, 179 + population of, 31 + +German Empire, the, creation of, 15, 66 + +German Government, _versus_ German Diplomacy, 10 + +German mentality, a typical instance of, 4 + military party refuse peace, 32 + +German Nationalists and Count Andrassy, 25, 26 + +German policy founders on heritage left by Bismarck, 15 + +German-Russian differences as to occupied areas, 304 + +German Supreme Command and evacuation question, 312 + +Germans and a friendly attitude towards America, 122 + at Brest conference, 224 + attitude of, towards Poland, 203 + inferior mentality of, 69 + "insatiable appetite" of, 267 + Lenin and, 216 + oppose peace negotiations with Roumania, 260 + refuse to renounce occupied territory, 226 + the dynastic fidelity of, 52 + +Germany, a moral coalition against, 3 + advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115 _et seq._ + and Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + and Austro-Hungarian military action in Ukraine, 254 + answers the Papal Note, 177 + blind faith in invincibility of her army, 17 + blockade of, and her retaliatory measures, 16 + confident of victory, 23, 71 + culpability of, in matter of peace, 185 + decides on U-boat campaign, 124 + declares Armistice with Russia at an end, 318 + disillusionment of, 31 + dissatisfaction in, over peace resolution in Reichstag, 156 + England declares war on, 14 + evil times in store for, 336 + her dream of a victorious peace, 326, 331 + her hopes of food shortage in England, 145 + Michaelis on internal economic and political situation in, 157 + military party of, 19, 327, 330, 331 + negotiations respecting naval disarmament, 4 + post-war intentions of, 185 + restricts building of U-boats, 131 + revolution in, 328 + rupture with America, 127 + unsuccessful effort at _rapprochement_, 180 + violates neutrality of Belgium, 14 + +Goluchowski, Count, vacillation of, 36 + +Görlitz, battle of, 96, 107, 329 + +Gratz, Dr., a good suggestion by, 248 + author's discussion with, 219 + on Austro-Polish solution of Polish question, 244 + +Great-Roumania, question of, 80 + +Great War, the, psychology of various cities, 197 + (_See_ World War) + +Grey, Sir Edward, an interview with Lichnowsky, 7 + at London Conference, 275 + proposes negotiations, 8 + + +=H= + +Habsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty of London and, 21, 29, 33 + +Hadik, apathetic attitude of, 238 + +Hague Convention, the, 280 + +Haus, Admiral, favours submarine warfare, 334 + in Vienna, 121 + +Hauser, and the question of separate peace, 230 + +Hebel, appointment for, 154 + +Helfferich, Dr., disclosures by, 161 (note) + on attitude of William II. during Balkan troubles, 68 + speech on submarine warfare, 151, 288 _et seq._ + +Henry of Prussia, Prince, a telegram + from King George to, 9 + +Hertling, Count, advised to suppress "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 + becomes Imperial Chancellor, 198 + President Wilson on, 193 + succeeds Michaelis, 161 + +Herzegovina as compensation to Austria, 207 + +Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, modesty of, 126 + popularity of, in Germany, 17 + +Hoffmann, General, an unfortunate speech by, 237 + and plans for outer provinces, 226 + high words with Kühlmann, 235 + received by the Kaiser, 230 + receives a telegram from Petersburg, 229 + visited by author, 219 + +Hohenberg, Duchess of, 41 + welcomed in Roumania, 79 + +Hohendorf, General Conrad von, and his responsibility for + the war, 18 (note) + +Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement of Wedel's request, 127 + free speech with William II., 65 + report on U-boat campaign, 116, 126 + +Holtzendorff, Admiral, and submarine campaign, 149 + arrives in Vienna, 121 + guarantees results of U-boat campaign, 122, 334 + +Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle on, 243 + Social Democrats, 168 + +Hungary and cession of her territory, 106 + and Roumanian intervention, 77, 106, 107 + and the alliance with Roumania, 77 _et seq._ + demands of, at Bucharest, 319 + frontier rectification question, 258, 266, 319, 330 + her influence on the war, 138 + indignation in, at author's appointment to Bucharest, 77 + "just punishment" of, 97 + opposes economical alliance with Roumania, 266, 320 + question of a separate peace, 27 + repellent attitude of, 107 + struggle for liberty in, 202 + why her army was neglected, 22 + + +=I= + +Imperiali, Marchese, points submitted to London Conference by, 275 + +International arbitration (_see_ Arbitration) + +International disarmament, 171, 176, 177 + +International law, Germany's breach of, in adoption of U-boat + warfare, 280, 281 + +Internationalists, Russian, 211 + +Ischl, an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph at, 12 + +Iswolsky, 11 + +Italy, Allied defeat in, 183 + and Albania, 6 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + Czernin on, 308 + declares a blockade, 281 + points submitted to London Conference, 275 + stands in way of a peace of understanding, 188 + ultimatum to, 12 + why she entered the war, 3 + + +=J= + +Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic death of, 89 + +Jagow, Herr von, a frank disclosure by, 14 + +Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to Allies, 300 + conversation with, at Brest, 220 + criticisms on the Tsar, 227 + +Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + +Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 22 + appointed Chief of Air Force, 62 + reinstatement of, 61 + relinquishes his command, 62 + the Luck episode, 61 + + +=K= + +Kameneff at Brest, 220, 316 + +Karachou, Leo, secretary of Peace Delegation, 303 + +Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to the Entente, 20 + +Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince, Franz Ferdinand and, 39, 40 + +Karolyi and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 + his attitude before the Roumanian declaration of war, 28 + +Kerenski and the offensive against Central Powers, 211 + newspaper report of condition of his health, 212 + +Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical remark by, 63 + +Kieff, a mission to, 251 + entered by Bolsheviks, 248, 249 + in danger of a food crisis, 252 + peace conditions at, 208 + +Kieff Committee and the Bolsheviks, 245 + +Kiel Week, the, 62 + +_Kienthaler_ (Internationalists), 211 + +Konopischt and its history, 34 _et seq._ + +Kreuznach, a conference at, 145 + +Kriegen, Dr. Bogdan, a fulsome work by, 64 + +Kühlmann, Dr., and the food shortage, 238, 239 + author's talk with, 222 + difficult position of, 313 + high words with Hoffman, 235 + his influence, 198, 199 + informed of Roumanian peace overtures, 260 + on the Kaiser, 228 + returns to Brest, 230 + + +=L= + +Lamezan, Captain Baron, at Brest-Litovsk, 233 + +Landwehr, General, and the food shortage, 238, 240 + +Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory attitude of, 184 + +Larin and Menshevik Socialists, 211 + +League of Nations, the, 308 + +Lenin, author on, 216 + opposed to offensive against Central Powers, 211 + +Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a day's shooting with, 231 + chats with author, 219 + +Lewicky, M., 240 + +Lichnowsky interviews Sir Edward Grey, 7 + +Liége taken by Ludendorff, 22 + +Lithuania, Germany and, 249 + +Livonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317 + +London, Declaration of, discarded by England, 280 + +London, Pact of, 20, 170, 172, 179, 328 + desired amendments to, 146 + text of, 21, 275 _et seq._ + +Lublin, German demand for evacuation of, 204, 205, 206 + +Luck episode, the, 22, 106 + Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and, 61 + +Ludendorff and Belgium, 186 + and the Polish question, 207 + candid admission by, 247 + compared with enemy statesmen, 19 + confident of success of U-boat warfare, 126 + congratulates Hoffmann, 237 + displays "a gleam of insight", 230 + dominating influence of, 79, 115, 126 + German hero-worship of, 17 + his independent nature, 60 + how he captured Liége, 22 + personality of, 331 + +Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, 50 + +Luxembourg, German invasion of, 16 + + +=M= + +Mackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins at Bucharest, 101 + failure at Maracesci, 261 + headquarters at Bucharest, 105 + +Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdinand, 38, 50 + author and, 78 + +Majorescu and Austria's policy, 330 + and territorial concessions, 97, 206 + forms a Ministry, 81 + +Mandazescu, arrest and extradition of, 89 + +Maracesci, attack on, 261 + +Marghiloman and co-operation of Roumania, 106 + forms a Cabinet, 266, 320 + +Marie, Queen of Roumania, English sympathies of, 98, 99 + +Marne, the, first battle of, 17 + +Martow and the Menshevik party, 211 + +Martynoz, and the Russian Internationalists, 211 + +Medwjedew, J.G., Ukrainian delegate to Brest, 301 + +Mennsdorff, Ambassador, interviews General Smuts, 169 + +Menshevik party, the, 211 + +Meran, the Entente's proposals regarding, 170, 173 + +Merchant vessels, arming of, author on, 285 + +Merey meets Czernin at Brest, 219 + +Michaelis, Dr., appointed Imperial Chancellor, 156 + defines Germany's views regarding Belgium, 157 + on peace proposals, 157 + Pan-Germanism of, 160 + +"Might before Right," Bismarckian principle of, 15 + +Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, marvellous escape of, 89 + +Militarism, German faith in, 17 + England's idea of German, 166 + +Monarchists _v._ Republicans, 52 + +Monarchs, hypnotic complacency of, 58 _et seq._ + +Moutet, attitude of, at French Socialist conference, 214 + + +=N= + +Nationality, problem of, 190 + Franz Ferdinand and, 191 + +Naval disarmament, negotiations on, 4 + +Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the military party in Russia, 2 + +Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, 227 + +North Sea, the, blockade of, 280 + +Noxious gas, why used by Germany, 16 + + +=O= + +Odessa, in danger of a food crisis, 252 + +Orlando confers with Ribot and Lloyd George, 164 + +Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz Ferdinand, 36 + + +=P= + +Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses the political situation with author, 5 + +Pan-Germans, 330 + conditions on which they would conclude peace, 160 + +Pan-Russian Congress, the, 212, 213, 214 + +Papal Note, the, 167, 177 + Austria's reply to, 175 + German reply to, 333 + +Paris, negotiations _in camera_ at, 271 + +Peace by sacrifice, 327 + +Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk, 218 _et seq._ + +Peace movement, real historical truth concerning, 186 + +Peace negotiations, Count Czernin on, 298 _et seq._ + deadlock in, 182 + the Pope's proposals, 167, 175, 177, 333 + +Peace resolution, a, and its consequences, 156 + +Penfield, Mr., American Ambassador to Vienna, 131 + +People's Socialists, the, 212 + +Peschechonow, Minister of Food, 212 + +Petersburg and the Ukraine, 309 + +Plechanow, Georgei, and the Russian Social Patriots, 211 + +Poklewski, Russian Ambassador to Roumania, 86 + +Poland, a conference on question of, 205 + becomes a kingdom, 200 + conquest of, 106 + Count Czernin on, 304 + Emperor Charles's offer regarding, 75 + future position of, 203 + German standpoint on, 203 + Michaelis on, 159 + re-organisation of, 145 + the German demands, 244 + unrepresented at Brest, and the reason, 304, 315 + +Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 208 + party divisions among, 204 + +Polish question, and the Central-European project, 209 + difficulties of, 200 + +Popow, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, 223 + +Pro-Roumanian party and its head, 77 + +Prussian militarism, England's idea of, 166 + extermination of, 273 + fear of, 174 + (_See also_ German military party) + + +=Q= + + +Quadruple Alliance, the, dissension in, 250 + Germany as shield of, 183 + peace terms to Roumania, 262 + + +=R= + +Radek, a scene with a chauffeur, 237 + +Radoslawoff, ignorant of negotiations with Entente, 162 + +Randa, Lieut.-Col. Baron, a telling remark by, 104 + and Roumanian peace overtures, 260, 262, 319 + +Reichstag, the, a peace resolution passed in, 156 + demands peace without annexation, 156, 160 + +Renner and the Stockholm Congress, 168 + +Republicans _v._ Monarchists, 52 + +Ressel, Colonel, 264 + +Revertera negotiates for peace, 164, 169 + +Revolution, danger of, 147 + +Rhondda, Lord, British Food Controller, 151 + +Ribot confers with Orlando, 164 + statement by, 152 + +Richthofen brothers, the, 246 + +Rosenberg meets author at Brest, 219 + +Roumania, 77 _et seq._ + a change of Government in, 81 + a land of contrasts, 84 + affairs in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + author's negotiations for peace, 258 + between two stools, 261 + declares war, 100, 279 + espionage in, 97 + freedom of the Press in, 84 + Germany and, 262, 267 + her treachery to Central Powers, 262 + how news of Sarajevo tragedy was received in, 86 + Marghiloman forms a Cabinet, 266 + negotiations for peace, 318 + out of action, 23 + peace concluded with, 323 + question of annexations of, 159, 207 + question of her neutrality, 12, 95 + Russian gold in, 111 + social conditions in, 85 + ultimatum to, 12, 262 + why she entered the war, 3 + +Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, 108 + +Roumanians, mistaken views of strength of, 261 + their love of travel, 85 + +Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 37 + +Russia, a contemplated peace with, 211 + abdication of the Tsar, 142 + an appeal to German soldiers, 249 + begins military operations without a declaration of war, 3 + Bolshevism in, 211, 216, 229 + declares for cessation of hostilities, 318 + differences of opinion in, as to continuance of war, 211 _et seq._ + enters the war, 7 + Francis Joseph's inquiry as to a possible revolution in, 105 + her responsibility for Great War, 10 + incites German army to revolt, 317 + negotiations for peace, 298 + out of action, 23 + peace treaty signed, 318 + prepared for war, 112 + the military party in, 2, 9 + ultimatum to Roumania, 262 + +Russian Revolution, the, 142, 147, 211 _et seq._ + +Russians, their fear of Trotski, 237 + +Ruthenian districts of Hungary, Ukrainian demands, 242 + + +=S= + +Sacharow, General, murder of, 220 + +St. Mihiel, author at, 73 + +St. Privat, reminiscences of, 74 + +Salzburg negotiations, the, 210 + +Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 6, 49 + sounds death knell of the Monarchy, 32 + +Sassonoff, a momentous statement by, 88 + attitude of, after declaration of war, 8 + visits Bucharest, 112 + +Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch, 302 + +Schachrai, W.M., at Brest, 301 + +Schonburg, Alvis, and the Emperor Charles, 61 + +Schönerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdinand and, 50 + +Secret diplomacy, abolition of: author's views, 306-7 + +Sedan, a house with a history at, 74 + +Seidler, Dr. von, a _faux pas_ by, 56 + and the food shortage, 240 + and the partition of Galicia, 209 + and the Ukrainian question, 208, 242, 243 + apathetic attitude of, 238, 239 + author's meeting with, 230 + visits South Slav provinces, 59 + +Seitz, and the Stockholm Conference, 168 + +Serbia, arrogance of, 6 + ultimatum to, 7 + +Sewrjuk, M., 240 + +Sixtus, Prince, letters from Emperor Charles to, 164 + +Skobeleff and the Mensheviks, 211 + +Skrzynski, Herr von, 250 + +Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death of, 89 + +Slav provinces, a visit by the Emperor to, 59 + +Smuts, General, interview with Mennsdorff, 170 + +Social Democrats and the question of peace, 26, 30 + and the Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 + Hungarian, 243 + opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + +"Social Patriots," Russian, 211 + +Social Revolutionary Party, the, 212 + +Socialists and offensive against Central Powers, 211 + +Spanish reports of war-weariness in England and France, 143 + +Stirbey, Prince, 263 + +Stockholm, a Socialist Conference at, 168, 333 + Russians ask for a conference at, 229 + +Stockholm Congress, negative result of, 169 + +Strikes and their danger, 310 + +Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims, 241 + +Sturdza, Lieut.-Col., extraordinary behaviour of, 83 + +Stürgkh, Count, 18 (note) + recollections of, 46 + +Submarine warfare, author's note to American Government on, 279 + Czernin on, 334 + destruction without warning justified, 283 + enemy losses in, 290 + enemy's "statistical smoke-screens" as to, 289 + question of safety of passengers and crew, 282 + speech by Dr. Helfferich on, 288 + why adopted by Central Powers, 281 _et seq._ + (_See also_ U-boats) + +Südekum, Herr, and Austria-Hungary's peace proposals, 155, 333 + +Supreme Military and Naval Command, conditions of, for peace + negotiations, 159 + +Switzerland, reported disturbances in: author's disclaimer, 335 + +Sycophancy in high places, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64 + +Sylvester, Dr., and the German-Austrian National Assembly, 26 + + +=T= + +Talaat Pasha arrives at Brest, 233 + influence of, 143 + threatens to resign, 269 + +Talleyrand, a dictum of, 174 + +Tarnowski, Count, author's opinion of, 110 + German Ambassador to Washington, 127 + +Thomas, M., war speech on Russian front, 214 + +Tisza, Count Stephen, 18 (note) + a characteristic letter from, 200 + advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 334 + and American intervention, 123 + and author's appointment to Bucharest, 78 + and cession of Hungarian territory, 135 + and control of foreign policy, 134 + and the Stockholm Conference, 168 + assassination of, 137 + at a U-boat campaign conference, 121 + author's conference with, 27, 28 + defends Count Czernin, 108 + dismissal of, 136, 203 + Franz Ferdinand and, 38 + his influence in Hungary, 27 + leads anti-Roumanian party, 77 + lively correspondence with author, 128 + on dangers of pessimism, 154 + on the Treaty of London, 28 + opposes annexation of Roumania, 207 + opposes the war, 10 + opposes U-boat warfare, 131, 334 + peace proposal of, 139 + _pro-memoria_ of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 258 + question of frontier rectifications, 319 + refuses cession of Hungarian territory, 107 + speech at conference on Polish question, 206 + tribute to, 137 + views regarding Poland, 200 + visits the Southern Slavs, 30 + +Transylvania, 173 + opposition to cession of, 107 + proposed cession of, 28, 50 + Roumanian invasion of, 108 + +Trentino, the, offered to Italy, 75 + +Trieste, Entente proposals regarding, 170, 173 + +"Tripartite solution" of Polish question, Tisza on, 201 + +Trnka and the Customs dues, 168 + +Trotski, a tactical blunder by, 236 + accepts the German-Austria ultimatum, 235 + and the Internationalist party, 211 + arrives at Brest, 232 + declines to sign, 250 + his brother-in-law Kameneff, 220 + his library, 235, 236 + negotiations with, 247 + opposed to ill-treatment of war prisoners, 236 + ultimatum to, 234 + +Trudoviks, the, 212 + +Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks, 211, 213 + +Tschernow, speaks at Peasants' Congress, 212 + +Tschirsky, Herr von, a momentous communication to Berchtold, 7 + and a telegram from King George, 9 + his desire for war, 32 + untactful diplomacy of, 10 + +Tseretelli and the Menshevik party, 211 + +Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria, 268 + asks for munitions, 95 + how the Sultan was deposed, 233 + probable secession of, 269 + +Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at Brest, 233 + +Turks, a reported advance by a hostile Power for a separate peace, 143 + at Brest Conference, 223 + +Tyrol, the, German troops in, 24 + + +=U= + +U-boat warfare, 114 _et seq._ + a conference in Vienna on, 121 + "a terrible mistake", 126 + and America's entry into the war, 126 + and why adopted by Germany, 16 + Czernin on, 148 + political arguments against, 117, 118 + what it achieved, 178 + (_See also_ Submarine warfare) + +Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripartite" solution of Polish question, 201 + +Ukraine and Petersburg, 309 + Bolshevik destruction in, 252 + food supplies from, 251 _et seq._, 315 + military action in, and the consequences, 253 + peace concluded with, 249 + revolution in, 253 + survey of imports from, 255 + treaty signed, 317 + +Ukrainian Army General Committee appointed, 214 + delegates at Brest, 231, 300 + Workers' and Peasants' Government, a declaration from, 301 + +Ukrainians and their demands, 208, 240, 314 + dictatorial attitude of, 241 + negotiations with, 315 + +United States, the, scarcity of supplies in, 294 + (_See also_ America) + + +=V= + +Versailles, opening of Peace Congress at, 196 + the Council of Four at, 271 + the Peace of, 18, 19, 271 + terrible nature of, 273 + triumph of Entente at, 186 + +Vienna, a council in, 121 + differences of opinion in, 77 + disastrous effects of troubles in, 250 + disturbances in, 58 + food shortage and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 + politicians' views on peace proposals, 230 + psychology of, 197 + warlike demonstrations at, after Sarajevo tragedy, 33 + +Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch Ambassador to Roumania, 104 + + +=W= + +Wales, Prince of (_see_ Edward VII., King) + +Wallachia, occupation of, 99, 105 + +Wallhead, Mr., 295 + +Washington Cabinet, and Austria-Hungary's attitude to submarine + warfare, 279 + +Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Austrian Ruthenians, 247, 249 + +Wedel, Count, calls on Count Czernin, 127 + disclosures of, 161 (note) + revelations of, 155 (note) + +Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins the term "bread peace," 257 + +Wekerle, Dr., and the Polish question, 203 + author and, 136, 230 + on the Ukrainian question, 242 + standpoint of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 260, 319 + +Western front, an Entente break-through on, 183 + +Western Powers, the, and Germany's ambitions, 2 + +Wiesner, Ambassador, von, and a Pan-German, 161 + at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + author discusses Russian peace with, 219 + +Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 43 + anxious for peace, 72 + author's conversation with, 74 + his quarters at Sedan, 74 + +William I. and Bismarck, 65 + +William II., Emperor, and Bismarck, 52 + and Franz Ferdinand, 42 + and the German Supreme Military Command, 17 + as _causeur_, 66 + as the "elect of God," 52, 53 + cause of his ruin, 62 _et seq._ + demonstrations against, in the Reichstag, 54 + desires to help deposed Tsar, 70 + difficulties of his political advisers, 60 + fails to find favour in England, 63 + his projected division of the world, 67 + impending trial of: author's protest, 66 + informed of serious nature of situation for Allies, 332 + instructions to Kühlmann, 249 + long years of peaceful government, 68 + longs for peace, 70 + on food troubles in England, 145 + on impending attack on Italian front, 71 + presents author with "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 + Prince Hohenlohe and, 65 + question of his abdication, 75 + the Press and, 65 + warlike speeches of, 68 + +Wilson, President, advantages of his "Fourteen Points," 188 + as master of the world, 192 + author on his Message, 305 + Count Andrassy's Note to, 25 + Count Czernin on, 192 + Entente's reply to his peace proposal, 118, 120, 123 + his Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles, 271 + on the freedom of the seas, 281 + ready to consider peace, 250 + reopens hopes of a peace of understanding, 189 + speech to Congress, 193 + text of the Fourteen Points, 323 + +Wolf, K.H., a scene in the "Burg," 169 + +World-domination, Germany's dream of, 1, 2 + +World organization, a new, principles of, 174 _et seq._ + +World War, the, an important phase of, 107 + attempts at peace, 134 _et seq._ + author's impressions and reflections on, 195 _et seq._, 271 _et seq._ + by whom started, 18 (note) + causes of, 3 + President Wilson and, 188 _et seq._ + questions of responsibility for outbreak of, 2 + +World War, the, U-boat warfare in, 114 _et seq._ + (_see also_ Submarine warfare and U-boat) + violent measures adopted by Germany in, 16 + + +=Z= + +Zeppelin raids on Bucharest, 100 + +Zimmermann, Herr, and author's peace proposals, 146 + opposes unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 120 + +_Zimmerwalder_ (Russian Internationalists), 211 + + + +PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C. 4 + + * * * * * + + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Typographical errors corrected in text: | + | | + | Table of Contents: Appendix is listed as 257, changed to 275 | + | Page 47: 'and and in doing so' replaced with 'and in doing so' | + | Page 81: 'to made room' replaced with 'to make room' | + | Page 107: session replaced with cession | + | Page 196: perdera replaced with perdra | + | Page 201: Nr 63 replaced with Nr. 63 | + | Page 251: official replaced with officials | + | Page 286: 'Les navir' replaced with 'Les navires' | + | Page 293: persumably replaced with presumably | + | Page 333: Sudekum replaced with Südekum | + | Page 334: 'would have have been' replaced with 'would have been' | + | Page 343: Gouluchowski replaced with Goluchowski | + | Page 344: Gorlitz replaced with Görlitz | + | Page 346: Lubin replaced with Lublin | + | | + | The surname Colloredo-Mannsfield/Colloredo-Mannsfeld appears | + | once each way, on page 121, and in the index | + 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: In the World War + +Author: Count Ottokar Czernin + +Release Date: April 12, 2006 [EBook #18160] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE WORLD WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jeannie Howse, Thierry Alberto, Henry Craig +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> + +<div class="tr"> +<p class="cen" style="font-weight: bold;">Transcriber's Note:</p> +<br /> +<p class="noin">A number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected in this text.<br /> +For a complete list, please see the <a href="#TN">bottom of this document</a>.</p> +</div> + +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> + +<div class="img"><a name="frontis" id="frontis"></a> +<a href="images/frontis.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/frontis.jpg" width="50%" alt="COUNT CZERNIN" /></a><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">COUNT CZERNIN<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> + +<h1>IN THE WORLD WAR</h1> +<br /> +<br /> +<h2>BY COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN</h2> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<h4><i>WITH FOUR PLATES</i></h4> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<h5>CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD<br /> +London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne</h5> + +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> + +<h5>Copyright in Great Britain.</h5> + +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> + +<h3>PREFACE</h3> +<br /> + + +<p>It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World +War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of +this book.</p> + +<p>Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe +separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and individuals +with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe +closely; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama.</p> + +<p>By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of +the war as a whole, which may, nevertheless, differ in many respects +from the hitherto recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war.</p> + +<p>Everyone regards people and events from his own point of view; it is +inevitable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was in close touch; +of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression +on me; and finally, of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I +endeavour to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to +describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description +appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely +formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the +capacity for judging.</p> + +<p>Not everything could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it +could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those +events to justify the lifting of the veil from all that happened.</p> + +<p>But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture, +which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="sc">Ottokar Czernin.</span></p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="toc" id="toc"></a><hr /> +<br /> + +<h3>CONTENTS</h3> +<br /> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="80%" summary="Table of Contents"> + <tr> + <td class="tdr"><span style="font-size: 80%;">CHAPTER</span></td> + <td> </td> + <td class="tdr"><span style="font-size: 80%;">PAGE</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp" width="10%"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc" width="70%">Introductory Reflections</td> + <td class="tdr" width="20%">1</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">2.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Konopischt</td> + <td class="tdr">34</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">3.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">William II</td> + <td class="tdr">52</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">4.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Roumania</td> + <td class="tdr">77</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">5.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">The U-boat Warfare</td> + <td class="tdr">114</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">6.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Attempts at Peace</td> + <td class="tdr">134</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">7.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Wilson</td> + <td class="tdr">188</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">8.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Impressions and Reflections</td> + <td class="tdr">195</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">9.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Poland</td> + <td class="tdr">200</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">10.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Brest-Litovsk</td> + <td class="tdr">211</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">11.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">The Peace of Bucharest</td> + <td class="tdr">258</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">12.</a></td> + <td class="tdlsc">Final Reflections</td> + <td class="tdr">271</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"> </td> + <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#APPENDIX">Appendix</a></td> + <td class="tdr">275</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> + + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="toi" id="toi"></a><hr /> +<br /> + +<h3>LIST OF PLATES</h3> +<br /> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="List of Plates"> + <tr> + <td class="tdlsc" width="80%"><a href="#frontis">Count Czernin</a></td> + <td class="tdr" width="20%"><i>Frontispiece</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> </td> + <td class="tdr"><span style="font-size: 70%;">FACING PAGE</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#imagep048">The Archduke Franz Ferdinand</a></td> + <td class="tdr">48</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#imagep128">Count Tisza</a></td> + <td class="tdr">128</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlsc"><a href="#imagep240">General Hoffmann</a></td> + <td class="tdr">240</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span><br /> + +<h2>IN THE WORLD WAR</h2> + +<h3>CHAPTER I<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>The bursting of a thunderstorm is preceded by certain definite +phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the +storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be +repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through +outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less +threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is +bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts.</p> + +<p>For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of +Foreign Affairs had stood at "storm." It rose periodically, to fall +again; it varied—naturally; but for years everything had pointed to +the fact that the peace of the world was in danger.</p> + +<p>The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several +years: to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand England's dread of +the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand Berlin's politics, +which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief +that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in +Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but +partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence; these +fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII., and thus was +started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward +VII. made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the +Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor +Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate +of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent +masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany; +without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through +the Alliance.</p> + +<p>I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war, +it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had +eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her +dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the +Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm +conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the +situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany, +the unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention +the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in +Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise, +and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this, +the greatest misfortune of all time—and such is this war—lies in the +fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation +created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals +keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and +statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as +much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable +difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither +France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the +thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no +intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary—as she did fifty +years ago—left the decisive moment for entering into war to the +future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite +of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed +her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not +know what he wanted, and the military party <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>urged unceasingly for +war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a +declaration of war.</p> + +<p>The states that followed after—Italy and Roumania—entered into the +war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of +course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to +pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than +Roumania.</p> + +<p>But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the +growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already +brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of +Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the +Prussians throughout the world—whether in the case of a general at +Potsdam or a <i>commis voyageur</i> out in East Africa—these Prussian +manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting +of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the +whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral +coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly +practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that +German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the +world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention +of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in +the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was +undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German +provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence +created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition +policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.</p> + +<p>It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans +of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the +sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan +of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by +King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English +motives.</p> + +<p>Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for +armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>race to +possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried +to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had +become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been +obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be +pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained—either a voluntary +and general disarmament, or war.</p> + +<p>A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through +negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, +but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for +peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she +was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the +Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion.</p> + +<p>I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British +points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral +state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American +steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German +industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German was a great talker +and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating +on the "uprising" of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for +expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of +impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made +in all these endeavours. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of +German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns +where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how +"Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world, +and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on +solid foundations upheld by military support. Such was the German. +When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and +asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered: "There is no need +for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us." Such +was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind. +It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was +reflected in the brain <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic, +because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of +the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe.</p> + +<p>The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the +Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest +strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world +regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy +was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action +would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of +anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and +closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while +there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the +Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador +there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by +his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to +put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as +follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not +intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he +considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in +our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and +leaving the field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own +mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great +Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was +preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterwards I +repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, +and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of +Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion. +The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with +the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I +had with him, and I do not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span>know whether he ever carried out his +intention of discussing the matter with the monarch.</p> + +<p>The two Balkan wars were as summer lightning before the coming +European thunderstorm. It was obvious to anyone acquainted with Balkan +conditions that the peace there had produced no definite result, and +the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, so enthusiastically acclaimed by +Roumania, carried the germ of death at its birth. Bulgaria was +humiliated and reduced; Roumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out +of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description. +Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy, +was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars. +In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the +separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred +came to an outburst in the world war the most terrible scenes were +enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Roumanians tore +their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the +Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Roumanian prisoners to death +in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war +can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph +clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely +a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for +Bucharest in 1913 I was received in audience by the aged emperor, who +said to me: "The Peace of Bucharest is untenable, and we are faced by +a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia, +which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being +satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of +becoming a Great Power.</p> + +<p>Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before +the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed +almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade. +But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent +asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the +world. The stone had started rolling.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able +from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin. +Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with +numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been +able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no +doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought +of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all, +was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German +Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war +against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe +that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the +ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either—and this +is the most favourable view—Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which +would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and +then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and +France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It +cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of +errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count +Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to +the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German +promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators +and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.</p> + +<p>Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war +would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent +by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no +doubt on the matter.</p> + +<p>Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian +war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment +extremely important events took place.</p> + +<p>On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram +received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the +following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was +very grave, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>perfectly collected, though pointing out that the +situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had +intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a +position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested +England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities +to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as +it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after +occupying Belgrade, would state her terms.</p> + +<p>To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention +to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would +facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would +inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved. +Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very +favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was +difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy.</p> + +<p>Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that +he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting +negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without +a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future.</p> + +<p>Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by +Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the +Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this +information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position +was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the +evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation +was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him +whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in +view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the +different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was +obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the +day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to +incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun +without the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they +were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary +would be too late.</p> + +<p>I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material +placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire +into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the +Emperor Francis Joseph.</p> + +<p>On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz, +communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince +Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:—</p> + +<div class="block"><p class="lilin">"Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to +concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly +desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war +should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting +to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if +Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade +and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for +satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile +suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his +great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus +proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent +what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I +am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to +preserve peace of Europe.</p> + +<p class="right sc">George."</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject +to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy +London.</p> + +<p>In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to +Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party +working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an +accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop +mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with +defence. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their +Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their +personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly +weighed in the balance.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn +hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours +merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was +the result.</p> + +<p>Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war.</p> + +<p>Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all +these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen +Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw +a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread +errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the +war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but +because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance +would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the +Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which +then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before +we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning +the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German +Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a +distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as +I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various +steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have +alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the +language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky +specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to +interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in +the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private +speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and +it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be +"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point +of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would +prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff +appears to me <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was +firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go +through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the +year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason, +because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of +either Russia or France, and secondly because—and this is a very +important point—he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy +into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and +peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany +on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he +wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of +Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his +policy, and not Bethmann's.</p> + +<p>This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy +conversations with Count Tisza—an impression which has been confirmed +from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in +behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of +activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this +to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was +never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war, +but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic +representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government +to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his +instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete +anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy +expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his Government; +and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain +circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all +events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's +private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy.</p> + +<p>In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark +a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there +for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to +return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before +leaving had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at +Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite +briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a +war, I could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the +affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any +guarantee was impossible.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>3</h3> + +<p>Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately +preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence +of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we +granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing +the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before +action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them +also.</p> + +<p>I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in +Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In +all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of +renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious +feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would +strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour.</p> + +<p>Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings.</p> + +<p>Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian +Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared +that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case +there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest +had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His +efforts were crowned with success.</p> + +<p>On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet +Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that +no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"The Cabinet Council has resolved that <i>as Roumania was neither +notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in +Belgrade no casus fœderis exists</i>. The Cabinet Council further +resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier +be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its +frontiers would thereby be covered.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to +strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general +mobilisation would follow.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"The Government intends only to publish a short communiqué +relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the +country."</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up +as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for +war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870 +Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a +different character.</p> + +<p>In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have +been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto +were favourably disposed towards us.</p> + +<p>Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and +confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not +inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending +over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a +very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung +the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.</p> + +<p>It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the +Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new +conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the +year 1914 the case was very different from former days—before the +ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.</p> + +<p>At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution, +and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was +the attacking party, and he succeeded in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>interchanging the parts. We +also succeeded, but in an opposite sense.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>4</h3> + +<p>Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.</p> + +<p>Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his +book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how +on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English +Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would +respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already +on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but, +returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in +before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into +Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his +passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and +the consequence was a declaration of war by England.</p> + +<p>That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would +resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is +fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English +Ambassador.</p> + +<p>Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave +France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian +neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action +against France. The contradiction between both points of view is +clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation +is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of +August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the +evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of +making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext +for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also +that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do +so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying +her own hands in the event of Germany <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span>accepting the ultimatum. <i>On +the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the +decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with +Germany.</i></p> + +<p>Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of +the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom. +That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the +diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power.</p> + +<p>The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious +onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.</p> + +<p>In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage +left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a +lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually +forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but +Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans, +though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently +competent to lead them therein.</p> + +<p>Bismarck created the German Empire out of Düppel, Königgrätz and +Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"—and for fifty years +that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the +mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art—but +Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial +efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means. +Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when +he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no +desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the +first week had already created political situations which were beyond +her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the +Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose +against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over +the world.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would +have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to +fight against France and Russia and mutually <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>weaken each other, then +at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to +join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How +far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to +a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear—but +this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right +remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or +small.</p> + +<p>The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian +policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who +were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating +consequences.</p> + +<p>Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command +made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than +useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable +and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that +Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would +not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of +noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare were +means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women +and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany +must be annihilated.</p> + +<p>When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it was +only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of +such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war +of annihilation.</p> + +<p>England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic +than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the +present case England originally had no intention of joining in the +conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own +confederates.</p> + +<p>So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the +wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors +in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final +decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was +taken in Berlin and not in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>London. Moreover, the German Foreign +Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence, +but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor +political complications, carried everything before them.</p> + +<p>It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits +of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both +encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and +very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs. +Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into +subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made +manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had +possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had +the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have +been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the +abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the +Central Powers.</p> + +<p>From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the +hands of his generals.</p> + +<p>The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much +else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant, +inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people +believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms +of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing +the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William +allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their +tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a +godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war +long since had assumed a totally different character, when the troops +were made stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were +constantly rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally +America appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve +miracles of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the +eyes of the German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and +hoped for victory through them alone. They were more powerful <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>than +the Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose +them.</p> + +<p>Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power +direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt +that they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering +people clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could +give them victory.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>5</h3> + +<p>Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy, +and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours +had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought +about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling +herself on the Central Powers.</p> + +<p>That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning +of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources +may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of +the case.</p> + +<p>The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They +maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of +Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as +punishment.</p> + +<p>A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their +own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge +and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of +State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view +of the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that +"three Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the +war."<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of +blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war +without being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true, +there could only have been a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>question of some plot laid by the +Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case Germany, +being the vastly superior military element, would undoubtedly have +assumed the rôle of leader.</p> + +<p>Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace +were right.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>6</h3> + +<p>While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would +have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had attempts +at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we should +have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as we were +united together in a war of defence and not in a war of conquest. +Although the German military party both dreamed and talked incessantly +of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a misunderstanding of the +situation, that was by no means the exclusive reason why peace could +not be attained. It simply was because on no consideration could the +Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have already mentioned this in +my speech of December 11, 1918,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> in which I discoursed on politics +in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of France +and England. None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for +victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long +as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with +Germany <i>inter pares</i>, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part +of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to +do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we +ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to +conclude a <i>status quo</i> peace with Germany, we would have been +relieved of our moral obligations. Against this may be quoted: "<i>Salus +rei publicas supreme lex</i>"—in order to save the Monarchy Germany +would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be +inquired into as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate +peace really did exist. I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid +speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after +the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America +into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian +idea. But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished +the hope of a <i>peace of understanding</i> from month to month, from week +to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would +arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the +sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end +which practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of affairs. A +catastrophe of such magnitude and such dimensions was never what I +feared. This is confirmed in the published report of my aforesaid +speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are +therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial +offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose +out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the +Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for +<i>endurable</i> sacrifices.</p> + +<p>It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in +shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a +separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of +London of April 26, 1915.</p> + +<p>The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's +entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they +included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into +a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times +when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the +resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on +both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired +advances to us.</p> + +<p>As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this +strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we +obtain the authentic whole, when <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>the Russian revolutionary Government +published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was +reproduced in our papers.</p> + +<p>I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> as, in spite of +its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate +attention on the part of the public.</p> + +<p>According to the settlements, which were binding on the four +States—England, France, Russia, and Italy—the last-named was awarded +the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass, +Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of +islands, also Dalmatia.</p> + +<p>In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises +to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of +the Monarchy.</p> + +<p>Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace +was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the +reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming +neutral—reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change +our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with +Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It +must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held +office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German +troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial +German Command. We had no army of our own in the East—not in the true +sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army. That +was a consequence of our military inferiority. Again and again we +resorted to German aid. We called repeatedly for help in Serbia, +Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by +giving up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only in very +slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it +emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs. We entered +the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various +Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect. +The Hungarian <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>Parliament neglected the army for years because their +national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social +Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting +therein plans for attack and not defence.</p> + +<p>Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were, of course, +exceptions, but they only prove the rule. What was chiefly wanting was +contact with the troops. These gentlemen sat with their backs turned +and gave their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the front +or where the bullets whistled. During the war the troops learned to +<i>hate</i> the General Staff. It was very different in the German army. +The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much; +above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example. +Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liége, accompanied by a couple of men! +In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were +quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes +Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions. The first of +these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a +leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany, +and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph. He always acted +correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties. What +was left of our independence was lost after Luck.</p> + +<p>To return, therefore, to the plan developed above: a separate peace +that would have contained an order for our troops on the Eastern front +to lay down their arms or to march back would immediately have led to +conflict at the front. Following on the violent opposition that such +an order would naturally have aroused in the German leaders, orders +from Vienna and counter-orders from Berlin would have led to a state +of complete disorganisation, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it was +out of the question to look for a peaceful and bloodless unravelment +at the front. I state this in order to explain my firm conviction that +the idea that such a separating of the two armies could have been +carried out in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous +premises, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span>also to prove that we have here the first factor +showing that we would not have ended the war by a separate peace, but +would, on the contrary, have been entangled in a new one.</p> + +<p>But what would have been enacted at the front would also, and in +aggravated fashion, have been repeated throughout the entire country: +a civil war would have been inevitable.</p> + +<p>I must here explain a second misunderstanding, resulting also from my +speech of December 11, which is due to my statement that "if we came +out Germany could not carry on the war." I admit that this statement +is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as though I had intended +to say that if we came out the immediate collapse of Germany was a +foregone conclusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or +mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Germany would render +impossible a victorious ending of the war, or even a lasting +successful continuance of the war; that Germany through this would be +faced by the alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the +Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers and +suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the same fate as Roumania +met with. I meant to say that Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the +Entente troops to enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany +that she would be compelled to use every means to forestall us and +paralyse the move. Whoever imagines that the German military leaders +would not have seized the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and +has a poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to form an +objective judgment of this train of thought one should be able to +enter into the spirit of the situation. In April, 1916, when I sent in +my resignation for other reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was +stronger than ever. The Eastern front was free: Russia and Roumania +were out of action. The troops were bound westward, and no one who +knew the situation as it was then can repudiate my assertion that the +German military leaders believed themselves then to be nearer than +ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they would take both +Paris and Calais <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>and force the Entente to its knees. It is out of the +question that at such a moment and under such conditions they could +have replied to the falling away of Austria-Hungary otherwise than by +violence.</p> + +<p>All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to a fact which it +would be difficult to evade. Six months afterwards, when there was +already clear evidence of the German collapse, when Andrassy declared +a separate peace, the <i>Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into +the Tyrol</i>. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated, and ruined, +with revolution at their back, still held firmly to this decision and +endeavoured to make a battlefield on Austrian territory, how much more +would they have done that six months earlier, when they still stood +full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of victory and +triumph? What I, secondly, also would maintain is that the immediate +consequence of a separate peace would have been the conversion of +Austria-Hungary into a theatre of war. The Tyrol, as well as Bohemia, +would have become fields of battle.</p> + +<p>If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion from the war that +prevailed throughout the Monarchy before April, 1917, had caused the +entire population of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister +who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious or unconscious +untruth. Certainly the Czechs were decidedly against Germany, and it +would not have been reasons of political alliance that would have +prevented them from agreeing. But I would like to know what the Czech +people would have said if Bohemia had been turned into a theatre of +war and exposed to all the sufferings endured by this and all other +peoples, and when to it had been added the devastation of the +fatherland, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops advancing +with flying colours from Saxony would have made their way to Prague +and penetrated even farther. We had no military forces in Bohemia; we +should not have been able to check the advance, and quicker than +either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth mentioning to +Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops from their wellnigh +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>inexhaustible reserves, would have marched either against us or +against the Entente on our territory. The German-Austrian public would +not have been in agreement with such a Minister; the German +Nationalists and the German <i>bourgeoisie</i> have no say in the matter.</p> + +<p>On October 28 the German Nationalists published their own particular +point of view in the following manner:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly +indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's +Note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to any +agreement with the Imperial German Government nor with the +representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the +Note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed +and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count +Andrassy in dispatching the Note to Wilson without previous +arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest +indignation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation +from the German Executive Committee was in Berlin and was +favourably received by the German Imperial Government in the +matter of providing for German-Austria. Although German soldiers +fought by the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the +alliance has now been violated by this effort to approach Wilson +without the consent of the German Empire, as is expressly stated +in the Note. Besides which, no previous agreement with the +representatives of the German Executive Committee was sought for. +They were ignored and the answer was sent to Wilson. The German +Nationalist parties strongly protest against such an +<i>unqualifiable act</i> and will insist in the German Executive +Committee that German-Austria's right of self-determination be +unconditionally upheld and peace be secured in concert with the +German Empire."</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Neither would the German-Austrian Social Democrats have been a party +to such a movement.</p> + +<p>A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact lies before us if +it be maintained to-day that either the National Assembly or the +Austrian Social Democrats would have approved of and supported such +policy. I again have in mind the Andrassy days.</p> + +<p>On October 30 the National Assembly took up its position <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>for action. +Dr. Sylvester drew up the report and pointed out the following:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the +attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between +German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the +future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly +asserts that the Note of October 27 from the Royal and Imperial +Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and dispatched to +President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with +the representatives of the German-Austrian people. The National +Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding +as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs +belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National +Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to +represent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to +foreign affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations."</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>The protest met with no opposition in the National Assembly.</p> + +<p>Afterwards the chairman, Dr. Ellenbogen, the Social Democrat, spoke as +follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"Instead of now telling the German Emperor that his remaining in +office is the greatest obstacle to peace" (loud applause from the +Social Democrats), "and if there ever were an object in Curtius's +famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German +Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes +the present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so +attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived too +late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is the +<i>bare and shameful breach of faith</i>, the thanks of the House of +Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet." (Applause from +the Social Democrats and the German Radicals.)</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished the exceptional +opportunity for Social Democrats and German Radicals to unite in +common applause, probably the first instance of such a thing in all +these years of war.</p> + +<p>If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that +there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding +together with Germany—what would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>have happened, I ask, at a time +when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the +population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at +least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together +with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding? +Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all, +civil war in the interior—such would have been the result of a +separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose on us the +resolutions passed in London! For never—as I shall presently +show—had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to +Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have +been as suicide from the sheer fear of death.</p> + +<p>In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor +Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a +separate peace.</p> + +<p>Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with +Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was +then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of +our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has +arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war."</p> + +<p>Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war—and a +separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with +Germany.</p> + +<p>In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he +was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together. +As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the +carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and +richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia, +Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that +the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without +putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the +circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the +whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I +took office I had a long and very serious conversation with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>him on +the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans +were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet +without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to +cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce +an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities +were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in +London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never +could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the +Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we +must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many +different currents of feeling—but the moment that Vienna prepared to +sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man +against such action. In that respect there was no difference between +him—Tisza—and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before +the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of +Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's +back she would separate from Austria and act independently.</p> + +<p>I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany +or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear +as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the +German lust of conquest.</p> + +<p>Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was +not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in +London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian +territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the +Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and +both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give +Hungary a guarantee for the <i>status quo ante</i> and to desist from any +internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must +declare against any attempt at peace.</p> + +<p>The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing +particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a +Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>though he maintained +that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms +appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than +Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make +peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to +bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's +advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was +fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be +lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German +politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as +England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory, +Germany was the only protection against these plans.</p> + +<p>Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from +Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new +states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary.</p> + +<p>After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the +following policy:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="hang">(1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in +London, i.e. the destruction of the Monarchy, continues to +be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the certain +hope of crushing that spirit of destruction.</p> + +<p class="hang">(2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no +account be carried on for purposes of conquest.</p> + +<p class="hang">(3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must be +avoided.</p> + +<p class="hang">(4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without +the knowledge of the Prime Minister.</p> + +<p class="hang">(5) Should the Austrian Ministry agree with the Foreign Minister +respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hungarian +Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>When the conference in London and the destruction of the Monarchy came +into question, Tisza was entirely in the right, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>and that he otherwise +to the end adhered to his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his +last visit to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request of +the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and when in the most +marked manner he showed himself to be opposed to the aspirations of +the Southern Slavs.</p> + +<p>Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must not, when looking +back from to-day, relegate all that has since happened to former +discernible facts, but should consider that, in spite of all pessimism +and all fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding, even +though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that it was impossible +to plunge the Monarchy into a catastrophe at once for fear of its +coming later.</p> + +<p>If the situation is described to-day as though the inhabitants of the +Monarchy, and especially the Social Democrats, were favourably +disposed for any eventuality, even for a separate peace, I must again +most emphatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social Democracy +without doubt was the party most strongly in favour of peace, and also +that Social Democracy in Germany, as with us, repeatedly stated that +there were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German Social +Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine ought to be given up, and +never have our Social Democrats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen and +Meran. This would in any case have been the price of peace—and also +the price of a separate peace—for, as I have already pointed out, at +the conference in London, which dates back to 1915, binding +obligations had been entered into for the partition of the Monarchy, +while all that had been promised to Italy.</p> + +<p>The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the +separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente +ranks—for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians, +and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would +have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I +doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings +would have recommended it to the special <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>protection of the Entente. +It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to +believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and +especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any +strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian +Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in +the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material +advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the +decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire +political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union +with Germany—how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which, +without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to +a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the +upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the +opposite?</p> + +<p>But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my +resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not +pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is +of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near +a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would +throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end +before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as +we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory +was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany +against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant +influence.</p> + +<p>As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign +policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of +renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several +men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I +feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I +came to the firm conclusion that the Entente—England above all—from +the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to +shatter Germany.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief +characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further +with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to +earth. It makes no difference in the matter that the German military +party—though for other reasons—from a total misconception of their +chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a +time when it might have been possible. This is an historical fact, but +as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether +concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. <i>We</i> could have +gone over to the enemy—in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought +against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would +doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the wounds which +Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been +less serious than those from which she is now suffering: she would +have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as +perished in her fight allied with Germany.</p> + +<p><i>Austria-Hungary's watch had run down.</i> Among the few statesmen who in +1914 wished for war—like Tschirsky, for instance—there can have been +none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views. +They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe to-day, +nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would +have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first +step.</p> + +<p>The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of Greater Serbia's +aspirations; but these aspirations, which led to the breaking away of +our Southern Slav provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on +the contrary, would have largely increased and asserted themselves, +and would have strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of other +peoples within the Monarchy.</p> + +<p>Lightning at night reveals the country for a second, and the same +effect was produced by the shots fired at Sarajevo. It became obvious +that the signal for the fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells +of Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the murder, +sounded the death knell of the Monarchy.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially at Vienna, was +very general that the outrage at Sarajevo was a matter of more +importance than the murder of an Imperial prince and his wife, and +that it was the alarm signal for the ruin of the Habsburg Empire.</p> + +<p>I have been told that during the period between the assassination and +the war, warlike demonstrations were daily occurrences in the Viennese +restaurants and people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were +sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not "exert himself +to take any energetic steps." This must not be taken as an excuse for +any eventual mistakes on the part of the leaders of the nation, for a +leading statesman ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the +man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit developed in +1914 appears to have been very general. And it may perhaps be +permitted to add this comment: how many of those who then clamoured +for war and revenge and demanded "energy," would, now that the +experiment has totally failed, severely criticise and condemn +Berchtold's "criminal behaviour"?</p> + +<p>It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the fall of the +Monarchy would have occurred had war been averted. Certainly in a less +terrible fashion than was the case through the war. Probably much more +slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole world into the +whirlpool. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the +manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible.</p> + +<p>Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the outbreak of war. +We were transformed from a subject into an object.</p> + +<p>This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless to end it. At the +conference in London the death sentence had been passed on the Empire +of the Habsburgs and a separate peace would have been no easier a form +of death than that involved in holding out at the side of our Allies.</p> + +<br /> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza and Stürgkh +and General Conrad von Hohendorf.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See Appendix, p. 325.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See page 275.</p></div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER II<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>KONOPISCHT</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>Konopischt has become the cradle of manifold legends. The lord of the +castle was the first victim of the terrible world conflagration, and +the part that he played before the war has been the subject of much +and partly erroneous commentary.</p> + +<p>The Archduke and heir to the throne was a man of a very peculiar +nature. The main feature of his character was a great lack of balance. +He knew no middle course and was just as eager to hate as to love. He +was unbalanced in everything; he did nothing like other people, and +what he did was done in superhuman dimensions. His passion for buying +and collecting antiquities was proverbial and fabulous. A first-rate +shot, sport was for him a question of murdering <i>en masse</i>, and the +number of game shot by him reached hundreds of thousands. A few years +before his death he shot his 5,000th stag.</p> + +<p>His ability as a good shot was phenomenal. When in India, during his +voyage round the world, and while staying with a certain Maharajah, an +Indian marksman gave an exhibition of his skill. Coins were thrown +into the air which the man hit with bullets. The Archduke tried the +same and beat the Indian. Once when I was staying with him at +Eckartsau he made a <i>coup double</i> at a stag and a hare as they ran; he +had knocked over a fleeing stag, and when, startled by the shot, a +hare jumped up, he killed it with the second bullet. He scorned all +modern appliances for shooting, such as telescopic sights or automatic +rifles; he invariably used a short double-barrelled rifle, and his +exceptionally keen sight rendered glasses unnecessary.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>The artistic work of laying out parks and gardens became in latter +years his dominating passion. He knew every tree and every bush at +Konopischt, and loved his flowers above everything. He was his own +gardener. Every bed and every group was designed according to his +exact orders. He knew the conditions essential to the life of each +individual plant, the quality of the soil required; and even the +smallest spot to be laid out or altered was done according to his +minute instructions. But here, too, everything was carried out on the +same gigantic lines, and the sums spent on that park must have been +enormous. Few people had the varied artistic knowledge possessed by +the Archduke; no dealer could palm off on him any modern article as an +antique, and he had just as good taste as understanding. On the other +hand, music to him was simply a disagreeable noise, and he had an +unspeakable contempt for poets. He could not bear Wagner, and Goethe +left him quite cold. His lack of any talent for languages was +peculiar. He spoke French tolerably, but otherwise no other language, +though he had a smattering of Italian and Czech. For years—indeed, to +the end of his life—he struggled with the greatest energy to learn +Hungarian. He had a priest living permanently in the house to give him +Hungarian lessons. This priest accompanied him on his travels, and at +St. Moritz, for instance, Franz Ferdinand had a Hungarian lesson every +day; but, in spite of this, he continued to suffer from the feeling +that he would never be able to learn the language, and he vented his +annoyance at this on the entire Hungarian people. "Their very language +makes me feel antipathy for them," was a remark I constantly heard him +make. His judgment of people was not a well-balanced one; he could +either love or hate, and unfortunately the number of those included in +the latter category was considerably the greater.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt about it that there was a very hard strain in Franz +Ferdinand's mentality, and those who only knew him slightly felt that +this hardness of character was the most notable feature in him and his +great unpopularity can <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>doubtless be attributed to this cause. The +public never knew the splendid qualities of the Archduke, and +misjudged him accordingly.</p> + +<p>Apparently he was not always like that. He suffered in his youth from +severe lung trouble, and for long was given up by the doctors. He +often spoke to me of that time and all that he had gone through, and +referred with intense bitterness to the people who were only waiting +day by day to put him altogether on one side. As long as he was looked +upon as the heir to the throne, and people reckoned on him for the +future, he was the centre of all possible attention; but when he fell +ill and his case was considered hopeless, the world fluctuated from +hour to hour and paid homage to his younger brother Otto. I do not for +a moment doubt that there was a great deal of truth in what the late +Archduke told me; and no one knowing the ways of the world can deny +the wretched, servile egotism that is almost always at the bottom of +the homage paid to those in high places. More deeply than in the +hearts of others was this resentment implanted in the heart of Franz +Ferdinand, and he never forgave the world what he suffered and went +through in those distressful months. It was chiefly the ostensible +vacillation of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count +Goluchowski, that had so deeply hurt the Archduke, who had always +imagined that Goluchowski was deeply attached to him. According to +Franz Ferdinand's account, Goluchowski is supposed to have said to the +Emperor Francis Joseph that the Archduke Otto ought now to be given +the retinue and household suitable for the heir to the throne as +he—Franz Ferdinand—"was in any case lost." It was not so much the +fact as the manner in which Goluchowski tried "to bury him while still +living" that vexed and hurt him whom a long illness had made +irritable. But besides Goluchowski, there were numberless others whose +behaviour at that time he took greatly amiss, and his unparalleled +contempt of the world which, when I knew him, was one of his most +characteristic features, appears—partly, at any rate—to date from +his experiences during that illness.</p> + +<p>In connection with politics, too, this bitterness exercised a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>lasting +influence on his entire mental outlook. I have been told by an +authentic witness that the Archduke, when suffering and combating his +terrible disease, saw one day an article in a Hungarian paper which, +in brutal and derisive tones, spoke of the Archduke's expectations of +future government as laid aside, and gloated openly, with malicious +delight, over the probable event. The Archduke, who while reading the +article had turned ashen grey with rage and indignation, remained +silent for a moment and then made the following characteristic remark: +"Now I must get better. I shall live from now only for my health. I +must get better in order to show them that their joy is premature." +And though this may not have been the only reason for his violent +antipathy to everything Hungarian, there is no doubt that the episode +influenced his mind considerably. The Archduke was a "good hater"; he +did not easily forget, and woe betide those upon whom he vented his +hatred. On the other hand, though but few knew it, he had an +uncommonly warm corner in his heart; he was an ideal husband, the best +of fathers, and a faithful friend. But the number of those he despised +was incomparably greater than those who gained his affection, and he +himself was in no doubt whatever as to his being the most unpopular +person in the Monarchy. But there was a certain grandeur in this very +contempt of popularity. He never could bring himself to make any +advances to newspapers or other organs that are in the habit of +influencing public opinion either favourably or unfavourably. He was +too proud to sue for popularity, and too great a despiser of men to +attach any importance to their judgment.</p> + +<p>The Archduke's antipathy to Hungary runs like a scarlet thread through +the political chain of his thoughts. I have been told that at the time +when the Crown Prince Rudolf was frequently in Hungary shooting, the +Archduke was often with him, and that the Hungarian gentlemen took a +pleasure in teasing and ridiculing the young Archduke in the presence +and to the delight of the considerably older Crown Prince. Ready as I +am to believe that the Crown Prince Rudolf enjoyed the jokes—and +little do I doubt that there were men there who would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>act in such +fashion so as to curry favour with the Crown Prince—I still think +that these unpleasant incidents in his youth weighed less in the +balance with Franz Ferdinand than the already-mentioned occurrences +during his illness.</p> + +<p>Apart from his personal antipathies, which he transferred from a few +Hungarians to the entire nation, there were also various far-reaching +and well-founded political reasons which strengthened the Archduke in +his antagonistic relations with Hungary. Franz Ferdinand possessed an +exceptionally fine political <i>flair</i>, and this enabled him to see that +Hungarian policy was a vital danger to the existence of the whole +Habsburg Empire. His desire to overthrow the predominance of the +Magyars and to help the nationalities to obtain their rights was +always in his thoughts, and influenced his judgment on all political +questions. He was the steady representative of the Roumanians, the +Slovaks, and other nationalities living in Hungary, and went so far in +that respect that he would have treated every question at once from an +anti-Magyar point of view without inquiring into it in an objective +and expert manner. These tendencies of his were no secret in Hungary, +and the result was a strong reaction among the Magyar magnates, which +he again took as purely personal antagonism to himself, and as the +years went on existing differences increased automatically, until +finally, under the Tisza régime, they led to direct hostility.</p> + +<p>The Archduke's antipathy to party leaders in Hungary was even stronger +than that he felt for Tisza, and he showed it particularly to one of +the most prominent figures of that time. I do not know for certain +what took place between them; I only know that several years before +the catastrophe the gentleman in question was received in audience at +the Belvedere, and that the interview came to a very unsatisfactory +end. The Archduke told me that his visitor arrived bringing a whole +library with him in order to put forward legal proofs that the +Magyar's standpoint was the right one. He, the Archduke, snapped his +fingers at their laws, and said so. It came to a violent scene, and +the gentleman, pale as death, tottered from the room.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>Certain it is that Ministers and other officials rarely waited on the +Archduke without beating hearts. He was capable of flying out at +people and terrifying them to such a degree that they lost their heads +completely. He often took their fright to be obstinacy and passive +resistance, and it irritated him all the more.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it was extremely easy to get on with him if one +knew him well and did not stand in awe of him. I had many scenes with +him and often lost my temper, too; but there was never any lasting +ill-feeling. Once when at Konopischt we had a scene one evening after +dinner because, he said, I always worked in opposition to him and +rewarded his friendship by treachery. I broke off the conversation, +remarking that, if he could say such things, any further serious +conversation would be impossible, and I also stated my intention of +leaving the next morning. We separated without saying good night to +each other. Quite early next morning—I was still in bed—he appeared +in my room and asked me to forget what he had said the previous +evening, that he had not meant it seriously, and thus completely +disarmed my still prevailing vexation.</p> + +<p>A despiser of men, with his wits sharpened by his own experiences, he +never allowed himself to be fooled by servile cringing and flattery. +He listened to people, but how often have I heard him say: "He is no +good; he is a toady." Such people never found favour with him, as he +always mistrusted them at the outset. He was protected more than +others in such high spheres from the poison of servility that attacks +all monarchs.</p> + +<p>His two best friends, and the men to whom—after his own nearest +relations—he was most attached, were his brother-in-law Albrecht von +Würtemberg and the Prince Karl of Schwarzenberg.</p> + +<p>The former, a man of charming personality, great intelligence, and +equally efficient in political as in military matters, lived on a +footing of true brotherly unity with Franz Ferdinand, and also, +naturally, on terms of perfect equality.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>Karl of Schwarzenberg was the most sincere, honourable and +straightforward character I have ever encountered; a man who concealed +the truth from no one. Rich, independent, and devoid of personal +ambition, it was quite immaterial to him whether the Archduke was +pleased with what he asserted or no. He was his <i>friend</i>, and +considered it his duty to be honest and open—and if necessary, +disagreeable. The Archduke understood, appreciated, and valued this +attitude. I do not think there are many monarchs or heirs to the +throne who would have suffered, as the Archduke did, Schwarzenberg's +sayings and doings.</p> + +<p>Franz Ferdinand was on very bad terms with Aehrenthal, who easily +became abrupt and repellent. Still, there was another reason why two +such hard millstones could not grind together. I do not believe that +the many reproaches launched against Aehrenthal by the Archduke were +consequent on political differences; it was more Aehrenthal's manner +that invariably irritated the Archduke. I had occasion to read some of +Aehrenthal's letters to Franz Ferdinand which, perhaps unintentionally, +had a slight ironical flavour which made the Archduke feel he was not +being taken seriously. He was particularly sensitive in this respect.</p> + +<p>When Aehrenthal fell ill the Archduke made unkind remarks about the +dying man, and there was great and general indignation at the want of +feeling shown by him. He represented the Emperor at the first part of +the funeral service, and afterwards received me at the Belvedere. We +were standing in the courtyard when the procession, with the hearse, +passed on the way to the station. The Archduke disappeared quickly +into a cottage close by, the windows of which looked on to the road, +and there, concealed behind the window curtain, he watched the +procession pass. He said not a word, but his eyes were full of tears. +When he saw that I noticed his emotion he turned away angrily, vexed +at having given proof of his weakness. It was just like him. He would +rather be considered hard and heartless than soft and weak, and +nothing was more repugnant to him than the idea that he had aroused +suspicion of striving <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>to enact a touching scene. I have no doubt that +at that moment he was suffering the torture of self-reproach, and +probably suffered the more through being so reserved and unable to +give free play to his feelings.</p> + +<p>The Archduke could be extremely gay, and possessed an exceptionally +strong sense of humour. In his happiest years he could laugh like any +youth, and carried his audience with him by his unaffected merriment.</p> + +<p>Some years ago a German prince, who was unable to distinguish between +the numerous archdukes, came to Vienna. A dinner was given in his +honour at the Hofburg, where he was seated next to Franz Ferdinand. +Part of the programme was that he was to have gone the next morning +with the Archduke to shoot in the neighbourhood. The German prince, +who mistook the Archduke Franz Ferdinand for someone else, said to him +during dinner: "I am to go out shooting to-morrow, and I hear it is to +be with that tiresome Franz Ferdinand; I hope the plan will be +changed." As far as I know, the expedition did not take place; but I +never heard whether the prince discovered his mistake. The Archduke, +however, laughed heartily for days at the episode.</p> + +<p>The Archduke invariably spoke of his nephew, the present Emperor +Charles, with great affection. The relations between the two were, +however, always marked by the absolute subordination of the nephew to +the uncle. In all political discussions, too, the Archduke Charles was +always the listener, absorbing the precepts expounded by Franz +Ferdinand.</p> + +<p>Charles's marriage met with the full approval of his uncle. The +Duchess of Hohenberg, too, entertained the warmest affection for the +young couple.</p> + +<p>The Archduke was a firm partisan of the Great-Austria programme. His +idea was to convert the Monarchy into numerous more or less +independent National States, having in Vienna a common central +organisation for all important and absolutely necessary affairs—in +other words to substitute Federalisation for Dualism. Now that, after +terrible military and revolutionary struggles, the development of the +former <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>Monarchy has been accomplished in a national spirit, there +cannot be many to contend that the plan is Utopian. At that time, +however, it had many opponents who strongly advised against dissecting +the State in order to erect in its place something new and "presumably +better," and the Emperor Francis Joseph was far too conservative and +far too old to agree to his nephew's plans. This direct refusal of the +idea cherished by the Archduke offended him greatly, and he complained +often in bitter terms that the Emperor turned a deaf ear to him as +though he were the "lowest serving man at Schönbrunn."</p> + +<p>The Archduke lacked the knowledge of how to deal with people. He +neither could nor would control himself, and, charming though he could +be when his natural heartiness was allowed free scope, just as little +could he conceal his anger and ill-humour. Thus it came about that the +relations between him and the aged Emperor grew more and more +strained. There were doubtless faults on both sides. The standpoint of +the old Emperor, that as long as he lived no one else should +interfere, was in direct opposition to that of the Archduke, who held +that he would one day have to suffer for the present faults in the +administration, and anyone acquainted with life at court will know +that such differences between the highest individuals are quickly +raked together and exaggerated. At every court there are men who seek +to gain their master's favour by pouring oil on the flames, and who, +by gossip and stories of all kinds, add to the antipathy that +prevails. Thus it was in this case, and, instead of being drawn closer +together, the two became more and more estranged.</p> + +<p>The Archduke had but few friends, and under the old monarch +practically none at all. That was one of the reasons for the advances +he made to the Emperor William. In reality, they were men of such a +different type that there could be no question of friendship in the +true sense of the word, or any real understanding between him and the +Emperor William, and the question was never mooted practically. The +only point common to both their characters was a strongly defined +autocratic trait. The Archduke had no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>sympathy with the speeches of +the Emperor William, nor yet with his obvious desire for popularity, +which the Archduke could not understand. The Emperor William, on his +part, undoubtedly grew more attached to the Archduke during his latter +years than he had been originally. Franz Ferdinand was not on such +good terms with the Crown Prince of Germany. They spent some weeks +together at St. Moritz in Switzerland, without learning to know each +other any better; but this can readily be explained by the difference +in age and also by the much more serious views of life held by the +Archduke.</p> + +<p>The isolation and retirement in which the Archduke lived, and the +regrettably restricted intercourse he had with other circles, gave +rise to the circulation of some true, besides numerous false, rumours. +One of these rumours, which is still obstinately kept up, was to the +effect that the Archduke was a fanatic for war and looked upon war as +a necessary aid to the realisation of his plans for the future. +Nothing could be more untrue, and, although the Archduke never openly +admitted it to me, I am convinced that he had an instinctive feeling +that the Monarchy would never be able to bear the terrible test of +strength of a war, and the fact is that, instead of working to +encourage war, his activities lay all in the opposite direction. I +recollect an extremely symptomatic episode: I do not remember the +exact date, but it was some time before the death of the Archduke. One +of the well-known Balkan turmoils threw the Monarchy into a state of +agitation, and the question whether to mobilise or not became the +order of the day. I chanced to be in Vienna, where I had an interview +with Berchtold who spoke of the situation with much concern and +complained that the Archduke was acting in a warlike spirit. I offered +to draw the Archduke's attention to the danger of the proceeding, and +put myself in telegraphic communication with him. I arranged to join +his train that same day when he passed through Wessely on his way to +Konopischt. I only had the short time between the two stations for my +conversation. I therefore at once took the bull <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>by the horns and told +him of the rumours current about him in Vienna and of the danger of +promoting a conflict with Russia by too strong action in the Balkans. +I did not meet with the slightest opposition from the Archduke, and in +his usual expeditious way he wrote, while still in the train, a +telegram to Berchtold in which he expressed his perfect agreement in +maintaining a friendly attitude and repudiated all the reports of his +having been opposed to it. It is a fact that certain of the military +party, who were anxious for war, made use of the Archduke, or rather +misused him, in order to carry on a military propaganda in his name +and thus gave rise to so wrongful an estimate of him. Several of these +men died a hero's death in the war; others have disappeared and are +forgotten. Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, was never among those +who misused the Archduke. He could never have done such a thing. He +carried out himself what he considered necessary and did it openly and +in face of everybody.</p> + +<p>In connection with these reports about the Archduke there is one +remarkable detail that is worthy of note. He told me himself how a +fortune-teller once predicted that "he would one day let loose a world +war." Although to a certain extent this prophecy flattered him, +containing as it did the unspoken recognition that the world would +have to reckon on him as a powerful factor, still he emphatically +pointed out how mad such a prophecy was. It was fulfilled, however, +later, though very differently from what was meant originally, and +never was prince more innocent of causing blood to flow than the +unhappy victim of Sarajevo.</p> + +<p>The Archduke suffered most terribly under the conditions resulting +from his unequal marriage. The sincere and true love he felt for his +wife kept alive in him the wish to raise her to his rank and +privileges, and the constant obstacles that he encountered at all +court ceremonies embittered and angered him inexpressibly. The +Archduke was firmly resolved that when he came to the throne he would +give to his wife, not the title of Empress, but a position which, +though without the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>title, would bestow upon her the highest rank. His +argument was that wherever he was she would be the mistress of the +house, and as such was entitled to the highest position, "therefore +she will take precedence of all the archduchesses." Never did the +Archduke show the slightest wish to alter the succession and put his +son in place of the Archduke Charles. On the contrary, he was resolved +that his first official act on coming to the throne would be to +publish a solemn declaration containing his intention, in order to +counteract the ever-recurring false and biassed statements. As regards +his children, for whom he did everything that a loving father's heart +could devise, his greatest wish was to see them become wealthy, +independent private individuals, and able to enjoy life without any +material cares. His plan was to secure the title of Duke of Hohenberg +for his eldest son. It was, therefore, in harmony with this intention +that the Emperor Charles conferred the title on the youth.</p> + +<p>One fine quality in the Archduke was his fearlessness. He was quite +clear that the danger of an attempt to take his life would always be +present, and he often spoke quite simply and openly of such a +possibility. A year before the outbreak of war he informed me that the +Freemasons had resolved to kill him. He even gave me the name of the +town where the resolution was passed—it has escaped my memory +now—and mentioned the names of several Austrian and Hungarian +politicians who must have been in the secret. He also told me that +when he went to the coronation in Spain he was to have made the +journey with a Russian Grand Duke, but shortly before the train +started the news came that the Grand Duke had been murdered on the +way. He did not deny that it was with mixed feelings that he stepped +into his compartment. When at St. Moritz news was sent him that two +Turkish anarchists had arrived in Switzerland intending to murder him, +that every effort was being made to capture them, but that so far no +trace of them had been discovered, and he was advised to be on his +guard. The Archduke showed me the telegram at the time. He laid it +aside without the slightest sign of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>fear, saying that such events, +when announced beforehand, seldom were carried out. The Duchess +suffered all the more in her fears for his life, and I think that in +imagination the poor lady often went through the catastrophe of which +she and her husband were the victims. Another praiseworthy feature in +the Archduke was that, out of consideration for his wife's anxiety, he +tolerated the constant presence of a detective, which not only bored +him terribly but in his opinion was absurd. He was afraid that if the +fact became known it would be imputed to timidity on his part, and he +conceded the point solely with the view of calming his wife's fears.</p> + +<p>But he anxiously concealed all his good qualities and took an +obstinate pleasure in being hard and disagreeable. I will not +endeavour here to excuse certain traits in his character. His strongly +pronounced egotism cannot be denied any more than the hardness of +character, which made him insensible to the sufferings of all who were +not closely connected with him. He also made himself hated by his +severe financial proceedings and his inexorable judgment on any +subordinate whom he suspected of the slightest dishonesty. In this +connection there are hundreds of anecdotes, some true, some false. +These petty traits in his character injured him in the eyes of the +great public, while the really great and manly qualities he possessed +were unknown to them, and were not weighed in the balance in his +favour. For those who knew him well his great and good qualities +outweighed the bad ones a hundredfold.</p> + +<p>The Emperor was always very perturbed concerning the Archduke's plans +for the future. There was a stern trait also in the old monarch's +character, and in the interests of the Monarchy he feared the +impetuosity and obstinacy of his nephew. Nevertheless, he often took a +very magnanimous view of the matter. For instance, Count Stürgkh, the +murdered Prime Minister, gave me details respecting my nomination to +the Herrenhaus which are very characteristic of the old monarch. It +was Franz Ferdinand's wish that I should be in the Herrenhaus, as he +was anxious for me to be one of a delegation and also to profit by my +extensive training in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>the province of foreign policy. I must mention +here that it had been impressed on the Emperor on all sides that the +Archduke's friends and trusted men were working against him; a version +of affairs which to a certain degree he obviously believed, owing to +his numerous disputes with Franz Ferdinand. On Stürgkh mentioning my +name as a candidate for the Herrenhaus, the Emperor hesitated a moment +and then said: "Ah, yes. That is the man who is to be Minister for +Foreign Affairs when I am dead. Let him go to the Herrenhaus that he +may learn a little more."</p> + +<p>Political discussions with the Emperor Francis Joseph were often very +difficult, as he kept strictly to the Government department in +question and only discussed what referred thereto. While I was +ambassador the Emperor would discourse to me on Roumania and the +Balkans, but on nothing else. Meanwhile, the different questions were +often so closely interwoven that it was impossible to separate them. I +remember at one audience where I submitted to the Emperor the +Roumanian plans for a closer connection with the Monarchy—plans which +I shall allude to in a later chapter—and in doing so I was +naturally bound to state what the Roumanians proposed respecting the +closer connection with Hungary, and also what changes would be +necessitated thereby in the Hungarian administration. The Emperor at +once broke off the conversation, saying that it was a matter of +Hungarian internal policy.</p> + +<p>The old Emperor was almost invariably kind and friendly, and to the +very last his knowledge of the smallest details was astonishing. He +never spoke of the different Roumanian Ministers as the Minister of +Agriculture, of Trade, or whatever it might be, but mentioned them all +by name and never made a mistake.</p> + +<p>I saw him for the last time in October, 1916, after my definite return +from Roumania, and found him then quite clear and sound mentally, +though failing in bodily health.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Francis Joseph was a "Grand Seigneur" in the true sense of +the word. He was an Emperor and remained <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>always unapproachable. +Everyone left his presence feeling he had stood before an Emperor. His +dignity in representing the monarchical idea was unsurpassed by any +sovereign in Europe.</p> + +<p>He was borne to his grave at a time of great military successes for +the Central Powers. He lies now in the Imperial vault, and a century +seems to have elapsed since his death; the world is changed.</p> + +<p>Day by day streams of people pass by the little church, but no one +probably gives a thought to him who lies in peace and forgotten, and +yet he, through many long years, embodied Austria, and his person was +a common centre for the State that so rapidly was falling asunder.</p> + +<p>He is now at rest, free from all care and sorrow; he saw his wife, his +son, his friends all die, but Fate spared him the sight of his +expiring Empire.</p> + +<hr /> + +<div class="img" style="width: 65%;"><a name="imagep048" id="imagep048"></a> +<a href="images/imagep048.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/imagep048.jpg" width="73%" alt="THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND" /></a><br /> +<p class="right" style="margin-top: .2em;"><i>Photo: Pietzner, Vienna.</i></p> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>Franz Ferdinand's character held many sharply defined corners and +edges; judging him objectively, no one can deny his great faults. +Though the circumstances of his death were so tragic, it may well be +that for him it was a blessing. It is hardly conceivable that, once on +the throne, the Archduke would have been able to carry out his plans. +The structure of the Monarchy which he was so anxious to strengthen +and support was already so rotten that it could not have stood any +great innovations, and if not the war, then probably the Revolution, +would have shattered it. On the other hand, there seems to be no doubt +that the Archduke, with all the vehemence and impulsiveness of his +character, would have made the attempt to rebuild the entire structure +of the Monarchy. It is futile to comment on the chances of his +success, but according to human foresight the experiment would not +have succeeded, and he would have succumbed beneath the ruins of the +falling Monarchy.</p> + +<p>It is also futile to conjecture how the Archduke would have acted had +he lived to see the war and the upheaval. I think that in two respects +his attitude would have differed from that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>taken. In the first place, +he never would have agreed to our army being under German control. It +would not have been consistent with his strongly developed autocratic +tendencies, and he was too clever politically not to see that we +should thereby lose all political freedom of action. In the second +place, he would not, like the Emperor Charles, have yielded to +revolution. He would have gathered his faithful followers round him +and would have fallen fighting, sword in hand. He would have fallen as +did his greatest and most dangerous enemy, Stephen Tisza.</p> + +<p>But he died the death of a hero on the field of honour, valiantly and +in harness. The golden rays of the martyr's crown surrounded his dying +head. Many there were who breathed more freely on hearing the news of +his death. At the court in Vienna and in society at Budapest there was +more joy than sorrow, the former having rightly foreseen that he would +have dealt hardly with them. None of them could guess that the fall of +the strong man would carry them all with it and engulf them in a world +catastrophe.</p> + +<p>Franz Ferdinand will remain portrayed in history as a man who either +loved or hated. But his tragic end at the side of his wife, who would +not allow death to separate them, throws a mild and conciliatory light +on the whole life of this extraordinary man, whose warm heart to the +very last was devoted to his Fatherland and duty.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>There was a widely-spread but entirely wrongful idea in the Monarchy +that the Archduke had drawn up a programme of his future activities. +This was not the case. He had very definite and pronounced ideas for +the reorganisation of the Monarchy, but the ideas never developed into +a concrete plan—they were more like the outline of a programme that +never was completed in detail. The Archduke was in touch with experts +from the different departments; he expounded the fundamental views of +his future programme to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>prominent military and political officials, +receiving from them hints on how to materialise these views; but a +really finished and thought-out programme was never actually produced. +The ground lines of his programme were, as already mentioned, the +abolition of the dualism and the reorganisation of the Monarchy to +form a federative state. He was not clear himself into how many states +the Habsburg Monarchy should be converted, but the principle was the +rebuilding of the Monarchy on a national basis. Having always in view +that prosperity depended on the weakening of the Magyar influence, the +Archduke was in favour of a strong preference for the different +nationalities living in Hungary, the Roumanians in particular. Not +until my return to Bucharest and following on my reports did the +Archduke conceive the plan of ceding Transylvania to Roumania and thus +adding Greater Roumania to the Habsburg Empire.</p> + +<p>His idea was to make of Austria separate German, Czech, Southern Slav +and Polish states, which in some respects would be autonomous; in +others, would be dependent on Vienna as the centre. But, so far as I +know, his programme was never quite clearly defined, and was subject +to various modifications.</p> + +<p>The Archduke had a great dislike for the Germans, especially the +northern Bohemians, who were partisans of the Pan-Germanic tendencies, +and he never forgave the attitude of the Deputy Schönerer. He had a +decided preference for all Germans in the Alpine countries, and +generally his views were very similar to those of the Christian +Socialists. His political ideal was Lueger. When Lueger was lying ill +the Archduke said to me: "If God will only spare this man, no better +Prime Minister could be found." Franz Ferdinand had a keen desire for +a more centralised army. He was a violent opponent of the endeavours +of the Magyars whose aim was an independent Hungarian army, and the +question of rank, word of command, and other incidental matters could +never be settled as long as he lived, because he violently resisted +all Hungarian advances.</p> + +<p>The Archduke had a special fondness for the navy. His <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>frequent visits +to Brioni brought him into close touch with our navy. He was always +anxious to transform the Austrian Navy into one worthy of a Great +Power. In regard to foreign policy, the Archduke was always in favour +of a Triple Alliance of the three Emperors. The chief motive of this +idea must have been that, in the three then apparently so powerful +monarchs at Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, he saw the strongest +support against revolution, and wished thereby to build up a strong +barrier against disorganisation. He saw great danger to the friendly +relations between Russia and ourselves in the rivalry between Vienna +and Petersburg in the Balkans, and contrary to the reports that have +been spread about him, he was rather a partisan than an opposer of +Serbia. He was in favour of the Serbians because he felt assured that +the petty agrarian policy of the Magyars was responsible for the +constant annoyance of the Serbians. He favoured meeting Serbia +half-way, because he considered that the Serbian question was a source +of discord between Vienna and Petersburg. Another reason was that he +was no friend of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who constantly pursued an +anti-Serbian policy. I believe that if those who were responsible for +the organisation of the assassination of the Archduke had known what +little justification there was for supposing him to be the man they +thought him, they would have desisted.</p> + +<p>Franz Ferdinand had a very pronounced feeling that in spite of all +alliances the Monarchy must remain independent. He was opposed to any +closer combine with Germany, not wishing to be bound to Germany more +than to Russia, and the plan that was formulated later as "Central +Europe" was always far removed from his wishes and endeavours.</p> + +<p>His plans for the future were not worked out, not complete, but they +were sound. This, however, is not sufficient to enable one to say that +they could have been successfully carried out. In certain +circumstances more harm than good will result from energy devoid of +the necessary calm prudence, wisdom and, above all, patience.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER III<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>WILLIAM II</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>The Emperor William has been for so long the centre of historic +events, so much has been written about him, that apparently he should +be known to all the world; and yet I believe he has often been +misrepresented.</p> + +<p>It is well known that the scarlet thread running through the whole +character of William II. was his firm conviction that he was the +"elect of God," and that the dynasty was inextricably bound to the +German people. Bismarck also believed in the dynastic fidelity of the +Germans. It seems to me that there is just as little dynastic as +republican spirit in nations—just as little in the Germans as in +others. There is merely a feeling of content or discontent which +manifests itself either for or against the dynasty and the form of +government. Bismarck himself was a proof of the justice of this +argument. As he himself always maintained, he was thoroughly +dynastic—but only during the lifetime of the Emperor William I. He +had no love for William II., who had treated him badly, and made no +secret of his feelings. He hung the picture of the "young man" in the +scullery and wrote a book about him which, owing to its contents, +could not be published.</p> + +<p>The Monarchists who derive benefit from their attachment to the +reigning monarch deceive themselves as to their true feelings. They +are Monarchists because they consider that form of government the most +satisfactory one. The Republicans, who apparently glorify the majesty +of the people, really mean themselves. But in the long run a people +will always recognise that form of government which soonest can give +it order, work, prosperity and contentment. In ninety-nine per cent. +of the population the patriotism and enthusiasm for one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>or other form +of government is nothing but a matter of material considerations. They +prefer a good king to a bad republic, and vice versa; the form of +government is the means to the end, but the end is the contentment of +the people governed. Nor has the liberty of those governed anything to +do with the form of government. Monarchical England is just as free as +Republican America, and the Bolshevists have demonstrated <i>ad oculus</i> +to the whole world that the proletariat exercises the greatest +tyranny.</p> + +<p>The war that was lost swept away the monarchs, but the Republics will +only be maintained if they can convince the people that they are more +successful in satisfying the masses than the monarchs were, a proof +which—it seems to me—the German-Austrian Republic, at any rate, has +hitherto failed to give.</p> + +<p>The conviction that these questionable statements not only are false +but also objectionable and criminal errors; that the Divine Will has +placed the monarch at his post and keeps him there—this conviction +was systematically imprinted in the German people, and formed an +integral part of the views attributed to the Emperor. All his +pretensions are based on this; they all breathe the same idea. Every +individual, however, is the product of his birth, his education and +his experience. In judging William II. it must be borne in mind that +from his youth upwards he was deceived and shown a world which never +existed. All monarchs should be taught that their people do not love +them; that they are quite indifferent to them; that it is not love +that makes them follow them and look up to them, but merely curiosity; +that they do not acclaim them from enthusiasm, but for their own +amusement, and would as soon hiss at them as cheer them. The loyalty +of subjects can never be depended on; it is not their intention to be +loyal, but only contented; they only tolerate the monarchs as long as +they themselves are contented, or as long as they have not enough +strength to abolish them. That is the truth, a knowledge of which +would prevent monarchs from arriving at unavoidably false +conclusions.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>The Emperor William is an example of this. I do not think there is +another ruler who had better intentions than he had. He lived only for +his calling—as he viewed it. All his thoughts and longings were +centred round Germany. His relations, pleasures and amusements were +all subservient to the one idea of making and keeping the German +people great and happy, and if good will were sufficient to achieve +great things William II. would have achieved them. From the very +beginning he was misunderstood. He made statements and gestures +intended not only to win his listeners but the whole world, which had +just the contrary effect. But he never was conscious of the practical +effect of his actions, because he was systematically misled, not only +by those in his immediate presence, but by the entire German people. +How many millions, who to-day fling curses at him, could not bow low +enough when he appeared on the horizon in all his splendour; how many +felt overjoyed if the Imperial glance fell on them!—and none of them +realise that they themselves are to blame for having shown the Emperor +a world which never existed, and driven him into a course which he +otherwise would never have taken. It certainly cannot be denied that +the whole nature of the Emperor was peculiarly susceptible to this +characteristically German attitude, and that monarchs less talented, +less keen, less ready, and above all, less impregnated with the idea +of self-sufficiency, are not so exposed to the poison of popularity as +he was.</p> + +<p>I once had the opportunity of studying the Emperor William in a very +important phase of his life. I met him at the house of a friend in the +celebrated days of November, 1908, when great demonstrations against +the Emperor occurred in the Reichstag, and when the then Imperial +Chancellor, Prince Bülow, exposed him. Although he did not allude to +the matter to us with whom he was not familiar, the powerful +impression made upon him by these events in Berlin was very obvious, +and I felt that in William II. I saw a man who, for the first time in +his life, with horror-stricken eyes, looked upon the world as it +really was. He saw brutal reality in close <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>proximity. For the first +time in his life, perhaps, he felt his position on his throne to be a +little insecure. He forgot his lesson too quickly. Had the +overwhelming impression which prevailed for several days been a +lasting one it might perhaps have induced him to descend from the +clouds to which his courtiers and his people had raised him, and once +more feel firm ground beneath his feet. On the other hand, had the +German people often treated the German Emperor as they did then it +might have cured him.</p> + +<p>A remarkable incident which occurred on this occasion is +characteristic of the way in which the Emperor was treated by many of +the gentlemen of his suite. I had opportunity, while waiting at a +German station restaurant for the arrival of the next train, to watch +and study the excitement of the population at the events in Berlin, +which bore signs of a revolutionary character. The densely crowded +restaurant re-echoed with discussion and criticisms of the Emperor, +when suddenly one of the men stood up on a table and delivered a fiery +speech against the head of the Government. With the impression of this +scene fresh in my mind, I described it to the members of the Emperor's +suite, who were just as disagreeably affected by the episode, and it +was suggested that nothing should be said about it to the Emperor. One +of them, however, protested most energetically and declared that, on +the contrary, every detail should be told to the Emperor, and, so far +as I know, he himself probably undertook this disagreeable task. This +case is characteristic of the desire to keep all unpleasantness from +the Emperor and to spare him even the most well-founded criticisms; to +praise and exalt him, but never to show that he was being blamed. This +systematic putting forward of the Emperor's divine attributes, which +in reality was neither due to love of his personality nor any other +dynastic cause, but to the purely egotistical wish not to get into +disfavour themselves or expose themselves to unpleasantness; this +unwholesome state must in the long run act on mind and body as an +enervating poison. I readily believe that the Emperor William, +unaccustomed to so great an extent to all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>criticism, did not make it +easy for those about him to be open and frank. It was, nevertheless, +true that the enervating atmosphere by which he was surrounded was the +cause of all the evil at his court. In his youth the Emperor William +did not always adhere strictly to the laws of the Constitution; he +subsequently cured himself of this failing and never acted +independently of his counsellors. At the time when I had official +dealings with him he might have served as a model of constitutional +conduct.</p> + +<p>In the case of so young and inexperienced a man as the Emperor Charles +it was doubly necessary to uphold the principle of ministerial +responsibility to the fullest extent. As according to our Constitution +the Emperor is not responsible to the law, it was of the greatest +importance to carry out the principle that he could undertake no +administrative act without the cognisance and sanction of the +responsible Ministers, and the Emperor Francis Joseph adhered to this +principle as though it were gospel.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Charles, though full of good intentions, was devoid of all +political training and experience, and ought to have been brought up +to understand the principles of the Constitution. This, however, had +never been taken into consideration.</p> + +<p>After my resignation in April, 1918, a deputation from the +Constitutional and Central Party in the Herrenhaus waited on the Prime +Minister, Dr. von Seidler, and pointed out the importance of a +severely constitutional régime, whereupon Dr. von Seidler declared +that he took upon himself the full responsibility of the "letter +incident."</p> + +<p>This was quite preposterous. Dr. von Seidler could not be responsible +for events that had occurred a year before—at a time when he was not +Minister—apart from its being an established fact that during his +tenure of office he was not aware of what had happened, and not until +after my resignation did he learn the Imperial views on the situation. +He might just as well have accepted responsibility for the Seven Years +War or for the battle of Königgrätz.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>In 1917 and '18, when I had certain official dealings with the Emperor +William, his horror of an unpleasant discussion was so great that it +was a matter of extreme difficulty to impart the necessary information +to him. I recollect how once, at the cost of the consideration due to +an Emperor, I was compelled to extract a direct statement from him. I +was with the Emperor Charles on the Eastern front, but left him at +Lemberg and, joining the Emperor William in his train, travelled with +him for a couple of hours. I had certain things to submit to him, none +of which was of an unpleasant nature. I do not know why it was, but it +was obvious that the Emperor was expecting to hear some disagreeable +statements, and offered a passive resistance to the request for a +private interview. He invited me to breakfast with him in his +dining-car, where he sat in the company of ten other gentlemen, and +there was no possibility of beginning the desired conversation. +Breakfast had been over some time, but the Emperor made no sign of +moving. I was several times obliged to request him to grant me a +private interview before he rose from the table, and even then he took +with him an official from the Foreign Ministry to be present at our +conversation as though to have some protection against anticipated +troubles. The Emperor William was never rude to strangers, though he +often was so to his own people.</p> + +<p>With regard to the Emperor Charles, the situation was very different. +He was never anything but friendly; in fact I never saw him angry or +vexed. There was no need for any special courage in making an +unpleasant statement to him, as there was no danger of receiving a +violent answer or any other disagreeable consequences. And yet the +desire to believe only what was agreeable and to put from him anything +disagreeable was very strong in the Emperor Charles, and neither +criticism nor blame made any lasting impression on him. But in his +case, too, the atmosphere that surrounded him rendered it impossible +to convince him of the brutal realities prevailing. On one occasion, +when I returned from the front, I had a long conversation with him. I +reproached him for some act of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>administration and asserted that not +only on me but on the whole Monarchy his action had made a most +unfavourable impression. I told him in the course of the conversation +that he must remember how, when he came to the throne, the whole +Monarchy had looked to him with great hopes, but that now he had +already lost 80 per cent. of his popularity. The interview ended +without incident; the Emperor preserved, as usual, a friendly +demeanour, though my remarks must have affected him unpleasantly. Some +hours later we passed through a town where not only the station but +all buildings were black with people, standing even on the roofs, +waving handkerchiefs and loudly welcoming the Imperial train as it +passed through. The same scenes were repeated again and again at other +stations that we passed. The Emperor turned to me with a smile and a +look that showed me he was firmly convinced everything I had told him +as to his dwindling popularity was false, the living picture before +our eyes proving the contrary.</p> + +<p>When I was at Brest-Litovsk disturbances began in Vienna owing to the +lack of food. In view of the whole situation, we did not know what +dimensions they would assume, and it was considered that they were of +a threatening nature. When discussing the situation with the Emperor, +he remarked with a smile: "The only person who has nothing to fear is +myself. If it happens again I will go out among the people and you +will see the welcome they will give me." Some few months later this +same Emperor disappeared silently and utterly out of the picture, and +among all the thousands who had acclaimed him, and whose enthusiasm he +had thought genuine, not one would have lifted a little finger on his +behalf. I have witnessed scenes of enthusiasm which would have +deceived the boldest and most sceptical judge of the populace. I saw +the Emperor and the Empress surrounded by weeping women and men +wellnigh smothered in a rain of flowers; I saw the people on their +knees with uplifted hands, as though worshipping a Divinity; and I +cannot wonder that the objects of such enthusiastic homage should have +taken dross for pure gold <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>in the firm belief that they <i>personally</i> +were beloved of the people, even as children love their own parents. +It is easy to understand that after such scenes the Emperor and +Empress looked upon all the criticism of themselves and the discontent +among the people as idle talk, and held firmly to the belief that +grave disturbances might occur elsewhere but not in their own country. +Any simple citizen who has held for a time a higher position +experiences something of the kind, though in a lesser degree. I could +mention names of many men who could not bow low enough as long as I +was in power, but after my resignation would cross the street to avoid +a bow, fearing that Imperial disfavour might react on them. But years +before his rise the simple citizen has an opportunity of learning to +know the world, and, if he be a man of normal temperament, will feel +the same contempt for the servility shown during his time in office as +for the behaviour he meets with afterwards. Monarchs are without +training in the school of life, and therefore usually make a false +estimate of the psychology of humanity. But in this tragi-comedy it is +they who are led astray.</p> + +<p>It is less easy, however, to understand that responsible advisers, who +are bound to distinguish between reality and comedy, should also allow +themselves to be deceived and draw false political conclusions from +such events. In 1918 the Emperor, accompanied by the Prime Minister, +Dr. von Seidler, went to the South Slav provinces to investigate +matters there. He found, of course, the same welcome there as +everywhere, curiosity brought the people out to see him; pressure from +the authorities on the one hand, and hope of Imperial favours on the +other, brought about ovations similar to those in the undoubtedly +dynastic provinces. And not only the Emperor, but von Seidler returned +in triumph, firmly convinced that everything stated in Parliament or +written in the papers respecting the separatist tendencies of the +South Slavs was pure invention and nonsense, and that they would never +agree to a separation from the Habsburg Empire.</p> + +<p>The objects of these demonstrations of enthusiasm and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span>dynastic +loyalty were deceived by them, but I repeat that those who were to +blame were not the monarchs, but those who were the instigators and +organisers of such scenes and who omitted to enlighten the monarchs on +the matter. But any such explanation could only be effectual if all +those in the immediate neighbourhood of the ruler concurred in a +similar reckless disregard of truth. For if one out of ten people +declares such scenes to be not genuine and the others contradict him +and assert that the demonstrations of the "love of the people" are +overwhelming, the monarch will always be more inclined to listen to +the many pleasant rather than to the few unpleasant counsels. +Willingly or unwillingly, all monarchs try, very humanly, to resist +awakening out of this hypnotic complacency. Naturally, there were men +in the entourage of the German Emperor whose pride kept them from +making too large an offering to the throne, but as a rule their +suffering in the Byzantine atmosphere of Germany was greater than +their enjoyment. I always considered that the greatest sycophants were +not those living at court, but generals, admirals, professors, +officials, representatives of the people and men of learning—people +whom the Emperor met infrequently.</p> + +<p>During the second half of the war, however, the leading men around the +Kaiser were not Byzantine—Ludendorff certainly was not. His whole +nature was devoid of Byzantine characteristics. Energetic, brave, sure +of himself and his aims, he brooked no opposition and was not +fastidious in his choice of language. To him it was a matter of +indifference whether he was confronted by his Emperor or anyone +else—he spoke unrestrainedly to all who came in his way.</p> + +<p>The numerous burgomasters, town councillors, professors of the +universities, deputies—in short, men of the people and of +science—had for years prostrated themselves before the Emperor +William; a word from him intoxicated them—but how many of them are +there now amongst those who condemn the former régime with its abuses +and, above all, the Emperor himself!</p> + +<p>His political advisers experienced great difficulty in their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>business +dealings with the Emperor William during the war, as he was generally +at Headquarters and seldom in Berlin. The Emperor Charles's absence +from Vienna was also at times most inconvenient.</p> + +<p>In the summer of 1917, for instance, he was at Reichenau, which +necessitated a two hours' motor drive; I had to go there twice or +three times a week, thus losing five or six hours which had to be made +good by prolonged night work. On no account would he come to Vienna, +in spite of the efforts made by his advisers to persuade him to do so. +From certain remarks the Emperor let fall I gathered that the reason +of this persistent refusal was anxiety concerning the health of the +children. He himself was so entirely free from pretensions that it +cannot have been a question of his own comfort that prevented his +coming.</p> + +<p>The Emperor's desire to restore the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to a +post of command was for me a source of much unpleasantness. The +Archduke is said to have been to blame for the Luck failure. I cannot +judge whether wrongly—as the Emperor maintained—or rightly; but the +fact remains that the public no longer had confidence in him. Quite +accidentally I learnt that his reinstatement was imminent. As a matter +of fact, this purely military proceeding in no way concerned me, but I +had to reckon with the feeling of the populace, who were in no mood +for further burdens, and also with the fact that, since Conrad had +gone, none of those in the Emperor's entourage showed the slightest +disposition to acquaint him with the truth. The only general who, to +my personal knowledge, was in the habit of speaking frankly to the +Emperor, was Alvis Schonburg, and he was at this time somewhere on the +Italian front. I therefore told the Emperor that the reinstatement was +an impossibility, giving as my reason the fact that the Archduke had +forfeited the confidence of the country, and that no mother could be +expected to give up her son to serve under a general whom everyone +held to be guilty of the Luck catastrophe. The Emperor insisted that +this view was unjust, and that the Archduke was not culpable. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>I +replied that, even so, the Archduke would have to submit. Everyone had +lost confidence in him, and the most strenuous exertions of the people +could neither be expected nor obtained if the command were handed to +generals who were unanimously regarded as unworthy of the confidence +placed in them.</p> + +<p>My efforts were vain.</p> + +<p>I then adopted another course. I sent an official from the Department +of Foreign Affairs to the Archduke with the request that he would +resign voluntarily.</p> + +<p>It must be admitted that Joseph Ferdinand took both a loyal and a +dignified attitude, as he himself notified the Emperor that he would +relinquish his command at the front. A short correspondence followed +between the Archduke and myself, which on his side was couched in an +indignant and not over-polite tone; this, however, I did not take +amiss, as my interference had been successful in preventing his +resuming the command.</p> + +<p>His subsequent appointment as Chief of the Air Force was made without +my knowledge; but this was of no importance when compared to the +previous plans.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>There is no doubt that the Byzantine atmosphere of Berlin took a more +objectionable form than ever was the case in Vienna. The very idea of +high dignitaries kissing the Emperor's hand, as they did in Berlin, +would have been impossible in Vienna. I never heard of anyone, even +among the keenest sycophants, who demeaned themselves by such an act, +which in Berlin, as I know from personal observation, was an everyday +occurrence. For instance, after a trip on the <i>Meteor</i>, during the +"Kiel Week," the Emperor presented two German officials with +scarf-pins as a souvenir. He handed the pins to them himself, and +great was my surprise to see them kiss his hand as they thanked him.</p> + +<p>Many foreigners were in the habit of coming for the Kiel Week: +Americans, French, and English. The Emperor paid them much attention, +and they nearly always succumbed to the charm of his personality. +Apparently William II. had a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span>preference for America; on the subject +of his feelings regarding England it is difficult to express an +opinion. My impression always was that the Emperor resented the scant +sympathy shown him in England; he strove to make himself beloved, and +the failure of his efforts caused him a certain annoyance. He was +quite aware that the extent of his popularity in England would +proportionately influence Anglo-German relations, and his desire to +find favour in England did not proceed from personal vanity, but from +political interests.</p> + +<p>King Edward was known to be one of the best judges of men in all +Europe, and his interest in foreign policy was predominant. He would +have been an ideal ambassador. There was never a very good +understanding between uncle and nephew. When the nephew was already +Emperor, and his much older uncle still only a prince, the difference +in their positions was characterised by the satirical Kiderlen-Waechter +in the following terms: "The Prince of Wales cannot forgive his nephew, +eighteen years younger than himself, for making a more brilliant career +than has fallen to his lot."</p> + +<p>Personal sympathy and personal differences in leading circles are +capable of influencing the world's history. Politics are, and always +will be, made by men, and individual personal relations will always +play a certain part in their development. Who can to-day assert that +the course of the world might not have been different had the monarchs +of Germany and England been more alike in temperament? The encircling +policy of King Edward was not brought into play until he was persuaded +that an understanding with the Emperor William was impossible.</p> + +<p>The difficulty the Emperor experienced in adapting himself to the +ideas and views of others increased as the years went by, a state of +things largely the fault of his entourage.</p> + +<p>The atmosphere in which he lived would have killed the hardiest plant. +Whatever the Emperor said or did, whether it was right or wrong, was +received with enthusiastic praise and admiration. Dozens of people +were always at hand to laud him to the skies.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>For instance, a book was published during the war entitled, "Der +Kaiser im Felde," by Dr. Bogdan Kriegen. The Emperor presented me with +a copy when at Kreuznach in May, 1917, and wrote a suitable +inscription inside. The book contained an accurate account of all the +Emperor had done during the campaign—but it was entirely superficial +matter; where he had driven to, where breakfasted, with whom he had +spoken, the jokes he had made, what clothes he wore, the shining light +in his eyes, etc., etc. It also recorded his speeches to the troops; +dull and uninteresting words that he addressed to individual soldiers, +and much more in the same strain. The whole book is impregnated and +permeated with boundless admiration and unqualified praise. The +Emperor gave me the book when I was leaving, and I read it through +when in the train.</p> + +<p>I was asked a few weeks later by a German officer what I thought of +the book. I replied that it was trash and could only harm the Emperor, +and that it should be confiscated. The officer shared my opinion, but +said that the Emperor had been assured on all sides that the book was +a splendid work and helped to fire the spirit of the army; he +therefore had it widely distributed. Once, at a dinner at Count +Hertling's, I called his attention to the book and advised him to +suppress it, as such a production could only be detrimental to the +Emperor. The old gentleman was very angry, and declared: "That was +always the way; people who wished to ingratiate themselves with the +Emperor invariably presented him with such things." A professor from +the University had warmly praised the book to me, but he went on to +say: "The Emperor had, of course, no time to read such stuff and +repudiate the flattery; neither had he himself found time to read it, +but would make a point of doing so now." I did not know much of that +professor, but he certainly was not in frequent touch with the +Emperor, nor was the author of the book.</p> + +<p>In this instance, as in many others, I concluded that many of the +members of the Emperor's suite were far from being in sympathy with +such tendencies. The court was not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>the principal offender, but was +carried away by the current of sycophancy.</p> + +<p>During my period of office Prince Hohenlohe, the ambassador, had +numerous interviews with the Emperor William, and invariably spoke +most freely and openly to him, and yet always was on the best footing +with him. This was, of course, an easier matter for a foreign +ambassador than for a German of the Empire, but it proves that the +Emperor accepted it when done in proper form.</p> + +<p>In his own country the Emperor was either glorified and exalted to the +skies or else scorned and scoffed at by a minority of the Press in a +prejudicial manner. In the latter case it bore so evidently the stamp +of personal enmity that it was discredited <i>a priori</i>. Had there +existed earnest papers and organs that would, in dignified fashion, +have discussed and criticised the Emperor's faults and failings, while +recognising all his great and good qualities, it would have been much +more satisfactory. Had there been more books written about him showing +that the real man is quite different from what he is made to appear to +be; that he is full of the best intentions and inspired with a +passionate love of Germany; that in a true and profound religious +sense he often wrestles with himself and his God, asking himself if he +has chosen the right way; that his love for his people is far more +genuine than that of many of the Germans for him; that he never has +deceived them, but was constantly deceived by them—such literature +would have been more efficacious and, above all, nearer the truth.</p> + +<p>Undoubtedly the German Emperor's gifts and talents were above the +average, and had he been an ordinary mortal would certainly have +become a very competent officer, architect, engineer, or politician. +But for lack of criticism he lost his bearings, and it caused his +undoing. According to all the records the Emperor William I. was of a +very different nature. Yet Bismarck often had a hard task in dealing +with him, though Bismarck's loyalty and subservience to the dynastic +idea made him curb his characteristically ruthless frankness. But +William I. was a self-made man. When he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>came to the throne and began +to govern his kingdom was tottering. Assisted by the very capable men +he was able to find and to retain, he upheld it, and by means of +Königgrätz and Sedan created the great German Empire. William II. came +to the throne when Germany had reached the zenith of her power. He had +not acquired what he possessed by his own work, as his grandfather +had; it came to him without any effort on his part; a fact which had a +great and far from favourable influence on his whole mental +development.</p> + +<p>The Emperor William was an entertaining and interesting <i>causeur</i>. One +could listen to him for hours without wearying. Emperors usually enjoy +the privilege of finding a ready audience, but even had the Emperor +William been an ordinary citizen he would always have spoken to a +crowded house. He could discourse on art, science, politics, music, +religion, and astronomy in a most animated manner. What he said was +not always quite correct; indeed, he often lost himself in very +questionable conclusions; but the fault of boring others, the greatest +of social faults, was not his.</p> + +<p>Although the Emperor was always very powerful in speech and gesture, +still, during the war he was much less independent in his actions than +is usually assumed, and, in my opinion, this is one of the principal +reasons that gave rise to a mistaken understanding of all the +Emperor's administrative activities. Far more than the public imagine +he was a driven rather than a driving factor, and if the Entente +to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge combined in +order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust and an error, +as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William never +played the part attributed to him by the Entente.</p> + +<p>The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in +store for him. He has been carried too high and cannot escape a +terrible fall. Fate seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, +if it exists at all, is not so much his as that of his country and his +times. The Byzantine atmosphere in Germany was the ruin of Emperor +William; it enveloped him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a +vast crowd of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the +hour of trial. The Emperor William was merely a particularly +distinctive representative of his class. All modern monarchs suffer +from the disease; but it was more highly developed in the Emperor +William and, therefore, more obvious than in others. Accustomed from +his youth to the subtle poison of flattery, at the head of one of the +greatest and mightiest states in the world, possessing almost +unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot that awaits men who +feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who begin to believe +in their Divine semblance.</p> + +<p>He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with +him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the +best. And notwithstanding all that is said and written about William +II. in these days, the beautiful words of the text may be applied to +him: "Peace on earth to men of goodwill."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>In his retirement from the world his good conscience will be his most +precious possession.</p> + +<p>Perhaps in the evening of his days William II. will acknowledge that +there is neither happiness nor unhappiness in mortal life, but only a +difference in the strength to endure one's fate.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>War was never in William II.'s programme. I am not able to say where, +in his own mind, he had fixed the limits he proposed for Germany and +whether it was justifiable to reproach him with having gone too far in +his ambition for the Fatherland. He certainly never thought of a +<i>unified</i> German world dominion; he was not so simple as to think he +could achieve that without a war, but his plan undoubtedly was +permanently to establish Germany among the first Powers of the world. +I know for certain that the Emperor's ideal plan was to come to a +world agreement with England and, in a certain sense, to divide the +world with her. In this projected <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>division of the world a certain +part was to be played by Russia and Japan, but he paid little heed to +the other states, especially to France, convinced that they were all +nations of declining power. To maintain that William intentionally +prepared and started this war is in direct opposition to his long +years of peaceful government. Helfferich, in his work "Die +Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," speaks of the Emperor's attitude +during the Balkan troubles, and says:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">A telegram sent by William II. at that time to the Imperial +Chancellor explains the attitude of the German Emperor in this +critical position for German politics, being similar to the +situation in July, 1914. The contents of the telegram are as +follows: "The Alliance with Austria-Hungary compels us to take +action should Austria-Hungary be attacked by Russia. In that case +France would also be involved, and in those circumstances England +would not long remain quiescent. The present prevailing questions +of dispute cannot be compared with that danger. It cannot be the +intention of the Alliance that we, the life interest of our ally +not being endangered, should enter upon a life-and-death conflict +for a caprice of that ally. Should it become evident that the +other side intend to attack, the danger must then be faced."</p> + +<p class="lilin">This calm and decided standpoint which alone could maintain peace +was also the German policy observed in further developments. It +was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as also +against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in +Vienna.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I cannot say, but I +believe the account is correct.</p> + +<p>It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into +the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their +effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to +terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of <i>si vis +pacem para bellum</i>, and by emphasising the military power of Germany +he endeavoured to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from +declaring war on him.</p> + +<p>It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and +mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>of war; but it is +asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the <i>dolus</i> of making war; +that he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up +war.</p> + +<p>Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the +injurious effects of his behaviour and to make him feel the growing +mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two +but dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on +the Emperor. It is quite true that of all the inhabitants of the +earth, the German is the one the least capable of adapting himself to +the mentality of other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were +perhaps but few in the immediate entourage of the Emperor who +recognised the growing anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of those who +so continuously extolled the Emperor were really honestly of opinion +that his behaviour was quite correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible +not to believe that among the many clever German politicians of the +last decade there were some who had a clear grasp of the situation, +and the fact remains that, in order to spare the Emperor and +themselves, they had not the courage to be harsh with him and tell him +the truth to his face. These are not reproaches, but reminiscences +which should not be superfluous at a time when the Emperor is to be +made the scapegoat of the whole world. Certainly, the Emperor, being +such as he is, the experiment would not have passed off without there +being opposition to encounter and overcome. The first among his +subjects to attempt the task of enlightening the Emperor would have +been looked upon with the greatest surprise; hence no one would +undertake it. Had there, however, been men who, regardless of +themselves, would have undertaken to do it, it would certainly have +succeeded, as not only was the Emperor full of good intentions, but he +was also impressionable, and consistent purposefulness on a basis of +fearless honesty would have impressed him. Besides, the Emperor was a +thoroughly kind and good man. It was a genuine pleasure for him to be +able to do good, neither did he hate his enemies. In the summer of +1917 he spoke to me about the fate of the deposed Tsar and of his +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>desire to help him and subsequently bring him to Germany, a desire due +not to dynastic but to human motives. He stated repeatedly that he had +no desire for revenge, but "only to succour his fallen adversary."</p> + +<p>I firmly believe that the Emperor clearly saw the clouds grow blacker +and blacker on the political horizon, but he was sincerely and +honestly persuaded that it was not through any fault of his that they +had accumulated, that they were caused by envy and jealousy, and that +there was no other way of keeping the threatening war danger at bay +than by an ostentatious attitude of strength and fearlessness. +"Germany's power and might must daily be proclaimed to the world, for +as long as they fear us they will do us no harm"—that was the +doctrine that obtained on the Spree. And the echo came back from the +world, "This continued boasting of German power and the perpetual +attempts at intimidation prove that Germany seeks to tyrannise the +world."</p> + +<p>When war broke out the Emperor was firmly convinced that a war of +defence was being forced on him, which conviction was shared by the +great majority of the German people. I draw these conclusions solely +from my knowledge of the Emperor and his entourage and from other +information obtained indirectly. As I have already mentioned, I had +not had the slightest connection with Berlin for some years previous +to the war, and certainly not for two years after it broke out.</p> + +<p>In the winter of 1917, when I met the Emperor again in my capacity as +Minister for Foreign Affairs, I thought he had aged, but was still +full of his former vivacity. In spite of marked demonstrations of the +certainty of victory, I believe that William II. even then had begun +to doubt the result of the war and that his earnest wish was to bring +it to an honourable end. When in the course of one of our first +conversations I urged him to spare no sacrifice to bring it to an end, +he interrupted me, exclaiming: "What would you have me do? Nobody +longs for peace more intensely than I do. But every day we are told +that the others will not hear a word about peace until Germany has +been crushed." It was a true answer, for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>all statements made by +England culminated in the one sentence <i>Germanium esse delendam</i>. I +endeavoured, nevertheless, to induce the Emperor to consent to the +sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, persuaded that if France had obtained +all that she looked upon in the light of a national idea she would not +be inclined to continue the war. I think that, had the Emperor been +positively certain that it would have ended the war, and had he not +been afraid that so distressing an offer would have been considered +unbearable by Germany, he would personally have agreed to it. But he +was dominated by the fear that a peace involving such a loss, and +after the sacrifices already made, would have driven the German people +to despair. Whether he was justified in this fear or not cannot now be +confirmed. In 1917, and 1918 as well, the belief in a victorious end +was still so strong in Germany that it is at least doubtful whether +the German people would have consented to give up Alsace-Lorraine. All +the parties in the Reichstag were opposed to it, including the Social +Democrats.</p> + +<p>A German official of high standing said to me in the spring of 1918: +"I had two sons; one of them fell on the field of battle, but I would +rather part with the other one too than give up Alsace-Lorraine," and +many were of the same opinion.</p> + +<p>In the course of the year and a half when I had frequent opportunities +of meeting the Emperor, his frame of mind had naturally gone through +many different phases. Following on any great military success, and +after the collapse of Russia and Roumania, his generals were always +able to enrol him on their programme of victory, and it is quite a +mistake to imagine that William II. unceasingly clung to the idea of +"Peace above all." He wavered, was sometimes pessimistic, sometimes +optimistic, and his peace aims changed in like manner. Humanly +speaking, it is very comprehensible that the varying situation in the +theatre of war must have influenced the individual mind, and everyone +in Europe experienced such fluctuations.</p> + +<p>Early in September, 1917, he wrote to the Emperor Charles on the +subject of an impending attack on the Italian front, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>in this +letter was the following passage: "I trust that the possibility of a +common offensive of our allied armies will raise the spirits of your +Foreign Minister. In my opinion, and in view of the general situation, +there is no reason to be anything but confident." Other letters and +statements prove the Emperor's fluctuating frame of mind. He, as well +as the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse, made use, with regard to the +"war-weary Austria-Hungary," of such tactics as demonstrated a +pronounced certainty of victory in order to strengthen our powers of +resistance.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>The Archduke Friedrich deserves the greatest praise for having kept up +the friendly relations between Vienna and Berlin. It was not always +easy to settle the delicate questions relating to the conduct of the +war without giving offence. The honest and straightforward nature of +the Archduke and his ever friendly and modest behaviour saved many a +difficult situation.</p> + +<p>After our collapse and overthrow, and when the Imperial family could +be abused with impunity, certain newspapers took a delight in covering +the Archduke Friedrich with contumely. It left him quite indifferent. +The Prince is a distinguished character, of faultless integrity and +always ready to put down abuse. He prevented many disasters, and it +was not his fault if he did not succeed every time.</p> + +<p>When I saw the Crown Prince Wilhelm again after several years, in the +summer of 1917, I found him very tired of war and most anxious for +peace. I had gone to the French front on purpose to meet him and to +try if it were possible through him to exercise some conciliatory +pressure, above all, on the military leaders. A long conversation that +I had with him showed me very clearly that he—if he had ever been of +warlike nature—was then a pronounced pacifist.</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="cen"><i>Extract from my Diary.</i></p> + +<p>"On the Western front, 1917. We drove to the Camp des Romains, but in +detachments in order not to attract the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>attention of the enemy +artillery to our cars, for in some places the road was visible to the +enemy. I drove together with Bethmann. When discussing the military +leaders, he remarked: 'The generals will probably throw hand grenades +at me when they see me.'</p> + +<p>"An enemy flier cruised high up in the clouds over our heads. He +circled around, paying little heed to the shrapnel bursting on all +sides. The firing ceased, and the human bird soared into +unapproachable heights. The artillery fire a long way off sounded like +distant thunder.</p> + +<p>"The French lines are not more than a couple of hundred metres distant +from the camp. A shot fell here and there and a shell was heard to +whistle; otherwise all was quiet. It was still early. The firing +usually begins at ten and ceases at noon—interval for lunch—and +begins again in the afternoon.</p> + +<p>"Poincaré's villa is visible on the horizon in the green landscape. A +gun has been brought to bear on the house—they mean to destroy it +before leaving—they call this the extreme unction.</p> + +<p>"The daily artillery duel began on our return drive, and kept up an +incessant roar.</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="noin">"<i>St. Mihiel.</i></p> + +<p>"We stopped at St. Mihiel, where many French people still remain. They +were detained as hostages to prevent the town from being fired at. +People were standing about in the streets watching the cars go by.</p> + +<p>"I spoke to an old woman, who sat by herself on her house-steps. She +said: 'This disaster can never be made good, and it cannot well be +worse than it is now. It is quite the same to me what happens. I do +not belong here; my only son has been killed and my house is burnt. +Nothing is left me but my hatred of the Germans, and I bequeath that +to France.' And she gazed past me into vacancy. She spoke quite +without passion, but was terribly sad.</p> + +<p>"This terrible hatred! Generations will go to their graves before the +flood of hatred is abated. Would a settlement, a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>peace of +understanding, be possible with this spirit of the nations? Will it +not end by one of them being felled to earth and annihilated?</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="noin">"<i>St. Privat.</i></p> + +<p>"We passed through St. Privat on our way to Metz. Monuments that tell +the tale of 1870 stand along the road. Everywhere the soil is +historic, soaked in blood. Every spot, every stone, is reminiscent of +past great times. It was here that the seed was sown that brought +forth the plan of revenge that is being fought for now.</p> + +<p>"Bethmann seemed to divine my thoughts. 'Yes,' he said, 'that +sacrifice would be easier for Germany to bear than to part with +Alsace-Lorraine, which would close one of the most brilliant episodes +in her history.'</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="noin">"<i>Sedan.</i></p> + +<p>"On the way to the Crown Prince's quarters. There stands the little +house where the historic meeting between Napoleon III. and Bismarck +took place. The woman who lived there at the time died only a few +weeks ago. For the second time she saw the Germans arrive, bringing a +Moltke but no Bismarck with them, a detail, however, that cannot +deeply have interested the old lady.</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="noin">"<i>With the Crown Prince.</i></p> + +<p>"A pretty little house outside the town. I found a message from the +Crown Prince asking me to proceed there immediately, where I had +almost an hour's private conversation with him before supper.</p> + +<p>"I do not know if the Crown Prince ever was of a warlike disposition, +as people say, but he is so no longer. He longs for peace, but does +not know how to secure it. He spoke very quietly and sensibly. He was +also in favour of territorial sacrifices, but seemed to think that +Germany would not allow it. The great difficulty lay in the contrast +between the actual military situation, the confident expectations of +the generals, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>and the fears entertained by the military laymen. +Besides, it is not only Alsace-Lorraine. The suppression of German +militarism spoken of in London means the one-sided disarmament of +Germany. Can an army far advanced on enemy soil whose generals are +confident of final victory, can a people still undefeated tolerate +that?</p> + +<p>"I advised the Crown Prince to speak to his father on the question of +abdication, in which he fully agreed. I then invited him to come to +Vienna on behalf of the Emperor, which he promised to do as soon as he +could get leave."</p> + +<p>On my return the Emperor wrote him a letter, drawn up by me, which +contained the following passage:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">My Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me of the interesting +conversation he had the honour to have with you, and it has been a +great pleasure to me to hear all your statements, which so exactly +reflect my own views of the situation. Notwithstanding the +superhuman exertions of our troops, the situation throughout the +country demands that a stop be put to the war before winter, in +Germany as well as here. Turkey will not be with us much longer, +and with her we shall also lose Bulgaria; we two will then be +alone, and next spring will bring America and a still stronger +Entente. From other sources there are distinct signs that we could +win over France if Germany could make up her mind to certain +territorial sacrifices in Alsace-Lorraine. With France secured to +us we are the conquerors, and Germany will obtain elsewhere ample +compensation. But I cannot allow Germany to be the only one to +make a sacrifice. I too will take the lion's share of sacrifice, +and have informed His Majesty your father that under the above +conditions I am prepared not only to dispense with the whole of +Poland, but to cede Galicia to her and to assist in combining that +state with Germany, who would thus acquire a state in the East +while yielding up a portion of her soil in the West. In 1915, at +the request of Germany and in the interests of our Alliance, we +offered the Trentino to faithless Italy without asking for +compensation in order to avert war. Germany is now in a similar +situation, though with far better prospects. You, as heir to the +German Imperial crown, are privileged to have a say in the matter, +and I know that His Majesty your father entirely shares this view +respecting your co-operation. I beg of you, therefore, in this +decisive hour for Germany and Austria-Hungary, to consider the +whole situation and to unite your efforts with mine to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>bring the +war to a rapid and honourable end. If Germany persists in her +standpoint of refusal and thus wrecks the hope of a possible peace +the situation in Austria-Hungary will become extremely critical.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I should be very glad to have a talk with you as soon as possible, +and your promise conveyed through Count Czernin soon to pay us a +visit gives me the greatest pleasure.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>The Crown Prince's answer was very friendly and full of anxiety to +help, though it was also obvious that the German military leaders had +succeeded in nipping his efforts in the bud. When I met Ludendorff +some time afterwards in Berlin this was fully confirmed by the words +he flung at me: "What have you been doing to our Crown Prince? He had +turned very slack, but we have stiffened him up again."</p> + +<p>The game remained the same. The last war period in Germany was +controlled by one will only, and that was Ludendorff's. His thoughts +were centred on fighting, his soul on victory.</p> + +<br /> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> This is a literal rendering of the famous text from the +German.</p></div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER IV<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>ROUMANIA</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>My appointment as ambassador to Bucharest in the autumn of 1913 came +as a complete surprise to me, and was much against my wishes. The +initiative in the matter came from the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. I had +never had any doubt that sooner or later the Archduke would take part +in politics, but it took me by surprise that he should do so in the +Emperor Francis Joseph's lifetime.</p> + +<p>A great difference of opinion prevailed then in Vienna on the +Roumanian question, a pro-Roumanian spirit fighting against an +anti-Roumanian one. The head of the former party was the Archduke +Franz, and with him, though in less marked degree, was Berchtold. +Tisza was the leader on the other side, and carried with him almost +the entire Hungarian Parliament. The pro-Roumanians wished Roumania to +be more closely linked to the Monarchy; the others, to replace that +alliance by one with Bulgaria; but both were unanimous in seeking for +a clear knowledge of how matters stood with the alliance, and whether +we had a friend or a foe on the other side of the Carpathians. My +predecessor, Karl Fürstenberg, had sent in a very clear and correct +report on the subject, but he shared the fate of so many ambassadors: +his word was not believed.</p> + +<p>The actual task assigned to me was, first of all to find out whether +this alliance was of any practical value, and if I thought not to +suggest ways and means of justifying its existence.</p> + +<p>I must mention in this connection that my appointment as ambassador to +Bucharest had raised a perfect storm in the Hungarian Parliament. The +reason for this widely spread <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span>indignation in Hungary at my selection +for the post was owing to a pamphlet I had written some years +previously, in which I certainly had attacked the Magyar policy +somewhat vehemently. I maintained the standpoint that a policy of +suppression of the nations was not tenable in the long run, and that +no future was in store for Hungary unless she definitely abolished +that policy and allowed the nations equal rights. This pamphlet gave +serious displeasure in Budapest, and representatives in the Hungarian +Parliament were afraid I should introduce that policy in Roumania, +which, following the spirit of the pamphlet, was directed against the +official policy of Vienna and Budapest. It was at this period that I +made Tisza's acquaintance. I had a long and very frank conversation +with him on the whole subject, and explained to him that I must uphold +the standpoint I put forward in my pamphlet, as it tallied with my +convictions, but that I clearly saw that from the moment I accepted +the post of ambassador I was bound to consider myself as a part of the +great state machinery, and loyally support the policy emanating from +the Ballplatz. I still maintain that my standpoint is perfectly +justifiable. A unified policy would be utterly impossible if every +subordinate official were to publish his own views, whether right or +wrong, and I for my part would never, as Minister, have tolerated an +ambassador who attempted to pursue an independent policy of his own. +Tisza begged me to give my word of honour that I would make no attempt +to introduce a policy opposed to that of Vienna and Budapest, to which +I readily agreed, provided that the Archduke was agreeable to such +decision. I then had a conversation with the latter, and found that he +quite agreed with my action, his argument being that as long as he was +the heir to the throne he would never attempt to introduce a policy +opposed to that of the Emperor; consequently he would not expect it +from me either. But should he come to the throne he would certainly +make an effort to carry out his own views, in which case I should no +longer be at Bucharest, but probably in some post where I would be in +a position to support his efforts. The Archduke begged me for the sake +of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>my friendship for him to accept the post, which I finally decided +to do after I obtained a promise from Berchtold that, at the end of +two years as the longest term, he would put no obstacle in the way of +my retirement.</p> + +<p>The Archduke Franz drew his pro-Roumanian proclivities from a very +unreliable source. He hardly knew Roumania at all. So far as I know, +he had only once been in the country, and paid a short visit to King +Carol at Sinaia; but the friendly welcome accorded to himself and his +wife by the old King and Queen entirely took his warm heart by storm, +and he mistook King Carol for Roumania. This is again a proof how +greatly the individual relations of great personalities can influence +the policy of nations. The royal couple met the Archduke at the +station; the Queen embraced and kissed the duchess and, placing her at +her right side, drove with her to the castle. In short, it was the +first time that the Duchess of Hohenberg had been treated as enjoying +equal privileges with her husband. During his short stay in Roumania +the Archduke had the pleasure of seeing his wife treated as his equal +and not as a person of slight importance, always relegated to the +background. At the court balls in Vienna the duchess was always +obliged to walk behind all the archduchesses, and never had any +gentleman allotted to her whose arm she could take. In Roumania she +was <i>his wife</i>, and etiquette was not concerned with her birth. The +Archduke valued this proof of friendly tactfulness on the part of the +King very highly, and always afterwards Roumania, in his eyes, was +endowed with a special charm. Besides which he very correctly +estimated that a change in certain political relations would effect a +closer alliance between Roumania and ourselves. He felt, rather than +knew, that the Transylvanian question lay like a huge obstacle between +Vienna and Bucharest, and that this obstacle once removed would alter +the entire situation.</p> + +<p>To find out the real condition of the alliance was my first task, and +it was not difficult, as the first lengthy conferences I had with King +Carol left no doubt in my mind that the old King himself considered +the alliance very unsafe. King Carol <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>was an exceptionally clever man, +very cautious and deliberate, and it was not easy to make him talk if +he intended to be silent. The question of the vitality of the alliance +was settled by my suggesting to the King that the alliance should +receive pragmatic sanction, i.e. be ratified by the Parliaments at +Vienna, Budapest, and Bucharest. The alarm evinced by the King at the +suggestion, the very idea that the carefully guarded secret of the +existence of an alliance should be divulged, proved to me how totally +impossible it would be, in the circumstances, to infuse fresh life +into such dead matter.</p> + +<p>My reports sent to the Ballplatz leave no doubt that I answered this +first question by declaring in categorical fashion that the alliance +with Roumania was, under the existing conditions, nothing but a scrap +of paper.</p> + +<p>The second question, as to whether there were ways and means of +restoring vitality to the alliance, and what they were, was +theoretically just as easy to answer as difficult to carry out in +practice. As already mentioned, the real obstacle in the way of closer +relations between Bucharest and Vienna was the question of Great +Roumania; in other words, the Roumanian desire for national union with +her "brothers in Transylvania." This was naturally quite opposed to +the Hungarian standpoint. It is interesting, as well as characteristic +of the then situation, that shortly after my taking up office in +Roumania, Nikolai Filippescu (known later as a war fanatic) proposed +that Roumania should join with Transylvania and the whole of united +Great Roumania enter into relations with the Monarchy similar to the +relation of Bavaria to the German Empire. I admit that I welcomed the +idea warmly, for if it were launched by a party which justly was held +to be antagonistic to the Monarchy there can be no doubt that the +moderate element in Roumania would have accepted it with still greater +satisfaction. I still believe that had this plan been carried out it +would have led to a real linking of Roumania to the Monarchy, that the +notification would have met with no opposition, and consequently the +outbreak of war would have found us very differently situated. +Unfortunately <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>the plan failed at its very first stage owing to +Tisza's strong and obstinate resistance. The Emperor Francis Joseph +held the same standpoint as Tisza, and it was out of the question to +achieve anything by arguing. On the other hand, nobody had any idea +then that the great war, and with it the testing of the alliance, was +so imminent, and I consoled myself for my unsuccessful efforts in the +firm hope that this grand plan, as it seemed to me both then and now, +would be realised one day under the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.</p> + +<p>When I arrived in Roumania a change was proceeding in the Government. +Majorescu's Conservative Ministry gave way to the Liberal Ministry of +Bratianu. King Carol's policy of government was very peculiar. From +the very first his principle was never to proceed with violence or +even much energy against injurious tendencies in his own country; but, +on the contrary, always to yield to the numerous claims made by +extortioners. He knew his people thoroughly, and knew that both +parties, Conservatives and Liberals, must alternately have access to +the manger until thoroughly satisfied and ready to make room the one +for the other. Almost every change in the Government was accomplished +in that manner: the Opposition, desirous of coming into power, began +with threats and hints at revolution. Some highly unreasonable claim +would be put forward and vehemently insisted upon and the people +incited to follow it up; the Government would retire, unable to accede +to the demands, and the Opposition, once in power, would show no +further signs of keeping their promise. The old King was well versed +in the game; he allowed the opposition tide to rise to the highest +possible limit, when he effected the necessary change of individuals +and looked on until the game began again. It is the custom in +Roumania, when a new party comes into power, to change the whole +personnel, even down to the lowest officials. This arrangement, +obviously, has its drawbacks, though on the other hand it cannot be +denied that it is a practical one.</p> + +<p>In this manner the Bratianu Ministry came into office in 1913. +Majorescu's Government gave entire satisfaction to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>the King and the +moderate elements in the country. In the eyes of the Roumanians he had +just achieved a great diplomatic success by the Peace of Bucharest and +the acquisition of the Dobrudsha, when Bratianu came forward with a +demand for vast agrarian reforms. These reforms are one of the +hobby-horses of Roumanian policy which is always mounted when it is a +question of making use of the poor unfortunate peasants, and the +manœuvre invariably succeeds, largely owing to the lack of +intelligence prevailing among the peasant population of Roumania, who +are constantly made the tools of one or other party, and simply pushed +on one side when the object has been obtained. Bratianu also, once he +was in office, gave no thought to the fulfilment of his promises, but +calmly proceeded on the lines Majorescu had laid down in his time.</p> + +<p>Still, it was more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement in +foreign affairs with Bratianu than it had been with Majorescu, as the +former was thoroughly conversant with all West European matters, and +at the bottom of his heart was anti-German. One of the distinctions to +be made between Liberals and Conservatives was that the Liberals had +enjoyed a Parisian education: they spoke no German, only French; while +the Conservatives, taking Carp and Majorescu as models, were offshoots +of Berlin. As it was impossible to carry out the plan of firmly and +definitely linking Roumania to us by a change of Hungarian internal +policy, the idea naturally, almost automatically, arose to substitute +Bulgaria for Roumania. This idea, which found special favour with +Count Tisza, could be carried out, both because, since the Bucharest +peace of 1913, it was out of the question to bring Roumania and +Bulgaria under one roof, and because an alliance with Sofia would have +driven Roumania straight into the enemy camp. But Berchtold, as well +as the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was opposed to this latter +eventuality, nor would the Emperor Francis Joseph have approved of +such proceedings. Hence no change was made; Roumania was not won, nor +was Bulgaria substituted for her, and they were content in Vienna to +leave everything to the future.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span>In a social sense the year that I spent in Roumania before the war was +not an unpleasant one. The relations of an Austrian-Hungarian +Ambassador with the court, as with the numerous <i>Bojars</i>, were +pleasant and friendly, and nobody could then have imagined what +torrents of hatred were so soon to be launched against the +Austro-Hungarian frontiers.</p> + +<p>Social life became less pleasant during the war, as will be seen from +the following instance. There lived at Bucharest a certain +Lieut.-Colonel Prince Sturdza, who was a noted braggart and brawler +and an inveterate enemy of Austria-Hungary. I did not know him +personally, and there was no personal reason for him to begin one day +to abuse me publicly in the papers as being an advocate of the +Monarchy. I naturally took not the slightest notice of his article, +whereupon he addressed an open letter to me in the <i>Adeverul</i>, in +which he informed me that he would box my ears at the first +opportunity. I telegraphed to Berchtold and asked the Emperor's +permission to challenge this individual, as, being an officer, he was, +according to our ideas, entitled to satisfaction. The Emperor sent +word that it was out of the question for an ambassador to fight a duel +in the country to which he was accredited, and that I was to complain +to the Roumanian Government. I accordingly went to Bratianu, who +declared that he was totally unable to move in the matter. According +to the laws and regulations of the country it was impossible to +protect a foreign ambassador against such abuse. If Sturdza carried +out his threats he would be arrested. Until then nothing could be +done.</p> + +<p>Upon this I assured Bratianu that if such were the case I would in +future arm myself with a revolver, and if he attacked me shoot the man; +if one lived in a country where the habits of the Wild West obtained, +one must act accordingly. I sent word to the lieutenant-colonel that +each day, at one o'clock, I could be found at the Hotel Boulevard, +where he would find a bullet awaiting him.</p> + +<p>The next time I saw the Emperor Francis Joseph he asked for further +information concerning the episode, and I told him <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span>of my conversation +with Bratianu and of my firm intention to be my own helper. The +Emperor rejoined: "Naturally you cannot allow yourself to be beaten. +You are quite right; if he lays hands on you, shoot him."</p> + +<p>I afterwards met Sturdza several times in restaurants and +drawing-rooms without his attempting to carry out his threats. This +man, whose nature was that of a daring adventurer, afterwards deserted +to the Russian army, and fought against us at a time when Roumania +still was neutral. I then completely lost sight of him.</p> + +<p>The absolute freedom of the Press in the Balkan States, combined with +the brutality of the prevailing customs, produced the most varied +results, even going so far as abuse of their own kings. In this +connection King Carol gave me many drastic instances. While King +Ferdinand was still neutral, one of the comic papers contained a +picture of the King taking aim at a hare, while underneath were these +words, supposed to come from the hare: "My friend, you have long ears, +I have long ears; you are a coward, I am a coward. Wherefore would my +brother shoot me?"</p> + +<p>On the day when war broke out this freedom of the Press was diverted +into a different channel and replaced by the severest control and +censorship.</p> + +<p>Roumania is a land of contrasts, both as regards the landscape, the +climate, and social conditions. The mountainous north, with the +wonderful Carpathians, is one of the most beautiful districts. Then +there are the endless, unspeakably monotonous, but fertile plains of +Wallachia, leading into the valley of the Danube, which is a very +Paradise. In spring particularly, when the Danube each year overflows +its banks, the beauty of the landscape baffles description. It is +reminiscent of the tropics, with virgin forests standing in the water, +and islands covered with luxuriant growth scattered here and there. It +is an ideal country for the sportsman. All kinds of birds, herons, +ducks, pelicans, and others, are to be met with, besides wolves and +wild cats, and days may be spent in rowing and walking in this +Paradise without wearying of it.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>The Roumanians usually care but little for sport, being averse to +physical exertion. Whenever they can they leave the country and spend +their time in Paris or on the Riviera. This love of travel is so +strong in them that a law was passed compelling them to spend a +certain portion of the year in their own country or else pay the +penalty of a higher tax. The country people, in their sad poverty, +form a great contrast to the enormously wealthy <i>Bojars</i>. Although +very backward in everything relating to culture, the Roumanian peasant +is a busy, quiet, and easily satisfied type, unpretentious to a +touching degree when compared with the upper classes.</p> + +<p>Social conditions among the upper ten thousand have been greatly +complicated owing to the abolition of nobility, whereby the question +of titles plays a part unequalled anywhere else in the world. Almost +every Roumanian has a title derived from one or other source; he +values it highly, and takes it much amiss when a foreigner betrays his +ignorance on the subject. As a rule, it is safer to adopt the plan of +addressing everyone as "<i>Mon prince</i>." Another matter difficult for a +foreigner to grasp is the real status of Roumanian society, owing to +the incessant divorce and subsequent remarriages. Nearly every woman +has been divorced at least once and married again, the result being, +on the one hand, the most complicated questions of relationship, and, +on the other, so many breaches of personal relations as to make it the +most difficult task to invite twenty Roumanians, particularly ladies, +to dinner without giving offence in some quarter.</p> + +<p>In the days of the old régime it was one of the duties of the younger +members of the Embassy to develop their budding diplomatic talents by +a clever compilation of the list for such a dinner and a wise +avoidance of any dangerous rock ahead. But as the question of rank in +Roumania is taken just as seriously as though it were authorised, +every lady claims to have first rank—the correct allotment of places +at a dinner is really a question for the most efficient diplomatic +capacities. There were about a dozen ladies in Bucharest who would +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>actually not accept an invitation unless they were quite sure the +place of honour would be given to them.</p> + +<p>My predecessor cut the Gordian knot of these difficulties by arranging +to have dinner served at small separate tables, thus securing several +places of honour, but not even by these means could he satisfy the +ambition of all.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>While at Sinaia I received the news of the assassination of the +Archduke from Bratianu. I was confined to bed, suffering from +influenza, when Bratianu telephoned to ask if I had heard that there +had been an accident to the Archduke's train in Bosnia, and that both +he and the duchess were killed. Soon after this first alarm came +further news, leaving no doubt as to the gravity of the catastrophe. +The first impression in Roumania was one of profound and sincere +sympathy and genuine consternation. Roumania never expected by means +of war to succeed in realising her national ambitions; she only +indulged in the hope that a friendly agreement with the Monarchy would +lead to the union of all Roumanians, and in that connection Bucharest +centred all its hopes in the Archduke and heir to the throne. His +death seemed to end the dream of a Greater Roumania, and the genuine +grief displayed in all circles in Roumania was the outcome of that +feeling. Take Jonescu, on learning the news while in my wife's +drawing-room, wept bitterly; and the condolences that I received were +not of the usual nature of such messages, but were expressions of the +most genuine sorrow. Poklewski, the Russian Ambassador, is said to +have remarked very brutally that there was no reason to make so much +out of the event, and the general indignation that his words aroused +proved how strong was the sympathy felt in the country for the +murdered Archduke.</p> + +<p>When the ultimatum was made known the entire situation changed at +once. I never had any illusions respecting the Roumanian psychology, +and was quite clear in my own mind <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>that the sincere regret at the +Archduke's death was due to egotistical motives and to the fear of +being compelled now to abandon the national ambition. The ultimatum +and the danger of war threatening on the horizon completely altered +the Roumanian attitude, and it was suddenly recognised that Roumania +could achieve its object by other means, not by peace, but by war—not +<i>with</i>, but <i>against</i> the Monarchy. I would never have believed it +possible that such a rapid and total change could have occurred +practically within a few hours. Genuine and simulated indignation at +the tone of the ultimatum was the order of the day, and the universal +conclusion arrived at was: <i>L'Autriche est devenue folle.</i> Men and +women with whom I had been on a perfectly friendly footing for the +last year suddenly became bitter enemies. Everywhere I noticed a +mixture of indignation and growing eagerness to realise at last their +heart's dearest wish. The feeling in certain circles fluctuated for +some days. Roumanians had a great respect for Germany's military +power, and the year 1870 was still fresh in the memory of many of +them. When England, however, joined the ranks of our adversaries their +fears vanished, and from that moment it became obvious to the large +majority of the Roumanians that the realisation of their aspirations +was merely a question of time and of diplomatic efficiency. The wave +of hatred and lust of conquest that broke over us in the first stage +of the war was much stronger than in later stages, because the +Roumanians made the mistake we all have committed of reckoning on too +short a duration of the war, and therefore imagined the decision to be +nearer at hand than it actually was. After the great German successes +in the West, after Görlitz and the downfall of Serbia, certain +tendencies pointing to a policy of delay became noticeable among the +Roumanians. With the exception of Carp and his little group all were +more or less ready at the very first to fling themselves upon us.</p> + +<p>Like a rock standing in the angry sea of hatred, poor old King Carol +was alone with his German sympathies. I had been instructed to read +the ultimatum to him the moment it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>was sent to Belgrade, and never +shall I forget the impression it made on the old King when he heard +it. He, wise old politician that he was, recognised at once the +immeasurable possibilities of such a step, and before I had finished +reading the document he interrupted me, exclaiming: "It will be a +world war." It was long before he could collect himself and begin to +devise ways and means by which a peaceful solution might still be +found. I may mention here that a short time previously the Tsar, with +Sassonoff, had been in Constanza for a meeting with the Roumanian +royal family. The day after the Tsar left I went to Constanza myself +to thank the King for having conferred the Grand Cross of one of the +Roumanian orders on me, obviously as a proof that the Russian visit +had not made him forget our alliance, and he gave me some interesting +details of the said visit. Most interesting of all was his account of +the conversations with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. On +asking whether Sassonoff considered the situation in Europe to be as +safe as he (the King) did, Sassonoff answered in the affirmative, +"<i>pourvu que l'Autriche ne touche pas à la Serbie</i>." I at once, of +course, reported this momentous statement to Vienna; but neither by +the King nor by myself, nor yet in Vienna, was the train of thought +then fully understood. The relations between Serbia and the Monarchy +were at that time no worse than usual; indeed, they were rather +better, and there was not the slightest intention on our part to +injure the Serbians. But the suspicion that Sassonoff already then was +aware that the Serbians were planning something against us cannot be +got rid of.</p> + +<p>When the King asked me whether I had reported Sassonoff's important +remark to Vienna, I replied that I had done so, and added that this +remark was another reason to make me believe that the assassination +was a crime long since prepared and carried out under Russian +patronage.</p> + +<p>The crime that was enacted at Debruzin, which made such a sensation at +the time, gave rise to suspicions of a Russo-Roumanian attempt at +assassination.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>On February 24, 1914, the Hungarian Correspondence Bureau published +the following piece of news:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">A terrible explosion took place this morning in the official +premises of the newly-instituted Greek-Catholic Hungarian +bishopric, which are on the second floor of the Ministry of Trade +and Commerce in the Franz Deak Street. It occurred in the office +of the bishop's representative, the Vicar Michael Jaczkovics, +whose secretary, Johann Slapowszky, was also present in the room. +Both of them were blown to pieces. The Greek-Catholic bishop, +Stephan Miklossy, was in a neighbouring room, but had a most +marvellous escape. Alexander Csatth, advocate and solicitor to the +bishopric, who was in another room, was mortally wounded by the +explosion. In a third room the bishop's servant with his wife were +both killed. All the walls in the office premises fell in, and the +whole building is very much damaged. The explosion caused such a +panic in the house that all the inhabitants took flight and +vanished. All the windows of the neighbouring Town Hall in the +Verboczy Street were shattered by the concussion. Loose tiles were +hurled into the street and many passers-by were injured. The four +dead bodies and the wounded were taken to the hospital. The +bishop, greatly distressed, left the building and went to a +friend's house. The daughter of the Vicar Jaczkovics went out of +her mind on hearing of her father's tragic death. The cause of the +explosion has not yet been discovered.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>I soon became involved in the affair when Hungary and Roumania began +mutually to blame one another as originators of the outrage. This led +to numerous interventions and adjustments, and my task was intensified +because a presumed accomplice of the murderer Catarau was arrested in +Bucharest, and his extradition to Hungary had to be effected by me. +This man, of the name of Mandazescu, was accused of having obtained a +false passport for Catarau.</p> + +<p>Catarau, who was a Roumanian Russian from Bessarabia, vanished +completely after the murder and left no trace. News came, now from +Serbia, then from Albania, that he had been found, but the rumours +were always false. I chanced to hear something about the matter in +this way. I was on board a Roumanian vessel bound from Constanza to +Constantinople, when I accidentally overheard two Roumanian naval +officers <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>talking together. One of them said: "That was on the day +when the police brought Catarau on board to help him to get away +secretly."</p> + +<p>Catarau was heard of later at Cairo, which he appears to have reached +with the aid of Roumanian friends.</p> + +<p>It cannot be asserted that the Roumanian Government was implicated in +the plot—but the Roumanian authorities certainly were, for in the +Balkans, as in Russia, there are many bands like the <i>Cerna Ruka</i>, the +<i>Narodna Odbrena</i>, etc., etc., who carry on their activities alongside +the Government.</p> + +<p>It was a crime committed by some Russian or Roumanian secret society, +and the Governments of both countries showed surprisingly little +interest in investigating the matter and delivering the culprits up to +justice.</p> + +<p>On June 15 I heard from a reliable source that Catarau had been seen +in Bucharest. He walked about the streets quite openly in broad +daylight, and no one interfered with him; then he disappeared.</p> + +<p>To return, however, to my interview with the old King. Filled with +alarm, he dispatched that same evening two telegrams, one to Belgrade +and one to Petersburg, urging that the ultimatum be accepted without +fail.</p> + +<p>The terrible distress of mind felt by the King when, like a sudden +flash of lightning from the clouds, he saw before him a picture of the +world war may be accounted for because he felt certain that the +conflict between his personal convictions and his people's attitude +would suddenly be known to all. The poor old King fought the fight to +the best of his ability, but it killed him. King Carol's death was +caused by the war. The last weeks of his life were a torture to him; +each message that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip. I +was enjoined to do all I could to secure Roumania's prompt +co-operation, according to the terms of the Alliance, and I was even +obliged to go so far as to remind him that "a promise given allows of +no prevarication: that a treaty is a treaty, and <i>his honour</i> obliged +him to unsheathe his sword." I recollect one particularly painful +scene, where the King, weeping <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>bitterly, flung himself across his +writing-table and with trembling hands tried to wrench from his neck +his order <i>Pour le Mérite</i>. I can affirm without any exaggeration that +I could see him wasting away under the ceaseless moral blows dealt to +him, and that the mental torment he went through undoubtedly shortened +his life.</p> + +<p>Queen Elizabeth was well aware of all, but she never took my action +amiss; she understood that I had to deliver the messages, but that it +was not I who composed them.</p> + +<p>Queen Elizabeth was a good, clever and touchingly simple woman, not a +<i>poet qui court après l'esprit</i>, but a woman who looked at the world +through conciliatory and poetical glasses. She was a good +conversationalist, and there was always a poetic charm in all she did. +There hung on the staircase a most beautiful sea picture, which I +greatly admired while the Queen talked to me about the sea, about her +little villa at Constanza, which, built on the extreme end of the +quay, seems almost to lie in the sea. She spoke, too, of her travels +and impressions when on the high seas, and as she spoke the great +longing for all that is good and beautiful made itself felt, and this +is what she said to me: "The sea lives. If there could be found any +symbol of eternity it would be the sea, endless in greatness and +everlasting in movement. The day is dull and stormy. One after another +the glassy billows come rolling in and break with a roar on the rocky +shore. The small white crests of the waves look as if covered with +snow. And the sea breathes and draws its breath with the ebb and flow +of the tide. The tide is the driving power that forces the mighty +waters from Equator to North Pole. And thus it works, day and night, +year by year, century by century. It takes no heed of the perishable +beings who call themselves lords of the world, who live only for a +day, coming and going and vanishing almost as they come. The sea +remains to work. It works for all, for men, for animals, for plants, +for without the sea there could be no organic life in the world. The +sea is like a great filter, which alone can produce the change of +matter that is necessary for life. In the course of a century +numberless rivers <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>carry earth to the sea. Each river carries without +ceasing its burden of earth and sand to the ocean; and the sea +receives the load which is carried by the current far out to sea, and +slowly and by degrees in the course of time the sea dissolves or +crushes all it has received. No matter to the sea if the process lasts +a thousand years or more—it may even last for ages, who can tell?</p> + +<p>"But one day, quite suddenly, the sea begins to wander. Once there was +sea everywhere, and all continents are born from the sea. One day land +arose out of the sea. The birth was of a revolutionary nature, there +were earthquakes, volcanic craters, falling cities and dying men—but +new land was there. Or else it moves slowly, invisibly, a metre or two +in a century, and returns to the land it used to possess. Thus it +restores the soil it stole from it, but cleaner, refined and full of +vitality to live and to create. Such is the sea and its work."</p> + +<p>These are the words of the old half-blind Queen, who can never look +upon the beloved picture again, but she told me how she always +idolised the sea, and how her grand nephews and nieces shared her +feelings, and how she grew young again with them when she told them +tales of olden times.</p> + +<p>One could listen to her for hours without growing weary, and always +there was some beautiful thought or word to carry away and think over.</p> + +<p>Doubtless such knowledge would be more correct were it taken from some +geological work. But Carmen Sylva's words invariably seemed to strike +some poetic chord; that is what made her so attractive.</p> + +<p>She loved to discourse on politics, which for her meant King Carol. He +was her all in all. After his death, when it was said that all states +in the world were losing in the terrible war, she remarked: "Roumania +has already lost her most precious possession." She never spoke of her +own poems and writings. In politics her one thought besides King Carol +was Albania. She was deeply attached to the Princess of Wied, and +showed her strong interest in the country where she lived. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>Talking +about the Wieds one day afforded me an opportunity of seeing the King +vexed with his wife; it was the only time I ever noticed it. It was +when we were at Sinaia, and I was, as often occurred, sitting with the +King. The Queen came into the room, which she was otherwise not in the +habit of entering, bringing with her a telegram from the Princess of +Wied in which she asked for something—I cannot now remember what—for +Albania. The King refused, but the Queen insisted, until he at last +told her very crossly to leave him in peace, as he had other things to +think of than Albania.</p> + +<p>After King Carol's death she lost all her vital energy, and the change +in the political situation troubled her. She was very fond of her +nephew Ferdinand—hers was a truly loving heart—and she trembled lest +he should commit some act of treachery. I remember once how, through +her tears, she said to me: "Calm my fears. Tell me that he will never +be guilty of such an act." I was unable to reassure her, but a kind +Fate spared her from hearing the declaration of war.</p> + +<p>Later, not long before her death, the old Queen was threatened with +total blindness. She was anxious to put herself in the hands of a +French oculist for an operation for cataract, who would naturally be +obliged to travel through the Monarchy in order to reach Bucharest. At +her desire I mentioned the matter in Vienna, and the Emperor Francis +Joseph at once gave the requisite permission for the journey.</p> + +<p>After a successful operation, the Queen sent a short autograph poem to +one of my children, adding that it was her <i>first</i> letter on +recovering her sight. At the same time she was again very uneasy +concerning politics.</p> + +<p>I wrote her the following letter:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Your Majesty,—My warmest thanks for the beautiful little poem you +have sent to my boy. That it was granted to me to contribute +something towards the recovery of your sight is in itself a +sufficient reward, and no thanks are needed. That Your Majesty has +addressed the first written lines to my children delights and +touches me.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Meanwhile Your Majesty must not be troubled regarding politics. It +is of no avail. For the moment Roumania will retain the policy of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span>the late King, and God alone knows what the future will bring +forth.</p> + +<p class="lilin">We are all like dust in this terrible hurricane sweeping through +the world. We are tossed helplessly hither and thither and know +not whether we are to face disaster or success. The point is not +whether we live or die, but how it is done. In that respect King +Carol set an example to us all.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I hope King Ferdinand may never forget that, together with the +throne, his uncle bequeathed to him a political creed, a creed of +honour and loyalty, and I am persuaded that Your Majesty is the +best guardian of the bequest.</p> + +<p>Your Majesty's grateful and devoted</p> + +<p class="right sc">Czernin.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>When I said that King Carol fought the fight to the best of his +ability, I intended to convey that no one could expect him to be +different from what he always was. The King never possessed in any +special degree either energy, strength of action, or adventurous +courage, and at the time I knew him, as an old man, he had none of +those attributes. He was a clever diplomat, a conciliatory power, a +safe mediator, and one who avoided trouble, but not of a nature to +risk all and weather the storm. That was known to all, and no one, +therefore, could think that the King would try to put himself on our +side against the clearly expressed views of all Roumania. My idea is +that if he had been differently constituted he could successfully have +risked the experiment. The King possessed in Carp a man of quite +unusual, even reckless, activity and energy, and from the first moment +he placed himself and his activities at the King's disposal. If the +King, without asking, had ordered mobilisation, Carp's great energy +would have certainly carried it through. But, in the military +situation as it was then, the Roumanian army would have been forced to +the rear of the Russian, and in all probability the first result of +the battlefields would have changed the situation entirely, and the +blood that was shed mutually in victorious battles would have brought +forth the unity that the spirit of our alliance never succeeded in +evolving. But the King was not a man of such calibre. He could not +change his nature, and what he did do entirely concurred with his +methods from the time he ascended the throne.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span>As long as the King lived there was the positive assurance that +Roumania would not side against us, for he would have prevented any +mobilisation against us with the same firm wisdom which had always +enabled him to avert any agitation in the land. He would then have +seen that the Roumanians are not a warlike people like the Bulgarians, +and that Roumania had not the slightest intention of risking anything +in the campaign. A policy of procrastination in the wise hands of the +King would have delayed hostilities against us indefinitely.</p> + +<p>Immediately after the outbreak of war Bratianu began his game, which +consisted of entrenching the Roumanian Government firmly and willingly +in a position between the two groups of Powers, and bandying favours +about from one to the other, reaping equal profits from each, until +the moment when the stronger of the two should be recognised as such +and the weaker then attacked.</p> + +<p>Even from 1914-16 Roumania was never really neutral. She always +favoured our enemies, and as far as lay in her power hindered all our +actions.</p> + +<p>The transport of horses and ammunition to Turkey in the summer of 1915 +that was exacted from us was an important episode. Turkey was then in +great danger, and was asking anxiously for munitions. Had the +Roumanian Government adopted the standpoint not to favour any of the +belligerent Powers it would have been a perfectly correct attitude, +viewed from a neutral standpoint, but she never did adopt such +standpoint, as is shown by her allowing the Serbians to receive +transports of Russian ammunition via the Danube, thus showing great +partiality. When all attempts failed, the munitions were transmitted, +partially at any rate, through other means.</p> + +<p>At that time, too, Russian soldiers were allowed in Roumania and were +not molested, whereas ours were invariably interned.</p> + +<p>Two Austrian airmen once landed by mistake in Roumania, and were, of +course, interned immediately. The one was a cadet of the name of +Berthold and a pilot whose name I have forgotten. From their prison +they appealed to me to help <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span>them, and I sent word that they must +endeavour to obtain permission to pay me a visit. A few days later the +cadet appeared, escorted by a Roumanian officer as guard. This +officer, not being allowed without special permission to set foot on +Austro-Hungarian soil, was obliged to remain in the street outside the +house. I had the gates closed, put the cadet into one of my cars, sent +him out through the back entrance, and had him driven to Giurgui, +where he got across the Danube, and in two hours was again at liberty. +After a lengthy and futile wait the officer departed. His protests +came too late.</p> + +<p>The unfortunate pilot who was left behind was not allowed to come to +the Embassy. One night, however, he made his escape through the window +and arrived. I kept him concealed for some time, and he eventually +crossed the frontier safely and got away by rail to Hungary.</p> + +<p>Bratianu reproached me later for what I had done, but I told him it +was in consequence of his not having strictly adhered to his +neutrality. Had our soldiers been left unmolested, as in the case of +the Russians, I should not have been compelled to act as I had done.</p> + +<p>Bratianu can never seriously have doubted that the Central Powers +would succumb, and his sympathies were always with the Entente, not +only on account of his bringing up, but also because of that political +speculation. During the course of subsequent events there were times +when Bratianu to a certain extent seemed to vacillate, especially at +the time of our great offensive against Russia. The break through at +Görlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior of Russia had +an astounding effect in Roumania. Bratianu, who obviously knew very +little about strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian +millions, whom he imagined to be in a fair way to Vienna and Berlin, +should suddenly begin to rush back and a fortress like Warsaw be +demolished like a house of cards. He was evidently very anxious then +and must have had many a disturbed night. On the other hand, those who +to begin with, though not for, still were not against Austria began to +raise their heads and breathe more freely. The victory of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>Central +Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event. That was the +historic moment when Roumania might have been coerced into active +co-operation, but not the Bratianu Ministry. Bratianu himself would +never in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we could +have made up our minds then to instal a Majorescu or a Marghiloman +Ministry in office, we could have had the Roumanian army with us. In +connection with this were several concrete proposals. In order to +carry out the plan we should have been compelled to make territorial +concessions in Hungary to a Majorescu Ministry—Majorescu demanded it +as a primary condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs, and +this proposal failed owing to Hungary's obstinate resistance. It is a +terrible but a just punishment that poor Hungary, who contributed so +much to our definite defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from +the consequences thereof, and that the Roumanians, so despised and +persecuted by Hungary, should gain the greatest triumphs on her +plains.</p> + +<p>One of the many reproaches that have been brought against me recently +is to the effect that I, as ambassador at Bucharest, should have +resigned if my proposals were not accepted in Vienna. These reproaches +are dictated by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsibility. +It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe the situation as +he sees it and to make such proposals as he considers right, but the +responsibility for the policy is with the Minister for Foreign +Affairs, and it would lead to the most impossible and absurd state of +things if every ambassador whose proposals were rejected were to draw +the conclusion that his resignation was a necessary consequence +thereof. If officials were to resign because they did not agree with +the view of their chief, it would mean that almost all of them would +send in their resignations.</p> + +<p>Espionage and counter-espionage have greatly flourished during the +war. In that connection Russia showed great activity in Roumania.</p> + +<p>In October, 1914, an event occurred which was very unfortunate for me. +I drove from Bucharest to Sinaia, carrying <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>certain political +documents with me in a dispatch-case, which, by mistake, was fastened +on behind instead of being laid in the car. On the way the case was +unstrapped and stolen. I made every effort to get it back, and +eventually recovered it after a search of three weeks, involving much +expense. It was found at last in some peasant's barn, but nothing had +apparently been abstracted save the cigarettes that were in it.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, after the occupation of Bucharest copies and photographs +of all my papers were found in Bratianu's house.</p> + +<p>After the loss of the dispatch-case I at once tendered my resignation +in Vienna, but it was not accepted by the Emperor.</p> + +<p>The Red Book on Roumania, published by Burian, which contains a +summary of my most important reports, gives a very clear picture of +the several phases of that period and the approaching danger of war. +The several defeats that Roumania suffered justified the fears of all +those who warned her against premature intervention. In order to +render the situation quite clear, it must here be explained that +during the time immediately preceding Roumania's entry into war there +were really only two parties in the country: the one was hostile to us +and wished for an immediate declaration of war, and the other was the +"friendly" one that did not consider the situation ripe for action and +advised waiting until we were weakened still more. During the time of +our successes the "friendly" party carried the day. Queen Marie, I +believe, belonged to the latter. From the beginning of the war, she +was always in favour of "fighting by the side of England," as she +always looked upon herself as an Englishwoman, but, at the last moment +at any rate, she appears to have thought the time for action +premature. A few days before the declaration of war she invited me to +a farewell lunch, which was somewhat remarkable, as we both knew that +in a very few days we should be enemies. After lunch I took the +opportunity of telling her that I <i>likewise</i> was aware of the +situation, but that "the Bulgarians would be in Bucharest before the +Roumanians reached Budapest." She entered into the conversation very +calmly, being of a very frank nature and not afraid of hearing the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span>truth. A few days later a letter was opened at the censor's office +from a lady-in-waiting who had been present at the lunch. It was +evidently not intended for our eyes; it contained a description of the +<i>déjeuner fort embêtant</i>, with some unflattering remarks about me.</p> + +<p>Queen Marie never lost her hope in a final victory. She did not +perhaps agree with Bratianu in all his tactics, but a declaration of +war on us was always an item on her programme. Even in the distressing +days of their disastrous defeat she always kept her head above water. +One of the Queen's friends told me afterwards that when our armies, +from south, north and west, were nearing Bucharest, when day and night +the earth shook with the ceaseless thunder of the guns, the Queen +quietly went on with her preparations for departure, and was firmly +persuaded that she would return as "Empress of all the Roumanians." I +have been told that after the taking of Bucharest Bratianu collapsed +altogether, and it was Queen Marie who comforted and encouraged him. +Her English blood always asserted itself. After we had occupied +Wallachia, I received absolutely reliable information from England, +according to which she had telegraphed to King George from Jassy, +recommending "her little but courageous people" to his further +protection. After the Peace of Bucharest strong pressure was brought +to bear on me to effect the abdication of the King and Queen. It would +not in any way have altered the situation, as the Entente would +naturally have reinstated them when victory was gained; but I opposed +all such efforts, not for the above reason, which I could not foresee, +but from other motives, to be mentioned later, although I was +perfectly certain that Queen Marie would always remain our enemy.</p> + +<p>The declaration of war created a very uncomfortable situation for all +Austro-Hungarians and Germans. I came across several friends in the +Austro-Hungarian colony who had been beaten by the Roumanian soldiers +with the butt-ends of their rifles on their way to prison. I saw wild +scenes of panic and flight that were both grotesque and revolting, and +the cruel sport lasted for days.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>In Vienna all subjects of an enemy state were exempt from deportation. +In my capacity as Minister I ordered reprisals on Roumanian citizens, +as there were no other means to relieve the fate of our poor refugees. +As soon as the neutral Powers notified that the treatment had become +more humane, they were set free.</p> + +<p>If we showed ourselves at the windows or in the garden of the Embassy +the crowd scoffed and jeered at us, and at the station, when we left, +a young official whom I asked for information simply turned his back +on me.</p> + +<p>A year and a half later I was again in Bucharest. The tide of victory +had carried us far, and we came to make peace. We were again subjects +of interest to the crowds in the streets, but in very different +fashion. A tremendous ovation awaited us when we appeared in the +theatre, and I could not show myself in the street without having a +crowd of admirers in my wake.</p> + +<p>Before all this occurred, and when war was first declared, the members +of the Embassy, together with about 150 persons belonging to the +Austro-Hungarian colony, including many children, were interned, and +spent ten very unpleasant days, as we were not sure whether we should +be released or not. We had occasion during that time to witness three +Zeppelin raids over Bucharest, which, seen in the wonderful moonlight, +cloudless nights under the tropical sky, made an unforgettable +impression on us.</p> + +<p>I find the following noted in my diary:</p> + + +<p class="right">"<i>Bucharest, August, 1916.</i></p> + +<p>"The Roumanians have declared war on my wife and daughter too. A +deputation composed of two officials from the Ministry for Foreign +Affairs, in frock-coats and top hats, appeared last night at eleven +o'clock in my villa at Sinaia. My wife was roused out of her sleep, +and by the light of a single candle—more is forbidden on account of +the Zeppelin raids—they informed her that Roumania had declared war +on us.</p> + +<p>"As the speaker put it, '<i>Vous avez déclaré la guerre</i>.' He then read +the whole declaration of war aloud to them both. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>Bratianu sent word +to me that he would have a special train sent to take my wife and +daughter and the whole personnel of the Embassy to Bucharest.</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="right">"<i>Bucharest, September, 1916.</i></p> + +<p>"The Roumanians really expected a Zeppelin attack at once. So far it +has not occurred, and they begin to feel more at ease, and say that it +is too far for the Zeppelins to come all the way from Germany. They +seem not to be aware that Mackensen has Zeppelins in Bulgaria. But who +can tell whether they really will come?</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="right">"<i>Bucharest, September, 1916.</i></p> + +<p>"Last night a Zeppelin did come. About three o'clock we were roused by +the shrill police whistles giving the alarm. The telephone notified us +that a Zeppelin had crossed the Danube, and all the church bells began +to peal. Suddenly darkness and silence reigned, and the whole town, +like some great angry animal, sullen and morose, prepared for the +enemy attack. Nowhere was there light or sound. The town, with a +wonderful starry firmament overhead, waited in expectation. Fifteen, +twenty minutes went by, when suddenly a shot was fired and, as though +it were a signal, firing broke out in every direction. The +anti-aircraft guns fired incessantly, and the police, too, did their +best, firing in the air. But what were they firing at? There was +absolutely nothing to be seen. The searchlights then came into play. +Sweeping the heavens from east to west, from north to south, they +searched the firmament, but could not find the Zeppelin. Was it really +there, or was the whole thing due to excited Roumanian nerves?</p> + +<p>"Suddenly a sound was heard: the noise of the propeller overhead. It +sounded so near in the clear, starry night, we felt we must be able to +see it. But the noise died away in the direction of Colbroceni. Then +we heard the first bomb. Like a gust of wind it whistled through the +air, followed by a crash and an explosion. A second and third came +quickly after. The firing became fiercer, but they can see nothing +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>and seem to aim at where the sound comes from. The searchlights sway +backwards and forwards. Now one of them has caught the airship, which +looks like a small golden cigar. Both the gondolas can be seen quite +distinctly, and the searchlight keeps it well in view, and now a +second one has caught it. It looks as though this air cruiser is +hanging motionless in the sky, brilliantly lit up by the searchlights +right and left. Then the guns begin in good earnest. Shrapnel bursts +all around, a wonderful display of fireworks, but it is impossible to +say if the aim is good and if the monster is in danger. Smaller and +smaller grows the Zeppelin, climbing rapidly higher and higher, until +suddenly the miniature cigar disappears. Still the searchlights sweep +the skies, hoping to find their prey again.</p> + +<p>"Suddenly utter silence reigns. Have they gone? Is the attack over? +Has one been hit? Forced to land? The minutes go by. We are all now on +the balcony—the women, too—watching the scene. Again comes the +well-known sound—once heard never forgotten—as though the wind were +getting up, then a dull thud and explosion. This time it is farther +away towards the forts. Again the firing breaks out, and machine-guns +bark at the friendly moon; searchlights career across the heavens, but +find nothing. Again there falls a bomb—much nearer this time—and +again comes the noise of the propellers louder and louder. Shrapnel +bursts just over the Embassy, and the Zeppelin is over our heads. We +hear the noise very distinctly, but can see nothing. Again a sudden +silence everywhere, which has a curious effect after the terrible +noise. Time passes, but nothing more is heard. The first rays of dawn +are seen in the east; the stars slowly pale.</p> + +<p>"A child is heard to cry somewhere, far away: strange how clearly it +sounds in the silent night. There is a feeling as though the terrified +town hardly dared breathe or move for fear the monster might return. +And how many more such nights are there in prospect? In the calm of +this fairylike dawn, slowly rising, the crying of the child strikes a +note <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span>of discord, infinitely sad. But the crying of the child—does it +not find an echo among the millions whom this terrible war has driven +to desperation?</p> + +<p>"The sun rises like a blood-red ball. For some hours the Roumanians +can take to sleep and gather fresh strength, but they know now that +the Zeppelin's visit will not be the last.</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="right">"<i>Bucharest, September, 1916.</i></p> + +<p>"The Press is indignant about the nocturnal attack. Bucharest is +certainly a fortress, but it should be known that the guns are no +longer in the forts. It was stated in the <i>Adeverul</i> that the heroic +resistance put up in defence was most successful. That the airship, +badly damaged, was brought down near Bucharest, and that a commission +started off at once to make sure whether it was an aeroplane or a +Zeppelin!</p> + +<br /> + +<p class="right">"<i>Bucharest, September, 1916.</i></p> + +<p>"The Zeppelin returned again this evening and took us by surprise. It +seemed to come from the other side of Plojest, and the sentries on the +Danube must have missed it. Towards morning the night watch at the +Embassy whose duty it is to see that there is no light in the house +saw a huge mass descending slowly over the Embassy till it almost +touched the roof. It hovered there a few minutes, making observations. +No one noticed it until suddenly the engines started again, and it +dropped the first bomb close to the Embassy. A direct hit was made on +the house of the Ambassador Jresnea Crecianu, and twenty gendarmes who +were there were killed. The royal palace was also damaged. The +Government is apparently not satisfied with the anti-aircraft forces, +but concludes that practice will make them perfect. Opportunity for +practice will certainly not be lacking.</p> + +<p>"Our departure is being delayed by every sort of pretext. One moment +it seems as though we should reach home via Bulgaria. This idea suited +Bratianu extremely well, as the Bulgarian willingness to grant +permission was a guarantee that they had no plans of attack. But he +reckoned in this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span>without his host. E. and W. are greatly alarmed +because the Roumanians intend to detain them, and will probably hang +them as spies. I have told them, 'Either we all stay here or we all +start together. No one will be given up.' That appears to have +somewhat quieted their fears.</p> + +<p>"As might be expected, these nocturnal visits had disagreeable +consequences for us. The Roumanians apparently thought that it was not +a question of Zeppelins, but of Austro-Hungarian airships, and that my +presence in the town would afford a certain protection against the +attacks; after the first one they declared that for every Roumanian +killed ten Austrians or Bulgarians would be executed, and the hostile +treatment to which we were subjected grew worse and worse. The food +was cut down and was terribly bad, and finally the water supply was +cut off. With the tropical temperature that prevailed and the +overcrowding of a house that normally was destined to hold twenty, and +now housed 170, persons, the conditions within the space of +twenty-four hours became unbearable and the atmosphere so bad that +several people fell ill with fever, and neither doctor nor medicine +was obtainable. Thanks to the energetic intervention of the Dutch +Ambassador, Herr von Vredenburch, who had undertaken the charge of our +State interests, it was finally possible to alter the conditions and +to avert the outbreak of an epidemic."</p> + +<br /> + +<p>It was just about that time that our Military Attaché, Lieut.-Colonel +Baron Randa, made a telling remark. One of our Roumanian slave-drivers +was in the habit of paying us a daily visit and talking in the +bombastic fashion the Roumanians adopted when boasting of their +impending victories. The word "Mackensen" occurred in Randa's answer. +The Roumanian was surprised to hear the name, unknown to him, and +said: "Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce Mackensen? Je connais beaucoup +d'Allemands, mais je n'ai jamais fait la connaissance de M. +Mackensen." "Eh bien," replied Randa, patting him on the shoulder, +"vous la ferez cette connaissance, je vous en guarantie." Three months +after that Mackensen <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>had occupied all Wallachia and had his +headquarters at Bucharest. By that time, therefore, his name must have +been more familiar to our Roumanian friend.</p> + +<p>At last we set off for home via Russia and had a very interesting +journey lasting three weeks, via Kieff, Petersburg, Sweden, and +Germany. To spend three weeks in a train would seem very wearisome to +many; but as everything in this life is a matter of habit we soon grew +so accustomed to it that when we arrived in Vienna there were many of +us who could not sleep the first few nights in a proper bed, as we +missed the shaking of the train. Meanwhile, we had every comfort on +the special train, and variety as well, especially when, on Bratianu's +orders, we were detained at a little station called Baratinskaja, near +Kieff. The reason of this was never properly explained, but it was +probably owing to difficulties over the departure of the Roumanian +Ambassador in Sofia and to the wish to treat us as hostages. The +journey right through the enemy country was remarkable. Fierce battles +were just then being fought in Galicia, and day and night we passed +endless trains conveying gay and smiling soldiers to the front, and +others returning full of pale, bandaged wounded men, whose groans we +heard as we passed them. We were greeted everywhere in friendly +fashion by the population, and there was not a trace of the hatred we +had experienced in Roumania. Everything that we saw bore evidence of +the strictest order and discipline. None of us could think it possible +that the Empire was on the eve of a revolution, and when the Emperor +Francis Joseph questioned me on my return as to whether I had reason +to believe that a revolution would occur, I discountenanced the idea +most emphatically.</p> + +<p>This did not please the old Emperor. He said afterwards to one of his +suite: "Czernin has given a correct account of Roumania, but he must +have been asleep when he passed through Russia."</p> + +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span><br /> +<br /> + +<h3>3</h3> + +<p>The development of Roumanian affairs during the war occurs in three +phases, the first of which was in King Carol's reign. Then neutrality +was guaranteed. On the other hand, it was not possible during those +months to secure Roumania's co-operation because we, in the first +period of the war, were so unfavourably situated in a military sense +that public opinion in Roumania would not voluntarily have consented +to a war at our side, and, as already mentioned, such forcible action +would not have met with the King's approval.</p> + +<p>In the second phase of the war, dating from King Carol's death to our +defeat at Luck, conditions were quite different. In this second phase +were included the greatest military successes the Central Powers ever +obtained. The downfall of Serbia and the conquest of the whole of +Poland occurred during this period, and, I repeat, in those months we +could have secured the active co-operation of Roumania. Nevertheless, +I must make it clearly understood here that if the political +preliminaries for intervention on the part of Roumania were not +undertaken, the fault must not be ascribed to the then Minister of +Foreign Affairs, but to the <i>vis major</i> which opposed the project +under the form of a Hungarian veto. As previously stated, Majorescu, +as well as Marghiloman, would only have given his consent to +co-operation if Roumania had been given a slice of the Hungarian +state. Thanks to the attitude of absolute refusal observed at the +Ballplatz, the territory in question was never definitely decided on, +but the idea probably was Transylvania and a portion of the Bukovina. +I cannot say whether Count Burian, if he had escaped other influences, +would have adopted the plan, but certain it is that however ready and +willing he was to act he would never have carried out the plan against +the Hungarian Parliament. According to the Constitution, the Hungarian +Parliament is sovereign in the Hungarian State, and without the use of +armed means Hungary could never have been induced to cede any part of +her territory.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>It is obvious, however, that it would have been impossible during the +world war to have stirred up an armed conflict between Vienna and +Budapest. My then German colleague, von dem Busche, entirely agreed +with me that Hungary ought to make some territorial sacrifices in +order to encourage Roumania's intervention. I firmly believe that +then, and similarly before the Italian declaration of war, a certain +pressure was brought to bear direct on Vienna by Berlin to this end—a +pressure which merely contributed to strengthen and intensify Tisza's +opposition. For Germany, the question was far simpler; she had drawn +payment for her great gains from a foreign source. The cession of the +Bukovina might possibly have been effected, as Stürgkh did not object, +but that alone would not have satisfied Roumania.</p> + +<p>It was quite clear that the opposition to the ceding of Transylvania +originated in Hungary. But this opposition was not specially Tisza's, +for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head +of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint.</p> + +<p>I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to +explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the +concession. Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote +me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of +Hungarian territory was out of the question; "whoever attempts to +seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot."</p> + +<p>There was nothing to be done. And still I think that this was one of +the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly +managed, might have influenced the final result. The military advance +on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of +our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it +the clever break through at Görlitz would have had some results; but +as it was, Görlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any +lasting effect.</p> + +<p>The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two +ways: the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span>giving up any of +their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe—even to the +very last—that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that +sooner or later we would be forced to fight <i>against</i> Roumania unless +we in good time carried her with us. In this connection Tisza always +maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the +belief that Roumania would not dare take it upon herself to attack us. +This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us +so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry +off so much rich booty. I would have been able to take much better +care of the many Austrians and Hungarians living in Roumania—whose +fate was terrible after the declaration of war, which took them also +by surprise—if I had been permitted to draw their attention more +openly and generally to the coming catastrophe; but in several of his +letters Tisza implored me not to create a panic, "which would bring +incalculable consequences with it." As I neither did, nor could, know +how far this secrecy was in agreement with our military +counter-preparations, I was bound to observe it. Apparently, Burian +believed my reports to a certain extent; at any rate, for some time +before the declaration of war he ordered all the secret documents and +the available money to be conveyed to Vienna, and entrusted to Holland +the care of our citizens; but Tisza told me long after that he +considered my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid to +give orders for the <i>superfluous</i> evacuation of Transylvania.</p> + +<p>After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic and rage ran high in +the Hungarian Parliament. The severest criticism was heaped upon me, +as no one doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my false +reports. Here Tisza was again himself when, in a loud voice, he +shouted out that it was untrue; my reports were correct; I had warned +them in time and no blame could be attached to me; he thus took upon +himself the just blame. Fear was unknown to him, and he never tried to +shield himself behind anyone. When I arrived back in Vienna after a +journey of some weeks in Russia, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>only then heard of the incident, +I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the honourable and loyal +manner in which he had defended my cause. He replied with the ironical +smile characteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course.</p> + +<p>But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no means such a matter +of course. We have had so many cowards on the Ministerial benches, so +many men who were brave when dealing with their subordinates, toadied +to their superiors, and were intimidated by strong opposition, that a +man like Tisza, who was such a contrast to these others, has a most +refreshing and invigorating effect. The Roumanians attempted several +times to make the maintenance of their <i>neutrality</i> contingent on +territorial concessions. I was always opposed to this, and at the +Ballplatz they were of the same opinion. The Roumanians would have +appropriated these concessions and simply attacked us later to obtain +more. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to gain <i>military +co-operation</i> a cession of territory would be quite in order, since, +once in the field, the Roumanians could not draw back and their fate +would be permanently bound up with ours.</p> + +<p>Finally, the third phase comprises the comparatively short period +between our defeat at Luck and the outbreak of the war in Roumania, +and was simply the death throes of neutrality.</p> + +<p>War was in the air and could be foreseen with certainty.</p> + +<p>As was to be expected, the inefficient diplomacy displayed in the +preparations for the world war brought down severe criticism of our +diplomatic abilities, and if the intention at the Ballplatz was to +bring about a war, it cannot be denied that the preparations for it +were most inadequate.</p> + +<p>Criticism was not directed towards the Ballplatz only, but entered +into further matters, such as the qualifications of the individual +representatives in foreign countries. I remember an article in one of +the most widely-read Viennese papers, which drew a comparison between +the "excellent" ambassador at Sofia and almost all of the others; that +is, all those whose <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>posts were in countries that either refused their +co-operation or even already were in the field against us.</p> + +<p>In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I wish to state here that in +my opinion our then ambassador to Sofia, Count Tarnowski, was one of +the best and most competent diplomats in Austria-Hungary, but that the +point of view from which such praise was awarded to him was in itself +totally false. Had Count Tarnowski been in Paris, London or Rome, +these states, in spite of his undeniable capabilities, would not have +adopted a different attitude; while, on the other hand, there are +numbers of distinguished members of the diplomatic corps who would +have carried out his task at Sofia just as well as Count Tarnowski.</p> + +<p>In other words, I consider it is making an unwarrantable demand to +expect that a representative in a foreign land should have a leading +influence on the policy of the state to which he is accredited. What +may be demanded of a diplomatic representative is a correct estimate +of the situation. The ambassador must know what the Government of the +state where he is will do. A false diagnosis is discreditable. But it +is impossible for a representative, whoever he may be, to obtain such +power over a foreign state as to be able to guide the policy of that +state into the course desired by him. The policy of a state will +invariably be subservient to such objects as the Government of that +period deem vital, and will always be influenced by factors which are +quite outside the range of the foreign representative.</p> + +<p>In what manner a diplomatic representative obtains his information is +his own affair. He should endeavour to establish intercourse, not only +with a certain class of society, but also with the Press, and also +keep in touch with other classes of the population.</p> + +<p>One of the reproaches made to the "old régime" was the assumed +preference for aristocrats in diplomacy. This was quite a mistake. No +preference was shown for the aristocracy, but it lay in the nature of +the career that wealth and social polish were assets in the exercise +of its duties. An attaché <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span>had no salary. He was, therefore, expected +to have a tolerably good income at home in order to be able to live +conformably to his rank when abroad. This system arose out of +necessity, and was also due to the unwillingness of the authorities to +raise salaries in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The consequence +was that only sons of wealthy parents could adopt such a career. I +once told some delegates who interviewed me in connection with the +subject that a change of the system depended entirely on themselves +and their increased munificence.</p> + +<p>A certain amount of social polish was just as necessary for diplomats +of the old régime as was the requisite allowance for their household +and a knowledge of foreign languages. So long as courts exist in +Europe, the court will always be the centre of all social life, and +diplomats must have the entrée to such circles. A young man who does +not know whether to eat with his fork or his knife would play a sorry +part there—his social training is not an indifferent matter. +Preference is, therefore, not given to the aristocracy, but to young +men of wealth familiar with European society etiquette.</p> + +<p>That does not mean that a diplomat is to consider it his duty only to +show himself at all the parties and fêtes given by the upper ten +thousand, but it is one of his duties, as at such places he might gain +information unobtainable elsewhere. A diplomat must be in touch with +all sources from which he can glean information.</p> + +<p>Individual capabilities and zeal will naturally play a great part; but +the means that a Government places at the disposition of its foreign +missions are also of the highest importance.</p> + +<p>There are people in the East—I do not know whether to say in +contradistinction to the West—who are not immune to the influence of +gold. In Roumania, for instance, Russia, before the war, had +completely undermined the whole country and had lavished millions long +before the war in the hope of an understanding with that country. Most +of the newspapers were financed by Russians, and numbers of the +leading <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>politicians were bound by Russian interests, whereas neither +Germany nor Austria-Hungary had made any such preparations. Thus it +happened that, on the outbreak of war, Russia was greatly in advance +of the Central Powers, an advance that was all the more difficult to +overtake as from the first day of war Russia opened still wider the +floodgates of her gold and inundated Roumania with roubles.</p> + +<p>If the fact that the scanty preparation for war is a proof of how +little the Central Powers reckoned on such a contingency it may on the +other hand explain away much apparent inactivity on the part of their +representatives. Karl Fürstenberg, my predecessor at Bucharest, whose +estimate of the situation was a just one, demanded to have more funds +at his disposal, which was refused at Vienna on the plea that there +was no money. After the war began the Ministry stinted us no longer, +but it was too late then for much to be done.</p> + +<p>Whether official Russia, four weeks in advance, had really counted on +the assassination of the Archduke and the outbreak of a war ensuing +therefrom remains an open question. I will not go so far as to assert +it for a fact, but one thing is certain, that Russia within a +measurable space of time had prepared for war as being inevitable and +had endeavoured to secure Roumania's co-operation. When the Tsar was +at Constanza a month before the tragedy at Sarajevo, his Minister for +Foreign Affairs, Sassonoff, paid a visit to Bucharest. When there, he +and Bratianu went on a walking tour together to Transylvania. I did +not hear of this tactless excursion until it was over, but I shared +Berchtold's surprise at such a proceeding on the part of both +Ministers.</p> + +<p>I once, in 1914, overheard by chance a conversation between two +Russians. It was at the Hotel Capsa, known later as a resort for +anti-Austrians. They were sitting at the table next to mine in the +restaurant and were speaking French quite freely and openly. They +appeared to be on good terms with the Russian Ambassador and were +discussing the impending visit of the Tsar to Constanza. I discovered +later that they were officers in mufti. They agreed that the Emperor +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span>Francis Joseph could not live very much longer, and that when his +death occurred and a new ruler came to the throne It would be a +favourable moment for Russia to declare war on us.</p> + +<p>They were evidently exponents of the "loyal" tendency that aimed at +declaring war on us without a preceding murder; and I readily believe +that the majority of the men in Petersburg who were eager for war held +the same view.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER V<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>THE U-BOAT WARFARE</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>My appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs was thought by many to +indicate that the Emperor Charles was carrying out the political +wishes of his uncle, Ferdinand. Although it had been the Archduke's +intention to have made me his Minister for Foreign Affairs, my +appointment to the post by the Emperor Charles had nothing to do with +that plan. It was due, above all, to his strong desire to get rid of +Count Burian and to the lack of other candidates whom he considered +suitable. The Red Book that was published by Count Burian after the +outbreak of war with Roumania may have attracted the Emperor's +attention to me.</p> + +<p>Although the Emperor, while still Archduke, was for several years my +nearest neighbour in Bohemia—he was stationed at Brandeis, on the +Elbe—we never became more closely acquainted. In all those years he +was not more than once or twice at my house, and they were visits of +no political significance. It was not until the first winter of the +war, when I went from Roumania to the Headquarters at Teschen, that +the then Archduke invited me to make the return journey with him. +During this railway journey that lasted several hours politics formed +the chief subject of conversation, though chiefly concerning Roumania +and the Balkan questions. In any case I was never one of those who +were in the Archduke's confidence, and my call to the Ballplatz came +as a complete surprise.</p> + +<p>At my first audience, too, we conversed at great length on Roumania +and on the question whether the war with Bucharest could have been +averted or not.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span>The Emperor was then still under the influence of our first peace +offer so curtly rejected by the Entente. At the German Headquarters at +Pless, where I arrived a few days later, I found the prevailing +atmosphere largely influenced by the Entente's answer. Hindenburg and +Ludendorff, who were apparently opposed to Burian's <i>démarche</i> for +peace, merely remarked to me that a definite victory presented a +possibility of ending the war, and the Emperor William said that he +had offered his hand in peace but that the Entente had given him a +slap in the face, and there was nothing for it now but war to the +uttermost.</p> + +<p>It was at this time that the question of the unrestricted U-boat +warfare began to be mooted. At first it was the German Navy only, and +Tirpitz in particular, who untiringly advocated the plan. +Hohenlohe,<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> who, thanks to his excellent connections, was always +very well informed, wrote, several weeks before the fateful decision +was taken, that the German Navy was determined and bent on that aim. +Bethmann and Zimmermann were both decidedly against it. It was +entirely in keeping with the prudent wisdom of the former not to risk +such experiments; Bethmann was an absolutely dependable, honourable +and capable partner, but the unbounded growth of the military +autocracy must be imputed to his natural tendency to conciliate. He +was powerless against Ludendorff and little by little was turned aside +by him. My first visit to Berlin afforded me the opportunity of +thoroughly discussing the U-boat question with the Imperial +Chancellor, and we were quite agreed in our disapproval of that method +of warfare. At all events, Bethmann pointed out that such essentially +military matters should in the first instance be left to military +decision, as they alone were able to form a correct estimate of the +result, and these reflections made me fear from the very first that +all reasonable political scruples would be upset by military +arguments. On this my first visit to Berlin, when this question +naturally was the dominating one, the Chancellor explained to me how +difficult his position was, because the military leaders, both on land +and at sea, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>declared that if the unrestricted U-boat warfare were not +carried out they would not be able to guarantee the Western front. +They thus brought an iron pressure to bear on him, for how could he, +the Chancellor, undertake to guarantee that the Western front could +hold out? As a matter of fact, the danger of introducing the +unrestricted U-boat campaign became greater and greater, and the +reports sent by Hohenlohe left no doubt as to the further development +of affairs in Berlin.</p> + +<p>On January 12 he reported as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">The question of the extension of the U-boat warfare, as Your +Excellency is aware from the last discussions in Berlin, becomes +daily more acute.</p> + +<p class="lilin">On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities insist +on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they +declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand, +all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on +America and other neutrals.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on a +very large scale is imminent in the West and that the armies which +are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the +navy should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at +any rate to decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to +our adversaries. The absence of co-operation on the part of the +navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will +again have to face will have a most <i>injurious</i> effect on their +<i>moral</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might +have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that +America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact, +would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United +States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves +what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a +possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily +signify war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may +be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of +crushing England, at least to be able, <i>before</i> America can come +in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire +will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves +with us at the Conference table.</p> + +<p class="lilin">To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that +the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves +in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to +find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the +U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to +<i>beg</i> for peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or +against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively +determining which decision was the right one.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be +constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the +question, and it is obvious—whatever the decision may be—that we +also shall be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me +that when the German Government does approach us in that +connection we should act with all possible reserve. As the matter +now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right +one is not possible. I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to +take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the +responsibility from the German Government and render it possible +for them to lay it upon us.</p> + +<p>The Imperial and Royal Ambassador,</p> + +<p class="right sc">G. Hohenlohe, M.P.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>The concluding passage of the above cited report had already been +anticipated by me in a telegraphic communication in which I begged the +ambassador with all possible energy to urge the political arguments +opposed to the unrestricted U-boat warfare, which is proved by a +telegram from Hohenlohe on January 13 as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Reply to yesterday's telegram No. 15.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In accordance with the telegram mentioned, and after discussing it +with Baron Flotow, I went to the Secretary of State—not being +able to see the Chancellor to-day—and in conformity with Your +Excellency's intentions called his attention to the fact that we +should participate in the results of the U-boat war just as much +as Germany and that, therefore, the German Government is bound to +listen to us also. All the leading German statesmen know that Your +Excellency, during your stay here, expressed <i>yourself as opposed +to the movement</i>, but that I had come once more as Your +Excellency's representative to repeat the <i>warning against too +hasty action</i>. I further emphasised all the arguments against the +U-boat warfare, but will not trouble Your Excellency with a +repetition of them, nor yet with the counter-arguments, already +known to Your Excellency, that were put forward by the Secretary. +I gave a brief summary of both these standpoints in my yesterday's +report No. 6 P.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>Herr Zimmermann, however, laid special stress on the fact that the +information he was receiving convinced him more and more that +America, especially after the Entente's answer to Mr. Wilson, +which was in the nature of an insult, would very probably not +allow it to come to a breach with the Central Powers.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I did all I possibly could to impress upon him the responsibility +Germany was taking for herself and for us by her decision in this +question, pointing out very particularly that before any decision +was arrived at our opinion from a nautical-technical standpoint +must also be heard, in which the Secretary of State fully +concurred.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I have the feeling that the idea of carrying out the U-boat +warfare is more and more favourably received, and Your Excellency +had the same impression also when in Berlin. The last word as to +the final attitude to be adopted by the German Government will no +doubt come from the military side.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In conformity with the instructions received, <i>I will nevertheless +uphold with all firmness the political arguments against the +U-boat warfare</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Baron Flotow will have occasion to meet the Secretary of State +this afternoon.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>I had sent Baron Flotow, a Chief of Department, to Berlin at the same +time, in order that he might support all Hohenlohe's efforts and spare +no pains to induce Germany to desist from her purpose.</p> + +<p>Flotow sent me the following report on January 15:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">After a two-days' stay in Berlin my impression is that the +question of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought +to the front by the leading men in the German Empire. This +question—according to Herr Zimmermann—under conditions of the +greatest secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under +debate between the heads of the Army and Navy and the Foreign +Office; they insist on a decision. For if the unrestricted U-boat +warfare is to be opened it must be at a time when, in view of the +vast impending Anglo-French offensive on the Western front, it +will make itself felt. The Secretary of State mentioned the month +of February.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I wish in the following account to summarise the reasons put +forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted +U-boat warfare:</p> + +<p class="lilin">Time is against us and favours the Entente; if, therefore, the +Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less +prospect <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span>of our obtaining a peace on our own terms. The enemy's +last Note to Wilson is again a striking example of their war +energy.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war +after 1917 with any prospect of success. Peace must, therefore, +unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in +the course of this year, which means that we must enforce it.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The military situation is unfavourable owing to the impending +Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with +great force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme. To +meet the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other +fronts. Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to +bring that enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have +been possible, can no longer be reckoned on.</p> + +<p class="lilin">If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the East +becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in +the West, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat +warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding +the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral +flag.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat +warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the +transport of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to +such a degree as would render it impossible for the English to +continue the war. In Italy and in France this will be felt no less +severely. The neutrals, too, will be made to suffer, which, +however, might serve as a pretext to bring about peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">America will hardly push matters further than breaking off +diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on +a war with the United States.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It must not be overlooked that the United States—as was the case +in regard to Mexico—are not well prepared for war, that their one +anxiety is Japan. Japan would not allow a European war with +America to pass unheeded.</p> + +<p class="lilin">But even if America were to enter the war it would be three to +four months before she could be ready, and in that space of time +peace must have been secured in Europe. According to the estimate +of certain experts (among others, some Dutch corn merchants), +England has only provisions sufficient for six weeks, or three +months at the outside.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It would be possible to carry on the U-boat warfare on England +from fifteen bases in the North Sea, so <i>that the passage of a +large vessel through to England would be hardly conceivable</i>. +Traffic in the Channel, even if not entirely stopped, would be +very limited, as travelling conditions in France exclude the +possibility of suitable connection.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>And if the unrestricted U-boat warfare once were started, the +terror caused by it (the sinking of the vessels without warning) +would have such an effect that most vessels would not dare to put +to sea.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The above already hints at the rejoinder to be put forward to the +arguments advanced by us against the opening of the unrestricted +U-boat warfare, and also combats the view that the corn supply +from the Argentine is not at the present moment so important for +the United States as would be a prompt opening of the U-boat +campaign, which would mean a general stoppage of all traffic.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The fact that America would not be ready for war before the end of +three months does not exclude the possibility that it might even +be as long as six or eight months, and that she therefore might +join in the European war at a time when, without playing our last +card, it might be possible to end it in a manner that we could +accept. It must not be forgotten, however, that in America we have +to do with an Anglo-Saxon race, which—once it had decided on +war—will enter on it with energy and tenacity, as England did, +who, though unprepared for war as to military matters, can +confront to-day the Germans with an army of millions that commands +respect. I cannot with certainty make any statement as to the +Japanese danger to America at a time when Japan is bound up with +Russia and England through profitable treaties and Germany is shut +out from that part of the world.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Among other things I referred to the great hopes entertained of +the Zeppelins as an efficient weapon of war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Herr Zimmermann said to me: "Believe me, our fears are no less +than yours; they have given me many sleepless nights. There is no +positive certainty as to the result; we can only make our +calculations. We have not yet arrived at any decision. Show me a +way to obtain a reasonable peace and I would be the first to +reject the idea of the U-boat warfare. As matters now stand, both +I and several others have almost been converted to it."</p> + +<p class="lilin">But whether, in the event of the ruthless U-boat warfare being +decided on, it would be notified in some way, has not yet been +decided.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Zimmermann told me he was considering the advisability of +approaching Wilson, and, while referring to the contemptuous +attitude of the Entente in the peace question, give the President +an explanation of the behaviour of the German Government, and +request him, for the safety of the life and property of American +citizens, to indicate the steamers and shipping lines by which +traffic between America and other neutrals could be maintained.</p> + +<p><i>Vienna, January 15, 1917.</i></p> + +<p class="right sc">Flotow, M.P.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>On January 20 Zimmermann and Admiral Holtzendorff arrived in Vienna, +and a council was held, presided over by the Emperor. Besides the +three above-mentioned, Count Tisza, Count Clam-Martinic, Admiral Haus +and I were also present. Holtzendorff expounded his reasons, which I +recapitulate below. With the exception of Admiral Haus, no one gave +unqualified consent. All the arguments which appear in the official +documents and ministerial protocols were advanced but did not make the +slightest impression on the German representatives. The Emperor, who +took no part in the debate, finally declared that he would decide +later. Under his auspices a further conference was held in the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 2 o'clock; the report is as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Report of a conference held January 20, 1917, in the Imperial and +Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Dr. +Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs +Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval +Staff; Count Czernin, Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign +Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count +Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus, +the German naval attaché in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the +Imperial and Royal naval attaché in Berlin; Count B. +Colloredo-Mannsfeld.</p> + +<p class="lilin">On January 20 a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs on the question of establishing unrestricted U-boat +warfare.</p> + +<p class="lilin">As evidenced by Admiral v. Holtzendorff's statements, the German +naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an +absolute necessity for the quickest possible inauguration of an +unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in support of +this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and Royal +Ambassador in Berlin (report of 12/1/17 Nr. 6/P, and telegram of +13/1 Nr. 22), and may be summarised in the following sentences: +Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central Powers, +progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-French +offensive on the Western front with improved and increased means +for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent or at +least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking, the +impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of +raising the <i>moral</i> of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results +and the use of every available means in war, certainty of the +success of an unrestricted <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>U-boat warfare in view of provisions +in England only being sufficient for two to three months, as well +as the stoppage of the munitions output and industrial production +owing to the lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying +coal to France and Italy, etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Concerning the carrying out of the plan, the German Navy owns at +present for that purpose 120 U-boats of the latest type. In view +of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of +the war, when there were only 19 of an antiquated type, the +present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guarantee of +success.</p> + +<p class="lilin">February 1 is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date on +which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to +announce the blockade of the English coast and the west coast of +France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed +without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to +reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral +von Holtzendorff <i>expressis verbis</i> guaranteed the results.</p> + +<p class="lilin">As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading +German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic +views. It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or +Holland will interfere with us, although, in view of the +possibility of such happening, military precautions have been +taken. The measures taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will, +in the opinion of the Germans, hold those countries in check, and +the possibility of sharing the fate of Roumania will frighten +them. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a complete +stoppage of all neutral shipping, which in the matter of supplies +for England amounts to 39 per cent. of the cargo space. Meanwhile +concessions will be granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit +for the withdrawal of such of their vessels as may be at sea on +the opening day of the U-boat warfare.</p> + +<p class="lilin">With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all +possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central +Powers by adopting a friendly attitude towards America (acting +upon the proposals made at the time of the <i>Lusitania</i> incident), +but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever +attitude America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the +opinion that the United States will not go so far as making a +breach with the Central Powers. If that should occur, America +would be too late and could only come into action after England +had been beaten. America is not prepared for war, which was +clearly shown at the time of the Mexican crisis; she lives in fear +of Japan and has to fight against agricultural and social +difficulties. Besides which, Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the +Germans presume that after his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span>election he will adopt a still +more decided tendency that way, for his election will not be due +to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the +Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the +Irish and Germans. These considerations, together with the +Entente's insulting answer to President Wilson's peace proposal, +do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into +war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand +for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is +based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign +Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian +Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would +ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral, +agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of +the success of a blockade of England. Count Czernin held that the +Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in +England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war +consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been +reduced by half. Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague +and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities. +It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to +the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons +per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end, +and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best +card until all other means had been tried. The possibility of +being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a +Damocles' sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would +perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the +reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it +the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the effect expected by +Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of +possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the +enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanishing of +the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact. +Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put +forward by the Germans show a complete <i>novum</i>, namely, the danger +on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive +that is expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the +attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered +necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy +into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most +certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and +the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be +accepted. Both Count <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span>Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their +grave doubts in this connection.</p> + +<p class="lilin">To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the +necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the +neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the +Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to +them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing +unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice +was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as +the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary +steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements +had already been made.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Admiral Haus agreed <i>unreservedly</i> with the arguments of the +German Navy, as he declared that <i>no great anxiety need be felt</i> +as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force, +and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a +ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been +practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged +that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the +Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said +that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the +conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th +inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor, +and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare +and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany +had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and +that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to +be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small +number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great +effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I +entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should +separate from Germany on that one point, although I was aware that it +might lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty was that +the U-boat effort would also have to be carried on in the +Mediterranean in order that it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>should not lose its effect in the +North Sea. If the Mediterranean remained exempt, the transports would +take that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and Dover, and +thus render the northern U-boat warfare of no effect. But in order to +carry it on in the Mediterranean, Germany would need our support in +the Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed her at +those places it involved us in the campaign, and if we refused to let +our few U-boats go out, it would be attacking Germany in the rear and +we should become embroiled with her, which would lead to the definite +severance of the Alliance.</p> + +<p>This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong +and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it +changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally. None +who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart +we gave our consent. Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of +the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was +differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the +German plans. Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that +Bulgaria's not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside +world, and would not help her in any way. Although her relations with +America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of +fact, make her fate easier.</p> + +<p>Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat +warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined +in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of +our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of +Bulgaria. As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict +with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and +artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans. We were +compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already +at war with her.</p> + +<p>It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even +nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her +and Bulgaria to the very end of the war.</p> + +<p>It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>that +the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible +mistake. To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German +military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and +when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was +still that England would be defeated by the naval war. Writing on +December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles +the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however, certainly perceived +definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff +in replying to the reproaches I made to him said: "Everything is risky +in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the +results. I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final +result will show that I was right." In order to exculpate themselves +all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case, +have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last +impetus. Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either +be asserted or denied positively.</p> + +<p>The world has become used to looking upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff as +one; they belonged together. Together they rose to highest power, to +be forcibly separated in their fall. In all business transactions +Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great speaker, but always +in a sharp tone, suggestive of the Prussian military system. It +usually aroused a scene, but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his +anger vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's retiring +modesty made him attractive. Once when we were speaking of the +photographers who besieged every conference in Berlin, the old +gentleman remarked: "I have lived to be seventy, and nobody ever +thought there was anything wonderful about me; now they seem all at +once to have discovered that I have such an interesting head." He was +much more staid and quiet than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to +public opinion as the latter. I remember once how Ludendorff, when I +exhorted him to yield on the peace question, rejoined with vigour: +"The German people wishes for no peace of renunciation, and I do not +intend to end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>would never +survive such a peace." The dynasty has departed, the stones have been +thrown, and the peace of renunciation has become a reality, and is +certainly more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever have +believed!</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>The rupture between America and Germany occurred on February 3, 1917.</p> + +<p>The Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, remained in Washington, but was not +received by Wilson, and had intercourse with Lansing only. I still +hoped to maintain these semi-official relations with America, in case +America, in breaking off relations with Germany, might be content with +that and not declare war on her. The German Government would have +preferred our breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with +them.</p> + +<p>On February 12 Count Wedel called on me, and his request and my +settlement of it appear in the following telegram to Hohenlohe:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="noin"><i>Vienna, Feb. 12, 1917.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin">To notify Your Excellency.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following +three requests from his Government:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="hang">(1) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the +situation between Germany and America is clear.</p> + +<p class="hang">(2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his having +tried to make the neutrals turn against Germany.</p> + +<p class="hang">(3) On the outbreak of war with Germany Count Tarnowski must be +recalled.</p></div> + +<p class="lilin">I have refused the first two items and accepted the last.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>As we should not have been able to prevent Germany from beginning the +U-boat warfare, the only alternative for us was to use all means in +our power to maintain our relations with America, and thus enable us +later to play the part of mediator, although this could only be for +that period during which America, having broken off relations, had not +yet declared war. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>My answer of March 5, 1917, to America's request +for an explanation of our standpoint was sent with the object of +preventing America from breaking off relations with us, and also to +keep from the public the knowledge of our divergence from Germany. +This will be found noted in the appendix.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> It met with success so +far that America continued diplomatic relations with us until April 9, +1917.</p> + +<div class="img" style="width: 65%;"><a name="imagep128" id="imagep128"></a> +<a href="images/imagep128.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/imagep128.jpg" width="76%" alt="COUNT TISZA." /></a><br /> +<p class="right" style="margin-top: .2em;"><i>Photo: Stanley's Press Agency.</i></p> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">COUNT TISZA.<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen Tisza in consequence +of my answer. I received the following letter on March 3:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Dear Friend</span>,—In the interests of the cause I can only +greatly regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the +definite sense of our <i>aide-mémoire</i> before it was dispatched. +Apart from other less important matters, I cannot conceal my +painful surprise that we repeatedly and expressly admit having +given a promise in our <i>Ancona</i> Note. I am afraid that we have +placed ourselves in a very awkward position with Wilson, which so +easily could have been avoided, as it was not in accordance with +my views that we had given a promise.</p> + +<p class="lilin">An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to +detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different +legal character, and from the point of view of a third person has +no legal authority in favour of that person as a promise.</p> + +<p class="lilin">By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans a +promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them. +In spite of the fine and clever argument in our Note, it will be +easy for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot +be reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a +promise, then the American Government has the right to look for +the fulfilment of it, and we will then be in an awkward +predicament. I remarked in my notification that I would prefer to +omit the admission that we had made any promise; there would have +been the possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in +their hands we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a +checkmate, and I very much fear that we shall greatly regret it.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Naturally this remains between us. But I was constrained to pour +out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of all +such important State documents which involve such far-reaching +consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and +comment <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span>on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the +cause and in every respect can only be for the best. In sincere +friendship, your devoted</p> + +<p class="right sc">Tisza.</p> + + +<p class="noin"><i>Enclosure.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin">It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace +wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson, +influenced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a +decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my +presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as +possible the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Therefore the answer to the American <i>aide-mémoire</i>, to be +dispatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give +it the appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put +forward on the American side without falling into the trap of the +question put forward in the <i>aide-mémoire</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to +avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer we +shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on January 31.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is +provided by the <i>aide-mémoire</i> itself, as it identifies our +statements in the <i>Ancona</i> and <i>Persia</i> question with the attitude +of the German Note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite +consistent if we, as we did in our Note of December 14, 1915, were +to declare that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In our correspondence with the American Government respecting the +<i>Ancona</i>, <i>Persia</i> and <i>Petrolite</i> questions we treated the +concrete case always without going deeper into the individual +principles of legal questions. In our Note of December 29, 1915, +which contains the expression of opinion cited in the +<i>aide-mémoire</i> (it may also be noted that our expression of +opinion was no pledge, as we had promised nothing nor taken any +obligation upon ourselves), the Austrian Government distinctly +stated that they would refer later to the difficult international +questions connected with the U-boat warfare.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion. +In consequence, however, of the dealings of our enemies, events +have occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on +our side also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat +question unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever +attainable, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the +enemy. Our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most +aggravated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals +offering any resistance.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Entente when laying their minefields displayed the same +ruthlessness towards free shipping and the lives of neutrals.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Mines are considered as a recognised weapon for the definite +protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of +blockading an enemy port. But the use made of them as an +aggressive factor in this war is quite a new feature, for vast +areas of open sea on the route of the world's traffic were +converted into minefields impassable for the neutrals except at +the greatest danger of their lives.</p> + +<p class="lilin">There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the +freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests +than establishing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited +and clearly marked-out zone, leaving open channels for neutral +shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the +interests of the neutrals.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire +belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our +group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to +conclude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh +and larger minefield was laid down in the North Sea on the route +of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble +initiative of the United States, a war of destruction against our +groups of Powers was announced by the Entente.</p> + +<p class="lilin">We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American +Government: the quickest possible cessation of the fearful +slaughter of men and the founding of an honourable, lasting and +blessed peace by combating with the greatest energy our enemies' +furious war for conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common +aims of ourselves and the American Government, and we cannot give +up the hope of finding understanding in the people and the +Government of the United States.</p> + +<p class="right sc">Tisza.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>I answered as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right"><i>March 5.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Dear Friend</span>,—I cannot agree with you. After the first +<i>Ancona</i> Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that +"we agreed with the German standpoint in the main"—that was an +obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and +if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any +further.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with +words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it; +either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will +avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and +will find it in our Note.</p> + +<p class="lilin">So much for the merits of the matter.</p> + +<p class="lilin">What you demand is technically impossible. The Note was not easy +to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His +Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and +sanctioned it. Meanwhile Penfield<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> importuned me and telegraphed +even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans, +too, had to be won over for that particular passage.</p> + +<p class="lilin">You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but +<i>ultra posse nemo tenetur</i>—it was physically impossible to upset +everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views.</p> + +<p>In true friendship, your</p> + +<p class="right sc">Czernin.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Dear Friend</span>,—I also note with genuine pleasure the +success of your American <i>aide-mémoire</i> (meaning thereby America's +resolve not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter +my opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been +given. It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and +it would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final +word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think +me better than I am.</p> + +<p>Au revoir, in true friendship, your</p> + +<p class="right sc">Tisza.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated +it from reasons of <i>vis major</i>, because we could not prevent the +German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and +I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no +advantage to us.</p> + +<p>Not until very much later—in fact, not until after the war—did I +learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible +misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more +U-boats during the war. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>Secretary of State, Capelle, was +approached by competent naval technical experts, who told him that, by +stopping the building of all other vessels, a fivefold number of +U-boats could be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext +"that nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats when the war +was at an end." Germany had, as mentioned, 100 submarines; had she +possessed 500, she might have achieved her aims.</p> + +<p>I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was from a source from +which I invariably gleaned correct information.</p> + +<p>Seldom has any military action called forth such indignation as the +sinking, without warning, of enemy ships. And yet the observer who +judges from an objective point of view must admit that the waging war +on women and children was not begun by us, but by our enemies when +they enforced the blockade. Millions have perished in the domains of +the Central Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest and +weakest people—the greater part women and children—were the victims. +If, to meet the argument, it be asserted that the Central Powers were +as a besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved Paris in +similar fashion, there is certainly some truth in the argument. But it +is just as true—as stated in the Note of March 5—that in a war on +land no regard is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war +zone, and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should be +subject to different moral conditions. When a town or village is +within the range of battle, the fact has never prevented the artillery +from acting in spite of the danger to the women and children. But in +the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy States who are +in danger can easily escape it by not undertaking a sea voyage.</p> + +<p>Since the débâcle in the winter of 1918, I have thoroughly discussed +the matter with English friends of long standing, and found that their +standpoint was—that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had +roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature of the +proceedings so opposed to international law. Also, the torpedoing of +hospital ships by the Germans, and the firing on passengers seeking to +escape, and so on. These <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>accounts are flatly contradicted by the +Germans, who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English +brutality, as instanced by the <i>Baralong</i> episode.</p> + +<p>There have, of course, been individual cases of shameful brutality in +all the armies; but that such deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the +German or English Supreme Commands I do not believe.</p> + +<p>An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court would be the only +means of bringing light to bear on the matter.</p> + +<p>Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be condemned, no matter who +the perpetrators are; but in itself, the U-boat warfare was an +allowable means of defence.</p> + +<p>The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible and necessary +proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat warfare is stigmatised as a crime +against international law. That is the sentence passed by might but +not by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise.</p> + +<br /> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince +Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <a href="#Page_279">See p. 279.</a></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna.</p></div> + + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER VI<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>ATTEMPTS AT PEACE</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary +state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of +representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His +action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of +representatives. If the majority of that body are against the +minister, he must go.</p> + +<p>The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in +the hands of the delegations.</p> + +<p>Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a +regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was +responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently, +the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in +conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and +the Prime Minister."</p> + +<p>It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime +Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's régime it had +become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret +nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought +his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza +possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time +to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding +his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore, +to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign +policy was, therefore, twofold—both by the delegation and the Prime +Minister.</p> + +<p>Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the +friendship between us, still his constant supervision <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span>and +intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of +business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on +top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for +Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified +presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the +Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the +standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar +centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians. +He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism +save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to +keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a +crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of +Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected +cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined +than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the +Tyrol.</p> + +<p>Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for +Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's +internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external +pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of +provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian +Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was +fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any +expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All +his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a +mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at +most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her +over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with +Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He +looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to +the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he +was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian +pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered. +Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span>making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay +much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for +the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite +of eventual disagreement.</p> + +<p>This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was +unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various +disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these +scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty +word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised +never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I +promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after +this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different +reasons.</p> + +<p>I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had +caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a +speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly, +Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the +war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the +Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace +negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the +<i>status quo ante</i>. His support—and that was the third reason—was of +great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become +hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood +in awe of nothing and nobody—and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this +upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth, +and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did.</p> + +<p>I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve +the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never +put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the +strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that +warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle +as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship +with him as with Tisza.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest +reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this +remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years +Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and +manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity +raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with +brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in +Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and +he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of +old were made—heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often +did I reproach him with his unhappy "<i>puszta</i>" patriotism, that was +digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change +him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that, +all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy. +Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her +day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this +wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like +none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the +breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful +personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was +one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly +loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand +of some cowardly assassin.</p> + +<p>Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that +his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian.</p> + +<p>I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a +man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar +way of thinking spoilt him.</p> + +<p>Hungary and her Constitution—dualism—were one of our misfortunes in +the war.</p> + +<p>Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing +away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love +and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>Berchtold's time Hungarian policy +settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an +impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the +war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment, +through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was +beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains +true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. +The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition; +therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in +the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more +injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war. +Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder +that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly +linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but +like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."</p> + +<p>If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would +have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any +sensible European <i>consortium</i> would consent to be brought into +partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.</p> + +<p>But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was +impossible.</p> + +<p>Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever +be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind +fate preserve us from a return of dualism.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>On December 26, 1916—four days after entering upon office—I received +a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the +tactics to be observed:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously +threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania, +etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared +with that of the Entente—if consistently and cleverly carried +out—will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.</p> + +<p class="lilin">From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that +our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war +aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a +plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly +desire peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to +neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the +necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for +our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from +making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.</p> + +<p class="lilin">An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the +belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and +might easily make the situation more strained; <i>a one-sided +announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the +belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of +the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially, +but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints +concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting +interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief +aim, <i>the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the +English at sea</i>, is in the interests of the entire world, and that +our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the +future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral +side.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest +friendship, your devoted</p> + +<p class=" right sc">Tisza.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace +proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is +still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and +there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I +have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not +have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a +conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not +attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very +arrogant—an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's +speeches in the Hungarian Parliament—I think, nevertheless, that even +had it been differently worded <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>it had small prospect of success. +However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only +strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with +increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a +mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.</p> + +<p>In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial +concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed +from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private +individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government. +It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A +Government can make use of a private individual to take the first +step—it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may +also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the +knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the +latter occurred frequently during my term of office.</p> + +<p>I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, +even when a ministerial source could not be proved <i>a priori</i>, should +be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the +above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could +separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her +purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose +aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian +aspirations. A separate peace with Italy—her separation from her +Allies—was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would +have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an +understanding with Germany.</p> + +<p>The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the +extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready +to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a +conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have +brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.</p> + +<p>I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim +at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span>on the basis of +pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent.</p> + +<p>After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to +judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have +separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further +accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But +it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single +moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her +Allies.</p> + +<p>An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A +person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give +credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral +Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been +instructed to let me know that our enemies—or at least one of +them—were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions +would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question +of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if +agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the +same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that +<i>these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and +void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the +hostile country heard of the step</i>.</p> + +<p>The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final +sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to +negotiate unknown to the others.</p> + +<p>I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my +authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could +not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27 +through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that +Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further +bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as +stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I +drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span>application, not +being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for +peace <i>with us only</i>, or with the entire <i>group of Powers</i>, and I was +constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate +from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as +mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to +conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee +secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our +Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made +clear.</p> + +<p>This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a +direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace +with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made +clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered +at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to +a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I +hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result.</p> + +<p>I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on +March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his +part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier, +would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole +world.</p> + +<p>The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After +all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility +of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that +direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to +make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the +Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve.</p> + +<p>If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted +U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the +altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer +of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all +expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time +there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat +could be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to +counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was +only in the course of the summer that the success of the +anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed.</p> + +<p>In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative +to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid, +which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers +returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there +during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there +was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all +the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers; +potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the +majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so +that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and +they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and, +therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no +one to man them.</p> + +<p>This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different +sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came +from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was +noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an +end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of +the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on +into the winter, the result would be as in Russia—a revolution.</p> + +<p>At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy +Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The +Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their +Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of +non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and +his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At +the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety +concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that +she considered the game was lost. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>revolution and the collapse of +the army in Russia still continued.</p> + +<p>Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us, +and justified the views of those who had always held that a little +more "endurance"—to use a word since become ominous—would lead to a +decision.</p> + +<p>During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an +important and adequately estimated significance to confidential +reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided +Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is +inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be +accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism. +Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from +political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from +the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own +personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are +apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the +feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies +of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the +leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be +compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved.</p> + +<p>In persons who make this <i>métier</i> their profession, the wish is often +present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give +pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of +losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate +confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as +being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more +pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin, +was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming +from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were +losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to +assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the +politicians looked at the situation <i>among our opponents</i> differently +from us.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he +related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in +England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was +convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no +question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was +whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of +American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not, +but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing +incidents that might have occurred.</p> + +<p>After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that +many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact. +But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how +matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer +of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England +be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide +difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the +one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken +into account by German opinion.</p> + +<p>However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of +the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented +a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it +was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be +brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became +stronger.</p> + +<p>I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make +the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words +that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in +Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with +France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede +Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make +efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to +Germany—not <i>incorporated</i>, but, say, some form of personal union.</p> + +<p>The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span>made the +proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence +of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor +William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the +conference terminated with a request from the Germans for +consideration of the question.</p> + +<p>In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If +Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with +the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of +London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to +satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the +hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor +Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once, +nevertheless, to take the proposed step.</p> + +<p>I, however, thoroughly believed then—though wrongly—that in the +circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an +amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a +definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.</p> + +<p>In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to +the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting +that he would submit it to the Emperor William.</p> + +<p>The report was as follows:—</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from +the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my +responsible opinion of the situation?</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an +end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to +take up Your Majesty's time needlessly.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production +of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and, +above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to +under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of +the sufferings from the war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few +months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely +out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in +the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace +negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the +fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a +moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the +coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the +Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the +absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right +time is, therefore, of extreme importance.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the +whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising +on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is +demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been +dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the +strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us +feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: <i>exempla trahunt</i>. +Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the +conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly +rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the +possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the +history of the world; it is without example and without precedent. +The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be +vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the +happenings that have now become daily occurrences.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the +dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound +to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be +conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that +factor.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the +town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our +Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for +the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch +whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one +where the people themselves are fighting for their national +independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the +population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your +Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any +day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances +occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal +the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further +efforts to secure peace will be defeated.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span>I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely +different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military +circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I +am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached +the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders +in Berlin do not seek to deny it.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark +on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the +interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than +a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central +Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months, +it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide +of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers +fought and died.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I do not wish to make any <i>oratio pro domo</i>, but I beg Your +Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the +Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when +I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very +day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as +convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and +I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the +dangers that I see ahead.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly +aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can +throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact, +the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the +situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies +have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait +longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be +said what course events will take in Russia. I hope—and this is +the vital point of my whole argument—that Russia has lost her +motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that +this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless, +that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be +launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we +shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds—and I +reckon it can be done in two or three months—we must then, before +America takes any further military action to our disadvantage, +make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not +shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to +make.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such +hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous +deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span>the +tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the +success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been +achieved.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in +Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare +would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty +will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared +that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously +affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by +the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a +half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare +started, and all the information that we get from England is to +the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most +dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of +many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and +consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the +U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German +arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely +necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and +because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately, +would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted +U-boat warfare.</p> + +<p class="lilin">To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the +U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory +will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that +England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will +lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics +than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more +fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall +a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible +awakening will follow.</p> + +<p class="lilin">England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay +down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps—and here I +concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme—perhaps England in +a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to +continue this war <i>à l'outrance</i>, or whether it would not be more +statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central +Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for +great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to +separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the +responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any +dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty +instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that +our strength is at an end, and that after <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span>the close of the summer +Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these +commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for +Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this +one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say:</p> + +<p class="lilin">We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility +of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed, +then we must—and at the right time—play our last card and make +the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has +proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect +from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be +ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to +make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the +Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to +defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with +all the means in your power and to your very last breath.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial +Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor +Charles, and then to me:—</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to +submit the following in answer to the enclosed <i>exposé</i> from the +Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Since the <i>exposé</i> was drawn up, the French and English on the +Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a +wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous +quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of +the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every +reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the +men and the iron will of their leaders.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may +consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the +same confidence.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political +upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a +large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the +situation would release more men even if it were considered +necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to +guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary +movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West +would become more favourable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>for us. The withdrawal of men would +also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for +the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front +until the end of the war is reached.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material +for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards +provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out +until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary, +especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken +into consideration.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When +Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic +Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success +for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the +expected military advantages weighed against the political risk. +We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a +blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the +entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling +off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies +would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we +were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the +U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest +share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been +transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where +English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the +resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and +favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined +attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat +warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest +statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing +difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies, +as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include +urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength, +but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the +distress that England is suffering.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head +Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed +account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The +review was published in the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i> of +the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p class="lilin">According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span>owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to +specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so +restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by +hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from +abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by +cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires +not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for +the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to +enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of +the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country, +it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two +instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it +is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats +reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable +extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope +of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater +number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport +facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries +in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed +with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the +possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo +space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat +warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last +year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if +they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But +they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the +subject have already said quite openly that there are only two +ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build +vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy +the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has +proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than +the new vessels building.</p> + +<p class="lilin">England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss +of tonnage.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and +on all private and Government activities will be felt more and +more.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare +with the greatest confidence.</p> + +<p class="lilin">According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister +Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that +France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed +before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since +then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping +up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this +war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after +it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France, +which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.</p> + +<p class="lilin">As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the +difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe +fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe +that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without +permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare, +without any further crises and without menace to Government +organisation.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a +favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with +Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as +possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of +our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the +important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and +that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a +time when both political and military initiative are still in our +hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or +three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a +matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of +the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not +having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too +pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to +failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the +hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present +moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to +the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be +tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the +Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as +regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative +necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been +favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within +the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political, +economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day +that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will +be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to +follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in +Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but +yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace +negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any +appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to +find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace +between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>have +the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the +general peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance +with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an +end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a +prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on +the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also +the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as +Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as +we did.</p> + +<p>I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the +following passage:—</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no +doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all +essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with +<i>sangfroid</i>. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a +love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more +peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be +crushed.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your +report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the +leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that +you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both +His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the +world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they +cease to believe in our powers of resistance—and are not +persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest +efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in +order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to +persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were +prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German +military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of +sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in +the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct +touch with the German Reichstag.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span>One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections +with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with +different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the +Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the +Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was +enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have +incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were +thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we +simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been +vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore, +absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had +been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret +from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence +with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the +Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.</p> + +<p>My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency +and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> +and Südekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now +reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it +was to be peace or war <i>à l'outrance</i>. France was tired and not +anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the +latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the +situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey +could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a +successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole +world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war +compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the +recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a +universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered +the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the +war.)</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as +Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="hang">(1) No annexations, no indemnities.</p> + +<p class="hang">(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium +(politically and economically).</p> + +<p class="hang">(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be +evacuated as soon as both those States had had their +territories restored to them (including the German +colonies).</p> + +<p class="hang">(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general +disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the +Reichstag, and to be made public.</p> + +<p>The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step. +The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme +Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to +secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable. +When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were +satisfied.</p> + +<p>Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault +at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with +Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the +decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the +entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them +per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with +a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace," +the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the +subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval +of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any +decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a +speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it."</p> + +<p>The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span>confirming his +very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views +regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to +in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any +rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to +herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic +influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:—</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right"><i>Berlin, August 17, 1917.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Dear Count Czernin</span>,—According to our agreement, I take +the liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions +of the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if +Your Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on +my activities.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies +me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand +a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than +we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of +the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably +higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less +than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out +economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories, +including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with +regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915.</p> + +<p class="lilin">There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The +people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is +very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really +morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will +be no worse than it was last year.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the +condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from +the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change +for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary +to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as +would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is +already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly +prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it. +It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war +in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most +earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace +as soon as possible.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to +come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span>would be a great tactical error. Our <i>démarche</i> for peace last +December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered +by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind +would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any +peace advances must come now from the enemy.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the +watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm +of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal +co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the +spirit of the Alliance—and in this I know Your Excellency +agrees—remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our +enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to +agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he +states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into +if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down +there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen +to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations +for peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a +proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the +reinstatement of the <i>status quo</i> would be a suitable basis on +which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as +follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is +not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is +ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession +of any German territory; with such a conception of the term +"reinstatement of the <i>status quo</i>," that form would be a very +suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the +desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by +negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close +economic and military conjunction with Germany—this would refer +to Courland, Lithuania and Poland—and thus secure Germany's +frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the +continent and overseas.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but +must reserve to herself the right, <i>by means of the peace +negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of +Longwy and Briey</i>, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal +grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any +noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the +matter of <i>connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and +economic sense</i>. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at +the Kreuznach negotiations—the military control of Belgium until +the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany, +the acquisition <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span>of Liége (or a long-term rental thereof)—were +the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The +Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or +similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on +England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and +military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the +matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much +resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to +see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a +prosperous future.</p> + +<p class="lilin">As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your +Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State +is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France, +which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as +out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent +State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of +November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an +actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the +future will be tested later. There are already many signs of +danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the +Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of +her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in +the administration of the whole state.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger +caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary +through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would +not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the +frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to +grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the +possibility of being joined to Russia.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the +Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in +connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany +respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin, +here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the +questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there +may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling +us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full +agreement.</p> + +<p class="lilin">With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very +devoted</p> + +<p class="right sc">Michaelis.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span>I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course, +the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I +could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing +war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it +imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any +revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would +spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of +Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor +Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore, +conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to +peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, +and I failed to understand it.</p> + +<p>I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the +minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the +question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable +annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers.</p> + +<p>I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German +Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and +that it would be out of the question for the German Government to +ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question +of whether we <i>wished</i> to go on fighting, but whether we <i>could</i>, and +it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end +the war.</p> + +<p>Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor.</p> + +<p>It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the +situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I +had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I +remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on +me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was +prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of +east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession +of the English Fleet to Germany, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>I forget how many milliards in +war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the +Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case +for a doctor.</p> + +<p>There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's +ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he +left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling.</p> + +<p>About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the +scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs.</p> + +<p>Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of +persons who, without being in any important position, had access to +diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names, +especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard +the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very +unsatisfactory way—at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the +Entente were slackening.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused +and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early +summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of +the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the +Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of +the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of +our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente +welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance.</p> + +<p>I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear +light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further +development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what +happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with +Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western +Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a +general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span>and the +Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us.</p> + +<p>Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the +time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the +collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to +blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also +suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to +Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by +personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were +repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that +when I heard of the episode I immediately <i>possessed myself of +documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the +matter</i>, but could not possibly have known.</p> + +<p>Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the +universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I +felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, +from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other +side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to +me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit +of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone +was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination +for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the +alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the +downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a +neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had +heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they +expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of +course, would alter the entire military situation.</p> + +<p>Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral +country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind +the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as +suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, +the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe +about Radoslawoff as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span>about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other +forces were at work.</p> + +<p>The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a +further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet +not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it +lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted +than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to +the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh +instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a +more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In +the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland +myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not +have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it +would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the +mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held +the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert +that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial +Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the +case was different.</p> + +<p>One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the +impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked +everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In +Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were +as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to +Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm +signal for a general <i>sauve qui peut</i>. But the very suggestion that +the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would +have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.</p> + +<p>The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined +visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs, +separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of +1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less. +It was seen by the enemy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span>that it could not accomplish what he had +first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final +military victory.</p> + +<p>These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace +wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera +negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment +to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together +with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a +sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the +negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient +agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from +the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace +when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire +group of Powers.</p> + +<p>Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to <i>prevent</i> us +from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in +London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we +ourselves thus used <i>sabotage</i> in the striving for a general peace; +for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see +Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.</p> + +<p>There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the +idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from +the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for +negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being +enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in +any case, would claim the promises made to her.</p> + +<p>In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on +the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify +the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and +insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we +should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the +Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And +secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had +already begun to do so.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags +others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations, +opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the +foregoing events.</p> + +<p>The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was +that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our +Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace. +For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being +crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that +we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.</p> + +<p>Later I had information from England relating to the official view of +the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic +confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so +strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy +was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made +the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with +her—that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our +intervention—would have put an end to the war.</p> + +<p>This information was to the effect that England was less than ever +inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been +guaranteed—the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German +militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would +support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was +necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's +military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the +army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military +successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace +resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not +enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in +the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial +collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power. +Certain statements made by General Ludendorff—so the Entente +said—proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>of +understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate +itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged +against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude +peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that +in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far +as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to +conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises +made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much +territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in +exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states +like Poland.</p> + +<p>This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of +making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the +bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a +more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding +might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military +questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power +proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's +power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.</p> + +<p>Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the +actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing +misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England +meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy +was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and +Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in +a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened +and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.</p> + +<p>By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the +strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of +a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best +and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous +without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's +eyes <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat. +According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of +France under Bonaparte—if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed +being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"—and just +as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any +dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the +lust for conquest and the policy of violence.</p> + +<p>The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite +justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the +smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception +that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at +Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not +only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.</p> + +<p>Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy +continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety +as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the +"hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like +throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, +too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of +settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly +detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.</p> + +<p>In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same +category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest +heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to +irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who +otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he +called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not +the slightest impression on him.</p> + +<p>The <i>démarche</i> for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been +published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made +by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.</p> + +<p>In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span>Conference at +Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the +representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties +to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear +by the following letter to Tisza.</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right">(<i>Not dated.</i>)</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Dear Friend</span>,—I hear that you do not approve of the +delegation of Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a +delegation. The men came to me of their own accord and applied for +permission to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz +were there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I +value them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The +two last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous +of peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of +the Empire.</p> + +<p class="lilin">If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor +will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear +friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor +will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my +prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved +to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service +but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war +not coming to an end.</p> + +<p class="lilin">If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they +would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been +allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the +Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to +"buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if +they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but +that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the +death-blow to the Customs dues—but I felt rather like Daniel in +the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very +indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside +Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the +octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more, +but the contention is false.</p> + +<p class="lilin">You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we +shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it +is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to +prepare <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span>the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the +valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous +steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none +of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of +using <i>sabotage</i> with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps +tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they +understand and have the conviction that it cannot be +otherwise—that a <i>vis major</i> predominates; in other words, that +peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill +will or stupidity of the Ministers.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the +speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we +were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and +made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to +a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm.</p> + +<p class="lilin">You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's +what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the +slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an +anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the +dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are +always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard +helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this +movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only +way to keep a straight course—he must hold out. Such is the case +of statecraft in Vienna—it is always carried out of the course of +the Alliance.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought +feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully. +Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not +carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing +either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this—<i>you</i> +share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk +about Stockholm again.—In true friendship, your old</p> + +<p class="right sc">Czernin.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be +quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social +Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known.</p> + +<p>As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in +detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the +negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts +were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the +Ambassador Mennsdorff and General <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span>Smuts, which were referred to in +the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about +the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was +at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and +which finally wrecked them all.</p> + +<p>The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite +correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of +intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, +and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism. +Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany +was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the +Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us +the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could +conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices. +The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted. +Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as +well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the +Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the +Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided +concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, +naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain +premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not +meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however, +the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be +laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but +beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the +frontier posts in the Monarchy.</p> + +<p>It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a +settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals +such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as +was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I +referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone +accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the +future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a +peace in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span>the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in +other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the +Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the +unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.</p> + +<p>Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were +not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory. +Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in +England especially there were various currents of thought; not +everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to +lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I +seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by +some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable +military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; +she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or +provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea +was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even +unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make +use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She +would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente, +therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even +of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of +German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that +I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be +secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by +Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined +what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the +enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had +to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal. +Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible +and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration +under international control: that, according to my idea, would present +an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in +this, as in the territorial <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>question, would not mete out the same +measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some +guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the +plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a +trial.</p> + +<p>Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question, +which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in +Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred +that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any +further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined +that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the +mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us +to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty +to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost +more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it, +concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military +superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the +Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war.</p> + +<p>I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who +readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations +would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the +war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid +assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and +Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation +that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a +treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies. +Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new +Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have +certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such +relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up +Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and +Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span>a vague +promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful +remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by +dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice +Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and +Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the +concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could +understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the +arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be +let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister +who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain +sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living +being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still +more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that +represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out +fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save +himself—but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he +suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the +German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge, +for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but +even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that +deprived us of Bozen and Meran.</p> + +<p>My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to +the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another +ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German +people, for whom no hatred was felt—always the same repetition of +that deceptive argument—but German militarism. England was in a +condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany +were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more +extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would +then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then +England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own +existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard +one, but it would not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>crush her. In London they cite again the +example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done +man can do again."</p> + +<p>This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and +the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare +ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would +be a great advantage and an important step towards peace.</p> + +<p>My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of +securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that +militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that +direction.</p> + +<p>At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party +leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone +would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At +home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed, +and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting, +and would further check all friendly intentions.</p> + +<p>The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world +organisation is as follows:—</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said: +words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true +respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a +maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are +fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to +know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to +know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet +been made.</p> + +<p class="lilin">When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly +to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should +tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace +negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of +a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained, +though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian +Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have +reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said +critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness +of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am +that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span>attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called +upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal +Government will deal with the further development of the utterly +distorted European conditions.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation, +preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation, +is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It, +therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme +and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided +us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It +will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear +incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially +Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military +armament, as it is only their military power that has protected +them through these trying years against vastly superior forces.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it +has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the +foundations of former European policy. Among many other political +theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring +state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the +Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and +caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But +having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at +any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on +a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no +hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms. +Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could +not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to +unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the +legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have +been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down +arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration. +This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of +not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of +arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with +all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past.</p> + +<p class="lilin">After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new +political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This +basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature:</p> + +<p class="lilin">In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall +be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can +bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will +be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span>undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can +achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is +international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of +the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these +measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate +state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally +to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be +combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all +states in the world must be established on an international basis +and under international control, and the defensive forces limited +to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult +to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny +and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a +path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether +it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to +imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it +left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by +and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could +happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue +after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin +of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be +borne were heavy—though we specially note that Austria-Hungary +was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when +we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during +the war that she resumed her armaments—but after this war an open +competition in armaments would render state burdens all round +simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments +in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold +supply of everything—ten times the artillery, munition factories, +vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to +work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great +Powers would comprise many milliards—it would be impossible with +all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to +bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean +the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively +limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite +impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind +that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred +would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively +low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an +international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no +sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether.</p> + +<p class="lilin">There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span>international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any +object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world +guarantee the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to +the lowest limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the +interior. This will only be possible on an international basis; +that is, under international control. Every state will have to +cede some of its independence to ensure a world peace. The present +generation will probably not live to see this great pacifist +movement fully completed. It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I +consider it our duty to put ourselves at the head of the movement +and do all that lies in human power to hasten its achievement. The +conclusion of peace will establish the fundamental principles.</p> + +<p class="lilin">If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory +international arbitration system as well as general disarmament on +land, the second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas +and disarmament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not +extend the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that +special rules and regulations must be laid down for the connecting +sea routes. If these first two factors have been settled and +assured, any reason for territorial adjustments on the plea of +ensuring national safety is done away with, and this forms the +third fundamental principle of the new international basis. This +idea is the gist of the beautiful and sublime Note that His +Holiness the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not gone +to war to make conquests, and we have no aggressive plans. If the +international disarmament that we so heartily are longing for be +adopted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we are in +no need of assurances of territorial safety; in that case, we can +give up the idea of expanding the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, +provided, of course, that the enemy has entirely evacuated our own +territory.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The fourth principle to enforce in order to ensure a free and +peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have +experienced is the free economic participation by everyone and the +unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature +must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude +peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies +have given up that idea.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world +organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based +on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note, +has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament. +Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted +these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span>but +agree thoroughly on one—that there nevermore should be a war of +revenge.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most +pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the +subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be +hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment.</p> + +<p>Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a +guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an +opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the +greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was +knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came +from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of +disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only +one way out of it—a fight to the end and then victory.</p> + +<p>Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side +unconditionally with the generals.</p> + +<p>Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as +after my speech—both for and against, with both sides equally +impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn +and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement.</p> + +<p>In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The +U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to +overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the +positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of +their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk +of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign +was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though +mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the +ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse. The +U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western +front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>The military situation underwent a change in the autumn. The end of +the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being +able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the +line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved +the situation.</p> + +<p>It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a +decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was +the new military opinion. Paris and Calais could not be taken.</p> + +<p>In these different phases of military hopes and expectation we floated +like a boat on a stormy sea. In order to land in the haven of peace, +we needed a military wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only +could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would help us to reach +the saving shores. As long as the enemy persisted only in dealing with +the crushed and depopulated Central Powers all was in vain.</p> + +<p>I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare. I believed in a +break-through on the Western front, and during the winter of 1917-1918 +lived in the hope that by such means we might break the obstinate love +of destruction in our enemies.</p> + +<p>As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained the same peace was +impossible, as was also the bringing of any outside pressure to bear +on Germany, for it was true that "the German army was fighting more to +support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own existence."</p> + +<p>Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions of the Pact of +London confronted us. They forced us always to take up arms again, and +drove us back into the field.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>At the time of writing these lines, in June, 1919, Austria has long +ceased to exist. There is only left now a small, impoverished, +wretched land called German-Austria, a country without army or money; +helpless, starving, and wellnigh in despair. This country has been +told of the peace terms at St. Germain. It has been told it must give +up the Tyrol as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>to be handed over to Italy. And defenceless and +helpless as it is, it sends up a cry of despair and frantic grief. One +voice only is heard—such peace is impossible!</p> + +<p>How could an Austrian Government accept the dictates of London at a +time when our armies stood far advanced in enemy country, unvanquished +and unbroken, when we had for Ally the strongest land Power in the +world, and when the greatest generals of the war so firmly believed in +the break-through and in final victory?</p> + +<p>To demand that in 1917 or 1918 I should have accepted peace terms +which in 1919 were rejected by the whole of the German-Austrian people +is sheer madness. But it may be there is method in such madness. The +method of using every means to discredit the "old régime."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>In the beginning of August, 1917, an effort was made at a +<i>rapprochement</i> between England and Germany which, unfortunately, +almost immediately broke down.</p> + +<p>At the suggestion of England a neutral Power had sounded Germany with +regard to Belgium. Germany replied that she was ready for direct +verbal negotiations with England on the Belgian question. In +transmitting this favourable answer, Germany did not entrust it to the +same neutral Power that had brought the message, but for some unknown +reason confided it to a trusted messenger from another neutral +country. This latter appears to have been guilty of some indiscreet +dealings, and when rumours of the affair reached Paris it caused some +anxiety. It was probably thought there that England was more +interested in the Belgian than in the Alsace-Lorraine question.</p> + +<p>The messenger sent from Berlin thought that his task had failed, and +sent word to Berlin that, owing to his errand having been made known, +the opinion among the Entente was that every step taken by Germany was +condemned beforehand to failure.</p> + +<p>The Government which had employed the messenger took up the case on +its own initiative, and transmitted the German <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span>reply to London. No +answer was ever received from England.</p> + +<p>This is the account as given to me <i>post festum</i> by Berlin, and +doubtless reflects Berlin's views. Whether the incident in detail was +exactly as described, or whether many more hitherto unknown events +took place, has not been proved.</p> + +<p>During the war all happenings on the other side of the trenches were +looked upon with dim and gloomy eyes as through a veil, and, according +to news received by me later, it was not clear whether England had +sent an answer. Whether it was dispatched and held up on the way, or +what became of it I never knew. It is said never to have reached +Berlin.</p> + +<p>A warlike speech by Asquith on September 27 appears to be connected +with this unsuccessful attempt, and served to calm the Allies.</p> + +<p>It appears extremely doubtful to me, however, whether this advance +would have led to anything, had the occasion been more favourable. The +previously mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis dates +from those August days, a letter referring to Belgian projects which +were very far removed from the English ideas on the subject. And even +if it had been possible to settle the Belgian question, there would +have been that of Alsace-Lorraine, which linked France and England +together, and, first and foremost, the question of disarmament. The +chasm that divided the two camps would have grown so wide that no +bridge could possibly have spanned it.</p> + +<p>Not until January, 1918, did I learn the English version. According to +that, the Germans are said to have taken the first steps, and the +English were not disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It +was stated in <i>Vorwärts</i> that the suggestion was made at the +instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that subsequently military +influence gained the upper hand. The episode did not tend to improve +the frame of mind of the leading men in England.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span>In the early summer of 1917 conditions seemed favourable for peace and +the hope of arriving at an understanding, though still far distant, +was not exactly a Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our +group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have contributed to +stiffen the desire for war in the Entente countries cannot definitely +be stated. Both factors had a share in it. Before we came to a +deadlock in the negotiations, the position was such that even in case +of a separate peace we should have been compelled to accept the terms +of the conference of London. Whether the Entente would have abandoned +that basis if we had not veered from the straight course, and by +unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist +desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not +proved, and never will be. After the débâcle in the winter of 1918-19 +it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power +a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question. His +standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed. +Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only +came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and +were beginning to falter.</p> + +<p>With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and England would have +welcomed a separate peace on our part, even during Clemenceau's period +of office; but in that case we should have had to accept the terms of +the London conference.</p> + +<p>Such was the peace question then. How it would have developed if no +misleading policy had come into being naturally cannot be stated.</p> + +<p>I am not putting forward suppositions but confirming facts. And the +fact remains that the failure of the U-boat campaign on the one hand, +and a policy carried on behind the backs of the responsible men on the +other hand, were the reasons why the favourable moment passed and the +peace efforts were checked. And I herewith repeat that this fact does +not in itself prove that peace negotiations would not also have failed +later if the two reasons mentioned above had not existed.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>It became quite clear in the autumn that the war would have to +continue. In my speeches to delegations I endeavoured to leave no +doubt that we were faithful to our Allies. When I said "I see no +difference between Strassburg and Trieste," I said it chiefly for +Sofia and Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple Alliance +was the greatest danger. I still hoped to be able to prop the +trembling foundations of the Alliance policy, and either to secure a +general peace in the East, where the military opposition was giving +way, or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German +break-through on the Western front.</p> + +<p>Several months after my dismissal in the summer of 1918 I spoke in the +Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and warned everyone present against +trying to undermine the Quadruple Alliance. When I declared that +"honour, duty to the Alliance, and the call for self-preservation +compel us to fight by the side of Germany," I was misunderstood. It +did not seem as though the public realised that the moment the Entente +thought the Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that moment +our cause was lost. Had the public no knowledge of the London +agreement? Did they not know that a separate peace would hand us over +totally defenceless to those cruel conditions? Did they not realise +that the German army was the shield that afforded us the last and only +possibility of escaping the fate of being broken up?</p> + +<p>My successor steered the same course as I had done, doubtless from the +same reasons of honour and the call for self-preservation. I have no +particulars as to what occurred in the summer of 1918.</p> + +<p>Afterwards events followed in rapid succession. First came our +terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente break-through on the +Western front, and finally the Bulgarian secession, which had +gradually been approaching since the summer of 1917.</p> + +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span><br /> +<br /> + +<h3>3</h3> + +<p>As is the case in all countries, among the Entente during the war +there were many and varied currents of thought. When Clemenceau came +into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war +aim.</p> + +<p>To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a +Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as +though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military +strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I think that +this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when +any such hope was deceptive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote +in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining +influence in England.</p> + +<p>When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to +discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in +Germany was to be or could be guaranteed—and I invariably came to an +<i>impasse</i>. It was never explained how England intended to carry out +the proposal.</p> + +<p>The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined +people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly +admitted to us in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not +suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could +lead to a decision.</p> + +<p>Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a +parliamentary régime which would have deprived the Emperor of power +and given it to the Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not +later. The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A disarmament +treaty with Germany would be a treaty between a fox and many geese," +conveyed what he really thought.</p> + +<p>After my Budapest speech, which was treated with such scorn and +contempt in the Press and by public opinion on the other side of the +Channel, word was sent to me from an English source that it was said +the "Czernin scheme" might settle <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span>the question. But again it was not +Lloyd George who said that.</p> + +<p>Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the English Prime +Minister, and with them the great majority in France and England, had +of Germany's intentions, no measure could be devised that would have +given London and Paris a sufficient guarantee for a future peaceful +policy. From the summer of 1917, no matter what Germany had proposed, +Lloyd George would always have rejected it as inadequate.</p> + +<p>In consequence of this it was quite immaterial later to the course of +the war that Germany not only did nothing whatever to allay English +fears, but, on the contrary, poured oil in the fire and fanned the +flames.</p> + +<p>Germany, the leading military Power in the war, never for one moment +thought of agreeing to disarmament under international control. After +my speech in Budapest I was received in Berlin not in an unfriendly +manner, but with a sort of pity, as some poor insane person might be +treated. The subject was avoided as much as possible. Erzberger alone +told me of his complete agreement with me.</p> + +<p>Had Germany been victorious her militarism would have increased +enormously. In the summer of 1917 I spoke to several generals of high +standing on the Western front, who unanimously declared that after the +war armaments must be maintained, but on a very much greater scale. +They compared this war with the first Punic War. It would be continued +and its continuation be prepared for; in short, the tactics of +Versailles. The standard of violence must be planted, and would be the +banner of the generals, the Pan-Germans, the Fatherland Party, etc. +etc. They thought as little about a reconciliation of the nations +after the war as did the Supreme Council of Four at Versailles, and +Emperor, Government and Reichstag floundered helplessly in this +torrent of violent purpose.</p> + +<p>The military spirit flourished on the Spree as it is doing now on the +Seine and the Thames. Lloyd George and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>Unter den Linden in Berlin. +The only difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that the one is a +Frenchman and the other a German; as men they are as like as two peas.</p> + +<p>The Entente is victorious, and many millions are delighted and declare +that the policy of Might is justified. The future only can show +whether this is not a terrible mistake. The lives of hundreds of +thousands of young, hopeful men who have fallen might have been saved +if in 1917 peace had been made possible for us. The triumph of victory +cannot call them back to life again. It appears to me that the Entente +has conquered too much, too thoroughly. The madness of expiring +militarism, in spite of all its orgies, has perhaps celebrated its +last triumph at Versailles.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h4>Postscript.</h4> + +<p>Taking it altogether, the real historical truth concerning the peace +movement is that, in general, neither the Entente nor the ruling, +all-powerful military party in Germany wished for a peace of +understanding. They both wished to be victorious and to enforce a +peace of violence on the defeated adversary. The leading men in +Germany—Ludendorff above all—never had a genuine intention of +releasing Belgium in an economic and political sense; neither would +they agree to any sacrifices. They wished to conquer in the East and +the West, and their arbitrary tendencies counteracted the pacifist +leaning of the Entente as soon as there were the slightest indications +of it. On the other hand, the leading men in the Entente—Clemenceau +from the first and Lloyd George later—were firmly resolved to crush +Germany, and therefore profited by the continuous German threats to +suppress all pacifist movements in their own countries, always ready +to prove that a peace of understanding with Berlin would be a "pact +between the fox and the geese."</p> + +<p>Thanks to the attitude of the leading Ministers in Germany, the +Entente was fully persuaded that an understanding with Germany was +quite out of the question, and insisted obstinately on peace terms +which could not be accepted by a Germany <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span>still unbeaten. This closes +the <i>circular vitiosus</i> which paralysed all negotiating activities.</p> + +<p><i>We</i> were wedged in between these two movements and unable to strike +out for ourselves, because the Entente, bound by their promises to +their Allies, had already disposed of us by the Pact of London and the +undertakings to Roumania and Serbia. We therefore <i>could</i> not exercise +extreme pressure on Germany, as we were unable to effect the annulment +of those treaties.</p> + +<p>In the early summer of 1917 the possibility of an understanding +<i>seemed</i> to show itself on the horizon, but it was wrecked by the +previously mentioned events.</p> + +<br /> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Helfferich's <i>exposé</i> is reproduced in the Appendix. (See +p. 288.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> At this time I did not know that my secret report to the +Emperor was handed over to Herr Erzberger and not kept secret by him. +(Later it was made public through the revelations of Count Wedel.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The disclosures made by Count Wedel and Helfferich +concerning Erzberger are only a link in the chain.</p></div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER VII<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>WILSON</h4> +<br /> + +<p>Through the dwindling away of the inclination for peace in the enemy +camp we were faced in the autumn of 1917 by the prospect either of +concluding separate peace and accepting the many complicated +consequences of a war with Germany and the ensuing mutilation of the +Monarchy under the terms of the Pact of London, or else fighting on +and, aided by our Allies, breaking the will for destruction of our +enemies.</p> + +<p>If Russia was the one to let loose war, it was Italy who perpetually +stood in the way of a peace of understanding, insisting upon obtaining +under all circumstances the whole of the Austrian territory promised +to her in 1915. The Entente during the war assigned the several parts +to be enacted. France was to shed the most blood; England, besides her +fabulous military action, to finance the war, together with America, +and diplomatic affairs to be in Italy's hands. Far too little is known +as yet, and will only later be public knowledge, as to the extent to +which Italian diplomacy dominated affairs during the war. Our +victories in Italy would only have changed the situation if the +defeats that were suffered had led to an Italian revolution and a +complete overthrow of the régime existing there. In other words, the +Royal Government would not be influenced in its attitude by our +victories. Even had our armies advanced much farther than they did, it +would have held to its standpoint in the expectation that, perhaps not +Italy herself, but her Allies, would secure final victory.</p> + +<p>Such was the situation in the autumn of 1917 when Wilson came forward +with his Fourteen Points.</p> + +<p>The advantage of the Wilson programme in the eyes of the whole world +was its violent contrast to the terms of the Pact of London. The right +of self-determination for the nations <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span>had been utterly ignored in +London by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy. Wilson forbade this +and declared that nations could not be treated against their will and +moved hither and thither like the pieces in a game of chess. Wilson +said that every solution of a territorial question arising out of this +war must be arrived at in the interests and in favour of the peoples +concerned, and not as a mere balancing or compromise of claims from +rival sources; and further, that all clearly stated national claims +would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be afforded them, +without admitting new factors or the perpetuation of old disputes or +oppositions, which in all probability would soon again disturb the +peace of Europe and the whole world. A general peace, established on +such a basis could be discussed—and more in the same strain.</p> + +<p>The publication of this clear and absolutely acceptable programme +seemed from day to day to render possible a peaceful solution of the +world conflict. In the eyes of millions of people this programme +opened up a world of hope. A new star had risen on the other side of +the ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction. A mighty man +had come forward and with one powerful act had upset the London +resolutions and, in so doing, had reopened the gates for a peace of +understanding.</p> + +<p>From the first moment the main question was, so it seemed, what hopes +were there of Wilson's programme being carried out in London, Paris +and, above all, in Rome?</p> + +<p>Secret information sent to me from the Entente countries seemed to +suggest that the Fourteen Points were decidedly not drawn up in +agreement with England, France and Italy. On the other hand I was, and +still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken honestly and +sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed that his programme could +be carried out.</p> + +<p>Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual +distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his +surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and +especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly +weaken his position and his influence on <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>his Allies. There would be +no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly introducing Wilson into the +international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong +directions, so that he could not find his way out again. To begin +with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step further.</p> + +<p>The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in +Austria-Hungary. Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed +than it is now. Nations were still sleeping—the Czechs, Slovaks and +Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to +national life. Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between +what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting. The union between +Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of—or was +perhaps the first sign of—the world-movement. At all events it was in +the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of +international politics.</p> + +<p>The world's racial problems found a centre in Austria-Hungary, whose +affairs, therefore, became very prominent. A chemist can enclose in +his retorts different substances and observe how, following the +eternal laws of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a +similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved racial +antagonisms might have been studied within the Habsburg Monarchy and +the inevitable explosion anticipated, instead of its being allowed to +culminate in the world war.</p> + +<p>In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson obviously felt the +necessity of settling the world problem of nationality and recognised +that the Habsburg Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as +a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a terrifying +example. But to begin with, he overlooked the fact that in the +settling of national questions there must be neither adversary nor +ally, as those reflect passing differences, whereas the problem of +nationality is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that what +applies to the Czechs applies also to Ireland, that the Armenians as +well as the Ukrainians desire to live their own national life, and +that the coloured peoples of Africa and India are human <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span>beings with +the same rights as white people. He also failed to see that good will +and the desire for justice are far from being sufficient in themselves +to solve the problem of nationality. Thus it was that under his +patronage, and presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the +question of nationality was not solved but simply turned round where +not actually left untouched. If Germans and Magyars had hitherto been +the dominating races they would now become the oppressed. By the terms +settled at Versailles they were to be handed over to states of other +nationality. Ten years hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as +they exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations will have +appeared and become dominant. The explosive power of unsolved +questions will continue to take effect and within a measurable space +of time again blow up the world.</p> + +<p>Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the programme of the +Pact of London, though not attaching sufficient importance to the +national difficulties, probably hoped to be able to effect a +compromise between the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal +policy. In this connection, however, no bridge existed between Rome +and Washington. Conquests are made by right of the conqueror—such was +Clemenceau's and Orlando's policy—or else the world is ruled on the +principles of national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal, +however, will not be attained—no ideal is attainable; but it will be +brought very much nearer. Might or Right, the one alone can conquer. +But Czechs, Poles and others cannot be freed while at the same time +Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans and Transylvanian-Hungarians are +handed over to foreign states. It cannot be done from the point of +view of justice or with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles +and St. Germain have proved that it can be done by might, and as a +temporary measure.</p> + +<p>The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which +all Franz Ferdinand's political interests were centred during his +lifetime. Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he +certainly did try. The Emperor <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>Charles, too, was not averse to the +movement. The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative +to make the experiment. His idea was <i>quieta non movere</i>. Without +powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the +German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible. Therefore, when +Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the +scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the +German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread.</p> + +<p>I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions +entertained by Wilson—nor do I doubt them now—but my doubts as to +his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced. +It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger +than when he took part in the Peace Conference. As long as fighting +proceeded Wilson was master of the world. He had only to call back his +troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be +placed in a most difficult position. It has always been +incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not +have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to +preserve his own war aims.</p> + +<p>The secret information that I received soon after the publication of +the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the +situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect +for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated +France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition. The logical and +practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the +public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to +understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace +negotiations. Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between +Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open.</p> + +<p>On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I +spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them +to be—in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies—a +suitable basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took steps +to enlighten ourselves on the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span>problem of how in a practical way the +fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out. The +negotiations were then by no means hopeless.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding. Although that +episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot +have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise +that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought +against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply +to Vienna. On February 12—thus, <i>after</i> the conclusion of the Brest +peace—the President, in his speech to Congress, said:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace +foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an +independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish +inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for +European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium +must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and +concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be +satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of +Europe and humanity.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with +the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is +only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances +to defer to Germany and Turkey. Recognising and agreeing with the +important principles in question and the necessity of converting +them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more +easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by +the United States. He would probably have gone even further had he +not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and +the country's dependence on Germany.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>In the same speech the President goes on to say:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8 +is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements a +sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own +Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a +thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>And again:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most +confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say +what <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone +from that of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very +different object in view.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us +speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he +has the best intentions of coming to an understanding. My efforts in +this connection were interrupted by my dismissal.</p> + +<p>In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had +definitely lost faith in me. This was not due to the Wilson question, +nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy. A +difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's +entourage and myself was the real reason. The situation became so +strained as to make it unbearable. The forces that conspired against +me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my +objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be +obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence.</p> + +<p>In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not +intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by +accounts derived from reliable sources. I am still convinced to this +day that morally I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form, +because I was neither clever nor patient enough to <i>bend</i> the +opposition, but would have <i>broken</i> it, by reducing the situation to a +case of "either—or".</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER VIII<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>In the autumn of 1917 I had a visit from a subject of a neutral state, +who is a pronounced upholder of general disarmament and world +pacifism. We began, of course, to discuss the theme of free +competition in armaments, of militarism, which in England prevails on +the sea and in Germany on land, and my visitor entered upon the +various possibilities likely to occur when the war was at an end. He +had no faith in the destruction of England, nor had I; but he thought +it possible that France and Italy might collapse. The French and +Italians could not possibly bear any heavier burdens than already were +laid on them; in Paris and Rome, he thought, revolution was not far +distant, and a fresh phase of the war would then ensue. England and +America would continue to fight on alone, for ten, perhaps even +twenty, years. England was not to be considered just a little island, +but comprised Australia, India, Canada, and the sea. "<i>L'Angleterre +est imbattable</i>," he repeated, and America likewise. On the other +hand, the German army was also invincible. The secession of France and +Italy would greatly hinder the cruel blockade, for the resources of +those two countries—once they were conquered by the Central +Powers—were very vast, and in that case he could not see any end to +the war. Finally, the world would collapse from the general state of +exhaustion. My visitor cited the fable in which two goats met on a +narrow bridge; neither would give way to the other, and they fought +until they both fell into the water and were drowned. The victory of +one group as in previous wars, he continued, where the conqueror +gleaned a rich harvest of gains and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span>vanquished had to bear all +the losses, was out of the question in this present war. <i>Tout le +monde perdra, et à la fin il n'y aura que des vaincus.</i></p> + +<p>I often recalled that interview later. Much that was false and yet, as +it seemed to me, much that was true lay in my friend's words. France +and Italy did not break down; the end of the war came quicker than he +thought; and the invincible Germany was defeated. And still I think +that the conclusions he arrived at came very near the truth.</p> + +<p>The conquerors' finances are in a very precarious state, particularly +in Italy and France; unrest prevails; wages are exorbitant; discontent +is general; the phantom of Bolshevism leers at them; and they live in +the hope that the defeated Central Powers will have to pay, and they +will thus be saved. It was set forth in the peace terms, but <i>ultra +posse nemo tenetur</i>, and the future will show to what extent the +Central Powers can fulfil the conditions dictated to them.</p> + +<p>Since the opening of the Peace Congress at Versailles continuous war +in Europe has been seen: Russians against the whole world, Czechs +against Hungarians, Roumanians against Hungarians, Poles against +Ukrainians, Southern Slavs against Germans, Communists against +Socialists. Three-fourths of Europe is turned into a witch's cauldron +where everything is concocted except work and production, and it is +futile to ask how this self-lacerated Europe will be able to find the +war expenses laid upon her. According to human reckoning, the +conquerors cannot extract even approximate compensation for their +losses from the defeated states, and their victory will terminate with +a considerable deficit. If that be the case, then my visitor will be +right—there will only be the vanquished.</p> + +<p>If our plan in 1917, namely, Germany to cede Alsace-Lorraine to France +in exchange for the annexation of all Poland, together with Galicia, +and all states to disarm; if that plan had been accepted in Berlin and +sanctioned by the Entente—unless the <i>non possumus</i> in Berlin and +opposition in Rome to a change in the Pact of London had hindered any +action—it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span>seems to me the advantage would not only have been on the +side of the Central Powers.</p> + +<p>Pyrrhus also conquered at Asculum.</p> + +<br /> + +<p>My visitor was astonished at Vienna. The psychology of no city that he +had seen during the war could compare with that of Vienna. An amazing +apathy prevailed. In Paris there was a passionate demand for +Alsace-Lorraine; in Berlin the contrary was demanded just as eagerly; +in England the destruction of Germany was the objective; in Sofia the +conquest of the Dobrudsha; in Rome they clamoured for all possible and +impossible things; in Vienna nothing at all was demanded. In Cracow +they called for a Great Poland; in Budapest for an unmolested Hungary; +in Prague for a united Czech State; and in Innsbruck the descendants +of Andreas Hofer were fighting as they did in his day for their sacred +land, Tyrol. In Vienna they asked only for peace and quiet.</p> + +<p>Old men and children would fight the arch-enemy in Tyrol, but if the +Italians were to enter Vienna and bring bread with them they would be +received with shouts of enthusiasm. And yet Berlin and Innsbruck were +just as hungry as Vienna. <i>C'est une ville sans âme.</i></p> + +<p>My visitor compared the Viennese to a pretty, gay, and frivolous woman, +whose aim in life is pleasure and only pleasure. She must dance, sing, +and enjoy life, and will do so under any circumstances—<i>sans âme</i>.</p> + +<p>This pleasure-loving good nature of the Viennese has its admirable +points. For instance, all enemy aliens were better treated in Vienna +than anywhere else. Not the slightest trace of enmity was shown to +those who were the first to attack and then starve the city.</p> + +<p>Stronger than anything else in Vienna was the desire for sensation, +pleasure, and a gay life. My friend once saw a piece acted at one of +the theatres in Vienna called, I believe, <i>Der Junge Medardus</i>. The +scene is laid during the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon. Viennese +citizens condemned to death for intriguing with the enemy are led away +by the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span>French. In a most thrilling scene weeping women and children +bid them farewell. A vast crowd witnesses the affair. A boy suddenly +rushes in shouting: "Napoleon is coming." The crowd hurries away to +see him, and cries of "Long live Napoleon" are heard in the distance.</p> + +<p>Such was Vienna a hundred years ago, and it is still the same. <i>Une +ville sans âme.</i></p> + +<p>I pass on the criticism without comment.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<p>In different circles which justly and unjustly intervened in politics +during my time of office, the plan was suggested of driving a wedge +between North and South Germany, and converting the latter to the +peaceful policy of Vienna in contradistinction to Prussian militarism.</p> + +<p>The plan was a faulty one from the very first. To begin with, as +already stated, the most pronounced obstacle to peace was not only the +Prussian spirit, but the Entente programme for our disruption, which a +closer connection with Bavaria and Saxony would not have altered. +Secondly, Austria-Hungary, obviously falling more and more to pieces, +formed no point of attraction for Munich and Dresden, who, though not +Prussian, yet were German to the very backbone. The vague and +irresponsible plan of returning to the conditions of the period before +1866 was an anachronism. Thirdly and chiefly, all experiments were +dangerous which might create the impression in the Entente that the +Quadruple Alliance was about to be dissolved. In a policy of that +nature executive ability was of supreme importance, and that was +exactly what was usually lacking.</p> + +<p>The plan was not without good features. The appointment of the +Bavarian Count Hertling to be Imperial Chancellor was not due to +Viennese influence, though a source of the greatest pleasure to us, +and the fact of making a choice that satisfied Vienna played a great +part with the Emperor William. Two Bavarians, Hertling and Kühlmann, +had taken over the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span>leadership of the German Empire, and they, apart +from their great personal qualities, presented a certain natural +counter-balance to Prussian hegemony through their Bavarian origin; +but only so far as it was still possible in general administration +which then was in a disturbed state. But farther they could not go +without causing injury.</p> + +<p>Count Hertling and I were on very good terms. This wise and +clear-sighted old man, whose only fault was that he was too old and +physically incapable of offering resistance, would have saved Germany, +if she possibly could have been saved, in 1917. In the rushing torrent +that whirled her away to her fall, he found no pillar to which he +could cling.</p> + +<p>Latterly his sight began to fail and give way. He suffered from +fatigue, and the conferences and councils lasting often for hours and +hours were beyond his strength.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER IX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>POLAND</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>By letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Emperors declared +Poland's existence as a Kingdom.</p> + +<p>When I came into office, I found the situation to be that the Poles +were annoyed with my predecessor because, they declared, Germany had +wanted to cede the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and Count +Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there is some +misunderstanding in this version of the case, as Burian says it is not +correctly rendered.</p> + +<p>There were three reasons that made the handling of the Polish question +one of the greatest difficulty. The first was the totally different +views of the case held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian +Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favour of the so-called +Austro-Polish solution, Count Tisza was strongly opposed to it. His +standpoint was that the political structure of the Monarchy ought not +to undergo any change through the annexation of Poland, and that Poland +eventually might be joined to the Monarchy as an Austrian province, but +never as a partner in a tripartite Monarchy.</p> + +<p>A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on February 22, 1917, was +characteristic of his train of thought. It was as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">Your Excellency</span>,—Far be it from me to raise a discussion +on questions which to-day are without actual value and most +probably will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other +hand, I wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken +conclusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest +certain statements that appeared in the correspondence of our +diplomatic representatives.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span>Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the +attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the so-called +Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question has repeatedly (as +in telegram Nr. 63 from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the +"tripartite solution."</p> + +<p class="lilin">With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out the +fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the +Austro-Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent +circles in the Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland +to the Monarchy must on no account affect its <i>dualistic +structure</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This principle was distinctly recognised by the then leaders in +the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers; +it was also recognised and sanctioned by His late Majesty the +Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this +view is shared by Your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid +misunderstanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian Government +considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political +system, from which, in no circumstances, would it be in a position +to deviate.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The +uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian State, where the +German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a +very unsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that +easily might gain the upper hand should a relatively small number +of the Germans, whether from social-democratic, +political-reactionary or doctrinary reasons, separate from the +other German parties. The establishment of the new Polish element +as a third factor with Austria-Hungary in our constitutional +organism would represent an element so unsafe, and would be +combined with such risks for the further development of the policy +of the Habsburg Great Power, that, in view of the position of the +Monarchy as such, I should feel the greatest anxiety lest the new +and unreliable Russian-Polish element, so different from us in +many respects, should play too predominant a part.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The firm retention of dualism, according to which half the +political influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and +<i>the Hungarian and German element in common furnish a safe +majority</i> in the delegation, alone can secure for the dynasty and +the two States under its sceptre an adequate guarantee for the +future.</p> + +<p class="lilin">There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital +interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the +Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose clear +perception of that fact may have become dulled during the last +peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realisation of +it by the present war.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span>The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and active +Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condition +for the existence of the Hungarian State. It was fatal for all of +us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative +qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all State and +national aims, have for centuries past not been able to devote +themselves to the common cause. The striving for a solution of the +world racial problem and the necessity of combining the +responsibilities of a Great Power with the independence of the +Hungarian State have caused heavy trials and century-long friction +and fighting.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of +efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for +liberty did not attack the continuance of the Habsburg Empire as a +Great Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle +they never followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown +a guarantee for their chartered rights.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the sceptre +of the Habsburgs; she did not wish to come under any foreign rule, +but to be a free nation governed by her own king and her own laws +and not subordinate to any other ruler. This principle was +repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723 and +1791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was found +which endowed it with life and ensured its being carried out in a +manner favourable for the position of a great nation.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In the period of preparation for the agreement of 1867 Hungary was +a poor and, comparatively speaking, small part of the then +Monarchy, and the great statesmen of Hungary based their +administrative plan on dualism and equality as being the only +possible way for ensuring that Hungarian independence, recognised +and appealed to on many occasions, should materialise in a +framework of modern constitutional practice.</p> + +<p class="lilin">A political structure for the Monarchy which would make it +possible for Hungary to be outvoted on the most important +questions of State affairs, and therefore subject to a foreign +will, would again have nullified all that had been achieved after +so much striving and suffering, so much futile waste of strength +for the benefit of us all, which even in this war, too, would have +brought its blessings. All those, therefore, who have always stood +up firmly and loyally for the agreement of 1867 must put their +whole strength into resisting any tripartite experiments.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I would very much regret if, in connection with this question, +differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible +leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it +unnecessary <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span>to give publicity to a question that is not pressing. +At all events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be +avoided which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event +of a resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken +expectations in them which could only lead to the most complicated +consequences.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The more moderate Poles had made up their minds that the dualistic +structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact, and that +the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the Austrian +State, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have to be the +consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent and +injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realisation of which +seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view but +from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest +esteem.</p> + +<p class="right sc">Tisza.</p> +<p class="noin"><i>Budapest, February 22, 1917.</i></p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>The question as to what was to be Poland's future position with regard +to the Monarchy remained still unsolved. I continued to press the +point that Poland should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza +wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dismissed him, although +he was favoured by the majority of the Parliament, it did not alter +the situation in regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as +in almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views; otherwise, +he would have been in the minority.</p> + +<p>The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the question of +electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to +Tisza's instructions. For, as leader of the majority, which he +continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could +be carried out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the +Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which +he considered quite logical, though not agreeable.</p> + +<p>The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland. At +the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the +Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country. Always and +everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield, and the +consequence was that they claimed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span>the lion's share of all the +successes gained. This was in reality quite natural, but it greatly +added to all diplomatic and political activities, which were +invariably prejudiced and hindered by military facts. When I entered +upon office, Germany's standpoint was that she had a far superior +right to Poland, and that the simplest solution would be for us to +evacuate the territory we had occupied. It was, of course, obvious +that I could not accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the +point that under no circumstances would our troops leave Lublin. After +much controversy, the Germans agreed, <i>tant bien que mal</i>, to this +solution. The further development of the affair showed that the German +standpoint went through many changes. In general, it fluctuated +between two extremes: either Poland must unite herself to Germany—the +German-Polish solution, or else vast portions of her territory must be +ceded to Germany to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained +would be either for us or for Poland herself. Neither solution could +be accepted by us. The first one for this reason, that the Polish +question being in the foreground made that of Galicia very acute, as +it would have been quite impossible to retain Galicia in the Monarchy +when separated from the rest of Poland. We were obliged to oppose the +German-Polish solution, not from any desire for conquest, but to +prevent the sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose.</p> + +<p>The second German suggestion was just as impossible to carry out, +because Poland, crippled beyond recognition by the frontier +readjustment, even though united with Galicia, would have been so +unsatisfactory a factor that there would never have been any prospect +of harmonious dealings with her.</p> + +<p>The third difficulty was presented by the Poles themselves, as they +naturally wished to secure the greatest possible profit out of their +release by the Central Powers, even though it did not contribute much +to their future happiness so far as military support was concerned. +There were many different parties among them: first of all, one for +the Entente; a second, Bilinski's party; above all, one for the +Central Powers, especially when we gained military successes.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>On the whole, Polish policy was to show their hand as little as +possible to any particular group, and in the end range themselves on +the side of the conquerors. It must be admitted that these tactics +were successful.</p> + +<p>In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost always in +Polish political circles a certain nervous excitement, which made it +extremely difficult to enter into any calm and essential negotiations. +At the very beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the Polish +leaders and myself with regard to what I proposed to do; +misunderstandings which, toward the end of my term of office, +developed into the most bitter enmity towards me on the part of the +Poles. On February 10, 1917, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk, I +received the news from Warsaw that Herr von Bilinski, apparently +misunderstanding my standpoint, evolved from the facts, considered +that hopes represented promises, and in so doing raised Polish +expectations to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed thereupon to our +representative as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right"><i>February 16, 1917.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin">I have informed Herr von Bilinski, together with other Poles, that +it is impossible in the present unsettled European situation to +make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I have +told them that I sympathise with the Austro-Polish solution longed +for by all our Poles, but that I am not in the position to say +whether this solution will be attainable, though I am equally +unable to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared +that our whole policy where Poland is concerned can only consist +in our leaving a door open for all future transactions.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>I added that our representative must quote my direct orders in +settling the matter.</p> + +<p>In January, 1917, a conference was held respecting the Polish +question: a conference which aimed at laying down a broad line of +action for the policy to be adopted. I first of all referred to the +circumstances connected with the previously-mentioned German request +for us to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not agreeing +to the demand. I pointed out that it did not seem probable to me that +the war would end with a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>dictated peace on our side, and that, with +reference to Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish +question without the co-operation of the Entente, and that there was +not much object so long as the war lasted in endeavouring to secure +<i>faits accomplis</i>. The main point was that we remain in the country, +and on the conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the +Entente and the Allies to secure a solution of the Austro-Polish +question. That should be the gist of our policy. Count Tisza spoke +after me and agreed with me that we must not yield to the German +demand for our evacuation of Lublin. As regards the future, the +Hungarian Prime Minister stated that he had always held the view that +we should cede to Germany our claim to Poland in exchange for economic +and financial compensation; but that, at the present time, he did not +feel so confident about it. The conditions then prevailing were +unbearable, chiefly owing to the variableness of German policy, and +he, Count Tisza, returned to his former, oft-repeated opinion that we +should strive as soon as possible to withdraw with honour out of the +affair; impose no conditions that would lead to further friction, but +the surrendering to Germany of our share in Poland in exchange for +economic compensation.</p> + +<p>The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Clam, opposed this from the +Austrian point of view, which supported the union of all the Poles +under the Habsburg sceptre as being the one and only desirable +solution.</p> + +<p>The feeling during the debate was that the door must be closed against +the Austro-Polish proposals, and that, in view of the impossibility of +an immediate definite solution, we must adhere firmly to the policy +that rendered possible the union of all the Poles under the Habsburg +rule.</p> + +<p>After Germany's refusal of the proposal to accept Galicia as +compensation for Alsace-Lorraine, this programme was adhered to +through various phases and vicissitudes until the ever-increasing +German desire for frontier readjustment created a situation which made +the achievement of the Austro-Polish project very doubtful. Unless we +could secure a Poland which, thanks to the unanimity of the great +majority of all Poles, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>would willingly and cheerfully join the +Monarchy, the Austro-Polish solution would not have been a happy one, +as in that case we should only have increased the number of +discontented elements in the Monarchy, already very high, by adding +fresh ones to them. As it proved impossible to break the resistance +put up by General Ludendorff, the idea presented itself at a later +stage to strive for the annexation of Roumania instead of Poland. It +was a return to the original idea of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the +union of Roumania with Transylvania, closely linked to the Monarchy. +In that case we should have lost Galicia to Poland, but a certain +compensation would have been conceded to us in Roumania with her corn +and oil springs, and for the Monarchy, as for the Poles, it appeared +better to unite the latter collectively with Germany rather than to +divide them, as suggested in the Vienna-Berlin dispute.</p> + +<p>The plan for the annexation of Roumania presented wellnigh +insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing to her geographical +position, Roumania ought naturally to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza, +who was not in favour of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to +it if the annexed country had been administered from Budapest and in +the Magyar spirit, which meant that it would be incorporated in +Hungary. This, for obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the +plan, for the Roumanians would gain no advantage from the annexation +if it was to be at the sacrifice of their national independence. On +the other hand, the Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable +objections to the suggestion of a future combination that would add a +rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria would be reduced in +proportion, and compensation in one or other form was demanded. +Another, but tentative, plan was to make over Bosnia and the +Herzegovina definitely by way of compensation to Austria. All these +ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory nature, evoked by the +constantly recurring difficulties in Berlin and Warsaw, and they +invariably fell through when it was seen that the obstacles arising +from dualism were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish +solution was taken up again, although it was impossible to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>extort +from the Germans a definite statement as to a reasonable western +frontier for Poland. In the very last term of my office the Roumanian +plan again came up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles +on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims made by Germany, +which rendered the Austro-Polish solution impossible.</p> + +<p>Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the future organisation +of the Monarchy was being considered. The Emperor adhered to the +correct standpoint, as I still consider it to be, that the structure +of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the war, would have to +be altered, and reconstruction on a far more pronounced national basis +be necessary. As applied to the Poles, this project would entail the +dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent position for the +Ruthenian Poles.</p> + +<p>When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the hunger riots that +were beginning, I refused to agree to the Ukrainian demands, but +consented to submit the question of the division of Galicia to the +Austrian Crown Council. I was impelled thereto by the conviction that +we were adhering strictly to the programme as it had been planned for +the Monarchy.</p> + +<p>I will give fuller details respecting this question in the next +chapter, but will merely relate the following incident as an example +to show the degree of hostile persecution to which I was exposed. The +rumour was spread on all sides that the Emperor had told the Poles +that "I had concluded peace with the Ukraine without his knowledge and +against his will." It is quite out of the question that the Emperor +can have made such a statement, as the peace conditions at Kieff were +a result of a council convoked <i>ad hoc</i>, where—as the protocol +proves—the Emperor and Dr. von Seidler were responsible for the +terms.</p> + +<p>The great indignation of the Poles at my conduct at Brest-Litovsk was +quite unfounded. I never promised the Poles that they were to have the +Cholm district, and never alluded to any definite frontiers. Had I +done so the capable political leaders in Poland would never have +listened to me, as they knew very <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>well that the frontiers, only in a +very slight degree, depended on the decisions at Vienna. If we lost +the war we had nothing more to say in the matter; if a peace of +agreement was concluded, then Berlin would be the strongest side, +having occupied the largest portion of the country; the question would +then have to be decided at the general Conference.</p> + +<p>I always told the Polish leaders that I hoped to secure a Poland +thoroughly satisfied, also with respect to her frontier claims, and +there were times when we seemed to be very near the accomplishment of +such an aim; but I never concealed the fact that there were many +influences at work restricting my wishes and keeping them very much +subdued.</p> + +<p>The partition of Galicia was an internal Austrian question. Dr. von +Seidler took up the matter most warmly, and at the Council expressed +the hope of being able to carry out these measures by parliamentary +procedure and against the opposition of the Poles.</p> + +<p>I will allude to this question also in my next chapter.</p> + +<p>Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called +Central-European project.</p> + +<p>For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly +interested in a scheme for closer union. I was always full of the idea +of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment +as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting +a peace of understanding.</p> + +<p>During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to +secure a revision of the Pact of London. I hoped, as already +mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted +for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach +the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would +greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London. +When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to +the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any +change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military +force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span>and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the +right moment had arrived to make the offer.</p> + +<p>In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was +unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and +closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the +armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them +after the war. I was convinced that a peace of understanding would +bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military +settlements would be influenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of +peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and +that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined +in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those +relating to economic questions.</p> + +<p>The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent +opposition on the part of the Emperor. He was particularly opposed to +all military <i>rapprochement</i>.</p> + +<p>When the attempt to approach the question failed through the +resistance from the crown, I arranged on my own initiative for a +debate on the economic question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in +which he forbade any further dealings in the matter. I answered his +letter by a business report, pointing out the necessity of continuing +the negotiations.</p> + +<p>The question then became a sore point between the Emperor and myself. +He did not give his permission for further negotiations, but I +continued them notwithstanding. The Emperor knew of it, but did not +make further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put forward by +the Germans made the negotiations extremely difficult, and with long +intervals and at a very slow pace they dragged on until I left office.</p> + +<p>Afterwards the Emperor went with Burian to the German Headquarters. +Following that, the Salzburg negotiations were proceeded with and, +apparently, at greater speed.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER X<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>BREST-LITOVSK</h4> + +<h3>1</h3> +<br /> + +<p>In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest +a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report +dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as +follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p>The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the +following state of affairs:</p> + +<p class="lilin">At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as +to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies +and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches +throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists +under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a +definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the +Mensheviks as well, <i>i.e.</i> Tscheidse's party, to which the present +Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to +the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is +threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained +with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled +Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old +<i>Internationale</i>, also called <i>Zimmerwalder</i> or <i>Kienthaler</i>, and +led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned +from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from +Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of +Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government, +decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this +reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social +Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too +little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory. +He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the +Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their +Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either +as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the +official <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>organ of the Mensheviks, the <i>Rabocaja Gazeta</i>, is +forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for +instance, frequent articles against the offensive.</p> + +<p class="lilin">There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the +Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is, +perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having +succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its +course—at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the +peasants' deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social +Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants' +Deputies' Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem, +the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to +any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the +party, <i>Delo Naroda</i> and <i>Zemlja i Wolja</i>. Only a small and +apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ <i>Volja +Naroda</i>, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for +an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group. +Kerenski's party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People's +Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food, +Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here +or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press, +as, for instance, the <i>Retch</i>, assert that Kerenski's health gives +grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The +official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council, +the <i>Isvestia</i>, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great +emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is +characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture, +Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning +that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to +justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that +such had been his meaning.</p> + +<p class="lilin">While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question +of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined +to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the +Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with +satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are +against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among +the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery. +It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war. +These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by +success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the +revolutionary régime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that +while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property +exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all, +every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span>is +constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land +question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of +the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also +that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of +the Tsar.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the +following details:</p> + +<p class="lilin">At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers' +Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd +Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the <i>Retch</i> of May +1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following +characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the +disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires +connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers +will not remain <i>more than one month</i> at the front, but will go +home."</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from +the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority +Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the <i>Rabocaja +Gazeta</i>, May 18 and 19—this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e. +that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente +Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness +that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the +imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the +transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to +the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a +speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist +delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of +feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that +they should undertake to make known the result of their experience +in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some +very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives +from the Russian front spoke openly of America's policy of +exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that +an international Socialist conference should be convened at the +earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French +majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the +French and English Socialists were given the following reply:</p> + +<p class="lilin">"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your +Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We +will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be +Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement +between the workers of all countries for the termination of the +war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued, +prove <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude +any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims +as soon as possible."</p> + +<p class="lilin">According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether +converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case, +from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and +Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other +hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined +somewhat toward the Russian point of view.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in +this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the +Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at +the Russian front.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or +soldier at the front in the same organ, the <i>Rabocaja Gazeta</i> for +May 26, as follows:</p> + +<p class="lilin">"The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye, +even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts), +is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it +passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and +in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army +fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse +this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy +fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates' +Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg +June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the +following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for +peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a +declaration with regard to the answer already received at the +beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This +congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination +for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals +with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out +between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and +the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of +the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an +"Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the +conflict.</p> + +<p class="lilin">With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing +seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in +connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed +report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded +later.</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following +letter, which I have given <i>in extenso</i>, as it shows faithfully my +estimate of the situation at the time:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right"><i>Vienna, November 17, 1917.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class="sc">My dear Friend</span>,—After many days, full of trouble, +annoyance and toil, I write to you once more in order to answer +your very noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again +turns my thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the +time at least, to forget the wretchedness of every day.</p> + +<p class="lilin">You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well +between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am +sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the +friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree. +As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out—and it does so fast +enough—all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed +strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing +my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures—I +myself am the carrion—they can scent from afar that there is +something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the +lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to +increasing existing differences—really, they are worthy of +admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine?</p> + +<p class="lilin">Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture.</p> + +<p class="lilin">And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of +those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of +political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted +because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my +influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly +negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief +is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia +quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all +round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the +Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as +possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can +throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of +being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly +threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to +peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of +conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after +losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as <i>inter +pares</i>—it would at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>least be necessary to make every endeavour in +that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he +promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes +in his forthcoming success in the West—always taking for granted, +of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace +with Russia. The Russian peace, then, <i>may</i> prove the first step +on the way to the peace of the world.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I have during the last few days received reliable information +about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews, +with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country +that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the +most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make +peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for +they cannot carry on the war.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines +to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage, +the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless +unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the +third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I +<i>will</i> treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of +his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's +period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent +Russian Government will recommence the war—and I cannot take a +Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Germans are hesitating—they do not altogether like the idea +of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons +already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the +case. The German military party—which, as everyone knows, holds +the reins of policy in Germany entirely—have, as far as I can +see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up +"something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there, +and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even +though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen +for oneself.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is impossible to get any exact information about these +Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information +available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this: +everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture +must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and +equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only +a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The +Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly +as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like +sheep.</p> + +<p class="lilin">True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>had +the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to +force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would +be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to +march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the +power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our +own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get +to Paris—and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front +is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German +military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether +illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal +grounds.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this +to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which +you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate +peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this +would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could +not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under +some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to +make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a +division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would +avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to +receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the +remainder is to be broken up into separate states—Czechish, +Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact +between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would +mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be +hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must +fight on, and that, moreover, <i>against</i> Germany, which will, of +course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy. +The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the +Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to +make <i>Austria itself the theatre of war</i>. So that instead of +bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one +opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto +spared—such as Bohemia and Tyrol—to the fury of battle, only to +be wrecked completely in the end.</p> + +<p class="lilin">On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure +peace all round, with Germany as well—a tolerable peace of mutual +understanding—always provided the German offensive turns out +successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage, +one pulls this way, another that—and we gain nothing in that +manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the +confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy, +then let him do it—<i>le remède sera pire que le mal</i>—but to be +for ever <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the +pose without carrying it out in reality—this I cannot regard as +prudent policy.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding; +we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain +nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the +entire structure of the Monarchy—after the fashion of the +<i>fédération Danubienne</i> proposed in France—and I am certainly +rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the +Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I +hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the +London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into +Paris, and then the Entente <i>must</i> utter the decisive word that +they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly +determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the +<i>peoples</i> of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to +fight on for conquest or if they will have peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through +the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to +make peace—even at a loss—that is my plan and the hope for which +I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading" +men—with the exception of the Emperor Karl—will demand a "good" +peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of +having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself.</p> + +<p class="lilin">So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled. +But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in +throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my +Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically +on all sides.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. <i>Lebe +wohl</i>, and let me hear from you again soon.—In friendship as of +old, yours</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="sc">Czernin.</span></p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave +my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may +appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have +not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I +believe will be a clear picture of the development.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 19, 1917.</i>—Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th.</p> + +<p>"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>assembled there: +Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut. +Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden.</p> + +<p>"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of +my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my +opinion Russia would propose a <i>general</i> peace, and that we must of +course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a +general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long +time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be +open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with +Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 20, 1917.</i>—Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At +the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten +of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I +greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into +the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few +days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the +situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we +should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters +satisfactorily.</p> + +<p>"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me +some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates, +and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had +the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy +with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian +brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians, +despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of +truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in, +and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance.</p> + +<p>"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of +nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable +pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince +sat the leader of the Russian <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>delegation, a Jew called Joffe, +recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other +delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the +delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister, +Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison +during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate +is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a +minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary +movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor +of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the +Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a +petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general +began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the +spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at +first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier +conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This +remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to +read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words +should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian +proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined +set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All +that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with +indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the +International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression +alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand +and preparing to fall upon it and rend it.</p> + +<p>"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His +whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of +self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the +world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual +love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war +throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war, +as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end +worth all it would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>cost. I contented myself with telling him that he +must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier +age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be +won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by +example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to +adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without +indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the +development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the +Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn +something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force +Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was +a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we +should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods, +and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs: +this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry +out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had +better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question +of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft +eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring +tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be +able to raise the revolution in your country too.'</p> + +<p>"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in +bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage +that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms.</p> + +<p>"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom +and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and +unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history +has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and +their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with +Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity +surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress +decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span>time of the +universal blessing of freedom—it is sheer lying.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 21, 1917.</i>—I went with all my party to lunch at noon with +the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an +hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military +matters, and is very busy.</p> + +<p>"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast +our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a +small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite +close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could +be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and +in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three +Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kühlmann alone, and at +once declared positively that the Russians would propose a <i>general</i> +peace, and that we must accept it. Kühlmann is half disposed to take +my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand +annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have +an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they +will.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 22, 1917.</i>—The forenoon was devoted to the first +discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as +discussed with Kühlmann being then academically laid down. In the +afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being +opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kühlmann. It was +decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order +of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche, +etc. Dr. Kühlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on +which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian +delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from +the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a +reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among +ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief +sitting of the peace congress.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 23, 1917.</i>—Kühlmann and I prepared our answer early. It +will be generally known from the newspaper <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span>reports. It cost us much +heavy work to get it done. Kühlmann is personally an advocate of +general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do +not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is +done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They +declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian +troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the +conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree, +as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland, +Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never +consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last +succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second +Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly +declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal +affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs +in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian +intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting, +he also could be content.</p> + +<p>"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of +Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all, +some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole +proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the +24th.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 24, 1917.</i>—Morning and afternoon, long conferences with +the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kühlmann and I on the one hand +and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with +considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause +should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation +principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian +and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a +clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void, +and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was +attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian +delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give +way. Kühlmann and my humble self remained <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span>perfectly firm, and told +them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they +could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the +proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which +we, Kühlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived +at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian +delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions.</p> + +<p>"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we +had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty +about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far +as that goes.</p> + +<p>"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Germans. The German +military party 'fear' that the Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to +agree to a general peace, and could not think of ending the war in +this 'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to listen to +such twaddle.</p> + +<p>"If the great victories which the German generals are hoping for on +the Western front should be realised, there will be no bounds to their +demands, and the difficulty of all negotiations will be still further +increased.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 25, 1917.</i>—The plenary sitting took place to-day, when we +gave the Russians our answer to their peace proposals. I was +presiding, and delivered the answer, and Joffe replied. <i>The general +offer of peace is thus to be made, and we must await the result.</i> In +order to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters concerning +Russia are being continued meanwhile. We have thus made a good step +forward, and <i>perhaps</i> got over the worst. It is impossible to say +whether yesterday may not have been a decisive turning point in the +history of the world.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 26, 1917.</i>—The special negotiations began at 9 +<span class="sc">A.M</span>. The programme drawn up by Kühlmann, chiefly questions of +economical matters and representation, were dealt with so rapidly and +smoothly that by 11 o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of +further matter to discuss. This is perhaps a good omen. Our people are +using to-day to enter the results of the discussion in a report of +proceedings, as the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>sitting is to be continued to-morrow, when +territorial questions will be brought up.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 26, 1917.</i>—I have been out for a long walk alone.</p> + +<p>"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting in the gutter, +weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did not even look at me, only wept +and wept, and could not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me +his story—Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together.</p> + +<p>"Well, he had a store—heaven knows where, but somewhere in the war +zone. First came the Cossacks. They took all he had—his goats and his +clothes, and everything in the place—and then they beat him. Then the +Russians retired, beat him again, <i>en passant</i> as it were, and then +came the Germans. They fired his house with their guns, pulled off his +boots, and beat him. Then he entered the service of the Germans, +carrying water and wood, and received his food and beatings in return. +But to-day he had got into trouble with them in some incomprehensible +fashion; no food after that, only the beatings; and was thrown into +the street.</p> + +<p>"The beatings he referred to as something altogether natural. They +were for him the natural accompaniment to any sort of action—but he +could not live on beatings alone.</p> + +<p>"I gave him what I had on me—money and cigars—told him the number of +my house, and said he could come to-morrow, when I could get him a +pass to go off somewhere where there were no Germans and no Russians, +and try to get him a place of some sort where he would be fed and not +beaten. He took the money and cigars thankfully enough; the story of +the railway pass and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway +travelling was for soldiers, and an existence without beatings seemed +an incredible idea.</p> + +<p>"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight, waving his hand, and +thanking me in his German-Russian gibberish.</p> + +<p>"A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but worst of all in +one's own country. We at home suffer hunger and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span>cold, but at least we +have been spared up to now the presence of the enemy hordes.</p> + +<p>"This is a curious place—melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An +endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean +set fast, wave behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things +grey, dead grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds +race across the sky, the wind lashing them on.</p> + +<p>"This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed the Russians of the +German plans with regard to the outer provinces. The position is this: +As long as the war in the West continues, the Germans cannot evacuate +Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact that they must be +held as security for the general peace negotiations, these countries +form part of the German munition establishment. The railway material, +the factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable as long +as the war lasts. That they cannot now withdraw from there at once is +clear enough. If peace is signed, then the self-determination of the +people in the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the +great difficulty: how this right of self-determination is to be +exercised.</p> + +<p>"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be taken while the +German bayonets are still in the country, and the Germans reply that +the unexampled terrorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election +result, since the 'bourgeois,' according to Bolshevist ideas, are not +human beings at all. My idea of having the proceedings controlled by a +<i>neutral</i> Power was not altogether acceptable to anyone. During the +war no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the German +occupation could not be allowed to last until the ultimate end. In +point of fact, both sides are afraid of terrorisation by the opposing +party, and each wishes to apply the same itself.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 26, 1917.</i>—There is no hurry apparently in this place. Now +it is the Turks who are not ready, now the Bulgarians, then it is the +Russians' turn—and the sitting is again postponed or broken off +almost as soon as commenced.</p> + +<p>"I am reading some memoirs from the French Revolution. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>A most +appropriate reading at the present time, in view of what is happening +in Russia and may perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no +Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannised the world under the battle-cry +of freedom were to be found in Paris then as well as now in St. +Petersburg. Charlotte Corday said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast +I killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear, and who can +say if there will be a Corday ready for Trotski?</p> + +<p>"Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and the state of things +said to exist there. He spoke with great respect of Nicolai +Nicolaievitch as a thorough man, full of energy and courage, one to be +respected even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he considered +cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a proof of the incapacity of +the bourgeois that they had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all +of them more or less degenerate; he could not understand how anyone +could accept a form of government which involved the risk of having a +degenerate ruler. I answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first +of all one advantage, that there was at least one place in the state +beyond the sphere of personal ambition and intrigues, and as to +degeneration, that was often a matter of opinion: there were also +degenerates to be found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe +considered that there would be no such risk when the people could +choose for themselves. I pointed out that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had +not been 'chosen,' and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial +election would have brought him into power. Possibly there might be +some in Russia who would consider him also degenerate.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 27, 1917.</i>—The Russians are in despair, and some of them +even talked of withdrawing altogether. They had thought the Germans +would renounce all occupied territory without further parley, or hand +it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the Russians, +Kühlmann, and myself, part of the time with Hoffmann. I drew up the +following:—</p> + +<p>"1. As long as general peace is not yet declared, we cannot give up +the occupied areas; they form part of our great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>munition works +(factories, railways, sites with buildings, etc.).</p> + +<p>"2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland, Courland, and +Lithuania is to decide the fate of the people there; as to the form in +which the vote is to be taken, this remains to be further discussed, +in order that the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used. +Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much worse.</p> + +<p>"<i>Afternoon.</i>—Matters still getting worse. Furious wire from +Hindenburg about "renunciation" of everything; Ludendorff telephoning +every minute; more furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kühlmann +true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians declare they cannot +accept the vague formulas of the Germans with regard to freedom of +choice.</p> + +<p>"I told Kühlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far as possible with them; +but should their endeavours fail, then I would enter into separate +negotiations with the Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were +really both opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary, on the +other hand, desired nothing but final peace. Kühlmann understands my +position, and says he himself would rather <i>go</i> than let it fail. +Asked me to give him my point of view in writing, as it 'would +strengthen his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed it to the +Kaiser.</p> + +<p>"<i>Evening.</i>—Kühlmann believes matters will be settled—or broken off +altogether—by to-morrow.</p> + +<p>"<i>December 28, 1917.</i>—General feeling, dull. Fresh outbursts of +violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a wire from Bussche: Hertling had +spoken with the Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kühlmann said to +me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole of Germany.'</p> + +<p>"We have at last agreed about the form of the committee; that is, a +committee <i>ad hoc</i> is to be formed in Brest, to work out a plan for +the evacuation and voting in detail. <i>Tant bien que mal</i>, a +provisional expedient. All home to report; next sitting to be held +January 5, 1918.</p> + +<p>"Russians again somewhat more cheerful.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span>"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on the part of the +Russians and the four Allies to Prince Leopold. He answered at once, +and very neatly, but told me immediately afterwards that I had taken +him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken by surprise +myself; no notice had been given; it was only during the dinner itself +that the Germans asked me to speak.</p> + +<p>"Left at 10 <span class="fakesc">P.M.</span> for Vienna.</p> + +<p>"From the 29th to the morning of the 3rd I was in Vienna. Two long +audiences with the Emperor gave me the opportunity of telling him what +had passed at Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view +that peace must be made, if at all possible.</p> + +<p>"I have dispatched a trustworthy agent to the outer provinces in order +to ascertain the exact state of feeling there. He reports that <i>all</i> +are against the Bolsheviks except the Bolsheviks themselves. The +entire body of citizens, peasants—in a word, everyone with any +possessions at all—trembles at the thought of these red robbers, and +wishes to go over to Germany. The terrorism of Lenin is said to be +indescribable, and in Petersburg all are absolutely <i>longing</i> for the +entry of the German troops to deliver them.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 3, 1918.</i>—Return to Brest.</p> + +<p>"On the way, at 6 <span class="fakesc">P.M.</span>, I received, at a station, the +following telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch, who had remained at +Brest:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'Russian delegation received following telegram from Petersburg +this morning: To General Hoffmann. For the representatives of the +German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish delegations. The +Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to carry +on the further negotiations on neutral ground, and proposes +removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the proposals as +formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegation in Points +1 and 2, the Government of the Russian Republic and the +Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of +Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire +agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the +proposals are contrary to the principle of national +self-determination, even in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span>the restricted form in which it +appears in Point 3 of the reply given by the Four Powers on the +12th ult. President of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe." Major +Brinkmann has communicated this by telephone to the German +delegation, already on the way here. Herr von Kühlmann has sent a +telephone message in return that he is continuing the journey, and +will arrive at Brest this evening.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"I also went on of course, considering this manœuvre on the part of +the Russians as rather in the nature of bluffing. If they do not come, +then we can treat with the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now.</p> + +<p>"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither, Hauser, Wekerle, +Seidler, and some few others. The opinion of almost all may be summed +up as follows: 'Peace <i>must</i> be arranged, but a separate peace without +Germany is <i>impossible</i>.'</p> + +<p>"No one has told me how I am to manage it if neither Germany nor +Russia will listen to reason.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 4, 1918.</i>—Fearful snowstorm in the night; the heating +apparatus in the train was frozen, and the journey consequently far +from pleasant. On awaking early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians +and Turks were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnificent now: +cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went across to Kühlmann, had +breakfast with him, and talked over events in Berlin. There seems to +have been desperate excitement there. Kühlmann suggested to Ludendorff +that he should come to Brest himself and take part in the +negotiations. After long discussion, however, it appeared that +Ludendorff himself was not quite clear as to what he wanted, and +declared spontaneously that he considered it superfluous for him to go +to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he did.' Heaven +grant the man such gleams of insight again, and often! It seems as if +the whole trouble is more due to feeling against Kühlmann than to +anything in the questions at issue; people do not want the world to +have the impression that the peace was gained by 'adroit diplomacy,' +but by military success alone. General Hoffmann appears to have been +received with marked favour by the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span>Kaiser, and both he and Kühlmann +declare themselves well satisfied with the results of their journey.</p> + +<p>"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg telegram, declining a +conference in Stockholm, and further tactics to be followed in case of +need. We agreed that if the Russians did not come, we must declare the +armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers would say to +that. On this point Kühlmann and I were entirely agreed. Nevertheless, +the feeling, both in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a +little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break off +negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position. The only +way to save the situation is by acting quickly and energetically with +the Ukrainian delegation, and we therefore commenced this work on the +afternoon of the same day. There is thus at least a hope that we may +be able to arrive at positive results with them within reasonable +time.</p> + +<p>"In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from Petersburg announcing +the arrival of the delegation, including the Foreign Minister, +Trotski. It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at +the news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of satisfaction +was it fully apparent how seriously they had been affected by the +thought that the Russians would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great +step forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the way.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 5, 1918.</i>—At seven this morning a few of us went out +shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria. We went for a distance of 20 +to 30 kilometres by train, and then in open automobiles to a +magnificent primeval forest extending over two to three hundred square +kilometres. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow, and pleasant +company. From the point of view of sport, it was poorer than one could +have expected. One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two +hares, and that was all. Back at 6 <span class="fakesc">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>"<i>January 6, 1918.</i>—To-day we had the first discussions with the +Ukrainian delegates, all of whom were present except the leader. The +Ukrainians are very different from the Russian delegates. Far less +revolutionary, and with far more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>interest in their own country, less +in the progress of Socialism generally. They do not really care about +Russia at all, but think only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are +solely directed towards attaining their own independence as soon as +possible. Whether that independence is to be complete and +international, or only as within the bounds of a Russian federative +state, they do not seem quite to know themselves. Evidently, the very +intelligent Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard +from which they themselves could spring upon the Bolsheviks. Their +idea was that we should acknowledge their independence, and then, with +this as a <i>fait accompli</i>, they could face the Bolsheviks and force +them to recognise their equal standing and treat with them on that +basis. Our line of policy, however, must be either to bring over the +Ukrainians to our peace basis, or else to drive a wedge between them +and the Petersburgers. As to their desire for independence, we +declared ourselves willing to recognise this, provided the Ukrainians +on their part would agree to the following three points: 1. The +negotiations to be concluded at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2. +Recognition of the former political frontier between Austria-Hungary +and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any one state in the internal +affairs of another. Characteristically enough, no answer has yet been +received to this proposal!</p> + +<p>"<i>January 7, 1918.</i>—This forenoon, all the Russians arrived, under +the leadership of Trotski. They at once sent a message asking to be +excused for not appearing at meals with the rest for the future. At +other times also we see nothing of them. The wind seems to be in a +very different quarter now from what it was. The German officer who +accompanied the Russian delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron +Lamezan, gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first +place, he declared that the trenches in front of Dunaburg are entirely +deserted, and save for an outpost or so there were no Russians there +at all; also, that at many stations delegates were waiting for the +deputation to pass, in order to demand that peace should be made. +Trotski had throughout answered them with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>polite and careful +speeches, but grew ever more and more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the +impression that the Russians were altogether desperate now, having no +choice save between going back with a bad peace or with no peace at +all; in either case with the same result: that they would be swept +away. Kühlmann said: 'Ils n'ont que le choix à quelle sauce ils se +feront manger.' I answered: 'Tout comme chez nous.'</p> + +<p>"A wire has just come in reporting demonstrations in Budapest against +Germany. The windows of the German Consulate were broken, a clear +indication of the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were +to be lost through our demands.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 8, 1918.</i>—The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived +during the night, and has just been to call on me. He seems +emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in +case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the +foreground and keep out of the way himself. Talaat Pasha is one of the +cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of +them all.</p> + +<p>"Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph +service, and was on the revolutionary committee. In his official +capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed +him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game +be lost unless immediate action were taken. He suppressed the message, +warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their +work at once. The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat +was made Minister of the Interior. With iron energy he then turned his +attention to the suppression of the opposing movement. Later, he +became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the +will and power of Turkey.</p> + +<p>"This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied +delegations and the Russian. Afterwards, plenary sitting.</p> + +<p>"The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span>not ready +with their preparations. Late in the evening I had a conversation with +Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics. I +said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands +as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off +the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a +free hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially +Kühlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow +the negotiations to prove fruitless. As to details, we agreed to +demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form +of an ultimatum.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 9, 1918.</i>—Acting on the principle that attack is the best +defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister +speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum.</p> + +<p>"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was +such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered +state of affairs called for new resolutions. The removal of the +conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, +for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of +all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing +we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the +start—to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take +the lead—would infallibly have taken place. We must now wait to see +what to-morrow brings: either a victory or the final termination of +the negotiations.</p> + +<p>"Adler said to me in Vienna: 'You will certainly get on all right with +Trotski,' and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered: 'Well, +you and I get on quite well together, you know.'</p> + +<p>"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to appreciate the +situation there. These Bolsheviks have no longer anything in common +with Adler; they are brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a +disgrace to the name of freedom.</p> + +<p>"Trotski is undoubtedly an interesting, clever fellow, and a very +dangerous adversary. He is quite exceptionally gifted <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span>as a speaker, +with a swiftness and adroitness in retort which I have rarely seen, +and has, moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 10, 1918.</i>—The sitting has just taken place. Trotski made a +great and, in its way, really fine speech, calculated for the whole of +Europe, in which he gave way entirely. He accepts, he says, the +German-Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk, as he +will not give us the satisfaction of being able to blame Russia for +the continuance of the war.</p> + +<p>"Following on Trotski's speech, the Committee was at once formed to +deal with the difficult questions of territory. I insisted on being on +the Committee myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of +these important negotiations. This was not an easy matter really, as +the questions involved, strictly speaking, concern only Courland and +Lithuania, i.e., they are not our business, but Germany's alone.</p> + +<p>"In the evening I had another long talk with Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in +the course of which the General and the Secretary of State came to +high words between themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our +ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and 'give the +Russians another touch of the whip.' Kühlmann and I took the opposite +view, and insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly, +confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing up point by point +as we went on, and putting all doubtful questions aside. Once we had +got so far, in clearing up things generally, we could then take that +which remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instructions +from the two Emperors for dealing therewith. This is undoubtedly the +surest way to avoid disaster and a fresh breach.</p> + +<p>"A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians. They now demand +recognition of their independence, and declare they will leave if this +is not conceded.</p> + +<p>"Adler told me at Vienna that Trotski had his library, by which he set +great store, somewhere in Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told +Trotski that I would arrange to have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span>the books forwarded to him, if +he cared about it. I then recommended to his consideration certain +prisoners of war, as L. K. and W., all of whom are said to have been +very badly treated. Trotski noted the point, declared that he was +strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and promised to +look into the matter; he wished to point out, however, that in so +doing he was not in the least influenced by the thought of his +library; he would in any case have considered my request. He would be +glad to have the books.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 11, 1918.</i>—Forenoon and afternoon, long sittings of the +Committee on territorial questions. Our side is represented by +Kühlmann, Hoffmann, Rosenberg, and a secretary, in addition to myself, +Csicserics, Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present, but +without the Ukrainians. I told Kühlmann that I only proposed to attend +as a second, seeing that the German interests were incomparably more +affected than our own. I only interpose now and again.</p> + +<p>"Trotski made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In a speech rising to +violence, he declared that we were playing false; we aimed at +annexations, and were simply trying to cover them with the cloak of +self-determination. He would never agree to this, and would rather +break off altogether than continue in that way. If we were honest, we +should allow representatives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to +come to Brest, and there express their views without being influenced +in any way by ourselves. Now it should here be noted that from the +commencement of the negotiations it has been a point of conflict +whether the legislative bodies at present existing in the occupied +territories are justified in speaking in the name of their respective +peoples, or not. We affirm that they are; the Russians maintain they +are not. We at once accepted Trotski's proposal, that representatives +of these countries should be called, but added that, when we agreed to +accept their testimony, then their judgment if in our favour should be +taken as valid.</p> + +<p>"It was characteristic to see how gladly Trotski would have taken back +what he had said. But he kept his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>countenance, fell in with the new +situation at once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned for +twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-reaching importance +that he must confer with his colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotski +will make no difficulty now. If the Poles could be called, it would be +an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that Germany, too, would +rather be without them, knowing the anti-Prussian feeling that exists +among the Poles.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 12, 1918.</i>—Radek has had a scene with the German chauffeur, +which led to something more. General Hoffmann had placed cars at the +disposal of the Russians in case they cared to drive out. On this +occasion it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the proper +time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man and abused him +violently. The chauffeur complained, and Hoffmann took his part. +Trotski seems to consider Hoffmann's action correct, and has +<i>forbidden</i> the entire delegation to go out any more. That settled +them. And serve them right.</p> + +<p>"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a holy fear of Trotski. +At the sittings, too, none of them dare to speak while he is there.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 12, 1918.</i>—Hoffmann has made his unfortunate speech. He has +been working at it for days, and was very proud of the result. +Kühlmann and I did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it +beyond exciting the people at home against us. This made a certain +impression on him, but it was soon effaced by Ludendorff's +congratulations, which followed promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the +situation more difficult, and there was certainly no need for that.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 15, 1918.</i>—I had a letter to-day from one of our mayors at +home, calling my attention to the fact that disaster due to lack of +foodstuffs is now imminent.</p> + +<p>"I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which +justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to Your +Majesty, and shows that in the question of food supply we are on +the very verge of a catastrophe. The situation <i>arising out of the +carelessness</i> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span><i>and incapacity of the Ministers</i> is terrible, and I +fear it is already too late to check the total collapse which is +to be expected in the next few weeks. My informant writes: "Only +small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from +Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease +of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must +infallibly perish. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the +Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the +case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic, +would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be +impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse +of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points +he answered yes, that is so, and added that all was being done to +alter the state of affairs, especially as regards the Hungarian +deliveries. But no one, not even His Majesty, has been able to get +anything done. We can only hope that some <i>deus ex machina</i> may +intervene to save us from the worst.'"</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"To this I added:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude +of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored Your +Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and <i>compel</i> Seidler, on +the one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in +order. Even from here I have written entreating Your Majesty to +act while there was yet time. But all in vain.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the situation would +be to secure temporary assistance from Germany, and then to +requisition by force the stocks that were doubtless still available in +Hungary; finally, I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime +Minister of my telegram.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 16, 1918.</i>—Despairing appeals from Vienna for food +supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin for aid, otherwise disaster +imminent. I replied to General Landwehr as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'Dr. Kühlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope of +success. The only hope now is for His Majesty to do as I have +advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On my +return I propose to put before His Majesty my point of view, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>that +it is impossible to carry on the foreign policy if the food +question at home is allowed to come to such a state as now.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"'Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most positively +that we could hold out till the new harvest.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"At the same time I wired the Emperor:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for us. +Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two +conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that +we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food supply, +which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of +the stocks still existing in Hungary.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"'I have just explained the entire situation to Dr. Kühlmann, and +he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all sanguine, +as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think the only +way to secure any success from this step would be for Your Majesty +to send at once, through military means, a Hughes telegram to +Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to intervene +himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the outbreak +of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I must, +however, emphatically point out that the commencement of unrest +among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of peace +here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian representatives +perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution, they +will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is +based on this factor.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"<i>January 17, 1918.</i>—Bad news from Vienna and environs: serious +strike movement, due to the reduction of the flour rations and the +tardy progress of the Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna +Ministry seems to be past all understanding.</p> + +<p>"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time to secure some +supplies from the Ukraine, if only we can manage to keep matters quiet +at home for the next few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in +question to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On the same +day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Dr. von Seidler, the Prime +Minister:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of +all the errors made by those entrusted with the food resources.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span>"'Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us, +having insufficient for itself.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"'Had your Excellency or your department called attention to the +state of things <i>in time</i>, it might still have been possible to +procure supplies from Roumania. As things are now, I can see no +other way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian +grain for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the +Roumanian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come +to hand.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"<i>January 20, 1918.</i>—The negotiations have now come to this: that +Trotski declares his intention of laying the German proposals before +Petersburg, though he cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in +any case, to return here. As to calling in representatives from the +outer provinces, he will only do this provided he is allowed to choose +them. We cannot agree to this. With the Ukrainians, who, despite their +youth, are showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit by +the situation, negotiations are proceeding but slowly. First they +demanded East Galicia for the new 'Ukrainia.' This could not be +entertained for a moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the +outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they realise our position, +and know that we <i>must</i> make peace in order to get corn. Now they +demand a separate position for East Galicia. The question will have to +be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry will have the final +word.</p> + +<p>"Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that without supplies +of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe is imminent. There <i>are</i> +supplies in the Ukraine; if we can get them, the worst may be avoided.</p> + +<p>"The position now is this: Without help from outside, we shall, +according to Seidler, have thousands perishing in a few weeks. Germany +and Hungary are no longer sending anything. All messages state that +there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question is only whether we +can get it in time. I hope we may. But if we do not make peace <i>soon</i>, +then the troubles at home will be repeated, and each demonstration in +Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for Messrs. +Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of our state of famine <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span>at +home from these troubles as by a thermometer. If only the people who +create these disturbances know how they are by that very fact +increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from Ukraine! And we +were all but finished!</p> + +<div class="img"><a name="imagep240" id="imagep240"></a> +<a href="images/imagep240.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/imagep240.jpg" width="52%" alt="GENERAL HOFFMANN (on right) WITH MAJ. BRINKMANN" /></a><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">GENERAL HOFFMANN (on right) WITH MAJ. BRINKMANN<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>"The question of East Galicia I will leave to the Austrian Ministry; +it must be decided in Vienna. I cannot, and dare not, look on and see +hundreds of thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy of +the Poles, so long as there is a possibility of help.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 21, 1918.</i>—Back to Vienna. The impression of the troubles +here is even greater than I thought, and the effect disastrous. The +Ukrainians no longer treat with us: they <i>dictate</i>!</p> + +<p>"On the way, reading through old reports, I came upon the notes +relating to the discussions with Michaelis on August 1. According to +these, Under-Secretary of State von Stumm said at the time:</p> + +<p>"'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with the Ukrainians, and +the separatist movement in Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of +their movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance that they should +be allowed to unite with the Government of Cholm, and with the areas +of East Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs to +Austria, the demand for East Galicia cannot be conceded. It would be +another matter if Galicia were united with Poland; then a cession of +East Galicia might be possible.'</p> + +<p>"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long since been prejudged +by the Germans.</p> + +<p>"On January 22 the Council was held which was to determine the issue +of the Ukrainian question. The Emperor opened the proceedings, and +then called on me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties +that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which will be apparent +from the foregoing entries in this diary. I expressed my doubt as to +whether our group would succeed in concluding general peace with +Petersburg. I then sketched the course of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span>negotiations with the +Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians had originally demanded the +cession of East Galicia, but that I had refused this. With regard to +the Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made demands which +had been refused by me. At present, they demanded the division of +Galicia into two parts, and the formation of an independent Austrian +province from East Galicia and Bukovina. I pointed out the serious +consequences which the acceptance of the Ukrainian demands would have +upon the further development of the Austro-Polish question. The +concessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to consist in +the inclusion in the peace treaty of a commercial agreement which +should enable us to cover our immediate needs in the matter of grain +supplies. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full +reciprocity for the Poles resident in Ukraine.</p> + +<p>"I pointed out emphatically that I considered it my duty to state the +position of the peace negotiations; that the decision could not lie +with me, but with the Ministry as a whole, in particular with the +Austrian Prime Minister. The Austrian Government would have to decide +whether these sacrifices could be made or not, and here I could leave +them in no doubt that if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should +probably come to no result with that country, and should thus be +compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk without having achieved any +peace settlement at all.</p> + +<p>"When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, rose to +speak. He pointed out first of all the necessity of an immediate +peace, and then discussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian +crown land, especially from the parliamentary point of view. Seidler +believed that despite the active opposition which was to be expected +from the Poles, he would still have a majority of two-thirds in the +House for the acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not blind +to the fact that arrangement would give rise to violent parliamentary +conflicts, but repeated his hope that a two-thirds majority could be +obtained despite the opposition of the Polish Delegation. After +Seidler came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle. He was +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span>particularly pleased to note that no concessions had been made to the +Ukrainians with regard to the Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear +division of the nationalities in Hungary was impracticable. The +Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of culture to enable +them to be given national independence. Dr. Wekerle also laid stress +on the danger, alike in Austria, of allowing any interference from +without; the risk of any such proceeding would be very great, we +should find ourselves on a downward grade by so doing, and we must +hold firmly to the principle that no interference in the affairs of +the Monarchy from without could be tolerated. In summing up, however, +Wekerle opposed the point of view of the Austrian Prime Minister.</p> + +<p>"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was perfectly aware +of the eminent importance and perilous aspects of this step. It was +true that it would bring us on to a down-grade, but from all +appearances, we had been in that position already for a long time, +owing to the war, and could not say how far it might lead us. I put +the positive question to Dr. Wekerle, what was a responsible leader of +our foreign policy to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the +Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hungarian supplies +would only suffice to help us over the next two months, after which +time a collapse would be absolutely unavoidable, unless we could +secure assistance from somewhere in the way of corn? On being +interrupted here by a dissentient observation from Dr. Wekerle, I told +him that if he, Wekerle, could bring corn into Austria I should be the +first to support his point of view, and that with pleasure, but so +long as he stood by his categorical denial, and insisted on his +inability to help us, we were in the position of a man on the third +floor of a burning house who jumps out of the window to save himself. +A man in such a situation would not stop to think whether he risked +breaking his legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the +certainty of the same. If the position really were as stated, that in +a couple of months we should be altogether without food supplies, then +we must take the consequences of such a position. Dr. von Seidler +here <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span>once more took up the discussion, and declared himself entirely +in agreement with my remarks.</p> + +<p>"During the further course of the debate, the probability of a +definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solution in connection with +the Ukrainian peace was discussed, and the question was raised as to +what new constellation would arise out of such failure. Sektionschef +Dr. Gratz then took up this question. Dr. Gratz pointed out that the +Austro-Polish solution must fail even without acceptance of the +Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates rendered solution +impossible. The Germans demanded, apart from quite enormous +territorial reductions of Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish +industry, part possession of the Polish railways and State domains, as +well as the imposition of part of the costs of war upon the Poles. We +could not attach ourselves to a Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed, +capable of living at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its +position. Dr. Gratz maintained that it would be wiser to come back to +the programme already discussed in general form; the project, by which +United Poland should be left to Germany, and the attachment of +Roumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Dr. Gratz went at length into +the details of this point of view. The Emperor then summed up the +essence of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that it was +primarily necessary to make peace with Petersburg and the Ukrainians, +and that negotiations should be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the +division of Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish +solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not finally settled, +but shelved for the time being.</p> + +<p>"In conclusion, Dr. Burian, the Minister of Finance, rose to speak, +and pointed out, as Dr. Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian +standpoint. Burian declared that, while the war might doubtless change +the internal structure of the Monarchy, such alteration must be made +from within, not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the +Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the Austrian principle +of the division of Galicia were to be carried through, the <i>form</i> of +so doing would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span>be of great importance. Baron Burian advised that a +clause referring to this should be inserted, not in the instrument of +peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This form was, in his, Burian's, +view, the only possible means of diminishing the serious consequences +of the steps which the Austrian Government wished to take."</p> + +<p>Thus the notes in my diary relative to this Council. The Austrian +Government was thus not only agreed as to the proposed arrangement +with the Ukraine; it was indeed at the direct wish of the Government, +by its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was brought +about.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 28, 1918.</i>—Reached Brest this evening.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 29, 1918.</i>—Trotski arrived.</p> + +<p>"<i>January 30, 1918.</i>—The first plenary session has been held. There +is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in +Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a +general convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of the question +now to come to any peace terms with the Russians. It is evident among +the Russians themselves that they positively expect the outbreak of a +world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their tactics now are +simply to gain time and wait for this to happen. The conference was +not marked by any particular event, only pin-pricks between Kühlmann +and Trotski. To-day is the first sitting of the Committee on +territorial questions, where I am to preside, and deal with our +territorial affairs.</p> + +<p>"The only interesting point about the new constellation seems to be +that the relations between Petersburg and Kieff are considerably worse +than before, and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognised at all by +the Bolsheviks as independent.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 1, 1918.</i>—Sitting of the Territorial Committee, I myself +presiding, with the Petersburg Russians. My plan is to play the +Petersburgers and the Ukrainians one against the other, and manage at +least to make peace with one of the two parties. I have still some +slight hope that a peace with one may so affect the other that +possibly peace with both may be attained.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span>"As was to be expected, Trotski replied to my question, whether he +admitted that the Ukrainians should treat with us alone on questions +dealing with their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after +some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be adjourned, and a +plenary sitting convened, in order that the matter might be dealt with +by the Kieff and Petersburg parties together.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 2, 1918.</i>—I have tried to get the Ukrainians to talk over +things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well. The +insults hurled by the Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were +simply grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between these two +Governments, and that it is not our fault that we have not been able +to bring them together under one hat on the question of peace. Trotski +was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he stared fixedly +before him, drawing nervously on his blotting paper. Heavy drops of +sweat trickled down his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the +disgrace of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence of the +enemy.</p> + +<p>"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little while ago. The elder +has shot down some sixty, the younger 'only' some thirty enemy +airmen. The elder's face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He +told me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only get as near +to the enemy as possible, from behind, and then keep on shooting, +when the other man would fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over +your own fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your +opponent.—Modern heroes.</p> + +<p>"Two charming stories were told about these two brothers. The English +had put a price on the head of the elder Richthofen. When he learned +of this, he sent down broadsheets informing them that to make matters +easier for them, he would from the following day have his machine +painted bright red. Next morning, going to the shed, he found all the +machines there painted bright red. One for all and all for one.</p> + +<p>"The other story is this: Richthofen and an English airman were +circling round each other and firing furiously. They came <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>closer and +closer, and soon they could distinctly see each other's faces. +Suddenly something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun, and he +could not shoot. The Englishman looked across in surprise, and seeing +what was wrong, waved his hand, turned and flew off. Fair play! I +should like to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is +greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 3, 1918.</i>—Started for Berlin. Kühlmann, Hoffmann, +Colloredo.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 4, 1918.</i>—Arrived Berlin. Nothing this afternoon, as the +Germans are holding council among themselves.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 5, 1918.</i>—Sitting all day. I had several violent passages +of arms with Ludendorff. Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this +is not yet altogether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for +Brest, we have at last to set down <i>in writing</i> that we are only +obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany. Ludendorff +was violently opposed to this, and said, 'If Germany makes peace +without profit, then Germany has lost the war.'</p> + +<p>"The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling +nudged me and whispered: 'Leave him alone, we two will manage it +together without him.'</p> + +<p>"I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to +Hertling.</p> + +<p>"Supper this evening at Höhenlohe.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 6, 1918.</i>—Arrived Brest this evening. Wiesner has been at +it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier +now. The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived +yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his +Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally, +far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna, +and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I +gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the +Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then in the name of Germany +commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech +with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>possible +or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposition we agreed.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 7, 1918.</i>—My conversation with Trotski took place. I took +Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him. I began +by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption +of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be +avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken. I therefore +begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what +conditions he would accept. Trotski then declared very frankly and +clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he +knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that +the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian +provinces. He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kühlmann +during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right +of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of +sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force. He would +never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to +this interpretation of the right of self-determination. The Germans +must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he +would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation +and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak to oppose it. Only the +Moon Sound Islands seemed to be more than he could swallow. Secondly, +and this is very characteristic, Trotski said he could never agree to +our making peace with the Ukraine, since the Ukraine was no longer in +the hands of its Rada, but in the hands of his troops. It was a part +of Russia, and to make peace with it would be interfering in the +internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter seems to be +that about nineteen days ago the Russian troops really did enter +Kieff, but were subsequently driven out, the Rada once more coming +into power as before. Whether Trotski was unaware of this latter +development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot say for certain, +but it seems as if the former were the case.</p> + +<p>"The last hope of coming to an understanding with Petersburg has +vanished. An appeal from the Petersburg <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>Government to the German +soldiers has been discovered in Berlin, inciting them to revolt, to +murder the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the soviets. +Following on this came a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm to Kühlmann +ordering him to terminate negotiations at once, by demanding, besides +Courland and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia—all without regard to the right of self-determination of the +peoples concerned.</p> + +<p>"The dastardly behaviour of these Bolsheviks renders negotiation +impossible. I cannot blame Germany for being incensed at such +proceedings, but the instructions from Berlin are hardly likely to be +carried out. We do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia.</p> + +<p>"<i>February 8, 1918.</i>—This evening the peace with Ukraine is to be +signed. The first peace in this terrible war. I wonder if the Rada is +still really sitting at Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message +dated 6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here, and +Trotski has declined my suggestion to dispatch an officer of the +Austrian General Staff to the spot, in order to bring back reliable +information. Evidently, then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were +already masters of Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me, by the +way, that Trotski, with whom he spoke early this morning, is much +depressed at our intention of concluding peace with Ukraine to-day +after all. This confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz +has convened a meeting with the Petersburgers for to-morrow; this will +clear matters up, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if +we must break off altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that +the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end."</p> + +<p>After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received the following +telegram from the Emperor:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="right">"'<i>Court train, February 9, 1918.</i></p> + +<p class="lilin">"'Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace +with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for +your persevering and successful endeavours.</p> + +<p class="lilin">"'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>far +from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further +continue to aid you on your difficult path—to the benefit of the +Monarchy and of our peoples.</p> + +<p class="right sc">Karl.'</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>"<i>February 11, 1918.</i>—Trotski declines to sign. The war is over, but +there is no peace.</p> + +<p>"The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna will be seen clearly +from the following message from Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux, +February 12, 1918. Skrzynski writes:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">"'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the +following notification: We were already quite disposed to enter +into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether +Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give +her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which +is perhaps already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And +Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows: +It has been decided to wait for a while.'"</p> +</div> +<br /> +<br /> + +<p>Our position, then, during the negotiations with Petersburg was as +follows: We could not induce Germany to resign the idea of Courland +and Lithuania. We had not the physical force to do so. The pressure +exerted by the Supreme Army Command on the one hand and the shifty +tactics of the Russians made this impossible. We had then to choose +between leaving Germany to itself, and signing a separate peace, or +acting together with our three Allies and finishing with a peace +including the covert annexation of the Russian outer provinces.</p> + +<p>The former alternative involved the serious risk of making a breach in +the Quadruple Alliance, where some dissension was already apparent. +The Alliance could no longer stand such experiments. We were faced +with the final military efforts now, and the unity of the Allies must +not in any case be further shaken. On the other hand, the danger that +Wilson, the only statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of +a peace on mutual understanding, might from the conclusion of such a +peace obtain an erroneous impression as to our intentions. I hoped +then, and I was not deceived, that this eminently clever <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span>man would +see through the situation and recognise that we were forced to act +under pressure of circumstances. His speeches delivered after the +peace at Brest confirmed my anticipation.</p> + +<p>The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine. And +it bears the characteristic marks of such a birth. That is true. But +it is no less true that despite the fact of our having obtained far +less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should, without these +supplies, have been unable to carry on at all until the new harvest. +Statistics show that during the spring and summer of 1918 42,000 +wagon-loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have been +impossible to procure these supplies from anywhere else. Millions of +human beings were thus saved from death by starvation—and let those +who sit in judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind.</p> + +<p>It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks available in +Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity could have been brought into +Austria if the collecting and transport apparatus had worked +differently.</p> + +<p>The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my request, in May, +1919, furnished me with the following statistical data for +publication:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Brief survey of the organisation of corn imports from Ukraine (on +terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same:</p> + +<p class="lilin">When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived +at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies, +a mission was dispatched to Kieff, in which not only Government +officials but also the best qualified and most experienced experts +which the Government could procure were represented.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being +persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain +business, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente +grain houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the +leading French corn merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss).</p> + +<p class="lilin">The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and +commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to +show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Ukrainian Government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk that +very great quantities, probably about one million tons, of +surplus <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span>foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the meantime +been replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power +evinced no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to +fulfil obligations on this scale, but was more disposed to point +out that it would be altogether impossible, for various reasons, +to do so.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange +system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But +neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in a +position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded) +required in exchange.</p> + +<p class="lilin">We had then to endeavour to obtain the supplies on credit, and the +Ukrainian Government agreed, after long and far from easy +negotiations, to provide <i>credit valuta</i> (against vouchers for +mark and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this +were finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all 643 +million karbowanez.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Rouble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under the +leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, +was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight +activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of +great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost; +and even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with. +Anyhow, it had only procured comparatively small sums of roubles, +so that the purchasing organisation in Ukraine, especially at +first, suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment.</p> + +<p class="lilin">But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question would +only have improved matters in a few of the best supplied +districts, for the principal obstacle was simply <i>the lack of +supplies</i>. The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves +continually in danger of a food crisis is the best indication as +to the state of things.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the +resulting confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the +Bolsheviks (November, 1917, to March, 1918) were conspicuously +apparent; cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but +where supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly +carried off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the +harvest had given certain stocks available in the country, though +these were not extensive, and the organisation of a purchasing +system was now commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and +Germany had originally contemplated could not be carried out in +fact, since the Ukrainian Government declared that it would itself +set up this organisation, and maintained this intention with the +greatest stubbornness. But the authority in the country had been +destroyed by <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion; +the peasantry turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by +revolutionaries and cut up. The power of the Government, then, in +respect of collecting supplies of grain, was altogether +inadequate; on the other hand, however, it was still sufficient +(as some actual instances proved) to place serious, indeed +insuperable, obstacles in our way. It was necessary, therefore, to +co-operate with the Government—that is, to come to a compromise +with it. After weeks of negotiation this was at last achieved, by +strong diplomatic pressure, and, accordingly, the agreement of +April 23, 1918, was signed.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hungarian +Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a great firm +of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed a number +of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of activity +in the business, with Russian grain affairs.</p> + +<p class="lilin">But while this establishment was still in progress the people in +Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey to +North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no +longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a <i>civil</i> +commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied +by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a +decree from the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain +should be entrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the +districts occupied by them. To carry out this plan a general, who +had up to that time been occupied in Roumania, was dispatched to +Odessa, and now commenced independent military proceedings from +there. For payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War +Grain Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial +instructions to the Government, to place 100 million kronen at the +disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set +aside by the finance section of that department.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This military action and its execution very seriously affected the +civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired +the value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to +such an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in +circulation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus +into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed to +the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place +there some months later.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great +disapproval by the <i>Germans</i>, and when in a time of the greatest +scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Germany +for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition that +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span>independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary should +be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be entrusted to +Germany.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured, +especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established a +collecting organisation, to the demand of which the Roumanian +Government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain, and +in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The +country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies, +and in addition to this the collecting system never really worked +properly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was +frequently upset by overbidding on the part of our own military +section.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the harvest +of 1918. The collecting organisation had become more firmly +established and extended, the necessary personal requirements were +fully complied with, and <i>it would doubtless have been possible to +bring great quantities out of the country</i>. But first of all the +demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in +many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian +and finally the very considerable contingents of German and +Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for +these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow +any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout +the whole country had seriously declined—owing to the entire +uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution. +The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were +little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local +embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to +any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which +had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of +the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position +of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was +unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements +throughout the whole country were now working with increasing +success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more +difficult in September and October—and then came the collapse.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had +either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube, +or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient +wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition, +often <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>instances of resistance on the part of the local railways, +incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.</p> + +<p class="lilin">However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much +the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have +contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing +of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may +nevertheless maintain that <i>all that was humanly possible</i> was +done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And +in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and +experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were +utilised to the utmost degree.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import +organisation—apart from the before-mentioned interference of the +military department and consequent fluctuations of the system—was +largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on +more particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high +export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian +Government were constantly being overbid. This smuggling was also +in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the +nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and +frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or +upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did +a great deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany +likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted +smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation, +and led to similar conditions on our own side.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen +from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not +inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned, +amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the +quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations.</p> +<br /> + +<h4 class="sc">Survey of the Imports from Ukraine dating from Commencement of +Importation (Spring, 1918) to November, 1918.</h4> + +<p class="lilin">I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department +(corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds):</p><br /> + +<div style="margin-left: 10%;"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" width="80%" summary="Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department"> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Total imported for the contracting states</td> + <td class="tdr" width="20%"> </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" width="5%"> </td> + <td class="tdl" width="75%">(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey)</td> + <td class="tdr">113,421 tons</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Of which Austria-Hungary received</td> + <td class="tdr"> 57,382 tons</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Grain and flour amounting to</td> + <td class="tdr">46,225 tons</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> + +<br /> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span>II. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company:</p><br /> + +<div style="margin-left: 10%;"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="90%" summary="Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company"> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" style="padding-bottom: .5em;"> </td> + <td class="tdrp" style="vertical-align: bottom; padding-bottom: .5em;">Total</td> + <td class="tdl" style="padding-bottom: .5em;"> </td> + <td class="tdc" colspan="2" style="vertical-align: bottom; padding-bottom: .5em;">Of which <br />Austria-Hungary <br />received:</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" width="44%">Butter, fat, bacon</td> + <td class="tdr" width="18%">3,329,403</td> + <td class="tdl" width="15%">kg.</td> + <td class="tdr" width="18%">2,170,437</td> + <td class="tdl" width="5%">kg.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Oil, edible oils</td> + <td class="tdr">1,802,847</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + <td class="tdr">977,105</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Cheese, curds</td> + <td class="tdr">420,818</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + <td class="tdr">325,103</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Fish, preserved fish, herrings</td> + <td class="tdr">1,213,961</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + <td class="tdr">473,561</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Cattle</td> + <td class="tdr">105,542</td> + <td class="tdl">head</td> + <td class="tdr">55,421</td> + <td class="tdl">head</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdr">(36,834,885</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.)</td> + <td class="tdr">(19,505,760</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.)</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Horses</td> + <td class="tdr">98,976</td> + <td class="tdl">head</td> + <td class="tdr">40,027</td> + <td class="tdl">head</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdr">(31,625,172</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.)</td> + <td class="tdr">(13,165,725</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.)</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Salted meat</td> + <td class="tdr">2,927,439</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.</td> + <td class="tdr">1,571,569</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Eggs</td> + <td class="tdr">75,200</td> + <td class="tdl">boxes</td> + <td class="tdr">32,433</td> + <td class="tdl">boxes</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Sugar</td> + <td class="tdr">66,809,969</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.</td> + <td class="tdr">24,973,443</td> + <td class="tdl">kg.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">Various foodstuffs</td> + <td class="tdr" style="border-bottom: solid 1pt black;">27,385,095</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + <td class="tdr" style="border-bottom: solid 1pt black;">7,836,287</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 5em;">Total</td> + <td class="tdr" style="border-top: solid 1pt black;">172,349,556</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + <td class="tdr" style="border-top: solid 1pt black;">61,528,220</td> + <td class="tdl"> "</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdr" style="vertical-align: top;">and 75,200</td> + <td class="tdl">boxes<br />eggs</td> + <td class="tdr" style="vertical-align: top;">and 32,433</td> + <td class="tdl">boxes<br />eggs</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"> </td> + <td class="tdr" style="white-space: nowrap;">(Total, 30,757</td> + <td class="tdl">wagons)</td> + <td class="tdr" style="white-space: nowrap;">(Total, 13,037</td> + <td class="tdl">wagons)</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> +<br /> + +<p class="lilin">The goods imported under II. represent a value of roughly 450 +<i>million kronen</i>.</p> + +<p class="lilin">The quantities <i>smuggled</i> unofficially into the states concerned +are estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official +imports).</p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important while we were +living through it, but which was yet nothing but a phase of no great +importance after all, since it produced no lasting effect.</p> + +<p>The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, washing +it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by +the incoming tide.</p> + +<p>Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in the Herrenhaus, +who asserted that I had proved my incapability by my own confession +that the Peace of Brest had not withstood <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span>the test of subsequent +events. But should I have shown more capability by asserting, after +the collapse of the Central Powers, that the peace still existed?</p> + +<p>The term "bread peace" (<i>Brotfrieden</i>) was not coined by me, but by +Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the +Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives +were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words +without a sneer.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER XI<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST</h4> +<br /> + +<p>At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not +intend to continue the war. These rumours assumed a very definite +character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine. That peace, as +well as Trotski's attitude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania +could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia +and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back. I +say in <i>some</i> circles, for there was one group which, to the very last +moment, was all for war.</p> + +<p>While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of +the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace +aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a +peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than +with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians +on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical +frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from +Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, +as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person +with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was +brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far +as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of +acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a <i>pro-memoria</i> with +the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his +already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very +distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The <i>pro-memoria</i> +reads as follows:</p> + +<div class="block"> +<p class="lilin">Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much +exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy +could wish.</p> + +<p class="lilin"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span>The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains +in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us +are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her +military situation.</p> + +<p class="lilin">Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift +offered to vanquished Roumania and are <i>not at all to be made a +subject for negotiations</i>. In no case are these negotiations to +assume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses +to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only +be a resumption of hostilities.</p> + +<p class="lilin">I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will +run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western +Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that +after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back +and give way before our superior forces.</p> + +<p class="lilin">At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse +of Roumania.</p> + +<p class="lilin">In all human probability it is almost certain that the development +of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the +peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete +success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier +rectification as <i>conditio sine qua non</i> forms a justifiable +measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a +purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the +entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the +question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up +another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in +the Delegation.</p> + +<p class="lilin">And, besides, the procedure—to which the greatest importance must +be attached—is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise +the chances of a general peace.</p> + +<p class="lilin">It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of +the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree +to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and +firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in +this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only +way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude +that will lead them to think differently.</p> + +<p class="lilin">This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and +undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is +evident that to yield on the frontier question—even for fear of a +breakdown in the negotiations—must have a deplorable effect on +the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right +not to take advantage of Roumania's desperate situation, but to +grant her reasonable peace <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span>terms in accordance with the +principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with +adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the +Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude +a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and +sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to +teach them otherwise.</p> + +<p class="right sc">Tisza.</p> + +<p class="noin"><i>February 27, 1916.</i></p> +</div> +<br /> + +<p>Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of +Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord +on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do +not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time +displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the +feet of General Franchet d'Esperey, dominated.</p> + +<p>Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the +horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace +negotiations must be supported.</p> + +<p>The episode of the Roumanian peace must not be taken out of the great +picture of the war. Like the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanian +peace was necessary from a military point of view, because it seemed +desirable to release troops in the East as quickly as possible and +transfer them to the Western front. It was urgently desired and +repeatedly demanded that we should come to a final settlement with +Roumania as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result I had +already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Emperor to send word +privately to King Ferdinand that he could reckon on an honourable +peace should he wish to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my +advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews with a member of +the immediate entourage of the King. But the German opinion was that +King Ferdinand must be "punished for his treachery" and no +negotiations entered into with him. For this reason, and to avoid +fruitless controversy, I first imparted to Herr von Kühlmann the +accomplished fact and informed him that we had put ourselves secretly +into communication with King Ferdinand. This event was quite in +accordance with the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>standard of equality in our Federation, by which +every member was privileged to act according to the best of his +ability and was merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the +proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany for permission to +take such a step.</p> + +<p>There was a three-fold reason why I did not share Germany's opinion on +this question. In the first place, my point of view was that it was +not our duty to mete out divine justice and to inflict punishment, +but, on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible. Therefore +my duty was to seize every means possible to prevent a continuance of +the war. I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles +that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were +compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false. The +Roumanians held very strong positions, the <i>moral</i> in the army was +excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen's +troops had suffered very severely. This success turned the Roumanians' +heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian +army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war <i>à +l'outrance</i>. They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were +upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the +defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies +on the West would secure victory for them. They were probably afraid, +too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent +disgrace with the Entente—that they would lose the friendship of the +Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools. +The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the +King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most +unwise to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a certain +fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it +might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones. The +third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a +competent representative in Roumania. If we were to depose the King we +should divide Roumania into two camps and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>would, at the best, only be +able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the +dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly-secured peace could +only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania.</p> + +<p>In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4 +and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy +asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the +step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would +be released. I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied +that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other +Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable +peace, address them accordingly. As to the question of territorial +possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express +any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the +introductory negotiations.</p> + +<p>The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with +Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently +from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the +question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite +justified. Roumania's actions with regard to us were far more +treacherous than those of Italy. Italy, owing to her geographical +position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western +Powers—a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to +their demands—would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in +this world war. Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was +amply provided for through her rich granaries. Apart from the fact +that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that +Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her +into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be +influenced by the Entente than Italy. But neither would the Russian +ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and +willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and +political matters that gave her into Russia's power. Bratianu said to +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span>me in one of our last interviews: "Russia is exactly like a blackcock +dancing before the hens." In admitting the truth of this appropriate +comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to +be embraced, directly provoked violence.</p> + +<p>For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his +own country. Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his +Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had +no effect.</p> + +<p>In Roumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power. On February 24 +Kühlmann and I had our first interview alone with Avarescu at the +castle of Prince Stirbey, at Buftia. At this interview, which was very +short, the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The frontier +rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-Hungarian programme, were +barely alluded to, and the economic questions, which later played a +rather important part, were only hinted at. Avarescu's standpoint was +that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an impossibility, and the +interview ended with a <i>non possumus</i> from the Roumanian general, +which was equivalent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the +Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint. The so-called +"old" Dobrudsha, the portion that Roumania in 1913 had wrested from +Bulgaria, had been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the time +of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their co-operation, and +the area that lies between that frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda +railway line was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They went much +further in their aspirations: they demanded the whole of the +Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, and the great and +numerous disputes that occurred later in this connection show how +insistently and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands. At +the same time, as there was a danger that the Bulgars, thoroughly +disappointed in their aspirations, might secede from us, it became +absolutely impossible to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Roumanians. +All that could be effected was to secure for the Roumanians free +access to Constanza, and, further, to find <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span>a way out of the +difficulty existing between Turkey and Bulgaria in connection with the +Dobrudsha.</p> + +<p>In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I suggested to +Avarescu that he should arrange for his King to meet me. My plan was +to make it clear to the King that it would be possible for him now to +conclude a peace, though involving certain losses, but still a peace +that would enable him to keep his crown. On the other hand, by +continuing the war, he could not count on forbearance on the part of +the Central Powers. I trusted that this move on my part would enable +him to continue the peace negotiations.</p> + +<p>I met the King on February 27 at a little station in the occupied +district of Moldavia.</p> + +<p>We arrived at Focsani at noon and continued by motor to the lines, +where Colonel Ressel and a few Roumanian officers were waiting to +receive me. We drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German +car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded as far as the +railway station of Padureni. A saloon carriage in the train had been +reserved for me there, and we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at +5 o'clock.</p> + +<p>The Roumanian royal train arrived a few minutes later, and I at once +went across to the King.</p> + +<p>Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand lasted twenty minutes.</p> + +<p>As the King did not begin the conversation I had to do so, and said +that I had not come to sue for peace but purely as the bearer of a +message from the Emperor Charles, who, in spite of Roumania's +treachery, would show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand +would <i>at once</i> conclude peace under the conditions mutually agreed on +by the Quadruple Alliance Powers.</p> + +<p>Should the King not consent, then a continuance of the war would be +unavoidable and would put an end to Roumania and the dynasty. Our +military superiority was already very considerable, and now that our +front would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it would be +an easy matter for us, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span>in a very short space of time, to increase our +strength still more. We were aware that Roumania would very soon have +no more munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks the +kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist.</p> + +<p>The King did not oppose anything but thought the conditions terribly +hard. Without the Dobrudsha Roumania would hardly be able to draw +breath. At any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding "old" +Dobrudsha again.</p> + +<p>I said to the King that if he complained about hard conditions I could +only ask what would his conditions have been if his troops had reached +Budapest? Meanwhile, I was ready to guarantee that Roumania would not +be cut off from the sea, but would have free access to Constanza.</p> + +<p>Here the King again complained of the hard conditions enforced on him, +and declared he would never be able to find a Ministry who would +accept them.</p> + +<p>I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Roumania's internal +business, but my private opinion was that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in +order to save Roumania, would agree to the conditions laid down. I +could only repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms laid +before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If the King did not accept +them, we should have, in a month's time, a far better peace than the +one which the Roumanians might consider themselves lucky to get +to-day.</p> + +<p>We were ready to give our diplomatic support to Roumania that she +might obtain Bessarabia, and she would, therefore, gain far more than +she would lose.</p> + +<p>The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was +steeped in Bolshevism, and the Dobrudsha could not be given up; +anyhow, it was only under the very greatest pressure that he had +decided to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He began +again, however, to speak of the promised access to the sea, which +apparently made the cession of the Dobrudsha somewhat easier.</p> + +<p>We then entered into details, and I reproached the King for the +dreadful treatment of our people interned in Roumania, which he said +he regretted.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span>Finally, I requested that he would give me a clear and decided answer +within forty-eight hours as to whether he would negotiate on the basis +of our proposals or not.</p> + +<p>The result of the interview was the appointment of the Marghiloman +Ministry and the continuation of the negotiations.</p> + +<p>Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet, he approached me to +learn the exact terms.</p> + +<p>He declared himself to be in agreement with the first and hardest of +the conditions—the cession of the Dobrudsha, because he was quicker +than the King in seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation +to Bulgaria in this connection, it could not be otherwise. As to our +territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that I laid chief stress on +entering into friendly and lasting relations with Roumania after peace +was concluded, and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such +measure as Roumania, on her part, would consider bearable. On the +other hand, he, Marghiloman, must understand that I was bound to +consider the Hungarian aspirations to a certain degree, Marghiloman, +who was an old and tried parliamentarian, fully saw in what a +constrained position I was placed. We finally agreed that the cession +of the populated districts and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should +not take place, and, altogether the original claims were reduced to +about half. Marghiloman said he accepted the compromise.</p> + +<p>My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with Roumania played +an important part in the negotiations. It was clear to me that this +demand was in Austrian, but not in Hungarian interests; but I still +think that, even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for both +countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage of provisions made the +opening of the Roumanian granaries very desirable. As was to be +expected, this clause in the negotiations met with the most violent +opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible to see a way out +of the difficulty. I never took back my demand, however, and was +firmly resolved that peace should not be signed if my plan was not +realised. I was dismissed from office in the middle <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span>of the +negotiations, and my successor did not attach the same importance to +that particular item as I did.</p> + +<p>On the German side there was at once evidence of that insatiable +appetite which we had already noticed at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans +wished to have a species of war indemnity by compelling Roumania to +cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbours to German +companies, and placing the permanent control of her finances in German +hands. I opposed these demands in the most decided manner from the +very first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude all +possibility of any friendly relations in future. I went so far as to +ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph direct to the Emperor William in +that connection, which met with a certain amount of success. In the +end the German claims were reduced by about fifty per cent., and +accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form. With regard to the +petroleum question, a ninety years' lease was agreed on. In the matter +of the corn supply, Roumania was to bind herself to deliver her +agricultural produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of +years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent control of +Roumanian finances was not carried out. In the question of price, the +Roumanian views held good. The most impossible of the German demands, +namely, the occupation of Roumania for five to six years after the +conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties. This was the +point that was most persistently and energetically insisted on by the +German Supreme Military Command, and it was only with great trouble +and after lengthy explanations and discussions that we settled the +matter on the following lines: That on the conclusion of peace the +entire legislative and executive power of the Roumanian Government +would be restored in principle, and that we should content ourselves +with exercising a certain control through a limited number of agents, +this control not to be continued after the general peace was made. I +cannot say positively whether this standpoint was adhered to by my +successor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only undertook +office on condition that I gave him a guarantee that the plan would be +supported by me.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span>As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha had prepared great +difficulties for us in two respects. First of all there was the +relinquishing of their claim which, for the Roumanians, was the +hardest term of all, and imparted to the peace the character of a +peace of violence; and secondly, the matter had precipitated a dispute +between Turkey and Bulgaria.</p> + +<p>The Bulgarians' view was that the entire Dobrudsha, including the +mouth of the Danube, must be promised to them, and they insisted on +their point with an obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come +across. They went so far as to declare that neither the present +Government nor any other would be able to return to Sofia, and allowed +it clearly to be seen that by refusing their claims we could never +again count on Bulgaria. The Turks, on the other hand, protested with +equal vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered by two Turkish +army corps, that it was a moral injustice that the gains chiefly won +by Turkish forces should be given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and +that they would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole of the +Dobrudsha unless compensation was given to them. By way of +compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they +had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but +also a considerable area beyond.</p> + +<p>In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed, +Kühlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making +every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both +saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the +result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble, +we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It +took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to +Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a +possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision +agreed upon later.</p> + +<p>Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor +yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>was the only possible +way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.</p> + +<p>Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy +through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and +Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to +the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved +later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding. +Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a +state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without +first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to +important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a +burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has +damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was +very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my +predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger. +There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the +Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through +promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the +Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it.</p> + +<p>On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too +severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was +dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret +with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on Talaat and +Enver. Talaat told me in Bucharest, however, quite positively that he +would be forced to send in his resignation if he were to return +empty-handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would be very +probable.</p> + +<p>We tried then at Bucharest to steer our way through the many shoals; +not mortally to offend the Roumanians, to observe as for as possible +the character of a peace of understanding, and yet to keep both Turks +and Bulgars on our side.</p> + +<p>The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard demand to make on the +Roumanians, and was only rendered bearable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span>for them when Kühlmann and +I, with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent +opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free access to the +Black Sea.</p> + +<p>When later, in one breath, we were reproached with having enforced a +peace of violence on the Roumanians and with not having treated the +Bulgarian claims and wishes with sufficient consideration—the answer +to the charge is obvious. <i>Because</i> we were compelled to consider both +Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to demand the Dobrudsha from the +Roumanians and treat them with greater severity than we should have +done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and the Bulgars for +our negotiation plans. Judged according to the Versailles standard, +the Peace of Bucharest would be a peace of understanding, both as +regards form and contents.</p> + +<p>The Central Powers' mediators, both at Versailles and St. Germain, +would have been glad had they been treated in the same way as the +Marghiloman Ministry was treated.</p> + +<p>The Roumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired safe and guaranteed +access to the sea; they lost a district of sparsely populated +mountainous country to us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia.</p> + +<p>They gained far more than they lost.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>CHAPTER XII<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<h4>FINAL REFLECTIONS</h4> +<br /> + +<p>The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the +character of the work of individual men. It assumed rather the +character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the +effectiveness of the most powerful individuals.</p> + +<p>All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with +certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation +given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory. +The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing +crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making +each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an +avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and +without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone.</p> + +<p>The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the +world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe +according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That +signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four +different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and +Washington. And the four representatives—"the Big Four," as they were +called—were each individually the slave of his programme, his +pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations +<i>in camera</i>, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground +for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there +was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found.</p> + +<p>Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his +programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between +the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but +it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his +will against the three <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>others. We do not know what occurred behind +those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought +weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off +proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the +chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world +if the only one who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest +had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of +Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, +who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the +Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he +had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of +France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had +been told for the last five years: <i>Que les boches payeront tout</i>. +What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France +would have dismissed him.</p> + +<p>And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of +approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to +check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national +interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was +much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might +much more probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after final +victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves +of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would +have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the +right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally, +he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the +question here, but rather that neither could have acted very +differently even had he wished to do so.</p> + +<p>It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson +lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the +President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his +Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were +so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held +it.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span>And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the +most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a +continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars.</p> + +<p>In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of +all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at +Versailles—the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating +Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory +that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give +themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and +passion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful +paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while +they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but +instruments in a world revolution.</p> + +<p>The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the +blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made +Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its +mother, despair its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in +the veins of Europe for many a long year.</p> + +<p>Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The +war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming +generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the +world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with +the world-war.</p> + +<p>Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done. +The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms +that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible +earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and +again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up +flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of +elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation +through the land—until everything has been swept away that reminds us +of the madness of the war and the French peace.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming +generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad +dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid +in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions, +with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to +devastate and destroy.</p> + +<p>But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will +rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always +after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law +in life.</p> + +<p>Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the +ranks of whoever comes to build the new world.</p> + +<p><i>June, 1919.</i></p> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>APPENDIX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> + +<br /> + +<h3>1</h3> + +<h4>Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor"><span style="font-weight: normal;">[11]</span></a></h4> + +<p class="noin">On February 28, 1917, the <i>Isvestia</i> published the following text of +this agreement:</p> + +<p>"The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the +instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the +Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Ambassador +in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in London, Count +Benckendorff, the following notable points:</p> + +<p>§1. A <i>Military Convention</i> shall be concluded without delay between +the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This +convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia +against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its +forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly +against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle +questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their +nature come within the scope of the Army Command.</p> + +<p>§2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at +her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against +all countries at war with them.</p> + +<p>§3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy +undiminished, active assistance until the <i>destruction of the Austrian +fleet</i>, or until the moment peace is concluded. A <i>Naval Convention</i> +shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and +Italy.</p> + +<p>§4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the +district of the <i>Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its +natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the +city</i> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span><i>and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, +the whole of Istria</i> as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the +Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of +Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St. +Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands.</p> + +<p>Note: 1. By way of supplement to §4, the frontier shall be drawn +through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a +northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the +watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers +Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the +Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn +southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the +present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it +will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course +along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil, +Mangart and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and +Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction +to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its +sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the +Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua, +Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions.</p> + +<p>§5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its +present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all +possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca +eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the +Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching +at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those +situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised <i>all the +islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast</i>, beginning with +the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura, +etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the +islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza +and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as +Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona, +Pua, Solta and Brazza.</p> + +<p>The following are to be <i>neutralised</i>: (1) The entire coast from Cape +Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of +Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned +peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning +from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far +as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the +boundaries of the neutralised zone <i>the whole of the Bay <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span>of Cattaro</i> +with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo; +this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in +April and May, 1909, as to the rights of <i>Montenegro</i>.</p> + +<p>In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only +admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they +shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in +the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the +coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future +neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari, +agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the +islands not accorded to Italy.</p> + +<p>Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the +Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of <i>Croatia, +Serbia and Montenegro</i>: In the north of the Adriatic, <i>the entire +coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca</i> on the frontier of Istria +as far as the <i>northern frontier</i> of Dalmatia, including the whole of +the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia, +the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as +also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the +south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the +entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the +principal ports of <i>Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and +San Giovanni di Medua</i>, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua, +Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta.</p> + +<p>The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State +of Albania.</p> + +<p>§6. Italy to be given full possession of <i>Valona, the Island of +Sasseno</i>, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in +military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north +and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south.</p> + +<p>§7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to §4, Dalmatia and the +islands of the Adriatic according to §5, as well as Valona, is not to +oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain and Russia in case +of the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state in +Albania, as to <i>division of the northern and southern frontier belts +of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece</i>. The southern strip +of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as far as +Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralisation.</p> + +<p>Italy has the prospect of <i>right to determine the foreign policy of +Albania</i>; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a +sufficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on +the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece and +Serbia.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span>§8. Italy to have full possession of all the <i>islands of the +Dodecanessus</i> which it occupies at present.</p> + +<p>§9. France, Great Britain and Russia accept in principle the fact of +<i>Italy's interest in maintaining political equilibrium</i> in the +Mediterranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any <i>division of +Turkey, to a like portion with themselves</i> in the basin of the +Mediterranean, and that in the part adjacent to the <i>province of +Adalia</i>, where Italy has already acquired particular rights, and +developed particular interests, to be noted in the Italo-British +Convention. The zone then falling to the possession of Italy will in +due time be determined according to the vital interests of France and +Great Britain. Similarly, the interests of Italy are also to be +considered in case the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should +be maintained by the Powers for a further period, and only a +limitation between the spheres of interest be made. Should, in such +case, any areas of Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain +and Russia during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to +Italy, and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together +with the right to occupy the same.</p> + +<p>§10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto +conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne.</p> + +<p>§11. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall be +commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts.</p> + +<p>§12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, England and +Russia whereby <i>Arabia and the holy cities of the Mohammedans</i> are to +be granted to <i>an independent Mohammedan Power</i>.</p> + +<p>§13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial +possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great +Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain +compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in +Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to +the colonies of France and England.</p> + +<p>§14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realisation of <i>a +loan of not less than 50 million pounds sterling</i> in the English +market on favourable conditions.</p> + +<p>§15. France, England and Russia undertake to support Italy in +<i>preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any +diplomatic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a +peace</i>, or the regulation of questions connected with the present war.</p> + +<p>§16. The present treaty to be <i>kept secret</i>. As regards Italy's +agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration +will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against +Italy.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span>The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective authorised +representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, together with the +representative of Italy similarly authorised by his Government for +this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain and Russia declare +their full agreement with the foregoing notable points, as set before +them by the Italian Government. With regard to §§1, 2 and 3, referring +to the agreement upon military and naval undertakings of all four +Powers, <i>Italy undertakes to commence active operations at the +earliest possible date</i>, and in any case not later than one month +after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties.</p> + +<p>The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the 26th +April, 1915, and sealed, by</p> + +<p class="noin" style="margin-left: 55%;">Sir Edward Grey,<br /> +Cambon,<br /> +Marchese Imperiali,<br /> +Graf Benckendorff."</p> +<br /> + +<p>After the entry of Roumania into the war (September, 1916) this +programme was further extended.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>2</h3> + +<h4>Note from Count Czernin to the American Government, dated March 5, 1917</h4> + +<p class="noin">From the <i>aide-mémoire</i> of the American Ambassador in Vienna, dated +February 18 of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign +Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet entertains some doubt, +in view of the statements issued by the Imperial and Royal Government +on February 10 and January 11 of this year, as to what attitude +Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting for the future with regard to +submarine warfare, and whether the assurance given by the Austrian +Government to the Washington Cabinet in the course of the proceedings +with regard to the case of the vessels <i>Ancona</i> and <i>Persia</i> might not +be taken as altered or withdrawn by the statements mentioned.</p> + +<p>The Austrian Government is most willing to meet the desire of the +United States Government that this doubt should be removed by a clear +and final declaration.</p> + +<p>It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on the +methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since these +form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span>put into +practice by Austria-Hungary and her allies, besides throwing a clear +light upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian Government in +the questions arising therefrom.</p> + +<p>When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central Powers, but a +few years had elapsed since the memorable time when Great Britain +itself, together with the remaining states, had commenced at the Hague +to lay the foundations of a modern code of law for marine warfare. +Shortly after that the English Government had brought about a meeting +of representatives of the principal naval Powers, assembling in +London, in order further to carry forward the work commenced at the +Hague, presumably in a spirit of reasonable compromise between the +interests of belligerents and those of neutrals. The unexpected +success of these endeavours, which aimed at nothing less than +concerted establishment of legal standards calculated to maintain the +freedom of the seas and the interests of neutrals even in time of war, +was not to be long enjoyed by the peoples concerned.</p> + +<p>Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war than it +also began to break through the barriers with which it was confronted +by the standards of international law. While the Central Powers +immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their intention of +observing the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of +the British representative, England discarded the most important +points in that Declaration. In the endeavour to cut off the Central +Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually extended the list +of contraband until it included everything now required by human +beings for the maintenance of life. Great Britain then placed all the +coasts of the North Sea—an important transit-way also for the +maritime trade of Austria-Hungary—under the obstruction of a +so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the entry into Germany of +all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband list, as also to bar all +neutral traffic with those coasts, and prevent any export from the +same. That this method of proceeding stands in the most lurid +contradiction to the standards of blockade law arrived at and +established by international congress has already been admitted by the +President of the United States in words which will live in the history +of the law of nations. By this illegally preventing export of goods +from the Central Powers Great Britain thought to be able to shut down +the innumerable factories and industries which had been set up by +industrious and highly-developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and +to bring the workers to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And +when Austria-Hungary's southern neighbour joined the ranks of the +enemies of the Central Powers her first step was to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span>declare a +blockade of all the coasts of her opponent—following the example, of +course, of her Allies—in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy +had shortly before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to +point out to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of +all legal validity.</p> + +<p>For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until then, and +after long and mature consideration for and against, did they proceed +to answer in like measure and close with their adversaries at sea. As +the only belligerents who had done everything to secure the observance +of the agreement which should provide for freedom of the seas to +neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes to bow to the need of the +moment and attack that freedom; but they took that step in order to +fulfil their urgent duty to their peoples and with the conviction that +the step in question must lead towards the freedom of the seas in the +end. The declarations made by the Central Powers on the last day of +January of this year are only apparently directed against the rights +of neutrals; as a matter of fact, they are working toward the +restitution of those rights which the enemy has constantly infringed +and would, if victorious, annihilate for ever. The submarines, then, +which circle round England's shores, announce to all peoples using and +needing the sea—and who does not need it?—that the day is not far +off when the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly +acquired freedom.</p> + +<p>It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo +wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in +particular by the great people of the United States of America, whose +most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up with +ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all +nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in +mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended not +only to force the Central Powers to submission by starvation but +ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and +thereby ensure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the +other hand the blockading of England and its Allies only serves to +render possible <i>a peace with honour</i> for these Powers and to +guarantee to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritime trade, +thus ensuring their safe existence, then the question as to which of +the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided. +Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further +allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming +that neutrals should appreciate their endeavours to bring to life +again the principles of international law and the equal rights of +nations.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span>Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memorandum of +February 18 of this year, already referred to, the Austrian Government +would first of all remark that in the exchange of Notes in the cases +of the <i>Ancona</i> and <i>Persia</i> this Government restricted itself to +consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then arisen, +without setting forth the legal position in point of principle. In the +Note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the <i>Ancona</i> case it +reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of +international law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion +at a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the +question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum is +concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may be +made clear to the American Government that the Austrian Government now +as heretofore <i>holds immovably by the assurance already given</i>, and +with the endeavour to avoid any misunderstanding between the Monarchy +and the American Union by clearing up the most important question +arising out of the submarine warfare—most important as it rests on +the dictates of humanity.</p> + +<p>First and foremost the Austrian Government wishes to point out that +the thesis advanced by the American Government and adopted in many +learned works—to the effect that enemy merchant vessels, save in the +event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be destroyed +without provision for the safety of those on board—is also, in the +opinion of the Austrian Government itself, the kernel, so to speak, of +the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view, this theory +can at any rate be considered in connection with possible +circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the +dictates of humanity, which the Austrian Government and the Washington +Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down the +general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy +merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible. +This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before +exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the method +indicated by the theory of the Union Government referred to, according +to which <i>the commander of the warship himself issues a warning to the +vessel about to be sunk</i>, so that crew and passengers can be brought +into safety at the last moment; or, on the other hand, the Government +of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an imperative +necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect, <i>before the +sailing of the vessel</i> to be sunk; or, finally, such Government can, +when preparing comprehensive measures against the enemy traffic at +sea, have recourse to <i>a general warning applicable to all enemy +vessels concerned</i>.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span>That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on board +is liable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union Government +itself. The Austrian Government believes, however, that destruction +without warning is not only justifiable in cases of attempted escape +or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance only, that the +character of the vessel itself should be taken into consideration; +thus merchant ships or other private craft, placed in the service of +war operations, whether as transports or guardships, or with a +military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any kind of +hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be liable to +destruction without notice. The Austrian Government need not go into +the question of how far a belligerent is released from any obligation +as to provision for safety of human life when his opponent sinks enemy +merchant vessels without such previous warning, as in the well-known +cases, previously referred to, of the <i>Elektra</i>, <i>Dubrovnik</i>, +<i>Zagreb</i>, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident right, the +Austrian Government itself has never returned like for like. +Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian warships have +not destroyed a single enemy merchant vessel without previous warning, +though this may have been of a general character.</p> + +<p>The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also +admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance, +whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can +be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or +whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for +example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers +into the boats (the case of the <i>Ancona</i>), or when the passengers +themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian +Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of +the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as +otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive +the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should +also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as +to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at +all.</p> + +<p>The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a +vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand, +involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in +certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful +interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied +that saving lives <i>at sea</i> is nearly always a matter of blind +uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a +vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in +small <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span>boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore, +far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity <i>to restrain +people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them +beforehand</i>. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not +convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions +concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to +immunity when travelling on board enemy ships.</p> + +<p>The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the +freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral +persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly +justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their +power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed +necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the +sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their +purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, <i>are +enabled to avoid risking their lives</i>. But even where there is doubt +as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals +threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be +decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being +admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their +military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such +operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken +against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate +claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of +measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may +refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the +Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian +Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the +correctness of these views would imply—and this the Union Government +can hardly intend—that neutrals have the right of interfering in the +military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to +constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be +employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a +neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the +right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or +indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at +the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very +existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all +kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the +bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships +for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact +that subjects of neutral <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span>states are themselves responsible for any +harm they may incur <i>by their presence in any territory on land where +military operations are in progress</i>. Obviously, there is no ground +for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly +since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the +agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare +upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea.</p> + +<p>From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given +to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to +exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for +instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and +resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others +warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian +Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with +the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of +life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards +some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government +has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds +in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions +with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the +Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated +that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views. +The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington +Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are +inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American +citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in +this direction.</p> + +<p>Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year +concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian +Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the +foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when +only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern +international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an +enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop +the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain, +examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and, +where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with +these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship +has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a +peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance +can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of +offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to +act in such a manner under the guns of an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span>enemy, whatever may be the +purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the +fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all +assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive +purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would +also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship +were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance +on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less +valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the +subjects of a foreign Power.</p> + +<p>The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former +assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to +armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards +prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military +forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable +to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the +<i>general</i> law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified +in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes. +But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it +would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves +with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant +ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and +that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek +to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity. +As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was +discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of +arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the +second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the +laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the +arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual +observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is +characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of +superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre +se propose d'arrêter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le +commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation à la mer, fera tirer un +coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on +puisse donner. <i>Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons à bord.</i>" +(When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the +commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun +is the best guarantee that can be given. <i>Merchant vessels do not +carry guns.</i>)</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its +assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span>were +cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods +on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put +into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable +neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally, +the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of +encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to +provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible +to do so in the circumstances.</p> + +<p>The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed +British steamers <i>Secondo</i> and <i>Welsh Prince</i> were sunk without +warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian +Government has in the meantime received information that no +Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of +these vessels.</p> + +<p>The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already +referred to—reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine +warfare referred to in the memorandum—also in its declaration of +January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with +corresponding time limit; indeed, <i>the whole of the declaration itself +is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect +that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined +therein</i>. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as +far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in +the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew. +And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports +stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these +waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any +responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all +occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels +encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the +Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and +Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any +action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian +warships.</p> + +<p>After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it +need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as +a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the +destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that +its object—apart from the higher aims of <i>relieving humanity from +further suffering by shortening the war</i>, is only to place Great +Britain and its Allies, who have—without establishing any legally +effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers—hindered +traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of +isolation, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span>render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of +permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of +war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human +control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all +in its power to avoid loss of human life. <i>The object aimed at in the +blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly +attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those +waters.</i></p> + +<p>To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance +given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the <i>Ancona</i>, and +renewed in the case of the <i>Persia</i>, is neither withdrawn nor +qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31, +1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government +will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to +the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the +pursuit of this aim—which it may take for granted has the full +sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself—it should find itself +compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain +areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its +opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be +followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the +persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its +destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate +extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian +Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being +carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation +of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the +idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest +phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part +of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm +in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of +humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests +of neutral peoples.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>3</h3> + +<h4>Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine Warfare</h4> + +<p class="noin">The <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i> of May 1, 1917, gives the +following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the +economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal +committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span>verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential +statements:</p> + +<p>"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the +technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been +estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in +estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first +month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the +estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly +cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the +economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the +economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set +down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of +tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are +expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the +enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so +to speak, to statistical smoke-screens.</p> + +<p>"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost +say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of +State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the +British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports +on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine +losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but +mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to +general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government +lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six +U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals +from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of +tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted +submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since +February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light +on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports, +the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report, +which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the +next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete; +and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted +that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for +us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a +gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed +that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid +revealing its strength.</p> + +<p>"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an +idea.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span>"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two +months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons +were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed +under the British flag.</p> + +<p>"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present +available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the +higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two +months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace +it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In +the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of +1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite +all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in +peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless +to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new +vessels.</p> + +<p>"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British +service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to +the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with +some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for +preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there +is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in +January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into +British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought +up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per +cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping +traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage +frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a +low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as +against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons. +I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information +that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and +leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons +represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting +to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further +progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war +reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based +his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America, +achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that, +even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us. +Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out: +'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right +tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will +depend.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span>"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a +thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought +into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save.</p> + +<p>"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible, +despite the English policy of suppression and concealment.</p> + +<p>"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet +available, but those for February tell us enough.</p> + +<p>"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds +sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down +from 46 to 37 millions sterling—imports and exports together showing +a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine +warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the +commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so +that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may +fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and +exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in +the traffic with British ports.</p> + +<p>"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures +rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off +the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt +can only partially succeed.</p> + +<p>"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31 +millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and +luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important +war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and +wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline +of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of +unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to +life and to the purposes of war.</p> + +<p>"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February, +1916, appears as follows:</p> + +<p>"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48 +per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper +and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the +imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures:</p> + +<p>"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent., +refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent., +lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent.</p> + +<p>"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides, +rubber and tin.</p> + +<p>"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>various +sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from +February onwards.</p> + +<p>"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no +complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the +commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when +the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly +weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment +will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the +entire development of the imports during the course of the war.</p> + +<p>"I will here give only the most important figures.</p> + +<p>"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its +position better than in other respects.</p> + +<p>"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons.</p> + +<p>"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons.</p> + +<p>"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons.</p> + +<p>"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons.</p> + +<p>"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons.</p> + +<p>"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months +of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the +imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the +same month in 1916.</p> + +<p class="noin" style="margin-left: 1em;"> +"Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads.<br /> + Timber imports, 1916, 5.9 million loads.<br /> + Timber imports, February, 1913, 406,000 loads.<br /> + Timber imports, February, 1916, 286,000 loads.<br /> + Timber imports, February, 1917, 167,000 loads.</p> + +<p>"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from +3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here +December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as +the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a +statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February.</p> + +<p>"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to +the export of coal.</p> + +<p>"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913 +to 46½ million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were +exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first +time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million +tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January, +1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more +significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of +the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls +again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million +tons in February of the year before), thus almost <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>reaching once more +to the lowest point hitherto recorded—that of December, 1916. And it +should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports, +sunk transports are included in the English statistics.</p> + +<p>"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the +beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous +of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for +the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal +supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of +1916, may be seen from the following figures:</p> + +<p>"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only +1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year; +the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons, +as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly +average for the peace year 1913.</p> + +<p>"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to +give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first +week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous +year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against +2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the +operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war +industries in the countries allied with England.</p> + +<p>"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year, +showed the English how they could protect themselves against the +effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own +country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more +than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies +how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal +supply.</p> + +<p>"I come now to the most important point: <i>the position of England with +regard to its food supply</i>.</p> + +<p>"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to +mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of +foodstuffs from overseas.</p> + +<p>"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged +during the last years of peace as follows:</p> + +<p>"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent.</p> + +<p>"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as +substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.; +meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar +consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely +covered by imports from abroad.</p> + +<p>"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span>the +food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally +favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been +followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of +45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest +hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of +view, in North America. The effects are now—the rich stocks from the +former harvest having been consumed—becoming more evident every day +and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain. +As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen +from the following figures:</p> + +<p>"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in +the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or +little over 2½ million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that +date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the +time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or +even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply +of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only +789,000 bushels.</p> + +<p>"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit. +The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic. +Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917, +at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25 +had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 87¼ +cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to +191½ cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted +at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the +peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these +281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of +exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton.</p> + +<p>"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help +England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!</p> + +<p>"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of +grain. I can, however, state as follows:</p> + +<p>"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917, +England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as +against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From +January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the +stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do +not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks +amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the +requirements for scarcely three weeks.</p> + +<p>"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import +figures for January—as published. The imports of bread-corn and +fodder-grain—I take them altogether, as in the English regulations +for eking out supplies—amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as +against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.</p> + +<p>"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import +value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as +against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the +various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning +with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in +the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain +shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and +Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March +has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing +the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than +in the previous years.</p> + +<p>"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in +February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within +the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of +Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural +congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an +extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far +worse even than then.</p> + +<p>"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department +(<i>Kriegsernährungsamt</i>), stated briefly on April 19 that the then +consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present +<i>and prospective</i> supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the +consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.</p> + +<p>"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a +conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that, +according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be +in a complete state of famine.</p> + +<p>"The crisis in which England is placed—and we can fairly call it a +crisis now—is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of +other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn.</p> + +<p>"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for +many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.</p> + +<p>"The marked falling off in the butter imports—February, 1917, showing +only half as much as in the previous year—is not nearly +counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort +to introduce.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span>"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States, +shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs. +The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 15½ cents at the beginning +of January, 1917, to 21½ cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in +the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars.</p> + +<p>"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at +present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a +generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain +Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of +potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.</p> + +<p>"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the +face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger +by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have +recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late."</p> + +<p>The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures +taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and +thereafter continues:</p> + +<p>"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated +in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of +bread would be necessary, but that it would be <i>a national disaster</i> +if England should have to resort to compulsion.</p> + +<p>"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not +wish to introduce <i>so un-English a system</i>. In the first place, +because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to +assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as +we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises +no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too +complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men +and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.'</p> + +<p>"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest +reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a +failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the +purpose is in readiness.</p> + +<p>"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now +being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the +country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the +measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor +can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly +be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not +until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between +then and now lies a long road, a road of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span>suffering for England, and +for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply.</p> + +<p>"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the +harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917. +In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are +worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The +winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492 +million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for +1915.</p> + +<p>"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and +offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.</p> + +<p>"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short, +but safe—for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that +the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against +those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can +save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across +the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations +by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of +exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation, +into entering into the war against us.</p> + +<p>"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the +neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the +seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by +hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England +that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into +submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic +arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in +crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle?</p> + +<p>"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on +our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the +world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what +our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But +they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so +hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must +do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own +house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence +and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German +people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending +decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence."</p> + +<br /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>4</h3> + +<h4>Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24, 1918.</h4> + +<p>"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace +negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained +up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical +and justifiable.</p> + +<p>"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of +the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the +difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will +in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties, +but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing +between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which +have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I +am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It +would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the +present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition. +We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new +world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has +destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the +various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors, +the results being first declared to the world when the whole was +completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough, +that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly +over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less +favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the +details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world +at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing +throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite +public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of +this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish +of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to +meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to +conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable +impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of +secrecy until completion. <i>But the complete publicity in the +negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country +behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool.</i> The match must be +played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the +peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the +conference.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span>"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which +Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian +states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the +programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister, +I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated +to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace. +And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I +am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are +poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest +doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed +myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way, +either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite +of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the +Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate +partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as +innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me; +on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this +serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single +kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if +Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then +peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might +entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards +Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete +frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going +beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any +surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall +continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as +they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.</p> + +<p>"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground +for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since +the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations +or indemnities—and nothing but new instructions from the various +Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis—I +then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the +reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all +wished.</p> + +<p>"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with <i>a single</i> +Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian +states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely +fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the +following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span>Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of +Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.</p> + +<p>"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is +to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or +less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to +Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate +Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with +which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but +which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to +show the extent of the matter to be debated.</p> + +<p>"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that +of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In +the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this +delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no +indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a +settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established +with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this +very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing +difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of +being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with +ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between +their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed, +and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking +part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not +admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This +unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia, +however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these +difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able +once more to resume negotiations.</p> + +<p>"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received +yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two +telegrams:</p> + +<p>"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the +Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the +four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants' +Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates +to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace +negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers', +soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a +supplementary part of the <i>Russian</i> delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds +with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive +these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement +is supplemented by a copy of a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span>"declaration" dated from Kharkov, +addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest, +and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only +represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of +acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian +Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge +any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev +without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send +representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a +supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise +as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of +Russia.'</p> + +<p>"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of +the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding +the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two +appendices thereto runs as follows:</p> + +<p>"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.</p> + +<p>"'Sir,—In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by +me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their +mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation, +in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the +right of self-determination among all peoples—including naturally the +Ukrainian—sees nothing to hinder the participation of the +representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them, +according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace +Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and +Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to +your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most +sincere respect.—The President of the Russian Peace Delegation: +<span class="sc">A. Joffe.</span>'</p> + +<p>"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian +Republic. Declaration.</p> + +<p>"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M. +Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive +Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' +Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for +the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives +of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement +with the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span>representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of +People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be +acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name +of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare +categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat +without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people, +cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised.</p> + +<p>"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and +thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' +Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace +negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the +Russian Peace Delegation.</p> + +<p>"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following +resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the +Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, +on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918:</p> + +<p>"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew, +President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary +Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace +negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare +categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act +in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as <i>arbitrary +steps</i> on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population, +against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine, +and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be +acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the +Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government +regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the +Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on +behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of +the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the +purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada, +will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian +Delegation.</p> + +<p>"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the +Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917.</p> + +<p>"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir +Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore +arrive with us.</p> + +<p>"'January, 1918.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span>"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian +Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew.</p> + +<p>"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai.</p> + +<p>"'A true copy of the original.</p> + +<p>"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'</p> + +<p>"Appendix 2.</p> + +<p>"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council +of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of +the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the +Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and +Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the +People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch +Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, +Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's +Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of +Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace +between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With +this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch +Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch +Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to +issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers' +and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited +representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are +bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the +accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of +People's Commissaries.</p> + +<p>"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International +Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works, +Commissariat.</p> + +<p>"'The Manager of the Secretariat.</p> + +<p>"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.</p> + +<p>"'In accordance with the copy.</p> + +<p>"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'</p> + +<p>"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not +interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.</p> + +<p>"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties +to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic +determine that <i>the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span>and the +former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the +Ukraine.</i></p> + +<br /> + +<h4>Poland</h4> + +<p>"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet +been exactly determined, <i>we want nothing at all from this new state</i>. +Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own +fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the <i>form</i> of the +people's vote in this respect; <i>the more surely it expresses the +general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased</i>. For I +desire only the <i>voluntary</i> attachment of Poland; only in the express +<i>wish</i> of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for +lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that <i>the Polish +question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single +day</i>. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach +us, we will not reject its advances—<i>the Polish question must not and +shall not endanger the peace itself</i>.</p> + +<p>"I should have been glad if <i>the Polish Government had been able to +take part in the negotiations</i>, since in my opinion Poland is <i>an +independent state</i>. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the +attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak +in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent +to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in +order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of +importance, but it is more important still in my opinion <i>to set aside +all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations</i>.</p> + +<br /> +<h4>German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas</h4> + +<p>"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been +most widely echoed in the Press, is the <i>difference of opinion between +our German allies and the Petersburg Government</i> anent the +interpretation of <i>the right of self-determination among the Russian +peoples</i>; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops. +Germany maintains that it <i>does not aim at any annexation of territory +by force</i> from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion +is a double one.</p> + +<p>"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that <i>the numerous +expressions of desire for independence</i> on the part of <i>legislative +corporations, communal representations</i>, etc., in the occupied areas +should be taken as the <i>provisional</i> basis for the will of the people, +to be <i>later</i> tested by <i>plebiscite on a broader foundation</i>, a point +of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree +to, as it did not consider the existing administrations <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span>in Courland +and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in +the case of Poland.</p> + +<p>"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take +place <i>after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from +the occupied provinces</i>, while Germany, in reply to this, points out +that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would +create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state +of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted +that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the +life of a state at all is <i>German property</i>. Railways, posts and +telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire +administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands. +The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a +condition of things which seems <i>practically impossible to maintain</i>.</p> + +<p>"In both cases it is a question of finding a <i>middle way</i>, which +moreover <i>must be found</i>.</p> + +<p>"<i>The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion +not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations</i>.</p> + +<p>"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they +take time.</p> + +<p>"<i>If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the +general peace cannot be long delayed</i>, despite all efforts on the part +of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable +to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of +negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general +peace, but of a <i>separate peace with Russia</i>. This was the necessary +recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted +without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would +have been on a different footing—that is to say, <i>in a more limited +sphere</i>—if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of +treating for a general peace.</p> + +<p>"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of +general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced +that the fruit <i>has begun to ripen</i>, and that it is now only a +question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable +peace or not.</p> + +<br /> +<h4>Wilson's Message</h4> + +<p>"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put +forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole +world. This is <i>an offer of peace</i>, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson +sets forth the principles upon which he seeks <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span>to establish a general +peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to +furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case, +then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be +arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course, +is not so.</p> + +<p>"<i>But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on +the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the +Austro-Hungarian point of view</i>, and that there are among his +proposals some which we can even agree to <i>with great pleasure</i>.</p> + +<p>"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, +to begin with, point out two things:</p> + +<p>"So far as the proposals are concerned with <i>our Allies</i>—mention is +made of the German possession of <i>Belgium</i> and of the <i>Turkish +Empire</i>—I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am +firmly determined <i>to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very +last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally +with our own</i>. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete +reciprocity with ourselves.</p> + +<p>"In the second place, I have to point out that I must <i>politely but +definitely decline</i> to consider the Point dealing with our internal +Government. We have in Austria <i>a parliament elected by general, +equal, direct and secret ballot</i>. There is not a more democratic +parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other +constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon +matters of <i>Austrian internal affairs</i>. I speak of <i>Austria</i> only, +because I do not refer to <i>Hungarian</i> internal affairs in the +<i>Austrian Delegation</i>. I should not consider it constitutional to do +so. <i>And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other +hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state +whatever.</i> Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the +remaining Points, to state as follows:</p> + +<p>"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and +the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing +to say. From my point of view I have <i>no objection to such public +negotiations so long as full reciprocity</i> is the basis of the same, +though I do entertain <i>considerable doubt</i> as to whether, all things +considered, <i>it is the quickest and most practical method</i> of arriving +at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business. +But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of +commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be +advisable <i>to publish incomplete results beforehand</i> to the world. In +such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their +demands as high as possible in order to climb down <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span>gradually, using +this or that expressed demand as matter for <i>compensation in</i> other +ways until finally an <i>equilibrium of the opposing interests is +arrived at</i>, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is +to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with +full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from +passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any +concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced +<i>for tactical reasons</i>. And when the public takes up any such point +with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered +impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as +in itself <i>a defeat</i>, possibly by both sides. And this would not +conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary, +<i>increase the friction</i> between the states concerned. And as in the +case of commercial treaties, so also with <i>political</i> negotiations, +which deal with political matters.</p> + +<p>"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that <i>no secret +compacts are to be made</i>, that no agreements are to be entered upon +without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the +introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and +adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted +that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be +able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the +fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by +formalities, and <i>a question of more or less formal nature will never +prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement</i>.</p> + +<p>"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.</p> + +<p>"Point 2 is concerned with the <i>freedom of the seas</i>. In this +postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here +<i>fully and completely share America's desire</i>, the more so as the +President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'—that is to +say, we are to understand the freedom of <i>the open sea</i>, and there is +thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the +sovereign rights of our faithful <i>Turkish</i> Allies. Their standpoint in +this respect will be ours.</p> + +<p>"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any <i>future economic +war</i>, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by +ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.</p> + +<p>"Point 4, which demands <i>general disarmament</i>, sets forth in +particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this +present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient +for the <i>internal security</i> of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly +and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to +express the same idea; it forms <i>part of my political creed</i>, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span>and I +am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.</p> + +<p>"As regards the <i>Russian clause</i>, we are already showing in deeds that +we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our +neighbours there.</p> + +<p>"With regard to <i>Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro</i>, I can only +repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.</p> + +<p>"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our +enemies.</p> + +<p>"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies, +who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until +the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such +concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of +being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk. +(<i>Applause.</i>)</p> + +<p>"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among +his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare <i>on what +conditions they are willing to treat</i>; he will then have rendered the +enormous service of having set on foot the <i>general peace +negotiations</i>. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and +I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for +themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that <i>time, and the +continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here +concerned</i>.</p> + +<p>"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example. +Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial +acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into +the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war +expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its +own population, and all this <i>only to lose for ever an advantage which +it might have won</i>.</p> + +<p>"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are +adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to +include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this +point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the +President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal <i>League of +Nations</i> he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part +of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.</p> + +<p>"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. +Wilson, we are not only <i>agreed in essentials as to the great +principles</i> for rearrangement of the world after this war, but <i>our +ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are +closely allied</i>.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a +discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and +bring us closer still.</p> + +<p>"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one +hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great +Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least +opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that +<i>an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the +natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion</i> between all +those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations. +(<i>Applause.</i>) So much for Wilson's proposals.</p> + +<br /> +<h4>Petersburg and the Ukraine</h4> + +<p>"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is +perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to +bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg.</p> + +<p>"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our +definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to +the Petersburg Government—we have the Ukrainian against us—and it is +impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing +there themselves but <i>revolution and anarchy, goods which the +Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must +politely decline to receive</i>.</p> + +<p>"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since +this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the +<i>general peace</i>.</p> + +<p>"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of +provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms. +The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the +world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a +burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with +those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our +own population. <i>We could and would hold out without this assistance.</i> +But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to +lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore, +from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few +days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our +people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For +such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian +party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part +wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace.</p> + +<p>"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span>newly +established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable +delay in the negotiations.</p> + +<br /> +<h4>Appeal to the Country</h4> + +<p>"<i>If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at +once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all</i>, +and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which +they should have gained from the peace.</p> + +<p>"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him +standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in +record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him +for the manner in which it had been carried out.</p> + +<p>"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have +<i>peace at once, and at any price</i>, we shall not get so much as a +single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic. +It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the +war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves +intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the +no-annexation basis. It is a question—I repeat it once again—not of +'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our +population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and +procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our +partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to +see <i>whether you are forcing me to act or not</i>.</p> + +<p>"<i>If you wish to ruin the peace</i>, if you are anxious to renounce the +supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by +speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not +otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are +now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic +gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow.</p> + +<p>"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to +lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and +organisation which are increasing. <i>When you at home get up strikes +you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate +the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal.</i> You +are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that +peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.</p> + +<p>"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours +to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave +to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as +<i>criminal slanderers or as fools</i>.</p> + +<p>"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span>different +from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a +Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one +might understand a conflict between the Government and the country. +<i>But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority +of the people—that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable +peace without annexationist aims—then it is madness to attack that +Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and +hamper its movements.</i> Those who do so are fighting, not against the +Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend +to serve and against themselves.</p> + +<p>"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your +duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust +me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must +help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me. +I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the +Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of +confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter +is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought +up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall +at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to +secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less +so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty, +which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the +Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense +of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could +conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the +world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority +among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half +measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must +assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>5</h3> + +<h4>Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk</h4> + +<p>The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at +Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a +peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general +peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a +preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points:</p> + +<p>1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span>concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford +any support to the enemies of the other.</p> + +<p>2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining +the right of determining their own destiny for the future.</p> + +<p>3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military +operations.</p> + +<p>4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by +private persons through the economic war.</p> + +<p>5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on +the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference +subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with +neighbouring countries.</p> + +<p>6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.</p> + +<p>A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the +occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until +after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose +co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and +Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has +indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the +evacuation.</p> + +<p>In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in +particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of +evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no +evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after +conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in +connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied +districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it +should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within +its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in +question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain +standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through, +although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating +the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a +compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately +arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent +German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation +the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops +before the general peace might be discussed.</p> + +<p>In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this +was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace. +Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no +annexations" would have succeeded throughout.</p> + +<p>Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span>endeavours +to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German +Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken +telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates +prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being +recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that +German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm +adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only +have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the +negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr +Kühlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise +Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary +would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This +declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not +fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely +responsible for the fact that Kühlmann was able to remain.</p> + +<p>Kühlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered +the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first +officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up +in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward +matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be +evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was +disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the +fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against +this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to +the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already +availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and +allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that +this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be +arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts +at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they +were first interrupted on December 29.</p> + +<p>On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little +changed. Kühlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than +before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German +military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which +Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to +altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of +self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the +distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to +get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made +on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German +and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span>and +especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial +question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to +the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint +should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the +Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the +case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for +free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long +discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts +prepared by us.</p> + +<p>Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances +arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as +also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been +commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first +discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and +demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more +guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part +of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations +were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis +broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with +the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost +immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening +proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign +Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and +towards the opposing parties in the negotiations—with both of which +he was then in conflict—and this, at a most critical moment, to a +degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required +to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask, +but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna +would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the +enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at +home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to +Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour +troubles were well known to that enemy.</p> + +<p>This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and +tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the +supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish +political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to +persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to +arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions +possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious +difficulties of the food situation.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span>In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German +delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace +with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies +from Germany—the more so as the representative of the German Army +Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary +made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if +the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however, +the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation +to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government—to +the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on +the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.</p> + +<p>At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were +continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded +in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be +acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine +undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918. +As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have +relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates +refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by +General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much +inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to +accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the +admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had +frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was +the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish +party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that +the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to +those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of +the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the +finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e. +the principle of national boundaries under international protection. +The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the +Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the +autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard +to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that +they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled +the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the +deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that +the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the +failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other. +The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span>formulation of these points, which met with the greatest +difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date.</p> + +<p>At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the +separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results +hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign +Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations +to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his +policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the +concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the +same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme +necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations +with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of +Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all +grounds to the contrary, answered <i>in thesi</i> in the affirmative, as +the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative.</p> + +<p>On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were +made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what +would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of +the deliberations on this point with Herr Kühlmann we succeeded after +great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to +a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign +Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the +following considerations:</p> + +<p>For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:</p> + +<p>1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to +be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be +taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken +first;</p> + +<p>2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a +constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;</p> + +<p>3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and</p> + +<p>4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a +vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in +accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the +decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver +them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should, +also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at +once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated +upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this +temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as +Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the +foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span>part of the will +of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the +occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the +Russian principles, by free election.</p> + +<p>On February 7, immediately after Herr Kühlmann had agreed to mediation +on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian +delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The +idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's +taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the +handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the +other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new +basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now +found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to +whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be +termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of +the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial +alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes +that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion +of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon +Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the +other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any +separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government +was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some +reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now +anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he +had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kühlmann, while +General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.</p> + +<p>All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end +owing to the fact that Herr Kühlmann was forced by the German Supreme +Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the +negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when +a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the +German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kühlmann was strictly ordered +not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand +the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had +not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the +treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an +end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign +Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his +discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to +the fact that Trotski, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span>despite repeated questioning, persisted in +leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would, +in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers +at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this +cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed +no treaty of peace.</p> + +<p>The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for +further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since +peace seemed to have come <i>via facta</i> already. At a meeting on +February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and +Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it +was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the +situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The +one dissentient vote—that of General Hoffmann—was to the effect that +Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at +an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly +against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr +von Kühlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the +peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech. +Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany +declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march +on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the +signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no +part in this action.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>6</h3> + +<h4>Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest</h4> + +<p>The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was +considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at +Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from +taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian +Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King +and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only +intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with +Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the +Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea +seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the +end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in +order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent +Colonel <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span>Randa, the former Military Attaché to the Roumanian +Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness +to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace.</p> + +<p>In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in +Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to +prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the +invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbürgen, despite opposition +on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical +frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was +influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line +involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several +valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary +voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion +that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace +not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading +Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared +the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace <i>sine qua +non</i>. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this +serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire +agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the +negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that +demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle +to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should +only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of +a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary +regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister +with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line +conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be +unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal +politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be +thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would +give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions; +and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it +would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and +that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility. +Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the +frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used +to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a régime amicably +disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was +particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating +a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet +it would be easier to arrive at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span>a peace of mutual understanding, and +was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive +concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the +Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he +would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which +he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of +inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he +was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the +Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would, +despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be +reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were +particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga +and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these +negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to +Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru +district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier +question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with +this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless +rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further +telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent +of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely +considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility.</p> + +<p>Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the +Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an +economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of +especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier +question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a +matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact, +did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical +alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before +the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to +overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and +secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with +Roumania—at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs +alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at +the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the +right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed +their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the +plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter +beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no +part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done +was to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span>sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private +manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal. +The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the +prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly +advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was +therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the +East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these +deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for +Foreign Affairs resigned his office.</p> + +<p>Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in +Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when +treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection +with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war +indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia +should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of +peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its +railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property, +and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary +opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly +relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had +been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and +Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with +Roumania.</p> + +<p>This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some +success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the +middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German +Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle +in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until +comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of +Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant +discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout +endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to +arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if +Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally +contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably +suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the +Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and +the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to +amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian +harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The +petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years' +tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span>a +monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management. +Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the +agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of +years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances +was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The +negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these +questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions +especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of +prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the +drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the +Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences +were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of +the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one +hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a +compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in +particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the +original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead +to any result.</p> + +<p>The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for +five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part +at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly +opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an +arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have +all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a +certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but +not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign +Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a +Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an +impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we +were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather +use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania +through the medium of such politicians in that country as were +disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central +Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in +Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be +rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might +gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing +everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the +German Secretary of State, Kühlmann, of the inadvisability of the +demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by +the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span>of +Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it +impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been +informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command +insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the +assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the +occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did +ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania.</p> + +<p>One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania +was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted +with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum +which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered +chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of +the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been +disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have +on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do +was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the +Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of +Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea. +When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of +the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube" +was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the +territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the +Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and +Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty +that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be +ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was +unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the +preliminary peace again.</p> + +<p>The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his +office.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>7</h3> + +<h4>Wilson's Fourteen Points</h4> + +<p>I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.</p> + +<p>II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial +waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants.</p> + +<p>III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its +maintenance.</p> + +<p>IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will +be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.</p> + +<p>V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that +in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the Government whose title is to be determined.</p> + +<p>VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of +all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy, +and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations +under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome +assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself +desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the +months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their +comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, +and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.</p> + +<p>VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve +as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.</p> + +<p>VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the +matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world +for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once +more be made secure in the interests of all.</p> + +<p>IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognisable lines of nationality.</p> + +<p>X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span>nations we +wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first +opportunity of autonomous development.</p> + +<p>XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied +territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the +sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another +determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of +allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the +political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the +several Balkan States should be entered into.</p> + +<p>XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are +now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life +and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, +and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to +the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.</p> + +<p>XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should +include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, +which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should +be guaranteed by international covenant.</p> + +<p>XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small States +alike.</p> + +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>8</h3> + +<h4>Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War</h4> + +<p class="cen"><i>Speech delivered December 11, 1918</i></p> + +<p><span class="sc">Gentlemen</span>,—In rising now to speak of our policy during the +war it is my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. +We are living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the +bloodiest and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the +midst of the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only +too easily understood. But the result of this excitement is that all +those rumours which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood +together, end by misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary +to arrive at a clear understanding. The public has a right to know +what has really happened, it has the right to know why we did not +succeed in attaining the peace we had so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span>longed for, it has a right +to know whether, and if so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or +whether it was the overwhelming power of circumstances which has led +our policy to take the course it did. The new arrangement of relations +between ourselves and Germany will make an end of all secret +proceedings. The day will come then when, fortunately, all that has +hitherto been hidden will be made clear. As, however, I do not know +when all this will be made public, I am grateful for the opportunity +of lifting the veil to-day from certain hitherto unknown events. In +treating of this theme I will refrain from touching upon those +constitutional factors which once counted for so much, but which do so +no longer. I do so because it seems to me unfair to import into the +discussion persons who are now paying heavily for what they may have +done and who are unable to defend themselves. And I must pay this +honourable tribute to the Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the +whole sought to spare the former Emperor as far as possible. There +are, of course, exceptions—<i>exceptiones firmant regulam</i>. There are +in Vienna, as everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to +attack, the less if those whom they are attacking are able to defend +themselves. But, believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not +the bravest, not the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad +that they form so insignificant a minority.</p> + +<p>But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the +various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two +things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the +war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace" +on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately, +was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly, +that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On +several occasions peace feelers were put forward between +representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however, +these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the +impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany, +but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on +its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed +that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the +war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to +fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to +a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente +never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished +for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its +intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany, +and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span>our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult. +We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be +allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire +for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial +concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This, +however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was +primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had +offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that +Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made +peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to +make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.</p> + +<p>When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable, +obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching +that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other, +a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the +former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the +question of separate peace.</p> + +<p>I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not +even in the hour of disillusionment—I may say of despair at my +inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels—even in +such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the +German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be +contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be +broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten +million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which +could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military +party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and +that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a +few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my +policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to +the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw +salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I +relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was +a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between +Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from +which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the +Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should +be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente +would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the +blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved +also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have +been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span>no +possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung +several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the +same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy, +Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But +even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led +to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against +their brothers, and the Hungarians—Tisza's Hungarians—would never +have lent their aid to such a policy. <i>We had begun the war in common, +and we could not end it save in common.</i> For us there was no way out +of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against +the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until +Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have +happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy +at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and +prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol, +and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a +conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the +Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And, +gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would +not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war +into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been +much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component +national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only +refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved +by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State +makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a +"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would +have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude +which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister +of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider +dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I +believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In +particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements +by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, +would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria +would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with +Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the +powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been +in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav +question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the +Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span>forgiven +the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia +and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion +the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. <i>A separate peace +was a sheer impossibility.</i> There remained the second way: to make +peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which +rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our +great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects. +Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In +Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with +the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation +living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play +the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly +when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we +were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply. +Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany, +because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had +brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by +the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on +the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I +remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict +with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from +Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine, +gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a +Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of +our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred +million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of +the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as +urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread. +And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at +peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to +say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. <i>The +situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military +success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while +entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being +accepted by the enemy.</i> The German military party, on the other hand, +increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless +than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a +policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single +moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had +some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Görlitz. +Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like +houses of cards, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span>many among our enemies changed their point of view. +I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was +then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army +moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of +the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations, +have brought about a complete débâcle. It is not unlikely that the +collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then, +and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the +horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things, +however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded, +as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian +frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the +second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at +all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success, +have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not +called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would +undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been +by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been +possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that +during my period of office <i>such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost +we and Germany could have attained</i>. The future will show what +superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That +all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was +it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the +leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous +power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to +Kühlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the +military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than +as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kühlmann. The +Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not +understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that +victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that +territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless +securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem +them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section +demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an +indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were +agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German +possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with +the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic +ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world +thereafter at will. But if <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span>anyone attempted to look at things from +the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with +the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the +obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us +remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to +a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then, +the possibility of a more favourable peace—I mean a peace based on +mutual understanding—I have never believed in the possibility of a +victorious peace—would only have been acute in the case of Poland and +the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the +fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way +of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that +Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and +attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step +should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the +will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only +Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not +disinclined to agree to such a solution.</p> + +<p>But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree +of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of +the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible +collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General +Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in +conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man +required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the +Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never +found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved +the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the +people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are +much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke +himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain +equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it +was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for +him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of +Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was +directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot, +desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his +country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless—and for all +that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam +glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt +at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who +worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span>victorious peace stone him +now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of +England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for +victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them. +The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on +the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said +this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to +carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the +integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could +never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to +declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for +Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente +so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a +step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in +this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our +military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the +German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is +undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to +such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I +should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity +solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most +valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at +favourable relations with Germany.</p> + +<p>Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the +German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the +serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917—eighteen months +ago—I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he +forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely +of my opinion.</p> + +<p>[This report is already printed in these pages. <a href="#Page_146">See p. 146.</a>]</p> + +<p>This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again +expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine +campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to +take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be +calculated to give an impression of weakness.</p> + +<p>As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not +to be thought of.</p> + +<p>As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine +ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the +Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with +Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to +Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in +order to secure peace. But we were met with a <i>non <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span>possumus</i> and the +German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the +question.</p> + +<p>The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that +if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine; +and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have +restrained me had it been a question of the highest value—of peace +itself.</p> + +<p>When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views +steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the +Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the +Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own +initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less +true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the +views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own +country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the +outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to +their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump" +parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to +bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have +an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical +principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step, +and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed. +It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then +received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic +proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so +incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which +maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means +towards peace.</p> + +<p>It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority +of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically +weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely +powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here +again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation, +had several conversations with Südekum and Erzberger, and encouraged +them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known +peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of +affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry +the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual +understanding—the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn +from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment, +to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag +against the German military plans of conquest.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span>And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of +that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning +of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many +other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our +own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of +unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The +principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of +the former <i>Reichskansler</i>, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was +long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to +dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he +was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came +in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff +came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point +of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial +colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in +agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only +one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It +should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time +was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the +suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American +munition transports were sunk—that is to say, the case for the +submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of <i>technical +military importance</i> and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered +the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; +with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but +little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had +here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the +northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the +Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would +have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern +U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry +on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans +access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing +we were <i>de facto</i> partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we +did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering +their submarine campaign—that is to say, it would bring us into direct +conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we +agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.</p> + +<p>And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to +say as to the present. From time to time reports have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span>appeared in the +papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing +disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one +of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these +reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the +last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself +appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give +you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am +most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that +any such attempt could only lead to civil war—a thing no one would +wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government +must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a +whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the +German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a +dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as +republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great +freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people +itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I +therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the +constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely +at one with the present Government. There are two methods of +ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the +representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a +republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself +will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can +be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I +myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any +co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can, +therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the +old régime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and +its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe +that the majority of German-Austria is against the old régime, and +when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of +democracy is sufficiently assured.</p> + +<p>And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set +before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany, +but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the +German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with +Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have +defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do +not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra +turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how +present a danger was that of war with Germany. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span>Had the same +experiment been made six months before it would have been war with +Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war.</p> + +<p>There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of +many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come +when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day +comes a better future will dawn.</p> + +<p>The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria. +They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood +and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will +not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold +alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of +the generations to come.</p> + +<br /> +<hr style="width: 15%;" /> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, +no English text being available.</p></div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a><hr /> +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span><br /> + +<h3>INDEX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3> +<br /> + +<ul style="margin-left: 15%;"> +<li>Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, <a href="#Page_27">27</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> + <li>and Trotski, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Adrianople, cession of, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> + +<li>Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, <a href="#Page_40">40</a> + <ul> + <li>policy of expansion, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Air-raids on England, cause of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a> + <ul> + <li>their effect, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, <a href="#Page_6">6</a> + <ul> + <li>Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Albrecht von Würtemberg, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> + +<li>Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, <a href="#Page_74">74</a> + <ul> + <li>cession of, demanded by Entente, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + <li>conquest of, a curse to Germany, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + <li>Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + <li>France insists on restoration of, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> + <li>Germany and, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ambassadors and their duties, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li>America and the U-boat campaign, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a> + <ul> + <li>enters the war, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, 148</li> + <li>rupture with Germany, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a></li> + <li>shipbuilding programme of, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a></li> + <li>unpreparedness for war, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a></li> + <li>(<i>Cf.</i> United States)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a> + <ul> + <li>declares a separate peace, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> + <li>German Nationalist view of his action, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Andrian at Nordbahnhof, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + +<li>Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + +<li>Arbitration, courts of, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></li> + +<li>Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a></li> + +<li>Armaments, pre-war fever for, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + +<li>Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> + +<li>Asquith, a warlike speech by, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> + +<li>Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a> + <ul> + <li>and Albania, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li>and cession of Galicia, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + <li>and question of separate peace, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + <li>and the U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>ceases to exist, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> + <li>consequences of a separate peace, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> + <li>death-blow to Customs dues, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + <li>declaration on submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a></li> + <li>democratic Parliament of, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li>enemy's secret negotiations for peace, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> + <li>food troubles and strikes in, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a></li> + <li>her army merged into German army, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></li> + <li>her position before and after the ultimatum, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a></li> + <li>heroism of her armies, <a href='#Page_336'>336</a></li> + <li>impossibility of a separate peace for, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>maritime trade obstructed by blockade, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li>mobilisation and its difficulties, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></li> + <li>obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>parlous position of, in 1917, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a></li> + <li>peace negotiations with Roumania, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>peace terms to, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></li> + <li>policy during war, Count Czernin on, <a href='#Page_325'>325</a></li> + <li>racial problems in, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a></li> + <li>separatist tactics in, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> + <li>Social Democracy in, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> + <li>terms on which she could make peace, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span></li> + <li>the Archdukes, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + <li>views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> + +<li>Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + +<li>Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a></li> + +<li>Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a></li> + +<li>Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> + <ul> + <li>inferiority of, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> + <ul> + <li>peace idea of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a> + <ul> + <li>no bar to peace, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a></li> + <li>solution of, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Avarescu, interview with, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> +<ul> + <li>retirement of, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>B</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + +<li>Balkan Wars, the, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + +<li>Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + +<li><i>Baralong</i> episode, the, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a></li> + +<li>Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> + <ul> + <li>on an "un-English" system, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></li> + +<li>Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + +<li>Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> + +<li>Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + +<li>Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a></li> + +<li>Belgium, England's promise to, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a> + <ul> + <li>German entry into, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + <li>Germany's views regarding, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + +<li>Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + +<li>Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> + <ul> + <li>German reply to, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + <li>proposals for peace by, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Roumanian question, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li>criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> + <li>ultimatum to Serbia, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + <li>vacillation of, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a> + <ul> + <li>the English Ambassador demands his passport, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a></li> + +<li>Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Supreme Military Command, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a></li> + <li>draws up a peace proposal, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></li> + <li>opposes U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>optimistic view of U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>replies to author's <i>exposé</i>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> + <li>requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>visits Western front, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a></li> + +<li>Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> + <ul> + <li>and William II., <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> + <li>dealings with William I., <a href='#Page_65'>65</a></li> + <li>heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></li> + <li>his policy of "blood and iron," <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></li> + +<li>Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a> + <ul> + <li>of Germany, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li>why established by Great Britain, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> + +<li>Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> + +<li>Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> + <ul> + <li>destruction wrought in Ukraine, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a></li> + <li>enter Kieff, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bolshevism, Czernin on, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> + <ul> + <li>in Bessarabia, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a></li> + <li>in Russia, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> + <li>terrorism of, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + <li>the Entente and, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> + +<li>Bozen, proposals for cession of, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></li> + +<li>Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a> + <ul> + <li>apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + <li>collapse of, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> + <li>Ministry of, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> + <li>on Russia, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a></li> + <li>reproaches author, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>"Bread peace," origin of the term, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a></li> + +<li>Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a> + <ul> + <li>a victory for German militarism, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> + <li>answer to Russian peace proposals, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li> + <li>arrival of Trotski at, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li>conflict with Ukrainians at, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + <li>episode of Roumanian peace, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li>evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a></li> + <li>first peace concluded at, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>frontier question, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> + <li>further Ukrainian representation at, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a></li> + <li>heated discussions at, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></li> + <li>object of negotiations at, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a></li> + <li>peace negotiations at, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a></li> + <li>Russians threaten to withdraw from, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> + <li>territorial questions at, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> + <li>Ukrainian delegation and their claims, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Briand, peace negotiations with, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a></li> + +<li>Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German + <ul> + <li>delegation, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>British losses by submarines, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> + <ul> + <li>trade, and result of submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bronstein and Bolshevism, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li><i>Brotfrieden</i> ("Bread peace"), <a href='#Page_257'>257</a></li> + +<li>Bucharest, fall of, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a> + <ul> + <li>report of peace negotiations at, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>Zeppelin attacks on, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a> et seq.</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bucharest, Peace of, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a></li> + +<li>Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a> + <ul> + <li>demonstrations against Germany in, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Buftea, Treaty of, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + +<li>Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Dobrudsha question, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + <li>her relations with America, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a></li> + <li>humiliation of, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li>negotiations with the Entente, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a></li> + <li>question of her neutrality, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + <li>secession of, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Bulgarian representatives at Brest, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a></li> + +<li>Bülow, Prince, exposes William II., <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> + +<li>Burian, Count, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a> + <ul> + <li>and the division of Galicia, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> + <li>draws up a peace proposal, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></li> + <li>his Red Book on Roumania, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li> + <li>succeeded by author, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li> + <li>visits German headquarters, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>C</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + +<li>Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + +<li>Capelle and U-boats, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> + +<li>Carmen Sylva (<i>see</i> Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania)</li> + +<li>Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a> + <ul> + <li>and Serbia, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + <li>last days of, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a></li> + <li>peculiar policy of Government of, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></li> + <li>tactfulness of, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></li> + <li>Tsar's visit to, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> + <li>urges acceptance of ultimatum, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a></li> + <li>visited by Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Carp, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></li> + +<li>Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span></li> + +<li>Central-European question, the, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a> + <ul> + <li>the terror of the Entente, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a> + <ul> + <li>enemy blockade of, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a></li> + <li>favourable news in 1917, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> + <li>why they adopted submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a> + <ul> + <li>and problem of nationality, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> + <li>and the principle of ministerial responsibility, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a></li> + <li>and the Ukrainian question, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> + <li>apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + <li>cautions the Kaiser, <a href='#Page_321'>321</a></li> + <li>communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li>confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li>correspondence with Prince Sixtus, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> + <li>frequent absences from Vienna, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + <li>his ever friendly demeanour, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a></li> + <li>invites Crown Prince to Vienna, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a></li> + <li>opposes U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + <li>rejoices at peace with Ukraine, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>submits author's <i>exposé</i> to William II., <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a></li> + <li>suggests sacrifices for ending World War, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a></li> + <li>visits South Slav provinces, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a> + <ul> + <li>and U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>attends conference on Polish question, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> + <li>opposes submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Clemenceau, M., and Germany, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Peace of Versailles, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a></li> + <li>dominant war aim of, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a> + <ul> + <li>attends conference on U-boat question, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>meets author, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Compulsory international arbitration, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></li> + +<li>Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> + +<li>Constantinople, an Entente group in, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> + +<li>Corday, Charlotte, cited, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> + +<li>Cossacks, the, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Courland demanded by Germany, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + +<li>Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack on Bucharest, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a></li> + +<li>Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a></li> + +<li>Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a> + <ul> + <li>at Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> + +<li>Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> + <ul> + <li>a hostile Power's desire for peace, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a></li> + <li>a scene at Konopischt, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></li> + <li>abused by a braggart and brawler, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a></li> + <li>acquaints Emperor of food shortage, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + <li>activities for peace with Roumania, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>ambassador to Roumania, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + <li>an appeal for confidence, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a></li> + <li>and American intervention, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a></li> + <li>and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + <li>and the Ukrainian question (<i>see</i> Ukrainian)</li> + <li>answers explanation of an American request, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> + <li>appeals to Germany for food, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a></li> + <li>appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li>apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + <li>attends conference on U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>avoided by Pan-Germans, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + <li>becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li> + <li>breakfasts with Kühlmann, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>confers with Tisza, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></li> + <li>conflicts with the Kaiser, <a href='#Page_335'>335</a></li> + <li>conversation with Trotski, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a></li> + <li>converses with Crown Prince, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> + <li>criticises Michaelis, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + <li>decorated by King Carol, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span></li> + <li>disapproves of U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a></li> + <li>dismissal of, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a></li> + <li>extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> + <li>friction with the Emperor, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a></li> + <li>his hopes of a peace of understanding, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + <li>imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a></li> + <li>informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> + <li>interviews King Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a></li> + <li>issues passports for Stockholm Conference, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + <li>journeys to Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> + <li>learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + <li>loss of a dispatch-case, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a></li> + <li>loyalty to Germany, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a></li> + <li>lunches with Prince of Bavaria, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> + <li>meets the Emperor William II., <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> + <li>misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a></li> + <li>nominated to the Herrenhaus, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> + <li>note to American Government, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a></li> + <li>obtains a direct statement from William II., <a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li> + <li>on a separate peace, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a></li> + <li>on Austria's policy during war, <a href='#Page_325'>325</a></li> + <li>on Bolshevism, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> + <li>on President Wilson's programme, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> + <li>on U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>passages of arms with Ludendorff, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a></li> + <li>peace programme of, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a></li> + <li>persecution of, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> + <li>Polish leaders and, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a></li> + <li>President Wilson on, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> + <li>private talk with the Emperor, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> + <li>sends in his resignation, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a></li> + <li>sets interned prisoners at liberty, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a></li> + <li>speech to Austrian Delegation, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>threatens a separate peace with Russia, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></li> + <li>unfounded charges against, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> + <li>urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + <li>William II.'s gift to, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> + <li>with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>D</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of Hungarian State, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a> + <ul> + <li>dangers of a political structure for, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Debruzin, sensational crime at, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> + +<li>Declaration of London, the, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + +<li>D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + +<li>Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Devonport, Lord, on the food question, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a></li> + +<li>Disarmament, negotiations respecting, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a> + <ul> + <li>international, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a></li> + <li>question of, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Divorces in Roumania, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a></li> + +<li>Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a> + <ul> + <li>assigned to Bulgaria, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a></li> + <li>cession of, at peace with Roumania, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + <li>King Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a></li> + <li>Marghiloman's view on, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a></li> + <li>question discussed with Avarescu, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a></li> + <li>Turkish attitude concerning, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Dualism, the curse of, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>E</b><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>"Echinstvo" group, the, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a> + <ul> + <li>and William II., <a href='#Page_63'>63</a></li> + <li>encircling policy of, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a> + <ul> + <li>an operation for cataract, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> + <li>her devotion to King Carol, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a> + <ul> + <li>plain speaking by, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>England, an effort at <i>rapprochement</i> with Germany and its failure, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> + <ul> + <li>and dissolution of military power in Germany, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + <li>and the elder Richthofen, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a></li> + <li>attitude of, at beginning of World War, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + <li>blockade of, by U-boats, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> + <li>bread shortage in, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a></li> + <li>declares war on Germany, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + <li>discards Declaration of London, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li>distress in, from U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + <li>distrust of Germany's intentions in, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a></li> + <li>dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a></li> + <li>Flotow's tribute to, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> + <li>food supply of, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a></li> + <li>freedom in, <a href='#Page_335'>335</a></li> + <li>her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + <li>negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></li> + <li>public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>refusal to restore German colonies, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + <li>shortage of potatoes in, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a></li> + <li>the Pacifist party in, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a></li> + <li>"unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>English mentality, a typical instance of, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></li> + +<li>English Socialists, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + +<li>Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> + <ul> + <li>and arming of merchant vessels, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a></li> + <li>and Italy, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> + <li>and the trial of William II., <a href='#Page_66'>66</a></li> + <li>answers President Wilson, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> + <li>as instruments in a world revolution, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + <li>Austria pressed to join, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + <li>demands abolition of German militarism, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></li> + <li>desire of final military victory, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> + <li>exterminates Prussian militarism, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + <li>impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a></li> + <li>mine-laying by, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> + <li>peace proposals to, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a></li> + <li>rejects first peace offer, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a></li> + <li>suspicious of Germany's plans, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + <li>their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_326'>326</a></li> + <li>views as to peace, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a></li> + +<li>Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a> + <ul> + <li>and author's secret report to the Emperor, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a> (note)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Espionage in Roumania, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + +<li>Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> + +<li>Esthonia demanded by Germany, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a></li> + +<li>Eugen, Archduke, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + +<li>Europe after the war, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> + +<li>European tension, beginnings of, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>F</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + +<li>Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a></li> + +<li>Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a> + <ul> + <li>German opinion of, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li>Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> + +<li>Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> + +<li>Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + +<li>Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a> + <ul> + <li>reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Fourteen Points, Wilson's, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a> + <ul> + <li>Bethmann's tribute to, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> + <li>distrust of Germany's intentions in, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a></li> + <li>insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + <li>opening of war a surprise to, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + <li>the Pacifist party in, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a> + <ul> + <li>advised to accept negotiations, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> + <li>and the principle of ministerial responsibility, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span></li> + <li>author's audience with, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + <li>death of, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a></li> + <li>gives audience to author, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a></li> + <li>King Edward VII. and, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + <li>on the Peace of Bucharest, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li>opposes Filippescu's scheme, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> + <ul> + <li>anti-Magyar point of view of, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + <li>antipathy to Hungary, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></li> + <li>as gardener, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></li> + <li>as husband and father, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li>dislike for the Germans of, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + <li>false rumours concerning, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> + <li>fearlessness of, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li>friendships of, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></li> + <li>Goluchowski and, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a></li> + <li>Great-Austrian programme of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> + <li>his high opinion of Pallavicini, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a></li> + <li>his sense of humour, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a></li> + <li>makes advances to the Kaiser, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> + <li>marriage of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> + <li>mentality of, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></li> + <li>personality of, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a></li> + <li>pro-Roumanian proclivities of, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></li> + <li>tragic end of, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> (<i>see also</i> Sarajevo tragedy)</li> + <li>views on foreign policy of, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Freedom of the seas, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a> + <ul> + <li>attacked by Entente, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + <li>neutrals and, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a></li> + <li>President Wilson on, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>French Socialistic Congress, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + +<li>Freyburg, Baron von, attends conference on U-boat question, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + +<li>Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> + <ul> + <li>tact of, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Frontier rectifications, Hungary and, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a></li> + +<li>Fürstenberg, Karl, a request of, refused at Vienna, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a> + <ul> + <li>report on Roumanian question by, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>G</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Galicia, proposed cession of, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a> + <ul> + <li>partition of, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a></li> + <li>Tisza and, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Gas attacks, reason for Germany's use of, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + +<li>Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram from, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> + <ul> + <li>at Nordbahnhof, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>George, Lloyd, admits grave state of grain supplies, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Peace of Versailles, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a></li> + <li>author in agreement with, <a href='#Page_177'>177-8</a></li> + <li>confers with Orlando, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> + <li>Dr. Helfferich's allusions to, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a></li> + <li>his desire to crush Germany, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> + <li>influence of, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + <li>on disarmament, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>George V., King, his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></li> + +<li>German army, the General Staff, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + +<li>German-Austria, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a> + <ul> + <li>population of, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>German Empire, the, creation of, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a></li> + +<li>German Government, <i>versus</i> German Diplomacy, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + +<li>German mentality, a typical instance of, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a> + <ul> + <li>military party refuse peace, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>German Nationalists and Count Andrassy, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></li> + +<li>German policy founders on heritage left by Bismarck, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></li> + +<li>German-Russian differences as to occupied areas, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></li> + +<li>German Supreme Command and evacuation question, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a></li> + +<li>Germans and a friendly attitude towards America, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a> + <ul> + <li>at Brest conference, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a></li> + <li>attitude of, towards Poland, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li>inferior mentality of, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></li> + <li>"insatiable appetite" of, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a></li> + <li>Lenin and, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a></li> + <li>oppose peace negotiations with Roumania, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li>refuse to renounce occupied territory, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + <li>the dynastic fidelity of, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Germany, a moral coalition against, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a> + <ul> + <li>advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>and Alsace-Lorraine, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + <li>and Austro-Hungarian military action in Ukraine, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a></li> + <li>answers the Papal Note, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span></li> + <li>blind faith in invincibility of her army, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> + <li>blockade of, and her retaliatory measures, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + <li>confident of victory, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + <li>culpability of, in matter of peace, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a></li> + <li>decides on U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a></li> + <li>declares Armistice with Russia at an end, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>disillusionment of, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> + <li>dissatisfaction in, over peace resolution in Reichstag, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a></li> + <li>England declares war on, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + <li>evil times in store for, <a href='#Page_336'>336</a></li> + <li>her dream of a victorious peace, <a href='#Page_326'>326</a>, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a></li> + <li>her hopes of food shortage in England, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + <li>Michaelis on internal economic and political situation in, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> + <li>military party of, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a></li> + <li>negotiations respecting naval disarmament, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></li> + <li>post-war intentions of, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a></li> + <li>restricts building of U-boats, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a></li> + <li>revolution in, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a></li> + <li>rupture with America, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a></li> + <li>unsuccessful effort at <i>rapprochement</i>, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a></li> + <li>violates neutrality of Belgium, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Goluchowski, Count, vacillation of, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a></li> + +<li>Görlitz, battle of, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a></li> + +<li>Gratz, Dr., a good suggestion by, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a> + <ul> + <li>author's discussion with, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + <li>on Austro-Polish solution of Polish question, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Great-Roumania, question of, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></li> + +<li>Great War, the, psychology of various cities, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a> + <ul> + <li>(<i>See</i> World War)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Grey, Sir Edward, an interview with Lichnowsky, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a> + <ul> + <li>at London Conference, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + <li>proposes negotiations, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>H</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Habsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty of London and, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> + +<li>Hadik, apathetic attitude of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></li> + +<li>Hague Convention, the, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + +<li>Haus, Admiral, favours submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a> + <ul> + <li>in Vienna, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hauser, and the question of separate peace, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + +<li>Hebel, appointment for, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> + +<li>Helfferich, Dr., disclosures by, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> (note) + <ul> + <li>on attitude of William II. during Balkan troubles, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + <li>speech on submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Henry of Prussia, Prince, a telegram from King George to, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></li> + +<li>Hertling, Count, advised to suppress "Der Kaiser im Felde," <a href='#Page_64'>64</a> + <ul> + <li>becomes Imperial Chancellor, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a></li> + <li>President Wilson on, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> + <li>succeeds Michaelis, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Herzegovina as compensation to Austria, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> + +<li>Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, modesty of, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a> + <ul> + <li>popularity of, in Germany, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hoffmann, General, an unfortunate speech by, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a> + <ul> + <li>and plans for outer provinces, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + <li>high words with Kühlmann, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + <li>received by the Kaiser, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>receives a telegram from Petersburg, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> + <li>visited by author, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hohenberg, Duchess of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a> + <ul> + <li>welcomed in Roumania, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hohendorf, General Conrad von, and his responsibility for the war, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a> (note)</li> + +<li>Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement of Wedel's request, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a> + <ul> + <li>free speech with William II., <a href='#Page_65'>65</a></li> + <li>report on U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Holtzendorff, Admiral, and submarine campaign, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a> + <ul> + <li>arrives in Vienna, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>guarantees results of U-boat campaign, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle on, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a> + <ul> + <li>Social Democrats, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Hungary and cession of her territory, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> + <ul> + <li>and Roumanian intervention, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + <li>and the alliance with Roumania, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> <i>et seq.</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span></li> + <li>demands of, at Bucharest, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a></li> + <li>frontier rectification question, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a></li> + <li>her influence on the war, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a></li> + <li>indignation in, at author's appointment to Bucharest, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li>"just punishment" of, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + <li>opposes economical alliance with Roumania, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a></li> + <li>question of a separate peace, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> + <li>repellent attitude of, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + <li>struggle for liberty in, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a></li> + <li>why her army was neglected, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>I</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Imperiali, Marchese, points submitted to London Conference by, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + +<li>International arbitration (<i>see</i> Arbitration)</li> + +<li>International disarmament, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></li> + +<li>International law, Germany's breach of, in adoption of U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + +<li>Internationalists, Russian, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Ischl, an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph at, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + +<li>Iswolsky, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></li> + +<li>Italy, Allied defeat in, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> + <ul> + <li>and Albania, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li>and the Peace of Versailles, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a></li> + <li>Czernin on, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a></li> + <li>declares a blockade, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + <li>points submitted to London Conference, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + <li>stands in way of a peace of understanding, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a></li> + <li>ultimatum to, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + <li>why she entered the war, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>J</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic death of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a></li> + +<li>Jagow, Herr von, a frank disclosure by, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></li> + +<li>Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to Allies, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a> + <ul> + <li>conversation with, at Brest, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></li> + <li>criticisms on the Tsar, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + +<li>Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> + <ul> + <li>appointed Chief of Air Force, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></li> + <li>reinstatement of, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + <li>relinquishes his command, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></li> + <li>the Luck episode, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>K</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Kameneff at Brest, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a></li> + +<li>Karachou, Leo, secretary of Peace Delegation, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a></li> + +<li>Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to the Entente, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a></li> + +<li>Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince, Franz Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a></li> + +<li>Karolyi and Roumanian peace negotiations, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a> + <ul> + <li>his attitude before the Roumanian declaration of war, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Kerenski and the offensive against Central Powers, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> + <ul> + <li>newspaper report of condition of his health, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical remark by, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a></li> + +<li>Kieff, a mission to, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a> + <ul> + <li>entered by Bolsheviks, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>in danger of a food crisis, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a></li> + <li>peace conditions at, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Kieff Committee and the Bolsheviks, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a></li> + +<li>Kiel Week, the, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></li> + +<li><i>Kienthaler</i> (Internationalists), <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Konopischt and its history, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Kreuznach, a conference at, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + +<li>Kriegen, Dr. Bogdan, a fulsome work by, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> + +<li>Kühlmann, Dr., and the food shortage, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a> + <ul> + <li>author's talk with, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> + <li>difficult position of, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a></li> + <li>high words with Hoffman, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + <li>his influence, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a></li> + <li>informed of Roumanian peace overtures, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li>on the Kaiser, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></li> + <li>returns to Brest, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>L</b><br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></li> + +<li>Lamezan, Captain Baron, at Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + +<li>Landwehr, General, and the food shortage, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + +<li>Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory attitude of, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + +<li>Larin and Menshevik Socialists, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>League of Nations, the, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a></li> + +<li>Lenin, author on, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a> + <ul> + <li>opposed to offensive against Central Powers, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a day's shooting with, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> + <ul> + <li>chats with author, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Lewicky, M., <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + +<li>Lichnowsky interviews Sir Edward Grey, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + +<li>Liége taken by Ludendorff, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + +<li>Lithuania, Germany and, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + +<li>Livonia demanded by Germany, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a></li> + +<li>London, Declaration of, discarded by England, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + +<li>London, Pact of, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a> + <ul> + <li>desired amendments to, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a></li> + <li>text of, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Lublin, German demand for evacuation of, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> + +<li>Luck episode, the, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> + <ul> + <li>Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ludendorff and Belgium, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Polish question, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> + <li>candid admission by, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a></li> + <li>compared with enemy statesmen, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></li> + <li>confident of success of U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> + <li>congratulates Hoffmann, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> + <li>displays "a gleam of insight", <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>dominating influence of, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> + <li>German hero-worship of, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> + <li>his independent nature, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> + <li>how he captured Liége, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + <li>personality of, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + +<li>Luxembourg, German invasion of, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>M</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Mackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins at Bucharest, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a> + <ul> + <li>failure at Maracesci, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a></li> + <li>headquarters at Bucharest, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a> + <ul> + <li>author and, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Majorescu and Austria's policy, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a> + <ul> + <li>and territorial concessions, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> + <li>forms a Ministry, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Mandazescu, arrest and extradition of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a></li> + +<li>Maracesci, attack on, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a></li> + +<li>Marghiloman and co-operation of Roumania, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a> + <ul> + <li>forms a Cabinet, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Marie, Queen of Roumania, English sympathies of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> + +<li>Marne, the, first battle of, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> + +<li>Martow and the Menshevik party, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Martynoz, and the Russian Internationalists, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Medwjedew, J.G., Ukrainian delegate to Brest, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a></li> + +<li>Mennsdorff, Ambassador, interviews General Smuts, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> + +<li>Menshevik party, the, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Meran, the Entente's proposals regarding, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></li> + +<li>Merchant vessels, arming of, author on, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a></li> + +<li>Merey meets Czernin at Brest, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + +<li>Michaelis, Dr., appointed Imperial Chancellor, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a> + <ul> + <li>defines Germany's views regarding Belgium, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> + <li>on peace proposals, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> + <li>Pan-Germanism of, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>"Might before Right," Bismarckian principle of, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></li> + +<li>Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, marvellous escape of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a></li> + +<li>Militarism, German faith in, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> + <ul> + <li>England's idea of German, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Monarchists <i>v.</i> Republicans, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a></li> + +<li>Monarchs, hypnotic complacency of, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Moutet, attitude of, at French Socialist conference, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>N</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Nationality, problem of, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a> + <ul> + <li>Franz Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Naval disarmament, negotiations on, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span></li> + +<li>Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the military party in Russia, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + +<li>Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> + +<li>North Sea, the, blockade of, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + +<li>Noxious gas, why used by Germany, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>O</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Odessa, in danger of a food crisis, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a></li> + +<li>Orlando confers with Ribot and Lloyd George, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a></li> + +<li>Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>P</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses the political situation with author, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a></li> + +<li>Pan-Germans, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a> + <ul> + <li>conditions on which they would conclude peace, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Pan-Russian Congress, the, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + +<li>Papal Note, the, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a> + <ul> + <li>Austria's reply to, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></li> + <li>German reply to, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Paris, negotiations <i>in camera</i> at, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + +<li>Peace by sacrifice, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a></li> + +<li>Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Peace movement, real historical truth concerning, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> + +<li>Peace negotiations, Count Czernin on, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a> <i>et seq.</i> + <ul> + <li>deadlock in, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a></li> + <li>the Pope's proposals, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Peace resolution, a, and its consequences, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a></li> + +<li>Penfield, Mr., American Ambassador to Vienna, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a></li> + +<li>People's Socialists, the, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Peschechonow, Minister of Food, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Petersburg and the Ukraine, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a></li> + +<li>Plechanow, Georgei, and the Russian Social Patriots, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Poklewski, Russian Ambassador to Roumania, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + +<li>Poland, a conference on question of, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a> + <ul> + <li>becomes a kingdom, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + <li>conquest of, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> + <li>Count Czernin on, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></li> + <li>Emperor Charles's offer regarding, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a></li> + <li>future position of, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li>German standpoint on, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li>Michaelis on, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a></li> + <li>re-organisation of, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + <li>the German demands, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></li> + <li>unrepresented at Brest, and the reason, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk negotiations, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a> + <ul> + <li>party divisions among, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Polish question, and the Central-European project, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a> + <ul> + <li>difficulties of, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Popow, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a></li> + +<li>Pro-Roumanian party and its head, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + +<li>Prussian militarism, England's idea of, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> + <ul> + <li>extermination of, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + <li>fear of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a></li> + <li>(<i>See also</i> German military party)</li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>Q</b><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Quadruple Alliance, the, dissension in, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a> + <ul> + <li>Germany as shield of, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a></li> + <li>peace terms to Roumania, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>R</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Radek, a scene with a chauffeur, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> + +<li>Radoslawoff, ignorant of negotiations with Entente, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a></li> + +<li>Randa, Lieut.-Col. Baron, a telling remark by, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a> + <ul> + <li>and Roumanian peace overtures, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Reichstag, the, a peace resolution passed in, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a> + <ul> + <li>demands peace without annexation, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Renner and the Stockholm Congress, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + +<li>Republicans <i>v.</i> Monarchists, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span></li> + +<li>Ressel, Colonel, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a></li> + +<li>Revertera negotiates for peace, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> + +<li>Revolution, danger of, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a></li> + +<li>Rhondda, Lord, British Food Controller, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> + +<li>Ribot confers with Orlando, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a> + <ul> + <li>statement by, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Richthofen brothers, the, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a></li> + +<li>Rosenberg meets author at Brest, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + +<li>Roumania, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a> <i>et seq.</i> + <ul> + <li>a change of Government in, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></li> + <li>a land of contrasts, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a></li> + <li>affairs in, after Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + <li>and the Peace of Bucharest, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li>author's negotiations for peace, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a></li> + <li>between two stools, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a></li> + <li>declares war, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a></li> + <li>espionage in, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + <li>freedom of the Press in, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a></li> + <li>Germany and, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a></li> + <li>her treachery to Central Powers, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a></li> + <li>how news of Sarajevo tragedy was received in, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a></li> + <li>Marghiloman forms a Cabinet, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a></li> + <li>negotiations for peace, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>out of action, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a></li> + <li>peace concluded with, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + <li>question of annexations of, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> + <li>question of her neutrality, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> + <li>Russian gold in, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a></li> + <li>social conditions in, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a></li> + <li>ultimatum to, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a></li> + <li>why she entered the war, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></li> + +<li>Roumanians, mistaken views of strength of, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> + <ul> + <li>their love of travel, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> + +<li>Russia, a contemplated peace with, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> + <ul> + <li>abdication of the Tsar, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> + <li>an appeal to German soldiers, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>begins military operations without a declaration of war, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + <li>Bolshevism in, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> + <li>declares for cessation of hostilities, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>differences of opinion in, as to continuance of war, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>enters the war, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + <li>Francis Joseph's inquiry as to a possible revolution in, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a></li> + <li>her responsibility for Great War, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + <li>incites German army to revolt, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a></li> + <li>negotiations for peace, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a></li> + <li>out of action, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a></li> + <li>peace treaty signed, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a></li> + <li>prepared for war, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a></li> + <li>the military party in, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></li> + <li>ultimatum to Roumania, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Russian Revolution, the, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>Russians, their fear of Trotski, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> + +<li>Ruthenian districts of Hungary, Ukrainian demands, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>S</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Sacharow, General, murder of, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></li> + +<li>St. Mihiel, author at, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a></li> + +<li>St. Privat, reminiscences of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> + +<li>Salzburg negotiations, the, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + +<li>Sarajevo, the tragedy of, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> + <ul> + <li>sounds death knell of the Monarchy, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Sassonoff, a momentous statement by, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a> + <ul> + <li>attitude of, after declaration of war, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>visits Bucharest, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a></li> + +<li>Schachrai, W.M., at Brest, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a></li> + +<li>Schonburg, Alvis, and the Emperor Charles, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + +<li>Schönerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + +<li>Secret diplomacy, abolition of: author's views, <a href='#Page_306'>306-7</a></li> + +<li>Sedan, a house with a history at, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> + +<li>Seidler, Dr. von, a <i>faux pas</i> by, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a> + <ul> + <li>and the food shortage, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + <li>and the partition of Galicia, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a></li> + <li>and the Ukrainian question, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> + <li>apathetic attitude of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + <li>author's meeting with, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>visits South Slav provinces, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Seitz, and the Stockholm Conference, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + +<li>Serbia, arrogance of, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a> + <ul> + <li>ultimatum to, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Sewrjuk, M., <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + +<li>Sixtus, Prince, letters from Emperor Charles to, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span></li> + +<li>Skobeleff and the Mensheviks, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Skrzynski, Herr von, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> + +<li>Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a></li> + +<li>Slav provinces, a visit by the Emperor to, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a></li> + +<li>Smuts, General, interview with Mennsdorff, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + +<li>Social Democrats and the question of peace, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a> + <ul> + <li>and the Stockholm Conference, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + <li>Hungarian, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> + <li>opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>"Social Patriots," Russian, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Social Revolutionary Party, the, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Socialists and offensive against Central Powers, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Spanish reports of war-weariness in England and France, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> + +<li>Stirbey, Prince, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a></li> + +<li>Stockholm, a Socialist Conference at, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a> + <ul> + <li>Russians ask for a conference at, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Stockholm Congress, negative result of, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> + +<li>Strikes and their danger, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a></li> + +<li>Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a></li> + +<li>Sturdza, Lieut.-Col., extraordinary behaviour of, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a></li> + +<li>Stürgkh, Count, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a> (note) + <ul> + <li>recollections of, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarine warfare, author's note to American Government on, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a> + <ul> + <li>Czernin on, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>destruction without warning justified, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a></li> + <li>enemy losses in, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a></li> + <li>enemy's "statistical smoke-screens" as to, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a></li> + <li>question of safety of passengers and crew, <a href='#Page_282'>282</a></li> + <li>speech by Dr. Helfferich on, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a></li> + <li>why adopted by Central Powers, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>(<i>See also</i> U-boats)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Südekum, Herr, and Austria-Hungary's peace proposals, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a></li> + +<li>Supreme Military and Naval Command, conditions of, for peace + <ul> + <li>negotiations, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Switzerland, reported disturbances in: author's disclaimer, <a href='#Page_335'>335</a></li> + +<li>Sycophancy in high places, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> + +<li>Sylvester, Dr., and the German-Austrian National Assembly, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>T</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Talaat Pasha arrives at Brest, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a> + <ul> + <li>influence of, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> + <li>threatens to resign, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Talleyrand, a dictum of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a></li> + +<li>Tarnowski, Count, author's opinion of, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a> + <ul> + <li>German Ambassador to Washington, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Thomas, M., war speech on Russian front, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + +<li>Tisza, Count Stephen, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a> (note) + <ul> + <li>a characteristic letter from, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + <li>advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>and American intervention, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a></li> + <li>and author's appointment to Bucharest, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a></li> + <li>and cession of Hungarian territory, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></li> + <li>and control of foreign policy, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a></li> + <li>and the Stockholm Conference, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + <li>assassination of, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> + <li>at a U-boat campaign conference, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>author's conference with, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></li> + <li>defends Count Czernin, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></li> + <li>dismissal of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li>Franz Ferdinand and, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></li> + <li>his influence in Hungary, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></li> + <li>leads anti-Roumanian party, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li>lively correspondence with author, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> + <li>on dangers of pessimism, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> + <li>on the Treaty of London, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></li> + <li>opposes annexation of Roumania, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></li> + <li>opposes the war, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + <li>opposes U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a></li> + <li>peace proposal of, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></li> + <li><i>pro-memoria</i> of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span></li> + <li>question of frontier rectifications, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a></li> + <li>refuses cession of Hungarian territory, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + <li>speech at conference on Polish question, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> + <li>tribute to, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> + <li>views regarding Poland, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + <li>visits the Southern Slavs, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Transylvania, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a> + <ul> + <li>opposition to cession of, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + <li>proposed cession of, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a></li> + <li>Roumanian invasion of, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Trentino, the, offered to Italy, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a></li> + +<li>Trieste, Entente proposals regarding, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></li> + +<li>"Tripartite solution" of Polish question, Tisza on, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a></li> + +<li>Trnka and the Customs dues, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></li> + +<li>Trotski, a tactical blunder by, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a> + <ul> + <li>accepts the German-Austria ultimatum, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + <li>and the Internationalist party, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + <li>arrives at Brest, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li>declines to sign, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> + <li>his brother-in-law Kameneff, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></li> + <li>his library, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li> + <li>negotiations with, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a></li> + <li>opposed to ill-treatment of war prisoners, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li> + <li>ultimatum to, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Trudoviks, the, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a></li> + +<li>Tschernow, speaks at Peasants' Congress, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + +<li>Tschirsky, Herr von, a momentous communication to Berchtold, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a> + <ul> + <li>and a telegram from King George, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></li> + <li>his desire for war, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> + <li>untactful diplomacy of, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Tseretelli and the Menshevik party, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + +<li>Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> + <ul> + <li>asks for munitions, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> + <li>how the Sultan was deposed, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + <li>probable secession of, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at Brest, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + +<li>Turks, a reported advance by a hostile Power for a separate peace, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a> + <ul> + <li>at Brest Conference, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Tyrol, the, German troops in, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>U</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a> <i>et seq.</i> + <ul> + <li>a conference in Vienna on, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li>"a terrible mistake", <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> + <li>and America's entry into the war, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a></li> + <li>and why adopted by Germany, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + <li>Czernin on, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a></li> + <li>political arguments against, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li> + <li>what it achieved, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a></li> + <li>(<i>See also</i> Submarine warfare)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripartite" solution of Polish question, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a></li> + +<li>Ukraine and Petersburg, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a> + <ul> + <li>Bolshevik destruction in, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a></li> + <li>food supplies from, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a></li> + <li>military action in, and the consequences, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> + <li>peace concluded with, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>revolution in, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> + <li>survey of imports from, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a></li> + <li>treaty signed, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ukrainian Army General Committee appointed, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a> + <ul> + <li>delegates at Brest, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a></li> + <li>Workers' and Peasants' Government, a declaration from, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Ukrainians and their demands, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a> + <ul> + <li>dictatorial attitude of, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a></li> + <li>negotiations with, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>United States, the, scarcity of supplies in, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a> + <ul> + <li>(<i>See also</i> America)</li> + </ul> +</li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>V</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Versailles, opening of Peace Congress at, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> + <ul> + <li>the Council of Four at, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li>the Peace of, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li>terrible nature of, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + <li>triumph of Entente at, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Vienna, a council in, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a> + <ul> + <li>differences of opinion in, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li>disastrous effects of troubles in, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> + <li>disturbances in, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a></li> + <li>food shortage and strikes in, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a></li> + <li>politicians' views on peace proposals, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>psychology of, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a></li> + <li>warlike demonstrations at, after Sarajevo tragedy, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch Ambassador to Roumania, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a></li> + + +<li><br /><br /><b>W</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Wales, Prince of (<i>see</i> Edward VII., King)</li> + +<li>Wallachia, occupation of, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a></li> + +<li>Wallhead, Mr., <a href='#Page_295'>295</a></li> + +<li>Washington Cabinet, and Austria-Hungary's attitude to submarine warfare, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a></li> + +<li>Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Austrian Ruthenians, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + +<li>Wedel, Count, calls on Count Czernin, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a> + <ul> + <li>disclosures of, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> (note)</li> + <li>revelations of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a> (note)</li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins the term "bread peace," <a href='#Page_257'>257</a></li> + +<li>Wekerle, Dr., and the Polish question, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a> + <ul> + <li>author and, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>on the Ukrainian question, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></li> + <li>standpoint of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Western front, an Entente break-through on, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a></li> + +<li>Western Powers, the, and Germany's ambitions, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + +<li>Wiesner, Ambassador, von, and a Pan-German, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> + <ul> + <li>at Brest-Litovsk, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li> + <li>author discusses Russian peace with, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a> + <ul> + <li>anxious for peace, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> + <li>author's conversation with, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> + <li>his quarters at Sedan, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>William I. and Bismarck, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a></li> + +<li>William II., Emperor, and Bismarck, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a> + <ul> + <li>and Franz Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> + <li>and the German Supreme Military Command, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></li> + <li>as <i>causeur</i>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a></li> + <li>as the "elect of God," <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a></li> + <li>cause of his ruin, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>demonstrations against, in the Reichstag, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> + <li>desires to help deposed Tsar, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a></li> + <li>difficulties of his political advisers, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> + <li>fails to find favour in England, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a></li> + <li>his projected division of the world, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a></li> + <li>impending trial of: author's protest, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a></li> + <li>informed of serious nature of situation for Allies, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a></li> + <li>instructions to Kühlmann, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + <li>long years of peaceful government, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + <li>longs for peace, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a></li> + <li>on food troubles in England, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></li> + <li>on impending attack on Italian front, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + <li>presents author with "Der Kaiser im Felde," <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></li> + <li>Prince Hohenlohe and, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a></li> + <li>question of his abdication, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a></li> + <li>the Press and, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a></li> + <li>warlike speeches of, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Wilson, President, advantages of his "Fourteen Points," <a href='#Page_188'>188</a> + <ul> + <li>as master of the world, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> + <li>author on his Message, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a></li> + <li>Count Andrassy's Note to, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> + <li>Count Czernin on, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> + <li>Entente's reply to his peace proposal, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a></li> + <li>his Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li>on the freedom of the seas, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + <li>ready to consider peace, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a></li> + <li>reopens hopes of a peace of understanding, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a></li> + <li>speech to Congress, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> + <li>text of the Fourteen Points, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Wolf, K.H., a scene in the "Burg," <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></li> + +<li>World-domination, Germany's dream of, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span></li> + +<li>World organization, a new, principles of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + +<li>World War, the, an important phase of, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> + <ul> + <li>attempts at peace, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>author's impressions and reflections on, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>by whom started, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a> (note)</li> + <li>causes of, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a></li> + <li>President Wilson and, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> + <li>questions of responsibility for outbreak of, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>World War, the, U-boat warfare in, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a> <i>et seq.</i> + <ul> + <li>(<i>see also</i> Submarine warfare and U-boat)</li> + <li>violent measures adopted by Germany in, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><br /><br /><b>Z</b><br /><br /></li> + +<li>Zeppelin raids on Bucharest, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a></li> + +<li>Zimmermann, Herr, and author's peace proposals, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> + <ul> + <li>opposes unrestricted U-boat warfare, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> + </ul></li> + +<li><i>Zimmerwalder</i> (Russian Internationalists), <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> +</ul> + +<br /> +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h4 class="sc">Printed by Cassell & Company, Limited, La Belle Sauvage, London, E.C. 4</h4> + +<br /> +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> +<br /> + + +<div class="tr"> +<p class="cen"><a name="TN" id="TN"></a>Typographical errors corrected in text:</p> +<br /> +<p class="noin">Table of Contents: Appendix is listed as 257, changed to 275<br /> +Page 47: 'and and in doing so' replaced with 'and in doing so'<br /> +Page 81: 'to made room' replaced with 'to make room'<br /> +Page 107: session replaced with cession<br /> +Page 196: perdera replaced with perdra<br /> +Page 201: Nr 63 replaced with Nr. 63<br /> +Page 251: official replaced with officials<br /> +Page 286: 'Les navir' replaced with 'Les navires'<br /> +Page 293: persumably replaced with presumably<br /> +Page 333: Sudekum replaced with Südekum<br /> +Page 334: 'would have have been' replaced with 'would have been'<br /> +Page 343: Gouluchowski replaced with Goluchowski<br /> +Page 344: Gorlitz replaced with Görlitz<br /> +Page 346: Lubin replaced with Lublin</p> +</div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<hr /> +<br /> +<br /> + + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's In the World War, by Count Ottokar Czernin + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE WORLD WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 18160-h.htm or 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: In the World War + +Author: Count Ottokar Czernin + +Release Date: April 12, 2006 [EBook #18160] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IN THE WORLD WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jeannie Howse, Thierry Alberto, Henry Craig +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images +generously made available by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + * * * * * + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | A number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected | + | in this text. For a complete list, please see the bottom of | + | this document. | + | | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + * * * * * + +[Illustration: COUNT CZERNIN] + + * * * * * + + + + +IN THE WORLD WAR + +BY COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN + + + +_WITH FOUR PLATES_ + + + +CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD +London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne + +Copyright in Great Britain. + + + + +PREFACE + + +It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World +War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of +this book. + +Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe +separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and individuals +with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe +closely; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama. + +By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of +the war as a whole, which may, nevertheless, differ in many respects +from the hitherto recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war. + +Everyone regards people and events from his own point of view; it is +inevitable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was in close touch; +of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression +on me; and finally, of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I +endeavour to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to +describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description +appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely +formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the +capacity for judging. + +Not everything could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it +could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those +events to justify the lifting of the veil from all that happened. + +But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture, +which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind. + +OTTOKAR CZERNIN. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER PAGE + + 1. INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 1 + + 2. KONOPISCHT 34 + + 3. WILLIAM II 52 + + 4. ROUMANIA 77 + + 5. THE U-BOAT WARFARE 114 + + 6. ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 134 + + 7. WILSON 188 + + 8. IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 195 + + 9. POLAND 200 + +10. BREST-LITOVSK 211 + +11. THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST 258 + +12. FINAL REFLECTIONS 271 + + APPENDIX 275 + + + + +LIST OF PLATES + + +COUNT CZERNIN _Frontispiece_ + + FACING PAGE + +THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND 48 + +COUNT TISZA 128 + +GENERAL HOFFMANN 240 + + + + +IN THE WORLD WAR + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS + + +1 + +The bursting of a thunderstorm is preceded by certain definite +phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the +storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be +repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through +outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less +threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is +bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts. + +For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of +Foreign Affairs had stood at "storm." It rose periodically, to fall +again; it varied--naturally; but for years everything had pointed to +the fact that the peace of the world was in danger. + +The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several +years: to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand England's dread of +the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand Berlin's politics, +which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief +that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in +Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but +partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence; these +fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII., and thus was +started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward +VII. made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor +Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the +Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor +Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate +of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent +masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany; +without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through +the Alliance. + +I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war, +it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had +eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her +dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the +Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm +conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the +situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany, +the unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention +the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in +Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise, +and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this, +the greatest misfortune of all time--and such is this war--lies in the +fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation +created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals +keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and +statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as +much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable +difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither +France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the +thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no +intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary--as she did fifty +years ago--left the decisive moment for entering into war to the +future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite +of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed +her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not +know what he wanted, and the military party urged unceasingly for +war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a +declaration of war. + +The states that followed after--Italy and Roumania--entered into the +war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of +course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to +pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than +Roumania. + +But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the +growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already +brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of +Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the +Prussians throughout the world--whether in the case of a general at +Potsdam or a _commis voyageur_ out in East Africa--these Prussian +manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting +of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the +whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral +coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly +practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that +German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the +world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention +of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in +the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was +undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German +provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence +created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition +policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war. + +It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans +of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the +sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan +of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by +King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English +motives. + +Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for +armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to +possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried +to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had +become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been +obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be +pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary +and general disarmament, or war. + +A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through +negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, +but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for +peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she +was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the +Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion. + +I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British +points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral +state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American +steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German +industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German was a great talker +and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating +on the "uprising" of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for +expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of +impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made +in all these endeavours. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of +German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns +where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how +"Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world, +and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on +solid foundations upheld by military support. Such was the German. +When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and +asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered: "There is no need +for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us." Such +was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind. +It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was +reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic, +because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of +the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe. + +The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the +Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest +strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world +regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy +was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action +would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of +anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and +closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way. + + +2 + +I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while +there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the +Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador +there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by +his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to +put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as +follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not +intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he +considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in +our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and +leaving the field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own +mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great +Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was +preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterwards I +repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, +and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of +Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion. +The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with +the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I +had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his +intention of discussing the matter with the monarch. + +The two Balkan wars were as summer lightning before the coming +European thunderstorm. It was obvious to anyone acquainted with Balkan +conditions that the peace there had produced no definite result, and +the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, so enthusiastically acclaimed by +Roumania, carried the germ of death at its birth. Bulgaria was +humiliated and reduced; Roumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out +of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description. +Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy, +was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars. +In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the +separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred +came to an outburst in the world war the most terrible scenes were +enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Roumanians tore +their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the +Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Roumanian prisoners to death +in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war +can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph +clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely +a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for +Bucharest in 1913 I was received in audience by the aged emperor, who +said to me: "The Peace of Bucharest is untenable, and we are faced by +a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia, +which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being +satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of +becoming a Great Power. + +Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before +the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed +almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade. +But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent +asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the +world. The stone had started rolling. + +At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able +from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin. +Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with +numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been +able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no +doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought +of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all, +was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German +Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war +against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe +that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the +ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this +is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which +would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and +then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and +France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It +cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of +errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count +Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to +the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German +promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators +and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated. + +Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war +would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent +by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no +doubt on the matter. + +Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian +war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment +extremely important events took place. + +On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram +received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the +following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was +very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the +situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had +intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a +position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested +England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities +to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as +it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after +occupying Belgrade, would state her terms. + +To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention +to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would +facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would +inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved. +Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very +favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was +difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy. + +Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that +he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting +negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without +a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future. + +Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by +Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the +Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this +information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position +was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the +evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation +was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him +whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in +view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the +different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was +obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the +day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to +incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun +without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they +were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary +would be too late. + +I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material +placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire +into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the +Emperor Francis Joseph. + +On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz, +communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince +Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:-- + + "Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to + concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly + desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war + should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting + to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if + Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade + and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for + satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile + suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his + great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus + proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent + what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I + am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to + preserve peace of Europe. + + GEORGE." + +Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject +to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy +London. + +In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to +Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party +working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an +accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop +mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with +defence. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their +Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their +personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly +weighed in the balance. + +This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn +hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours +merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was +the result. + +Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war. + +Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all +these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen +Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw +a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread +errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the +war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but +because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance +would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the +Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which +then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before +we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning +the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German +Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a +distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as +I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various +steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have +alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the +language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky +specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to +interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in +the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy. + +There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private +speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and +it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be +"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point +of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would +prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff +appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was +firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go +through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the +year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason, +because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of +either Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very +important point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy +into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and +peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany +on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he +wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of +Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his +policy, and not Bethmann's. + +This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy +conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been confirmed +from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in +behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of +activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this +to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was +never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war, +but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic +representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government +to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his +instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete +anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy +expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his Government; +and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain +circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all +events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's +private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy. + +In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark +a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there +for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to +return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before +leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at +Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite +briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a +war, I could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the +affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any +guarantee was impossible. + + +3 + +Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately +preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence +of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we +granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing +the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before +action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them +also. + +I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in +Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In +all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of +renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious +feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would +strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour. + +Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings. + +Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian +Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared +that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case +there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest +had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His +efforts were crowned with success. + +On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold: + + "The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet + Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty + into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that + no party could undertake the responsibility of such action. + + "The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither + notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in + Belgrade no casus foederis exists_. The Cabinet Council further + resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier + be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the + Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its + frontiers would thereby be covered. + + "The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to + strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general + mobilisation would follow. + + "The Government intends only to publish a short communique + relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the + country." + +Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up +as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for +war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870 +Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a +different character. + +In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have +been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto +were favourably disposed towards us. + +Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and +confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not +inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending +over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a +very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung +the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe. + +It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the +Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new +conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the +year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the +ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side. + +At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution, +and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was +the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We +also succeeded, but in an opposite sense. + + +4 + +Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium. + +Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his +book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how +on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English +Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would +respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already +on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but, +returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in +before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into +Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his +passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and +the consequence was a declaration of war by England. + +That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would +resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is +fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English +Ambassador. + +Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave +France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian +neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action +against France. The contradiction between both points of view is +clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation +is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of +August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the +evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of +making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext +for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also +that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do +so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying +her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On +the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the +decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with +Germany._ + +Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of +the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom. +That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the +diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power. + +The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious +onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne. + +In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage +left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a +lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually +forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but +Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans, +though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently +competent to lead them therein. + +Bismarck created the German Empire out of Dueppel, Koeniggraetz and +Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years +that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the +mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but +Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial +efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means. +Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when +he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no +desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the +first week had already created political situations which were beyond +her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the +Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose +against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over +the world. + +At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would +have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to +fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then +at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to +join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How +far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to +a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but +this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right +remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or +small. + +The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian +policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who +were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating +consequences. + +Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command +made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than +useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable +and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that +Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would +not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of +noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare were +means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women +and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany +must be annihilated. + +When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it was +only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of +such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war +of annihilation. + +England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic +than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the +present case England originally had no intention of joining in the +conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own +confederates. + +So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the +wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors +in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final +decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was +taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign +Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence, +but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor +political complications, carried everything before them. + +It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits +of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both +encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and +very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs. +Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into +subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made +manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had +possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had +the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have +been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the +abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the +Central Powers. + +From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the +hands of his generals. + +The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much +else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant, +inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people +believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms +of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing +the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William +allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their +tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a +godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war +long since had assumed a totally different character, when the troops +were made stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were +constantly rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally +America appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve +miracles of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the +eyes of the German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and +hoped for victory through them alone. They were more powerful than +the Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose +them. + +Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power +direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt +that they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering +people clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could +give them victory. + + +5 + +Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy, +and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours +had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought +about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling +herself on the Central Powers. + +That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning +of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources +may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of +the case. + +The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They +maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of +Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as +punishment. + +A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their +own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge +and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of +State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view +of the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that +"three Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the +war."[1] + +Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of +blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war +without being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true, +there could only have been a question of some plot laid by the +Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case Germany, +being the vastly superior military element, would undoubtedly have +assumed the role of leader. + +Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace +were right. + + +6 + +While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would +have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had attempts +at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we should +have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as we were +united together in a war of defence and not in a war of conquest. +Although the German military party both dreamed and talked incessantly +of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a misunderstanding of the +situation, that was by no means the exclusive reason why peace could +not be attained. It simply was because on no consideration could the +Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have already mentioned this in +my speech of December 11, 1918,[2] in which I discoursed on politics +in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of France +and England. None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for +victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long +as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with +Germany _inter pares_, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part +of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to +do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we +ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to +conclude a _status quo_ peace with Germany, we would have been +relieved of our moral obligations. Against this may be quoted: "_Salus +rei publicas supreme lex_"--in order to save the Monarchy Germany +would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be +inquired into as to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate +peace really did exist. I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid +speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after +the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America +into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian +idea. But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished +the hope of a _peace of understanding_ from month to month, from week +to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would +arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the +sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end +which practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of affairs. A +catastrophe of such magnitude and such dimensions was never what I +feared. This is confirmed in the published report of my aforesaid +speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are +therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial +offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose +out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the +Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for +_endurable_ sacrifices. + +It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in +shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a +separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of +London of April 26, 1915. + +The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's +entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they +included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into +a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times +when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the +resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on +both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired +advances to us. + +As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this +strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we +obtain the authentic whole, when the Russian revolutionary Government +published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was +reproduced in our papers. + +I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,[3] as, in spite of +its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate +attention on the part of the public. + +According to the settlements, which were binding on the four +States--England, France, Russia, and Italy--the last-named was awarded +the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass, +Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of +islands, also Dalmatia. + +In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises +to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of +the Monarchy. + +Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace +was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the +reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming +neutral--reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change +our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with +Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It +must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held +office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German +troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial +German Command. We had no army of our own in the East--not in the true +sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army. That +was a consequence of our military inferiority. Again and again we +resorted to German aid. We called repeatedly for help in Serbia, +Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by +giving up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only in very +slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it +emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs. We entered +the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various +Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect. +The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for years because their +national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social +Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting +therein plans for attack and not defence. + +Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were, of course, +exceptions, but they only prove the rule. What was chiefly wanting was +contact with the troops. These gentlemen sat with their backs turned +and gave their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the front +or where the bullets whistled. During the war the troops learned to +_hate_ the General Staff. It was very different in the German army. +The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much; +above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example. +Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liege, accompanied by a couple of men! +In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were +quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes +Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions. The first of +these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a +leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany, +and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph. He always acted +correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties. What +was left of our independence was lost after Luck. + +To return, therefore, to the plan developed above: a separate peace +that would have contained an order for our troops on the Eastern front +to lay down their arms or to march back would immediately have led to +conflict at the front. Following on the violent opposition that such +an order would naturally have aroused in the German leaders, orders +from Vienna and counter-orders from Berlin would have led to a state +of complete disorganisation, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it was +out of the question to look for a peaceful and bloodless unravelment +at the front. I state this in order to explain my firm conviction that +the idea that such a separating of the two armies could have been +carried out in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous +premises, and also to prove that we have here the first factor +showing that we would not have ended the war by a separate peace, but +would, on the contrary, have been entangled in a new one. + +But what would have been enacted at the front would also, and in +aggravated fashion, have been repeated throughout the entire country: +a civil war would have been inevitable. + +I must here explain a second misunderstanding, resulting also from my +speech of December 11, which is due to my statement that "if we came +out Germany could not carry on the war." I admit that this statement +is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as though I had intended +to say that if we came out the immediate collapse of Germany was a +foregone conclusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or +mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Germany would render +impossible a victorious ending of the war, or even a lasting +successful continuance of the war; that Germany through this would be +faced by the alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the +Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers and +suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the same fate as Roumania +met with. I meant to say that Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the +Entente troops to enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany +that she would be compelled to use every means to forestall us and +paralyse the move. Whoever imagines that the German military leaders +would not have seized the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and +has a poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to form an +objective judgment of this train of thought one should be able to +enter into the spirit of the situation. In April, 1916, when I sent in +my resignation for other reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was +stronger than ever. The Eastern front was free: Russia and Roumania +were out of action. The troops were bound westward, and no one who +knew the situation as it was then can repudiate my assertion that the +German military leaders believed themselves then to be nearer than +ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they would take both +Paris and Calais and force the Entente to its knees. It is out of the +question that at such a moment and under such conditions they could +have replied to the falling away of Austria-Hungary otherwise than by +violence. + +All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to a fact which it +would be difficult to evade. Six months afterwards, when there was +already clear evidence of the German collapse, when Andrassy declared +a separate peace, the _Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into +the Tyrol_. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated, and ruined, +with revolution at their back, still held firmly to this decision and +endeavoured to make a battlefield on Austrian territory, how much more +would they have done that six months earlier, when they still stood +full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of victory and +triumph? What I, secondly, also would maintain is that the immediate +consequence of a separate peace would have been the conversion of +Austria-Hungary into a theatre of war. The Tyrol, as well as Bohemia, +would have become fields of battle. + +If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion from the war that +prevailed throughout the Monarchy before April, 1917, had caused the +entire population of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister +who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious or unconscious +untruth. Certainly the Czechs were decidedly against Germany, and it +would not have been reasons of political alliance that would have +prevented them from agreeing. But I would like to know what the Czech +people would have said if Bohemia had been turned into a theatre of +war and exposed to all the sufferings endured by this and all other +peoples, and when to it had been added the devastation of the +fatherland, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops advancing +with flying colours from Saxony would have made their way to Prague +and penetrated even farther. We had no military forces in Bohemia; we +should not have been able to check the advance, and quicker than +either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth mentioning to +Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops from their wellnigh +inexhaustible reserves, would have marched either against us or +against the Entente on our territory. The German-Austrian public would +not have been in agreement with such a Minister; the German +Nationalists and the German _bourgeoisie_ have no say in the matter. + +On October 28 the German Nationalists published their own particular +point of view in the following manner: + + "The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly + indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's + Note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to any + agreement with the Imperial German Government nor with the + representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the + Note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed + and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count + Andrassy in dispatching the Note to Wilson without previous + arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest + indignation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation + from the German Executive Committee was in Berlin and was + favourably received by the German Imperial Government in the + matter of providing for German-Austria. Although German soldiers + fought by the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the + alliance has now been violated by this effort to approach Wilson + without the consent of the German Empire, as is expressly stated + in the Note. Besides which, no previous agreement with the + representatives of the German Executive Committee was sought for. + They were ignored and the answer was sent to Wilson. The German + Nationalist parties strongly protest against such an + _unqualifiable act_ and will insist in the German Executive + Committee that German-Austria's right of self-determination be + unconditionally upheld and peace be secured in concert with the + German Empire." + +Neither would the German-Austrian Social Democrats have been a party +to such a movement. + +A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact lies before us if +it be maintained to-day that either the National Assembly or the +Austrian Social Democrats would have approved of and supported such +policy. I again have in mind the Andrassy days. + +On October 30 the National Assembly took up its position for action. +Dr. Sylvester drew up the report and pointed out the following: + + "It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the + attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between + German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the + future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly + asserts that the Note of October 27 from the Royal and Imperial + Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and dispatched to + President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with + the representatives of the German-Austrian people. The National + Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding + as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs + belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National + Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to + represent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to + foreign affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations." + +The protest met with no opposition in the National Assembly. + +Afterwards the chairman, Dr. Ellenbogen, the Social Democrat, spoke as +follows: + + "Instead of now telling the German Emperor that his remaining in + office is the greatest obstacle to peace" (loud applause from the + Social Democrats), "and if there ever were an object in Curtius's + famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German + Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes + the present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so + attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived too + late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is the + _bare and shameful breach of faith_, the thanks of the House of + Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet." (Applause from + the Social Democrats and the German Radicals.) + +It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished the exceptional +opportunity for Social Democrats and German Radicals to unite in +common applause, probably the first instance of such a thing in all +these years of war. + +If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that +there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding +together with Germany--what would have happened, I ask, at a time +when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the +population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at +least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together +with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding? +Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all, +civil war in the interior--such would have been the result of a +separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose on us the +resolutions passed in London! For never--as I shall presently +show--had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to +Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have +been as suicide from the sheer fear of death. + +In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor +Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a +separate peace. + +Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with +Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was +then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of +our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has +arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war." + +Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war--and a +separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with +Germany. + +In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he +was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together. +As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the +carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and +richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia, +Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that +the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without +putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the +circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the +whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I +took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on +the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans +were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet +without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to +cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce +an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities +were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in +London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never +could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the +Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we +must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many +different currents of feeling--but the moment that Vienna prepared to +sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man +against such action. In that respect there was no difference between +him--Tisza--and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before +the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of +Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's +back she would separate from Austria and act independently. + +I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany +or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear +as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the +German lust of conquest. + +Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was +not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in +London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian +territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the +Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and +both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give +Hungary a guarantee for the _status quo ante_ and to desist from any +internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must +declare against any attempt at peace. + +The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing +particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a +Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, though he maintained +that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms +appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than +Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make +peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to +bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's +advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was +fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be +lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German +politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as +England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory, +Germany was the only protection against these plans. + +Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from +Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new +states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary. + +After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the +following policy: + + + (1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in + London, i.e. the destruction of the Monarchy, continues to + be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the certain + hope of crushing that spirit of destruction. + + (2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no + account be carried on for purposes of conquest. + + (3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must be + avoided. + + (4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without + the knowledge of the Prime Minister. + + (5) Should the Austrian Ministry agree with the Foreign Minister + respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hungarian + Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce. + +When the conference in London and the destruction of the Monarchy came +into question, Tisza was entirely in the right, and that he otherwise +to the end adhered to his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his +last visit to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request of +the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and when in the most +marked manner he showed himself to be opposed to the aspirations of +the Southern Slavs. + +Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must not, when looking +back from to-day, relegate all that has since happened to former +discernible facts, but should consider that, in spite of all pessimism +and all fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding, even +though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that it was impossible +to plunge the Monarchy into a catastrophe at once for fear of its +coming later. + +If the situation is described to-day as though the inhabitants of the +Monarchy, and especially the Social Democrats, were favourably +disposed for any eventuality, even for a separate peace, I must again +most emphatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social Democracy +without doubt was the party most strongly in favour of peace, and also +that Social Democracy in Germany, as with us, repeatedly stated that +there were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German Social +Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine ought to be given up, and +never have our Social Democrats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen and +Meran. This would in any case have been the price of peace--and also +the price of a separate peace--for, as I have already pointed out, at +the conference in London, which dates back to 1915, binding +obligations had been entered into for the partition of the Monarchy, +while all that had been promised to Italy. + +The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the +separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente +ranks--for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians, +and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would +have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I +doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings +would have recommended it to the special protection of the Entente. +It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to +believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and +especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any +strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian +Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in +the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material +advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the +decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire +political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union +with Germany--how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which, +without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to +a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the +upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the +opposite? + +But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my +resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not +pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is +of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near +a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would +throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end +before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as +we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory +was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany +against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant +influence. + +As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign +policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of +renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several +men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I +feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I +came to the firm conclusion that the Entente--England above all--from +the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to +shatter Germany. + +From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief +characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further +with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to +earth. It makes no difference in the matter that the German military +party--though for other reasons--from a total misconception of their +chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a +time when it might have been possible. This is an historical fact, but +as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether +concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. _We_ could have +gone over to the enemy--in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought +against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would +doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the wounds which +Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been +less serious than those from which she is now suffering: she would +have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as +perished in her fight allied with Germany. + +_Austria-Hungary's watch had run down._ Among the few statesmen who in +1914 wished for war--like Tschirsky, for instance--there can have been +none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views. +They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe to-day, +nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would +have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first +step. + +The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of Greater Serbia's +aspirations; but these aspirations, which led to the breaking away of +our Southern Slav provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on +the contrary, would have largely increased and asserted themselves, +and would have strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of other +peoples within the Monarchy. + +Lightning at night reveals the country for a second, and the same +effect was produced by the shots fired at Sarajevo. It became obvious +that the signal for the fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells +of Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the murder, +sounded the death knell of the Monarchy. + +The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially at Vienna, was +very general that the outrage at Sarajevo was a matter of more +importance than the murder of an Imperial prince and his wife, and +that it was the alarm signal for the ruin of the Habsburg Empire. + +I have been told that during the period between the assassination and +the war, warlike demonstrations were daily occurrences in the Viennese +restaurants and people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were +sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not "exert himself +to take any energetic steps." This must not be taken as an excuse for +any eventual mistakes on the part of the leaders of the nation, for a +leading statesman ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the +man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit developed in +1914 appears to have been very general. And it may perhaps be +permitted to add this comment: how many of those who then clamoured +for war and revenge and demanded "energy," would, now that the +experiment has totally failed, severely criticise and condemn +Berchtold's "criminal behaviour"? + +It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the fall of the +Monarchy would have occurred had war been averted. Certainly in a less +terrible fashion than was the case through the war. Probably much more +slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole world into the +whirlpool. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the +manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible. + +Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the outbreak of war. +We were transformed from a subject into an object. + +This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless to end it. At the +conference in London the death sentence had been passed on the Empire +of the Habsburgs and a separate peace would have been no easier a form +of death than that involved in holding out at the side of our Allies. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza and Stuergkh and General +Conrad von Hohendorf. + +[2] See Appendix, p. 325. + +[3] See page 275. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +KONOPISCHT + + +1 + +Konopischt has become the cradle of manifold legends. The lord of the +castle was the first victim of the terrible world conflagration, and +the part that he played before the war has been the subject of much +and partly erroneous commentary. + +The Archduke and heir to the throne was a man of a very peculiar +nature. The main feature of his character was a great lack of balance. +He knew no middle course and was just as eager to hate as to love. He +was unbalanced in everything; he did nothing like other people, and +what he did was done in superhuman dimensions. His passion for buying +and collecting antiquities was proverbial and fabulous. A first-rate +shot, sport was for him a question of murdering _en masse_, and the +number of game shot by him reached hundreds of thousands. A few years +before his death he shot his 5,000th stag. + +His ability as a good shot was phenomenal. When in India, during his +voyage round the world, and while staying with a certain Maharajah, an +Indian marksman gave an exhibition of his skill. Coins were thrown +into the air which the man hit with bullets. The Archduke tried the +same and beat the Indian. Once when I was staying with him at +Eckartsau he made a _coup double_ at a stag and a hare as they ran; he +had knocked over a fleeing stag, and when, startled by the shot, a +hare jumped up, he killed it with the second bullet. He scorned all +modern appliances for shooting, such as telescopic sights or automatic +rifles; he invariably used a short double-barrelled rifle, and his +exceptionally keen sight rendered glasses unnecessary. + +The artistic work of laying out parks and gardens became in latter +years his dominating passion. He knew every tree and every bush at +Konopischt, and loved his flowers above everything. He was his own +gardener. Every bed and every group was designed according to his +exact orders. He knew the conditions essential to the life of each +individual plant, the quality of the soil required; and even the +smallest spot to be laid out or altered was done according to his +minute instructions. But here, too, everything was carried out on the +same gigantic lines, and the sums spent on that park must have been +enormous. Few people had the varied artistic knowledge possessed by +the Archduke; no dealer could palm off on him any modern article as an +antique, and he had just as good taste as understanding. On the other +hand, music to him was simply a disagreeable noise, and he had an +unspeakable contempt for poets. He could not bear Wagner, and Goethe +left him quite cold. His lack of any talent for languages was +peculiar. He spoke French tolerably, but otherwise no other language, +though he had a smattering of Italian and Czech. For years--indeed, to +the end of his life--he struggled with the greatest energy to learn +Hungarian. He had a priest living permanently in the house to give him +Hungarian lessons. This priest accompanied him on his travels, and at +St. Moritz, for instance, Franz Ferdinand had a Hungarian lesson every +day; but, in spite of this, he continued to suffer from the feeling +that he would never be able to learn the language, and he vented his +annoyance at this on the entire Hungarian people. "Their very language +makes me feel antipathy for them," was a remark I constantly heard him +make. His judgment of people was not a well-balanced one; he could +either love or hate, and unfortunately the number of those included in +the latter category was considerably the greater. + +There is no doubt about it that there was a very hard strain in Franz +Ferdinand's mentality, and those who only knew him slightly felt that +this hardness of character was the most notable feature in him and his +great unpopularity can doubtless be attributed to this cause. The +public never knew the splendid qualities of the Archduke, and +misjudged him accordingly. + +Apparently he was not always like that. He suffered in his youth from +severe lung trouble, and for long was given up by the doctors. He +often spoke to me of that time and all that he had gone through, and +referred with intense bitterness to the people who were only waiting +day by day to put him altogether on one side. As long as he was looked +upon as the heir to the throne, and people reckoned on him for the +future, he was the centre of all possible attention; but when he fell +ill and his case was considered hopeless, the world fluctuated from +hour to hour and paid homage to his younger brother Otto. I do not for +a moment doubt that there was a great deal of truth in what the late +Archduke told me; and no one knowing the ways of the world can deny +the wretched, servile egotism that is almost always at the bottom of +the homage paid to those in high places. More deeply than in the +hearts of others was this resentment implanted in the heart of Franz +Ferdinand, and he never forgave the world what he suffered and went +through in those distressful months. It was chiefly the ostensible +vacillation of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count +Goluchowski, that had so deeply hurt the Archduke, who had always +imagined that Goluchowski was deeply attached to him. According to +Franz Ferdinand's account, Goluchowski is supposed to have said to the +Emperor Francis Joseph that the Archduke Otto ought now to be given +the retinue and household suitable for the heir to the throne as +he--Franz Ferdinand--"was in any case lost." It was not so much the +fact as the manner in which Goluchowski tried "to bury him while still +living" that vexed and hurt him whom a long illness had made +irritable. But besides Goluchowski, there were numberless others whose +behaviour at that time he took greatly amiss, and his unparalleled +contempt of the world which, when I knew him, was one of his most +characteristic features, appears--partly, at any rate--to date from +his experiences during that illness. + +In connection with politics, too, this bitterness exercised a lasting +influence on his entire mental outlook. I have been told by an +authentic witness that the Archduke, when suffering and combating his +terrible disease, saw one day an article in a Hungarian paper which, +in brutal and derisive tones, spoke of the Archduke's expectations of +future government as laid aside, and gloated openly, with malicious +delight, over the probable event. The Archduke, who while reading the +article had turned ashen grey with rage and indignation, remained +silent for a moment and then made the following characteristic remark: +"Now I must get better. I shall live from now only for my health. I +must get better in order to show them that their joy is premature." +And though this may not have been the only reason for his violent +antipathy to everything Hungarian, there is no doubt that the episode +influenced his mind considerably. The Archduke was a "good hater"; he +did not easily forget, and woe betide those upon whom he vented his +hatred. On the other hand, though but few knew it, he had an +uncommonly warm corner in his heart; he was an ideal husband, the best +of fathers, and a faithful friend. But the number of those he despised +was incomparably greater than those who gained his affection, and he +himself was in no doubt whatever as to his being the most unpopular +person in the Monarchy. But there was a certain grandeur in this very +contempt of popularity. He never could bring himself to make any +advances to newspapers or other organs that are in the habit of +influencing public opinion either favourably or unfavourably. He was +too proud to sue for popularity, and too great a despiser of men to +attach any importance to their judgment. + +The Archduke's antipathy to Hungary runs like a scarlet thread through +the political chain of his thoughts. I have been told that at the time +when the Crown Prince Rudolf was frequently in Hungary shooting, the +Archduke was often with him, and that the Hungarian gentlemen took a +pleasure in teasing and ridiculing the young Archduke in the presence +and to the delight of the considerably older Crown Prince. Ready as I +am to believe that the Crown Prince Rudolf enjoyed the jokes--and +little do I doubt that there were men there who would act in such +fashion so as to curry favour with the Crown Prince--I still think +that these unpleasant incidents in his youth weighed less in the +balance with Franz Ferdinand than the already-mentioned occurrences +during his illness. + +Apart from his personal antipathies, which he transferred from a few +Hungarians to the entire nation, there were also various far-reaching +and well-founded political reasons which strengthened the Archduke in +his antagonistic relations with Hungary. Franz Ferdinand possessed an +exceptionally fine political _flair_, and this enabled him to see that +Hungarian policy was a vital danger to the existence of the whole +Habsburg Empire. His desire to overthrow the predominance of the +Magyars and to help the nationalities to obtain their rights was +always in his thoughts, and influenced his judgment on all political +questions. He was the steady representative of the Roumanians, the +Slovaks, and other nationalities living in Hungary, and went so far in +that respect that he would have treated every question at once from an +anti-Magyar point of view without inquiring into it in an objective +and expert manner. These tendencies of his were no secret in Hungary, +and the result was a strong reaction among the Magyar magnates, which +he again took as purely personal antagonism to himself, and as the +years went on existing differences increased automatically, until +finally, under the Tisza regime, they led to direct hostility. + +The Archduke's antipathy to party leaders in Hungary was even stronger +than that he felt for Tisza, and he showed it particularly to one of +the most prominent figures of that time. I do not know for certain +what took place between them; I only know that several years before +the catastrophe the gentleman in question was received in audience at +the Belvedere, and that the interview came to a very unsatisfactory +end. The Archduke told me that his visitor arrived bringing a whole +library with him in order to put forward legal proofs that the +Magyar's standpoint was the right one. He, the Archduke, snapped his +fingers at their laws, and said so. It came to a violent scene, and +the gentleman, pale as death, tottered from the room. + +Certain it is that Ministers and other officials rarely waited on the +Archduke without beating hearts. He was capable of flying out at +people and terrifying them to such a degree that they lost their heads +completely. He often took their fright to be obstinacy and passive +resistance, and it irritated him all the more. + +On the other hand, it was extremely easy to get on with him if one +knew him well and did not stand in awe of him. I had many scenes with +him and often lost my temper, too; but there was never any lasting +ill-feeling. Once when at Konopischt we had a scene one evening after +dinner because, he said, I always worked in opposition to him and +rewarded his friendship by treachery. I broke off the conversation, +remarking that, if he could say such things, any further serious +conversation would be impossible, and I also stated my intention of +leaving the next morning. We separated without saying good night to +each other. Quite early next morning--I was still in bed--he appeared +in my room and asked me to forget what he had said the previous +evening, that he had not meant it seriously, and thus completely +disarmed my still prevailing vexation. + +A despiser of men, with his wits sharpened by his own experiences, he +never allowed himself to be fooled by servile cringing and flattery. +He listened to people, but how often have I heard him say: "He is no +good; he is a toady." Such people never found favour with him, as he +always mistrusted them at the outset. He was protected more than +others in such high spheres from the poison of servility that attacks +all monarchs. + +His two best friends, and the men to whom--after his own nearest +relations--he was most attached, were his brother-in-law Albrecht von +Wuertemberg and the Prince Karl of Schwarzenberg. + +The former, a man of charming personality, great intelligence, and +equally efficient in political as in military matters, lived on a +footing of true brotherly unity with Franz Ferdinand, and also, +naturally, on terms of perfect equality. + +Karl of Schwarzenberg was the most sincere, honourable and +straightforward character I have ever encountered; a man who concealed +the truth from no one. Rich, independent, and devoid of personal +ambition, it was quite immaterial to him whether the Archduke was +pleased with what he asserted or no. He was his _friend_, and +considered it his duty to be honest and open--and if necessary, +disagreeable. The Archduke understood, appreciated, and valued this +attitude. I do not think there are many monarchs or heirs to the +throne who would have suffered, as the Archduke did, Schwarzenberg's +sayings and doings. + +Franz Ferdinand was on very bad terms with Aehrenthal, who easily +became abrupt and repellent. Still, there was another reason why two +such hard millstones could not grind together. I do not believe that +the many reproaches launched against Aehrenthal by the Archduke were +consequent on political differences; it was more Aehrenthal's manner +that invariably irritated the Archduke. I had occasion to read some of +Aehrenthal's letters to Franz Ferdinand which, perhaps unintentionally, +had a slight ironical flavour which made the Archduke feel he was not +being taken seriously. He was particularly sensitive in this respect. + +When Aehrenthal fell ill the Archduke made unkind remarks about the +dying man, and there was great and general indignation at the want of +feeling shown by him. He represented the Emperor at the first part of +the funeral service, and afterwards received me at the Belvedere. We +were standing in the courtyard when the procession, with the hearse, +passed on the way to the station. The Archduke disappeared quickly +into a cottage close by, the windows of which looked on to the road, +and there, concealed behind the window curtain, he watched the +procession pass. He said not a word, but his eyes were full of tears. +When he saw that I noticed his emotion he turned away angrily, vexed +at having given proof of his weakness. It was just like him. He would +rather be considered hard and heartless than soft and weak, and +nothing was more repugnant to him than the idea that he had aroused +suspicion of striving to enact a touching scene. I have no doubt that +at that moment he was suffering the torture of self-reproach, and +probably suffered the more through being so reserved and unable to +give free play to his feelings. + +The Archduke could be extremely gay, and possessed an exceptionally +strong sense of humour. In his happiest years he could laugh like any +youth, and carried his audience with him by his unaffected merriment. + +Some years ago a German prince, who was unable to distinguish between +the numerous archdukes, came to Vienna. A dinner was given in his +honour at the Hofburg, where he was seated next to Franz Ferdinand. +Part of the programme was that he was to have gone the next morning +with the Archduke to shoot in the neighbourhood. The German prince, +who mistook the Archduke Franz Ferdinand for someone else, said to him +during dinner: "I am to go out shooting to-morrow, and I hear it is to +be with that tiresome Franz Ferdinand; I hope the plan will be +changed." As far as I know, the expedition did not take place; but I +never heard whether the prince discovered his mistake. The Archduke, +however, laughed heartily for days at the episode. + +The Archduke invariably spoke of his nephew, the present Emperor +Charles, with great affection. The relations between the two were, +however, always marked by the absolute subordination of the nephew to +the uncle. In all political discussions, too, the Archduke Charles was +always the listener, absorbing the precepts expounded by Franz +Ferdinand. + +Charles's marriage met with the full approval of his uncle. The +Duchess of Hohenberg, too, entertained the warmest affection for the +young couple. + +The Archduke was a firm partisan of the Great-Austria programme. His +idea was to convert the Monarchy into numerous more or less +independent National States, having in Vienna a common central +organisation for all important and absolutely necessary affairs--in +other words to substitute Federalisation for Dualism. Now that, after +terrible military and revolutionary struggles, the development of the +former Monarchy has been accomplished in a national spirit, there +cannot be many to contend that the plan is Utopian. At that time, +however, it had many opponents who strongly advised against dissecting +the State in order to erect in its place something new and "presumably +better," and the Emperor Francis Joseph was far too conservative and +far too old to agree to his nephew's plans. This direct refusal of the +idea cherished by the Archduke offended him greatly, and he complained +often in bitter terms that the Emperor turned a deaf ear to him as +though he were the "lowest serving man at Schoenbrunn." + +The Archduke lacked the knowledge of how to deal with people. He +neither could nor would control himself, and, charming though he could +be when his natural heartiness was allowed free scope, just as little +could he conceal his anger and ill-humour. Thus it came about that the +relations between him and the aged Emperor grew more and more +strained. There were doubtless faults on both sides. The standpoint of +the old Emperor, that as long as he lived no one else should +interfere, was in direct opposition to that of the Archduke, who held +that he would one day have to suffer for the present faults in the +administration, and anyone acquainted with life at court will know +that such differences between the highest individuals are quickly +raked together and exaggerated. At every court there are men who seek +to gain their master's favour by pouring oil on the flames, and who, +by gossip and stories of all kinds, add to the antipathy that +prevails. Thus it was in this case, and, instead of being drawn closer +together, the two became more and more estranged. + +The Archduke had but few friends, and under the old monarch +practically none at all. That was one of the reasons for the advances +he made to the Emperor William. In reality, they were men of such a +different type that there could be no question of friendship in the +true sense of the word, or any real understanding between him and the +Emperor William, and the question was never mooted practically. The +only point common to both their characters was a strongly defined +autocratic trait. The Archduke had no sympathy with the speeches of +the Emperor William, nor yet with his obvious desire for popularity, +which the Archduke could not understand. The Emperor William, on his +part, undoubtedly grew more attached to the Archduke during his latter +years than he had been originally. Franz Ferdinand was not on such +good terms with the Crown Prince of Germany. They spent some weeks +together at St. Moritz in Switzerland, without learning to know each +other any better; but this can readily be explained by the difference +in age and also by the much more serious views of life held by the +Archduke. + +The isolation and retirement in which the Archduke lived, and the +regrettably restricted intercourse he had with other circles, gave +rise to the circulation of some true, besides numerous false, rumours. +One of these rumours, which is still obstinately kept up, was to the +effect that the Archduke was a fanatic for war and looked upon war as +a necessary aid to the realisation of his plans for the future. +Nothing could be more untrue, and, although the Archduke never openly +admitted it to me, I am convinced that he had an instinctive feeling +that the Monarchy would never be able to bear the terrible test of +strength of a war, and the fact is that, instead of working to +encourage war, his activities lay all in the opposite direction. I +recollect an extremely symptomatic episode: I do not remember the +exact date, but it was some time before the death of the Archduke. One +of the well-known Balkan turmoils threw the Monarchy into a state of +agitation, and the question whether to mobilise or not became the +order of the day. I chanced to be in Vienna, where I had an interview +with Berchtold who spoke of the situation with much concern and +complained that the Archduke was acting in a warlike spirit. I offered +to draw the Archduke's attention to the danger of the proceeding, and +put myself in telegraphic communication with him. I arranged to join +his train that same day when he passed through Wessely on his way to +Konopischt. I only had the short time between the two stations for my +conversation. I therefore at once took the bull by the horns and told +him of the rumours current about him in Vienna and of the danger of +promoting a conflict with Russia by too strong action in the Balkans. +I did not meet with the slightest opposition from the Archduke, and in +his usual expeditious way he wrote, while still in the train, a +telegram to Berchtold in which he expressed his perfect agreement in +maintaining a friendly attitude and repudiated all the reports of his +having been opposed to it. It is a fact that certain of the military +party, who were anxious for war, made use of the Archduke, or rather +misused him, in order to carry on a military propaganda in his name +and thus gave rise to so wrongful an estimate of him. Several of these +men died a hero's death in the war; others have disappeared and are +forgotten. Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, was never among those +who misused the Archduke. He could never have done such a thing. He +carried out himself what he considered necessary and did it openly and +in face of everybody. + +In connection with these reports about the Archduke there is one +remarkable detail that is worthy of note. He told me himself how a +fortune-teller once predicted that "he would one day let loose a world +war." Although to a certain extent this prophecy flattered him, +containing as it did the unspoken recognition that the world would +have to reckon on him as a powerful factor, still he emphatically +pointed out how mad such a prophecy was. It was fulfilled, however, +later, though very differently from what was meant originally, and +never was prince more innocent of causing blood to flow than the +unhappy victim of Sarajevo. + +The Archduke suffered most terribly under the conditions resulting +from his unequal marriage. The sincere and true love he felt for his +wife kept alive in him the wish to raise her to his rank and +privileges, and the constant obstacles that he encountered at all +court ceremonies embittered and angered him inexpressibly. The +Archduke was firmly resolved that when he came to the throne he would +give to his wife, not the title of Empress, but a position which, +though without the title, would bestow upon her the highest rank. His +argument was that wherever he was she would be the mistress of the +house, and as such was entitled to the highest position, "therefore +she will take precedence of all the archduchesses." Never did the +Archduke show the slightest wish to alter the succession and put his +son in place of the Archduke Charles. On the contrary, he was resolved +that his first official act on coming to the throne would be to +publish a solemn declaration containing his intention, in order to +counteract the ever-recurring false and biassed statements. As regards +his children, for whom he did everything that a loving father's heart +could devise, his greatest wish was to see them become wealthy, +independent private individuals, and able to enjoy life without any +material cares. His plan was to secure the title of Duke of Hohenberg +for his eldest son. It was, therefore, in harmony with this intention +that the Emperor Charles conferred the title on the youth. + +One fine quality in the Archduke was his fearlessness. He was quite +clear that the danger of an attempt to take his life would always be +present, and he often spoke quite simply and openly of such a +possibility. A year before the outbreak of war he informed me that the +Freemasons had resolved to kill him. He even gave me the name of the +town where the resolution was passed--it has escaped my memory +now--and mentioned the names of several Austrian and Hungarian +politicians who must have been in the secret. He also told me that +when he went to the coronation in Spain he was to have made the +journey with a Russian Grand Duke, but shortly before the train +started the news came that the Grand Duke had been murdered on the +way. He did not deny that it was with mixed feelings that he stepped +into his compartment. When at St. Moritz news was sent him that two +Turkish anarchists had arrived in Switzerland intending to murder him, +that every effort was being made to capture them, but that so far no +trace of them had been discovered, and he was advised to be on his +guard. The Archduke showed me the telegram at the time. He laid it +aside without the slightest sign of fear, saying that such events, +when announced beforehand, seldom were carried out. The Duchess +suffered all the more in her fears for his life, and I think that in +imagination the poor lady often went through the catastrophe of which +she and her husband were the victims. Another praiseworthy feature in +the Archduke was that, out of consideration for his wife's anxiety, he +tolerated the constant presence of a detective, which not only bored +him terribly but in his opinion was absurd. He was afraid that if the +fact became known it would be imputed to timidity on his part, and he +conceded the point solely with the view of calming his wife's fears. + +But he anxiously concealed all his good qualities and took an +obstinate pleasure in being hard and disagreeable. I will not +endeavour here to excuse certain traits in his character. His strongly +pronounced egotism cannot be denied any more than the hardness of +character, which made him insensible to the sufferings of all who were +not closely connected with him. He also made himself hated by his +severe financial proceedings and his inexorable judgment on any +subordinate whom he suspected of the slightest dishonesty. In this +connection there are hundreds of anecdotes, some true, some false. +These petty traits in his character injured him in the eyes of the +great public, while the really great and manly qualities he possessed +were unknown to them, and were not weighed in the balance in his +favour. For those who knew him well his great and good qualities +outweighed the bad ones a hundredfold. + +The Emperor was always very perturbed concerning the Archduke's plans +for the future. There was a stern trait also in the old monarch's +character, and in the interests of the Monarchy he feared the +impetuosity and obstinacy of his nephew. Nevertheless, he often took a +very magnanimous view of the matter. For instance, Count Stuergkh, the +murdered Prime Minister, gave me details respecting my nomination to +the Herrenhaus which are very characteristic of the old monarch. It +was Franz Ferdinand's wish that I should be in the Herrenhaus, as he +was anxious for me to be one of a delegation and also to profit by my +extensive training in the province of foreign policy. I must mention +here that it had been impressed on the Emperor on all sides that the +Archduke's friends and trusted men were working against him; a version +of affairs which to a certain degree he obviously believed, owing to +his numerous disputes with Franz Ferdinand. On Stuergkh mentioning my +name as a candidate for the Herrenhaus, the Emperor hesitated a moment +and then said: "Ah, yes. That is the man who is to be Minister for +Foreign Affairs when I am dead. Let him go to the Herrenhaus that he +may learn a little more." + +Political discussions with the Emperor Francis Joseph were often very +difficult, as he kept strictly to the Government department in +question and only discussed what referred thereto. While I was +ambassador the Emperor would discourse to me on Roumania and the +Balkans, but on nothing else. Meanwhile, the different questions were +often so closely interwoven that it was impossible to separate them. I +remember at one audience where I submitted to the Emperor the +Roumanian plans for a closer connection with the Monarchy--plans which +I shall allude to in a later chapter--and in doing so I was naturally +bound to state what the Roumanians proposed respecting the closer +connection with Hungary, and also what changes would be necessitated +thereby in the Hungarian administration. The Emperor at once broke off +the conversation, saying that it was a matter of Hungarian internal +policy. + +The old Emperor was almost invariably kind and friendly, and to the +very last his knowledge of the smallest details was astonishing. He +never spoke of the different Roumanian Ministers as the Minister of +Agriculture, of Trade, or whatever it might be, but mentioned them all +by name and never made a mistake. + +I saw him for the last time in October, 1916, after my definite return +from Roumania, and found him then quite clear and sound mentally, +though failing in bodily health. + +The Emperor Francis Joseph was a "Grand Seigneur" in the true sense of +the word. He was an Emperor and remained always unapproachable. +Everyone left his presence feeling he had stood before an Emperor. His +dignity in representing the monarchical idea was unsurpassed by any +sovereign in Europe. + +He was borne to his grave at a time of great military successes for +the Central Powers. He lies now in the Imperial vault, and a century +seems to have elapsed since his death; the world is changed. + +Day by day streams of people pass by the little church, but no one +probably gives a thought to him who lies in peace and forgotten, and +yet he, through many long years, embodied Austria, and his person was +a common centre for the State that so rapidly was falling asunder. + +He is now at rest, free from all care and sorrow; he saw his wife, his +son, his friends all die, but Fate spared him the sight of his +expiring Empire. + + * * * * * + +[Illustration: THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND _Photo: Pietzner, Vienna._] + +Franz Ferdinand's character held many sharply defined corners and +edges; judging him objectively, no one can deny his great faults. +Though the circumstances of his death were so tragic, it may well be +that for him it was a blessing. It is hardly conceivable that, once on +the throne, the Archduke would have been able to carry out his plans. +The structure of the Monarchy which he was so anxious to strengthen +and support was already so rotten that it could not have stood any +great innovations, and if not the war, then probably the Revolution, +would have shattered it. On the other hand, there seems to be no doubt +that the Archduke, with all the vehemence and impulsiveness of his +character, would have made the attempt to rebuild the entire structure +of the Monarchy. It is futile to comment on the chances of his +success, but according to human foresight the experiment would not +have succeeded, and he would have succumbed beneath the ruins of the +falling Monarchy. + +It is also futile to conjecture how the Archduke would have acted had +he lived to see the war and the upheaval. I think that in two respects +his attitude would have differed from that taken. In the first place, +he never would have agreed to our army being under German control. It +would not have been consistent with his strongly developed autocratic +tendencies, and he was too clever politically not to see that we +should thereby lose all political freedom of action. In the second +place, he would not, like the Emperor Charles, have yielded to +revolution. He would have gathered his faithful followers round him +and would have fallen fighting, sword in hand. He would have fallen as +did his greatest and most dangerous enemy, Stephen Tisza. + +But he died the death of a hero on the field of honour, valiantly and +in harness. The golden rays of the martyr's crown surrounded his dying +head. Many there were who breathed more freely on hearing the news of +his death. At the court in Vienna and in society at Budapest there was +more joy than sorrow, the former having rightly foreseen that he would +have dealt hardly with them. None of them could guess that the fall of +the strong man would carry them all with it and engulf them in a world +catastrophe. + +Franz Ferdinand will remain portrayed in history as a man who either +loved or hated. But his tragic end at the side of his wife, who would +not allow death to separate them, throws a mild and conciliatory light +on the whole life of this extraordinary man, whose warm heart to the +very last was devoted to his Fatherland and duty. + + +2 + +There was a widely-spread but entirely wrongful idea in the Monarchy +that the Archduke had drawn up a programme of his future activities. +This was not the case. He had very definite and pronounced ideas for +the reorganisation of the Monarchy, but the ideas never developed into +a concrete plan--they were more like the outline of a programme that +never was completed in detail. The Archduke was in touch with experts +from the different departments; he expounded the fundamental views of +his future programme to prominent military and political officials, +receiving from them hints on how to materialise these views; but a +really finished and thought-out programme was never actually produced. +The ground lines of his programme were, as already mentioned, the +abolition of the dualism and the reorganisation of the Monarchy to +form a federative state. He was not clear himself into how many states +the Habsburg Monarchy should be converted, but the principle was the +rebuilding of the Monarchy on a national basis. Having always in view +that prosperity depended on the weakening of the Magyar influence, the +Archduke was in favour of a strong preference for the different +nationalities living in Hungary, the Roumanians in particular. Not +until my return to Bucharest and following on my reports did the +Archduke conceive the plan of ceding Transylvania to Roumania and thus +adding Greater Roumania to the Habsburg Empire. + +His idea was to make of Austria separate German, Czech, Southern Slav +and Polish states, which in some respects would be autonomous; in +others, would be dependent on Vienna as the centre. But, so far as I +know, his programme was never quite clearly defined, and was subject +to various modifications. + +The Archduke had a great dislike for the Germans, especially the +northern Bohemians, who were partisans of the Pan-Germanic tendencies, +and he never forgave the attitude of the Deputy Schoenerer. He had a +decided preference for all Germans in the Alpine countries, and +generally his views were very similar to those of the Christian +Socialists. His political ideal was Lueger. When Lueger was lying ill +the Archduke said to me: "If God will only spare this man, no better +Prime Minister could be found." Franz Ferdinand had a keen desire for +a more centralised army. He was a violent opponent of the endeavours +of the Magyars whose aim was an independent Hungarian army, and the +question of rank, word of command, and other incidental matters could +never be settled as long as he lived, because he violently resisted +all Hungarian advances. + +The Archduke had a special fondness for the navy. His frequent visits +to Brioni brought him into close touch with our navy. He was always +anxious to transform the Austrian Navy into one worthy of a Great +Power. In regard to foreign policy, the Archduke was always in favour +of a Triple Alliance of the three Emperors. The chief motive of this +idea must have been that, in the three then apparently so powerful +monarchs at Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, he saw the strongest +support against revolution, and wished thereby to build up a strong +barrier against disorganisation. He saw great danger to the friendly +relations between Russia and ourselves in the rivalry between Vienna +and Petersburg in the Balkans, and contrary to the reports that have +been spread about him, he was rather a partisan than an opposer of +Serbia. He was in favour of the Serbians because he felt assured that +the petty agrarian policy of the Magyars was responsible for the +constant annoyance of the Serbians. He favoured meeting Serbia +half-way, because he considered that the Serbian question was a source +of discord between Vienna and Petersburg. Another reason was that he +was no friend of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who constantly pursued an +anti-Serbian policy. I believe that if those who were responsible for +the organisation of the assassination of the Archduke had known what +little justification there was for supposing him to be the man they +thought him, they would have desisted. + +Franz Ferdinand had a very pronounced feeling that in spite of all +alliances the Monarchy must remain independent. He was opposed to any +closer combine with Germany, not wishing to be bound to Germany more +than to Russia, and the plan that was formulated later as "Central +Europe" was always far removed from his wishes and endeavours. + +His plans for the future were not worked out, not complete, but they +were sound. This, however, is not sufficient to enable one to say that +they could have been successfully carried out. In certain +circumstances more harm than good will result from energy devoid of +the necessary calm prudence, wisdom and, above all, patience. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +WILLIAM II + + +1 + +The Emperor William has been for so long the centre of historic +events, so much has been written about him, that apparently he should +be known to all the world; and yet I believe he has often been +misrepresented. + +It is well known that the scarlet thread running through the whole +character of William II. was his firm conviction that he was the +"elect of God," and that the dynasty was inextricably bound to the +German people. Bismarck also believed in the dynastic fidelity of the +Germans. It seems to me that there is just as little dynastic as +republican spirit in nations--just as little in the Germans as in +others. There is merely a feeling of content or discontent which +manifests itself either for or against the dynasty and the form of +government. Bismarck himself was a proof of the justice of this +argument. As he himself always maintained, he was thoroughly +dynastic--but only during the lifetime of the Emperor William I. He +had no love for William II., who had treated him badly, and made no +secret of his feelings. He hung the picture of the "young man" in the +scullery and wrote a book about him which, owing to its contents, +could not be published. + +The Monarchists who derive benefit from their attachment to the +reigning monarch deceive themselves as to their true feelings. They +are Monarchists because they consider that form of government the most +satisfactory one. The Republicans, who apparently glorify the majesty +of the people, really mean themselves. But in the long run a people +will always recognise that form of government which soonest can give +it order, work, prosperity and contentment. In ninety-nine per cent. +of the population the patriotism and enthusiasm for one or other form +of government is nothing but a matter of material considerations. They +prefer a good king to a bad republic, and vice versa; the form of +government is the means to the end, but the end is the contentment of +the people governed. Nor has the liberty of those governed anything to +do with the form of government. Monarchical England is just as free as +Republican America, and the Bolshevists have demonstrated _ad oculus_ +to the whole world that the proletariat exercises the greatest +tyranny. + +The war that was lost swept away the monarchs, but the Republics will +only be maintained if they can convince the people that they are more +successful in satisfying the masses than the monarchs were, a proof +which--it seems to me--the German-Austrian Republic, at any rate, has +hitherto failed to give. + +The conviction that these questionable statements not only are false +but also objectionable and criminal errors; that the Divine Will has +placed the monarch at his post and keeps him there--this conviction +was systematically imprinted in the German people, and formed an +integral part of the views attributed to the Emperor. All his +pretensions are based on this; they all breathe the same idea. Every +individual, however, is the product of his birth, his education and +his experience. In judging William II. it must be borne in mind that +from his youth upwards he was deceived and shown a world which never +existed. All monarchs should be taught that their people do not love +them; that they are quite indifferent to them; that it is not love +that makes them follow them and look up to them, but merely curiosity; +that they do not acclaim them from enthusiasm, but for their own +amusement, and would as soon hiss at them as cheer them. The loyalty +of subjects can never be depended on; it is not their intention to be +loyal, but only contented; they only tolerate the monarchs as long as +they themselves are contented, or as long as they have not enough +strength to abolish them. That is the truth, a knowledge of which +would prevent monarchs from arriving at unavoidably false +conclusions. + +The Emperor William is an example of this. I do not think there is +another ruler who had better intentions than he had. He lived only for +his calling--as he viewed it. All his thoughts and longings were +centred round Germany. His relations, pleasures and amusements were +all subservient to the one idea of making and keeping the German +people great and happy, and if good will were sufficient to achieve +great things William II. would have achieved them. From the very +beginning he was misunderstood. He made statements and gestures +intended not only to win his listeners but the whole world, which had +just the contrary effect. But he never was conscious of the practical +effect of his actions, because he was systematically misled, not only +by those in his immediate presence, but by the entire German people. +How many millions, who to-day fling curses at him, could not bow low +enough when he appeared on the horizon in all his splendour; how many +felt overjoyed if the Imperial glance fell on them!--and none of them +realise that they themselves are to blame for having shown the Emperor +a world which never existed, and driven him into a course which he +otherwise would never have taken. It certainly cannot be denied that +the whole nature of the Emperor was peculiarly susceptible to this +characteristically German attitude, and that monarchs less talented, +less keen, less ready, and above all, less impregnated with the idea +of self-sufficiency, are not so exposed to the poison of popularity as +he was. + +I once had the opportunity of studying the Emperor William in a very +important phase of his life. I met him at the house of a friend in the +celebrated days of November, 1908, when great demonstrations against +the Emperor occurred in the Reichstag, and when the then Imperial +Chancellor, Prince Buelow, exposed him. Although he did not allude to +the matter to us with whom he was not familiar, the powerful +impression made upon him by these events in Berlin was very obvious, +and I felt that in William II. I saw a man who, for the first time in +his life, with horror-stricken eyes, looked upon the world as it +really was. He saw brutal reality in close proximity. For the first +time in his life, perhaps, he felt his position on his throne to be a +little insecure. He forgot his lesson too quickly. Had the +overwhelming impression which prevailed for several days been a +lasting one it might perhaps have induced him to descend from the +clouds to which his courtiers and his people had raised him, and once +more feel firm ground beneath his feet. On the other hand, had the +German people often treated the German Emperor as they did then it +might have cured him. + +A remarkable incident which occurred on this occasion is +characteristic of the way in which the Emperor was treated by many of +the gentlemen of his suite. I had opportunity, while waiting at a +German station restaurant for the arrival of the next train, to watch +and study the excitement of the population at the events in Berlin, +which bore signs of a revolutionary character. The densely crowded +restaurant re-echoed with discussion and criticisms of the Emperor, +when suddenly one of the men stood up on a table and delivered a fiery +speech against the head of the Government. With the impression of this +scene fresh in my mind, I described it to the members of the Emperor's +suite, who were just as disagreeably affected by the episode, and it +was suggested that nothing should be said about it to the Emperor. One +of them, however, protested most energetically and declared that, on +the contrary, every detail should be told to the Emperor, and, so far +as I know, he himself probably undertook this disagreeable task. This +case is characteristic of the desire to keep all unpleasantness from +the Emperor and to spare him even the most well-founded criticisms; to +praise and exalt him, but never to show that he was being blamed. This +systematic putting forward of the Emperor's divine attributes, which +in reality was neither due to love of his personality nor any other +dynastic cause, but to the purely egotistical wish not to get into +disfavour themselves or expose themselves to unpleasantness; this +unwholesome state must in the long run act on mind and body as an +enervating poison. I readily believe that the Emperor William, +unaccustomed to so great an extent to all criticism, did not make it +easy for those about him to be open and frank. It was, nevertheless, +true that the enervating atmosphere by which he was surrounded was the +cause of all the evil at his court. In his youth the Emperor William +did not always adhere strictly to the laws of the Constitution; he +subsequently cured himself of this failing and never acted +independently of his counsellors. At the time when I had official +dealings with him he might have served as a model of constitutional +conduct. + +In the case of so young and inexperienced a man as the Emperor Charles +it was doubly necessary to uphold the principle of ministerial +responsibility to the fullest extent. As according to our Constitution +the Emperor is not responsible to the law, it was of the greatest +importance to carry out the principle that he could undertake no +administrative act without the cognisance and sanction of the +responsible Ministers, and the Emperor Francis Joseph adhered to this +principle as though it were gospel. + +The Emperor Charles, though full of good intentions, was devoid of all +political training and experience, and ought to have been brought up +to understand the principles of the Constitution. This, however, had +never been taken into consideration. + +After my resignation in April, 1918, a deputation from the +Constitutional and Central Party in the Herrenhaus waited on the Prime +Minister, Dr. von Seidler, and pointed out the importance of a +severely constitutional regime, whereupon Dr. von Seidler declared +that he took upon himself the full responsibility of the "letter +incident." + +This was quite preposterous. Dr. von Seidler could not be responsible +for events that had occurred a year before--at a time when he was not +Minister--apart from its being an established fact that during his +tenure of office he was not aware of what had happened, and not until +after my resignation did he learn the Imperial views on the situation. +He might just as well have accepted responsibility for the Seven Years +War or for the battle of Koeniggraetz. + +In 1917 and '18, when I had certain official dealings with the Emperor +William, his horror of an unpleasant discussion was so great that it +was a matter of extreme difficulty to impart the necessary information +to him. I recollect how once, at the cost of the consideration due to +an Emperor, I was compelled to extract a direct statement from him. I +was with the Emperor Charles on the Eastern front, but left him at +Lemberg and, joining the Emperor William in his train, travelled with +him for a couple of hours. I had certain things to submit to him, none +of which was of an unpleasant nature. I do not know why it was, but it +was obvious that the Emperor was expecting to hear some disagreeable +statements, and offered a passive resistance to the request for a +private interview. He invited me to breakfast with him in his +dining-car, where he sat in the company of ten other gentlemen, and +there was no possibility of beginning the desired conversation. +Breakfast had been over some time, but the Emperor made no sign of +moving. I was several times obliged to request him to grant me a +private interview before he rose from the table, and even then he took +with him an official from the Foreign Ministry to be present at our +conversation as though to have some protection against anticipated +troubles. The Emperor William was never rude to strangers, though he +often was so to his own people. + +With regard to the Emperor Charles, the situation was very different. +He was never anything but friendly; in fact I never saw him angry or +vexed. There was no need for any special courage in making an +unpleasant statement to him, as there was no danger of receiving a +violent answer or any other disagreeable consequences. And yet the +desire to believe only what was agreeable and to put from him anything +disagreeable was very strong in the Emperor Charles, and neither +criticism nor blame made any lasting impression on him. But in his +case, too, the atmosphere that surrounded him rendered it impossible +to convince him of the brutal realities prevailing. On one occasion, +when I returned from the front, I had a long conversation with him. I +reproached him for some act of administration and asserted that not +only on me but on the whole Monarchy his action had made a most +unfavourable impression. I told him in the course of the conversation +that he must remember how, when he came to the throne, the whole +Monarchy had looked to him with great hopes, but that now he had +already lost 80 per cent. of his popularity. The interview ended +without incident; the Emperor preserved, as usual, a friendly +demeanour, though my remarks must have affected him unpleasantly. Some +hours later we passed through a town where not only the station but +all buildings were black with people, standing even on the roofs, +waving handkerchiefs and loudly welcoming the Imperial train as it +passed through. The same scenes were repeated again and again at other +stations that we passed. The Emperor turned to me with a smile and a +look that showed me he was firmly convinced everything I had told him +as to his dwindling popularity was false, the living picture before +our eyes proving the contrary. + +When I was at Brest-Litovsk disturbances began in Vienna owing to the +lack of food. In view of the whole situation, we did not know what +dimensions they would assume, and it was considered that they were of +a threatening nature. When discussing the situation with the Emperor, +he remarked with a smile: "The only person who has nothing to fear is +myself. If it happens again I will go out among the people and you +will see the welcome they will give me." Some few months later this +same Emperor disappeared silently and utterly out of the picture, and +among all the thousands who had acclaimed him, and whose enthusiasm he +had thought genuine, not one would have lifted a little finger on his +behalf. I have witnessed scenes of enthusiasm which would have +deceived the boldest and most sceptical judge of the populace. I saw +the Emperor and the Empress surrounded by weeping women and men +wellnigh smothered in a rain of flowers; I saw the people on their +knees with uplifted hands, as though worshipping a Divinity; and I +cannot wonder that the objects of such enthusiastic homage should have +taken dross for pure gold in the firm belief that they _personally_ +were beloved of the people, even as children love their own parents. +It is easy to understand that after such scenes the Emperor and +Empress looked upon all the criticism of themselves and the discontent +among the people as idle talk, and held firmly to the belief that +grave disturbances might occur elsewhere but not in their own country. +Any simple citizen who has held for a time a higher position +experiences something of the kind, though in a lesser degree. I could +mention names of many men who could not bow low enough as long as I +was in power, but after my resignation would cross the street to avoid +a bow, fearing that Imperial disfavour might react on them. But years +before his rise the simple citizen has an opportunity of learning to +know the world, and, if he be a man of normal temperament, will feel +the same contempt for the servility shown during his time in office as +for the behaviour he meets with afterwards. Monarchs are without +training in the school of life, and therefore usually make a false +estimate of the psychology of humanity. But in this tragi-comedy it is +they who are led astray. + +It is less easy, however, to understand that responsible advisers, who +are bound to distinguish between reality and comedy, should also allow +themselves to be deceived and draw false political conclusions from +such events. In 1918 the Emperor, accompanied by the Prime Minister, +Dr. von Seidler, went to the South Slav provinces to investigate +matters there. He found, of course, the same welcome there as +everywhere, curiosity brought the people out to see him; pressure from +the authorities on the one hand, and hope of Imperial favours on the +other, brought about ovations similar to those in the undoubtedly +dynastic provinces. And not only the Emperor, but von Seidler returned +in triumph, firmly convinced that everything stated in Parliament or +written in the papers respecting the separatist tendencies of the +South Slavs was pure invention and nonsense, and that they would never +agree to a separation from the Habsburg Empire. + +The objects of these demonstrations of enthusiasm and dynastic +loyalty were deceived by them, but I repeat that those who were to +blame were not the monarchs, but those who were the instigators and +organisers of such scenes and who omitted to enlighten the monarchs on +the matter. But any such explanation could only be effectual if all +those in the immediate neighbourhood of the ruler concurred in a +similar reckless disregard of truth. For if one out of ten people +declares such scenes to be not genuine and the others contradict him +and assert that the demonstrations of the "love of the people" are +overwhelming, the monarch will always be more inclined to listen to +the many pleasant rather than to the few unpleasant counsels. +Willingly or unwillingly, all monarchs try, very humanly, to resist +awakening out of this hypnotic complacency. Naturally, there were men +in the entourage of the German Emperor whose pride kept them from +making too large an offering to the throne, but as a rule their +suffering in the Byzantine atmosphere of Germany was greater than +their enjoyment. I always considered that the greatest sycophants were +not those living at court, but generals, admirals, professors, +officials, representatives of the people and men of learning--people +whom the Emperor met infrequently. + +During the second half of the war, however, the leading men around the +Kaiser were not Byzantine--Ludendorff certainly was not. His whole +nature was devoid of Byzantine characteristics. Energetic, brave, sure +of himself and his aims, he brooked no opposition and was not +fastidious in his choice of language. To him it was a matter of +indifference whether he was confronted by his Emperor or anyone +else--he spoke unrestrainedly to all who came in his way. + +The numerous burgomasters, town councillors, professors of the +universities, deputies--in short, men of the people and of +science--had for years prostrated themselves before the Emperor +William; a word from him intoxicated them--but how many of them are +there now amongst those who condemn the former regime with its abuses +and, above all, the Emperor himself! + +His political advisers experienced great difficulty in their business +dealings with the Emperor William during the war, as he was generally +at Headquarters and seldom in Berlin. The Emperor Charles's absence +from Vienna was also at times most inconvenient. + +In the summer of 1917, for instance, he was at Reichenau, which +necessitated a two hours' motor drive; I had to go there twice or +three times a week, thus losing five or six hours which had to be made +good by prolonged night work. On no account would he come to Vienna, +in spite of the efforts made by his advisers to persuade him to do so. +From certain remarks the Emperor let fall I gathered that the reason +of this persistent refusal was anxiety concerning the health of the +children. He himself was so entirely free from pretensions that it +cannot have been a question of his own comfort that prevented his +coming. + +The Emperor's desire to restore the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to a +post of command was for me a source of much unpleasantness. The +Archduke is said to have been to blame for the Luck failure. I cannot +judge whether wrongly--as the Emperor maintained--or rightly; but the +fact remains that the public no longer had confidence in him. Quite +accidentally I learnt that his reinstatement was imminent. As a matter +of fact, this purely military proceeding in no way concerned me, but I +had to reckon with the feeling of the populace, who were in no mood +for further burdens, and also with the fact that, since Conrad had +gone, none of those in the Emperor's entourage showed the slightest +disposition to acquaint him with the truth. The only general who, to +my personal knowledge, was in the habit of speaking frankly to the +Emperor, was Alvis Schonburg, and he was at this time somewhere on the +Italian front. I therefore told the Emperor that the reinstatement was +an impossibility, giving as my reason the fact that the Archduke had +forfeited the confidence of the country, and that no mother could be +expected to give up her son to serve under a general whom everyone +held to be guilty of the Luck catastrophe. The Emperor insisted that +this view was unjust, and that the Archduke was not culpable. I +replied that, even so, the Archduke would have to submit. Everyone had +lost confidence in him, and the most strenuous exertions of the people +could neither be expected nor obtained if the command were handed to +generals who were unanimously regarded as unworthy of the confidence +placed in them. + +My efforts were vain. + +I then adopted another course. I sent an official from the Department +of Foreign Affairs to the Archduke with the request that he would +resign voluntarily. + +It must be admitted that Joseph Ferdinand took both a loyal and a +dignified attitude, as he himself notified the Emperor that he would +relinquish his command at the front. A short correspondence followed +between the Archduke and myself, which on his side was couched in an +indignant and not over-polite tone; this, however, I did not take +amiss, as my interference had been successful in preventing his +resuming the command. + +His subsequent appointment as Chief of the Air Force was made without +my knowledge; but this was of no importance when compared to the +previous plans. + + * * * * * + +There is no doubt that the Byzantine atmosphere of Berlin took a more +objectionable form than ever was the case in Vienna. The very idea of +high dignitaries kissing the Emperor's hand, as they did in Berlin, +would have been impossible in Vienna. I never heard of anyone, even +among the keenest sycophants, who demeaned themselves by such an act, +which in Berlin, as I know from personal observation, was an everyday +occurrence. For instance, after a trip on the _Meteor_, during the +"Kiel Week," the Emperor presented two German officials with +scarf-pins as a souvenir. He handed the pins to them himself, and +great was my surprise to see them kiss his hand as they thanked him. + +Many foreigners were in the habit of coming for the Kiel Week: +Americans, French, and English. The Emperor paid them much attention, +and they nearly always succumbed to the charm of his personality. +Apparently William II. had a preference for America; on the subject +of his feelings regarding England it is difficult to express an +opinion. My impression always was that the Emperor resented the scant +sympathy shown him in England; he strove to make himself beloved, and +the failure of his efforts caused him a certain annoyance. He was +quite aware that the extent of his popularity in England would +proportionately influence Anglo-German relations, and his desire to +find favour in England did not proceed from personal vanity, but from +political interests. + +King Edward was known to be one of the best judges of men in all +Europe, and his interest in foreign policy was predominant. He would +have been an ideal ambassador. There was never a very good +understanding between uncle and nephew. When the nephew was already +Emperor, and his much older uncle still only a prince, the difference +in their positions was characterised by the satirical Kiderlen-Waechter +in the following terms: "The Prince of Wales cannot forgive his nephew, +eighteen years younger than himself, for making a more brilliant career +than has fallen to his lot." + +Personal sympathy and personal differences in leading circles are +capable of influencing the world's history. Politics are, and always +will be, made by men, and individual personal relations will always +play a certain part in their development. Who can to-day assert that +the course of the world might not have been different had the monarchs +of Germany and England been more alike in temperament? The encircling +policy of King Edward was not brought into play until he was persuaded +that an understanding with the Emperor William was impossible. + +The difficulty the Emperor experienced in adapting himself to the +ideas and views of others increased as the years went by, a state of +things largely the fault of his entourage. + +The atmosphere in which he lived would have killed the hardiest plant. +Whatever the Emperor said or did, whether it was right or wrong, was +received with enthusiastic praise and admiration. Dozens of people +were always at hand to laud him to the skies. + +For instance, a book was published during the war entitled, "Der +Kaiser im Felde," by Dr. Bogdan Kriegen. The Emperor presented me with +a copy when at Kreuznach in May, 1917, and wrote a suitable +inscription inside. The book contained an accurate account of all the +Emperor had done during the campaign--but it was entirely superficial +matter; where he had driven to, where breakfasted, with whom he had +spoken, the jokes he had made, what clothes he wore, the shining light +in his eyes, etc., etc. It also recorded his speeches to the troops; +dull and uninteresting words that he addressed to individual soldiers, +and much more in the same strain. The whole book is impregnated and +permeated with boundless admiration and unqualified praise. The +Emperor gave me the book when I was leaving, and I read it through +when in the train. + +I was asked a few weeks later by a German officer what I thought of +the book. I replied that it was trash and could only harm the Emperor, +and that it should be confiscated. The officer shared my opinion, but +said that the Emperor had been assured on all sides that the book was +a splendid work and helped to fire the spirit of the army; he +therefore had it widely distributed. Once, at a dinner at Count +Hertling's, I called his attention to the book and advised him to +suppress it, as such a production could only be detrimental to the +Emperor. The old gentleman was very angry, and declared: "That was +always the way; people who wished to ingratiate themselves with the +Emperor invariably presented him with such things." A professor from +the University had warmly praised the book to me, but he went on to +say: "The Emperor had, of course, no time to read such stuff and +repudiate the flattery; neither had he himself found time to read it, +but would make a point of doing so now." I did not know much of that +professor, but he certainly was not in frequent touch with the +Emperor, nor was the author of the book. + +In this instance, as in many others, I concluded that many of the +members of the Emperor's suite were far from being in sympathy with +such tendencies. The court was not the principal offender, but was +carried away by the current of sycophancy. + +During my period of office Prince Hohenlohe, the ambassador, had +numerous interviews with the Emperor William, and invariably spoke +most freely and openly to him, and yet always was on the best footing +with him. This was, of course, an easier matter for a foreign +ambassador than for a German of the Empire, but it proves that the +Emperor accepted it when done in proper form. + +In his own country the Emperor was either glorified and exalted to the +skies or else scorned and scoffed at by a minority of the Press in a +prejudicial manner. In the latter case it bore so evidently the stamp +of personal enmity that it was discredited _a priori_. Had there +existed earnest papers and organs that would, in dignified fashion, +have discussed and criticised the Emperor's faults and failings, while +recognising all his great and good qualities, it would have been much +more satisfactory. Had there been more books written about him showing +that the real man is quite different from what he is made to appear to +be; that he is full of the best intentions and inspired with a +passionate love of Germany; that in a true and profound religious +sense he often wrestles with himself and his God, asking himself if he +has chosen the right way; that his love for his people is far more +genuine than that of many of the Germans for him; that he never has +deceived them, but was constantly deceived by them--such literature +would have been more efficacious and, above all, nearer the truth. + +Undoubtedly the German Emperor's gifts and talents were above the +average, and had he been an ordinary mortal would certainly have +become a very competent officer, architect, engineer, or politician. +But for lack of criticism he lost his bearings, and it caused his +undoing. According to all the records the Emperor William I. was of a +very different nature. Yet Bismarck often had a hard task in dealing +with him, though Bismarck's loyalty and subservience to the dynastic +idea made him curb his characteristically ruthless frankness. But +William I. was a self-made man. When he came to the throne and began +to govern his kingdom was tottering. Assisted by the very capable men +he was able to find and to retain, he upheld it, and by means of +Koeniggraetz and Sedan created the great German Empire. William II. came +to the throne when Germany had reached the zenith of her power. He had +not acquired what he possessed by his own work, as his grandfather +had; it came to him without any effort on his part; a fact which had a +great and far from favourable influence on his whole mental +development. + +The Emperor William was an entertaining and interesting _causeur_. One +could listen to him for hours without wearying. Emperors usually enjoy +the privilege of finding a ready audience, but even had the Emperor +William been an ordinary citizen he would always have spoken to a +crowded house. He could discourse on art, science, politics, music, +religion, and astronomy in a most animated manner. What he said was +not always quite correct; indeed, he often lost himself in very +questionable conclusions; but the fault of boring others, the greatest +of social faults, was not his. + +Although the Emperor was always very powerful in speech and gesture, +still, during the war he was much less independent in his actions than +is usually assumed, and, in my opinion, this is one of the principal +reasons that gave rise to a mistaken understanding of all the +Emperor's administrative activities. Far more than the public imagine +he was a driven rather than a driving factor, and if the Entente +to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge combined in +order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust and an error, +as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William never +played the part attributed to him by the Entente. + +The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in +store for him. He has been carried too high and cannot escape a +terrible fall. Fate seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, +if it exists at all, is not so much his as that of his country and his +times. The Byzantine atmosphere in Germany was the ruin of Emperor +William; it enveloped him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a +vast crowd of flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the +hour of trial. The Emperor William was merely a particularly +distinctive representative of his class. All modern monarchs suffer +from the disease; but it was more highly developed in the Emperor +William and, therefore, more obvious than in others. Accustomed from +his youth to the subtle poison of flattery, at the head of one of the +greatest and mightiest states in the world, possessing almost +unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot that awaits men who +feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who begin to believe +in their Divine semblance. + +He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with +him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the +best. And notwithstanding all that is said and written about William +II. in these days, the beautiful words of the text may be applied to +him: "Peace on earth to men of goodwill."[4] + +In his retirement from the world his good conscience will be his most +precious possession. + +Perhaps in the evening of his days William II. will acknowledge that +there is neither happiness nor unhappiness in mortal life, but only a +difference in the strength to endure one's fate. + + +2 + +War was never in William II.'s programme. I am not able to say where, +in his own mind, he had fixed the limits he proposed for Germany and +whether it was justifiable to reproach him with having gone too far in +his ambition for the Fatherland. He certainly never thought of a +_unified_ German world dominion; he was not so simple as to think he +could achieve that without a war, but his plan undoubtedly was +permanently to establish Germany among the first Powers of the world. +I know for certain that the Emperor's ideal plan was to come to a +world agreement with England and, in a certain sense, to divide the +world with her. In this projected division of the world a certain +part was to be played by Russia and Japan, but he paid little heed to +the other states, especially to France, convinced that they were all +nations of declining power. To maintain that William intentionally +prepared and started this war is in direct opposition to his long +years of peaceful government. Helfferich, in his work "Die +Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges," speaks of the Emperor's attitude +during the Balkan troubles, and says: + + A telegram sent by William II. at that time to the Imperial + Chancellor explains the attitude of the German Emperor in this + critical position for German politics, being similar to the + situation in July, 1914. The contents of the telegram are as + follows: "The Alliance with Austria-Hungary compels us to take + action should Austria-Hungary be attacked by Russia. In that case + France would also be involved, and in those circumstances England + would not long remain quiescent. The present prevailing questions + of dispute cannot be compared with that danger. It cannot be the + intention of the Alliance that we, the life interest of our ally + not being endangered, should enter upon a life-and-death conflict + for a caprice of that ally. Should it become evident that the + other side intend to attack, the danger must then be faced." + + This calm and decided standpoint which alone could maintain peace + was also the German policy observed in further developments. It + was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as also + against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in + Vienna. + +Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I cannot say, but I +believe the account is correct. + +It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into +the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their +effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to +terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of _si vis +pacem para bellum_, and by emphasising the military power of Germany +he endeavoured to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from +declaring war on him. + +It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and +mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is +asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the _dolus_ of making war; +that he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up +war. + +Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the +injurious effects of his behaviour and to make him feel the growing +mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two +but dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on +the Emperor. It is quite true that of all the inhabitants of the +earth, the German is the one the least capable of adapting himself to +the mentality of other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were +perhaps but few in the immediate entourage of the Emperor who +recognised the growing anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of those who +so continuously extolled the Emperor were really honestly of opinion +that his behaviour was quite correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible +not to believe that among the many clever German politicians of the +last decade there were some who had a clear grasp of the situation, +and the fact remains that, in order to spare the Emperor and +themselves, they had not the courage to be harsh with him and tell him +the truth to his face. These are not reproaches, but reminiscences +which should not be superfluous at a time when the Emperor is to be +made the scapegoat of the whole world. Certainly, the Emperor, being +such as he is, the experiment would not have passed off without there +being opposition to encounter and overcome. The first among his +subjects to attempt the task of enlightening the Emperor would have +been looked upon with the greatest surprise; hence no one would +undertake it. Had there, however, been men who, regardless of +themselves, would have undertaken to do it, it would certainly have +succeeded, as not only was the Emperor full of good intentions, but he +was also impressionable, and consistent purposefulness on a basis of +fearless honesty would have impressed him. Besides, the Emperor was a +thoroughly kind and good man. It was a genuine pleasure for him to be +able to do good, neither did he hate his enemies. In the summer of +1917 he spoke to me about the fate of the deposed Tsar and of his +desire to help him and subsequently bring him to Germany, a desire due +not to dynastic but to human motives. He stated repeatedly that he had +no desire for revenge, but "only to succour his fallen adversary." + +I firmly believe that the Emperor clearly saw the clouds grow blacker +and blacker on the political horizon, but he was sincerely and +honestly persuaded that it was not through any fault of his that they +had accumulated, that they were caused by envy and jealousy, and that +there was no other way of keeping the threatening war danger at bay +than by an ostentatious attitude of strength and fearlessness. +"Germany's power and might must daily be proclaimed to the world, for +as long as they fear us they will do us no harm"--that was the +doctrine that obtained on the Spree. And the echo came back from the +world, "This continued boasting of German power and the perpetual +attempts at intimidation prove that Germany seeks to tyrannise the +world." + +When war broke out the Emperor was firmly convinced that a war of +defence was being forced on him, which conviction was shared by the +great majority of the German people. I draw these conclusions solely +from my knowledge of the Emperor and his entourage and from other +information obtained indirectly. As I have already mentioned, I had +not had the slightest connection with Berlin for some years previous +to the war, and certainly not for two years after it broke out. + +In the winter of 1917, when I met the Emperor again in my capacity as +Minister for Foreign Affairs, I thought he had aged, but was still +full of his former vivacity. In spite of marked demonstrations of the +certainty of victory, I believe that William II. even then had begun +to doubt the result of the war and that his earnest wish was to bring +it to an honourable end. When in the course of one of our first +conversations I urged him to spare no sacrifice to bring it to an end, +he interrupted me, exclaiming: "What would you have me do? Nobody +longs for peace more intensely than I do. But every day we are told +that the others will not hear a word about peace until Germany has +been crushed." It was a true answer, for all statements made by +England culminated in the one sentence _Germanium esse delendam_. I +endeavoured, nevertheless, to induce the Emperor to consent to the +sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, persuaded that if France had obtained +all that she looked upon in the light of a national idea she would not +be inclined to continue the war. I think that, had the Emperor been +positively certain that it would have ended the war, and had he not +been afraid that so distressing an offer would have been considered +unbearable by Germany, he would personally have agreed to it. But he +was dominated by the fear that a peace involving such a loss, and +after the sacrifices already made, would have driven the German people +to despair. Whether he was justified in this fear or not cannot now be +confirmed. In 1917, and 1918 as well, the belief in a victorious end +was still so strong in Germany that it is at least doubtful whether +the German people would have consented to give up Alsace-Lorraine. All +the parties in the Reichstag were opposed to it, including the Social +Democrats. + +A German official of high standing said to me in the spring of 1918: +"I had two sons; one of them fell on the field of battle, but I would +rather part with the other one too than give up Alsace-Lorraine," and +many were of the same opinion. + +In the course of the year and a half when I had frequent opportunities +of meeting the Emperor, his frame of mind had naturally gone through +many different phases. Following on any great military success, and +after the collapse of Russia and Roumania, his generals were always +able to enrol him on their programme of victory, and it is quite a +mistake to imagine that William II. unceasingly clung to the idea of +"Peace above all." He wavered, was sometimes pessimistic, sometimes +optimistic, and his peace aims changed in like manner. Humanly +speaking, it is very comprehensible that the varying situation in the +theatre of war must have influenced the individual mind, and everyone +in Europe experienced such fluctuations. + +Early in September, 1917, he wrote to the Emperor Charles on the +subject of an impending attack on the Italian front, and in this +letter was the following passage: "I trust that the possibility of a +common offensive of our allied armies will raise the spirits of your +Foreign Minister. In my opinion, and in view of the general situation, +there is no reason to be anything but confident." Other letters and +statements prove the Emperor's fluctuating frame of mind. He, as well +as the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse, made use, with regard to the +"war-weary Austria-Hungary," of such tactics as demonstrated a +pronounced certainty of victory in order to strengthen our powers of +resistance. + + * * * * * + +The Archduke Friedrich deserves the greatest praise for having kept up +the friendly relations between Vienna and Berlin. It was not always +easy to settle the delicate questions relating to the conduct of the +war without giving offence. The honest and straightforward nature of +the Archduke and his ever friendly and modest behaviour saved many a +difficult situation. + +After our collapse and overthrow, and when the Imperial family could +be abused with impunity, certain newspapers took a delight in covering +the Archduke Friedrich with contumely. It left him quite indifferent. +The Prince is a distinguished character, of faultless integrity and +always ready to put down abuse. He prevented many disasters, and it +was not his fault if he did not succeed every time. + +When I saw the Crown Prince Wilhelm again after several years, in the +summer of 1917, I found him very tired of war and most anxious for +peace. I had gone to the French front on purpose to meet him and to +try if it were possible through him to exercise some conciliatory +pressure, above all, on the military leaders. A long conversation that +I had with him showed me very clearly that he--if he had ever been of +warlike nature--was then a pronounced pacifist. + + +_Extract from my Diary._ + +"On the Western front, 1917. We drove to the Camp des Romains, but in +detachments in order not to attract the attention of the enemy +artillery to our cars, for in some places the road was visible to the +enemy. I drove together with Bethmann. When discussing the military +leaders, he remarked: 'The generals will probably throw hand grenades +at me when they see me.' + +"An enemy flier cruised high up in the clouds over our heads. He +circled around, paying little heed to the shrapnel bursting on all +sides. The firing ceased, and the human bird soared into +unapproachable heights. The artillery fire a long way off sounded like +distant thunder. + +"The French lines are not more than a couple of hundred metres distant +from the camp. A shot fell here and there and a shell was heard to +whistle; otherwise all was quiet. It was still early. The firing +usually begins at ten and ceases at noon--interval for lunch--and +begins again in the afternoon. + +"Poincare's villa is visible on the horizon in the green landscape. A +gun has been brought to bear on the house--they mean to destroy it +before leaving--they call this the extreme unction. + +"The daily artillery duel began on our return drive, and kept up an +incessant roar. + + +"_St. Mihiel._ + +"We stopped at St. Mihiel, where many French people still remain. They +were detained as hostages to prevent the town from being fired at. +People were standing about in the streets watching the cars go by. + +"I spoke to an old woman, who sat by herself on her house-steps. She +said: 'This disaster can never be made good, and it cannot well be +worse than it is now. It is quite the same to me what happens. I do +not belong here; my only son has been killed and my house is burnt. +Nothing is left me but my hatred of the Germans, and I bequeath that +to France.' And she gazed past me into vacancy. She spoke quite +without passion, but was terribly sad. + +"This terrible hatred! Generations will go to their graves before the +flood of hatred is abated. Would a settlement, a peace of +understanding, be possible with this spirit of the nations? Will it +not end by one of them being felled to earth and annihilated? + + +"_St. Privat._ + +"We passed through St. Privat on our way to Metz. Monuments that tell +the tale of 1870 stand along the road. Everywhere the soil is +historic, soaked in blood. Every spot, every stone, is reminiscent of +past great times. It was here that the seed was sown that brought +forth the plan of revenge that is being fought for now. + +"Bethmann seemed to divine my thoughts. 'Yes,' he said, 'that +sacrifice would be easier for Germany to bear than to part with +Alsace-Lorraine, which would close one of the most brilliant episodes +in her history.' + + +"_Sedan._ + +"On the way to the Crown Prince's quarters. There stands the little +house where the historic meeting between Napoleon III. and Bismarck +took place. The woman who lived there at the time died only a few +weeks ago. For the second time she saw the Germans arrive, bringing a +Moltke but no Bismarck with them, a detail, however, that cannot +deeply have interested the old lady. + + +"_With the Crown Prince._ + +"A pretty little house outside the town. I found a message from the +Crown Prince asking me to proceed there immediately, where I had +almost an hour's private conversation with him before supper. + +"I do not know if the Crown Prince ever was of a warlike disposition, +as people say, but he is so no longer. He longs for peace, but does +not know how to secure it. He spoke very quietly and sensibly. He was +also in favour of territorial sacrifices, but seemed to think that +Germany would not allow it. The great difficulty lay in the contrast +between the actual military situation, the confident expectations of +the generals, and the fears entertained by the military laymen. +Besides, it is not only Alsace-Lorraine. The suppression of German +militarism spoken of in London means the one-sided disarmament of +Germany. Can an army far advanced on enemy soil whose generals are +confident of final victory, can a people still undefeated tolerate +that? + +"I advised the Crown Prince to speak to his father on the question of +abdication, in which he fully agreed. I then invited him to come to +Vienna on behalf of the Emperor, which he promised to do as soon as he +could get leave." + +On my return the Emperor wrote him a letter, drawn up by me, which +contained the following passage: + + My Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me of the interesting + conversation he had the honour to have with you, and it has been a + great pleasure to me to hear all your statements, which so exactly + reflect my own views of the situation. Notwithstanding the + superhuman exertions of our troops, the situation throughout the + country demands that a stop be put to the war before winter, in + Germany as well as here. Turkey will not be with us much longer, + and with her we shall also lose Bulgaria; we two will then be + alone, and next spring will bring America and a still stronger + Entente. From other sources there are distinct signs that we could + win over France if Germany could make up her mind to certain + territorial sacrifices in Alsace-Lorraine. With France secured to + us we are the conquerors, and Germany will obtain elsewhere ample + compensation. But I cannot allow Germany to be the only one to + make a sacrifice. I too will take the lion's share of sacrifice, + and have informed His Majesty your father that under the above + conditions I am prepared not only to dispense with the whole of + Poland, but to cede Galicia to her and to assist in combining that + state with Germany, who would thus acquire a state in the East + while yielding up a portion of her soil in the West. In 1915, at + the request of Germany and in the interests of our Alliance, we + offered the Trentino to faithless Italy without asking for + compensation in order to avert war. Germany is now in a similar + situation, though with far better prospects. You, as heir to the + German Imperial crown, are privileged to have a say in the matter, + and I know that His Majesty your father entirely shares this view + respecting your co-operation. I beg of you, therefore, in this + decisive hour for Germany and Austria-Hungary, to consider the + whole situation and to unite your efforts with mine to bring the + war to a rapid and honourable end. If Germany persists in her + standpoint of refusal and thus wrecks the hope of a possible peace + the situation in Austria-Hungary will become extremely critical. + + I should be very glad to have a talk with you as soon as possible, + and your promise conveyed through Count Czernin soon to pay us a + visit gives me the greatest pleasure. + +The Crown Prince's answer was very friendly and full of anxiety to +help, though it was also obvious that the German military leaders had +succeeded in nipping his efforts in the bud. When I met Ludendorff +some time afterwards in Berlin this was fully confirmed by the words +he flung at me: "What have you been doing to our Crown Prince? He had +turned very slack, but we have stiffened him up again." + +The game remained the same. The last war period in Germany was +controlled by one will only, and that was Ludendorff's. His thoughts +were centred on fighting, his soul on victory. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] This is a literal rendering of the famous text from the German. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +ROUMANIA + + +1 + +My appointment as ambassador to Bucharest in the autumn of 1913 came +as a complete surprise to me, and was much against my wishes. The +initiative in the matter came from the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. I had +never had any doubt that sooner or later the Archduke would take part +in politics, but it took me by surprise that he should do so in the +Emperor Francis Joseph's lifetime. + +A great difference of opinion prevailed then in Vienna on the +Roumanian question, a pro-Roumanian spirit fighting against an +anti-Roumanian one. The head of the former party was the Archduke +Franz, and with him, though in less marked degree, was Berchtold. +Tisza was the leader on the other side, and carried with him almost +the entire Hungarian Parliament. The pro-Roumanians wished Roumania to +be more closely linked to the Monarchy; the others, to replace that +alliance by one with Bulgaria; but both were unanimous in seeking for +a clear knowledge of how matters stood with the alliance, and whether +we had a friend or a foe on the other side of the Carpathians. My +predecessor, Karl Fuerstenberg, had sent in a very clear and correct +report on the subject, but he shared the fate of so many ambassadors: +his word was not believed. + +The actual task assigned to me was, first of all to find out whether +this alliance was of any practical value, and if I thought not to +suggest ways and means of justifying its existence. + +I must mention in this connection that my appointment as ambassador to +Bucharest had raised a perfect storm in the Hungarian Parliament. The +reason for this widely spread indignation in Hungary at my selection +for the post was owing to a pamphlet I had written some years +previously, in which I certainly had attacked the Magyar policy +somewhat vehemently. I maintained the standpoint that a policy of +suppression of the nations was not tenable in the long run, and that +no future was in store for Hungary unless she definitely abolished +that policy and allowed the nations equal rights. This pamphlet gave +serious displeasure in Budapest, and representatives in the Hungarian +Parliament were afraid I should introduce that policy in Roumania, +which, following the spirit of the pamphlet, was directed against the +official policy of Vienna and Budapest. It was at this period that I +made Tisza's acquaintance. I had a long and very frank conversation +with him on the whole subject, and explained to him that I must uphold +the standpoint I put forward in my pamphlet, as it tallied with my +convictions, but that I clearly saw that from the moment I accepted +the post of ambassador I was bound to consider myself as a part of the +great state machinery, and loyally support the policy emanating from +the Ballplatz. I still maintain that my standpoint is perfectly +justifiable. A unified policy would be utterly impossible if every +subordinate official were to publish his own views, whether right or +wrong, and I for my part would never, as Minister, have tolerated an +ambassador who attempted to pursue an independent policy of his own. +Tisza begged me to give my word of honour that I would make no attempt +to introduce a policy opposed to that of Vienna and Budapest, to which +I readily agreed, provided that the Archduke was agreeable to such +decision. I then had a conversation with the latter, and found that he +quite agreed with my action, his argument being that as long as he was +the heir to the throne he would never attempt to introduce a policy +opposed to that of the Emperor; consequently he would not expect it +from me either. But should he come to the throne he would certainly +make an effort to carry out his own views, in which case I should no +longer be at Bucharest, but probably in some post where I would be in +a position to support his efforts. The Archduke begged me for the sake +of my friendship for him to accept the post, which I finally decided +to do after I obtained a promise from Berchtold that, at the end of +two years as the longest term, he would put no obstacle in the way of +my retirement. + +The Archduke Franz drew his pro-Roumanian proclivities from a very +unreliable source. He hardly knew Roumania at all. So far as I know, +he had only once been in the country, and paid a short visit to King +Carol at Sinaia; but the friendly welcome accorded to himself and his +wife by the old King and Queen entirely took his warm heart by storm, +and he mistook King Carol for Roumania. This is again a proof how +greatly the individual relations of great personalities can influence +the policy of nations. The royal couple met the Archduke at the +station; the Queen embraced and kissed the duchess and, placing her at +her right side, drove with her to the castle. In short, it was the +first time that the Duchess of Hohenberg had been treated as enjoying +equal privileges with her husband. During his short stay in Roumania +the Archduke had the pleasure of seeing his wife treated as his equal +and not as a person of slight importance, always relegated to the +background. At the court balls in Vienna the duchess was always +obliged to walk behind all the archduchesses, and never had any +gentleman allotted to her whose arm she could take. In Roumania she +was _his wife_, and etiquette was not concerned with her birth. The +Archduke valued this proof of friendly tactfulness on the part of the +King very highly, and always afterwards Roumania, in his eyes, was +endowed with a special charm. Besides which he very correctly +estimated that a change in certain political relations would effect a +closer alliance between Roumania and ourselves. He felt, rather than +knew, that the Transylvanian question lay like a huge obstacle between +Vienna and Bucharest, and that this obstacle once removed would alter +the entire situation. + +To find out the real condition of the alliance was my first task, and +it was not difficult, as the first lengthy conferences I had with King +Carol left no doubt in my mind that the old King himself considered +the alliance very unsafe. King Carol was an exceptionally clever man, +very cautious and deliberate, and it was not easy to make him talk if +he intended to be silent. The question of the vitality of the alliance +was settled by my suggesting to the King that the alliance should +receive pragmatic sanction, i.e. be ratified by the Parliaments at +Vienna, Budapest, and Bucharest. The alarm evinced by the King at the +suggestion, the very idea that the carefully guarded secret of the +existence of an alliance should be divulged, proved to me how totally +impossible it would be, in the circumstances, to infuse fresh life +into such dead matter. + +My reports sent to the Ballplatz leave no doubt that I answered this +first question by declaring in categorical fashion that the alliance +with Roumania was, under the existing conditions, nothing but a scrap +of paper. + +The second question, as to whether there were ways and means of +restoring vitality to the alliance, and what they were, was +theoretically just as easy to answer as difficult to carry out in +practice. As already mentioned, the real obstacle in the way of closer +relations between Bucharest and Vienna was the question of Great +Roumania; in other words, the Roumanian desire for national union with +her "brothers in Transylvania." This was naturally quite opposed to +the Hungarian standpoint. It is interesting, as well as characteristic +of the then situation, that shortly after my taking up office in +Roumania, Nikolai Filippescu (known later as a war fanatic) proposed +that Roumania should join with Transylvania and the whole of united +Great Roumania enter into relations with the Monarchy similar to the +relation of Bavaria to the German Empire. I admit that I welcomed the +idea warmly, for if it were launched by a party which justly was held +to be antagonistic to the Monarchy there can be no doubt that the +moderate element in Roumania would have accepted it with still greater +satisfaction. I still believe that had this plan been carried out it +would have led to a real linking of Roumania to the Monarchy, that the +notification would have met with no opposition, and consequently the +outbreak of war would have found us very differently situated. +Unfortunately the plan failed at its very first stage owing to +Tisza's strong and obstinate resistance. The Emperor Francis Joseph +held the same standpoint as Tisza, and it was out of the question to +achieve anything by arguing. On the other hand, nobody had any idea +then that the great war, and with it the testing of the alliance, was +so imminent, and I consoled myself for my unsuccessful efforts in the +firm hope that this grand plan, as it seemed to me both then and now, +would be realised one day under the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. + +When I arrived in Roumania a change was proceeding in the Government. +Majorescu's Conservative Ministry gave way to the Liberal Ministry of +Bratianu. King Carol's policy of government was very peculiar. From +the very first his principle was never to proceed with violence or +even much energy against injurious tendencies in his own country; but, +on the contrary, always to yield to the numerous claims made by +extortioners. He knew his people thoroughly, and knew that both +parties, Conservatives and Liberals, must alternately have access to +the manger until thoroughly satisfied and ready to make room the one +for the other. Almost every change in the Government was accomplished +in that manner: the Opposition, desirous of coming into power, began +with threats and hints at revolution. Some highly unreasonable claim +would be put forward and vehemently insisted upon and the people +incited to follow it up; the Government would retire, unable to accede +to the demands, and the Opposition, once in power, would show no +further signs of keeping their promise. The old King was well versed +in the game; he allowed the opposition tide to rise to the highest +possible limit, when he effected the necessary change of individuals +and looked on until the game began again. It is the custom in +Roumania, when a new party comes into power, to change the whole +personnel, even down to the lowest officials. This arrangement, +obviously, has its drawbacks, though on the other hand it cannot be +denied that it is a practical one. + +In this manner the Bratianu Ministry came into office in 1913. +Majorescu's Government gave entire satisfaction to the King and the +moderate elements in the country. In the eyes of the Roumanians he had +just achieved a great diplomatic success by the Peace of Bucharest and +the acquisition of the Dobrudsha, when Bratianu came forward with a +demand for vast agrarian reforms. These reforms are one of the +hobby-horses of Roumanian policy which is always mounted when it is a +question of making use of the poor unfortunate peasants, and the +manoeuvre invariably succeeds, largely owing to the lack of +intelligence prevailing among the peasant population of Roumania, who +are constantly made the tools of one or other party, and simply pushed +on one side when the object has been obtained. Bratianu also, once he +was in office, gave no thought to the fulfilment of his promises, but +calmly proceeded on the lines Majorescu had laid down in his time. + +Still, it was more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement in +foreign affairs with Bratianu than it had been with Majorescu, as the +former was thoroughly conversant with all West European matters, and +at the bottom of his heart was anti-German. One of the distinctions to +be made between Liberals and Conservatives was that the Liberals had +enjoyed a Parisian education: they spoke no German, only French; while +the Conservatives, taking Carp and Majorescu as models, were offshoots +of Berlin. As it was impossible to carry out the plan of firmly and +definitely linking Roumania to us by a change of Hungarian internal +policy, the idea naturally, almost automatically, arose to substitute +Bulgaria for Roumania. This idea, which found special favour with +Count Tisza, could be carried out, both because, since the Bucharest +peace of 1913, it was out of the question to bring Roumania and +Bulgaria under one roof, and because an alliance with Sofia would have +driven Roumania straight into the enemy camp. But Berchtold, as well +as the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was opposed to this latter +eventuality, nor would the Emperor Francis Joseph have approved of +such proceedings. Hence no change was made; Roumania was not won, nor +was Bulgaria substituted for her, and they were content in Vienna to +leave everything to the future. + +In a social sense the year that I spent in Roumania before the war was +not an unpleasant one. The relations of an Austrian-Hungarian +Ambassador with the court, as with the numerous _Bojars_, were +pleasant and friendly, and nobody could then have imagined what +torrents of hatred were so soon to be launched against the +Austro-Hungarian frontiers. + +Social life became less pleasant during the war, as will be seen from +the following instance. There lived at Bucharest a certain +Lieut.-Colonel Prince Sturdza, who was a noted braggart and brawler +and an inveterate enemy of Austria-Hungary. I did not know him +personally, and there was no personal reason for him to begin one day +to abuse me publicly in the papers as being an advocate of the +Monarchy. I naturally took not the slightest notice of his article, +whereupon he addressed an open letter to me in the _Adeverul_, in +which he informed me that he would box my ears at the first +opportunity. I telegraphed to Berchtold and asked the Emperor's +permission to challenge this individual, as, being an officer, he was, +according to our ideas, entitled to satisfaction. The Emperor sent +word that it was out of the question for an ambassador to fight a duel +in the country to which he was accredited, and that I was to complain +to the Roumanian Government. I accordingly went to Bratianu, who +declared that he was totally unable to move in the matter. According +to the laws and regulations of the country it was impossible to +protect a foreign ambassador against such abuse. If Sturdza carried +out his threats he would be arrested. Until then nothing could be +done. + +Upon this I assured Bratianu that if such were the case I would in +future arm myself with a revolver, and if he attacked me shoot the man; +if one lived in a country where the habits of the Wild West obtained, +one must act accordingly. I sent word to the lieutenant-colonel that +each day, at one o'clock, I could be found at the Hotel Boulevard, +where he would find a bullet awaiting him. + +The next time I saw the Emperor Francis Joseph he asked for further +information concerning the episode, and I told him of my conversation +with Bratianu and of my firm intention to be my own helper. The +Emperor rejoined: "Naturally you cannot allow yourself to be beaten. +You are quite right; if he lays hands on you, shoot him." + +I afterwards met Sturdza several times in restaurants and +drawing-rooms without his attempting to carry out his threats. This +man, whose nature was that of a daring adventurer, afterwards deserted +to the Russian army, and fought against us at a time when Roumania +still was neutral. I then completely lost sight of him. + +The absolute freedom of the Press in the Balkan States, combined with +the brutality of the prevailing customs, produced the most varied +results, even going so far as abuse of their own kings. In this +connection King Carol gave me many drastic instances. While King +Ferdinand was still neutral, one of the comic papers contained a +picture of the King taking aim at a hare, while underneath were these +words, supposed to come from the hare: "My friend, you have long ears, +I have long ears; you are a coward, I am a coward. Wherefore would my +brother shoot me?" + +On the day when war broke out this freedom of the Press was diverted +into a different channel and replaced by the severest control and +censorship. + +Roumania is a land of contrasts, both as regards the landscape, the +climate, and social conditions. The mountainous north, with the +wonderful Carpathians, is one of the most beautiful districts. Then +there are the endless, unspeakably monotonous, but fertile plains of +Wallachia, leading into the valley of the Danube, which is a very +Paradise. In spring particularly, when the Danube each year overflows +its banks, the beauty of the landscape baffles description. It is +reminiscent of the tropics, with virgin forests standing in the water, +and islands covered with luxuriant growth scattered here and there. It +is an ideal country for the sportsman. All kinds of birds, herons, +ducks, pelicans, and others, are to be met with, besides wolves and +wild cats, and days may be spent in rowing and walking in this +Paradise without wearying of it. + +The Roumanians usually care but little for sport, being averse to +physical exertion. Whenever they can they leave the country and spend +their time in Paris or on the Riviera. This love of travel is so +strong in them that a law was passed compelling them to spend a +certain portion of the year in their own country or else pay the +penalty of a higher tax. The country people, in their sad poverty, +form a great contrast to the enormously wealthy _Bojars_. Although +very backward in everything relating to culture, the Roumanian peasant +is a busy, quiet, and easily satisfied type, unpretentious to a +touching degree when compared with the upper classes. + +Social conditions among the upper ten thousand have been greatly +complicated owing to the abolition of nobility, whereby the question +of titles plays a part unequalled anywhere else in the world. Almost +every Roumanian has a title derived from one or other source; he +values it highly, and takes it much amiss when a foreigner betrays his +ignorance on the subject. As a rule, it is safer to adopt the plan of +addressing everyone as "_Mon prince_." Another matter difficult for a +foreigner to grasp is the real status of Roumanian society, owing to +the incessant divorce and subsequent remarriages. Nearly every woman +has been divorced at least once and married again, the result being, +on the one hand, the most complicated questions of relationship, and, +on the other, so many breaches of personal relations as to make it the +most difficult task to invite twenty Roumanians, particularly ladies, +to dinner without giving offence in some quarter. + +In the days of the old regime it was one of the duties of the younger +members of the Embassy to develop their budding diplomatic talents by +a clever compilation of the list for such a dinner and a wise +avoidance of any dangerous rock ahead. But as the question of rank in +Roumania is taken just as seriously as though it were authorised, +every lady claims to have first rank--the correct allotment of places +at a dinner is really a question for the most efficient diplomatic +capacities. There were about a dozen ladies in Bucharest who would +actually not accept an invitation unless they were quite sure the +place of honour would be given to them. + +My predecessor cut the Gordian knot of these difficulties by arranging +to have dinner served at small separate tables, thus securing several +places of honour, but not even by these means could he satisfy the +ambition of all. + + +2 + +While at Sinaia I received the news of the assassination of the +Archduke from Bratianu. I was confined to bed, suffering from +influenza, when Bratianu telephoned to ask if I had heard that there +had been an accident to the Archduke's train in Bosnia, and that both +he and the duchess were killed. Soon after this first alarm came +further news, leaving no doubt as to the gravity of the catastrophe. +The first impression in Roumania was one of profound and sincere +sympathy and genuine consternation. Roumania never expected by means +of war to succeed in realising her national ambitions; she only +indulged in the hope that a friendly agreement with the Monarchy would +lead to the union of all Roumanians, and in that connection Bucharest +centred all its hopes in the Archduke and heir to the throne. His +death seemed to end the dream of a Greater Roumania, and the genuine +grief displayed in all circles in Roumania was the outcome of that +feeling. Take Jonescu, on learning the news while in my wife's +drawing-room, wept bitterly; and the condolences that I received were +not of the usual nature of such messages, but were expressions of the +most genuine sorrow. Poklewski, the Russian Ambassador, is said to +have remarked very brutally that there was no reason to make so much +out of the event, and the general indignation that his words aroused +proved how strong was the sympathy felt in the country for the +murdered Archduke. + +When the ultimatum was made known the entire situation changed at +once. I never had any illusions respecting the Roumanian psychology, +and was quite clear in my own mind that the sincere regret at the +Archduke's death was due to egotistical motives and to the fear of +being compelled now to abandon the national ambition. The ultimatum +and the danger of war threatening on the horizon completely altered +the Roumanian attitude, and it was suddenly recognised that Roumania +could achieve its object by other means, not by peace, but by war--not +_with_, but _against_ the Monarchy. I would never have believed it +possible that such a rapid and total change could have occurred +practically within a few hours. Genuine and simulated indignation at +the tone of the ultimatum was the order of the day, and the universal +conclusion arrived at was: _L'Autriche est devenue folle._ Men and +women with whom I had been on a perfectly friendly footing for the +last year suddenly became bitter enemies. Everywhere I noticed a +mixture of indignation and growing eagerness to realise at last their +heart's dearest wish. The feeling in certain circles fluctuated for +some days. Roumanians had a great respect for Germany's military +power, and the year 1870 was still fresh in the memory of many of +them. When England, however, joined the ranks of our adversaries their +fears vanished, and from that moment it became obvious to the large +majority of the Roumanians that the realisation of their aspirations +was merely a question of time and of diplomatic efficiency. The wave +of hatred and lust of conquest that broke over us in the first stage +of the war was much stronger than in later stages, because the +Roumanians made the mistake we all have committed of reckoning on too +short a duration of the war, and therefore imagined the decision to be +nearer at hand than it actually was. After the great German successes +in the West, after Goerlitz and the downfall of Serbia, certain +tendencies pointing to a policy of delay became noticeable among the +Roumanians. With the exception of Carp and his little group all were +more or less ready at the very first to fling themselves upon us. + +Like a rock standing in the angry sea of hatred, poor old King Carol +was alone with his German sympathies. I had been instructed to read +the ultimatum to him the moment it was sent to Belgrade, and never +shall I forget the impression it made on the old King when he heard +it. He, wise old politician that he was, recognised at once the +immeasurable possibilities of such a step, and before I had finished +reading the document he interrupted me, exclaiming: "It will be a +world war." It was long before he could collect himself and begin to +devise ways and means by which a peaceful solution might still be +found. I may mention here that a short time previously the Tsar, with +Sassonoff, had been in Constanza for a meeting with the Roumanian +royal family. The day after the Tsar left I went to Constanza myself +to thank the King for having conferred the Grand Cross of one of the +Roumanian orders on me, obviously as a proof that the Russian visit +had not made him forget our alliance, and he gave me some interesting +details of the said visit. Most interesting of all was his account of +the conversations with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. On +asking whether Sassonoff considered the situation in Europe to be as +safe as he (the King) did, Sassonoff answered in the affirmative, +"_pourvu que l'Autriche ne touche pas a la Serbie_." I at once, of +course, reported this momentous statement to Vienna; but neither by +the King nor by myself, nor yet in Vienna, was the train of thought +then fully understood. The relations between Serbia and the Monarchy +were at that time no worse than usual; indeed, they were rather +better, and there was not the slightest intention on our part to +injure the Serbians. But the suspicion that Sassonoff already then was +aware that the Serbians were planning something against us cannot be +got rid of. + +When the King asked me whether I had reported Sassonoff's important +remark to Vienna, I replied that I had done so, and added that this +remark was another reason to make me believe that the assassination +was a crime long since prepared and carried out under Russian +patronage. + +The crime that was enacted at Debruzin, which made such a sensation at +the time, gave rise to suspicions of a Russo-Roumanian attempt at +assassination. + +On February 24, 1914, the Hungarian Correspondence Bureau published +the following piece of news: + + A terrible explosion took place this morning in the official + premises of the newly-instituted Greek-Catholic Hungarian + bishopric, which are on the second floor of the Ministry of Trade + and Commerce in the Franz Deak Street. It occurred in the office + of the bishop's representative, the Vicar Michael Jaczkovics, + whose secretary, Johann Slapowszky, was also present in the room. + Both of them were blown to pieces. The Greek-Catholic bishop, + Stephan Miklossy, was in a neighbouring room, but had a most + marvellous escape. Alexander Csatth, advocate and solicitor to the + bishopric, who was in another room, was mortally wounded by the + explosion. In a third room the bishop's servant with his wife were + both killed. All the walls in the office premises fell in, and the + whole building is very much damaged. The explosion caused such a + panic in the house that all the inhabitants took flight and + vanished. All the windows of the neighbouring Town Hall in the + Verboczy Street were shattered by the concussion. Loose tiles were + hurled into the street and many passers-by were injured. The four + dead bodies and the wounded were taken to the hospital. The + bishop, greatly distressed, left the building and went to a + friend's house. The daughter of the Vicar Jaczkovics went out of + her mind on hearing of her father's tragic death. The cause of the + explosion has not yet been discovered. + +I soon became involved in the affair when Hungary and Roumania began +mutually to blame one another as originators of the outrage. This led +to numerous interventions and adjustments, and my task was intensified +because a presumed accomplice of the murderer Catarau was arrested in +Bucharest, and his extradition to Hungary had to be effected by me. +This man, of the name of Mandazescu, was accused of having obtained a +false passport for Catarau. + +Catarau, who was a Roumanian Russian from Bessarabia, vanished +completely after the murder and left no trace. News came, now from +Serbia, then from Albania, that he had been found, but the rumours +were always false. I chanced to hear something about the matter in +this way. I was on board a Roumanian vessel bound from Constanza to +Constantinople, when I accidentally overheard two Roumanian naval +officers talking together. One of them said: "That was on the day +when the police brought Catarau on board to help him to get away +secretly." + +Catarau was heard of later at Cairo, which he appears to have reached +with the aid of Roumanian friends. + +It cannot be asserted that the Roumanian Government was implicated in +the plot--but the Roumanian authorities certainly were, for in the +Balkans, as in Russia, there are many bands like the _Cerna Ruka_, the +_Narodna Odbrena_, etc., etc., who carry on their activities alongside +the Government. + +It was a crime committed by some Russian or Roumanian secret society, +and the Governments of both countries showed surprisingly little +interest in investigating the matter and delivering the culprits up to +justice. + +On June 15 I heard from a reliable source that Catarau had been seen +in Bucharest. He walked about the streets quite openly in broad +daylight, and no one interfered with him; then he disappeared. + +To return, however, to my interview with the old King. Filled with +alarm, he dispatched that same evening two telegrams, one to Belgrade +and one to Petersburg, urging that the ultimatum be accepted without +fail. + +The terrible distress of mind felt by the King when, like a sudden +flash of lightning from the clouds, he saw before him a picture of the +world war may be accounted for because he felt certain that the +conflict between his personal convictions and his people's attitude +would suddenly be known to all. The poor old King fought the fight to +the best of his ability, but it killed him. King Carol's death was +caused by the war. The last weeks of his life were a torture to him; +each message that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip. I +was enjoined to do all I could to secure Roumania's prompt +co-operation, according to the terms of the Alliance, and I was even +obliged to go so far as to remind him that "a promise given allows of +no prevarication: that a treaty is a treaty, and _his honour_ obliged +him to unsheathe his sword." I recollect one particularly painful +scene, where the King, weeping bitterly, flung himself across his +writing-table and with trembling hands tried to wrench from his neck +his order _Pour le Merite_. I can affirm without any exaggeration that +I could see him wasting away under the ceaseless moral blows dealt to +him, and that the mental torment he went through undoubtedly shortened +his life. + +Queen Elizabeth was well aware of all, but she never took my action +amiss; she understood that I had to deliver the messages, but that it +was not I who composed them. + +Queen Elizabeth was a good, clever and touchingly simple woman, not a +_poet qui court apres l'esprit_, but a woman who looked at the world +through conciliatory and poetical glasses. She was a good +conversationalist, and there was always a poetic charm in all she did. +There hung on the staircase a most beautiful sea picture, which I +greatly admired while the Queen talked to me about the sea, about her +little villa at Constanza, which, built on the extreme end of the +quay, seems almost to lie in the sea. She spoke, too, of her travels +and impressions when on the high seas, and as she spoke the great +longing for all that is good and beautiful made itself felt, and this +is what she said to me: "The sea lives. If there could be found any +symbol of eternity it would be the sea, endless in greatness and +everlasting in movement. The day is dull and stormy. One after another +the glassy billows come rolling in and break with a roar on the rocky +shore. The small white crests of the waves look as if covered with +snow. And the sea breathes and draws its breath with the ebb and flow +of the tide. The tide is the driving power that forces the mighty +waters from Equator to North Pole. And thus it works, day and night, +year by year, century by century. It takes no heed of the perishable +beings who call themselves lords of the world, who live only for a +day, coming and going and vanishing almost as they come. The sea +remains to work. It works for all, for men, for animals, for plants, +for without the sea there could be no organic life in the world. The +sea is like a great filter, which alone can produce the change of +matter that is necessary for life. In the course of a century +numberless rivers carry earth to the sea. Each river carries without +ceasing its burden of earth and sand to the ocean; and the sea +receives the load which is carried by the current far out to sea, and +slowly and by degrees in the course of time the sea dissolves or +crushes all it has received. No matter to the sea if the process lasts +a thousand years or more--it may even last for ages, who can tell? + +"But one day, quite suddenly, the sea begins to wander. Once there was +sea everywhere, and all continents are born from the sea. One day land +arose out of the sea. The birth was of a revolutionary nature, there +were earthquakes, volcanic craters, falling cities and dying men--but +new land was there. Or else it moves slowly, invisibly, a metre or two +in a century, and returns to the land it used to possess. Thus it +restores the soil it stole from it, but cleaner, refined and full of +vitality to live and to create. Such is the sea and its work." + +These are the words of the old half-blind Queen, who can never look +upon the beloved picture again, but she told me how she always +idolised the sea, and how her grand nephews and nieces shared her +feelings, and how she grew young again with them when she told them +tales of olden times. + +One could listen to her for hours without growing weary, and always +there was some beautiful thought or word to carry away and think over. + +Doubtless such knowledge would be more correct were it taken from some +geological work. But Carmen Sylva's words invariably seemed to strike +some poetic chord; that is what made her so attractive. + +She loved to discourse on politics, which for her meant King Carol. He +was her all in all. After his death, when it was said that all states +in the world were losing in the terrible war, she remarked: "Roumania +has already lost her most precious possession." She never spoke of her +own poems and writings. In politics her one thought besides King Carol +was Albania. She was deeply attached to the Princess of Wied, and +showed her strong interest in the country where she lived. Talking +about the Wieds one day afforded me an opportunity of seeing the King +vexed with his wife; it was the only time I ever noticed it. It was +when we were at Sinaia, and I was, as often occurred, sitting with the +King. The Queen came into the room, which she was otherwise not in the +habit of entering, bringing with her a telegram from the Princess of +Wied in which she asked for something--I cannot now remember what--for +Albania. The King refused, but the Queen insisted, until he at last +told her very crossly to leave him in peace, as he had other things to +think of than Albania. + +After King Carol's death she lost all her vital energy, and the change +in the political situation troubled her. She was very fond of her +nephew Ferdinand--hers was a truly loving heart--and she trembled lest +he should commit some act of treachery. I remember once how, through +her tears, she said to me: "Calm my fears. Tell me that he will never +be guilty of such an act." I was unable to reassure her, but a kind +Fate spared her from hearing the declaration of war. + +Later, not long before her death, the old Queen was threatened with +total blindness. She was anxious to put herself in the hands of a +French oculist for an operation for cataract, who would naturally be +obliged to travel through the Monarchy in order to reach Bucharest. At +her desire I mentioned the matter in Vienna, and the Emperor Francis +Joseph at once gave the requisite permission for the journey. + +After a successful operation, the Queen sent a short autograph poem to +one of my children, adding that it was her _first_ letter on +recovering her sight. At the same time she was again very uneasy +concerning politics. + +I wrote her the following letter: + + Your Majesty,--My warmest thanks for the beautiful little poem you + have sent to my boy. That it was granted to me to contribute + something towards the recovery of your sight is in itself a + sufficient reward, and no thanks are needed. That Your Majesty has + addressed the first written lines to my children delights and + touches me. + + Meanwhile Your Majesty must not be troubled regarding politics. It + is of no avail. For the moment Roumania will retain the policy of + the late King, and God alone knows what the future will bring + forth. + + We are all like dust in this terrible hurricane sweeping through + the world. We are tossed helplessly hither and thither and know + not whether we are to face disaster or success. The point is not + whether we live or die, but how it is done. In that respect King + Carol set an example to us all. + + I hope King Ferdinand may never forget that, together with the + throne, his uncle bequeathed to him a political creed, a creed of + honour and loyalty, and I am persuaded that Your Majesty is the + best guardian of the bequest. + + Your Majesty's grateful and devoted + + CZERNIN. + +When I said that King Carol fought the fight to the best of his +ability, I intended to convey that no one could expect him to be +different from what he always was. The King never possessed in any +special degree either energy, strength of action, or adventurous +courage, and at the time I knew him, as an old man, he had none of +those attributes. He was a clever diplomat, a conciliatory power, a +safe mediator, and one who avoided trouble, but not of a nature to +risk all and weather the storm. That was known to all, and no one, +therefore, could think that the King would try to put himself on our +side against the clearly expressed views of all Roumania. My idea is +that if he had been differently constituted he could successfully have +risked the experiment. The King possessed in Carp a man of quite +unusual, even reckless, activity and energy, and from the first moment +he placed himself and his activities at the King's disposal. If the +King, without asking, had ordered mobilisation, Carp's great energy +would have certainly carried it through. But, in the military +situation as it was then, the Roumanian army would have been forced to +the rear of the Russian, and in all probability the first result of +the battlefields would have changed the situation entirely, and the +blood that was shed mutually in victorious battles would have brought +forth the unity that the spirit of our alliance never succeeded in +evolving. But the King was not a man of such calibre. He could not +change his nature, and what he did do entirely concurred with his +methods from the time he ascended the throne. + +As long as the King lived there was the positive assurance that +Roumania would not side against us, for he would have prevented any +mobilisation against us with the same firm wisdom which had always +enabled him to avert any agitation in the land. He would then have +seen that the Roumanians are not a warlike people like the Bulgarians, +and that Roumania had not the slightest intention of risking anything +in the campaign. A policy of procrastination in the wise hands of the +King would have delayed hostilities against us indefinitely. + +Immediately after the outbreak of war Bratianu began his game, which +consisted of entrenching the Roumanian Government firmly and willingly +in a position between the two groups of Powers, and bandying favours +about from one to the other, reaping equal profits from each, until +the moment when the stronger of the two should be recognised as such +and the weaker then attacked. + +Even from 1914-16 Roumania was never really neutral. She always +favoured our enemies, and as far as lay in her power hindered all our +actions. + +The transport of horses and ammunition to Turkey in the summer of 1915 +that was exacted from us was an important episode. Turkey was then in +great danger, and was asking anxiously for munitions. Had the +Roumanian Government adopted the standpoint not to favour any of the +belligerent Powers it would have been a perfectly correct attitude, +viewed from a neutral standpoint, but she never did adopt such +standpoint, as is shown by her allowing the Serbians to receive +transports of Russian ammunition via the Danube, thus showing great +partiality. When all attempts failed, the munitions were transmitted, +partially at any rate, through other means. + +At that time, too, Russian soldiers were allowed in Roumania and were +not molested, whereas ours were invariably interned. + +Two Austrian airmen once landed by mistake in Roumania, and were, of +course, interned immediately. The one was a cadet of the name of +Berthold and a pilot whose name I have forgotten. From their prison +they appealed to me to help them, and I sent word that they must +endeavour to obtain permission to pay me a visit. A few days later the +cadet appeared, escorted by a Roumanian officer as guard. This +officer, not being allowed without special permission to set foot on +Austro-Hungarian soil, was obliged to remain in the street outside the +house. I had the gates closed, put the cadet into one of my cars, sent +him out through the back entrance, and had him driven to Giurgui, +where he got across the Danube, and in two hours was again at liberty. +After a lengthy and futile wait the officer departed. His protests +came too late. + +The unfortunate pilot who was left behind was not allowed to come to +the Embassy. One night, however, he made his escape through the window +and arrived. I kept him concealed for some time, and he eventually +crossed the frontier safely and got away by rail to Hungary. + +Bratianu reproached me later for what I had done, but I told him it +was in consequence of his not having strictly adhered to his +neutrality. Had our soldiers been left unmolested, as in the case of +the Russians, I should not have been compelled to act as I had done. + +Bratianu can never seriously have doubted that the Central Powers +would succumb, and his sympathies were always with the Entente, not +only on account of his bringing up, but also because of that political +speculation. During the course of subsequent events there were times +when Bratianu to a certain extent seemed to vacillate, especially at +the time of our great offensive against Russia. The break through at +Goerlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior of Russia had +an astounding effect in Roumania. Bratianu, who obviously knew very +little about strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian +millions, whom he imagined to be in a fair way to Vienna and Berlin, +should suddenly begin to rush back and a fortress like Warsaw be +demolished like a house of cards. He was evidently very anxious then +and must have had many a disturbed night. On the other hand, those who +to begin with, though not for, still were not against Austria began to +raise their heads and breathe more freely. The victory of the Central +Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event. That was the +historic moment when Roumania might have been coerced into active +co-operation, but not the Bratianu Ministry. Bratianu himself would +never in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we could +have made up our minds then to instal a Majorescu or a Marghiloman +Ministry in office, we could have had the Roumanian army with us. In +connection with this were several concrete proposals. In order to +carry out the plan we should have been compelled to make territorial +concessions in Hungary to a Majorescu Ministry--Majorescu demanded it +as a primary condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs, and +this proposal failed owing to Hungary's obstinate resistance. It is a +terrible but a just punishment that poor Hungary, who contributed so +much to our definite defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from +the consequences thereof, and that the Roumanians, so despised and +persecuted by Hungary, should gain the greatest triumphs on her +plains. + +One of the many reproaches that have been brought against me recently +is to the effect that I, as ambassador at Bucharest, should have +resigned if my proposals were not accepted in Vienna. These reproaches +are dictated by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsibility. +It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe the situation as +he sees it and to make such proposals as he considers right, but the +responsibility for the policy is with the Minister for Foreign +Affairs, and it would lead to the most impossible and absurd state of +things if every ambassador whose proposals were rejected were to draw +the conclusion that his resignation was a necessary consequence +thereof. If officials were to resign because they did not agree with +the view of their chief, it would mean that almost all of them would +send in their resignations. + +Espionage and counter-espionage have greatly flourished during the +war. In that connection Russia showed great activity in Roumania. + +In October, 1914, an event occurred which was very unfortunate for me. +I drove from Bucharest to Sinaia, carrying certain political +documents with me in a dispatch-case, which, by mistake, was fastened +on behind instead of being laid in the car. On the way the case was +unstrapped and stolen. I made every effort to get it back, and +eventually recovered it after a search of three weeks, involving much +expense. It was found at last in some peasant's barn, but nothing had +apparently been abstracted save the cigarettes that were in it. + +Nevertheless, after the occupation of Bucharest copies and photographs +of all my papers were found in Bratianu's house. + +After the loss of the dispatch-case I at once tendered my resignation +in Vienna, but it was not accepted by the Emperor. + +The Red Book on Roumania, published by Burian, which contains a +summary of my most important reports, gives a very clear picture of +the several phases of that period and the approaching danger of war. +The several defeats that Roumania suffered justified the fears of all +those who warned her against premature intervention. In order to +render the situation quite clear, it must here be explained that +during the time immediately preceding Roumania's entry into war there +were really only two parties in the country: the one was hostile to us +and wished for an immediate declaration of war, and the other was the +"friendly" one that did not consider the situation ripe for action and +advised waiting until we were weakened still more. During the time of +our successes the "friendly" party carried the day. Queen Marie, I +believe, belonged to the latter. From the beginning of the war, she +was always in favour of "fighting by the side of England," as she +always looked upon herself as an Englishwoman, but, at the last moment +at any rate, she appears to have thought the time for action +premature. A few days before the declaration of war she invited me to +a farewell lunch, which was somewhat remarkable, as we both knew that +in a very few days we should be enemies. After lunch I took the +opportunity of telling her that I _likewise_ was aware of the +situation, but that "the Bulgarians would be in Bucharest before the +Roumanians reached Budapest." She entered into the conversation very +calmly, being of a very frank nature and not afraid of hearing the +truth. A few days later a letter was opened at the censor's office +from a lady-in-waiting who had been present at the lunch. It was +evidently not intended for our eyes; it contained a description of the +_dejeuner fort embetant_, with some unflattering remarks about me. + +Queen Marie never lost her hope in a final victory. She did not +perhaps agree with Bratianu in all his tactics, but a declaration of +war on us was always an item on her programme. Even in the distressing +days of their disastrous defeat she always kept her head above water. +One of the Queen's friends told me afterwards that when our armies, +from south, north and west, were nearing Bucharest, when day and night +the earth shook with the ceaseless thunder of the guns, the Queen +quietly went on with her preparations for departure, and was firmly +persuaded that she would return as "Empress of all the Roumanians." I +have been told that after the taking of Bucharest Bratianu collapsed +altogether, and it was Queen Marie who comforted and encouraged him. +Her English blood always asserted itself. After we had occupied +Wallachia, I received absolutely reliable information from England, +according to which she had telegraphed to King George from Jassy, +recommending "her little but courageous people" to his further +protection. After the Peace of Bucharest strong pressure was brought +to bear on me to effect the abdication of the King and Queen. It would +not in any way have altered the situation, as the Entente would +naturally have reinstated them when victory was gained; but I opposed +all such efforts, not for the above reason, which I could not foresee, +but from other motives, to be mentioned later, although I was +perfectly certain that Queen Marie would always remain our enemy. + +The declaration of war created a very uncomfortable situation for all +Austro-Hungarians and Germans. I came across several friends in the +Austro-Hungarian colony who had been beaten by the Roumanian soldiers +with the butt-ends of their rifles on their way to prison. I saw wild +scenes of panic and flight that were both grotesque and revolting, and +the cruel sport lasted for days. + +In Vienna all subjects of an enemy state were exempt from deportation. +In my capacity as Minister I ordered reprisals on Roumanian citizens, +as there were no other means to relieve the fate of our poor refugees. +As soon as the neutral Powers notified that the treatment had become +more humane, they were set free. + +If we showed ourselves at the windows or in the garden of the Embassy +the crowd scoffed and jeered at us, and at the station, when we left, +a young official whom I asked for information simply turned his back +on me. + +A year and a half later I was again in Bucharest. The tide of victory +had carried us far, and we came to make peace. We were again subjects +of interest to the crowds in the streets, but in very different +fashion. A tremendous ovation awaited us when we appeared in the +theatre, and I could not show myself in the street without having a +crowd of admirers in my wake. + +Before all this occurred, and when war was first declared, the members +of the Embassy, together with about 150 persons belonging to the +Austro-Hungarian colony, including many children, were interned, and +spent ten very unpleasant days, as we were not sure whether we should +be released or not. We had occasion during that time to witness three +Zeppelin raids over Bucharest, which, seen in the wonderful moonlight, +cloudless nights under the tropical sky, made an unforgettable +impression on us. + +I find the following noted in my diary: + + +"_Bucharest, August, 1916._ + +"The Roumanians have declared war on my wife and daughter too. A +deputation composed of two officials from the Ministry for Foreign +Affairs, in frock-coats and top hats, appeared last night at eleven +o'clock in my villa at Sinaia. My wife was roused out of her sleep, +and by the light of a single candle--more is forbidden on account of +the Zeppelin raids--they informed her that Roumania had declared war +on us. + +"As the speaker put it, '_Vous avez declare la guerre_.' He then read +the whole declaration of war aloud to them both. Bratianu sent word +to me that he would have a special train sent to take my wife and +daughter and the whole personnel of the Embassy to Bucharest. + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Roumanians really expected a Zeppelin attack at once. So far it +has not occurred, and they begin to feel more at ease, and say that it +is too far for the Zeppelins to come all the way from Germany. They +seem not to be aware that Mackensen has Zeppelins in Bulgaria. But who +can tell whether they really will come? + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"Last night a Zeppelin did come. About three o'clock we were roused by +the shrill police whistles giving the alarm. The telephone notified us +that a Zeppelin had crossed the Danube, and all the church bells began +to peal. Suddenly darkness and silence reigned, and the whole town, +like some great angry animal, sullen and morose, prepared for the +enemy attack. Nowhere was there light or sound. The town, with a +wonderful starry firmament overhead, waited in expectation. Fifteen, +twenty minutes went by, when suddenly a shot was fired and, as though +it were a signal, firing broke out in every direction. The +anti-aircraft guns fired incessantly, and the police, too, did their +best, firing in the air. But what were they firing at? There was +absolutely nothing to be seen. The searchlights then came into play. +Sweeping the heavens from east to west, from north to south, they +searched the firmament, but could not find the Zeppelin. Was it really +there, or was the whole thing due to excited Roumanian nerves? + +"Suddenly a sound was heard: the noise of the propeller overhead. It +sounded so near in the clear, starry night, we felt we must be able to +see it. But the noise died away in the direction of Colbroceni. Then +we heard the first bomb. Like a gust of wind it whistled through the +air, followed by a crash and an explosion. A second and third came +quickly after. The firing became fiercer, but they can see nothing +and seem to aim at where the sound comes from. The searchlights sway +backwards and forwards. Now one of them has caught the airship, which +looks like a small golden cigar. Both the gondolas can be seen quite +distinctly, and the searchlight keeps it well in view, and now a +second one has caught it. It looks as though this air cruiser is +hanging motionless in the sky, brilliantly lit up by the searchlights +right and left. Then the guns begin in good earnest. Shrapnel bursts +all around, a wonderful display of fireworks, but it is impossible to +say if the aim is good and if the monster is in danger. Smaller and +smaller grows the Zeppelin, climbing rapidly higher and higher, until +suddenly the miniature cigar disappears. Still the searchlights sweep +the skies, hoping to find their prey again. + +"Suddenly utter silence reigns. Have they gone? Is the attack over? +Has one been hit? Forced to land? The minutes go by. We are all now on +the balcony--the women, too--watching the scene. Again comes the +well-known sound--once heard never forgotten--as though the wind were +getting up, then a dull thud and explosion. This time it is farther +away towards the forts. Again the firing breaks out, and machine-guns +bark at the friendly moon; searchlights career across the heavens, but +find nothing. Again there falls a bomb--much nearer this time--and +again comes the noise of the propellers louder and louder. Shrapnel +bursts just over the Embassy, and the Zeppelin is over our heads. We +hear the noise very distinctly, but can see nothing. Again a sudden +silence everywhere, which has a curious effect after the terrible +noise. Time passes, but nothing more is heard. The first rays of dawn +are seen in the east; the stars slowly pale. + +"A child is heard to cry somewhere, far away: strange how clearly it +sounds in the silent night. There is a feeling as though the terrified +town hardly dared breathe or move for fear the monster might return. +And how many more such nights are there in prospect? In the calm of +this fairylike dawn, slowly rising, the crying of the child strikes a +note of discord, infinitely sad. But the crying of the child--does it +not find an echo among the millions whom this terrible war has driven +to desperation? + +"The sun rises like a blood-red ball. For some hours the Roumanians +can take to sleep and gather fresh strength, but they know now that +the Zeppelin's visit will not be the last. + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Press is indignant about the nocturnal attack. Bucharest is +certainly a fortress, but it should be known that the guns are no +longer in the forts. It was stated in the _Adeverul_ that the heroic +resistance put up in defence was most successful. That the airship, +badly damaged, was brought down near Bucharest, and that a commission +started off at once to make sure whether it was an aeroplane or a +Zeppelin! + + +"_Bucharest, September, 1916._ + +"The Zeppelin returned again this evening and took us by surprise. It +seemed to come from the other side of Plojest, and the sentries on the +Danube must have missed it. Towards morning the night watch at the +Embassy whose duty it is to see that there is no light in the house +saw a huge mass descending slowly over the Embassy till it almost +touched the roof. It hovered there a few minutes, making observations. +No one noticed it until suddenly the engines started again, and it +dropped the first bomb close to the Embassy. A direct hit was made on +the house of the Ambassador Jresnea Crecianu, and twenty gendarmes who +were there were killed. The royal palace was also damaged. The +Government is apparently not satisfied with the anti-aircraft forces, +but concludes that practice will make them perfect. Opportunity for +practice will certainly not be lacking. + +"Our departure is being delayed by every sort of pretext. One moment +it seems as though we should reach home via Bulgaria. This idea suited +Bratianu extremely well, as the Bulgarian willingness to grant +permission was a guarantee that they had no plans of attack. But he +reckoned in this without his host. E. and W. are greatly alarmed +because the Roumanians intend to detain them, and will probably hang +them as spies. I have told them, 'Either we all stay here or we all +start together. No one will be given up.' That appears to have +somewhat quieted their fears. + +"As might be expected, these nocturnal visits had disagreeable +consequences for us. The Roumanians apparently thought that it was not +a question of Zeppelins, but of Austro-Hungarian airships, and that my +presence in the town would afford a certain protection against the +attacks; after the first one they declared that for every Roumanian +killed ten Austrians or Bulgarians would be executed, and the hostile +treatment to which we were subjected grew worse and worse. The food +was cut down and was terribly bad, and finally the water supply was +cut off. With the tropical temperature that prevailed and the +overcrowding of a house that normally was destined to hold twenty, and +now housed 170, persons, the conditions within the space of +twenty-four hours became unbearable and the atmosphere so bad that +several people fell ill with fever, and neither doctor nor medicine +was obtainable. Thanks to the energetic intervention of the Dutch +Ambassador, Herr von Vredenburch, who had undertaken the charge of our +State interests, it was finally possible to alter the conditions and +to avert the outbreak of an epidemic." + + * * * * * + +It was just about that time that our Military Attache, Lieut.-Colonel +Baron Randa, made a telling remark. One of our Roumanian slave-drivers +was in the habit of paying us a daily visit and talking in the +bombastic fashion the Roumanians adopted when boasting of their +impending victories. The word "Mackensen" occurred in Randa's answer. +The Roumanian was surprised to hear the name, unknown to him, and +said: "Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce Mackensen? Je connais beaucoup +d'Allemands, mais je n'ai jamais fait la connaissance de M. +Mackensen." "Eh bien," replied Randa, patting him on the shoulder, +"vous la ferez cette connaissance, je vous en guarantie." Three months +after that Mackensen had occupied all Wallachia and had his +headquarters at Bucharest. By that time, therefore, his name must have +been more familiar to our Roumanian friend. + +At last we set off for home via Russia and had a very interesting +journey lasting three weeks, via Kieff, Petersburg, Sweden, and +Germany. To spend three weeks in a train would seem very wearisome to +many; but as everything in this life is a matter of habit we soon grew +so accustomed to it that when we arrived in Vienna there were many of +us who could not sleep the first few nights in a proper bed, as we +missed the shaking of the train. Meanwhile, we had every comfort on +the special train, and variety as well, especially when, on Bratianu's +orders, we were detained at a little station called Baratinskaja, near +Kieff. The reason of this was never properly explained, but it was +probably owing to difficulties over the departure of the Roumanian +Ambassador in Sofia and to the wish to treat us as hostages. The +journey right through the enemy country was remarkable. Fierce battles +were just then being fought in Galicia, and day and night we passed +endless trains conveying gay and smiling soldiers to the front, and +others returning full of pale, bandaged wounded men, whose groans we +heard as we passed them. We were greeted everywhere in friendly +fashion by the population, and there was not a trace of the hatred we +had experienced in Roumania. Everything that we saw bore evidence of +the strictest order and discipline. None of us could think it possible +that the Empire was on the eve of a revolution, and when the Emperor +Francis Joseph questioned me on my return as to whether I had reason +to believe that a revolution would occur, I discountenanced the idea +most emphatically. + +This did not please the old Emperor. He said afterwards to one of his +suite: "Czernin has given a correct account of Roumania, but he must +have been asleep when he passed through Russia." + + +3 + +The development of Roumanian affairs during the war occurs in three +phases, the first of which was in King Carol's reign. Then neutrality +was guaranteed. On the other hand, it was not possible during those +months to secure Roumania's co-operation because we, in the first +period of the war, were so unfavourably situated in a military sense +that public opinion in Roumania would not voluntarily have consented +to a war at our side, and, as already mentioned, such forcible action +would not have met with the King's approval. + +In the second phase of the war, dating from King Carol's death to our +defeat at Luck, conditions were quite different. In this second phase +were included the greatest military successes the Central Powers ever +obtained. The downfall of Serbia and the conquest of the whole of +Poland occurred during this period, and, I repeat, in those months we +could have secured the active co-operation of Roumania. Nevertheless, +I must make it clearly understood here that if the political +preliminaries for intervention on the part of Roumania were not +undertaken, the fault must not be ascribed to the then Minister of +Foreign Affairs, but to the _vis major_ which opposed the project +under the form of a Hungarian veto. As previously stated, Majorescu, +as well as Marghiloman, would only have given his consent to +co-operation if Roumania had been given a slice of the Hungarian +state. Thanks to the attitude of absolute refusal observed at the +Ballplatz, the territory in question was never definitely decided on, +but the idea probably was Transylvania and a portion of the Bukovina. +I cannot say whether Count Burian, if he had escaped other influences, +would have adopted the plan, but certain it is that however ready and +willing he was to act he would never have carried out the plan against +the Hungarian Parliament. According to the Constitution, the Hungarian +Parliament is sovereign in the Hungarian State, and without the use of +armed means Hungary could never have been induced to cede any part of +her territory. + +It is obvious, however, that it would have been impossible during the +world war to have stirred up an armed conflict between Vienna and +Budapest. My then German colleague, von dem Busche, entirely agreed +with me that Hungary ought to make some territorial sacrifices in +order to encourage Roumania's intervention. I firmly believe that +then, and similarly before the Italian declaration of war, a certain +pressure was brought to bear direct on Vienna by Berlin to this end--a +pressure which merely contributed to strengthen and intensify Tisza's +opposition. For Germany, the question was far simpler; she had drawn +payment for her great gains from a foreign source. The cession of the +Bukovina might possibly have been effected, as Stuergkh did not object, +but that alone would not have satisfied Roumania. + +It was quite clear that the opposition to the ceding of Transylvania +originated in Hungary. But this opposition was not specially Tisza's, +for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head +of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint. + +I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to +explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the +concession. Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote +me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of +Hungarian territory was out of the question; "whoever attempts to +seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot." + +There was nothing to be done. And still I think that this was one of +the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly +managed, might have influenced the final result. The military advance +on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of +our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it +the clever break through at Goerlitz would have had some results; but +as it was, Goerlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any +lasting effect. + +The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two +ways: the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to giving up any of +their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe--even to the +very last--that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that +sooner or later we would be forced to fight _against_ Roumania unless +we in good time carried her with us. In this connection Tisza always +maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the +belief that Roumania would not dare take it upon herself to attack us. +This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us +so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry +off so much rich booty. I would have been able to take much better +care of the many Austrians and Hungarians living in Roumania--whose +fate was terrible after the declaration of war, which took them also +by surprise--if I had been permitted to draw their attention more +openly and generally to the coming catastrophe; but in several of his +letters Tisza implored me not to create a panic, "which would bring +incalculable consequences with it." As I neither did, nor could, know +how far this secrecy was in agreement with our military +counter-preparations, I was bound to observe it. Apparently, Burian +believed my reports to a certain extent; at any rate, for some time +before the declaration of war he ordered all the secret documents and +the available money to be conveyed to Vienna, and entrusted to Holland +the care of our citizens; but Tisza told me long after that he +considered my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid to +give orders for the _superfluous_ evacuation of Transylvania. + +After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic and rage ran high in +the Hungarian Parliament. The severest criticism was heaped upon me, +as no one doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my false +reports. Here Tisza was again himself when, in a loud voice, he +shouted out that it was untrue; my reports were correct; I had warned +them in time and no blame could be attached to me; he thus took upon +himself the just blame. Fear was unknown to him, and he never tried to +shield himself behind anyone. When I arrived back in Vienna after a +journey of some weeks in Russia, and only then heard of the incident, +I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the honourable and loyal +manner in which he had defended my cause. He replied with the ironical +smile characteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course. + +But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no means such a matter +of course. We have had so many cowards on the Ministerial benches, so +many men who were brave when dealing with their subordinates, toadied +to their superiors, and were intimidated by strong opposition, that a +man like Tisza, who was such a contrast to these others, has a most +refreshing and invigorating effect. The Roumanians attempted several +times to make the maintenance of their _neutrality_ contingent on +territorial concessions. I was always opposed to this, and at the +Ballplatz they were of the same opinion. The Roumanians would have +appropriated these concessions and simply attacked us later to obtain +more. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to gain _military +co-operation_ a cession of territory would be quite in order, since, +once in the field, the Roumanians could not draw back and their fate +would be permanently bound up with ours. + +Finally, the third phase comprises the comparatively short period +between our defeat at Luck and the outbreak of the war in Roumania, +and was simply the death throes of neutrality. + +War was in the air and could be foreseen with certainty. + +As was to be expected, the inefficient diplomacy displayed in the +preparations for the world war brought down severe criticism of our +diplomatic abilities, and if the intention at the Ballplatz was to +bring about a war, it cannot be denied that the preparations for it +were most inadequate. + +Criticism was not directed towards the Ballplatz only, but entered +into further matters, such as the qualifications of the individual +representatives in foreign countries. I remember an article in one of +the most widely-read Viennese papers, which drew a comparison between +the "excellent" ambassador at Sofia and almost all of the others; that +is, all those whose posts were in countries that either refused their +co-operation or even already were in the field against us. + +In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I wish to state here that in +my opinion our then ambassador to Sofia, Count Tarnowski, was one of +the best and most competent diplomats in Austria-Hungary, but that the +point of view from which such praise was awarded to him was in itself +totally false. Had Count Tarnowski been in Paris, London or Rome, +these states, in spite of his undeniable capabilities, would not have +adopted a different attitude; while, on the other hand, there are +numbers of distinguished members of the diplomatic corps who would +have carried out his task at Sofia just as well as Count Tarnowski. + +In other words, I consider it is making an unwarrantable demand to +expect that a representative in a foreign land should have a leading +influence on the policy of the state to which he is accredited. What +may be demanded of a diplomatic representative is a correct estimate +of the situation. The ambassador must know what the Government of the +state where he is will do. A false diagnosis is discreditable. But it +is impossible for a representative, whoever he may be, to obtain such +power over a foreign state as to be able to guide the policy of that +state into the course desired by him. The policy of a state will +invariably be subservient to such objects as the Government of that +period deem vital, and will always be influenced by factors which are +quite outside the range of the foreign representative. + +In what manner a diplomatic representative obtains his information is +his own affair. He should endeavour to establish intercourse, not only +with a certain class of society, but also with the Press, and also +keep in touch with other classes of the population. + +One of the reproaches made to the "old regime" was the assumed +preference for aristocrats in diplomacy. This was quite a mistake. No +preference was shown for the aristocracy, but it lay in the nature of +the career that wealth and social polish were assets in the exercise +of its duties. An attache had no salary. He was, therefore, expected +to have a tolerably good income at home in order to be able to live +conformably to his rank when abroad. This system arose out of +necessity, and was also due to the unwillingness of the authorities to +raise salaries in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The consequence +was that only sons of wealthy parents could adopt such a career. I +once told some delegates who interviewed me in connection with the +subject that a change of the system depended entirely on themselves +and their increased munificence. + +A certain amount of social polish was just as necessary for diplomats +of the old regime as was the requisite allowance for their household +and a knowledge of foreign languages. So long as courts exist in +Europe, the court will always be the centre of all social life, and +diplomats must have the entree to such circles. A young man who does +not know whether to eat with his fork or his knife would play a sorry +part there--his social training is not an indifferent matter. +Preference is, therefore, not given to the aristocracy, but to young +men of wealth familiar with European society etiquette. + +That does not mean that a diplomat is to consider it his duty only to +show himself at all the parties and fetes given by the upper ten +thousand, but it is one of his duties, as at such places he might gain +information unobtainable elsewhere. A diplomat must be in touch with +all sources from which he can glean information. + +Individual capabilities and zeal will naturally play a great part; but +the means that a Government places at the disposition of its foreign +missions are also of the highest importance. + +There are people in the East--I do not know whether to say in +contradistinction to the West--who are not immune to the influence of +gold. In Roumania, for instance, Russia, before the war, had +completely undermined the whole country and had lavished millions long +before the war in the hope of an understanding with that country. Most +of the newspapers were financed by Russians, and numbers of the +leading politicians were bound by Russian interests, whereas neither +Germany nor Austria-Hungary had made any such preparations. Thus it +happened that, on the outbreak of war, Russia was greatly in advance +of the Central Powers, an advance that was all the more difficult to +overtake as from the first day of war Russia opened still wider the +floodgates of her gold and inundated Roumania with roubles. + +If the fact that the scanty preparation for war is a proof of how +little the Central Powers reckoned on such a contingency it may on the +other hand explain away much apparent inactivity on the part of their +representatives. Karl Fuerstenberg, my predecessor at Bucharest, whose +estimate of the situation was a just one, demanded to have more funds +at his disposal, which was refused at Vienna on the plea that there +was no money. After the war began the Ministry stinted us no longer, +but it was too late then for much to be done. + +Whether official Russia, four weeks in advance, had really counted on +the assassination of the Archduke and the outbreak of a war ensuing +therefrom remains an open question. I will not go so far as to assert +it for a fact, but one thing is certain, that Russia within a +measurable space of time had prepared for war as being inevitable and +had endeavoured to secure Roumania's co-operation. When the Tsar was +at Constanza a month before the tragedy at Sarajevo, his Minister for +Foreign Affairs, Sassonoff, paid a visit to Bucharest. When there, he +and Bratianu went on a walking tour together to Transylvania. I did +not hear of this tactless excursion until it was over, but I shared +Berchtold's surprise at such a proceeding on the part of both +Ministers. + +I once, in 1914, overheard by chance a conversation between two +Russians. It was at the Hotel Capsa, known later as a resort for +anti-Austrians. They were sitting at the table next to mine in the +restaurant and were speaking French quite freely and openly. They +appeared to be on good terms with the Russian Ambassador and were +discussing the impending visit of the Tsar to Constanza. I discovered +later that they were officers in mufti. They agreed that the Emperor +Francis Joseph could not live very much longer, and that when his +death occurred and a new ruler came to the throne It would be a +favourable moment for Russia to declare war on us. + +They were evidently exponents of the "loyal" tendency that aimed at +declaring war on us without a preceding murder; and I readily believe +that the majority of the men in Petersburg who were eager for war held +the same view. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE U-BOAT WARFARE + + +1 + +My appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs was thought by many to +indicate that the Emperor Charles was carrying out the political +wishes of his uncle, Ferdinand. Although it had been the Archduke's +intention to have made me his Minister for Foreign Affairs, my +appointment to the post by the Emperor Charles had nothing to do with +that plan. It was due, above all, to his strong desire to get rid of +Count Burian and to the lack of other candidates whom he considered +suitable. The Red Book that was published by Count Burian after the +outbreak of war with Roumania may have attracted the Emperor's +attention to me. + +Although the Emperor, while still Archduke, was for several years my +nearest neighbour in Bohemia--he was stationed at Brandeis, on the +Elbe--we never became more closely acquainted. In all those years he +was not more than once or twice at my house, and they were visits of +no political significance. It was not until the first winter of the +war, when I went from Roumania to the Headquarters at Teschen, that +the then Archduke invited me to make the return journey with him. +During this railway journey that lasted several hours politics formed +the chief subject of conversation, though chiefly concerning Roumania +and the Balkan questions. In any case I was never one of those who +were in the Archduke's confidence, and my call to the Ballplatz came +as a complete surprise. + +At my first audience, too, we conversed at great length on Roumania +and on the question whether the war with Bucharest could have been +averted or not. + +The Emperor was then still under the influence of our first peace +offer so curtly rejected by the Entente. At the German Headquarters at +Pless, where I arrived a few days later, I found the prevailing +atmosphere largely influenced by the Entente's answer. Hindenburg and +Ludendorff, who were apparently opposed to Burian's _demarche_ for +peace, merely remarked to me that a definite victory presented a +possibility of ending the war, and the Emperor William said that he +had offered his hand in peace but that the Entente had given him a +slap in the face, and there was nothing for it now but war to the +uttermost. + +It was at this time that the question of the unrestricted U-boat +warfare began to be mooted. At first it was the German Navy only, and +Tirpitz in particular, who untiringly advocated the plan. +Hohenlohe,[5] who, thanks to his excellent connections, was always +very well informed, wrote, several weeks before the fateful decision +was taken, that the German Navy was determined and bent on that aim. +Bethmann and Zimmermann were both decidedly against it. It was +entirely in keeping with the prudent wisdom of the former not to risk +such experiments; Bethmann was an absolutely dependable, honourable +and capable partner, but the unbounded growth of the military +autocracy must be imputed to his natural tendency to conciliate. He +was powerless against Ludendorff and little by little was turned aside +by him. My first visit to Berlin afforded me the opportunity of +thoroughly discussing the U-boat question with the Imperial +Chancellor, and we were quite agreed in our disapproval of that method +of warfare. At all events, Bethmann pointed out that such essentially +military matters should in the first instance be left to military +decision, as they alone were able to form a correct estimate of the +result, and these reflections made me fear from the very first that +all reasonable political scruples would be upset by military +arguments. On this my first visit to Berlin, when this question +naturally was the dominating one, the Chancellor explained to me how +difficult his position was, because the military leaders, both on land +and at sea, declared that if the unrestricted U-boat warfare were not +carried out they would not be able to guarantee the Western front. +They thus brought an iron pressure to bear on him, for how could he, +the Chancellor, undertake to guarantee that the Western front could +hold out? As a matter of fact, the danger of introducing the +unrestricted U-boat campaign became greater and greater, and the +reports sent by Hohenlohe left no doubt as to the further development +of affairs in Berlin. + +On January 12 he reported as follows: + + The question of the extension of the U-boat warfare, as Your + Excellency is aware from the last discussions in Berlin, becomes + daily more acute. + + On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities insist + on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they + declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand, + all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on + America and other neutrals. + + The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on a + very large scale is imminent in the West and that the armies which + are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the + navy should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at + any rate to decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to + our adversaries. The absence of co-operation on the part of the + navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will + again have to face will have a most _injurious_ effect on their + _moral_. + + The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might + have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that + America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact, + would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United + States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves + what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a + possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily + signify war. + + Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may + be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of + crushing England, at least to be able, _before_ America can come + in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire + will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves + with us at the Conference table. + + To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that + the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves + in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty + promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to + find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the + U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to + _beg_ for peace. + + And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or + against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively + determining which decision was the right one. + + Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be + constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the + question, and it is obvious--whatever the decision may be--that we + also shall be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me + that when the German Government does approach us in that + connection we should act with all possible reserve. As the matter + now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right + one is not possible. I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to + take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the + responsibility from the German Government and render it possible + for them to lay it upon us. + + The Imperial and Royal Ambassador, + + G. HOHENLOHE, M.P. + +The concluding passage of the above cited report had already been +anticipated by me in a telegraphic communication in which I begged the +ambassador with all possible energy to urge the political arguments +opposed to the unrestricted U-boat warfare, which is proved by a +telegram from Hohenlohe on January 13 as follows: + + Reply to yesterday's telegram No. 15. + + In accordance with the telegram mentioned, and after discussing it + with Baron Flotow, I went to the Secretary of State--not being + able to see the Chancellor to-day--and in conformity with Your + Excellency's intentions called his attention to the fact that we + should participate in the results of the U-boat war just as much + as Germany and that, therefore, the German Government is bound to + listen to us also. All the leading German statesmen know that Your + Excellency, during your stay here, expressed _yourself as opposed + to the movement_, but that I had come once more as Your + Excellency's representative to repeat the _warning against too + hasty action_. I further emphasised all the arguments against the + U-boat warfare, but will not trouble Your Excellency with a + repetition of them, nor yet with the counter-arguments, already + known to Your Excellency, that were put forward by the Secretary. + I gave a brief summary of both these standpoints in my yesterday's + report No. 6 P. + + Herr Zimmermann, however, laid special stress on the fact that the + information he was receiving convinced him more and more that + America, especially after the Entente's answer to Mr. Wilson, + which was in the nature of an insult, would very probably not + allow it to come to a breach with the Central Powers. + + I did all I possibly could to impress upon him the responsibility + Germany was taking for herself and for us by her decision in this + question, pointing out very particularly that before any decision + was arrived at our opinion from a nautical-technical standpoint + must also be heard, in which the Secretary of State fully + concurred. + + I have the feeling that the idea of carrying out the U-boat + warfare is more and more favourably received, and Your Excellency + had the same impression also when in Berlin. The last word as to + the final attitude to be adopted by the German Government will no + doubt come from the military side. + + In conformity with the instructions received, _I will nevertheless + uphold with all firmness the political arguments against the + U-boat warfare_. + + Baron Flotow will have occasion to meet the Secretary of State + this afternoon. + +I had sent Baron Flotow, a Chief of Department, to Berlin at the same +time, in order that he might support all Hohenlohe's efforts and spare +no pains to induce Germany to desist from her purpose. + +Flotow sent me the following report on January 15: + + After a two-days' stay in Berlin my impression is that the + question of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought + to the front by the leading men in the German Empire. This + question--according to Herr Zimmermann--under conditions of the + greatest secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under + debate between the heads of the Army and Navy and the Foreign + Office; they insist on a decision. For if the unrestricted U-boat + warfare is to be opened it must be at a time when, in view of the + vast impending Anglo-French offensive on the Western front, it + will make itself felt. The Secretary of State mentioned the month + of February. + + I wish in the following account to summarise the reasons put + forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted + U-boat warfare: + + Time is against us and favours the Entente; if, therefore, the + Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less + prospect of our obtaining a peace on our own terms. The enemy's + last Note to Wilson is again a striking example of their war + energy. + + It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war + after 1917 with any prospect of success. Peace must, therefore, + unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in + the course of this year, which means that we must enforce it. + + The military situation is unfavourable owing to the impending + Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with + great force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme. To + meet the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other + fronts. Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to + bring that enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have + been possible, can no longer be reckoned on. + + If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the East + becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in + the West, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat + warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding + the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral + flag. + + In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat + warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the + transport of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to + such a degree as would render it impossible for the English to + continue the war. In Italy and in France this will be felt no less + severely. The neutrals, too, will be made to suffer, which, + however, might serve as a pretext to bring about peace. + + America will hardly push matters further than breaking off + diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on + a war with the United States. + + It must not be overlooked that the United States--as was the case + in regard to Mexico--are not well prepared for war, that their one + anxiety is Japan. Japan would not allow a European war with + America to pass unheeded. + + But even if America were to enter the war it would be three to + four months before she could be ready, and in that space of time + peace must have been secured in Europe. According to the estimate + of certain experts (among others, some Dutch corn merchants), + England has only provisions sufficient for six weeks, or three + months at the outside. + + It would be possible to carry on the U-boat warfare on England + from fifteen bases in the North Sea, so _that the passage of a + large vessel through to England would be hardly conceivable_. + Traffic in the Channel, even if not entirely stopped, would be + very limited, as travelling conditions in France exclude the + possibility of suitable connection. + + And if the unrestricted U-boat warfare once were started, the + terror caused by it (the sinking of the vessels without warning) + would have such an effect that most vessels would not dare to put + to sea. + + The above already hints at the rejoinder to be put forward to the + arguments advanced by us against the opening of the unrestricted + U-boat warfare, and also combats the view that the corn supply + from the Argentine is not at the present moment so important for + the United States as would be a prompt opening of the U-boat + campaign, which would mean a general stoppage of all traffic. + + The fact that America would not be ready for war before the end of + three months does not exclude the possibility that it might even + be as long as six or eight months, and that she therefore might + join in the European war at a time when, without playing our last + card, it might be possible to end it in a manner that we could + accept. It must not be forgotten, however, that in America we have + to do with an Anglo-Saxon race, which--once it had decided on + war--will enter on it with energy and tenacity, as England did, + who, though unprepared for war as to military matters, can + confront to-day the Germans with an army of millions that commands + respect. I cannot with certainty make any statement as to the + Japanese danger to America at a time when Japan is bound up with + Russia and England through profitable treaties and Germany is shut + out from that part of the world. + + Among other things I referred to the great hopes entertained of + the Zeppelins as an efficient weapon of war. + + Herr Zimmermann said to me: "Believe me, our fears are no less + than yours; they have given me many sleepless nights. There is no + positive certainty as to the result; we can only make our + calculations. We have not yet arrived at any decision. Show me a + way to obtain a reasonable peace and I would be the first to + reject the idea of the U-boat warfare. As matters now stand, both + I and several others have almost been converted to it." + + But whether, in the event of the ruthless U-boat warfare being + decided on, it would be notified in some way, has not yet been + decided. + + Zimmermann told me he was considering the advisability of + approaching Wilson, and, while referring to the contemptuous + attitude of the Entente in the peace question, give the President + an explanation of the behaviour of the German Government, and + request him, for the safety of the life and property of American + citizens, to indicate the steamers and shipping lines by which + traffic between America and other neutrals could be maintained. + + _Vienna, January 15, 1917._ + + FLOTOW, M.P. + +On January 20 Zimmermann and Admiral Holtzendorff arrived in Vienna, +and a council was held, presided over by the Emperor. Besides the +three above-mentioned, Count Tisza, Count Clam-Martinic, Admiral Haus +and I were also present. Holtzendorff expounded his reasons, which I +recapitulate below. With the exception of Admiral Haus, no one gave +unqualified consent. All the arguments which appear in the official +documents and ministerial protocols were advanced but did not make the +slightest impression on the German representatives. The Emperor, who +took no part in the debate, finally declared that he would decide +later. Under his auspices a further conference was held in the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 2 o'clock; the report is as follows: + + Report of a conference held January 20, 1917, in the Imperial and + Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Dr. + Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs + Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval + Staff; Count Czernin, Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign + Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count + Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus, + the German naval attache in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the + Imperial and Royal naval attache in Berlin; Count B. + Colloredo-Mannsfeld. + + On January 20 a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs on the question of establishing unrestricted U-boat + warfare. + + As evidenced by Admiral v. Holtzendorff's statements, the German + naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an + absolute necessity for the quickest possible inauguration of an + unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in support of + this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and Royal + Ambassador in Berlin (report of 12/1/17 Nr. 6/P, and telegram of + 13/1 Nr. 22), and may be summarised in the following sentences: + Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central Powers, + progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-French + offensive on the Western front with improved and increased means + for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent or at + least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking, the + impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of + raising the _moral_ of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results + and the use of every available means in war, certainty of the + success of an unrestricted U-boat warfare in view of provisions + in England only being sufficient for two to three months, as well + as the stoppage of the munitions output and industrial production + owing to the lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying + coal to France and Italy, etc., etc. + + Concerning the carrying out of the plan, the German Navy owns at + present for that purpose 120 U-boats of the latest type. In view + of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of + the war, when there were only 19 of an antiquated type, the + present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guarantee of + success. + + February 1 is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date on + which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to + announce the blockade of the English coast and the west coast of + France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed + without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to + reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral + von Holtzendorff _expressis verbis_ guaranteed the results. + + As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading + German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic + views. It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or + Holland will interfere with us, although, in view of the + possibility of such happening, military precautions have been + taken. The measures taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will, + in the opinion of the Germans, hold those countries in check, and + the possibility of sharing the fate of Roumania will frighten + them. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a complete + stoppage of all neutral shipping, which in the matter of supplies + for England amounts to 39 per cent. of the cargo space. Meanwhile + concessions will be granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit + for the withdrawal of such of their vessels as may be at sea on + the opening day of the U-boat warfare. + + With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all + possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central + Powers by adopting a friendly attitude towards America (acting + upon the proposals made at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident), + but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever + attitude America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the + opinion that the United States will not go so far as making a + breach with the Central Powers. If that should occur, America + would be too late and could only come into action after England + had been beaten. America is not prepared for war, which was + clearly shown at the time of the Mexican crisis; she lives in fear + of Japan and has to fight against agricultural and social + difficulties. Besides which, Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the + Germans presume that after his election he will adopt a still + more decided tendency that way, for his election will not be due + to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the + Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the + Irish and Germans. These considerations, together with the + Entente's insulting answer to President Wilson's peace proposal, + do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into + war. + + These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand + for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is + based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign + Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views. + + Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian + Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would + ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral, + agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of + the success of a blockade of England. Count Czernin held that the + Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in + England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war + consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been + reduced by half. Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague + and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities. + It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to + the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons + per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end, + and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best + card until all other means had been tried. The possibility of + being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a + Damocles' sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would + perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the + reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it + the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the effect expected by + Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of + possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the + enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanishing of + the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact. + Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put + forward by the Germans show a complete _novum_, namely, the danger + on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive + that is expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the + attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered + necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy + into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most + certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and + the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be + accepted. Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their + grave doubts in this connection. + + To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the + necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the + neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the + Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to + them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing + unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice + was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as + the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations. + + The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary + steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements + had already been made. + + Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the + German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_ + as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force, + and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a + ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been + practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged + that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the + Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent. + + The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said + that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the + conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th + inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose. + +After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor, +and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare +and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany +had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and +that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to +be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small +number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great +effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I +entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should +separate from Germany on that one point, although I was aware that it +might lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty was that +the U-boat effort would also have to be carried on in the +Mediterranean in order that it should not lose its effect in the +North Sea. If the Mediterranean remained exempt, the transports would +take that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and Dover, and +thus render the northern U-boat warfare of no effect. But in order to +carry it on in the Mediterranean, Germany would need our support in +the Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed her at +those places it involved us in the campaign, and if we refused to let +our few U-boats go out, it would be attacking Germany in the rear and +we should become embroiled with her, which would lead to the definite +severance of the Alliance. + +This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong +and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it +changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally. None +who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart +we gave our consent. Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of +the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was +differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the +German plans. Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that +Bulgaria's not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside +world, and would not help her in any way. Although her relations with +America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of +fact, make her fate easier. + +Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat +warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined +in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of +our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of +Bulgaria. As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict +with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and +artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans. We were +compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already +at war with her. + +It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even +nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her +and Bulgaria to the very end of the war. + +It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact that +the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible +mistake. To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German +military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and +when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was +still that England would be defeated by the naval war. Writing on +December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles +the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however, certainly perceived +definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff +in replying to the reproaches I made to him said: "Everything is risky +in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the +results. I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final +result will show that I was right." In order to exculpate themselves +all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case, +have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last +impetus. Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either +be asserted or denied positively. + +The world has become used to looking upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff as +one; they belonged together. Together they rose to highest power, to +be forcibly separated in their fall. In all business transactions +Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great speaker, but always +in a sharp tone, suggestive of the Prussian military system. It +usually aroused a scene, but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his +anger vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's retiring +modesty made him attractive. Once when we were speaking of the +photographers who besieged every conference in Berlin, the old +gentleman remarked: "I have lived to be seventy, and nobody ever +thought there was anything wonderful about me; now they seem all at +once to have discovered that I have such an interesting head." He was +much more staid and quiet than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to +public opinion as the latter. I remember once how Ludendorff, when I +exhorted him to yield on the peace question, rejoined with vigour: +"The German people wishes for no peace of renunciation, and I do not +intend to end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty would never +survive such a peace." The dynasty has departed, the stones have been +thrown, and the peace of renunciation has become a reality, and is +certainly more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever have +believed! + + +2 + +The rupture between America and Germany occurred on February 3, 1917. + +The Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, remained in Washington, but was not +received by Wilson, and had intercourse with Lansing only. I still +hoped to maintain these semi-official relations with America, in case +America, in breaking off relations with Germany, might be content with +that and not declare war on her. The German Government would have +preferred our breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with +them. + +On February 12 Count Wedel called on me, and his request and my +settlement of it appear in the following telegram to Hohenlohe: + + + _Vienna, Feb. 12, 1917._ + + To notify Your Excellency. + + Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following + three requests from his Government: + + (1) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the + situation between Germany and America is clear. + + (2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his having + tried to make the neutrals turn against Germany. + + (3) On the outbreak of war with Germany Count Tarnowski must be + recalled. + + I have refused the first two items and accepted the last. + +As we should not have been able to prevent Germany from beginning the +U-boat warfare, the only alternative for us was to use all means in +our power to maintain our relations with America, and thus enable us +later to play the part of mediator, although this could only be for +that period during which America, having broken off relations, had not +yet declared war. My answer of March 5, 1917, to America's request +for an explanation of our standpoint was sent with the object of +preventing America from breaking off relations with us, and also to +keep from the public the knowledge of our divergence from Germany. +This will be found noted in the appendix.[6] It met with success so +far that America continued diplomatic relations with us until April 9, +1917. + +[Illustration: COUNT TISZA. _Photo: Stanley's Press Agency._] + +I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen Tisza in consequence +of my answer. I received the following letter on March 3: + + DEAR FRIEND,--In the interests of the cause I can only greatly + regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the definite + sense of our _aide-memoire_ before it was dispatched. Apart from + other less important matters, I cannot conceal my painful surprise + that we repeatedly and expressly admit having given a promise in + our _Ancona_ Note. I am afraid that we have placed ourselves in a + very awkward position with Wilson, which so easily could have been + avoided, as it was not in accordance with my views that we had + given a promise. + + An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to + detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different + legal character, and from the point of view of a third person has + no legal authority in favour of that person as a promise. + + By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans a + promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them. + In spite of the fine and clever argument in our Note, it will be + easy for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot + be reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a + promise, then the American Government has the right to look for + the fulfilment of it, and we will then be in an awkward + predicament. I remarked in my notification that I would prefer to + omit the admission that we had made any promise; there would have + been the possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in + their hands we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a + checkmate, and I very much fear that we shall greatly regret it. + + Naturally this remains between us. But I was constrained to pour + out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of all + such important State documents which involve such far-reaching + consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and + comment on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the + cause and in every respect can only be for the best. In sincere + friendship, your devoted + + TISZA. + + + _Enclosure._ + + It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace + wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson, + influenced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a + decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my + presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as + possible the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America. + + Therefore the answer to the American _aide-memoire_, to be + dispatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give + it the appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put + forward on the American side without falling into the trap of the + question put forward in the _aide-memoire_. + + If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to + avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer we + shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on January 31. + + The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is + provided by the _aide-memoire_ itself, as it identifies our + statements in the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ question with the attitude + of the German Note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite + consistent if we, as we did in our Note of December 14, 1915, were + to declare that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice. + + In our correspondence with the American Government respecting the + _Ancona_, _Persia_ and _Petrolite_ questions we treated the + concrete case always without going deeper into the individual + principles of legal questions. In our Note of December 29, 1915, + which contains the expression of opinion cited in the + _aide-memoire_ (it may also be noted that our expression of + opinion was no pledge, as we had promised nothing nor taken any + obligation upon ourselves), the Austrian Government distinctly + stated that they would refer later to the difficult international + questions connected with the U-boat warfare. + + Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion. + In consequence, however, of the dealings of our enemies, events + have occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on + our side also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat + question unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever + attainable, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the + enemy. Our adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most + aggravated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals + offering any resistance. + + The Entente when laying their minefields displayed the same + ruthlessness towards free shipping and the lives of neutrals. + + Mines are considered as a recognised weapon for the definite + protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of + blockading an enemy port. But the use made of them as an + aggressive factor in this war is quite a new feature, for vast + areas of open sea on the route of the world's traffic were + converted into minefields impassable for the neutrals except at + the greatest danger of their lives. + + There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the + freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests + than establishing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited + and clearly marked-out zone, leaving open channels for neutral + shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the + interests of the neutrals. + + Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire + belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our + group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to + conclude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh + and larger minefield was laid down in the North Sea on the route + of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble + initiative of the United States, a war of destruction against our + groups of Powers was announced by the Entente. + + We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American + Government: the quickest possible cessation of the fearful + slaughter of men and the founding of an honourable, lasting and + blessed peace by combating with the greatest energy our enemies' + furious war for conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common + aims of ourselves and the American Government, and we cannot give + up the hope of finding understanding in the people and the + Government of the United States. + + TISZA. + + +I answered as follows: + + + _March 5._ + + DEAR FRIEND,--I cannot agree with you. After the first _Ancona_ + Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that "we + agreed with the German standpoint in the main"--that was an + obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise. + + I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and + if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any + further. + + But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with + words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it; + either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will + avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and + will find it in our Note. + + So much for the merits of the matter. + + What you demand is technically impossible. The Note was not easy + to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His + Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and + sanctioned it. Meanwhile Penfield[7] importuned me and telegraphed + even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans, + too, had to be won over for that particular passage. + + You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but + _ultra posse nemo tenetur_--it was physically impossible to upset + everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views. + + In true friendship, your + + CZERNIN. + +I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza: + + DEAR FRIEND,--I also note with genuine pleasure the success of + your American _aide-memoire_ (meaning thereby America's resolve + not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter my + opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given. + It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it + would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment. + + Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final + word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think + me better than I am. + + Au revoir, in true friendship, your + + TISZA. + +Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated +it from reasons of _vis major_, because we could not prevent the +German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and +I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no +advantage to us. + +Not until very much later--in fact, not until after the war--did I +learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible +misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more +U-boats during the war. The Secretary of State, Capelle, was +approached by competent naval technical experts, who told him that, by +stopping the building of all other vessels, a fivefold number of +U-boats could be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext +"that nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats when the war +was at an end." Germany had, as mentioned, 100 submarines; had she +possessed 500, she might have achieved her aims. + +I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was from a source from +which I invariably gleaned correct information. + +Seldom has any military action called forth such indignation as the +sinking, without warning, of enemy ships. And yet the observer who +judges from an objective point of view must admit that the waging war +on women and children was not begun by us, but by our enemies when +they enforced the blockade. Millions have perished in the domains of +the Central Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest and +weakest people--the greater part women and children--were the victims. +If, to meet the argument, it be asserted that the Central Powers were +as a besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved Paris in +similar fashion, there is certainly some truth in the argument. But it +is just as true--as stated in the Note of March 5--that in a war on +land no regard is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war +zone, and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should be +subject to different moral conditions. When a town or village is +within the range of battle, the fact has never prevented the artillery +from acting in spite of the danger to the women and children. But in +the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy States who are +in danger can easily escape it by not undertaking a sea voyage. + +Since the debacle in the winter of 1918, I have thoroughly discussed +the matter with English friends of long standing, and found that their +standpoint was--that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had +roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature of the +proceedings so opposed to international law. Also, the torpedoing of +hospital ships by the Germans, and the firing on passengers seeking to +escape, and so on. These accounts are flatly contradicted by the +Germans, who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English +brutality, as instanced by the _Baralong_ episode. + +There have, of course, been individual cases of shameful brutality in +all the armies; but that such deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the +German or English Supreme Commands I do not believe. + +An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court would be the only +means of bringing light to bear on the matter. + +Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be condemned, no matter who +the perpetrators are; but in itself, the U-boat warfare was an +allowable means of defence. + +The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible and necessary +proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat warfare is stigmatised as a crime +against international law. That is the sentence passed by might but +not by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[5] The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst. + +[6] See p. 279. + +[7] Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +ATTEMPTS AT PEACE + + +1 + +The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary +state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of +representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His +action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of +representatives. If the majority of that body are against the +minister, he must go. + +The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in +the hands of the delegations. + +Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a +regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was +responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently, +the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in +conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and +the Prime Minister." + +It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime +Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's regime it had +become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret +nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought +his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza +possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time +to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding +his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore, +to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign +policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime +Minister. + +Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the +friendship between us, still his constant supervision and +intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of +business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on +top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for +Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified +presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the +Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the +standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar +centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians. +He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism +save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to +keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a +crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of +Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected +cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined +than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the +Tyrol. + +Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for +Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's +internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external +pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of +provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian +Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was +fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any +expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All +his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a +mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at +most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her +over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with +Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He +looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to +the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he +was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian +pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered. +Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in +making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay +much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for +the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite +of eventual disagreement. + +This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was +unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various +disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these +scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty +word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised +never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I +promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after +this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different +reasons. + +I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had +caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a +speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly, +Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the +war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the +Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace +negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the +_status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of +great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become +hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood +in awe of nothing and nobody--and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this +upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth, +and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did. + +I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve +the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never +put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the +strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that +warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle +as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship +with him as with Tisza. + +Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest +reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this +remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years +Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and +manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity +raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with +brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in +Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and +he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of +old were made--heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often +did I reproach him with his unhappy "_puszta_" patriotism, that was +digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change +him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that, +all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy. +Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her +day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this +wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like +none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the +breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful +personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was +one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly +loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand +of some cowardly assassin. + +Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that +his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian. + +I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a +man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar +way of thinking spoilt him. + +Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in +the war. + +Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing +away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love +and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy +settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an +impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the +war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment, +through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was +beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains +true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. +The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition; +therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in +the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more +injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war. +Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder +that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly +linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but +like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck." + +If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would +have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any +sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into +partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion. + +But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was +impossible. + +Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever +be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind +fate preserve us from a return of dualism. + + +2 + +On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received +a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the +tactics to be observed: + + All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously + threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania, + etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour, + and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared + with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried + out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers. + + From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that + our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war + aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a + plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly + desire peace. + + We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to + neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the + necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for + our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from + making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions. + + An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the + belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and + might easily make the situation more strained; _a one-sided + announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the + belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything_. + + It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of + the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially, + but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints + concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting + interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief + aim, _the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the + English at sea_, is in the interests of the entire world, and that + our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the + future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral + side. + + I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest + friendship, your devoted + + TISZA. + +My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace +proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is +still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and +there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I +have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not +have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a +conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not +attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very +arrogant--an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's +speeches in the Hungarian Parliament--I think, nevertheless, that even +had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success. +However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only +strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with +increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a +mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end. + +In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial +concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed +from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private +individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government. +It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A +Government can make use of a private individual to take the first +step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may +also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the +knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the +latter occurred frequently during my term of office. + +I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace, +even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should +be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the +above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could +separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her +purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose +aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian +aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her +Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would +have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an +understanding with Germany. + +The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the +extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready +to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a +conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have +brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance. + +I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim +at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of +pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent. + +After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to +judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have +separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further +accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But +it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single +moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her +Allies. + +An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A +person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give +credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral +Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been +instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of +them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions +would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question +of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if +agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the +same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that +_these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and +void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the +hostile country heard of the step_. + +The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final +sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to +negotiate unknown to the others. + +I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my +authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could +not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27 +through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that +Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further +bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as +stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I +drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not +being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for +peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was +constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate +from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as +mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to +conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee +secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our +Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made +clear. + +This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a +direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace +with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made +clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered +at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to +a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I +hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result. + +I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on +March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his +part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier, +would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole +world. + +The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After +all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility +of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that +direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to +make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the +Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve. + +If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted +U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the +altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer +of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all +expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time +there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat +could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to +counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was +only in the course of the summer that the success of the +anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed. + +In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative +to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid, +which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers +returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there +during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there +was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all +the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers; +potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the +majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so +that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and +they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and, +therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no +one to man them. + +This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different +sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came +from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was +noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an +end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of +the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on +into the winter, the result would be as in Russia--a revolution. + +At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy +Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The +Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their +Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of +non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and +his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At +the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety +concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that +she considered the game was lost. The revolution and the collapse of +the army in Russia still continued. + +Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us, +and justified the views of those who had always held that a little +more "endurance"--to use a word since become ominous--would lead to a +decision. + +During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an +important and adequately estimated significance to confidential +reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided +Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is +inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be +accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism. +Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from +political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from +the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own +personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are +apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the +feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies +of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the +leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be +compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved. + +In persons who make this _metier_ their profession, the wish is often +present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give +pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of +losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate +confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as +being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more +pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin, +was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming +from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were +losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to +assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the +politicians looked at the situation _among our opponents_ differently +from us. + +When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he +related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in +England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was +convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no +question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was +whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of +American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not, +but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing +incidents that might have occurred. + +After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that +many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact. +But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how +matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer +of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England +be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide +difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the +one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken +into account by German opinion. + +However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of +the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented +a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it +was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be +brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became +stronger. + +I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make +the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words +that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in +Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with +France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede +Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make +efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to +Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union. + +The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the +proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence +of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor +William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the +conference terminated with a request from the Germans for +consideration of the question. + +In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If +Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with +the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of +London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to +satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the +hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor +Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once, +nevertheless, to take the proposed step. + +I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the +circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an +amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a +definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany. + +In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to +the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting +that he would submit it to the Emperor William. + +The report was as follows:-- + + Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from + the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my + responsible opinion of the situation? + + It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an + end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to + take up Your Majesty's time needlessly. + + I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production + of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and, + above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to + under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of + the sufferings from the war. + + Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few + months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless + quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely + out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in + the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs. + + Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace + negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the + fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a + moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the + coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the + Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the + absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right + time is, therefore, of extreme importance. + + I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the + whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising + on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is + demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been + dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the + strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us + feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: _exempla trahunt_. + Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the + conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly + rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the + possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the + history of the world; it is without example and without precedent. + The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be + vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the + happenings that have now become daily occurrences. + + The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the + dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound + to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be + conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that + factor. + + Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the + town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our + Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for + the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch + whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one + where the people themselves are fighting for their national + independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the + population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your + Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any + day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances + occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal + the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further + efforts to secure peace will be defeated. + + I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely + different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military + circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I + am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached + the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders + in Berlin do not seek to deny it. + + I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark + on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the + interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than + a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central + Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months, + it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide + of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers + fought and died. + + I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your + Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the + Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when + I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very + day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as + convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and + I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the + dangers that I see ahead. + + Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly + aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can + throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact, + the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the + situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies + have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait + longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be + said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is + the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her + motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that + this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless, + that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be + launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we + shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds--and I + reckon it can be done in two or three months--we must then, before + America takes any further military action to our disadvantage, + make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not + shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to + make. + + Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such + hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous + deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that the + tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the + success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been + achieved. + + Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in + Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare + would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty + will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared + that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously + affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by + the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a + half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare + started, and all the information that we get from England is to + the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most + dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of + many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and + consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the + U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German + arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely + necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and + because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately, + would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted + U-boat warfare. + + To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the + U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory + will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that + England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will + lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics + than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more + fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall + a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible + awakening will follow. + + England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay + down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps--and here I + concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in + a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to + continue this war _a l'outrance_, or whether it would not be more + statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central + Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for + great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers. + + Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to + separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the + responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any + dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty + instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that + our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer + Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these + commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for + Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this + one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say: + + We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility + of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed, + then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make + the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has + proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect + from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be + ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected. + + Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to + make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the + Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to + defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with + all the means in your power and to your very last breath. + +On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial +Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor +Charles, and then to me:-- + + In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to + submit the following in answer to the enclosed _expose_ from the + Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult. + + Since the _expose_ was drawn up, the French and English on the + Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a + wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous + quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of + the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every + reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the + men and the iron will of their leaders. + + Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may + consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the + same confidence. + + The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political + upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a + large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the + situation would release more men even if it were considered + necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to + guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary + movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West + would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would + also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for + the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front + until the end of the war is reached. + + In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material + for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards + provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out + until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary, + especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken + into consideration. + + The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When + Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic + Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success + for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the + expected military advantages weighed against the political risk. + We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a + blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the + entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling + off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies + would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we + were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the + U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest + share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been + transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where + English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the + resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and + favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined + attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England. + + The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat + warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest + statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing + difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies, + as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include + urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength, + but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the + distress that England is suffering. + + The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head + Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed + account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The + review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of + the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8] + + According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda, + owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to + specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so + restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by + hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from + abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by + cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires + not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for + the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to + enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of + the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country, + it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two + instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it + is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats + reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable + extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope + of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater + number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport + facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries + in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed + with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the + possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo + space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat + warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last + year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if + they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But + they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the + subject have already said quite openly that there are only two + ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build + vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy + the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has + proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than + the new vessels building. + + England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss + of tonnage. + + The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and + on all private and Government activities will be felt more and + more. + + I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare + with the greatest confidence. + + According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister + Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that + France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed + before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since + then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping + up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased. + + The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this + war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after + it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France, + which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable. + + As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the + difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe + fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe + that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without + permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare, + without any further crises and without menace to Government + organisation. + + Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a + favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with + Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as + possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of + our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the + important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and + that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a + time when both political and military initiative are still in our + hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or + three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a + matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of + the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not + having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too + pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to + failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the + hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present + moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to + the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be + tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the + Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as + regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative + necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been + favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within + the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political, + economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day + that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will + be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to + follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in + Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but + yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace + negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any + appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to + find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace + between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have + the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the + general peace. + + As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance + with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an + end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a + prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies. + +This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on +the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also +the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as +Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as +we did. + +I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the +following passage:-- + + The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no + doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all + essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with + _sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a + love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more + peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be + crushed. + + I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your + report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the + leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that + you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both + His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the + world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they + cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not + persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation. + +It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest +efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in +order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to +persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were +prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German +military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of +sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in +the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct +touch with the German Reichstag. + +One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections +with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with +different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the +Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the +Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was +enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have +incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were +thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we +simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been +vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore, +absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had +been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret +from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence +with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the +Ministry eventually to disavow the advances. + +My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency +and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9] +and Suedekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now +reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it +was to be peace or war _a l'outrance_. France was tired and not +anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the +latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the +situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey +could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a +successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole +world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war +compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the +recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a +universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered +the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the +war.) + +Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as +Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following: + + (1) No annexations, no indemnities. + + (2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium + (politically and economically). + + (3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be + evacuated as soon as both those States had had their + territories restored to them (including the German + colonies). + + (4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general + disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible. + +Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the +Reichstag, and to be made public. + +The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step. +The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme +Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to +secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable. +When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were +satisfied. + +Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault +at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with +Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the +decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the +entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them +per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with +a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace," +the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the +subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval +of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any +decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a +speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it." + +The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his +very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views +regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to +in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any +rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to +herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic +influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:-- + + _Berlin, August 17, 1917._ + + DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the + liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of + the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your + Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my + activities. + + The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies + me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand + a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than + we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of + the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably + higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less + than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out + economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories, + including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with + regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915. + + There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The + people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is + very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really + morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will + be no worse than it was last year. + + This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the + condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from + the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change + for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary + to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as + would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is + already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly + prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it. + It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war + in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most + earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace + as soon as possible. + + Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to + come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion, + would be a great tactical error. Our _demarche_ for peace last + December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered + by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind + would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any + peace advances must come now from the enemy. + + The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the + watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm + of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal + co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the + spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency + agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our + enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to + agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he + states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into + if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down + there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen + to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations + for peace. + + At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a + proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the + reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on + which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as + follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is + not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is + ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession + of any German territory; with such a conception of the term + "reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very + suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the + desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by + negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close + economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer + to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's + frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the + continent and overseas. + + Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but + must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace + negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of + Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal + grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any + noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine. + + I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the + matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and + economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at + the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until + the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany, + the acquisition of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof)--were + the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The + Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or + similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on + England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and + military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the + matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much + resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to + see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a + prosperous future. + + As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your + Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State + is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France, + which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as + out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent + State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of + November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an + actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the + future will be tested later. There are already many signs of + danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the + Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of + her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in + the administration of the whole state. + + It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger + caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary + through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would + not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the + frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to + grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the + possibility of being joined to Russia. + + The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the + Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in + connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany + respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland. + + It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin, + here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the + questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there + may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling + us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full + agreement. + + With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very + devoted + + MICHAELIS. + +I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course, +the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I +could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing +war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it +imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any +revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would +spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of +Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor +Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore, +conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to +peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, +and I failed to understand it. + +I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the +minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the +question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable +annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers. + +I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German +Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and +that it would be out of the question for the German Government to +ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question +of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and +it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end +the war. + +Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor. + +It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the +situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I +had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I +remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on +me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was +prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of +east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession +of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in +war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the +Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case +for a doctor. + +There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's +ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he +left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling. + +About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the +scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs. + +Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of +persons who, without being in any important position, had access to +diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names, +especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard +the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very +unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the +Entente were slackening.[10] + +It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused +and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early +summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of +the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the +Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of +the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of +our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente +welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance. + +I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear +light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further +development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what +happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with +Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western +Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a +general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the +Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us. + +Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the +time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the +collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to +blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also +suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to +Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by +personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were +repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that +when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of +documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the +matter_, but could not possibly have known. + +Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the +universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I +felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, +from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other +side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to +me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit +of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone +was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination +for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the +alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the +downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a +neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had +heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they +expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of +course, would alter the entire military situation. + +Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral +country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind +the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as +suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, +the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe +about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other +forces were at work. + +The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a +further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet +not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it +lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted +than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to +the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh +instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a +more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In +the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland +myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not +have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it +would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the +mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held +the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert +that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial +Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the +case was different. + +One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the +impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked +everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In +Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were +as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to +Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm +signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that +the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would +have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London. + +The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined +visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs, +separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of +1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less. +It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had +first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final +military victory. + +These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace +wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera +negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment +to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together +with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a +sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the +negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient +agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from +the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace +when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire +group of Powers. + +Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us +from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in +London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we +ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace; +for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see +Germany, her chief enemy, isolated. + +There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the +idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from +the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for +negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being +enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in +any case, would claim the promises made to her. + +In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on +the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify +the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and +insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we +should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the +Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And +secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had +already begun to do so. + +When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags +others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations, +opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the +foregoing events. + +The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was +that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our +Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace. +For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being +crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that +we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance. + +Later I had information from England relating to the official view of +the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic +confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so +strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy +was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made +the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with +her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our +intervention--would have put an end to the war. + +This information was to the effect that England was less than ever +inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been +guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German +militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would +support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was +necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's +military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the +army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military +successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace +resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not +enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in +the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial +collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power. +Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente +said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of +understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate +itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged +against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude +peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that +in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far +as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to +conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises +made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much +territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in +exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states +like Poland. + +This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of +making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the +bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a +more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding +might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military +questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power +proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's +power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then. + +Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the +actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing +misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England +meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy +was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and +Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in +a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened +and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible. + +By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the +strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of +a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best +and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous +without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's +eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat. +According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of +France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed +being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just +as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any +dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the +lust for conquest and the policy of violence. + +The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite +justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the +smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception +that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at +Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not +only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns. + +Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy +continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety +as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the +"hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like +throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, +too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of +settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly +detrimental to all pacifist tendencies. + +In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same +category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest +heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to +irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who +otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he +called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not +the slightest impression on him. + +The _demarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been +published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made +by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter. + +In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at +Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the +representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties +to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear +by the following letter to Tisza. + + (_Not dated._) + + DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of + Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation. + The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission + to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were + there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value + them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two + last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of + peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the + Empire. + + If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor + will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear + friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor + will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that. + + Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my + prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved + to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service + but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war + not coming to an end. + + If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they + would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been + allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace. + + Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the + Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to + "buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if + they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but + that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace. + + I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the + death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in + the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very + indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside + Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam. + + Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the + octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more, + but the contention is false. + + You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we + shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it + is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to + prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the + valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous + steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none + of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of + using _sabotage_ with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps + tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they + understand and have the conviction that it cannot be + otherwise--that a _vis major_ predominates; in other words, that + peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill + will or stupidity of the Ministers. + + The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the + speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we + were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and + made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to + a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm. + + You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's + what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the + slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an + anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the + dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are + always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard + helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this + movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only + way to keep a straight course--he must hold out. Such is the case + of statecraft in Vienna--it is always carried out of the course of + the Alliance. + + It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought + feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully. + Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not + carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing + either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_ + share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk + about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old + + CZERNIN. + +As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be +quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social +Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known. + +As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in +detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the +negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts +were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the +Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in +the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about +the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was +at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and +which finally wrecked them all. + +The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite +correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of +intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, +and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism. +Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany +was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the +Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us +the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could +conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices. +The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted. +Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as +well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the +Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the +Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided +concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, +naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain +premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not +meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however, +the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be +laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but +beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the +frontier posts in the Monarchy. + +It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a +settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals +such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as +was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I +referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone +accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the +future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a +peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in +other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the +Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the +unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine. + +Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were +not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory. +Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in +England especially there were various currents of thought; not +everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to +lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I +seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by +some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable +military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; +she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or +provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea +was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even +unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make +use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She +would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente, +therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even +of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of +German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that +I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be +secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by +Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined +what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the +enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had +to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal. +Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible +and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration +under international control: that, according to my idea, would present +an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in +this, as in the territorial question, would not mete out the same +measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some +guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the +plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a +trial. + +Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question, +which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in +Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred +that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any +further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined +that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the +mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us +to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty +to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost +more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it, +concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military +superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the +Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war. + +I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who +readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations +would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the +war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid +assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and +Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation +that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a +treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies. +Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new +Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have +certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such +relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up +Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and +Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for a vague +promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful +remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by +dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice +Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and +Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the +concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could +understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the +arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be +let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister +who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain +sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living +being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still +more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that +represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out +fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save +himself--but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he +suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the +German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge, +for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but +even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that +deprived us of Bozen and Meran. + +My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to +the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another +ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German +people, for whom no hatred was felt--always the same repetition of +that deceptive argument--but German militarism. England was in a +condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany +were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more +extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would +then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then +England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own +existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard +one, but it would not crush her. In London they cite again the +example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done +man can do again." + +This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and +the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare +ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would +be a great advantage and an important step towards peace. + +My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of +securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that +militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that +direction. + +At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party +leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone +would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At +home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed, +and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting, +and would further check all friendly intentions. + +The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world +organisation is as follows:-- + + The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said: + words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true + respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a + maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are + fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to + know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to + know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet + been made. + + When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly + to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should + tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace + negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of + a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained, + though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian + Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have + reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said + critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness + of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am + that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my + attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called + upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal + Government will deal with the further development of the utterly + distorted European conditions. + + Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation, + preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation, + is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It, + therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme + and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided + us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It + will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear + incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially + Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military + armament, as it is only their military power that has protected + them through these trying years against vastly superior forces. + + Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it + has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the + foundations of former European policy. Among many other political + theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring + state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the + Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and + caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But + having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at + any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on + a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no + hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms. + Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could + not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to + unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the + legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have + been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down + arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration. + This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of + not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of + arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with + all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past. + + After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new + political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This + basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature: + + In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall + be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can + bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will + be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have + undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can + achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is + international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of + the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these + measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate + state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally + to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be + combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all + states in the world must be established on an international basis + and under international control, and the defensive forces limited + to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult + to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny + and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a + path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether + it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to + imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it + left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by + and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could + happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue + after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin + of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be + borne were heavy--though we specially note that Austria-Hungary + was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when + we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during + the war that she resumed her armaments--but after this war an open + competition in armaments would render state burdens all round + simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments + in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold + supply of everything--ten times the artillery, munition factories, + vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to + work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great + Powers would comprise many milliards--it would be impossible with + all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to + bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean + the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively + limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite + impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind + that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred + would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively + low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an + international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no + sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether. + + There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute + international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any + object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world + guarantee the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to + the lowest limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the + interior. This will only be possible on an international basis; + that is, under international control. Every state will have to + cede some of its independence to ensure a world peace. The present + generation will probably not live to see this great pacifist + movement fully completed. It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I + consider it our duty to put ourselves at the head of the movement + and do all that lies in human power to hasten its achievement. The + conclusion of peace will establish the fundamental principles. + + If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory + international arbitration system as well as general disarmament on + land, the second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas + and disarmament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not + extend the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that + special rules and regulations must be laid down for the connecting + sea routes. If these first two factors have been settled and + assured, any reason for territorial adjustments on the plea of + ensuring national safety is done away with, and this forms the + third fundamental principle of the new international basis. This + idea is the gist of the beautiful and sublime Note that His + Holiness the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not gone + to war to make conquests, and we have no aggressive plans. If the + international disarmament that we so heartily are longing for be + adopted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we are in + no need of assurances of territorial safety; in that case, we can + give up the idea of expanding the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, + provided, of course, that the enemy has entirely evacuated our own + territory. + + The fourth principle to enforce in order to ensure a free and + peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have + experienced is the free economic participation by everyone and the + unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature + must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude + peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies + have given up that idea. + + Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world + organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based + on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note, + has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament. + Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted + these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but + agree thoroughly on one--that there nevermore should be a war of + revenge. + +The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most +pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the +subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be +hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment. + +Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a +guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an +opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the +greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was +knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came +from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of +disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only +one way out of it--a fight to the end and then victory. + +Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side +unconditionally with the generals. + +Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as +after my speech--both for and against, with both sides equally +impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn +and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement. + +In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The +U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to +overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the +positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of +their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk +of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign +was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though +mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the +ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse. The +U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western +front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen. + +The military situation underwent a change in the autumn. The end of +the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being +able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the +line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved +the situation. + +It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a +decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was +the new military opinion. Paris and Calais could not be taken. + +In these different phases of military hopes and expectation we floated +like a boat on a stormy sea. In order to land in the haven of peace, +we needed a military wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only +could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would help us to reach +the saving shores. As long as the enemy persisted only in dealing with +the crushed and depopulated Central Powers all was in vain. + +I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare. I believed in a +break-through on the Western front, and during the winter of 1917-1918 +lived in the hope that by such means we might break the obstinate love +of destruction in our enemies. + +As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained the same peace was +impossible, as was also the bringing of any outside pressure to bear +on Germany, for it was true that "the German army was fighting more to +support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own existence." + +Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions of the Pact of +London confronted us. They forced us always to take up arms again, and +drove us back into the field. + + * * * * * + +At the time of writing these lines, in June, 1919, Austria has long +ceased to exist. There is only left now a small, impoverished, +wretched land called German-Austria, a country without army or money; +helpless, starving, and wellnigh in despair. This country has been +told of the peace terms at St. Germain. It has been told it must give +up the Tyrol as to be handed over to Italy. And defenceless and +helpless as it is, it sends up a cry of despair and frantic grief. One +voice only is heard--such peace is impossible! + +How could an Austrian Government accept the dictates of London at a +time when our armies stood far advanced in enemy country, unvanquished +and unbroken, when we had for Ally the strongest land Power in the +world, and when the greatest generals of the war so firmly believed in +the break-through and in final victory? + +To demand that in 1917 or 1918 I should have accepted peace terms +which in 1919 were rejected by the whole of the German-Austrian people +is sheer madness. But it may be there is method in such madness. The +method of using every means to discredit the "old regime." + + * * * * * + +In the beginning of August, 1917, an effort was made at a +_rapprochement_ between England and Germany which, unfortunately, +almost immediately broke down. + +At the suggestion of England a neutral Power had sounded Germany with +regard to Belgium. Germany replied that she was ready for direct +verbal negotiations with England on the Belgian question. In +transmitting this favourable answer, Germany did not entrust it to the +same neutral Power that had brought the message, but for some unknown +reason confided it to a trusted messenger from another neutral +country. This latter appears to have been guilty of some indiscreet +dealings, and when rumours of the affair reached Paris it caused some +anxiety. It was probably thought there that England was more +interested in the Belgian than in the Alsace-Lorraine question. + +The messenger sent from Berlin thought that his task had failed, and +sent word to Berlin that, owing to his errand having been made known, +the opinion among the Entente was that every step taken by Germany was +condemned beforehand to failure. + +The Government which had employed the messenger took up the case on +its own initiative, and transmitted the German reply to London. No +answer was ever received from England. + +This is the account as given to me _post festum_ by Berlin, and +doubtless reflects Berlin's views. Whether the incident in detail was +exactly as described, or whether many more hitherto unknown events +took place, has not been proved. + +During the war all happenings on the other side of the trenches were +looked upon with dim and gloomy eyes as through a veil, and, according +to news received by me later, it was not clear whether England had +sent an answer. Whether it was dispatched and held up on the way, or +what became of it I never knew. It is said never to have reached +Berlin. + +A warlike speech by Asquith on September 27 appears to be connected +with this unsuccessful attempt, and served to calm the Allies. + +It appears extremely doubtful to me, however, whether this advance +would have led to anything, had the occasion been more favourable. The +previously mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis dates +from those August days, a letter referring to Belgian projects which +were very far removed from the English ideas on the subject. And even +if it had been possible to settle the Belgian question, there would +have been that of Alsace-Lorraine, which linked France and England +together, and, first and foremost, the question of disarmament. The +chasm that divided the two camps would have grown so wide that no +bridge could possibly have spanned it. + +Not until January, 1918, did I learn the English version. According to +that, the Germans are said to have taken the first steps, and the +English were not disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It +was stated in _Vorwaerts_ that the suggestion was made at the +instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that subsequently military +influence gained the upper hand. The episode did not tend to improve +the frame of mind of the leading men in England. + +In the early summer of 1917 conditions seemed favourable for peace and +the hope of arriving at an understanding, though still far distant, +was not exactly a Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our +group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have contributed to +stiffen the desire for war in the Entente countries cannot definitely +be stated. Both factors had a share in it. Before we came to a +deadlock in the negotiations, the position was such that even in case +of a separate peace we should have been compelled to accept the terms +of the conference of London. Whether the Entente would have abandoned +that basis if we had not veered from the straight course, and by +unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist +desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not +proved, and never will be. After the debacle in the winter of 1918-19 +it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power +a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question. His +standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed. +Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only +came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and +were beginning to falter. + +With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and England would have +welcomed a separate peace on our part, even during Clemenceau's period +of office; but in that case we should have had to accept the terms of +the London conference. + +Such was the peace question then. How it would have developed if no +misleading policy had come into being naturally cannot be stated. + +I am not putting forward suppositions but confirming facts. And the +fact remains that the failure of the U-boat campaign on the one hand, +and a policy carried on behind the backs of the responsible men on the +other hand, were the reasons why the favourable moment passed and the +peace efforts were checked. And I herewith repeat that this fact does +not in itself prove that peace negotiations would not also have failed +later if the two reasons mentioned above had not existed. + +It became quite clear in the autumn that the war would have to +continue. In my speeches to delegations I endeavoured to leave no +doubt that we were faithful to our Allies. When I said "I see no +difference between Strassburg and Trieste," I said it chiefly for +Sofia and Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple Alliance +was the greatest danger. I still hoped to be able to prop the +trembling foundations of the Alliance policy, and either to secure a +general peace in the East, where the military opposition was giving +way, or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German +break-through on the Western front. + +Several months after my dismissal in the summer of 1918 I spoke in the +Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and warned everyone present against +trying to undermine the Quadruple Alliance. When I declared that +"honour, duty to the Alliance, and the call for self-preservation +compel us to fight by the side of Germany," I was misunderstood. It +did not seem as though the public realised that the moment the Entente +thought the Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that moment +our cause was lost. Had the public no knowledge of the London +agreement? Did they not know that a separate peace would hand us over +totally defenceless to those cruel conditions? Did they not realise +that the German army was the shield that afforded us the last and only +possibility of escaping the fate of being broken up? + +My successor steered the same course as I had done, doubtless from the +same reasons of honour and the call for self-preservation. I have no +particulars as to what occurred in the summer of 1918. + +Afterwards events followed in rapid succession. First came our +terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente break-through on the +Western front, and finally the Bulgarian secession, which had +gradually been approaching since the summer of 1917. + + +3 + +As is the case in all countries, among the Entente during the war +there were many and varied currents of thought. When Clemenceau came +into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war +aim. + +To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a +Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as +though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military +strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I think that +this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when +any such hope was deceptive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote +in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining +influence in England. + +When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to +discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in +Germany was to be or could be guaranteed--and I invariably came to an +_impasse_. It was never explained how England intended to carry out +the proposal. + +The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined +people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly +admitted to us in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not +suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could +lead to a decision. + +Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a +parliamentary regime which would have deprived the Emperor of power +and given it to the Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not +later. The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A disarmament +treaty with Germany would be a treaty between a fox and many geese," +conveyed what he really thought. + +After my Budapest speech, which was treated with such scorn and +contempt in the Press and by public opinion on the other side of the +Channel, word was sent to me from an English source that it was said +the "Czernin scheme" might settle the question. But again it was not +Lloyd George who said that. + +Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the English Prime +Minister, and with them the great majority in France and England, had +of Germany's intentions, no measure could be devised that would have +given London and Paris a sufficient guarantee for a future peaceful +policy. From the summer of 1917, no matter what Germany had proposed, +Lloyd George would always have rejected it as inadequate. + +In consequence of this it was quite immaterial later to the course of +the war that Germany not only did nothing whatever to allay English +fears, but, on the contrary, poured oil in the fire and fanned the +flames. + +Germany, the leading military Power in the war, never for one moment +thought of agreeing to disarmament under international control. After +my speech in Budapest I was received in Berlin not in an unfriendly +manner, but with a sort of pity, as some poor insane person might be +treated. The subject was avoided as much as possible. Erzberger alone +told me of his complete agreement with me. + +Had Germany been victorious her militarism would have increased +enormously. In the summer of 1917 I spoke to several generals of high +standing on the Western front, who unanimously declared that after the +war armaments must be maintained, but on a very much greater scale. +They compared this war with the first Punic War. It would be continued +and its continuation be prepared for; in short, the tactics of +Versailles. The standard of violence must be planted, and would be the +banner of the generals, the Pan-Germans, the Fatherland Party, etc. +etc. They thought as little about a reconciliation of the nations +after the war as did the Supreme Council of Four at Versailles, and +Emperor, Government and Reichstag floundered helplessly in this +torrent of violent purpose. + +The military spirit flourished on the Spree as it is doing now on the +Seine and the Thames. Lloyd George and Unter den Linden in Berlin. +The only difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that the one is a +Frenchman and the other a German; as men they are as like as two peas. + +The Entente is victorious, and many millions are delighted and declare +that the policy of Might is justified. The future only can show +whether this is not a terrible mistake. The lives of hundreds of +thousands of young, hopeful men who have fallen might have been saved +if in 1917 peace had been made possible for us. The triumph of victory +cannot call them back to life again. It appears to me that the Entente +has conquered too much, too thoroughly. The madness of expiring +militarism, in spite of all its orgies, has perhaps celebrated its +last triumph at Versailles. + + +Postscript. + +Taking it altogether, the real historical truth concerning the peace +movement is that, in general, neither the Entente nor the ruling, +all-powerful military party in Germany wished for a peace of +understanding. They both wished to be victorious and to enforce a +peace of violence on the defeated adversary. The leading men in +Germany--Ludendorff above all--never had a genuine intention of +releasing Belgium in an economic and political sense; neither would +they agree to any sacrifices. They wished to conquer in the East and +the West, and their arbitrary tendencies counteracted the pacifist +leaning of the Entente as soon as there were the slightest indications +of it. On the other hand, the leading men in the Entente--Clemenceau +from the first and Lloyd George later--were firmly resolved to crush +Germany, and therefore profited by the continuous German threats to +suppress all pacifist movements in their own countries, always ready +to prove that a peace of understanding with Berlin would be a "pact +between the fox and the geese." + +Thanks to the attitude of the leading Ministers in Germany, the +Entente was fully persuaded that an understanding with Germany was +quite out of the question, and insisted obstinately on peace terms +which could not be accepted by a Germany still unbeaten. This closes +the _circular vitiosus_ which paralysed all negotiating activities. + +_We_ were wedged in between these two movements and unable to strike +out for ourselves, because the Entente, bound by their promises to +their Allies, had already disposed of us by the Pact of London and the +undertakings to Roumania and Serbia. We therefore _could_ not exercise +extreme pressure on Germany, as we were unable to effect the annulment +of those treaties. + +In the early summer of 1917 the possibility of an understanding +_seemed_ to show itself on the horizon, but it was wrecked by the +previously mentioned events. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] Helfferich's _expose_ is reproduced in the Appendix. (See p. 288.) + +[9] At this time I did not know that my secret report to the Emperor +was handed over to Herr Erzberger and not kept secret by him. (Later it +was made public through the revelations of Count Wedel.) + +[10] The disclosures made by Count Wedel and Helfferich concerning +Erzberger are only a link in the chain. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +WILSON + + +Through the dwindling away of the inclination for peace in the enemy +camp we were faced in the autumn of 1917 by the prospect either of +concluding separate peace and accepting the many complicated +consequences of a war with Germany and the ensuing mutilation of the +Monarchy under the terms of the Pact of London, or else fighting on +and, aided by our Allies, breaking the will for destruction of our +enemies. + +If Russia was the one to let loose war, it was Italy who perpetually +stood in the way of a peace of understanding, insisting upon obtaining +under all circumstances the whole of the Austrian territory promised +to her in 1915. The Entente during the war assigned the several parts +to be enacted. France was to shed the most blood; England, besides her +fabulous military action, to finance the war, together with America, +and diplomatic affairs to be in Italy's hands. Far too little is known +as yet, and will only later be public knowledge, as to the extent to +which Italian diplomacy dominated affairs during the war. Our +victories in Italy would only have changed the situation if the +defeats that were suffered had led to an Italian revolution and a +complete overthrow of the regime existing there. In other words, the +Royal Government would not be influenced in its attitude by our +victories. Even had our armies advanced much farther than they did, it +would have held to its standpoint in the expectation that, perhaps not +Italy herself, but her Allies, would secure final victory. + +Such was the situation in the autumn of 1917 when Wilson came forward +with his Fourteen Points. + +The advantage of the Wilson programme in the eyes of the whole world +was its violent contrast to the terms of the Pact of London. The right +of self-determination for the nations had been utterly ignored in +London by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy. Wilson forbade this +and declared that nations could not be treated against their will and +moved hither and thither like the pieces in a game of chess. Wilson +said that every solution of a territorial question arising out of this +war must be arrived at in the interests and in favour of the peoples +concerned, and not as a mere balancing or compromise of claims from +rival sources; and further, that all clearly stated national claims +would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be afforded them, +without admitting new factors or the perpetuation of old disputes or +oppositions, which in all probability would soon again disturb the +peace of Europe and the whole world. A general peace, established on +such a basis could be discussed--and more in the same strain. + +The publication of this clear and absolutely acceptable programme +seemed from day to day to render possible a peaceful solution of the +world conflict. In the eyes of millions of people this programme +opened up a world of hope. A new star had risen on the other side of +the ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction. A mighty man +had come forward and with one powerful act had upset the London +resolutions and, in so doing, had reopened the gates for a peace of +understanding. + +From the first moment the main question was, so it seemed, what hopes +were there of Wilson's programme being carried out in London, Paris +and, above all, in Rome? + +Secret information sent to me from the Entente countries seemed to +suggest that the Fourteen Points were decidedly not drawn up in +agreement with England, France and Italy. On the other hand I was, and +still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken honestly and +sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed that his programme could +be carried out. + +Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual +distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his +surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and +especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly +weaken his position and his influence on his Allies. There would be +no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly introducing Wilson into the +international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong +directions, so that he could not find his way out again. To begin +with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step further. + +The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in +Austria-Hungary. Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed +than it is now. Nations were still sleeping--the Czechs, Slovaks and +Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to +national life. Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between +what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting. The union between +Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of--or was +perhaps the first sign of--the world-movement. At all events it was in +the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of +international politics. + +The world's racial problems found a centre in Austria-Hungary, whose +affairs, therefore, became very prominent. A chemist can enclose in +his retorts different substances and observe how, following the +eternal laws of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a +similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved racial +antagonisms might have been studied within the Habsburg Monarchy and +the inevitable explosion anticipated, instead of its being allowed to +culminate in the world war. + +In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson obviously felt the +necessity of settling the world problem of nationality and recognised +that the Habsburg Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as +a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a terrifying +example. But to begin with, he overlooked the fact that in the +settling of national questions there must be neither adversary nor +ally, as those reflect passing differences, whereas the problem of +nationality is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that what +applies to the Czechs applies also to Ireland, that the Armenians as +well as the Ukrainians desire to live their own national life, and +that the coloured peoples of Africa and India are human beings with +the same rights as white people. He also failed to see that good will +and the desire for justice are far from being sufficient in themselves +to solve the problem of nationality. Thus it was that under his +patronage, and presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the +question of nationality was not solved but simply turned round where +not actually left untouched. If Germans and Magyars had hitherto been +the dominating races they would now become the oppressed. By the terms +settled at Versailles they were to be handed over to states of other +nationality. Ten years hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as +they exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations will have +appeared and become dominant. The explosive power of unsolved +questions will continue to take effect and within a measurable space +of time again blow up the world. + +Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the programme of the +Pact of London, though not attaching sufficient importance to the +national difficulties, probably hoped to be able to effect a +compromise between the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal +policy. In this connection, however, no bridge existed between Rome +and Washington. Conquests are made by right of the conqueror--such was +Clemenceau's and Orlando's policy--or else the world is ruled on the +principles of national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal, +however, will not be attained--no ideal is attainable; but it will be +brought very much nearer. Might or Right, the one alone can conquer. +But Czechs, Poles and others cannot be freed while at the same time +Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans and Transylvanian-Hungarians are +handed over to foreign states. It cannot be done from the point of +view of justice or with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles +and St. Germain have proved that it can be done by might, and as a +temporary measure. + +The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which +all Franz Ferdinand's political interests were centred during his +lifetime. Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he +certainly did try. The Emperor Charles, too, was not averse to the +movement. The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative +to make the experiment. His idea was _quieta non movere_. Without +powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the +German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible. Therefore, when +Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the +scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the +German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread. + +I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions +entertained by Wilson--nor do I doubt them now--but my doubts as to +his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced. +It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger +than when he took part in the Peace Conference. As long as fighting +proceeded Wilson was master of the world. He had only to call back his +troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be +placed in a most difficult position. It has always been +incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not +have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to +preserve his own war aims. + +The secret information that I received soon after the publication of +the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the +situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect +for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated +France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition. The logical and +practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the +public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to +understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace +negotiations. Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between +Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open. + +On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I +spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them +to be--in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies--a +suitable basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took steps +to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in a practical way the +fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out. The +negotiations were then by no means hopeless. + +Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding. Although that +episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot +have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise +that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought +against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply +to Vienna. On February 12--thus, _after_ the conclusion of the Brest +peace--the President, in his speech to Congress, said: + + Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace + foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an + independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish + inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for + European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium + must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and + concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be + satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of + Europe and humanity. + + Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with + the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is + only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances + to defer to Germany and Turkey. Recognising and agreeing with the + important principles in question and the necessity of converting + them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more + easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by + the United States. He would probably have gone even further had he + not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and + the country's dependence on Germany. + +In the same speech the President goes on to say: + + Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8 + is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements a + sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own + Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a + thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims. + +And again: + + I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most + confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say + what it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone + from that of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very + different object in view. + +There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us +speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he +has the best intentions of coming to an understanding. My efforts in +this connection were interrupted by my dismissal. + +In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had +definitely lost faith in me. This was not due to the Wilson question, +nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy. A +difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's +entourage and myself was the real reason. The situation became so +strained as to make it unbearable. The forces that conspired against +me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my +objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be +obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence. + +In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not +intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by +accounts derived from reliable sources. I am still convinced to this +day that morally I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form, +because I was neither clever nor patient enough to _bend_ the +opposition, but would have _broken_ it, by reducing the situation to a +case of "either--or". + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS + + +1 + +In the autumn of 1917 I had a visit from a subject of a neutral state, +who is a pronounced upholder of general disarmament and world +pacifism. We began, of course, to discuss the theme of free +competition in armaments, of militarism, which in England prevails on +the sea and in Germany on land, and my visitor entered upon the +various possibilities likely to occur when the war was at an end. He +had no faith in the destruction of England, nor had I; but he thought +it possible that France and Italy might collapse. The French and +Italians could not possibly bear any heavier burdens than already were +laid on them; in Paris and Rome, he thought, revolution was not far +distant, and a fresh phase of the war would then ensue. England and +America would continue to fight on alone, for ten, perhaps even +twenty, years. England was not to be considered just a little island, +but comprised Australia, India, Canada, and the sea. "_L'Angleterre +est imbattable_," he repeated, and America likewise. On the other +hand, the German army was also invincible. The secession of France and +Italy would greatly hinder the cruel blockade, for the resources of +those two countries--once they were conquered by the Central +Powers--were very vast, and in that case he could not see any end to +the war. Finally, the world would collapse from the general state of +exhaustion. My visitor cited the fable in which two goats met on a +narrow bridge; neither would give way to the other, and they fought +until they both fell into the water and were drowned. The victory of +one group as in previous wars, he continued, where the conqueror +gleaned a rich harvest of gains and the vanquished had to bear all +the losses, was out of the question in this present war. _Tout le +monde perdra, et a la fin il n'y aura que des vaincus._ + +I often recalled that interview later. Much that was false and yet, as +it seemed to me, much that was true lay in my friend's words. France +and Italy did not break down; the end of the war came quicker than he +thought; and the invincible Germany was defeated. And still I think +that the conclusions he arrived at came very near the truth. + +The conquerors' finances are in a very precarious state, particularly +in Italy and France; unrest prevails; wages are exorbitant; discontent +is general; the phantom of Bolshevism leers at them; and they live in +the hope that the defeated Central Powers will have to pay, and they +will thus be saved. It was set forth in the peace terms, but _ultra +posse nemo tenetur_, and the future will show to what extent the +Central Powers can fulfil the conditions dictated to them. + +Since the opening of the Peace Congress at Versailles continuous war +in Europe has been seen: Russians against the whole world, Czechs +against Hungarians, Roumanians against Hungarians, Poles against +Ukrainians, Southern Slavs against Germans, Communists against +Socialists. Three-fourths of Europe is turned into a witch's cauldron +where everything is concocted except work and production, and it is +futile to ask how this self-lacerated Europe will be able to find the +war expenses laid upon her. According to human reckoning, the +conquerors cannot extract even approximate compensation for their +losses from the defeated states, and their victory will terminate with +a considerable deficit. If that be the case, then my visitor will be +right--there will only be the vanquished. + +If our plan in 1917, namely, Germany to cede Alsace-Lorraine to France +in exchange for the annexation of all Poland, together with Galicia, +and all states to disarm; if that plan had been accepted in Berlin and +sanctioned by the Entente--unless the _non possumus_ in Berlin and +opposition in Rome to a change in the Pact of London had hindered any +action--it seems to me the advantage would not only have been on the +side of the Central Powers. + +Pyrrhus also conquered at Asculum. + + * * * * * + +My visitor was astonished at Vienna. The psychology of no city that he +had seen during the war could compare with that of Vienna. An amazing +apathy prevailed. In Paris there was a passionate demand for +Alsace-Lorraine; in Berlin the contrary was demanded just as eagerly; +in England the destruction of Germany was the objective; in Sofia the +conquest of the Dobrudsha; in Rome they clamoured for all possible and +impossible things; in Vienna nothing at all was demanded. In Cracow +they called for a Great Poland; in Budapest for an unmolested Hungary; +in Prague for a united Czech State; and in Innsbruck the descendants +of Andreas Hofer were fighting as they did in his day for their sacred +land, Tyrol. In Vienna they asked only for peace and quiet. + +Old men and children would fight the arch-enemy in Tyrol, but if the +Italians were to enter Vienna and bring bread with them they would be +received with shouts of enthusiasm. And yet Berlin and Innsbruck were +just as hungry as Vienna. _C'est une ville sans ame._ + +My visitor compared the Viennese to a pretty, gay, and frivolous woman, +whose aim in life is pleasure and only pleasure. She must dance, sing, +and enjoy life, and will do so under any circumstances--_sans ame_. + +This pleasure-loving good nature of the Viennese has its admirable +points. For instance, all enemy aliens were better treated in Vienna +than anywhere else. Not the slightest trace of enmity was shown to +those who were the first to attack and then starve the city. + +Stronger than anything else in Vienna was the desire for sensation, +pleasure, and a gay life. My friend once saw a piece acted at one of +the theatres in Vienna called, I believe, _Der Junge Medardus_. The +scene is laid during the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon. Viennese +citizens condemned to death for intriguing with the enemy are led away +by the French. In a most thrilling scene weeping women and children +bid them farewell. A vast crowd witnesses the affair. A boy suddenly +rushes in shouting: "Napoleon is coming." The crowd hurries away to +see him, and cries of "Long live Napoleon" are heard in the distance. + +Such was Vienna a hundred years ago, and it is still the same. _Une +ville sans ame._ + +I pass on the criticism without comment. + + +2 + +In different circles which justly and unjustly intervened in politics +during my time of office, the plan was suggested of driving a wedge +between North and South Germany, and converting the latter to the +peaceful policy of Vienna in contradistinction to Prussian militarism. + +The plan was a faulty one from the very first. To begin with, as +already stated, the most pronounced obstacle to peace was not only the +Prussian spirit, but the Entente programme for our disruption, which a +closer connection with Bavaria and Saxony would not have altered. +Secondly, Austria-Hungary, obviously falling more and more to pieces, +formed no point of attraction for Munich and Dresden, who, though not +Prussian, yet were German to the very backbone. The vague and +irresponsible plan of returning to the conditions of the period before +1866 was an anachronism. Thirdly and chiefly, all experiments were +dangerous which might create the impression in the Entente that the +Quadruple Alliance was about to be dissolved. In a policy of that +nature executive ability was of supreme importance, and that was +exactly what was usually lacking. + +The plan was not without good features. The appointment of the +Bavarian Count Hertling to be Imperial Chancellor was not due to +Viennese influence, though a source of the greatest pleasure to us, +and the fact of making a choice that satisfied Vienna played a great +part with the Emperor William. Two Bavarians, Hertling and Kuehlmann, +had taken over the leadership of the German Empire, and they, apart +from their great personal qualities, presented a certain natural +counter-balance to Prussian hegemony through their Bavarian origin; +but only so far as it was still possible in general administration +which then was in a disturbed state. But farther they could not go +without causing injury. + +Count Hertling and I were on very good terms. This wise and +clear-sighted old man, whose only fault was that he was too old and +physically incapable of offering resistance, would have saved Germany, +if she possibly could have been saved, in 1917. In the rushing torrent +that whirled her away to her fall, he found no pillar to which he +could cling. + +Latterly his sight began to fail and give way. He suffered from +fatigue, and the conferences and councils lasting often for hours and +hours were beyond his strength. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +POLAND + + +1 + +By letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Emperors declared +Poland's existence as a Kingdom. + +When I came into office, I found the situation to be that the Poles +were annoyed with my predecessor because, they declared, Germany had +wanted to cede the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and Count +Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there is some +misunderstanding in this version of the case, as Burian says it is not +correctly rendered. + +There were three reasons that made the handling of the Polish question +one of the greatest difficulty. The first was the totally different +views of the case held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian +Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favour of the so-called +Austro-Polish solution, Count Tisza was strongly opposed to it. His +standpoint was that the political structure of the Monarchy ought not +to undergo any change through the annexation of Poland, and that Poland +eventually might be joined to the Monarchy as an Austrian province, but +never as a partner in a tripartite Monarchy. + +A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on February 22, 1917, was +characteristic of his train of thought. It was as follows: + + YOUR EXCELLENCY,--Far be it from me to raise a discussion on + questions which to-day are without actual value and most probably + will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other hand, I + wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken + conclusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest + certain statements that appeared in the correspondence of our + diplomatic representatives. + + Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the + attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the so-called + Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question has repeatedly (as + in telegram Nr. 63 from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the + "tripartite solution." + + With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out the + fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the + Austro-Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent + circles in the Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland + to the Monarchy must on no account affect its _dualistic + structure_. + + This principle was distinctly recognised by the then leaders in + the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers; + it was also recognised and sanctioned by His late Majesty the + Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this + view is shared by Your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid + misunderstanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian Government + considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political + system, from which, in no circumstances, would it be in a position + to deviate. + + It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The + uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian State, where the + German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a + very unsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that + easily might gain the upper hand should a relatively small number + of the Germans, whether from social-democratic, + political-reactionary or doctrinary reasons, separate from the + other German parties. The establishment of the new Polish element + as a third factor with Austria-Hungary in our constitutional + organism would represent an element so unsafe, and would be + combined with such risks for the further development of the policy + of the Habsburg Great Power, that, in view of the position of the + Monarchy as such, I should feel the greatest anxiety lest the new + and unreliable Russian-Polish element, so different from us in + many respects, should play too predominant a part. + + The firm retention of dualism, according to which half the + political influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and + _the Hungarian and German element in common furnish a safe + majority_ in the delegation, alone can secure for the dynasty and + the two States under its sceptre an adequate guarantee for the + future. + + There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital + interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the + Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose clear + perception of that fact may have become dulled during the last + peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realisation of + it by the present war. + + The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and active + Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condition + for the existence of the Hungarian State. It was fatal for all of + us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative + qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all State and + national aims, have for centuries past not been able to devote + themselves to the common cause. The striving for a solution of the + world racial problem and the necessity of combining the + responsibilities of a Great Power with the independence of the + Hungarian State have caused heavy trials and century-long friction + and fighting. + + Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of + efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for + liberty did not attack the continuance of the Habsburg Empire as a + Great Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle + they never followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown + a guarantee for their chartered rights. + + Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the sceptre + of the Habsburgs; she did not wish to come under any foreign rule, + but to be a free nation governed by her own king and her own laws + and not subordinate to any other ruler. This principle was + repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723 and + 1791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was found + which endowed it with life and ensured its being carried out in a + manner favourable for the position of a great nation. + + In the period of preparation for the agreement of 1867 Hungary was + a poor and, comparatively speaking, small part of the then + Monarchy, and the great statesmen of Hungary based their + administrative plan on dualism and equality as being the only + possible way for ensuring that Hungarian independence, recognised + and appealed to on many occasions, should materialise in a + framework of modern constitutional practice. + + A political structure for the Monarchy which would make it + possible for Hungary to be outvoted on the most important + questions of State affairs, and therefore subject to a foreign + will, would again have nullified all that had been achieved after + so much striving and suffering, so much futile waste of strength + for the benefit of us all, which even in this war, too, would have + brought its blessings. All those, therefore, who have always stood + up firmly and loyally for the agreement of 1867 must put their + whole strength into resisting any tripartite experiments. + + I would very much regret if, in connection with this question, + differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible + leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it + unnecessary to give publicity to a question that is not pressing. + At all events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be + avoided which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event + of a resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken + expectations in them which could only lead to the most complicated + consequences. + + The more moderate Poles had made up their minds that the dualistic + structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact, and that + the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the Austrian + State, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have to be the + consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent and + injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realisation of which + seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view but + from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy. + + I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest + esteem. + + TISZA. + + _Budapest, February 22, 1917._ + + + +The question as to what was to be Poland's future position with regard +to the Monarchy remained still unsolved. I continued to press the +point that Poland should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza +wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dismissed him, although +he was favoured by the majority of the Parliament, it did not alter +the situation in regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as +in almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views; otherwise, +he would have been in the minority. + +The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the question of +electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to +Tisza's instructions. For, as leader of the majority, which he +continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could +be carried out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the +Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which +he considered quite logical, though not agreeable. + +The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland. At +the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the +Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country. Always and +everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield, and the +consequence was that they claimed the lion's share of all the +successes gained. This was in reality quite natural, but it greatly +added to all diplomatic and political activities, which were +invariably prejudiced and hindered by military facts. When I entered +upon office, Germany's standpoint was that she had a far superior +right to Poland, and that the simplest solution would be for us to +evacuate the territory we had occupied. It was, of course, obvious +that I could not accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the +point that under no circumstances would our troops leave Lublin. After +much controversy, the Germans agreed, _tant bien que mal_, to this +solution. The further development of the affair showed that the German +standpoint went through many changes. In general, it fluctuated +between two extremes: either Poland must unite herself to Germany--the +German-Polish solution, or else vast portions of her territory must be +ceded to Germany to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained +would be either for us or for Poland herself. Neither solution could +be accepted by us. The first one for this reason, that the Polish +question being in the foreground made that of Galicia very acute, as +it would have been quite impossible to retain Galicia in the Monarchy +when separated from the rest of Poland. We were obliged to oppose the +German-Polish solution, not from any desire for conquest, but to +prevent the sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose. + +The second German suggestion was just as impossible to carry out, +because Poland, crippled beyond recognition by the frontier +readjustment, even though united with Galicia, would have been so +unsatisfactory a factor that there would never have been any prospect +of harmonious dealings with her. + +The third difficulty was presented by the Poles themselves, as they +naturally wished to secure the greatest possible profit out of their +release by the Central Powers, even though it did not contribute much +to their future happiness so far as military support was concerned. +There were many different parties among them: first of all, one for +the Entente; a second, Bilinski's party; above all, one for the +Central Powers, especially when we gained military successes. + +On the whole, Polish policy was to show their hand as little as +possible to any particular group, and in the end range themselves on +the side of the conquerors. It must be admitted that these tactics +were successful. + +In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost always in +Polish political circles a certain nervous excitement, which made it +extremely difficult to enter into any calm and essential negotiations. +At the very beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the Polish +leaders and myself with regard to what I proposed to do; +misunderstandings which, toward the end of my term of office, +developed into the most bitter enmity towards me on the part of the +Poles. On February 10, 1917, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk, I +received the news from Warsaw that Herr von Bilinski, apparently +misunderstanding my standpoint, evolved from the facts, considered +that hopes represented promises, and in so doing raised Polish +expectations to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed thereupon to our +representative as follows: + + _February 16, 1917._ + + I have informed Herr von Bilinski, together with other Poles, that + it is impossible in the present unsettled European situation to + make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I have + told them that I sympathise with the Austro-Polish solution longed + for by all our Poles, but that I am not in the position to say + whether this solution will be attainable, though I am equally + unable to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared + that our whole policy where Poland is concerned can only consist + in our leaving a door open for all future transactions. + +I added that our representative must quote my direct orders in +settling the matter. + +In January, 1917, a conference was held respecting the Polish +question: a conference which aimed at laying down a broad line of +action for the policy to be adopted. I first of all referred to the +circumstances connected with the previously-mentioned German request +for us to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not agreeing +to the demand. I pointed out that it did not seem probable to me that +the war would end with a dictated peace on our side, and that, with +reference to Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish +question without the co-operation of the Entente, and that there was +not much object so long as the war lasted in endeavouring to secure +_faits accomplis_. The main point was that we remain in the country, +and on the conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the +Entente and the Allies to secure a solution of the Austro-Polish +question. That should be the gist of our policy. Count Tisza spoke +after me and agreed with me that we must not yield to the German +demand for our evacuation of Lublin. As regards the future, the +Hungarian Prime Minister stated that he had always held the view that +we should cede to Germany our claim to Poland in exchange for economic +and financial compensation; but that, at the present time, he did not +feel so confident about it. The conditions then prevailing were +unbearable, chiefly owing to the variableness of German policy, and +he, Count Tisza, returned to his former, oft-repeated opinion that we +should strive as soon as possible to withdraw with honour out of the +affair; impose no conditions that would lead to further friction, but +the surrendering to Germany of our share in Poland in exchange for +economic compensation. + +The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Clam, opposed this from the +Austrian point of view, which supported the union of all the Poles +under the Habsburg sceptre as being the one and only desirable +solution. + +The feeling during the debate was that the door must be closed against +the Austro-Polish proposals, and that, in view of the impossibility of +an immediate definite solution, we must adhere firmly to the policy +that rendered possible the union of all the Poles under the Habsburg +rule. + +After Germany's refusal of the proposal to accept Galicia as +compensation for Alsace-Lorraine, this programme was adhered to +through various phases and vicissitudes until the ever-increasing +German desire for frontier readjustment created a situation which made +the achievement of the Austro-Polish project very doubtful. Unless we +could secure a Poland which, thanks to the unanimity of the great +majority of all Poles, would willingly and cheerfully join the +Monarchy, the Austro-Polish solution would not have been a happy one, +as in that case we should only have increased the number of +discontented elements in the Monarchy, already very high, by adding +fresh ones to them. As it proved impossible to break the resistance +put up by General Ludendorff, the idea presented itself at a later +stage to strive for the annexation of Roumania instead of Poland. It +was a return to the original idea of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the +union of Roumania with Transylvania, closely linked to the Monarchy. +In that case we should have lost Galicia to Poland, but a certain +compensation would have been conceded to us in Roumania with her corn +and oil springs, and for the Monarchy, as for the Poles, it appeared +better to unite the latter collectively with Germany rather than to +divide them, as suggested in the Vienna-Berlin dispute. + +The plan for the annexation of Roumania presented wellnigh +insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing to her geographical +position, Roumania ought naturally to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza, +who was not in favour of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to +it if the annexed country had been administered from Budapest and in +the Magyar spirit, which meant that it would be incorporated in +Hungary. This, for obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the +plan, for the Roumanians would gain no advantage from the annexation +if it was to be at the sacrifice of their national independence. On +the other hand, the Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable +objections to the suggestion of a future combination that would add a +rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria would be reduced in +proportion, and compensation in one or other form was demanded. +Another, but tentative, plan was to make over Bosnia and the +Herzegovina definitely by way of compensation to Austria. All these +ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory nature, evoked by the +constantly recurring difficulties in Berlin and Warsaw, and they +invariably fell through when it was seen that the obstacles arising +from dualism were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish +solution was taken up again, although it was impossible to extort +from the Germans a definite statement as to a reasonable western +frontier for Poland. In the very last term of my office the Roumanian +plan again came up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles +on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims made by Germany, +which rendered the Austro-Polish solution impossible. + +Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the future organisation +of the Monarchy was being considered. The Emperor adhered to the +correct standpoint, as I still consider it to be, that the structure +of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the war, would have to +be altered, and reconstruction on a far more pronounced national basis +be necessary. As applied to the Poles, this project would entail the +dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent position for the +Ruthenian Poles. + +When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the hunger riots that +were beginning, I refused to agree to the Ukrainian demands, but +consented to submit the question of the division of Galicia to the +Austrian Crown Council. I was impelled thereto by the conviction that +we were adhering strictly to the programme as it had been planned for +the Monarchy. + +I will give fuller details respecting this question in the next +chapter, but will merely relate the following incident as an example +to show the degree of hostile persecution to which I was exposed. The +rumour was spread on all sides that the Emperor had told the Poles +that "I had concluded peace with the Ukraine without his knowledge and +against his will." It is quite out of the question that the Emperor +can have made such a statement, as the peace conditions at Kieff were +a result of a council convoked _ad hoc_, where--as the protocol +proves--the Emperor and Dr. von Seidler were responsible for the +terms. + +The great indignation of the Poles at my conduct at Brest-Litovsk was +quite unfounded. I never promised the Poles that they were to have the +Cholm district, and never alluded to any definite frontiers. Had I +done so the capable political leaders in Poland would never have +listened to me, as they knew very well that the frontiers, only in a +very slight degree, depended on the decisions at Vienna. If we lost +the war we had nothing more to say in the matter; if a peace of +agreement was concluded, then Berlin would be the strongest side, +having occupied the largest portion of the country; the question would +then have to be decided at the general Conference. + +I always told the Polish leaders that I hoped to secure a Poland +thoroughly satisfied, also with respect to her frontier claims, and +there were times when we seemed to be very near the accomplishment of +such an aim; but I never concealed the fact that there were many +influences at work restricting my wishes and keeping them very much +subdued. + +The partition of Galicia was an internal Austrian question. Dr. von +Seidler took up the matter most warmly, and at the Council expressed +the hope of being able to carry out these measures by parliamentary +procedure and against the opposition of the Poles. + +I will allude to this question also in my next chapter. + +Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called +Central-European project. + +For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly +interested in a scheme for closer union. I was always full of the idea +of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment +as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting +a peace of understanding. + +During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to +secure a revision of the Pact of London. I hoped, as already +mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted +for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach +the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would +greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London. +When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to +the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any +change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military +force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail, +and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the +right moment had arrived to make the offer. + +In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was +unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and +closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the +armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them +after the war. I was convinced that a peace of understanding would +bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military +settlements would be influenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of +peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and +that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined +in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those +relating to economic questions. + +The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent +opposition on the part of the Emperor. He was particularly opposed to +all military _rapprochement_. + +When the attempt to approach the question failed through the +resistance from the crown, I arranged on my own initiative for a +debate on the economic question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in +which he forbade any further dealings in the matter. I answered his +letter by a business report, pointing out the necessity of continuing +the negotiations. + +The question then became a sore point between the Emperor and myself. +He did not give his permission for further negotiations, but I +continued them notwithstanding. The Emperor knew of it, but did not +make further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put forward by +the Germans made the negotiations extremely difficult, and with long +intervals and at a very slow pace they dragged on until I left office. + +Afterwards the Emperor went with Burian to the German Headquarters. +Following that, the Salzburg negotiations were proceeded with and, +apparently, at greater speed. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +BREST-LITOVSK + + +1 + +In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest +a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report +dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as +follows: + + The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the + following state of affairs: + + At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as + to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies + and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches + throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists + under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a + definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the + Mensheviks as well, _i.e._ Tscheidse's party, to which the present + Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to + the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is + threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained + with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled + Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old + _Internationale_, also called _Zimmerwalder_ or _Kienthaler_, and + led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned + from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from + Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of + Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government, + decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this + reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social + Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too + little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory. + He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the + Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their + Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either + as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the + official organ of the Mensheviks, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, is + forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for + instance, frequent articles against the offensive. + + There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the + Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is, + perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having + succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its + course--at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the + peasants' deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social + Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants' + Deputies' Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem, + the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to + any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the + party, _Delo Naroda_ and _Zemlja i Wolja_. Only a small and + apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ _Volja + Naroda_, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for + an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group. + Kerenski's party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People's + Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food, + Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here + or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press, + as, for instance, the _Retch_, assert that Kerenski's health gives + grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The + official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council, + the _Isvestia_, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great + emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is + characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture, + Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning + that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to + justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that + such had been his meaning. + + While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question + of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined + to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the + Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with + satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are + against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among + the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery. + It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war. + These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by + success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the + revolutionary regime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that + while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property + exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all, + every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is + constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land + question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of + the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also + that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of + the Tsar. + + Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the + following details: + + At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers' + Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd + Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the _Retch_ of May + 1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following + characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the + disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires + connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers + will not remain _more than one month_ at the front, but will go + home." + + It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from + the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority + Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the _Rabocaja + Gazeta_, May 18 and 19--this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e. + that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente + Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness + that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the + imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the + transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to + the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a + speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist + delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of + feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that + they should undertake to make known the result of their experience + in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some + very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives + from the Russian front spoke openly of America's policy of + exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that + an international Socialist conference should be convened at the + earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French + majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the + French and English Socialists were given the following reply: + + "Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your + Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We + will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be + Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement + between the workers of all countries for the termination of the + war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued, + prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude + any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims + as soon as possible." + + According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether + converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case, + from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and + Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other + hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined + somewhat toward the Russian point of view. + + Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in + this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the + Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at + the Russian front. + + The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or + soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for + May 26, as follows: + + "The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye, + even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts), + is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it + passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and + in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army + fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse + this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy + fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war. + + The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates' + Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg + June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the + following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for + peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a + declaration with regard to the answer already received at the + beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This + congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination + for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals + with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out + between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and + the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of + the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an + "Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the + conflict. + + With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing + seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in + connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed + report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded + later. + +Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following +letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my +estimate of the situation at the time: + + _Vienna, November 17, 1917._ + + MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and + toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very + noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my + thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at + least, to forget the wretchedness of every day. + + You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well + between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am + sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the + friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree. + As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast + enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed + strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing + my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I + myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is + something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the + lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to + increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of + admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine? + + Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture. + + And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of + those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of + political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted + because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my + influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly + negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly. + + In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief + is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia + quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all + round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the + Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as + possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can + throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of + being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly + threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to + peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of + conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after + losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter + pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in + that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he + promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes + in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted, + of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace + with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step + on the way to the peace of the world. + + I have during the last few days received reliable information + about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews, + with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country + that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the + most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make + peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for + they cannot carry on the war. + + In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines + to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage, + the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless + unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the + third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I + _will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of + his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's + period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent + Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a + Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had. + + The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea + of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons + already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the + case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds + the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can + see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up + "something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there, + and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even + though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen + for oneself. + + It is impossible to get any exact information about these + Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information + available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this: + everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture + must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and + equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only + a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The + Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly + as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like + sheep. + + True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had + the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to + force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would + be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to + march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the + power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our + own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get + to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front + is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German + military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether + illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal + grounds. + + I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this + to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which + you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate + peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this + would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could + not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under + some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to + make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a + division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would + avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to + receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the + remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish, + Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact + between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would + mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be + hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must + fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of + course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy. + The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the + Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to + make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of + bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one + opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto + spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to + be wrecked completely in the end. + + On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure + peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual + understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out + successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage, + one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that + manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the + confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy, + then let him do it--_le remede sera pire que le mal_--but to be + for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the + pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as + prudent policy. + + I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding; + we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain + nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the + entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the + _federation Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly + rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the + Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I + hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the + London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into + Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that + they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly + determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the + _peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to + fight on for conquest or if they will have peace. + + To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through + the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to + make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which + I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading" + men--with the exception of the Emperor Karl--will demand a "good" + peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of + having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself. + + So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled. + But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in + throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my + Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically + on all sides. + + This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. _Lebe + wohl_, and let me hear from you again soon.--In friendship as of + old, yours + + (Signed) CZERNIN. + +With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave +my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may +appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have +not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I +believe will be a clear picture of the development. + +"_December 19, 1917._--Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th. + +"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already assembled there: +Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut. +Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden. + +"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of +my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my +opinion Russia would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must of +course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a +general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long +time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be +open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with +Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day. + +"_December 20, 1917._--Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At +the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten +of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I +greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into +the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few +days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the +situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we +should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters +satisfactorily. + +"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me +some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates, +and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had +the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy +with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian +brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians, +despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of +truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in, +and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance. + +"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of +nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable +pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince +sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew called Joffe, +recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other +delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the +delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister, +Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison +during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate +is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a +minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary +movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor +of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the +Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a +petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general +began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the +spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at +first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier +conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This +remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to +read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words +should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian +proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined +set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All +that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with +indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the +International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression +alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand +and preparing to fall upon it and rend it. + +"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His +whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of +self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the +world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual +love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war +throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war, +as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end +worth all it would cost. I contented myself with telling him that he +must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier +age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be +won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by +example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to +adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without +indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the +development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the +Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn +something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force +Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was +a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we +should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods, +and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs: +this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry +out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had +better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question +of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft +eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring +tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be +able to raise the revolution in your country too.' + +"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in +bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage +that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms. + +"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom +and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and +unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history +has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and +their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with +Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity +surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress +decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the +universal blessing of freedom--it is sheer lying. + +"_December 21, 1917._--I went with all my party to lunch at noon with +the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an +hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military +matters, and is very busy. + +"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast +our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a +small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite +close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could +be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and +in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three +Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kuehlmann alone, and at +once declared positively that the Russians would propose a _general_ +peace, and that we must accept it. Kuehlmann is half disposed to take +my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand +annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have +an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they +will. + +"_December 22, 1917._--The forenoon was devoted to the first +discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as +discussed with Kuehlmann being then academically laid down. In the +afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being +opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kuehlmann. It was +decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order +of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche, +etc. Dr. Kuehlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on +which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian +delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from +the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a +reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among +ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief +sitting of the peace congress. + +"_December 23, 1917._--Kuehlmann and I prepared our answer early. It +will be generally known from the newspaper reports. It cost us much +heavy work to get it done. Kuehlmann is personally an advocate of +general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do +not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is +done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They +declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian +troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the +conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree, +as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland, +Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never +consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last +succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second +Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly +declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal +affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs +in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian +intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting, +he also could be content. + +"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of +Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all, +some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole +proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the +24th. + +"_December 24, 1917._--Morning and afternoon, long conferences with +the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kuehlmann and I on the one hand +and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with +considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause +should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation +principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian +and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a +clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void, +and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was +attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian +delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give +way. Kuehlmann and my humble self remained perfectly firm, and told +them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they +could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the +proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which +we, Kuehlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived +at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian +delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions. + +"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we +had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty +about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far +as that goes. + +"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Germans. The German +military party 'fear' that the Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to +agree to a general peace, and could not think of ending the war in +this 'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to listen to +such twaddle. + +"If the great victories which the German generals are hoping for on +the Western front should be realised, there will be no bounds to their +demands, and the difficulty of all negotiations will be still further +increased. + +"_December 25, 1917._--The plenary sitting took place to-day, when we +gave the Russians our answer to their peace proposals. I was +presiding, and delivered the answer, and Joffe replied. _The general +offer of peace is thus to be made, and we must await the result._ In +order to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters concerning +Russia are being continued meanwhile. We have thus made a good step +forward, and _perhaps_ got over the worst. It is impossible to say +whether yesterday may not have been a decisive turning point in the +history of the world. + +"_December 26, 1917._--The special negotiations began at 9 A.M. The +programme drawn up by Kuehlmann, chiefly questions of economical matters +and representation, were dealt with so rapidly and smoothly that by 11 +o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of further matter to discuss. +This is perhaps a good omen. Our people are using to-day to enter the +results of the discussion in a report of proceedings, as the sitting +is to be continued to-morrow, when territorial questions will be +brought up. + +"_December 26, 1917._--I have been out for a long walk alone. + +"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting in the gutter, +weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did not even look at me, only wept +and wept, and could not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me +his story--Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together. + +"Well, he had a store--heaven knows where, but somewhere in the war +zone. First came the Cossacks. They took all he had--his goats and his +clothes, and everything in the place--and then they beat him. Then the +Russians retired, beat him again, _en passant_ as it were, and then +came the Germans. They fired his house with their guns, pulled off his +boots, and beat him. Then he entered the service of the Germans, +carrying water and wood, and received his food and beatings in return. +But to-day he had got into trouble with them in some incomprehensible +fashion; no food after that, only the beatings; and was thrown into +the street. + +"The beatings he referred to as something altogether natural. They +were for him the natural accompaniment to any sort of action--but he +could not live on beatings alone. + +"I gave him what I had on me--money and cigars--told him the number of +my house, and said he could come to-morrow, when I could get him a +pass to go off somewhere where there were no Germans and no Russians, +and try to get him a place of some sort where he would be fed and not +beaten. He took the money and cigars thankfully enough; the story of +the railway pass and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway +travelling was for soldiers, and an existence without beatings seemed +an incredible idea. + +"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight, waving his hand, and +thanking me in his German-Russian gibberish. + +"A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but worst of all in +one's own country. We at home suffer hunger and cold, but at least we +have been spared up to now the presence of the enemy hordes. + +"This is a curious place--melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An +endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean +set fast, wave behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things +grey, dead grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds +race across the sky, the wind lashing them on. + +"This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed the Russians of the +German plans with regard to the outer provinces. The position is this: +As long as the war in the West continues, the Germans cannot evacuate +Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact that they must be +held as security for the general peace negotiations, these countries +form part of the German munition establishment. The railway material, +the factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable as long +as the war lasts. That they cannot now withdraw from there at once is +clear enough. If peace is signed, then the self-determination of the +people in the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the +great difficulty: how this right of self-determination is to be +exercised. + +"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be taken while the +German bayonets are still in the country, and the Germans reply that +the unexampled terrorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election +result, since the 'bourgeois,' according to Bolshevist ideas, are not +human beings at all. My idea of having the proceedings controlled by a +_neutral_ Power was not altogether acceptable to anyone. During the +war no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the German +occupation could not be allowed to last until the ultimate end. In +point of fact, both sides are afraid of terrorisation by the opposing +party, and each wishes to apply the same itself. + +"_December 26, 1917._--There is no hurry apparently in this place. Now +it is the Turks who are not ready, now the Bulgarians, then it is the +Russians' turn--and the sitting is again postponed or broken off +almost as soon as commenced. + +"I am reading some memoirs from the French Revolution. A most +appropriate reading at the present time, in view of what is happening +in Russia and may perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no +Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannised the world under the battle-cry +of freedom were to be found in Paris then as well as now in St. +Petersburg. Charlotte Corday said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast +I killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear, and who can +say if there will be a Corday ready for Trotski? + +"Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and the state of things +said to exist there. He spoke with great respect of Nicolai +Nicolaievitch as a thorough man, full of energy and courage, one to be +respected even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he considered +cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a proof of the incapacity of +the bourgeois that they had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all +of them more or less degenerate; he could not understand how anyone +could accept a form of government which involved the risk of having a +degenerate ruler. I answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first +of all one advantage, that there was at least one place in the state +beyond the sphere of personal ambition and intrigues, and as to +degeneration, that was often a matter of opinion: there were also +degenerates to be found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe +considered that there would be no such risk when the people could +choose for themselves. I pointed out that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had +not been 'chosen,' and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial +election would have brought him into power. Possibly there might be +some in Russia who would consider him also degenerate. + +"_December 27, 1917._--The Russians are in despair, and some of them +even talked of withdrawing altogether. They had thought the Germans +would renounce all occupied territory without further parley, or hand +it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the Russians, +Kuehlmann, and myself, part of the time with Hoffmann. I drew up the +following:-- + +"1. As long as general peace is not yet declared, we cannot give up +the occupied areas; they form part of our great munition works +(factories, railways, sites with buildings, etc.). + +"2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland, Courland, and +Lithuania is to decide the fate of the people there; as to the form in +which the vote is to be taken, this remains to be further discussed, +in order that the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used. +Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much worse. + +"_Afternoon._--Matters still getting worse. Furious wire from +Hindenburg about "renunciation" of everything; Ludendorff telephoning +every minute; more furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kuehlmann +true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians declare they cannot +accept the vague formulas of the Germans with regard to freedom of +choice. + +"I told Kuehlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far as possible with them; +but should their endeavours fail, then I would enter into separate +negotiations with the Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were +really both opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary, on the +other hand, desired nothing but final peace. Kuehlmann understands my +position, and says he himself would rather _go_ than let it fail. +Asked me to give him my point of view in writing, as it 'would +strengthen his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed it to the +Kaiser. + +"_Evening._--Kuehlmann believes matters will be settled--or broken off +altogether--by to-morrow. + +"_December 28, 1917._--General feeling, dull. Fresh outbursts of +violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a wire from Bussche: Hertling had +spoken with the Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kuehlmann said to +me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole of Germany.' + +"We have at last agreed about the form of the committee; that is, a +committee _ad hoc_ is to be formed in Brest, to work out a plan for +the evacuation and voting in detail. _Tant bien que mal_, a +provisional expedient. All home to report; next sitting to be held +January 5, 1918. + +"Russians again somewhat more cheerful. + +"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on the part of the +Russians and the four Allies to Prince Leopold. He answered at once, +and very neatly, but told me immediately afterwards that I had taken +him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken by surprise +myself; no notice had been given; it was only during the dinner itself +that the Germans asked me to speak. + +"Left at 10 P.M. for Vienna. + +"From the 29th to the morning of the 3rd I was in Vienna. Two long +audiences with the Emperor gave me the opportunity of telling him what +had passed at Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view +that peace must be made, if at all possible. + +"I have dispatched a trustworthy agent to the outer provinces in order +to ascertain the exact state of feeling there. He reports that _all_ +are against the Bolsheviks except the Bolsheviks themselves. The +entire body of citizens, peasants--in a word, everyone with any +possessions at all--trembles at the thought of these red robbers, and +wishes to go over to Germany. The terrorism of Lenin is said to be +indescribable, and in Petersburg all are absolutely _longing_ for the +entry of the German troops to deliver them. + +"_January 3, 1918._--Return to Brest. + +"On the way, at 6 P.M., I received, at a station, the following +telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch, who had remained at Brest: + + "'Russian delegation received following telegram from Petersburg + this morning: To General Hoffmann. For the representatives of the + German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish delegations. The + Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to carry + on the further negotiations on neutral ground, and proposes + removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the proposals as + formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegation in Points + 1 and 2, the Government of the Russian Republic and the + Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of + Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire + agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the + proposals are contrary to the principle of national + self-determination, even in the restricted form in which it + appears in Point 3 of the reply given by the Four Powers on the + 12th ult. President of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe." Major + Brinkmann has communicated this by telephone to the German + delegation, already on the way here. Herr von Kuehlmann has sent a + telephone message in return that he is continuing the journey, and + will arrive at Brest this evening.' + +"I also went on of course, considering this manoeuvre on the part of +the Russians as rather in the nature of bluffing. If they do not come, +then we can treat with the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now. + +"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither, Hauser, Wekerle, +Seidler, and some few others. The opinion of almost all may be summed +up as follows: 'Peace _must_ be arranged, but a separate peace without +Germany is _impossible_.' + +"No one has told me how I am to manage it if neither Germany nor +Russia will listen to reason. + +"_January 4, 1918._--Fearful snowstorm in the night; the heating +apparatus in the train was frozen, and the journey consequently far +from pleasant. On awaking early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians +and Turks were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnificent now: +cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went across to Kuehlmann, had +breakfast with him, and talked over events in Berlin. There seems to +have been desperate excitement there. Kuehlmann suggested to Ludendorff +that he should come to Brest himself and take part in the +negotiations. After long discussion, however, it appeared that +Ludendorff himself was not quite clear as to what he wanted, and +declared spontaneously that he considered it superfluous for him to go +to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he did.' Heaven +grant the man such gleams of insight again, and often! It seems as if +the whole trouble is more due to feeling against Kuehlmann than to +anything in the questions at issue; people do not want the world to +have the impression that the peace was gained by 'adroit diplomacy,' +but by military success alone. General Hoffmann appears to have been +received with marked favour by the Kaiser, and both he and Kuehlmann +declare themselves well satisfied with the results of their journey. + +"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg telegram, declining a +conference in Stockholm, and further tactics to be followed in case of +need. We agreed that if the Russians did not come, we must declare the +armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers would say to +that. On this point Kuehlmann and I were entirely agreed. Nevertheless, +the feeling, both in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a +little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break off +negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position. The only +way to save the situation is by acting quickly and energetically with +the Ukrainian delegation, and we therefore commenced this work on the +afternoon of the same day. There is thus at least a hope that we may +be able to arrive at positive results with them within reasonable +time. + +"In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from Petersburg announcing +the arrival of the delegation, including the Foreign Minister, +Trotski. It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at +the news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of satisfaction +was it fully apparent how seriously they had been affected by the +thought that the Russians would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great +step forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the way. + +"_January 5, 1918._--At seven this morning a few of us went out +shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria. We went for a distance of 20 +to 30 kilometres by train, and then in open automobiles to a +magnificent primeval forest extending over two to three hundred square +kilometres. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow, and pleasant +company. From the point of view of sport, it was poorer than one could +have expected. One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two +hares, and that was all. Back at 6 P.M. + +"_January 6, 1918._--To-day we had the first discussions with the +Ukrainian delegates, all of whom were present except the leader. The +Ukrainians are very different from the Russian delegates. Far less +revolutionary, and with far more interest in their own country, less +in the progress of Socialism generally. They do not really care about +Russia at all, but think only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are +solely directed towards attaining their own independence as soon as +possible. Whether that independence is to be complete and +international, or only as within the bounds of a Russian federative +state, they do not seem quite to know themselves. Evidently, the very +intelligent Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard +from which they themselves could spring upon the Bolsheviks. Their +idea was that we should acknowledge their independence, and then, with +this as a _fait accompli_, they could face the Bolsheviks and force +them to recognise their equal standing and treat with them on that +basis. Our line of policy, however, must be either to bring over the +Ukrainians to our peace basis, or else to drive a wedge between them +and the Petersburgers. As to their desire for independence, we +declared ourselves willing to recognise this, provided the Ukrainians +on their part would agree to the following three points: 1. The +negotiations to be concluded at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2. +Recognition of the former political frontier between Austria-Hungary +and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any one state in the internal +affairs of another. Characteristically enough, no answer has yet been +received to this proposal! + +"_January 7, 1918._--This forenoon, all the Russians arrived, under +the leadership of Trotski. They at once sent a message asking to be +excused for not appearing at meals with the rest for the future. At +other times also we see nothing of them. The wind seems to be in a +very different quarter now from what it was. The German officer who +accompanied the Russian delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron +Lamezan, gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first +place, he declared that the trenches in front of Dunaburg are entirely +deserted, and save for an outpost or so there were no Russians there +at all; also, that at many stations delegates were waiting for the +deputation to pass, in order to demand that peace should be made. +Trotski had throughout answered them with polite and careful +speeches, but grew ever more and more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the +impression that the Russians were altogether desperate now, having no +choice save between going back with a bad peace or with no peace at +all; in either case with the same result: that they would be swept +away. Kuehlmann said: 'Ils n'ont que le choix a quelle sauce ils se +feront manger.' I answered: 'Tout comme chez nous.' + +"A wire has just come in reporting demonstrations in Budapest against +Germany. The windows of the German Consulate were broken, a clear +indication of the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were +to be lost through our demands. + +"_January 8, 1918._--The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived +during the night, and has just been to call on me. He seems +emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in +case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the +foreground and keep out of the way himself. Talaat Pasha is one of the +cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of +them all. + +"Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph +service, and was on the revolutionary committee. In his official +capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed +him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game +be lost unless immediate action were taken. He suppressed the message, +warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their +work at once. The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat +was made Minister of the Interior. With iron energy he then turned his +attention to the suppression of the opposing movement. Later, he +became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the +will and power of Turkey. + +"This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied +delegations and the Russian. Afterwards, plenary sitting. + +"The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still not ready +with their preparations. Late in the evening I had a conversation with +Kuehlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics. I +said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands +as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off +the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a +free hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially +Kuehlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow +the negotiations to prove fruitless. As to details, we agreed to +demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form +of an ultimatum. + +"_January 9, 1918._--Acting on the principle that attack is the best +defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister +speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum. + +"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was +such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered +state of affairs called for new resolutions. The removal of the +conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, +for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of +all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing +we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the +start--to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take +the lead--would infallibly have taken place. We must now wait to see +what to-morrow brings: either a victory or the final termination of +the negotiations. + +"Adler said to me in Vienna: 'You will certainly get on all right with +Trotski,' and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered: 'Well, +you and I get on quite well together, you know.' + +"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to appreciate the +situation there. These Bolsheviks have no longer anything in common +with Adler; they are brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a +disgrace to the name of freedom. + +"Trotski is undoubtedly an interesting, clever fellow, and a very +dangerous adversary. He is quite exceptionally gifted as a speaker, +with a swiftness and adroitness in retort which I have rarely seen, +and has, moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race. + +"_January 10, 1918._--The sitting has just taken place. Trotski made a +great and, in its way, really fine speech, calculated for the whole of +Europe, in which he gave way entirely. He accepts, he says, the +German-Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk, as he +will not give us the satisfaction of being able to blame Russia for +the continuance of the war. + +"Following on Trotski's speech, the Committee was at once formed to +deal with the difficult questions of territory. I insisted on being on +the Committee myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of +these important negotiations. This was not an easy matter really, as +the questions involved, strictly speaking, concern only Courland and +Lithuania, i.e., they are not our business, but Germany's alone. + +"In the evening I had another long talk with Kuehlmann and Hoffmann, in +the course of which the General and the Secretary of State came to +high words between themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our +ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and 'give the +Russians another touch of the whip.' Kuehlmann and I took the opposite +view, and insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly, +confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing up point by point +as we went on, and putting all doubtful questions aside. Once we had +got so far, in clearing up things generally, we could then take that +which remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instructions +from the two Emperors for dealing therewith. This is undoubtedly the +surest way to avoid disaster and a fresh breach. + +"A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians. They now demand +recognition of their independence, and declare they will leave if this +is not conceded. + +"Adler told me at Vienna that Trotski had his library, by which he set +great store, somewhere in Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told +Trotski that I would arrange to have the books forwarded to him, if +he cared about it. I then recommended to his consideration certain +prisoners of war, as L. K. and W., all of whom are said to have been +very badly treated. Trotski noted the point, declared that he was +strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and promised to +look into the matter; he wished to point out, however, that in so +doing he was not in the least influenced by the thought of his +library; he would in any case have considered my request. He would be +glad to have the books. + +"_January 11, 1918._--Forenoon and afternoon, long sittings of the +Committee on territorial questions. Our side is represented by +Kuehlmann, Hoffmann, Rosenberg, and a secretary, in addition to myself, +Csicserics, Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present, but +without the Ukrainians. I told Kuehlmann that I only proposed to attend +as a second, seeing that the German interests were incomparably more +affected than our own. I only interpose now and again. + +"Trotski made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In a speech rising to +violence, he declared that we were playing false; we aimed at +annexations, and were simply trying to cover them with the cloak of +self-determination. He would never agree to this, and would rather +break off altogether than continue in that way. If we were honest, we +should allow representatives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to +come to Brest, and there express their views without being influenced +in any way by ourselves. Now it should here be noted that from the +commencement of the negotiations it has been a point of conflict +whether the legislative bodies at present existing in the occupied +territories are justified in speaking in the name of their respective +peoples, or not. We affirm that they are; the Russians maintain they +are not. We at once accepted Trotski's proposal, that representatives +of these countries should be called, but added that, when we agreed to +accept their testimony, then their judgment if in our favour should be +taken as valid. + +"It was characteristic to see how gladly Trotski would have taken back +what he had said. But he kept his countenance, fell in with the new +situation at once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned for +twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-reaching importance +that he must confer with his colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotski +will make no difficulty now. If the Poles could be called, it would be +an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that Germany, too, would +rather be without them, knowing the anti-Prussian feeling that exists +among the Poles. + +"_January 12, 1918._--Radek has had a scene with the German chauffeur, +which led to something more. General Hoffmann had placed cars at the +disposal of the Russians in case they cared to drive out. On this +occasion it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the proper +time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man and abused him +violently. The chauffeur complained, and Hoffmann took his part. +Trotski seems to consider Hoffmann's action correct, and has +_forbidden_ the entire delegation to go out any more. That settled +them. And serve them right. + +"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a holy fear of Trotski. +At the sittings, too, none of them dare to speak while he is there. + +"_January 12, 1918._--Hoffmann has made his unfortunate speech. He has +been working at it for days, and was very proud of the result. +Kuehlmann and I did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it +beyond exciting the people at home against us. This made a certain +impression on him, but it was soon effaced by Ludendorff's +congratulations, which followed promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the +situation more difficult, and there was certainly no need for that. + +"_January 15, 1918._--I had a letter to-day from one of our mayors at +home, calling my attention to the fact that disaster due to lack of +foodstuffs is now imminent. + +"I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows: + + "'I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which + justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to Your + Majesty, and shows that in the question of food supply we are on + the very verge of a catastrophe. The situation _arising out of the + carelessness and incapacity of the Ministers_ is terrible, and I + fear it is already too late to check the total collapse which is + to be expected in the next few weeks. My informant writes: "Only + small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from + Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease + of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must + infallibly perish. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the + Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the + case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic, + would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be + impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse + of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points + he answered yes, that is so, and added that all was being done to + alter the state of affairs, especially as regards the Hungarian + deliveries. But no one, not even His Majesty, has been able to get + anything done. We can only hope that some _deus ex machina_ may + intervene to save us from the worst.'" + +"To this I added: + + "'I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude + of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored Your + Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and _compel_ Seidler, on + the one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in + order. Even from here I have written entreating Your Majesty to + act while there was yet time. But all in vain.' + +"I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the situation would +be to secure temporary assistance from Germany, and then to +requisition by force the stocks that were doubtless still available in +Hungary; finally, I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime +Minister of my telegram. + +"_January 16, 1918._--Despairing appeals from Vienna for food +supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin for aid, otherwise disaster +imminent. I replied to General Landwehr as follows: + + "'Dr. Kuehlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope of + success. The only hope now is for His Majesty to do as I have + advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On my + return I propose to put before His Majesty my point of view, that + it is impossible to carry on the foreign policy if the food + question at home is allowed to come to such a state as now. + + "'Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most positively + that we could hold out till the new harvest.' + +"At the same time I wired the Emperor: + + "'Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for us. + Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two + conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that + we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food supply, + which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of + the stocks still existing in Hungary. + + "'I have just explained the entire situation to Dr. Kuehlmann, and + he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all sanguine, + as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think the only + way to secure any success from this step would be for Your Majesty + to send at once, through military means, a Hughes telegram to + Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to intervene + himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the outbreak + of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I must, + however, emphatically point out that the commencement of unrest + among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of peace + here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian representatives + perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution, they + will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is + based on this factor.' + +"_January 17, 1918._--Bad news from Vienna and environs: serious +strike movement, due to the reduction of the flour rations and the +tardy progress of the Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna +Ministry seems to be past all understanding. + +"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time to secure some +supplies from the Ukraine, if only we can manage to keep matters quiet +at home for the next few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in +question to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On the same +day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Dr. von Seidler, the Prime +Minister: + + "'I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of + all the errors made by those entrusted with the food resources. + + "'Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us, + having insufficient for itself. + + "'Had your Excellency or your department called attention to the + state of things _in time_, it might still have been possible to + procure supplies from Roumania. As things are now, I can see no + other way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian + grain for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the + Roumanian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come + to hand.' + +[Illustration: GENERAL HOFFMANN (on right) WITH MAJ. BRINKMANN] + +"_January 20, 1918._--The negotiations have now come to this: that +Trotski declares his intention of laying the German proposals before +Petersburg, though he cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in +any case, to return here. As to calling in representatives from the +outer provinces, he will only do this provided he is allowed to choose +them. We cannot agree to this. With the Ukrainians, who, despite their +youth, are showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit by +the situation, negotiations are proceeding but slowly. First they +demanded East Galicia for the new 'Ukrainia.' This could not be +entertained for a moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the +outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they realise our position, +and know that we _must_ make peace in order to get corn. Now they +demand a separate position for East Galicia. The question will have to +be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry will have the final +word. + +"Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that without supplies +of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe is imminent. There _are_ +supplies in the Ukraine; if we can get them, the worst may be avoided. + +"The position now is this: Without help from outside, we shall, +according to Seidler, have thousands perishing in a few weeks. Germany +and Hungary are no longer sending anything. All messages state that +there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question is only whether we +can get it in time. I hope we may. But if we do not make peace _soon_, +then the troubles at home will be repeated, and each demonstration in +Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for Messrs. +Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of our state of famine at +home from these troubles as by a thermometer. If only the people who +create these disturbances know how they are by that very fact +increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from Ukraine! And we +were all but finished! + +"The question of East Galicia I will leave to the Austrian Ministry; +it must be decided in Vienna. I cannot, and dare not, look on and see +hundreds of thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy of +the Poles, so long as there is a possibility of help. + +"_January 21, 1918._--Back to Vienna. The impression of the troubles +here is even greater than I thought, and the effect disastrous. The +Ukrainians no longer treat with us: they _dictate_! + +"On the way, reading through old reports, I came upon the notes +relating to the discussions with Michaelis on August 1. According to +these, Under-Secretary of State von Stumm said at the time: + +"'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with the Ukrainians, and +the separatist movement in Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of +their movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance that they should +be allowed to unite with the Government of Cholm, and with the areas +of East Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs to +Austria, the demand for East Galicia cannot be conceded. It would be +another matter if Galicia were united with Poland; then a cession of +East Galicia might be possible.' + +"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long since been prejudged +by the Germans. + +"On January 22 the Council was held which was to determine the issue +of the Ukrainian question. The Emperor opened the proceedings, and +then called on me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties +that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which will be apparent +from the foregoing entries in this diary. I expressed my doubt as to +whether our group would succeed in concluding general peace with +Petersburg. I then sketched the course of the negotiations with the +Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians had originally demanded the +cession of East Galicia, but that I had refused this. With regard to +the Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made demands which +had been refused by me. At present, they demanded the division of +Galicia into two parts, and the formation of an independent Austrian +province from East Galicia and Bukovina. I pointed out the serious +consequences which the acceptance of the Ukrainian demands would have +upon the further development of the Austro-Polish question. The +concessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to consist in +the inclusion in the peace treaty of a commercial agreement which +should enable us to cover our immediate needs in the matter of grain +supplies. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full +reciprocity for the Poles resident in Ukraine. + +"I pointed out emphatically that I considered it my duty to state the +position of the peace negotiations; that the decision could not lie +with me, but with the Ministry as a whole, in particular with the +Austrian Prime Minister. The Austrian Government would have to decide +whether these sacrifices could be made or not, and here I could leave +them in no doubt that if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should +probably come to no result with that country, and should thus be +compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk without having achieved any +peace settlement at all. + +"When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, rose to +speak. He pointed out first of all the necessity of an immediate +peace, and then discussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian +crown land, especially from the parliamentary point of view. Seidler +believed that despite the active opposition which was to be expected +from the Poles, he would still have a majority of two-thirds in the +House for the acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not blind +to the fact that arrangement would give rise to violent parliamentary +conflicts, but repeated his hope that a two-thirds majority could be +obtained despite the opposition of the Polish Delegation. After +Seidler came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle. He was +particularly pleased to note that no concessions had been made to the +Ukrainians with regard to the Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear +division of the nationalities in Hungary was impracticable. The +Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of culture to enable +them to be given national independence. Dr. Wekerle also laid stress +on the danger, alike in Austria, of allowing any interference from +without; the risk of any such proceeding would be very great, we +should find ourselves on a downward grade by so doing, and we must +hold firmly to the principle that no interference in the affairs of +the Monarchy from without could be tolerated. In summing up, however, +Wekerle opposed the point of view of the Austrian Prime Minister. + +"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was perfectly aware +of the eminent importance and perilous aspects of this step. It was +true that it would bring us on to a down-grade, but from all +appearances, we had been in that position already for a long time, +owing to the war, and could not say how far it might lead us. I put +the positive question to Dr. Wekerle, what was a responsible leader of +our foreign policy to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the +Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hungarian supplies +would only suffice to help us over the next two months, after which +time a collapse would be absolutely unavoidable, unless we could +secure assistance from somewhere in the way of corn? On being +interrupted here by a dissentient observation from Dr. Wekerle, I told +him that if he, Wekerle, could bring corn into Austria I should be the +first to support his point of view, and that with pleasure, but so +long as he stood by his categorical denial, and insisted on his +inability to help us, we were in the position of a man on the third +floor of a burning house who jumps out of the window to save himself. +A man in such a situation would not stop to think whether he risked +breaking his legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the +certainty of the same. If the position really were as stated, that in +a couple of months we should be altogether without food supplies, then +we must take the consequences of such a position. Dr. von Seidler +here once more took up the discussion, and declared himself entirely +in agreement with my remarks. + +"During the further course of the debate, the probability of a +definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solution in connection with +the Ukrainian peace was discussed, and the question was raised as to +what new constellation would arise out of such failure. Sektionschef +Dr. Gratz then took up this question. Dr. Gratz pointed out that the +Austro-Polish solution must fail even without acceptance of the +Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates rendered solution +impossible. The Germans demanded, apart from quite enormous +territorial reductions of Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish +industry, part possession of the Polish railways and State domains, as +well as the imposition of part of the costs of war upon the Poles. We +could not attach ourselves to a Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed, +capable of living at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its +position. Dr. Gratz maintained that it would be wiser to come back to +the programme already discussed in general form; the project, by which +United Poland should be left to Germany, and the attachment of +Roumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Dr. Gratz went at length into +the details of this point of view. The Emperor then summed up the +essence of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that it was +primarily necessary to make peace with Petersburg and the Ukrainians, +and that negotiations should be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the +division of Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish +solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not finally settled, +but shelved for the time being. + +"In conclusion, Dr. Burian, the Minister of Finance, rose to speak, +and pointed out, as Dr. Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian +standpoint. Burian declared that, while the war might doubtless change +the internal structure of the Monarchy, such alteration must be made +from within, not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the +Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the Austrian principle +of the division of Galicia were to be carried through, the _form_ of +so doing would be of great importance. Baron Burian advised that a +clause referring to this should be inserted, not in the instrument of +peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This form was, in his, Burian's, +view, the only possible means of diminishing the serious consequences +of the steps which the Austrian Government wished to take." + +Thus the notes in my diary relative to this Council. The Austrian +Government was thus not only agreed as to the proposed arrangement +with the Ukraine; it was indeed at the direct wish of the Government, +by its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was brought +about. + +"_January 28, 1918._--Reached Brest this evening. + +"_January 29, 1918._--Trotski arrived. + +"_January 30, 1918._--The first plenary session has been held. There +is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in +Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a +general convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of the question +now to come to any peace terms with the Russians. It is evident among +the Russians themselves that they positively expect the outbreak of a +world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their tactics now are +simply to gain time and wait for this to happen. The conference was +not marked by any particular event, only pin-pricks between Kuehlmann +and Trotski. To-day is the first sitting of the Committee on +territorial questions, where I am to preside, and deal with our +territorial affairs. + +"The only interesting point about the new constellation seems to be +that the relations between Petersburg and Kieff are considerably worse +than before, and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognised at all by +the Bolsheviks as independent. + +"_February 1, 1918._--Sitting of the Territorial Committee, I myself +presiding, with the Petersburg Russians. My plan is to play the +Petersburgers and the Ukrainians one against the other, and manage at +least to make peace with one of the two parties. I have still some +slight hope that a peace with one may so affect the other that +possibly peace with both may be attained. + +"As was to be expected, Trotski replied to my question, whether he +admitted that the Ukrainians should treat with us alone on questions +dealing with their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after +some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be adjourned, and a +plenary sitting convened, in order that the matter might be dealt with +by the Kieff and Petersburg parties together. + +"_February 2, 1918._--I have tried to get the Ukrainians to talk over +things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well. The +insults hurled by the Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were +simply grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between these two +Governments, and that it is not our fault that we have not been able +to bring them together under one hat on the question of peace. Trotski +was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he stared fixedly +before him, drawing nervously on his blotting paper. Heavy drops of +sweat trickled down his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the +disgrace of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence of the +enemy. + +"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little while ago. The elder +has shot down some sixty, the younger 'only' some thirty enemy +airmen. The elder's face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He +told me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only get as near +to the enemy as possible, from behind, and then keep on shooting, +when the other man would fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over +your own fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your +opponent.--Modern heroes. + +"Two charming stories were told about these two brothers. The English +had put a price on the head of the elder Richthofen. When he learned +of this, he sent down broadsheets informing them that to make matters +easier for them, he would from the following day have his machine +painted bright red. Next morning, going to the shed, he found all the +machines there painted bright red. One for all and all for one. + +"The other story is this: Richthofen and an English airman were +circling round each other and firing furiously. They came closer and +closer, and soon they could distinctly see each other's faces. +Suddenly something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun, and he +could not shoot. The Englishman looked across in surprise, and seeing +what was wrong, waved his hand, turned and flew off. Fair play! I +should like to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is +greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old. + +"_February 3, 1918._--Started for Berlin. Kuehlmann, Hoffmann, +Colloredo. + +"_February 4, 1918._--Arrived Berlin. Nothing this afternoon, as the +Germans are holding council among themselves. + +"_February 5, 1918._--Sitting all day. I had several violent passages +of arms with Ludendorff. Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this +is not yet altogether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for +Brest, we have at last to set down _in writing_ that we are only +obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany. Ludendorff +was violently opposed to this, and said, 'If Germany makes peace +without profit, then Germany has lost the war.' + +"The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling +nudged me and whispered: 'Leave him alone, we two will manage it +together without him.' + +"I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to +Hertling. + +"Supper this evening at Hoehenlohe. + +"_February 6, 1918._--Arrived Brest this evening. Wiesner has been at +it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier +now. The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived +yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his +Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally, +far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna, +and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I +gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the +Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then in the name of Germany +commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech +with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were possible +or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposition we agreed. + +"_February 7, 1918._--My conversation with Trotski took place. I took +Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him. I began +by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption +of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be +avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken. I therefore +begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what +conditions he would accept. Trotski then declared very frankly and +clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he +knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that +the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian +provinces. He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kuehlmann +during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right +of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of +sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force. He would +never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to +this interpretation of the right of self-determination. The Germans +must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he +would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation +and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak to oppose it. Only the +Moon Sound Islands seemed to be more than he could swallow. Secondly, +and this is very characteristic, Trotski said he could never agree to +our making peace with the Ukraine, since the Ukraine was no longer in +the hands of its Rada, but in the hands of his troops. It was a part +of Russia, and to make peace with it would be interfering in the +internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter seems to be +that about nineteen days ago the Russian troops really did enter +Kieff, but were subsequently driven out, the Rada once more coming +into power as before. Whether Trotski was unaware of this latter +development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot say for certain, +but it seems as if the former were the case. + +"The last hope of coming to an understanding with Petersburg has +vanished. An appeal from the Petersburg Government to the German +soldiers has been discovered in Berlin, inciting them to revolt, to +murder the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the soviets. +Following on this came a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm to Kuehlmann +ordering him to terminate negotiations at once, by demanding, besides +Courland and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia--all without regard to the right of self-determination of the +peoples concerned. + +"The dastardly behaviour of these Bolsheviks renders negotiation +impossible. I cannot blame Germany for being incensed at such +proceedings, but the instructions from Berlin are hardly likely to be +carried out. We do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia. + +"_February 8, 1918._--This evening the peace with Ukraine is to be +signed. The first peace in this terrible war. I wonder if the Rada is +still really sitting at Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message +dated 6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here, and +Trotski has declined my suggestion to dispatch an officer of the +Austrian General Staff to the spot, in order to bring back reliable +information. Evidently, then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were +already masters of Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me, by the +way, that Trotski, with whom he spoke early this morning, is much +depressed at our intention of concluding peace with Ukraine to-day +after all. This confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz +has convened a meeting with the Petersburgers for to-morrow; this will +clear matters up, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if +we must break off altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that +the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end." + +After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received the following +telegram from the Emperor: + + "'_Court train, February 9, 1918._ + + "'Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace + with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for + your persevering and successful endeavours. + + "'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto far + from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further + continue to aid you on your difficult path--to the benefit of the + Monarchy and of our peoples. + + KARL.' + +"_February 11, 1918._--Trotski declines to sign. The war is over, but +there is no peace. + +"The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna will be seen clearly +from the following message from Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux, +February 12, 1918. Skrzynski writes: + + "'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the + following notification: We were already quite disposed to enter + into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether + Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give + her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which + is perhaps already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And + Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows: + It has been decided to wait for a while.'" + +Our position, then, during the negotiations with Petersburg was as +follows: We could not induce Germany to resign the idea of Courland +and Lithuania. We had not the physical force to do so. The pressure +exerted by the Supreme Army Command on the one hand and the shifty +tactics of the Russians made this impossible. We had then to choose +between leaving Germany to itself, and signing a separate peace, or +acting together with our three Allies and finishing with a peace +including the covert annexation of the Russian outer provinces. + +The former alternative involved the serious risk of making a breach in +the Quadruple Alliance, where some dissension was already apparent. +The Alliance could no longer stand such experiments. We were faced +with the final military efforts now, and the unity of the Allies must +not in any case be further shaken. On the other hand, the danger that +Wilson, the only statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of +a peace on mutual understanding, might from the conclusion of such a +peace obtain an erroneous impression as to our intentions. I hoped +then, and I was not deceived, that this eminently clever man would +see through the situation and recognise that we were forced to act +under pressure of circumstances. His speeches delivered after the +peace at Brest confirmed my anticipation. + +The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine. And +it bears the characteristic marks of such a birth. That is true. But +it is no less true that despite the fact of our having obtained far +less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should, without these +supplies, have been unable to carry on at all until the new harvest. +Statistics show that during the spring and summer of 1918 42,000 +wagon-loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have been +impossible to procure these supplies from anywhere else. Millions of +human beings were thus saved from death by starvation--and let those +who sit in judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind. + +It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks available in +Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity could have been brought into +Austria if the collecting and transport apparatus had worked +differently. + +The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my request, in May, +1919, furnished me with the following statistical data for +publication: + + Brief survey of the organisation of corn imports from Ukraine (on + terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same: + + When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived + at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies, + a mission was dispatched to Kieff, in which not only Government + officials but also the best qualified and most experienced experts + which the Government could procure were represented. + + Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being + persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain + business, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente + grain houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the + leading French corn merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss). + + The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and + commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to + show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties. + + The Ukrainian Government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk that + very great quantities, probably about one million tons, of + surplus foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the meantime + been replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power + evinced no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to + fulfil obligations on this scale, but was more disposed to point + out that it would be altogether impossible, for various reasons, + to do so. + + Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange + system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But + neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in a + position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded) + required in exchange. + + We had then to endeavour to obtain the supplies on credit, and the + Ukrainian Government agreed, after long and far from easy + negotiations, to provide _credit valuta_ (against vouchers for + mark and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this + were finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all 643 + million karbowanez. + + The Rouble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under the + leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, + was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight + activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of + great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost; + and even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with. + Anyhow, it had only procured comparatively small sums of roubles, + so that the purchasing organisation in Ukraine, especially at + first, suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment. + + But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question would + only have improved matters in a few of the best supplied + districts, for the principal obstacle was simply _the lack of + supplies_. The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves + continually in danger of a food crisis is the best indication as + to the state of things. + + In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the + resulting confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the + Bolsheviks (November, 1917, to March, 1918) were conspicuously + apparent; cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but + where supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly + carried off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the + harvest had given certain stocks available in the country, though + these were not extensive, and the organisation of a purchasing + system was now commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and + Germany had originally contemplated could not be carried out in + fact, since the Ukrainian Government declared that it would itself + set up this organisation, and maintained this intention with the + greatest stubbornness. But the authority in the country had been + destroyed by the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion; + the peasantry turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by + revolutionaries and cut up. The power of the Government, then, in + respect of collecting supplies of grain, was altogether + inadequate; on the other hand, however, it was still sufficient + (as some actual instances proved) to place serious, indeed + insuperable, obstacles in our way. It was necessary, therefore, to + co-operate with the Government--that is, to come to a compromise + with it. After weeks of negotiation this was at last achieved, by + strong diplomatic pressure, and, accordingly, the agreement of + April 23, 1918, was signed. + + This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hungarian + Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a great firm + of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed a number + of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of activity + in the business, with Russian grain affairs. + + But while this establishment was still in progress the people in + Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey to + North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no + longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a _civil_ + commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied + by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a + decree from the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain + should be entrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the + districts occupied by them. To carry out this plan a general, who + had up to that time been occupied in Roumania, was dispatched to + Odessa, and now commenced independent military proceedings from + there. For payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War + Grain Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial + instructions to the Government, to place 100 million kronen at the + disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set + aside by the finance section of that department. + + This military action and its execution very seriously affected the + civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired + the value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to + such an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in + circulation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus + into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed to + the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place + there some months later. + + The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great + disapproval by the _Germans_, and when in a time of the greatest + scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Germany + for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition that + independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary should + be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be entrusted to + Germany. + + It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured, + especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established a + collecting organisation, to the demand of which the Roumanian + Government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain, and + in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The + country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies, + and in addition to this the collecting system never really worked + properly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was + frequently upset by overbidding on the part of our own military + section. + + Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the harvest + of 1918. The collecting organisation had become more firmly + established and extended, the necessary personal requirements were + fully complied with, and _it would doubtless have been possible to + bring great quantities out of the country_. But first of all the + demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in + many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian + and finally the very considerable contingents of German and + Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for + these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow + any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree. + + It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout + the whole country had seriously declined--owing to the entire + uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution. + The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were + little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local + embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to + any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves. + + In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which + had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of + the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position + of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was + unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements + throughout the whole country were now working with increasing + success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more + difficult in September and October--and then came the collapse. + + The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had + either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube, + or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient + wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition, + often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways, + incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort. + + However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much + the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have + contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing + of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may + nevertheless maintain that _all that was humanly possible_ was + done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And + in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and + experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were + utilised to the utmost degree. + + Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import + organisation--apart from the before-mentioned interference of the + military department and consequent fluctuations of the system--was + largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on + more particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high + export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian + Government were constantly being overbid. This smuggling was also + in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the + nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and + frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or + upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did + a great deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany + likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted + smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation, + and led to similar conditions on our own side. + + Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen + from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not + inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned, + amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the + quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations. + + + SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCEMENT OF + IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918. + + I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department + (corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds): + + Total imported for the contracting states + (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) 113,421 tons + Of which Austria-Hungary received 57,382 " + Grain and flour amounting to 46,225 " + + II. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company: + + Of which + Austria-Hungary + Total received: + + Butter, fat, bacon 3,329,403 kg. 2,170,437 kg. + Oil, edible oils 1,802,847 " 977,105 " + Cheese, curds 420,818 " 325,103 " + Fish, preserved fish, herrings 1,213,961 " 473,561 " + Cattle 105,542 head 55,421 head + (36,834,885 kg.) (19,505,760 kg.) + Horses 98,976 head 40,027 head + (31,625,172 kg.) (13,165,725 kg.) + Salted meat 2,927,439 " 1,571,569 " + Eggs 75,200 boxes 32,433 boxes + Sugar 66,809,969 kg. 24,973,443 kg. + Various foodstuffs 27,385,095 " 7,836,287 " + ------------- ------------- + Total 172,349,556 " 61,528,220 " + and 75,200 boxes and 32,433 boxes + eggs eggs + (Total, 30,757 wagons) (Total, 13,037 wagons) + + The goods imported under II. represent a value of roughly 450 + _million kronen_. + + The quantities _smuggled_ unofficially into the states concerned + are estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official + imports). + +So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important while we were +living through it, but which was yet nothing but a phase of no great +importance after all, since it produced no lasting effect. + +The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, washing +it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by +the incoming tide. + +Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in the Herrenhaus, +who asserted that I had proved my incapability by my own confession +that the Peace of Brest had not withstood the test of subsequent +events. But should I have shown more capability by asserting, after +the collapse of the Central Powers, that the peace still existed? + +The term "bread peace" (_Brotfrieden_) was not coined by me, but by +Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the +Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives +were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words +without a sneer. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST + + +At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not +intend to continue the war. These rumours assumed a very definite +character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine. That peace, as +well as Trotski's attitude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania +could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia +and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back. I +say in _some_ circles, for there was one group which, to the very last +moment, was all for war. + +While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of +the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace +aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a +peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than +with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians +on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical +frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from +Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, +as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person +with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was +brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far +as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of +acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with +the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his +already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very +distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The _pro-memoria_ +reads as follows: + + Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much + exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy + could wish. + + The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains + in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us + are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her + military situation. + + Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift + offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a + subject for negotiations_. In no case are these negotiations to + assume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses + to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only + be a resumption of hostilities. + + I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will + run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western + Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that + after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back + and give way before our superior forces. + + At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse + of Roumania. + + In all human probability it is almost certain that the development + of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the + peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete + success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier + rectification as _conditio sine qua non_ forms a justifiable + measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a + purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the + entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the + question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up + another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in + the Delegation. + + And, besides, the procedure--to which the greatest importance must + be attached--is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise + the chances of a general peace. + + It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of + the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree + to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and + firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in + this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only + way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude + that will lead them to think differently. + + This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and + undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is + evident that to yield on the frontier question--even for fear of a + breakdown in the negotiations--must have a deplorable effect on + the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right + not to take advantage of Roumania's desperate situation, but to + grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the + principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with + adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the + Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude + a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and + sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to + teach them otherwise. + + TISZA. + + _February 27, 1916._ + +Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of +Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord +on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do +not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time +displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the +feet of General Franchet d'Esperey, dominated. + +Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the +horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace +negotiations must be supported. + +The episode of the Roumanian peace must not be taken out of the great +picture of the war. Like the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanian +peace was necessary from a military point of view, because it seemed +desirable to release troops in the East as quickly as possible and +transfer them to the Western front. It was urgently desired and +repeatedly demanded that we should come to a final settlement with +Roumania as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result I had +already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Emperor to send word +privately to King Ferdinand that he could reckon on an honourable +peace should he wish to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my +advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews with a member of +the immediate entourage of the King. But the German opinion was that +King Ferdinand must be "punished for his treachery" and no +negotiations entered into with him. For this reason, and to avoid +fruitless controversy, I first imparted to Herr von Kuehlmann the +accomplished fact and informed him that we had put ourselves secretly +into communication with King Ferdinand. This event was quite in +accordance with the standard of equality in our Federation, by which +every member was privileged to act according to the best of his +ability and was merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the +proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany for permission to +take such a step. + +There was a three-fold reason why I did not share Germany's opinion on +this question. In the first place, my point of view was that it was +not our duty to mete out divine justice and to inflict punishment, +but, on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible. Therefore +my duty was to seize every means possible to prevent a continuance of +the war. I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles +that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were +compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false. The +Roumanians held very strong positions, the _moral_ in the army was +excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen's +troops had suffered very severely. This success turned the Roumanians' +heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian +army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war _a +l'outrance_. They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were +upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the +defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies +on the West would secure victory for them. They were probably afraid, +too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent +disgrace with the Entente--that they would lose the friendship of the +Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools. +The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the +King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most +unwise to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a certain +fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it +might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones. The +third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a +competent representative in Roumania. If we were to depose the King we +should divide Roumania into two camps and would, at the best, only be +able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the +dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly-secured peace could +only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania. + +In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4 +and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy +asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the +step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would +be released. I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied +that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other +Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable +peace, address them accordingly. As to the question of territorial +possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express +any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the +introductory negotiations. + +The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with +Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently +from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the +question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite +justified. Roumania's actions with regard to us were far more +treacherous than those of Italy. Italy, owing to her geographical +position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western +Powers--a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to +their demands--would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in +this world war. Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was +amply provided for through her rich granaries. Apart from the fact +that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that +Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her +into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be +influenced by the Entente than Italy. But neither would the Russian +ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and +willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and +political matters that gave her into Russia's power. Bratianu said to +me in one of our last interviews: "Russia is exactly like a blackcock +dancing before the hens." In admitting the truth of this appropriate +comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to +be embraced, directly provoked violence. + +For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his +own country. Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his +Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had +no effect. + +In Roumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power. On February 24 +Kuehlmann and I had our first interview alone with Avarescu at the +castle of Prince Stirbey, at Buftia. At this interview, which was very +short, the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The frontier +rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-Hungarian programme, were +barely alluded to, and the economic questions, which later played a +rather important part, were only hinted at. Avarescu's standpoint was +that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an impossibility, and the +interview ended with a _non possumus_ from the Roumanian general, +which was equivalent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the +Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint. The so-called +"old" Dobrudsha, the portion that Roumania in 1913 had wrested from +Bulgaria, had been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the time +of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their co-operation, and +the area that lies between that frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda +railway line was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They went much +further in their aspirations: they demanded the whole of the +Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, and the great and +numerous disputes that occurred later in this connection show how +insistently and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands. At +the same time, as there was a danger that the Bulgars, thoroughly +disappointed in their aspirations, might secede from us, it became +absolutely impossible to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Roumanians. +All that could be effected was to secure for the Roumanians free +access to Constanza, and, further, to find a way out of the +difficulty existing between Turkey and Bulgaria in connection with the +Dobrudsha. + +In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I suggested to +Avarescu that he should arrange for his King to meet me. My plan was +to make it clear to the King that it would be possible for him now to +conclude a peace, though involving certain losses, but still a peace +that would enable him to keep his crown. On the other hand, by +continuing the war, he could not count on forbearance on the part of +the Central Powers. I trusted that this move on my part would enable +him to continue the peace negotiations. + +I met the King on February 27 at a little station in the occupied +district of Moldavia. + +We arrived at Focsani at noon and continued by motor to the lines, +where Colonel Ressel and a few Roumanian officers were waiting to +receive me. We drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German +car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded as far as the +railway station of Padureni. A saloon carriage in the train had been +reserved for me there, and we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at +5 o'clock. + +The Roumanian royal train arrived a few minutes later, and I at once +went across to the King. + +Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand lasted twenty minutes. + +As the King did not begin the conversation I had to do so, and said +that I had not come to sue for peace but purely as the bearer of a +message from the Emperor Charles, who, in spite of Roumania's +treachery, would show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand +would _at once_ conclude peace under the conditions mutually agreed on +by the Quadruple Alliance Powers. + +Should the King not consent, then a continuance of the war would be +unavoidable and would put an end to Roumania and the dynasty. Our +military superiority was already very considerable, and now that our +front would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it would be +an easy matter for us, in a very short space of time, to increase our +strength still more. We were aware that Roumania would very soon have +no more munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks the +kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist. + +The King did not oppose anything but thought the conditions terribly +hard. Without the Dobrudsha Roumania would hardly be able to draw +breath. At any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding "old" +Dobrudsha again. + +I said to the King that if he complained about hard conditions I could +only ask what would his conditions have been if his troops had reached +Budapest? Meanwhile, I was ready to guarantee that Roumania would not +be cut off from the sea, but would have free access to Constanza. + +Here the King again complained of the hard conditions enforced on him, +and declared he would never be able to find a Ministry who would +accept them. + +I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Roumania's internal +business, but my private opinion was that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in +order to save Roumania, would agree to the conditions laid down. I +could only repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms laid +before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If the King did not accept +them, we should have, in a month's time, a far better peace than the +one which the Roumanians might consider themselves lucky to get +to-day. + +We were ready to give our diplomatic support to Roumania that she +might obtain Bessarabia, and she would, therefore, gain far more than +she would lose. + +The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was +steeped in Bolshevism, and the Dobrudsha could not be given up; +anyhow, it was only under the very greatest pressure that he had +decided to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He began +again, however, to speak of the promised access to the sea, which +apparently made the cession of the Dobrudsha somewhat easier. + +We then entered into details, and I reproached the King for the +dreadful treatment of our people interned in Roumania, which he said +he regretted. + +Finally, I requested that he would give me a clear and decided answer +within forty-eight hours as to whether he would negotiate on the basis +of our proposals or not. + +The result of the interview was the appointment of the Marghiloman +Ministry and the continuation of the negotiations. + +Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet, he approached me to +learn the exact terms. + +He declared himself to be in agreement with the first and hardest of +the conditions--the cession of the Dobrudsha, because he was quicker +than the King in seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation +to Bulgaria in this connection, it could not be otherwise. As to our +territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that I laid chief stress on +entering into friendly and lasting relations with Roumania after peace +was concluded, and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such +measure as Roumania, on her part, would consider bearable. On the +other hand, he, Marghiloman, must understand that I was bound to +consider the Hungarian aspirations to a certain degree, Marghiloman, +who was an old and tried parliamentarian, fully saw in what a +constrained position I was placed. We finally agreed that the cession +of the populated districts and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should +not take place, and, altogether the original claims were reduced to +about half. Marghiloman said he accepted the compromise. + +My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with Roumania played +an important part in the negotiations. It was clear to me that this +demand was in Austrian, but not in Hungarian interests; but I still +think that, even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for both +countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage of provisions made the +opening of the Roumanian granaries very desirable. As was to be +expected, this clause in the negotiations met with the most violent +opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible to see a way out +of the difficulty. I never took back my demand, however, and was +firmly resolved that peace should not be signed if my plan was not +realised. I was dismissed from office in the middle of the +negotiations, and my successor did not attach the same importance to +that particular item as I did. + +On the German side there was at once evidence of that insatiable +appetite which we had already noticed at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans +wished to have a species of war indemnity by compelling Roumania to +cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbours to German +companies, and placing the permanent control of her finances in German +hands. I opposed these demands in the most decided manner from the +very first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude all +possibility of any friendly relations in future. I went so far as to +ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph direct to the Emperor William in +that connection, which met with a certain amount of success. In the +end the German claims were reduced by about fifty per cent., and +accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form. With regard to the +petroleum question, a ninety years' lease was agreed on. In the matter +of the corn supply, Roumania was to bind herself to deliver her +agricultural produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of +years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent control of +Roumanian finances was not carried out. In the question of price, the +Roumanian views held good. The most impossible of the German demands, +namely, the occupation of Roumania for five to six years after the +conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties. This was the +point that was most persistently and energetically insisted on by the +German Supreme Military Command, and it was only with great trouble +and after lengthy explanations and discussions that we settled the +matter on the following lines: That on the conclusion of peace the +entire legislative and executive power of the Roumanian Government +would be restored in principle, and that we should content ourselves +with exercising a certain control through a limited number of agents, +this control not to be continued after the general peace was made. I +cannot say positively whether this standpoint was adhered to by my +successor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only undertook +office on condition that I gave him a guarantee that the plan would be +supported by me. + +As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha had prepared great +difficulties for us in two respects. First of all there was the +relinquishing of their claim which, for the Roumanians, was the +hardest term of all, and imparted to the peace the character of a +peace of violence; and secondly, the matter had precipitated a dispute +between Turkey and Bulgaria. + +The Bulgarians' view was that the entire Dobrudsha, including the +mouth of the Danube, must be promised to them, and they insisted on +their point with an obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come +across. They went so far as to declare that neither the present +Government nor any other would be able to return to Sofia, and allowed +it clearly to be seen that by refusing their claims we could never +again count on Bulgaria. The Turks, on the other hand, protested with +equal vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered by two Turkish +army corps, that it was a moral injustice that the gains chiefly won +by Turkish forces should be given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and +that they would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole of the +Dobrudsha unless compensation was given to them. By way of +compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they +had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but +also a considerable area beyond. + +In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed, +Kuehlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making +every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both +saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the +result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble, +we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It +took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to +Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a +possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision +agreed upon later. + +Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor +yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it was the only possible +way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars. + +Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy +through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and +Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to +the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved +later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding. +Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a +state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without +first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to +important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a +burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has +damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was +very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my +predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger. +There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the +Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through +promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the +Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it. + +On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too +severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was +dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret +with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on Talaat and +Enver. Talaat told me in Bucharest, however, quite positively that he +would be forced to send in his resignation if he were to return +empty-handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would be very +probable. + +We tried then at Bucharest to steer our way through the many shoals; +not mortally to offend the Roumanians, to observe as for as possible +the character of a peace of understanding, and yet to keep both Turks +and Bulgars on our side. + +The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard demand to make on the +Roumanians, and was only rendered bearable for them when Kuehlmann and +I, with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent +opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free access to the +Black Sea. + +When later, in one breath, we were reproached with having enforced a +peace of violence on the Roumanians and with not having treated the +Bulgarian claims and wishes with sufficient consideration--the answer +to the charge is obvious. _Because_ we were compelled to consider both +Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to demand the Dobrudsha from the +Roumanians and treat them with greater severity than we should have +done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and the Bulgars for +our negotiation plans. Judged according to the Versailles standard, +the Peace of Bucharest would be a peace of understanding, both as +regards form and contents. + +The Central Powers' mediators, both at Versailles and St. Germain, +would have been glad had they been treated in the same way as the +Marghiloman Ministry was treated. + +The Roumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired safe and guaranteed +access to the sea; they lost a district of sparsely populated +mountainous country to us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia. + +They gained far more than they lost. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +FINAL REFLECTIONS + + +The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the +character of the work of individual men. It assumed rather the +character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the +effectiveness of the most powerful individuals. + +All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with +certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation +given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory. +The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing +crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making +each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an +avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and +without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone. + +The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the +world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe +according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That +signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four +different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and +Washington. And the four representatives--"the Big Four," as they were +called--were each individually the slave of his programme, his +pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations +_in camera_, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground +for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there +was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found. + +Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his +programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between +the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but +it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his +will against the three others. We do not know what occurred behind +those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought +weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off +proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the +chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world +if the only one who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest +had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of +Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, +who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the +Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he +had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of +France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had +been told for the last five years: _Que les boches payeront tout_. +What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France +would have dismissed him. + +And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of +approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to +check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national +interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was +much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might +much more probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after final +victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves +of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would +have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the +right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally, +he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the +question here, but rather that neither could have acted very +differently even had he wished to do so. + +It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson +lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the +President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his +Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were +so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held +it. + +And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the +most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a +continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars. + +In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of +all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at +Versailles--the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating +Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory +that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give +themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and +passion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful +paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while +they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but +instruments in a world revolution. + +The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the +blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made +Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its +mother, despair its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in +the veins of Europe for many a long year. + +Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The +war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming +generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the +world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with +the world-war. + +Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done. +The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms +that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible +earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and +again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up +flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of +elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation +through the land--until everything has been swept away that reminds us +of the madness of the war and the French peace. + +Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming +generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad +dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid +in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions, +with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to +devastate and destroy. + +But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will +rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always +after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law +in life. + +Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the +ranks of whoever comes to build the new world. + +_June, 1919._ + + + + +APPENDIX + + +1 + +=Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915=[11] + +On February 28, 1917, the _Isvestia_ published the following text of +this agreement: + +"The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the +instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the +Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Ambassador +in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in London, Count +Benckendorff, the following notable points: + +Sec.1. A _Military Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between +the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This +convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia +against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its +forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly +against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle +questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their +nature come within the scope of the Army Command. + +Sec.2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at +her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against +all countries at war with them. + +Sec.3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy +undiminished, active assistance until the _destruction of the Austrian +fleet_, or until the moment peace is concluded. A _Naval Convention_ +shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and +Italy. + +Sec.4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the +district of the _Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its +natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the +city and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, +the whole of Istria_ as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the +Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of +Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St. +Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands. + +Note: 1. By way of supplement to Sec.4, the frontier shall be drawn +through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a +northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the +watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers +Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the +Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn +southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the +present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it +will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course +along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil, +Mangart and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and +Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction +to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its +sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the +Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua, +Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions. + +Sec.5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its +present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all +possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca +eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the +Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching +at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those +situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised _all the +islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast_, beginning with +the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura, +etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the +islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza +and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as +Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona, +Pua, Solta and Brazza. + +The following are to be _neutralised_: (1) The entire coast from Cape +Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of +Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned +peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning +from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far +as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the +boundaries of the neutralised zone _the whole of the Bay of Cattaro_ +with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo; +this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in +April and May, 1909, as to the rights of _Montenegro_. + +In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only +admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they +shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in +the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the +coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future +neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari, +agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the +islands not accorded to Italy. + +Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the +Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of _Croatia, +Serbia and Montenegro_: In the north of the Adriatic, _the entire +coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca_ on the frontier of Istria +as far as the _northern frontier_ of Dalmatia, including the whole of +the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia, +the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as +also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the +south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the +entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the +principal ports of _Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and +San Giovanni di Medua_, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua, +Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta. + +The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State +of Albania. + +Sec.6. Italy to be given full possession of _Valona, the Island of +Sasseno_, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in +military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north +and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south. + +Sec.7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to Sec.4, Dalmatia and the +islands of the Adriatic according to Sec.5, as well as Valona, is not to +oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain and Russia in case +of the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state in +Albania, as to _division of the northern and southern frontier belts +of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece_. The southern strip +of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as far as +Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralisation. + +Italy has the prospect of _right to determine the foreign policy of +Albania_; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a +sufficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on +the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece and +Serbia. + +Sec.8. Italy to have full possession of all the _islands of the +Dodecanessus_ which it occupies at present. + +Sec.9. France, Great Britain and Russia accept in principle the fact of +_Italy's interest in maintaining political equilibrium_ in the +Mediterranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any _division of +Turkey, to a like portion with themselves_ in the basin of the +Mediterranean, and that in the part adjacent to the _province of +Adalia_, where Italy has already acquired particular rights, and +developed particular interests, to be noted in the Italo-British +Convention. The zone then falling to the possession of Italy will in +due time be determined according to the vital interests of France and +Great Britain. Similarly, the interests of Italy are also to be +considered in case the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should +be maintained by the Powers for a further period, and only a +limitation between the spheres of interest be made. Should, in such +case, any areas of Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain +and Russia during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to +Italy, and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together +with the right to occupy the same. + +Sec.10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto +conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne. + +Sec.11. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall be +commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts. + +Sec.12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, England and +Russia whereby _Arabia and the holy cities of the Mohammedans_ are to +be granted to _an independent Mohammedan Power_. + +Sec.13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial +possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great +Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain +compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in +Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to +the colonies of France and England. + +Sec.14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realisation of _a +loan of not less than 50 million pounds sterling_ in the English +market on favourable conditions. + +Sec.15. France, England and Russia undertake to support Italy in +_preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any +diplomatic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a +peace_, or the regulation of questions connected with the present war. + +Sec.16. The present treaty to be _kept secret_. As regards Italy's +agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration +will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against +Italy. + +The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective authorised +representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, together with the +representative of Italy similarly authorised by his Government for +this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain and Russia declare +their full agreement with the foregoing notable points, as set before +them by the Italian Government. With regard to Sec.Sec.1, 2 and 3, referring +to the agreement upon military and naval undertakings of all four +Powers, _Italy undertakes to commence active operations at the +earliest possible date_, and in any case not later than one month +after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties. + +The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the 26th +April, 1915, and sealed, by + + Sir Edward Grey, + Cambon, + Marchese Imperiali, + Graf Benckendorff." + +After the entry of Roumania into the war (September, 1916) this +programme was further extended. + + +2 + +=Note from Count Czernin to the American Government, dated March 5, +1917= + +From the _aide-memoire_ of the American Ambassador in Vienna, dated +February 18 of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign +Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet entertains some doubt, +in view of the statements issued by the Imperial and Royal Government +on February 10 and January 11 of this year, as to what attitude +Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting for the future with regard to +submarine warfare, and whether the assurance given by the Austrian +Government to the Washington Cabinet in the course of the proceedings +with regard to the case of the vessels _Ancona_ and _Persia_ might not +be taken as altered or withdrawn by the statements mentioned. + +The Austrian Government is most willing to meet the desire of the +United States Government that this doubt should be removed by a clear +and final declaration. + +It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on the +methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since these +form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare put into +practice by Austria-Hungary and her allies, besides throwing a clear +light upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian Government in +the questions arising therefrom. + +When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central Powers, but a +few years had elapsed since the memorable time when Great Britain +itself, together with the remaining states, had commenced at the Hague +to lay the foundations of a modern code of law for marine warfare. +Shortly after that the English Government had brought about a meeting +of representatives of the principal naval Powers, assembling in +London, in order further to carry forward the work commenced at the +Hague, presumably in a spirit of reasonable compromise between the +interests of belligerents and those of neutrals. The unexpected +success of these endeavours, which aimed at nothing less than +concerted establishment of legal standards calculated to maintain the +freedom of the seas and the interests of neutrals even in time of war, +was not to be long enjoyed by the peoples concerned. + +Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war than it +also began to break through the barriers with which it was confronted +by the standards of international law. While the Central Powers +immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their intention of +observing the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of +the British representative, England discarded the most important +points in that Declaration. In the endeavour to cut off the Central +Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually extended the list +of contraband until it included everything now required by human +beings for the maintenance of life. Great Britain then placed all the +coasts of the North Sea--an important transit-way also for the +maritime trade of Austria-Hungary--under the obstruction of a +so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the entry into Germany of +all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband list, as also to bar all +neutral traffic with those coasts, and prevent any export from the +same. That this method of proceeding stands in the most lurid +contradiction to the standards of blockade law arrived at and +established by international congress has already been admitted by the +President of the United States in words which will live in the history +of the law of nations. By this illegally preventing export of goods +from the Central Powers Great Britain thought to be able to shut down +the innumerable factories and industries which had been set up by +industrious and highly-developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and +to bring the workers to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And +when Austria-Hungary's southern neighbour joined the ranks of the +enemies of the Central Powers her first step was to declare a +blockade of all the coasts of her opponent--following the example, of +course, of her Allies--in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy +had shortly before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to +point out to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of +all legal validity. + +For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until then, and +after long and mature consideration for and against, did they proceed +to answer in like measure and close with their adversaries at sea. As +the only belligerents who had done everything to secure the observance +of the agreement which should provide for freedom of the seas to +neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes to bow to the need of the +moment and attack that freedom; but they took that step in order to +fulfil their urgent duty to their peoples and with the conviction that +the step in question must lead towards the freedom of the seas in the +end. The declarations made by the Central Powers on the last day of +January of this year are only apparently directed against the rights +of neutrals; as a matter of fact, they are working toward the +restitution of those rights which the enemy has constantly infringed +and would, if victorious, annihilate for ever. The submarines, then, +which circle round England's shores, announce to all peoples using and +needing the sea--and who does not need it?--that the day is not far +off when the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly +acquired freedom. + +It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo +wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in +particular by the great people of the United States of America, whose +most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up with +ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all +nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in +mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended not +only to force the Central Powers to submission by starvation but +ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and +thereby ensure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the +other hand the blockading of England and its Allies only serves to +render possible _a peace with honour_ for these Powers and to +guarantee to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritime trade, +thus ensuring their safe existence, then the question as to which of +the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided. +Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further +allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming +that neutrals should appreciate their endeavours to bring to life +again the principles of international law and the equal rights of +nations. + +Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memorandum of +February 18 of this year, already referred to, the Austrian Government +would first of all remark that in the exchange of Notes in the cases +of the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ this Government restricted itself to +consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then arisen, +without setting forth the legal position in point of principle. In the +Note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the _Ancona_ case it +reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of +international law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion +at a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the +question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum is +concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may be +made clear to the American Government that the Austrian Government now +as heretofore _holds immovably by the assurance already given_, and +with the endeavour to avoid any misunderstanding between the Monarchy +and the American Union by clearing up the most important question +arising out of the submarine warfare--most important as it rests on +the dictates of humanity. + +First and foremost the Austrian Government wishes to point out that +the thesis advanced by the American Government and adopted in many +learned works--to the effect that enemy merchant vessels, save in the +event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be destroyed +without provision for the safety of those on board--is also, in the +opinion of the Austrian Government itself, the kernel, so to speak, of +the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view, this theory +can at any rate be considered in connection with possible +circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the +dictates of humanity, which the Austrian Government and the Washington +Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down the +general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy +merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible. +This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before +exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the method +indicated by the theory of the Union Government referred to, according +to which _the commander of the warship himself issues a warning to the +vessel about to be sunk_, so that crew and passengers can be brought +into safety at the last moment; or, on the other hand, the Government +of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an imperative +necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect, _before the +sailing of the vessel_ to be sunk; or, finally, such Government can, +when preparing comprehensive measures against the enemy traffic at +sea, have recourse to _a general warning applicable to all enemy +vessels concerned_. + +That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on board +is liable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union Government +itself. The Austrian Government believes, however, that destruction +without warning is not only justifiable in cases of attempted escape +or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance only, that the +character of the vessel itself should be taken into consideration; +thus merchant ships or other private craft, placed in the service of +war operations, whether as transports or guardships, or with a +military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any kind of +hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be liable to +destruction without notice. The Austrian Government need not go into +the question of how far a belligerent is released from any obligation +as to provision for safety of human life when his opponent sinks enemy +merchant vessels without such previous warning, as in the well-known +cases, previously referred to, of the _Elektra_, _Dubrovnik_, +_Zagreb_, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident right, the +Austrian Government itself has never returned like for like. +Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian warships have +not destroyed a single enemy merchant vessel without previous warning, +though this may have been of a general character. + +The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also +admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance, +whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can +be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or +whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for +example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers +into the boats (the case of the _Ancona_), or when the passengers +themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian +Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of +the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as +otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive +the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should +also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as +to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at +all. + +The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a +vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand, +involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in +certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful +interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied +that saving lives _at sea_ is nearly always a matter of blind +uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a +vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in +small boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore, +far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity _to restrain +people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them +beforehand_. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not +convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions +concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to +immunity when travelling on board enemy ships. + +The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the +freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral +persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly +justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their +power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed +necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the +sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their +purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, _are +enabled to avoid risking their lives_. But even where there is doubt +as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals +threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be +decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being +admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their +military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such +operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken +against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate +claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of +measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may +refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels. + +The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the +Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian +Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the +correctness of these views would imply--and this the Union Government +can hardly intend--that neutrals have the right of interfering in the +military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to +constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be +employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a +neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the +right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or +indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at +the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very +existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all +kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the +bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships +for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact +that subjects of neutral states are themselves responsible for any +harm they may incur _by their presence in any territory on land where +military operations are in progress_. Obviously, there is no ground +for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly +since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the +agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare +upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea. + +From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given +to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to +exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for +instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and +resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others +warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian +Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with +the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of +life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards +some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government +has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds +in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions +with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the +Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated +that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views. +The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington +Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are +inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American +citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in +this direction. + +Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year +concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian +Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the +foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when +only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern +international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an +enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop +the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain, +examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and, +where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with +these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship +has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a +peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance +can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of +offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to +act in such a manner under the guns of an enemy, whatever may be the +purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the +fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all +assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive +purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would +also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship +were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance +on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less +valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the +subjects of a foreign Power. + +The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former +assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to +armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards +prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military +forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable +to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the +_general_ law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified +in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes. +But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it +would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves +with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant +ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and +that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek +to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity. +As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was +discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of +arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the +second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the +laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the +arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual +observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is +characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of +superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre +se propose d'arreter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le +commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation a la mer, fera tirer un +coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on +puisse donner. _Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons a bord._" +(When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the +commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun +is the best guarantee that can be given. _Merchant vessels do not +carry guns._) + +Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its +assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were +cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods +on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put +into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable +neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally, +the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of +encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to +provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible +to do so in the circumstances. + +The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed +British steamers _Secondo_ and _Welsh Prince_ were sunk without +warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian +Government has in the meantime received information that no +Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of +these vessels. + +The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already +referred to--reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine +warfare referred to in the memorandum--also in its declaration of +January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with +corresponding time limit; indeed, _the whole of the declaration itself +is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect +that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined +therein_. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as +far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in +the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew. +And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports +stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these +waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any +responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all +occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels +encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the +Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and +Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any +action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian +warships. + +After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it +need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as +a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the +destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that +its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from +further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great +Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally +effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered +traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of +isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of +permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of +war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human +control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all +in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the +blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly +attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those +waters._ + +To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance +given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and +renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor +qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31, +1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government +will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to +the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the +pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full +sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself +compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain +areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its +opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be +followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the +persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its +destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate +extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian +Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being +carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation +of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the +idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest +phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part +of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm +in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of +humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests +of neutral peoples. + + +3 + +=Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine +Warfare= + +The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of May 1, 1917, gives the +following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the +economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal +committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given +verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential +statements: + +"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the +technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been +estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in +estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first +month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the +estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly +cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the +economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the +economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set +down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of +tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are +expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the +enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so +to speak, to statistical smoke-screens. + +"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost +say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of +State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the +British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports +on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine +losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but +mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to +general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government +lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six +U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals +from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of +tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted +submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since +February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light +on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports, +the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report, +which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the +next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete; +and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted +that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for +us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a +gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed +that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid +revealing its strength. + +"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an +idea. + +"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two +months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons +were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed +under the British flag. + +"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present +available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the +higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two +months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace +it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In +the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of +1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite +all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in +peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless +to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new +vessels. + +"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British +service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to +the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with +some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for +preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there +is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in +January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into +British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought +up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per +cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping +traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage +frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a +low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as +against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons. +I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information +that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and +leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons +represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting +to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further +progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war +reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based +his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America, +achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that, +even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us. +Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out: +'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right +tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will +depend. + +"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a +thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought +into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save. + +"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible, +despite the English policy of suppression and concealment. + +"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet +available, but those for February tell us enough. + +"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds +sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down +from 46 to 37 millions sterling--imports and exports together showing +a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine +warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the +commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so +that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may +fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and +exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in +the traffic with British ports. + +"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures +rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off +the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt +can only partially succeed. + +"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31 +millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and +luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important +war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and +wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline +of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of +unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to +life and to the purposes of war. + +"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February, +1916, appears as follows: + +"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48 +per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper +and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the +imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures: + +"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent., +refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent., +lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent. + +"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides, +rubber and tin. + +"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the various +sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from +February onwards. + +"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no +complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the +commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when +the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly +weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment +will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the +entire development of the imports during the course of the war. + +"I will here give only the most important figures. + +"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its +position better than in other respects. + +"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons. + +"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons. + +"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons. + +"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons. + +"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons. + +"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months +of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the +imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the +same month in 1916. + + "Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads. + " " 1916, 5.9 " " + " February, 1913, 406,000 loads. + " " 1916, 286,000 " + " " 1917, 167,000 " + +"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from +3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here +December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as +the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a +statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February. + +"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to +the export of coal. + +"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913 +to 461/2 million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were +exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first +time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million +tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January, +1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more +significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of +the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls +again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million +tons in February of the year before), thus almost reaching once more +to the lowest point hitherto recorded--that of December, 1916. And it +should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports, +sunk transports are included in the English statistics. + +"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the +beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous +of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for +the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal +supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of +1916, may be seen from the following figures: + +"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only +1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year; +the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons, +as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly +average for the peace year 1913. + +"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to +give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first +week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous +year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against +2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the +operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war +industries in the countries allied with England. + +"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year, +showed the English how they could protect themselves against the +effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own +country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more +than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies +how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal +supply. + +"I come now to the most important point: _the position of England with +regard to its food supply_. + +"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to +mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of +foodstuffs from overseas. + +"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged +during the last years of peace as follows: + +"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent. + +"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as +substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.; +meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar +consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely +covered by imports from abroad. + +"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns the +food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally +favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been +followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of +45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest +hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of +view, in North America. The effects are now--the rich stocks from the +former harvest having been consumed--becoming more evident every day +and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain. +As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen +from the following figures: + +"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in +the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or +little over 21/2 million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that +date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the +time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or +even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply +of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only +789,000 bushels. + +"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit. +The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic. +Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917, +at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25 +had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4 +cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to +1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted +at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the +peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these +281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of +exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton. + +"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help +England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself! + +"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of +grain. I can, however, state as follows: + +"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917, +England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as +against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From +January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the +stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do +not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks +amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the +requirements for scarcely three weeks. + +"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more +favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import +figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and +fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations +for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as +against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years. + +"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import +value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as +against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the +various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning +with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in +the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain +shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and +Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March +has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing +the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than +in the previous years. + +"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in +February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within +the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of +Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural +congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an +extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far +worse even than then. + +"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department +(_Kriegsernaehrungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then +consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present +_and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the +consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet. + +"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a +conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that, +according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be +in a complete state of famine. + +"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a +crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of +other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn. + +"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for +many years, with the single exception of September, 1914. + +"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing +only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly +counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort +to introduce. + +"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States, +shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs. +The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning +of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in +the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars. + +"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at +present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a +generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain +Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of +potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted. + +"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the +face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger +by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have +recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late." + +The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures +taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and +thereafter continues: + +"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated +in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of +bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_ +if England should have to resort to compulsion. + +"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not +wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place, +because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to +assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as +we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises +no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too +complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men +and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.' + +"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest +reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a +failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the +purpose is in readiness. + +"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now +being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the +country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the +measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor +can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly +be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not +until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between +then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and +for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply. + +"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the +harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917. +In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are +worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The +winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492 +million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for +1915. + +"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and +offer no hope of salvation to our enemies. + +"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short, +but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that +the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against +those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can +save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across +the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations +by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of +exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation, +into entering into the war against us. + +"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the +neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the +seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by +hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England +that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into +submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic +arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in +crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle? + +"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on +our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the +world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what +our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But +they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so +hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must +do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own +house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence +and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German +people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending +decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence." + + +4 + +=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24, +1918.= + +"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace +negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained +up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical +and justifiable. + +"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of +the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the +difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will +in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties, +but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing +between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which +have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I +am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It +would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the +present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition. +We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new +world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has +destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the +various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors, +the results being first declared to the world when the whole was +completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough, +that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly +over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less +favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the +details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world +at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing +throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite +public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of +this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish +of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to +meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to +conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable +impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of +secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the +negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country +behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be +played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the +peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the +conference. + +"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which +Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian +states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the +programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister, +I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated +to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace. +And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I +am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are +poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest +doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed +myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way, +either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite +of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the +Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate +partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as +innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me; +on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this +serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single +kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if +Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then +peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might +entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards +Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete +frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going +beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any +surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall +continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as +they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek. + +"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground +for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since +the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations +or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various +Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I +then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the +reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all +wished. + +"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_ +Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian +states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely +fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the +following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St. +Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of +Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus. + +"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is +to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or +less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to +Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate +Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with +which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but +which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to +show the extent of the matter to be debated. + +"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that +of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In +the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this +delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no +indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a +settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established +with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this +very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing +difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of +being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with +ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between +their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed, +and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking +part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not +admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This +unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia, +however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these +difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able +once more to resume negotiations. + +"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received +yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two +telegrams: + +"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the +Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the +four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants' +Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates +to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace +negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers', +soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a +supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds +with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive +these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement +is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov, +addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest, +and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only +represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of +acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian +Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge +any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev +without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send +representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a +supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise +as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of +Russia.' + +"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of +the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding +the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two +appendices thereto runs as follows: + +"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation. + +"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by +me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their +mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation, +in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the +right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the +Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the +representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them, +according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace +Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and +Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to +your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most +sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation: +A. JOFFE.' + +"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian +Republic. Declaration. + +"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M. +Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive +Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' +Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for +the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives +of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement +with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of +People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be +acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name +of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare +categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat +without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people, +cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised. + +"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and +thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' +Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace +negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the +Russian Peace Delegation. + +"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following +resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the +Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, +on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918: + +"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew, +President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary +Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace +negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare +categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act +in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary +steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population, +against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine, +and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be +acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the +Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government +regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the +Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on +behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of +the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the +purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada, +will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian +Delegation. + +"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the +Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917. + +"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir +Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore +arrive with us. + +"'January, 1918. + +"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian +Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew. + +"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai. + +"'A true copy of the original. + +"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.' + +"Appendix 2. + +"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council +of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's +Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of +the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the +Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and +Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the +People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch +Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, +Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's +Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of +Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace +between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With +this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch +Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch +Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to +issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers' +and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited +representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are +bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the +accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of +the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of +People's Commissaries. + +"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the +Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International +Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works, +Commissariat. + +"'The Manager of the Secretariat. + +"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918. + +"'In accordance with the copy. + +"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.' + +"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not +interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. + +"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties +to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic +determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the +former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the +Ukraine._ + + +=Poland= + +"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet +been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_. +Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own +fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the +people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the +general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I +desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express +_wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for +lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish +question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single +day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach +us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and +shall not endanger the peace itself_. + +"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to +take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an +independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the +attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak +in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent +to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in +order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of +importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside +all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_. + + +=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas= + +"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been +most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between +our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the +interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian +peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops. +Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory +by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion +is a double one. + +"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous +expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative +corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas +should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people, +to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point +of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree +to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland +and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in +the case of Poland. + +"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take +place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from +the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out +that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would +create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state +of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted +that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the +life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and +telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire +administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands. +The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a +condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_. + +"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which +moreover _must be found_. + +"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion +not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_. + +"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they +take time. + +"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the +general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part +of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable +to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of +negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general +peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary +recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted +without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would +have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited +sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of +treating for a general peace. + +"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of +general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced +that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a +question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable +peace or not. + + +=Wilson's Message= + +"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put +forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole +world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson +sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general +peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to +furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case, +then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be +arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course, +is not so. + +"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on +the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the +Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his +proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_. + +"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, +to begin with, point out two things: + +"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is +made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish +Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am +firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very +last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally +with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete +reciprocity with ourselves. + +"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but +definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal +Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general, +equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic +parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other +constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon +matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only, +because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the +_Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do +so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other +hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state +whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the +remaining Points, to state as follows: + +"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and +the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing +to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public +negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same, +though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things +considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving +at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business. +But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of +commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be +advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In +such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their +demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using +this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other +ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is +arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is +to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with +full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from +passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any +concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced +_for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point +with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered +impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as +in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not +conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary, +_increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the +case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations, +which deal with political matters. + +"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret +compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon +without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the +introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and +adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted +that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be +able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the +fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by +formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never +prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_. + +"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed. + +"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this +postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here +_fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the +President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to +say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is +thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the +sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in +this respect will be ours. + +"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic +war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by +ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark. + +"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in +particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this +present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient +for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly +and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to +express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I +am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought. + +"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that +we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our +neighbours there. + +"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only +repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation. + +"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our +enemies. + +"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies, +who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until +the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such +concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of +being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk. +(_Applause._) + +"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among +his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what +conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the +enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace +negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and +I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for +themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the +continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here +concerned_. + +"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example. +Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial +acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into +the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war +expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its +own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which +it might have won_. + +"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are +adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to +include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this +point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the +President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of +Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part +of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. + +"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. +Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great +principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our +ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are +closely allied_. + +"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a +discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and +bring us closer still. + +"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one +hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great +Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least +opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that +_an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the +natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all +those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations. +(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals. + + +=Petersburg and the Ukraine= + +"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is +perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to +bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg. + +"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our +definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to +the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is +impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing +there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the +Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must +politely decline to receive_. + +"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since +this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the +_general peace_. + +"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of +provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms. +The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the +world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a +burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with +those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our +own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._ +But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to +lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore, +from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few +days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our +people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For +such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian +party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part +wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace. + +"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly +established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable +delay in the negotiations. + + +=Appeal to the Country= + +"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at +once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_, +and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which +they should have gained from the peace. + +"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him +standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in +record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him +for the manner in which it had been carried out. + +"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have +_peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a +single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic. +It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the +war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves +intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the +no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of +'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our +population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and +procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our +partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to +see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_. + +"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the +supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by +speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not +otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are +now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic +gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow. + +"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to +lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and +organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes +you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate +the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You +are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that +peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken. + +"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours +to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave +to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as +_criminal slanderers or as fools_. + +"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different +from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a +Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one +might understand a conflict between the Government and the country. +_But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority +of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable +peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that +Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and +hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the +Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend +to serve and against themselves. + +"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your +duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust +me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must +help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me. +I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the +Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of +confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter +is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought +up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall +at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to +secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less +so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty, +which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the +Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense +of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could +conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the +world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority +among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half +measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must +assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say." + + +5 + +=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk= + +The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at +Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a +peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general +peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a +preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points: + +1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be +concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford +any support to the enemies of the other. + +2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining +the right of determining their own destiny for the future. + +3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military +operations. + +4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by +private persons through the economic war. + +5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on +the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference +subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with +neighbouring countries. + +6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles. + +A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the +occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until +after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose +co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and +Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has +indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the +evacuation. + +In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in +particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of +evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no +evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after +conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in +connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied +districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it +should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within +its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in +question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain +standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through, +although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating +the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a +compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately +arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent +German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation +the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops +before the general peace might be discussed. + +In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this +was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace. +Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no +annexations" would have succeeded throughout. + +Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours +to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German +Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken +telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates +prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being +recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that +German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm +adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only +have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the +negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr +Kuehlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise +Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary +would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This +declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not +fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely +responsible for the fact that Kuehlmann was able to remain. + +Kuehlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered +the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first +officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up +in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward +matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be +evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was +disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the +fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against +this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to +the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already +availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and +allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that +this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be +arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts +at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they +were first interrupted on December 29. + +On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little +changed. Kuehlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than +before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German +military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which +Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to +altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of +self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the +distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to +get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made +on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German +and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and +especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial +question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to +the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint +should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the +Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the +case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for +free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long +discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts +prepared by us. + +Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances +arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as +also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been +commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first +discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and +demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more +guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part +of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations +were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis +broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with +the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost +immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening +proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign +Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and +towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which +he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a +degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required +to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask, +but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna +would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the +enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at +home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to +Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour +troubles were well known to that enemy. + +This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and +tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the +supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish +political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to +persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to +arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions +possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious +difficulties of the food situation. + +In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German +delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace +with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies +from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army +Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary +made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if +the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however, +the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation +to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to +the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on +the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled. + +At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were +continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded +in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be +acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine +undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918. +As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have +relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates +refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by +General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much +inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to +accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the +admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had +frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was +the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish +party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that +the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to +those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of +the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the +finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e. +the principle of national boundaries under international protection. +The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the +Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the +autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard +to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that +they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled +the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the +deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that +the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the +failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other. +The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest +difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date. + +At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the +separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results +hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign +Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations +to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his +policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the +concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the +same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme +necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations +with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of +Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all +grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as +the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative. + +On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were +made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what +would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of +the deliberations on this point with Herr Kuehlmann we succeeded after +great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to +a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign +Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the +following considerations: + +For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to: + +1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to +be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be +taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken +first; + +2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a +constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct; + +3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and + +4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a +vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in +accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the +decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver +them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should, +also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at +once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated +upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this +temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as +Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the +foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will +of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the +occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the +Russian principles, by free election. + +On February 7, immediately after Herr Kuehlmann had agreed to mediation +on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian +delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The +idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's +taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the +handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the +other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new +basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now +found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to +whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be +termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of +the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial +alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes +that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion +of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon +Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the +other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any +separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government +was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some +reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now +anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he +had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kuehlmann, while +General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession. + +All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end +owing to the fact that Herr Kuehlmann was forced by the German Supreme +Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the +negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when +a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the +German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kuehlmann was strictly ordered +not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand +the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and +Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had +not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the +treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an +end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign +Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his +discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to +the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in +leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would, +in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers +at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this +cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed +no treaty of peace. + +The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for +further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since +peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on +February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and +Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it +was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the +situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The +one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that +Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at +an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly +against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr +von Kuehlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the +peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech. +Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany +declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march +on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the +signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no +part in this action. + + +6 + +=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest= + +The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was +considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at +Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from +taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian +Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King +and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only +intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with +Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the +Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea +seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the +end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in +order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent +Colonel Randa, the former Military Attache to the Roumanian +Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness +to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace. + +In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in +Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to +prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the +invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbuergen, despite opposition +on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical +frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was +influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line +involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several +valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary +voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion +that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace +not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading +Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared +the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua +non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this +serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire +agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the +negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that +demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle +to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should +only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of +a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary +regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister +with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line +conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be +unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal +politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be +thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would +give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions; +and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it +would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and +that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility. +Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the +frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used +to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a regime amicably +disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was +particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating +a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet +it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and +was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive +concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the +Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he +would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which +he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of +inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he +was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the +Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would, +despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be +reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were +particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga +and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these +negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to +Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru +district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier +question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with +this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless +rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further +telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent +of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely +considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility. + +Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the +Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an +economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of +especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier +question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a +matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact, +did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical +alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before +the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to +overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and +secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with +Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs +alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at +the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the +right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed +their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the +plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter +beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no +part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done +was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private +manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal. +The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the +prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly +advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was +therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the +East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these +deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for +Foreign Affairs resigned his office. + +Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in +Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when +treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection +with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war +indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia +should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of +peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its +railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property, +and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary +opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly +relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had +been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and +Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with +Roumania. + +This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some +success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the +middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German +Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle +in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until +comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of +Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant +discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout +endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to +arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if +Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally +contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably +suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the +Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and +the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to +amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian +harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The +petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years' +tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a +monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management. +Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the +agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of +years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances +was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The +negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these +questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions +especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of +prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the +drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the +Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences +were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of +the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one +hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a +compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in +particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the +original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead +to any result. + +The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for +five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part +at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly +opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an +arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have +all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a +certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but +not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign +Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a +Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an +impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we +were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather +use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania +through the medium of such politicians in that country as were +disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central +Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in +Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be +rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might +gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing +everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the +German Secretary of State, Kuehlmann, of the inadvisability of the +demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by +the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of +Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it +impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been +informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command +insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the +assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the +occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did +ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania. + +One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania +was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted +with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum +which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered +chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of +the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been +disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have +on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do +was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the +Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of +Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea. +When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of +the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube" +was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the +territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the +Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and +Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty +that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be +ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was +unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the +preliminary peace again. + +The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his +office. + + +7 + +=Wilson's Fourteen Points= + +I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall +be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy +shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. + +II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial +waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in +whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of +international covenants. + +III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the +establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations +consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its +maintenance. + +IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will +be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. + +V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all +colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that +in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the +populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims +of the Government whose title is to be determined. + +VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of +all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest +co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an +unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent +determination of her own political development and national policy, +and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations +under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome +assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself +desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the +months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their +comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, +and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. + +VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and +restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys +in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve +as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws +which they have themselves set and determined for the government of +their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole +structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired. + +VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions +restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the +matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world +for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once +more be made secure in the interests of all. + +IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along +clearly recognisable lines of nationality. + +X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we +wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first +opportunity of autonomous development. + +XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied +territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the +sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another +determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of +allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the +political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the +several Balkan States should be entered into. + +XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be +assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are +now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life +and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, +and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to +the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. + +XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should +include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, +which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose +political and economic independence and territorial integrity should +be guaranteed by international covenant. + +XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific +covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political +independence and territorial integrity to great and small States +alike. + + +8 + +=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War= + +_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_ + +GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is +my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are +living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest +and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of +the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily +understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours +which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by +misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a +clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really +happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining +the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if +so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the +overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take +the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves +and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will +come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be +made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made +public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day +from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will +refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once +counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it +seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now +paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend +themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the +Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the +former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course, +exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as +everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if +those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But, +believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not +the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so +insignificant a minority. + +But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the +various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two +things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the +war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace" +on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately, +was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly, +that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On +several occasions peace feelers were put forward between +representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however, +these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the +impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany, +but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on +its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed +that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the +war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to +fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to +a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente +never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished +for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its +intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany, +and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult. +We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be +allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire +for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial +concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This, +however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was +primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had +offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that +Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made +peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to +make peace until England and France made peace with Germany. + +When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable, +obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching +that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other, +a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the +former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the +question of separate peace. + +I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not +even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my +inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in +such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the +German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be +contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be +broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten +million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which +could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military +party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and +that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a +few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my +policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to +the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw +salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I +relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was +a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between +Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from +which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the +Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should +be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente +would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the +blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved +also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have +been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no +possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung +several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the +same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy, +Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But +even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led +to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against +their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never +have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common, +and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out +of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against +the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until +Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have +happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy +at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and +prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol, +and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a +conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the +Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And, +gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would +not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war +into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been +much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component +national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only +refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved +by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State +makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a +"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would +have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude +which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister +of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider +dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I +believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In +particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements +by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, +would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria +would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with +Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the +powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been +in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav +question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the +Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven +the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia +and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion +the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace +was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make +peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which +rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our +great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects. +Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In +Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with +the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation +living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play +the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly +when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we +were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply. +Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany, +because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had +brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by +the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on +the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I +remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict +with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from +Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine, +gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a +Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of +our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred +million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of +the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as +urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread. +And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at +peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to +say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The +situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military +success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while +entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being +accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand, +increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless +than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a +policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single +moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had +some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Goerlitz. +Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like +houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view. +I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was +then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army +moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of +the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations, +have brought about a complete debacle. It is not unlikely that the +collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then, +and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the +horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things, +however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded, +as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian +frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the +second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at +all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success, +have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not +called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would +undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been +by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been +possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that +during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost +we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what +superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That +all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was +it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the +leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous +power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to +Kuehlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the +military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than +as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kuehlmann. The +Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not +understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that +victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that +territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless +securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem +them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section +demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an +indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were +agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German +possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with +the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic +ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world +thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from +the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with +the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the +obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us +remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to +a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then, +the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on +mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a +victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and +the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the +fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way +of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that +Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and +attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step +should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the +will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only +Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not +disinclined to agree to such a solution. + +But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree +of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of +the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible +collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General +Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in +conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man +required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the +Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never +found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved +the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the +people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are +much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke +himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain +equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it +was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for +him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of +Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was +directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot, +desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his +country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all +that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam +glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt +at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who +worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him +now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of +England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for +victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them. +The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on +the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said +this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to +carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the +integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could +never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to +declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for +Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente +so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a +step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in +this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our +military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the +German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is +undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to +such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I +should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity +solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most +valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at +favourable relations with Germany. + +Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the +German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the +serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months +ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he +forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely +of my opinion. + +[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.] + +This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again +expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine +campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to +take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be +calculated to give an impression of weakness. + +As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not +to be thought of. + +As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine +ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the +Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with +Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to +Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in +order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the +German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the +question. + +The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that +if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine; +and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have +restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace +itself. + +When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views +steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the +Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the +Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own +initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less +true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the +views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own +country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the +outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to +their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump" +parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to +bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have +an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical +principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step, +and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed. +It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then +received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic +proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so +incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which +maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means +towards peace. + +It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority +of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically +weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely +powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here +again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation, +had several conversations with Suedekum and Erzberger, and encouraged +them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known +peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of +affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry +the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual +understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn +from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment, +to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag +against the German military plans of conquest. + +And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of +that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning +of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many +other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our +own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of +unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The +principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of +the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was +long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to +dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he +was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came +in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff +came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point +of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial +colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in +agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only +one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It +should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time +was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the +suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American +munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the +submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical +military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered +the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; +with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but +little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had +here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the +northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the +Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would +have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern +U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry +on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans +access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing +we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we +did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering +their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct +conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we +agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise. + +And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to +say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the +papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing +disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one +of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these +reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the +last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself +appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give +you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am +most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that +any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would +wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government +must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a +whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the +German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a +dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as +republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great +freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people +itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I +therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the +constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely +at one with the present Government. There are two methods of +ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the +representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a +republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself +will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can +be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I +myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any +co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can, +therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the +old regime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and +its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe +that the majority of German-Austria is against the old regime, and +when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of +democracy is sufficiently assured. + +And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set +before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany, +but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the +German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with +Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have +defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do +not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra +turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how +present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same +experiment been made six months before it would have been war with +Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war. + +There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of +many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come +when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day +comes a better future will dawn. + +The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria. +They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood +and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will +not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold +alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of +the generations to come. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English +text being available. + + + + +INDEX + + +Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27 + and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168 + and Trotski, 234, 235 + +Adrianople, cession of, 268 + +Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40 + policy of expansion, 5 + +Air-raids on England, cause of, 16 + their effect, 167 + +Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92 + +Albrecht von Wuertemberg, 39 + +Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74 + cession of, demanded by Entente, 165 + conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15 + Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75 + France insists on restoration of, 170 + Germany and, 71, 158, 159 + +Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110 + +America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120 + enters the war, 17, 148 + rupture with Germany, 127 + shipbuilding programme of, 291 + unpreparedness for war, 122 + (_Cf._ United States) + +American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._ + +Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 + declares a separate peace, 24, 25 + German Nationalist view of his action, 25 + +Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77 + +Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177 + +Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322 + +Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3 + +Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169 + +Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181 + +Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2 + and Albania, 6 + and cession of Galicia, 145 + and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170 + and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334 + ceases to exist, 179 + consequences of a separate peace, 24 + death-blow to Customs dues, 168 + declaration on submarine warfare, 279 + democratic Parliament of, 306 + enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162 + food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 + her army merged into German army, 21 + her position before and after the ultimatum, 13 + heroism of her armies, 336 + impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._ + maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280 + mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9 + obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 + parlous position of, in 1917, 188 + peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318 + peace terms to, 179 + policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325 + racial problems in, 190 + separatist tactics in, 164 + Social Democracy in, 21, 31 + terms on which she could make peace, 29 + the Archdukes, 22 + views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201 + +Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._ + +Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245 + +Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50 + +Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247 + +Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319 + +Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22 + inferiority of, 21 + +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134 + peace idea of, 174 + +Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242 + no bar to peace, 331 + solution of, 200 _et seq._ + +Avarescu, interview with, 263 + retirement of, 323 + + +=B= + +Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230 + +Balkan Wars, the, 6 + +Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68 + +_Baralong_ episode, the, 133 + +Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295 + on an "un-English" system, 296 + +Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18 + +Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235 + +Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27 + +Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14 + +Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180 + +Belgium, England's promise to, 14 + German entry into, 14 + Germany's views regarding, 157, 158 + +Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2 + +Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275 + +Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175 + German reply to, 333 + proposals for peace by, 167, 177 + +Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44 + and the Roumanian question, 77 + criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33 + ultimatum to Serbia, 7 + vacillation of, 10 + +Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66 + the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14 + +Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265 + +Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146 + and the Supreme Military Command, 156 + draws up a peace proposal, 139 + opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334 + optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._ + replies to author's _expose_, 150 + requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8 + visits Western front, 73 + +Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205 + +Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17 + and William II., 52 + dealings with William I., 65 + heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15 + his policy of "blood and iron," 15 + +Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220 + +Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297 + of Germany, 280 + why established by Great Britain, 281 + +Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24 + +Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245 + +Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249 + destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252 + enter Kieff, 248, 249 + +Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221 + in Bessarabia, 265 + in Russia, 211, 216, 229 + terrorism of, 226 + the Entente and, 273 + +Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207 + +Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173 + +Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112 + apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + collapse of, 99 + Ministry of, 88 + on Russia, 263 + reproaches author, 96 + +"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257 + +Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225 + a victory for German militarism, 193 + answer to Russian peace proposals, 224 + arrival of Trotski at, 232 + conflict with Ukrainians at, 235 + episode of Roumanian peace, 260 + evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312 + first peace concluded at, 249 + frontier question, 208 + further Ukrainian representation at, 300 + heated discussions at, 228 + object of negotiations at, 305 + peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311 + Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227 + territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245 + Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314 + +Briand, peace negotiations with, 182 + +Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German + delegation, 230 + +British losses by submarines, 290 + trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291 + +Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211 + +_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257 + +Bucharest, fall of, 99 + report of peace negotiations at, 318 + Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq. + +Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270 + +Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174 + demonstrations against Germany in, 233 + +Buftea, Treaty of, 323 + +Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268 + and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323 + her relations with America, 125 + humiliation of, 6 + negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269 + question of her neutrality, 10 + secession of, 183 + +Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223 + +Buelow, Prince, exposes William II., 54 + +Burian, Count, 106, 200 + and the division of Galicia, 244 + draws up a peace proposal, 139 + his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114 + succeeded by author, 114 + visits German headquarters, 210 + +Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107 + + +=C= + +Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214 + +Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275 + +Capelle and U-boats, 132 + +Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania) + +Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88 + and Serbia, 12 + last days of, 90 + peculiar policy of Government of, 81 + tactfulness of, 79 + Tsar's visit to, 88 + urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90 + visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79 + +Carp, 82, 87, 94 + +Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89 + +Central-European question, the, 209 + the terror of the Entente, 172 + +Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97 + enemy blockade of, 132 + favourable news in 1917, 143 + why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._ + +Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41 + and problem of nationality, 192 + and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 + and the Ukrainian question, 244 + apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239 + cautions the Kaiser, 321 + communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260 + confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45 + correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164 + frequent absences from Vienna, 61 + his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58 + invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75 + opposes U-boat warfare, 334 + reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 + rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249 + submits author's _expose_ to William II., 146, 332 + suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75 + visits South Slav provinces, 59 + +Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168 + and U-boat campaign, 121 + attends conference on Polish question, 206 + opposes submarine warfare, 334 + +Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + dominant war aim of, 184, 186 + +Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + attends conference on U-boat question, 121 + meets author, 219 + +Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177 + +Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44 + +Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163 + +Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227 + +Cossacks, the, 212 + +Courland demanded by Germany, 249 + +Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack + on Bucharest, 103 + +Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89 + +Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219 + at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + +Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24 + +Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43 + a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141 + a scene at Konopischt, 39 + abused by a braggart and brawler, 83 + acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239 + activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._ + ambassador to Roumania, 7 + an appeal for confidence, 310 + and American intervention, 123 + and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 + and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian) + answers explanation of an American request, 128 + appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329 + appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77 + apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12 + attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121 + avoided by Pan-Germans, 160 + becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114 + breakfasts with Kuehlmann, 230 + confers with Tisza, 27, 28 + conflicts with the Kaiser, 335 + conversation with Trotski, 248 + converses with Crown Prince, 74 + criticises Michaelis, 160 + decorated by King Carol, 88 + disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115 + dismissal of, 183, 194, 266 + extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72 + friction with the Emperor, 210, 215 + his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174, + 209, 217, 331, 333 + imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266 + informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229 + interviews King Ferdinand, 264 + issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 + journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218 + learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86 + loss of a dispatch-case, 98 + loyalty to Germany, 327 + lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222 + meets the Emperor William II., 54 + misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23 + nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46 + note to American Government, 279 + obtains a direct statement from William II., 57 + on a separate peace, 327 + on Austria's policy during war, 325 + on Bolshevism, 216, 221 + on President Wilson's programme, 192 + on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334 + passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247 + peace programme of, 299 + persecution of, 208 + Polish leaders and, 205 + President Wilson on, 193 + private talk with the Emperor, 124 + sends in his resignation, 23 + sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96 + speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._ + threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228 + unfounded charges against, 162 + urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + William II.'s gift to, 64 + with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57 + + +=D= + +Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of + Hungarian State, 202 + dangers of a political structure for, 202 + +Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88 + +Declaration of London, the, 280 + +D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260 + +Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211 + +Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296 + +Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4 + international, 171, 176, 177, 308 + question of, 181 + +Divorces in Roumania, 85 + +Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82 + assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269 + cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323 + King Ferdinand and, 265 + Marghiloman's view on, 266 + question discussed with Avarescu, 263 + Turkish attitude concerning, 268 + +Dualism, the curse of, 137 + + +=E= + + +East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._ + +"Echinstvo" group, the, 211 + +Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2 + and William II., 63 + encircling policy of, 1, 63 + +Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91 + an operation for cataract, 93 + her devotion to King Carol, 92 + +Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168 + plain speaking by, 26 + +England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180 + and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184 + and the elder Richthofen, 246 + attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16 + blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151 + bread shortage in, 295 + declares war on Germany, 14 + discards Declaration of London, 280 + distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145 + distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 + dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1 + Flotow's tribute to, 120 + food supply of, 293 + freedom in, 335 + her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2 + negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4 + public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 + refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170 + shortage of potatoes in, 296 + the Pacifist party in, 167 + "unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71 + +English mentality, a typical instance of, 4 + +English Socialists, 214 + +Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217 + and arming of merchant vessels, 286 + and Italy, 27 + and the trial of William II., 66 + answers President Wilson, 118, 120 + as instruments in a world revolution, 273 + Austria pressed to join, 2 + demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173 + desire of final military victory, 164 + exterminates Prussian militarism, 273 + impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178 + mine-laying by, 130 + peace proposals to, 19, 20 + rejects first peace offer, 115 + suspicious of Germany's plans, 3 + their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326 + views as to peace, 170 + +Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269 + +Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333 + and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note) + +Espionage in Roumania, 97 + +Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 136 + +Esthonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317 + +Eugen, Archduke, 22 + +Europe after the war, 175 + +European tension, beginnings of, 1 + + +=F= + +Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, 12 + +Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, 295 + +Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, 264 + German opinion of, 260 + Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, 93 + +Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, 51 + +Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, 80 + +Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, 117 + reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, 118 + +Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 190 _et seq._, 271, 305, 306, 323 _et seq._ + +France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, 250 + Bethmann's tribute to, 153 + distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 + insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 170 + opening of war a surprise to, 2 + the Pacifist party in, 167 + +Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, 47 + advised to accept negotiations, 8 + and Franz Ferdinand, 42, 46 + and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 + author's audience with, 12 + death of, 48 + gives audience to author, 47 + King Edward VII. and, 1, 2 + on the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + opposes Filippescu's scheme, 81 + +Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, 44 + anti-Magyar point of view of, 38, 50 + antipathy to Hungary, 35, 37, 38 + as gardener, 35 + as husband and father, 44, 45 + dislike for the Germans of, 50 + false rumours concerning, 43 + fearlessness of, 45 + friendships of, 39 + Goluchowski and, 36 + Great-Austrian programme of, 41, 49 + his high opinion of Pallavicini, 5 + his sense of humour, 41 + makes advances to the Kaiser, 42 + marriage of, 41, 44 + mentality of, 35 + personality of, 34 + pro-Roumanian proclivities of, 77, 78, 79 + tragic end of, 49 (_see also_ Sarajevo tragedy) + views on foreign policy of, 51 + +Freedom of the seas, 177 + attacked by Entente, 280, 281 + neutrals and, 284 + President Wilson on, 281, 307 + +French Socialistic Congress, 214 + +Freyburg, Baron von, attends conference on U-boat question, 121 + +Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to, 22 + tact of, 72 + +Frontier rectifications, Hungary and, 258, 266, 319, 330 + +Fuerstenberg, Karl, a request of, refused at Vienna, 112 + report on Roumanian question by, 77 + + +=G= + +Galicia, proposed cession of, 20, 75, 145, 159, 173, 332 + partition of, 209 + Tisza and, 135 + +Gas attacks, reason for Germany's use of, 16 + +Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram from, 229 + at Nordbahnhof, 219 + +George, Lloyd, admits grave state of grain supplies, 295 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + author in agreement with, 177-8 + confers with Orlando, 164 + Dr. Helfferich's allusions to, 290 + his desire to crush Germany, 186 + influence of, 184 + on disarmament, 184 + +George V., King, his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, 9 + +German army, the General Staff, 22 + +German-Austria, 179 + population of, 31 + +German Empire, the, creation of, 15, 66 + +German Government, _versus_ German Diplomacy, 10 + +German mentality, a typical instance of, 4 + military party refuse peace, 32 + +German Nationalists and Count Andrassy, 25, 26 + +German policy founders on heritage left by Bismarck, 15 + +German-Russian differences as to occupied areas, 304 + +German Supreme Command and evacuation question, 312 + +Germans and a friendly attitude towards America, 122 + at Brest conference, 224 + attitude of, towards Poland, 203 + inferior mentality of, 69 + "insatiable appetite" of, 267 + Lenin and, 216 + oppose peace negotiations with Roumania, 260 + refuse to renounce occupied territory, 226 + the dynastic fidelity of, 52 + +Germany, a moral coalition against, 3 + advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115 _et seq._ + and Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + and Austro-Hungarian military action in Ukraine, 254 + answers the Papal Note, 177 + blind faith in invincibility of her army, 17 + blockade of, and her retaliatory measures, 16 + confident of victory, 23, 71 + culpability of, in matter of peace, 185 + decides on U-boat campaign, 124 + declares Armistice with Russia at an end, 318 + disillusionment of, 31 + dissatisfaction in, over peace resolution in Reichstag, 156 + England declares war on, 14 + evil times in store for, 336 + her dream of a victorious peace, 326, 331 + her hopes of food shortage in England, 145 + Michaelis on internal economic and political situation in, 157 + military party of, 19, 327, 330, 331 + negotiations respecting naval disarmament, 4 + post-war intentions of, 185 + restricts building of U-boats, 131 + revolution in, 328 + rupture with America, 127 + unsuccessful effort at _rapprochement_, 180 + violates neutrality of Belgium, 14 + +Goluchowski, Count, vacillation of, 36 + +Goerlitz, battle of, 96, 107, 329 + +Gratz, Dr., a good suggestion by, 248 + author's discussion with, 219 + on Austro-Polish solution of Polish question, 244 + +Great-Roumania, question of, 80 + +Great War, the, psychology of various cities, 197 + (_See_ World War) + +Grey, Sir Edward, an interview with Lichnowsky, 7 + at London Conference, 275 + proposes negotiations, 8 + + +=H= + +Habsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty of London and, 21, 29, 33 + +Hadik, apathetic attitude of, 238 + +Hague Convention, the, 280 + +Haus, Admiral, favours submarine warfare, 334 + in Vienna, 121 + +Hauser, and the question of separate peace, 230 + +Hebel, appointment for, 154 + +Helfferich, Dr., disclosures by, 161 (note) + on attitude of William II. during Balkan troubles, 68 + speech on submarine warfare, 151, 288 _et seq._ + +Henry of Prussia, Prince, a telegram + from King George to, 9 + +Hertling, Count, advised to suppress "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 + becomes Imperial Chancellor, 198 + President Wilson on, 193 + succeeds Michaelis, 161 + +Herzegovina as compensation to Austria, 207 + +Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, modesty of, 126 + popularity of, in Germany, 17 + +Hoffmann, General, an unfortunate speech by, 237 + and plans for outer provinces, 226 + high words with Kuehlmann, 235 + received by the Kaiser, 230 + receives a telegram from Petersburg, 229 + visited by author, 219 + +Hohenberg, Duchess of, 41 + welcomed in Roumania, 79 + +Hohendorf, General Conrad von, and his responsibility for + the war, 18 (note) + +Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement of Wedel's request, 127 + free speech with William II., 65 + report on U-boat campaign, 116, 126 + +Holtzendorff, Admiral, and submarine campaign, 149 + arrives in Vienna, 121 + guarantees results of U-boat campaign, 122, 334 + +Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle on, 243 + Social Democrats, 168 + +Hungary and cession of her territory, 106 + and Roumanian intervention, 77, 106, 107 + and the alliance with Roumania, 77 _et seq._ + demands of, at Bucharest, 319 + frontier rectification question, 258, 266, 319, 330 + her influence on the war, 138 + indignation in, at author's appointment to Bucharest, 77 + "just punishment" of, 97 + opposes economical alliance with Roumania, 266, 320 + question of a separate peace, 27 + repellent attitude of, 107 + struggle for liberty in, 202 + why her army was neglected, 22 + + +=I= + +Imperiali, Marchese, points submitted to London Conference by, 275 + +International arbitration (_see_ Arbitration) + +International disarmament, 171, 176, 177 + +International law, Germany's breach of, in adoption of U-boat + warfare, 280, 281 + +Internationalists, Russian, 211 + +Ischl, an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph at, 12 + +Iswolsky, 11 + +Italy, Allied defeat in, 183 + and Albania, 6 + and the Peace of Versailles, 272 + Czernin on, 308 + declares a blockade, 281 + points submitted to London Conference, 275 + stands in way of a peace of understanding, 188 + ultimatum to, 12 + why she entered the war, 3 + + +=J= + +Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic death of, 89 + +Jagow, Herr von, a frank disclosure by, 14 + +Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to Allies, 300 + conversation with, at Brest, 220 + criticisms on the Tsar, 227 + +Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + +Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 22 + appointed Chief of Air Force, 62 + reinstatement of, 61 + relinquishes his command, 62 + the Luck episode, 61 + + +=K= + +Kameneff at Brest, 220, 316 + +Karachou, Leo, secretary of Peace Delegation, 303 + +Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to the Entente, 20 + +Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince, Franz Ferdinand and, 39, 40 + +Karolyi and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 + his attitude before the Roumanian declaration of war, 28 + +Kerenski and the offensive against Central Powers, 211 + newspaper report of condition of his health, 212 + +Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical remark by, 63 + +Kieff, a mission to, 251 + entered by Bolsheviks, 248, 249 + in danger of a food crisis, 252 + peace conditions at, 208 + +Kieff Committee and the Bolsheviks, 245 + +Kiel Week, the, 62 + +_Kienthaler_ (Internationalists), 211 + +Konopischt and its history, 34 _et seq._ + +Kreuznach, a conference at, 145 + +Kriegen, Dr. Bogdan, a fulsome work by, 64 + +Kuehlmann, Dr., and the food shortage, 238, 239 + author's talk with, 222 + difficult position of, 313 + high words with Hoffman, 235 + his influence, 198, 199 + informed of Roumanian peace overtures, 260 + on the Kaiser, 228 + returns to Brest, 230 + + +=L= + +Lamezan, Captain Baron, at Brest-Litovsk, 233 + +Landwehr, General, and the food shortage, 238, 240 + +Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory attitude of, 184 + +Larin and Menshevik Socialists, 211 + +League of Nations, the, 308 + +Lenin, author on, 216 + opposed to offensive against Central Powers, 211 + +Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a day's shooting with, 231 + chats with author, 219 + +Lewicky, M., 240 + +Lichnowsky interviews Sir Edward Grey, 7 + +Liege taken by Ludendorff, 22 + +Lithuania, Germany and, 249 + +Livonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317 + +London, Declaration of, discarded by England, 280 + +London, Pact of, 20, 170, 172, 179, 328 + desired amendments to, 146 + text of, 21, 275 _et seq._ + +Lublin, German demand for evacuation of, 204, 205, 206 + +Luck episode, the, 22, 106 + Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and, 61 + +Ludendorff and Belgium, 186 + and the Polish question, 207 + candid admission by, 247 + compared with enemy statesmen, 19 + confident of success of U-boat warfare, 126 + congratulates Hoffmann, 237 + displays "a gleam of insight", 230 + dominating influence of, 79, 115, 126 + German hero-worship of, 17 + his independent nature, 60 + how he captured Liege, 22 + personality of, 331 + +Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, 50 + +Luxembourg, German invasion of, 16 + + +=M= + +Mackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins at Bucharest, 101 + failure at Maracesci, 261 + headquarters at Bucharest, 105 + +Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdinand, 38, 50 + author and, 78 + +Majorescu and Austria's policy, 330 + and territorial concessions, 97, 206 + forms a Ministry, 81 + +Mandazescu, arrest and extradition of, 89 + +Maracesci, attack on, 261 + +Marghiloman and co-operation of Roumania, 106 + forms a Cabinet, 266, 320 + +Marie, Queen of Roumania, English sympathies of, 98, 99 + +Marne, the, first battle of, 17 + +Martow and the Menshevik party, 211 + +Martynoz, and the Russian Internationalists, 211 + +Medwjedew, J.G., Ukrainian delegate to Brest, 301 + +Mennsdorff, Ambassador, interviews General Smuts, 169 + +Menshevik party, the, 211 + +Meran, the Entente's proposals regarding, 170, 173 + +Merchant vessels, arming of, author on, 285 + +Merey meets Czernin at Brest, 219 + +Michaelis, Dr., appointed Imperial Chancellor, 156 + defines Germany's views regarding Belgium, 157 + on peace proposals, 157 + Pan-Germanism of, 160 + +"Might before Right," Bismarckian principle of, 15 + +Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, marvellous escape of, 89 + +Militarism, German faith in, 17 + England's idea of German, 166 + +Monarchists _v._ Republicans, 52 + +Monarchs, hypnotic complacency of, 58 _et seq._ + +Moutet, attitude of, at French Socialist conference, 214 + + +=N= + +Nationality, problem of, 190 + Franz Ferdinand and, 191 + +Naval disarmament, negotiations on, 4 + +Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the military party in Russia, 2 + +Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, 227 + +North Sea, the, blockade of, 280 + +Noxious gas, why used by Germany, 16 + + +=O= + +Odessa, in danger of a food crisis, 252 + +Orlando confers with Ribot and Lloyd George, 164 + +Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz Ferdinand, 36 + + +=P= + +Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses the political situation with author, 5 + +Pan-Germans, 330 + conditions on which they would conclude peace, 160 + +Pan-Russian Congress, the, 212, 213, 214 + +Papal Note, the, 167, 177 + Austria's reply to, 175 + German reply to, 333 + +Paris, negotiations _in camera_ at, 271 + +Peace by sacrifice, 327 + +Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk, 218 _et seq._ + +Peace movement, real historical truth concerning, 186 + +Peace negotiations, Count Czernin on, 298 _et seq._ + deadlock in, 182 + the Pope's proposals, 167, 175, 177, 333 + +Peace resolution, a, and its consequences, 156 + +Penfield, Mr., American Ambassador to Vienna, 131 + +People's Socialists, the, 212 + +Peschechonow, Minister of Food, 212 + +Petersburg and the Ukraine, 309 + +Plechanow, Georgei, and the Russian Social Patriots, 211 + +Poklewski, Russian Ambassador to Roumania, 86 + +Poland, a conference on question of, 205 + becomes a kingdom, 200 + conquest of, 106 + Count Czernin on, 304 + Emperor Charles's offer regarding, 75 + future position of, 203 + German standpoint on, 203 + Michaelis on, 159 + re-organisation of, 145 + the German demands, 244 + unrepresented at Brest, and the reason, 304, 315 + +Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 208 + party divisions among, 204 + +Polish question, and the Central-European project, 209 + difficulties of, 200 + +Popow, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, 223 + +Pro-Roumanian party and its head, 77 + +Prussian militarism, England's idea of, 166 + extermination of, 273 + fear of, 174 + (_See also_ German military party) + + +=Q= + + +Quadruple Alliance, the, dissension in, 250 + Germany as shield of, 183 + peace terms to Roumania, 262 + + +=R= + +Radek, a scene with a chauffeur, 237 + +Radoslawoff, ignorant of negotiations with Entente, 162 + +Randa, Lieut.-Col. Baron, a telling remark by, 104 + and Roumanian peace overtures, 260, 262, 319 + +Reichstag, the, a peace resolution passed in, 156 + demands peace without annexation, 156, 160 + +Renner and the Stockholm Congress, 168 + +Republicans _v._ Monarchists, 52 + +Ressel, Colonel, 264 + +Revertera negotiates for peace, 164, 169 + +Revolution, danger of, 147 + +Rhondda, Lord, British Food Controller, 151 + +Ribot confers with Orlando, 164 + statement by, 152 + +Richthofen brothers, the, 246 + +Rosenberg meets author at Brest, 219 + +Roumania, 77 _et seq._ + a change of Government in, 81 + a land of contrasts, 84 + affairs in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 86 + and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 + author's negotiations for peace, 258 + between two stools, 261 + declares war, 100, 279 + espionage in, 97 + freedom of the Press in, 84 + Germany and, 262, 267 + her treachery to Central Powers, 262 + how news of Sarajevo tragedy was received in, 86 + Marghiloman forms a Cabinet, 266 + negotiations for peace, 318 + out of action, 23 + peace concluded with, 323 + question of annexations of, 159, 207 + question of her neutrality, 12, 95 + Russian gold in, 111 + social conditions in, 85 + ultimatum to, 12, 262 + why she entered the war, 3 + +Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, 108 + +Roumanians, mistaken views of strength of, 261 + their love of travel, 85 + +Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 37 + +Russia, a contemplated peace with, 211 + abdication of the Tsar, 142 + an appeal to German soldiers, 249 + begins military operations without a declaration of war, 3 + Bolshevism in, 211, 216, 229 + declares for cessation of hostilities, 318 + differences of opinion in, as to continuance of war, 211 _et seq._ + enters the war, 7 + Francis Joseph's inquiry as to a possible revolution in, 105 + her responsibility for Great War, 10 + incites German army to revolt, 317 + negotiations for peace, 298 + out of action, 23 + peace treaty signed, 318 + prepared for war, 112 + the military party in, 2, 9 + ultimatum to Roumania, 262 + +Russian Revolution, the, 142, 147, 211 _et seq._ + +Russians, their fear of Trotski, 237 + +Ruthenian districts of Hungary, Ukrainian demands, 242 + + +=S= + +Sacharow, General, murder of, 220 + +St. Mihiel, author at, 73 + +St. Privat, reminiscences of, 74 + +Salzburg negotiations, the, 210 + +Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 6, 49 + sounds death knell of the Monarchy, 32 + +Sassonoff, a momentous statement by, 88 + attitude of, after declaration of war, 8 + visits Bucharest, 112 + +Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch, 302 + +Schachrai, W.M., at Brest, 301 + +Schonburg, Alvis, and the Emperor Charles, 61 + +Schoenerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdinand and, 50 + +Secret diplomacy, abolition of: author's views, 306-7 + +Sedan, a house with a history at, 74 + +Seidler, Dr. von, a _faux pas_ by, 56 + and the food shortage, 240 + and the partition of Galicia, 209 + and the Ukrainian question, 208, 242, 243 + apathetic attitude of, 238, 239 + author's meeting with, 230 + visits South Slav provinces, 59 + +Seitz, and the Stockholm Conference, 168 + +Serbia, arrogance of, 6 + ultimatum to, 7 + +Sewrjuk, M., 240 + +Sixtus, Prince, letters from Emperor Charles to, 164 + +Skobeleff and the Mensheviks, 211 + +Skrzynski, Herr von, 250 + +Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death of, 89 + +Slav provinces, a visit by the Emperor to, 59 + +Smuts, General, interview with Mennsdorff, 170 + +Social Democrats and the question of peace, 26, 30 + and the Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 + Hungarian, 243 + opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71 + +"Social Patriots," Russian, 211 + +Social Revolutionary Party, the, 212 + +Socialists and offensive against Central Powers, 211 + +Spanish reports of war-weariness in England and France, 143 + +Stirbey, Prince, 263 + +Stockholm, a Socialist Conference at, 168, 333 + Russians ask for a conference at, 229 + +Stockholm Congress, negative result of, 169 + +Strikes and their danger, 310 + +Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims, 241 + +Sturdza, Lieut.-Col., extraordinary behaviour of, 83 + +Stuergkh, Count, 18 (note) + recollections of, 46 + +Submarine warfare, author's note to American Government on, 279 + Czernin on, 334 + destruction without warning justified, 283 + enemy losses in, 290 + enemy's "statistical smoke-screens" as to, 289 + question of safety of passengers and crew, 282 + speech by Dr. Helfferich on, 288 + why adopted by Central Powers, 281 _et seq._ + (_See also_ U-boats) + +Suedekum, Herr, and Austria-Hungary's peace proposals, 155, 333 + +Supreme Military and Naval Command, conditions of, for peace + negotiations, 159 + +Switzerland, reported disturbances in: author's disclaimer, 335 + +Sycophancy in high places, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64 + +Sylvester, Dr., and the German-Austrian National Assembly, 26 + + +=T= + +Talaat Pasha arrives at Brest, 233 + influence of, 143 + threatens to resign, 269 + +Talleyrand, a dictum of, 174 + +Tarnowski, Count, author's opinion of, 110 + German Ambassador to Washington, 127 + +Thomas, M., war speech on Russian front, 214 + +Tisza, Count Stephen, 18 (note) + a characteristic letter from, 200 + advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 334 + and American intervention, 123 + and author's appointment to Bucharest, 78 + and cession of Hungarian territory, 135 + and control of foreign policy, 134 + and the Stockholm Conference, 168 + assassination of, 137 + at a U-boat campaign conference, 121 + author's conference with, 27, 28 + defends Count Czernin, 108 + dismissal of, 136, 203 + Franz Ferdinand and, 38 + his influence in Hungary, 27 + leads anti-Roumanian party, 77 + lively correspondence with author, 128 + on dangers of pessimism, 154 + on the Treaty of London, 28 + opposes annexation of Roumania, 207 + opposes the war, 10 + opposes U-boat warfare, 131, 334 + peace proposal of, 139 + _pro-memoria_ of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 258 + question of frontier rectifications, 319 + refuses cession of Hungarian territory, 107 + speech at conference on Polish question, 206 + tribute to, 137 + views regarding Poland, 200 + visits the Southern Slavs, 30 + +Transylvania, 173 + opposition to cession of, 107 + proposed cession of, 28, 50 + Roumanian invasion of, 108 + +Trentino, the, offered to Italy, 75 + +Trieste, Entente proposals regarding, 170, 173 + +"Tripartite solution" of Polish question, Tisza on, 201 + +Trnka and the Customs dues, 168 + +Trotski, a tactical blunder by, 236 + accepts the German-Austria ultimatum, 235 + and the Internationalist party, 211 + arrives at Brest, 232 + declines to sign, 250 + his brother-in-law Kameneff, 220 + his library, 235, 236 + negotiations with, 247 + opposed to ill-treatment of war prisoners, 236 + ultimatum to, 234 + +Trudoviks, the, 212 + +Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks, 211, 213 + +Tschernow, speaks at Peasants' Congress, 212 + +Tschirsky, Herr von, a momentous communication to Berchtold, 7 + and a telegram from King George, 9 + his desire for war, 32 + untactful diplomacy of, 10 + +Tseretelli and the Menshevik party, 211 + +Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria, 268 + asks for munitions, 95 + how the Sultan was deposed, 233 + probable secession of, 269 + +Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at Brest, 233 + +Turks, a reported advance by a hostile Power for a separate peace, 143 + at Brest Conference, 223 + +Tyrol, the, German troops in, 24 + + +=U= + +U-boat warfare, 114 _et seq._ + a conference in Vienna on, 121 + "a terrible mistake", 126 + and America's entry into the war, 126 + and why adopted by Germany, 16 + Czernin on, 148 + political arguments against, 117, 118 + what it achieved, 178 + (_See also_ Submarine warfare) + +Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripartite" solution of Polish question, 201 + +Ukraine and Petersburg, 309 + Bolshevik destruction in, 252 + food supplies from, 251 _et seq._, 315 + military action in, and the consequences, 253 + peace concluded with, 249 + revolution in, 253 + survey of imports from, 255 + treaty signed, 317 + +Ukrainian Army General Committee appointed, 214 + delegates at Brest, 231, 300 + Workers' and Peasants' Government, a declaration from, 301 + +Ukrainians and their demands, 208, 240, 314 + dictatorial attitude of, 241 + negotiations with, 315 + +United States, the, scarcity of supplies in, 294 + (_See also_ America) + + +=V= + +Versailles, opening of Peace Congress at, 196 + the Council of Four at, 271 + the Peace of, 18, 19, 271 + terrible nature of, 273 + triumph of Entente at, 186 + +Vienna, a council in, 121 + differences of opinion in, 77 + disastrous effects of troubles in, 250 + disturbances in, 58 + food shortage and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 + politicians' views on peace proposals, 230 + psychology of, 197 + warlike demonstrations at, after Sarajevo tragedy, 33 + +Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch Ambassador to Roumania, 104 + + +=W= + +Wales, Prince of (_see_ Edward VII., King) + +Wallachia, occupation of, 99, 105 + +Wallhead, Mr., 295 + +Washington Cabinet, and Austria-Hungary's attitude to submarine + warfare, 279 + +Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Austrian Ruthenians, 247, 249 + +Wedel, Count, calls on Count Czernin, 127 + disclosures of, 161 (note) + revelations of, 155 (note) + +Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins the term "bread peace," 257 + +Wekerle, Dr., and the Polish question, 203 + author and, 136, 230 + on the Ukrainian question, 242 + standpoint of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 260, 319 + +Western front, an Entente break-through on, 183 + +Western Powers, the, and Germany's ambitions, 2 + +Wiesner, Ambassador, von, and a Pan-German, 161 + at Brest-Litovsk, 236 + author discusses Russian peace with, 219 + +Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 43 + anxious for peace, 72 + author's conversation with, 74 + his quarters at Sedan, 74 + +William I. and Bismarck, 65 + +William II., Emperor, and Bismarck, 52 + and Franz Ferdinand, 42 + and the German Supreme Military Command, 17 + as _causeur_, 66 + as the "elect of God," 52, 53 + cause of his ruin, 62 _et seq._ + demonstrations against, in the Reichstag, 54 + desires to help deposed Tsar, 70 + difficulties of his political advisers, 60 + fails to find favour in England, 63 + his projected division of the world, 67 + impending trial of: author's protest, 66 + informed of serious nature of situation for Allies, 332 + instructions to Kuehlmann, 249 + long years of peaceful government, 68 + longs for peace, 70 + on food troubles in England, 145 + on impending attack on Italian front, 71 + presents author with "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 + Prince Hohenlohe and, 65 + question of his abdication, 75 + the Press and, 65 + warlike speeches of, 68 + +Wilson, President, advantages of his "Fourteen Points," 188 + as master of the world, 192 + author on his Message, 305 + Count Andrassy's Note to, 25 + Count Czernin on, 192 + Entente's reply to his peace proposal, 118, 120, 123 + his Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles, 271 + on the freedom of the seas, 281 + ready to consider peace, 250 + reopens hopes of a peace of understanding, 189 + speech to Congress, 193 + text of the Fourteen Points, 323 + +Wolf, K.H., a scene in the "Burg," 169 + +World-domination, Germany's dream of, 1, 2 + +World organization, a new, principles of, 174 _et seq._ + +World War, the, an important phase of, 107 + attempts at peace, 134 _et seq._ + author's impressions and reflections on, 195 _et seq._, 271 _et seq._ + by whom started, 18 (note) + causes of, 3 + President Wilson and, 188 _et seq._ + questions of responsibility for outbreak of, 2 + +World War, the, U-boat warfare in, 114 _et seq._ + (_see also_ Submarine warfare and U-boat) + violent measures adopted by Germany in, 16 + + +=Z= + +Zeppelin raids on Bucharest, 100 + +Zimmermann, Herr, and author's peace proposals, 146 + opposes unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 120 + +_Zimmerwalder_ (Russian Internationalists), 211 + + + +PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C. 4 + + * * * * * + + +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + | Typographical errors corrected in text: | + | | + | Table of Contents: Appendix is listed as 257, changed to 275 | + | Page 47: 'and and in doing so' replaced with 'and in doing so' | + | Page 81: 'to made room' replaced with 'to make room' | + | Page 107: session replaced with cession | + | Page 196: perdera replaced with perdra | + | Page 201: Nr 63 replaced with Nr. 63 | + | Page 251: official replaced with officials | + | Page 286: 'Les navir' replaced with 'Les navires' | + | Page 293: persumably replaced with presumably | + | Page 333: Sudekum replaced with Suedekum | + | Page 334: 'would have have been' replaced with 'would have been' | + | Page 343: Gouluchowski replaced with Goluchowski | + | Page 344: Gorlitz replaced with Goerlitz | + | Page 346: Lubin replaced with Lublin | + | | + | The surname Colloredo-Mannsfield/Colloredo-Mannsfeld appears | + | once each way, on page 121, and in the index | + 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