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diff --git a/18042-8.txt b/18042-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c74cdd --- /dev/null +++ b/18042-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7032 @@ +Project Gutenberg's A General Sketch of the European War, by Hilaire Belloc + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A General Sketch of the European War + The First Phase + +Author: Hilaire Belloc + +Release Date: March 23, 2006 [EBook #18042] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SKETCH OF THE EUROPEAN WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Thierry Alberto, Jeannie Howse and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + * * * * * + + + + +A +GENERAL SKETCH +OF THE +EUROPEAN WAR + +BY +HILAIRE BELLOC + +THE FIRST PHASE + + +THOMAS NELSON & COMPANY +LONDON, EDINBURGH, PARIS, AND NEW YORK + + + + + +_First published June 1, 1915_ +_Reprinted June 1915_ + + + + +CONTENTS. + +INTRODUCTION 7 + + +PART I. + +THE GENERAL CAUSES OF THE WAR. + +(1) THE GERMAN OBJECT 17 + +(2) CONFLICT PRODUCED BY THE CONTRAST OF THIS GERMAN + ATTITUDE OR WILL WITH THE WILLS OF OTHER NATIONS 23 + +(3) PRUSSIA 27 + +(4) AUSTRIA 39 + +(5) THE PARTICULAR CAUSES OF THE WAR 50 + +(6) THE IMMEDIATE OCCASION OF THE WAR 64 + + +PART II. + +THE FORCES OPPOSED. + +(1) THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE BELLIGERENTS 80 + + The Geographical Advantages and Disadvantages of + the Germanic Body 86 + + The Geographical Advantages and Disadvantages of + the Allies 121 + +(2) THE OPPOSING STRENGTHS 136 + + The Figures of the First Period, say to + October 1-31, 1914 145 + + The Figures of the Second Period, say to + April 15-June 1, 1915 151 + +(3) THE CONFLICTING THEORIES OF WAR 164 + + +PART III. + +THE FIRST OPERATIONS. + +(1) THE BATTLE OF METZ 316 + +(2) LEMBERG 322 + +(3) TANNENBERG 345 + +(4) THE SPIRITS IN CONFLICT 365 + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +It is the object of this book, and those which will succeed it in the +same series, to put before the reader the main lines of the European +War as it proceeds. Each such part must necessarily be completed and +issued some little time after the events to which it relates have +passed into history. The present first, or introductory volume, which +is a preface to the whole, covers no more than the outbreak of +hostilities, and is chiefly concerned with an examination of the +historical causes which produced the conflict, an estimate of the +comparative strength of the various combatants, and a description of +the first few days during which these combatants took up their +positions and suffered the first great shocks of the campaigns in East +and West. + +But in order to serve as an introduction to the remainder of the +series, it is necessary that the plan upon which these books are to +be constructed should be clearly explained. + +There is no intention of giving in detail and with numerous exact maps +the progress of the campaigns. Still less does the writer propose to +examine disputed points of detail, or to enumerate the units employed +over that vast field. His object is to make clear, as far as he is +able, those great outlines of the business which too commonly escape +the general reader. + +This war is the largest and the weightiest historical incident which +Europe has known for many centuries. It will surely determine the +future of Europe, and in particular the future of this country. Yet +the comprehension of its movements is difficult to any one not +acquainted with the technical language and the special study of +military history; and the reading of the telegrams day by day, even +though it be accompanied by the criticisms of the military experts in +the newspapers, leaves the mass of men with a most confused conception +of what happened and why it happened. + +Now, it is possible, by greatly simplifying maps, by further +simplifying these into clear diagrams, still more by emphasizing what +is essential and by deliberately omitting a crowd of details--by +showing first the framework, as it were, of any principal movement, +and then completing that framework with the necessary furniture of +analysed record--to give any one a conception both of what happened +and of how it happened. + +It is even possible, where the writer has seen the ground over which +the battles have been fought (and much of it is familiar to the author +of this), so to describe such ground to the reader that he will in +some sort be able to see for himself the air and the view in which the +things were done: thus more than through any other method will the +things be made real to him. The aim, therefore, of these pages, and of +those that will succeed them, is to give such a general idea of the +campaigns as a whole as will permit whoever has grasped it a secure +comprehension of the forces at work, and of the results of those +forces. It is desired, for example, that the reader of these pages +shall be able to say to himself: "The Germanic body expected to +win--and no wonder, for it had such and such advantages in number and +in equipment.... The first two battles before Warsaw failed, and I can +see why. It was because the difficulties in Russian supply were met by +a contraction of the Russian line.... The 1st German Army was +compelled to retreat before Paris, and I can now see why that was so: +as it turned to envelop the Allied line, a great reserve within the +fortified zone of Paris threatened it, and forced it back." + +These main lines, and these only, are attempted in the present book, +and in those that are to follow it in this series. + +The disadvantage of such a method is, of course, that the reader must +look elsewhere for details, for the notices of a particular action, +and the records of particular regiments. He must look for these to the +large histories of the war, which will amply supply his curiosity in +good time. But the advantage of the method consists in that it +provides, as I hope, a foundation upon which all this bewildering +multitude of detailed reading can repose. + +I set out, then, to give, as it were, the alphabet of the campaign, +and I begin in this volume with the preliminaries to it--that is, its +great political causes, deep rooted in the past; the particular and +immediate causes which led to the outbreak of war; an estimate of the +forces engaged; and the inception of hostilities. + + +PLAN OF THIS BOOK. + +This first volume will cover three parts. In Part I. I shall write of +The Causes of the War. In Part II. I shall Contrast the Forces +Opposed. In Part III. (the briefest) I shall describe the First Shock. + +In Part I., where I deal first with the general or historical causes +of the war, later with the particulars, I shall:-- + +1. Define the German object which led up to it. + +2. Show how this object conflicted with the wills of other nations. + +3. Briefly sketch the rise of Prussia and of her domination over North +Germany. + +4. Define the position of Austria-Hungary in the matter, and thus +close the general clauses. + +5. The particular causes of the war will next be dealt with; the +curious challenge thrown down to Great Britain by the German Fleet +_before_ the German Empire had made secure its position on the +Continent; the French advance upon Morocco; the coalition of the +Balkan States against the remainder of the Turkish Empire in Europe. + +6. Lastly, in this First Part, I shall describe the immediate occasion +of the war and its surroundings: the ultimatum issued by the +Austro-Hungarian Government to the little kingdom of Servia. + +In Part II. I will attempt to present the forces opposed at the +outbreak of war. + +First, the contrast in the geographical position of the Germanic +Allies with their enemies, the French, the English, and the Russians. +Secondly, the numbers of trained men prepared and the numbers of +reserves available in at least the first year to the various numbers +in conflict. Thirdly, the way in which the various enemies had thought +of the coming war (which was largely a matter of theory in the lack of +experience); in what either party has been right, and in what wrong, +as events proved; and with what measure of foresight the various +combatants entered the field. + +In Part III, I will very briefly describe the original armed +dispositions for combat at the outbreak of war, the German aim upon +the West, and the German orders to the Austrians upon the East; the +overrunning of Belgium, and the German success upon the Sambre; then +the pursuit of the Franco-British forces to the line Paris-Verdun, up +to the eve of the successful counter-offensive undertaken by them in +the first week of September. I will end by describing what were the +contemporary events in the Eastern field: in its northern part the +overrunning of East Prussia by the Russians, and the heavy blow which +the Germans there administered to the invader; in its southern the +Austrian opposition to the Russians on the Galician borders, and the +breakdown of that opposition at Lemberg. + +My terminal date for this sketch will be the 5th of September. + + + + +A GENERAL SKETCH OF THE EUROPEAN WAR. + +PART I. + +THE GENERAL CAUSES OF THE WAR. + + +War is the attempt of two human groups each to impose its will upon +the other by force of arms. This definition holds of the most +righteous war fought in self-defence as much as it does of the most +iniquitous war of mere aggression. The aggressor, for instance, +proposes to take the goods of his victim without the pretence of a +claim. He is attempting to impose his will upon that victim. The +victim, in resisting by force of arms, is no less attempting to impose +his will upon the aggressor; and if he is victorious does effectually +impose that will: for it is his will to prevent the robbery. + +Every war, then, arises from some conflict of wills between two human +groups, each intent upon some political or civic purpose, conflicting +with that of his opponent. + +War and all military action is but a means to a non-military end, to +be achieved and realized in peace. + +Although arguable differences invariably exist as to the right or +wrong of either party in any war, yet the conflicting wills of the two +parties, the irreconcilable political objects which each has put +before itself and the opposition between which has led to conflict, +can easily be defined. + +They fall into two classes:-- + +1. The general objects at which the combatants have long been aiming. + +2. The particular objects apparent just before, and actually +provoking, the conflict. + +In the case of the present enormous series of campaigns, which occupy +the energies of nearly all Europe, the general causes can be easily +defined, and that without serious fear of contradiction by the +partisans of either side. + +On the one hand, the Germanic peoples, especially that great majority +of them now organized as the German Empire under the hegemony of +Prussia, had for fully a lifetime and more been possessed of a certain +conception of themselves which may be not unjustly put into the form +of the following declaration. It is a declaration consonant with most +that has been written from the German standpoint during more than a +generation, and many of its phrases are taken directly from the +principal exponents of the German idea. + + +(I) THE GERMAN OBJECT. + +"We the Germans are in spirit one nation. But we are a nation the +unity of which has been constantly forbidden for centuries by a number +of accidents. None the less that unity has always been an ideal +underlying our lives. Once or twice in the remote past it has been +nearly achieved, especially under the great German emperors of the +Middle Ages. Whenever it has thus been nearly achieved, we Germans +have easily proved ourselves the masters of other societies around us. +Most unfortunately our very strength has proved our ruin time and +again by leading us into adventures, particularly adventures in +Italy, which took the place of our national ideal for unity and +disturbed and swamped it. The reason we have been thus supreme +whenever we were united or even nearly united lay in the fact, which +must be patent to every observer, that our mental, moral, and +physical characteristics render us superior to all rivals. The German +or Teutonic race can everywhere achieve, other things being equal, +more than can any other race. Witness the conquest of the Roman Empire +by German tribes; the political genius, commercial success, and final +colonial expansion of the English, a Teutonic people; and the peculiar +strength of the German races resident within their old homes on the +Rhine, the Danube, the Weser, and the Elbe, whenever they were not +fatally disunited by domestic quarrel or unwise foreign ideals. It was +we who revivified the declining society of Roman Gaul, and made it +into the vigorous medićval France that was ruled from the North. It +was we who made and conquered the heathen Slavs threatening Europe +from the East, and who civilized them so far as they could be +civilized. We are, in a word, and that patently not only to ourselves +but to all others, the superior and leading race of mankind; and you +have but to contrast us with the unstable Celt--who has never produced +a State--the corrupt and now hopelessly mongrel Mediterranean or +'Latin' stock, the barbarous and disorderly Slav, to perceive at once +the truth of all we say. + +[Illustration: Sketch 1.] + +"It so happens that the various accidents which interrupted our +strivings for unity permitted other national groups, inferior morally +and physically to our own, to play a greater part than such an +inferiority warranted; and the same accidents permitted men of +Teutonic stock, not inhabiting the ancient homes of the Teutons, but +emigrated therefrom and politically separated from the German Empire, +to obtain advantages in which we ourselves should have had a share, +but which we missed. Thus England, a Teutonic country, obtained her +vast colonial empire while we had not a ship upon the sea. + +"France, a nation then healthier than it is now, but still of much +baser stock than our own, played for centuries the leading part in +Western Europe; she is even to-day 'over-capitalized,' as it were, +possessing a far greater hold over the modern world than her real +strength warrants. Even the savage Slavs have profited by our former +disunion, and the Russian autocracy not only rules millions of +German-speaking subjects, but threatens our frontiers with its great +numbers of barbarians, and exercises over the Balkan Peninsula, and +therefore over the all-important position of Constantinople, a power +very dangerous to European culture as a whole, and particularly to our +own culture--which is, of course, by far the highest culture of all. + +"Some fifty years ago, acting upon the impulse of a group of great +writers and thinkers, our statesmen at last achieved that German unity +which had been the unrealized ideal of so many centuries. In a series +of wars we accomplished that unity, and we amply manifested our +superiority when we were once united by defeating with the greatest +ease and in the most fundamental fashion the French, whom the rest of +Europe then conceived to be the chief military power. + +"From that moment we have incontestably stood in the sight of all as +the strongest people in the world, and yet because other and lesser +nations had the start of us, our actual international position, our +foreign possessions, the security that should be due to so supreme an +achievement, did not correspond to our real strength and abilities. +England had vast dependencies, and had staked out the unoccupied world +as her colonies. We had no colonies and no dependencies. France, +though decadent, was a menace to our peace upon the West. We could +have achieved the thorough conquest and dismemberment of France at any +time in the last forty years, and yet during the whole of that time +France was adding to her foreign possessions in Tunis, Madagascar, and +Tonkin, latterly in Morocco, while we were obtaining nothing. The +barbarous Russians were increasing constantly in numbers, and somewhat +perfecting their insufficient military machine without any +interference from us, grave as was the menace from them upon our +Eastern frontier. + +"It was evident that such a state of things could not endure. A nation +so united and so immensely strong could not remain in a position of +artificial inferiority while lesser nations possessed advantages in no +way corresponding to their real strength. The whole equilibrium of +Europe was unstable through this contrast between what Germany might +be and what she was, and a struggle to make her what she might be +from what she was could not be avoided. + +"Germany must, in fulfilment of a duty to herself, obtain colonial +possessions at the expense of France, obtain both colonial possessions +and sea-power at the expense of England, and put an end, by campaigns +perhaps defensive, but at any rate vigorous, to the menace of Slav +barbarism upon the East. She was potentially, by her strength and her +culture, the mistress of the modern world, the chief influence in it, +and the rightful determinant of its destinies. She must by war pass +from a potential position of this kind to an actual position of +domination." + +Such was the German mood, such was the fatuous illusion which produced +this war. It had at its service, as we shall see later, _numbers_, +and, backed by this superiority of numbers, it counted on victory. + + +(2) CONFLICT PRODUCED BY THE CONTRAST OF THIS GERMAN ATTITUDE OR +WILL WITH THE WILLS OF OTHER NATIONS. + +When we have clearly grasped the German attitude, as it may thus be +not unfairly expressed, we shall not find it difficult to conceive +why a conflict between such a will and other wills around it broke +out. + +We need waste no time in proving the absurdity of the German +assumptions, the bad history they involve, and the perverse and +twisted perspective so much vanity presupposes. War can never be +prevented by discovering the moral errors of an opponent. It comes +into being because that opponent does not believe them to be moral +errors; and in the attempt to understand this war and its causes, we +should only confuse ourselves if we lost time over argument upon +pretensions even as crassly unreal as these. + +It must be enough for the purposes of this to accept the German will +so stated, and to see how it necessarily conflicts with the English +will, the French will, the Russian will, and sooner or later, for that +matter, with every other national will in Europe. + +In the matter of sea-power England would answer: "Unless we are +all-powerful at sea, our very existence is imperilled." In the matter +of her colonies and dependencies England would answer: "We may be a +Teutonic people or we may not. All that kind of thing is pleasant talk +for the academies. But if you ask whether we will allow any part of +our colonies to become German or any part of our great dependencies to +fall under German rule, the answer is in the negative." + +The French would answer: "We do not happen to think that we are either +decadent or corrupt, nor do we plead guilty to any other of your vague +and very pedantic charges; but quite apart from that, on the concrete +point of whether we propose to be subjugated by a foreign Power, +German or other, the answer is in the negative. Our will is here in +conflict with yours. And before you can proceed to any act of mastery +over us, you will have to fight. Moreover, we shall not put aside the +duty of ultimately fighting you so long as a population of two +millions, who feel themselves to be French (though most of them are +German-speaking) and who detest your rule, are arbitrarily kept in +subjection by you in Alsace-Lorraine." + +The Russians would reply: "We cannot help being numerically stronger +than you, and we do not propose to diminish our numbers even if we +could. We do not think we are barbaric; and as to our leadership of +the Slav people in the Balkans, that seems as right and natural to us, +particularly on religious grounds, as any such bond could be. It may +interfere with your ambitions; but if you propose that we should +abandon so obvious an attitude of leadership among the Slavs, the +answer is in the negative." There is here, therefore, again a conflict +of wills. + +In general, what the German peoples desired, based upon what they +believed themselves to be, was sharply at issue with what the English +people, what the French people, what the Russian people respectively +desired. Their desires were also based upon what _they_ believed +themselves to be, and they thought themselves to be very different +from what Germany thought them to be. The English did not believe that +they had sneaked their empire; the French did not believe that they +were moribund; the Russians did not believe that they were savages. + +It was impossible that the German will should impose itself without +coming at once into conflict with these other national wills. It was +impossible that the German ideal should seek to realize itself without +coming into conflict with the mere desire to live, let alone the +self-respect, of everybody else. + +And the consequence of such a conflict in ideals and wills translated +into practice was this war. + + * * * * * + +But the war would not have come nor would it have taken the shape that +it did, but for two other factors in the problem which we must next +consider. These two other factors are, first, the position and +tradition of Prussia among the German States; secondly, the peculiar +authority exercised by the Imperial House of Hapsburg-Lorraine at +Vienna over its singularly heterogeneous subjects. + + +(3) PRUSSIA. + +The Germans have always been, during their long history, a race +inclined to perpetual division and sub-division, accompanied by war +and lesser forms of disagreement between the various sections. Their +friends have called this a love of freedom, their enemies political +incompetence; but, without giving it a good or a bad name, the plain +fact has been, century after century, that the various German tribes +would not coalesce. Any one of them was always willing to take service +with the Roman Empire, in the early Roman days, against any one of the +others, and though there have been for short periods more or less +successful attempts to form one nation of them all in imitation of the +more civilized States to the west and south, these attempts have never +succeeded for very long. + +But it so happens that about two hundred years ago, or a little more, +there appeared one body of German-speaking men rather different from +the rest, and capable ultimately of leading the rest, or at least a +majority of the rest. + +[Illustration: Sketch 2.] + +I use the words "German-speaking" and "rather different" because this +particular group of men, though speaking German, were of less pure +German blood than almost any other of the peoples that spoke that +tongue. They were the product of a conquest undertaken late in the +Middle Ages by German knights over a mixed Pagan population, +Lithuanian and Slavonic, which inhabited the heaths and forests along +the Baltic Sea. These German knights succeeded in their task, and +compelled the subject population to accept Christianity, just as the +Germans themselves had been compelled to accept it by their more +powerful and civilized neighbours the French hundreds of years before. +The two populations of this East Baltic district, the large majority +which was Slavonic and Lithuanian, and the minority which was really +German, mixed and produced a third thing, which we now know as the +_Prussian_. The cradle of this Prussian race was, then, all that flat +country of which Königsberg and Danzig are the capitals, but +especially Königsberg--"King's Town"--where the monarchs of this +remote people were crowned. By an historical accident, which we need +not consider, the same dynasty was, after it had lost all claim to +separate kingship, merged in the rulers of the Mark of Brandenburg, a +somewhat more German but still mixed district lying also in the Baltic +plain, but more towards the west, and the official title of the +Prussian ruler somewhat more than two hundred years ago was the +Elector of Brandenburg. These rulers of the Mark of Brandenburg were a +family bearing the title of Hohenzollern, a castle in South Germany, +by which name they are still distinguished. The palace of these +Hohenzollerns was henceforward at Berlin. + +Now, much at the same time that the civil wars were being fought in +England--that is, not quite three hundred years ago--the Reformation +had produced in Germany also very violent quarrels. Vienna, which was +the seat of the Imperial House, stood for the Catholic or traditional +cause, and most Germans adhered to that cause. But certain of the +Northern German principalities and counties took up the side of the +Reformation. A terrible war, known as the Thirty Years' War, was +fought between the two factions. It enormously reduced the total +population of Germany. In the absence of exact figures we only have +wild guesses, such as a loss of half or three-quarters. At any rate, +both from losses from the adherence of many princes to the Protestant +cause and from the support lent to that cause for political reasons by +Catholic France, this great civil war in Germany left the Protestant +part more nearly equal in numbers to the Catholic part, and, among +other things, it began to make the Elector of Brandenburg with his +Prussians particularly prominent as the champion of the Protestant +cause. For, of all the warring towns, counties, principalities, and +the rest, Prussia had in particular shown military aptitude. + +From that day to this the advance of Prussia as, first, the champion, +then the leader, and at last the master of Northern Germany as a whole +(including many Catholic parts in the centre and the south), has been +consistent and almost uninterrupted. The "Great Elector" (as he was +called) formed an admirable army some two hundred years ago. His +grandson Frederick formed a still better one, and by his great +capacities as a general, as well as by the excellence of his troops, +gave Prussia a military reputation in the middle of the eighteenth +century which has occasionally been eclipsed, but has never been +extinguished. + +Frederick the Great did more than this. He codified and gave +expression, as it were, to the Prussian spirit, and the manifestation +of that spirit in international affairs is generally called the +"Frederician Tradition." + +This "Frederician Tradition" must be closely noted by the reader, +because it is the principal moral cause of the present war. It may be +briefly and honestly put in the following terms:-- + +"The King of Prussia shall do all that may seem to advantage the +kingdom of Prussia among the nations, notwithstanding any European +conventions or any traditions of Christendom, or even any of those +wider and more general conventions which govern the international +conduct of other Christian peoples." + +For instance, if a convention of international morals has arisen--as +it did arise very strongly, and was kept until recent times--that +hostilities should not begin without a formal declaration of war, the +"Frederician Tradition" would go counter to this, and would say: "If +ultimately it would be to the advantage of Prussia to attack without +declaration of war, then this convention may be neglected." + +Or, again, treaties solemnly ratified between two Governments are +generally regarded as binding. And certainly a nation that never kept +such a treaty for more than a week would find itself in a position +where it was impossible to make any treaties at all. Still, if upon a +vague calculation of men's memories, the acuteness of the +circumstance, the advantage ultimately to follow, and so on, it be to +the advantage of Prussia to break such solemn treaty, then such a +treaty should be broken. + +It will be apparent that what is called the "Frederician Tradition," +which is the soul of Prussia in her international relations, is not an +unprincipled thing. It has a principle, and that principle is a +patriotic desire to strengthen Prussia, which particular appetite +overweighs all general human morals and far outweighs all special +Christian or European morals. + +This doctrine of the "Frederician Tradition" does not mean that the +Prussian statesmen wantonly do wrong, whether in acts of cruelty or in +acts of treason and bad faith. What it means is that, wherever they +are met by the dilemma, "Shall I do _this_, which is to the advantage +of my country but opposed to European and common morals, or _that_, +which is consonant with those morals but to the disadvantage of my +country?" they choose the former and not the latter course. + +Prussia, endowed with this doctrine and possessed of a most excellent +military organization and tradition, stood out as the first military +power in Europe until the French Revolution. The wars of the French +Revolution and of Napoleon upset this prestige, and in the battle of +Jena (1806) seemed to have destroyed it. But it was too strong to be +destroyed. The Prussian Government was the first of Napoleon's allies +to betray Napoleon _after_ the Russians had broken his power (1812). +They took part with the other Allies in finishing off Napoleon after +the Russian campaign (1813-14); they were present with decisive effect +upon the final field of Waterloo (1815), and remained for fifty years +afterwards the great military power they had always been. They had +further added to their dominions such great areas in Northern +Germany, beyond the original areas inhabited by the true Prussian +stock, that they were something like half of the whole Northern German +people when, in 1864, they entered into the last phase of their +dominion. They began by asking Austria to help them in taking from +Denmark, a small and weak country, not only those provinces of hers +which spoke German, but certain districts which were Danish as well. +France and England were inclined to interfere, but they did not yet +understand the menace Prussia might be in the future, and they +neglected to act. Two years later Prussia suddenly turned upon +Austria, her ally, defeated her in a very short campaign, and insisted +upon Austria's relinquishing for the future all claims over any part +of the German-speaking peoples, save some ten millions in the valley +of the Middle Danube and of the Upper Elbe. Four years later again, in +1870, Prussia having arranged, after various political experiments +which need not be here detailed, for the support of all the German +States except Austria, fought a war with France, in which she was +immediately and entirely successful, and in the course of which the +rulers of the other German States consented (1) to give the +Hohenzollern-Prussian dynasty supreme military power for the future +over them, under the hereditary title of German Emperors; (2) to form +a united nation under the more or less despotic power of these +emperors. + +This latter point, the national unity, though really highly +centralized at Berlin, especially on the military side, was softened +in its rigour by a number of very wise provisions. A great measure of +autonomy was left to the more important of the lesser States, +particularly Catholic Bavaria; local customs were respected; and, +above all, local dynasties were flattered, and maintained in all the +trappings of sovereign rank. + +From that date--that is, for the last forty-four years--there has been +a complete _Northern_ Germany, one strong, centralized, and thoroughly +co-ordinated nation, in which the original Prussian domination is not +only numerically far the greatest element, but morally overshadows all +the rest. The spiritual influence ruling this state issues from Berlin +and from the Prussian soul, although a large minority consist of +contented but respectful Catholics, who, in all national matters, +wholly sympathize with and take their cue from the Protestant North. + +So far one may clearly see what kind of power it is that has initiated +the German theory of supremacy which we have described above, is +prepared to lead it to battle, and is quite certain of leading it to +victory. + +But we note--the fatal mark in all German history--that the unity is +not complete. The ten millions of Austrian Germans were, when Prussia +achieved this her highest ambition, deliberately left outside the new +German Empire. And this was done because, in Prussian eyes, a +so-called "German unity" was but a means to an end, and that end the +aggrandizement of the Hohenzollern dynasty. To include so many +southern and Catholic Germans would have endangered the mastery of +Berlin. The fact that Austria ruled a number of non-German subjects +far larger than her Austrian population would further have endangered +the Hohenzollern position had Austria been admitted to the new German +Empire, and had the consolidation of all Germans into one true state +been really and loyally attempted. Lastly, it would have been +impossible to destroy the historic claims to leadership of the +Imperial Hapsburgs, and that, more than anything else, was the rivalry +the Hohenzollerns dreaded. Once more had the Germans proved themselves +incapable of, and unwilling to submit to, the discipline of unity. +What part, then, was Austria, thus left out, to play in the +international activity of Prussia in the future? What part especially +was she to play when Prussia, at the head of Northern Germany, should +go out to impose the will of that Germany and of herself upon the rest +of the world? That is the next question we must answer before we can +hope to understand the causes of the present war in their entirety. + + +(4) AUSTRIA. + +Austria, or, more strictly speaking, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, +means no more than the congeries of States governed each separately +and all in combination by the head of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. +Of these various States only one is German-speaking as a whole, and +that is the Austrian State proper, the "Eastern States" (for that is +what the word "Austria" originally meant) which Christendom erected +round the Roman and Christian frontier town of Vienna to withstand the +pressure of the heathen Slavs and Mongol Magyars surging against it +upon this frontier. + +The complexity of the various sections which make up the realm of the +present Emperor Francis Joseph, the present head of the House of +Hapsburg-Lorraine, would be only confusing if it were detailed in so +general a description as this. We must be content with the broad lines +of the thing, which are as follows:-- + +[Illustration: Sketch 3.] + +From the Upper Danube and its valley--all the basin of it, one may +say, down to a point about twenty miles below Vienna--is the original +Austrian State; German-speaking as a whole, and the historic centre of +the entire agglomeration. East of this is the far larger state of +Hungary, and Hungary is the valley of the river Danube, from where the +German-speaking boundary cuts it, just below Vienna down to the Iron +Gates, up to the crest of the Carpathians. These two great units of +Austria proper and of Hungary have round them certain frills or edges. +On the north are two great bodies, Slav in origin, Bohemia and +Galicia; on the south another Slav body, separated from the rest for +centuries by the eruption of the Magyars from Asia in the Dark Ages, +and these Slav bodies are represented by Croatia, by much of Dalmatia, +and latterly by Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have been governed by +Austria for a generation, and formally annexed by her with the consent +of Europe seven years ago. Finally, there is a strip, or, to be more +accurate, there are patches of Italian-speaking people, all along the +coasts of the Adriatic, and occupying the ports governed by Austria +along the eastern and northern coast of that sea. There is also a belt +of Alpine territory of Italian speech--the Trentino--still in Austrian +hands. + +This very general description gives, however, far too rough an idea of +the extraordinarily complicated territories of the House of Hapsburg. +Thus, there are considerable German-speaking colonies in Hungary, and +these, oddly enough, are more frequent in the east than in the west +of that State. Again, the whole western slope of the Carpathians is, +so far as the mass of the population is concerned, Roumanian in +tongue, custom, and race. Bohemia, though Slavonic in origin, is +regularly enframed along its four sides by belts of German-speaking +people, and was mainly German-speaking until a comparatively recent +revival of its native Slavonic tongue, the Czech. Again, though the +Magyar language is Mongolian, like the Turkish, centuries of Christian +and European admixture have left very little trace of the original +race. Lastly, in all the north-eastern corner of this vast and +heterogeneous territory, something like a quarter of the population is +Jewish. + +The Western student, faced with so extraordinary a puzzle of race and +language, may well wonder what principle of unity there is lying +behind it, and, indeed, this principle of unity is not easy to find. + +Some have sought it in religion, pointing out that the overwhelming +majority of these various populations are Catholic, in communion with +Rome; and, indeed, this Catholic tincture or colour has a great deal +to do with the Austro-Hungarian unity; and of late years the chief +directing policy of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine has been to pose as +the leader of the Catholic Slavs against the Slavs belonging to the +Greek Church. + +But this principle of unity is not the true one, for two reasons: +first, that the motive leading the House of Hapsburg to the difficult +task of so complicated a government is not a religious motive; and, +secondly, because this religious unity is subject to profound +modification. Hungary, though Catholic in its majority, contains, and +is largely governed by, powerful Protestant families, who are +supported by considerable bodies of Protestant population. The Greek +Church is the religious profession of great numbers along the Lower +Danube valley and to the south of the river Save. There are in Bosnia +a considerable number of Mahomedans even, and I have already mentioned +the numerous Jewish population of the north-east, particularly in +Galicia. + +The true principle of unity in what has hitherto been the +Austro-Hungarian Empire is twofold. It consists, first, in the +reigning family, considerable personal attachment to which is felt in +every section of its dominions, utterly different as these are one +from another; and, secondly (a more important point), in the +historical development of the State. + +It is this last matter which explains all, and which can make us +understand why a realm so astonishingly ill constructed was brought +into the present struggle as one force, and that force a force allied +to, and in a military sense identical with, modern Prussian Germany. + +For the historical root of Austria-Hungary is German. Of its +population (some fifty-one millions) you may say that only about a +quarter are German-speaking (less than another quarter are +Magyar-speaking, most of the rest Slavonic in speech, together with +some proportion of Roumanian and Italian). + +But it is from this German _quarter_ and from the emperor at their +head that the historical growth of the State depends, because this +German _quarter_ was the original Christian nucleus and the civilized +centre, which had for its mission the reduction of Slavonic and Magyar +barbarism. The Slavs of the Bohemian quadrilateral were subjected, +not indeed by conquest, but by a process of culture, to Vienna. The +crown of Hungary, when it fell by marriage to the Hapsburgs, continued +that tradition; and when the Empress Maria-Theresa, in the last +century, participated in the abominable crime of Frederick the Great +of Prussia, and took her share of the dismembered body of Poland (now +called the Austrian province of Galicia), that enormous blunder was, +in its turn, a German blunder undertaken under the example of Northern +Germany, and as part of a movement German in spirit and origin. The +same is true even of the very latest of the Austrian developments, the +annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The act was that of Vienna, but +the spirit behind it, perhaps the suggestion of it, and the support +that made it possible came from Berlin. + +In a word, if you could interrogate the Genius of the Hapsburgs and +ask it for what their dominion stood, it would tell you that for +uninterrupted centuries they had stood for the German effort to +repress or to overcome pressure upon the German peoples from the +East. And that is still their rôle. They have come into this war, for +instance, as the servants of Prussia, not because Prussia threatened +or overawed them, but because they felt they had, in common with +Prussia, the mission of withstanding the Slav, or of tolerating the +Slav only as a subject; because, that is, they feared, and were +determined to resist, Russia, and the smaller Slavonic States, notably +Servia to the south, which are in the retinue of Russia. + + * * * * * + +We may sum up, then, and say that the fundamental conflict of wills in +Europe, which has produced this general war, is a conflict between the +German will, organized by Prussia to overthrow the ancient Christian +tradition of Europe (to _her_ advantage directly; and indirectly, as +she proposes, to the advantage of a supposedly necessary German +governance of the world under Prussian organization), and the will of +the more ancient and better founded Western and Latin tradition to +which the sanctity of separate national units profoundly appeals, and +a great deal more which is, in their eyes, civilization. In this +conflict, Prussia has called upon and received the support of not only +the German Empire, which she controls, but also the Hapsburg monarchy, +controlling the organized forces of Austria-Hungary; while there has +appeared against this strange Prussian claim all that values the +Christian tradition of Europe, and in particular the doctrine of +national freedom, with very much else--which very much else are the +things by which we of the civilized West and South, who have hitherto +proved the creators of the European world, live and have our being. +Allied with us, by the accident that this same German claim threatens +them also, is the young new world of the Slavs. + +It is at this final point of our examination that we may see the +immensity of the issues upon which the war turns. The two parties are +really fighting for their lives; that in Europe which is arrayed +against the Germanic alliance would not care to live if it should fail +to maintain itself against the threat of that alliance. It is for them +life and death. On the other side, the Germans having propounded this +theory of theirs, or rather the Prussians having propounded it for +them, there is no rest possible until they shall either have "made +good" to our destruction, or shall have been so crushed that a +recurrence of the menace from them will for the future be impossible. + +There is here no possibility of such a "draw" or "stalemate" as was +the result, for instance, of the reduction of Louis XIV.'s ambition, +or of the great revolutionary effort throughout Europe which ended +with the fall of Napoleon. Louis XIV.'s ambition cast over Europe, +which received it favourably, the colour of French culture. The +Revolutionary Wars were fought for a principle which, if it did not +appeal universally to men, appealed at least to all those millions +whose instincts were democratic in every country. But in this war +there is no such common term. No one outside the districts led by +Prussia desires a Prussian life, and perhaps most, certainly many, of +those whom Prussia now leads are in different degrees unwilling to +continue a Prussian life. The fight, in a word, is not like a fight +with a man who, if he beats you, may make you sign away some property, +or make you acknowledge some principle to which you are already half +inclined; it is like a fight with a man who says, "So long as I have +life left in me, I will make it my business to kill you." And fights +of that kind can never reach a term less absolute than the destruction +of offensive power in one side or the other. A peace not affirming +complete victory in this great struggle could, of its nature, be no +more than a truce. + + * * * * * + +So much for the really important and the chief thing which we have to +understand--the general causes of the war. + +Now let us turn to the particular causes. We shall find these to be, +not like the general causes, great spiritual attitudes, but, as they +always are, a sequence of restricted and recent _events_. + + +(5) THE PARTICULAR CAUSES OF THE WAR. + +After the great victories of Prussia a generation ago (the spoliation +of Denmark in 1864, the supremacy established over Austria in 1866, +the crushing defeat of France and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, +with two millions of people in 1870-1), Europe gradually drifted into +being an armed camp, the great forces of which were more or less in +equilibrium. Prussia had, for the moment at least, achieved all that +she desired. The French were for quite twenty years ardently desirous +of recovering what they had lost; but Europe would not allow the war +to be renewed, and Prussia, now at the head of a newly constituted +German Empire, made an arrangement with Austria and with Italy to curb +the French desire for recovery. The French, obviously inferior before +this triple alliance, gradually persuaded the Russians to support +them; but the Russians would not support the French in provoking +another great war, and with the French themselves the old feeling +gradually deadened. It did not disappear--any incident might have +revived it--but the anxious desire for immediate war when the +opportunity should come got less and less, and at the end of the +process, say towards 1904, when a new generation had grown up in all +the countries concerned, there was a sort of deadlock, every one very +heavily armed, the principal antagonists, France and Germany, armed +to their utmost, but the European States, as a whole, unwilling to +allow any one of them to break the peace. + +It was about this moment that Prussia committed what the future +historian will regard, very probably, as the capital blunder in her +long career of success. She began to build a great fleet. Here the +reader should note two very important consequences of the great +Prussian victories which had taken place a generation before. The +first was the immense expansion of German industrialism. Germany, from +an agricultural State, became a State largely occupied in mining, +smelting, spinning, and shipbuilding; and there went with this +revolution, as there always goes with modern industrialism, a large +and unhealthy increase of population. The German Empire, after its war +with France, was roughly equal to the population of the French; but +the German Empire, after this successful industrial experiment, the +result of its victories, was much more than half as large again in +population as the French (68 to 39). + +Secondly, the German Empire developed a new and very large maritime +commerce. This second thing did not follow, as some have imagined it +does, from the first. Germany might have exported largely without +exporting in her own ships. The creation of Germany's new mercantile +marine was a deliberate part of the general Prussian policy of +expansion. It was heavily subsidized, especially directed into the +form of great international passenger lines, and carefully +co-ordinated with the rest of the Prussian scheme throughout the +world. + +At a date determined by the same general policy, and somewhat +subsequent to the first creation of this mercantile marine, came the +decision to build a great fleet. Now, it so happens that Great Britain +alone among the Powers of Europe depends for her existence upon +supremacy at sea, and particularly upon naval superiority in the +Narrow Seas to the east and the south of the British islands. + +Such a necessity is, of course, a challenge to the rest of the world, +and it would be ridiculous to expect the rest of the world to accept +that challenge without protest. But a necessity this naval policy of +Great Britain remains none the less. The moment some rival or group +of rivals can overcome her fleet, her mere physical livelihood is in +peril. She cannot be certain of getting her food. She cannot be +certain of getting those foreign materials the making up of which +enables her to purchase her food. Further, her dominions are scattered +oversea, and supremacy at sea is her only guarantee of retaining the +various provinces of her dominion. + +It is a case which has happened more than once before in the history +of the world. Great commercial seafaring States have arisen; they have +always had the same method of government by a small, wealthy class, +the same ardent patriotism, the same scattered empire, and the same +inexorable necessity of maintaining supremacy at sea. Only one Power +had hitherto rendered this country anxious for the Narrow Seas: that +Power was France, and it only controlled one-half of the two branches +of the Narrow Seas, the North Sea and the Channel. It had been for +generations a cardinal piece of English policy that the French Fleet +should be watched, the English Fleet maintained overwhelmingly +superior to it, and all opportunities for keeping France engaged with +other rivals used to the advantage of this country. On this account +English policy leant, on the whole, towards the German side, during +all the generation of rivalry between France and Germany which +followed the war of 1870. + +But when the Germans began to build their fleet, things changed. The +Germans had openly given Europe to understand that they regarded +Holland and Belgium, and particularly the port of Antwerp, as +ultimately destined to fall under their rule or into their system. +Their fleet was specifically designed for meeting the British Fleet; +it corresponded to no existing considerable colonial empire, and +though the development of German maritime commerce was an excuse for +it, it was only an excuse. Indeed, the object of obtaining supremacy +at sea was put forward fairly clearly by the promoters of the whole +scheme. Great Britain was therefore constrained to transfer the weight +of her support to Russia and to France, and to count on the whole as a +force opposed, for the first time in hundreds of years, to North +Germany in the international politics of Europe. Similarity of +religion (which is a great bond) and a supposed identity (and partly +real similarity) of race were of no effect compared with this +sentiment of necessity. + +Here it is important to note that the transference of British support +from one continental group to another neither produced aggression by +Great Britain nor pointed to any intention of aggression. It is a +plain matter of fact, which all future history will note, that the +very necessity in English eyes of English supremacy at sea, and the +knowledge that such a supremacy was inevitably a provocation to +others, led to the greatest discretion in the use of British naval +strength, and, in general, to a purely defensive and peaceful policy +upon the part of the chief maritime power. It would, indeed, have been +folly to have acted otherwise, for there was nothing to prevent the +great nations, our rivals, if they had been directly menaced by the +British superiority at sea, from beginning to build great fleets, +equal or superior to our own. Germany alone pursued this policy, with +no excuse save an obvious determination to undo the claim of the +British Fleet. + +I have called this a blunder, and, from the point of view of the +German policy, it was a blunder. For if the Prussian dynasty set out, +as it did, to make itself the chief power in the world, its obvious +policy was to deal with its enemies in detail. It ought not, at any +cost, to have quarrelled with Russia until it had finally disposed of +France. If it was incapable, through lack of subtlety, to prevent the +Franco-Russian group from forming, it should at least have made itself +the master of that group before gratuitously provoking the rivalry of +Great Britain. But "passion will have all now," and the supposedly +cold and calculating nature of Prussian effort has about it something +very crudely emotional, as the event has shown. From about ten years +ago Prussian Germany had managed to array against itself not only the +old Franco-Russian group but Great Britain as well. + +This arrangement would not, however, have led to war. Equilibrium was +still perfectly maintained, and the very strong feeling throughout all +the great States of Europe that a disturbance of the peace would mean +some terrible catastrophe, to be avoided at all costs, was as +powerful as ever. + +The true origin of disturbance, the first overt act upon which you can +put your finger and say, "Here the chain of particular causes leading +to the great war begins," was the revolution in Turkey. This +revolution took place in the year 1908, and put more or less +permanently into power at Constantinople a group of men based upon +Masonic influence, largely Western in training, largely composed of +Jewish elements, known as the "Young Turks." + +The first result of this revolution, followed as it inevitably was by +the temporary weakening in international power which accompanies all +civil war at its outset, was the declaration by Austria that she would +regard the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina--hitherto only +administrated by her and nominally still Turkish--as her own +territory. + +It was but a formal act, but it proved of vast consequence. It was an +open declaration by a Germanic Power that the hopes of the Servians, +the main population of the district and a Slav nation closely bound +to Russia in feeling, were at an end; that Servia must content herself +with such free territory as she had, and give up all hope of a +completely independent State uniting all Servians within its borders. +It was as though Austria had said, "I intend in future to be the great +European Power in the Balkans, Slav though the Balkans are, and I +challenge Russia to prevent me." The Russian Government, thus +challenged, would perhaps have taken the occasion to make war had not +the French given it to be understood that they would not imperil +European peace for such an object. The Prussian Government of the +German Empire had, in all this crisis, acted perhaps as the leader, +certainly as the protector and supporter of Austria; and when France +thus refused to fight, and Russia in turn gave way, the whole thing +was regarded, not only in Germany but throughout the world, as +equivalent to an armed victory. Observers whose judgment and criticism +are of weight, even in the eyes of trained international agents, +proclaimed what had happened to be as much a Prussian success as +though the Prussian and Austrian armies had met in the field and had +defeated the Russian and the French forces. + +The next step in this series was a challenge advanced by Germany +against that arrangement whereby Morocco, joining as it did to French +North Africa, should be abandoned to French influence, so far as +England was concerned, in exchange for the French giving up certain +rights of interference they had in the English administration of +Egypt, and one or two other minor points. Germany, advancing from a +victorious position acquired over the Bosnian business, affirmed (in +the year 1911) her right to be consulted over the Moroccan settlement. +Nor were the French permitted to occupy Morocco until they had ceded +to Germany a portion of their African colony of the Congo. This +transaction was confused by many side issues. German patriots did not +regard it as a sufficient success, though French patriots certainly +regarded it as a grave humiliation. But perhaps the chief consequence +of the whole affair was the recrudescence in the French people as a +whole of a temper, half forgotten, which provoked them to withstand +the now greatly increased power of the German Empire and of its ally, +and to determine that if such challenges were to continue unchecked +during the coming years, the national position of France would be +forfeited. + +Following upon this crisis came, in the next year--still a consequence +of the Turkish Revolution--the sudden determination of the Balkan +States, including Greece, to attack Turkey. It was the King of +Montenegro (a small Slav State which had always maintained its +independence) who fired the first shot upon the 8th of October, 1912, +with his own hand. In the course of that autumn the Balkan Allies were +universally successful, failed only in taking Constantinople itself, +reduced Turkey in Europe to an insignificant strip of territory near +the capital itself, and proceeded to settle the conquered territory +according to an agreement made by them before the outbreak of +hostilities. + +But here the Germanic Powers again intervened. The defeated Turkish +Army had been trained by German officers upon a German system; the +expansion of German and Austrian political military influence +throughout the Near East was a cardinal part of the German creed and +policy. Through Austria the Balkans were to be dominated at last, and +Austria, at this critical moment, vetoed the rational settlement which +the allied Balkan States had agreed to among themselves. She would not +allow the Servians to annex those territories inhabited by men of +their race, and to reach their natural outlet to the sea upon the +shores of the Adriatic. She proposed the creation of a novel State of +Albania under a German prince, to block Servia's way to the sea. She +further proposed to Servia compensation by way of Servia's annexing +the territory round Monastir, which had a Bulgarian population, and to +Bulgaria the insufficient compensation of taking over, farther to the +east, territory that was not Bulgarian at all, but mixed Greek and +Turkish. + +The whole thing was characteristically German in type, ignoring and +despising national feeling and national right, creating artificial +boundaries, and flagrantly sinning against the European sense of +patriotism. A furious conflict between the various members of the +former Balkan Alliance followed; but the settlement which Austria had +virtually imposed remained firm, and the third of the great Germanic +steps affirming the growing Germanic scheme in Europe had been taken. + +But it had been taken at the expense of further and very gravely +shaking the already unstable armed equilibrium of Europe. + +The German Empire foresaw the coming strain; a law was passed +immediately increasing the numbers of men to be trained to arms within +its boundaries, and ultimately increasing that number so largely as to +give to Germany alone a very heavy preponderance--a preponderance of +something like thirty per cent.--over the corresponding number trained +in France. + +To this move France could not reply by increasing her armed forces, +because she already took every available man. She did the only +possible thing under the circumstances. She increased by fifty per +cent. the term during which her young men must serve in the army, +changing that term from two years to three. + +The heavy burden thus suddenly imposed upon the French led to very +considerable political disputes in that country, especially as the +parliamentary form of government there established is exceedingly +unpopular, and the politicians who live by it generally despised. +When, therefore, the elections of last year were at hand, it seemed as +though this French increase of military power would be in jeopardy. +Luckily it was maintained, in spite of the opposition of fairly honest +but uncritical men like Jaurés, and of far less reputable professional +politicians. + +Whether this novel strain upon the French people could have been long +continued we shall never know, for, in the heat of the debates +provoked by this measure and its maintenance, came the last events +which determined the great catastrophe. + + +(6) THE IMMEDIATE OCCASION OF THE WAR. + +We have seen how constantly and successfully Austria had supported the +general Prussian thesis in Europe, and, in particular, the +predominance of the German Powers over the Slav. + +We have seen how, in pursuit of this policy, the sharpest friction was +always suffered at the danger-point of _Servia_. Servia was the Slav +State millions of whose native population were governed against their +will by Austro-Hungarian officials. Servia was the Slav State mortally +wounded by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And Servia was +the Slav State which Austria had in particular mortified by forbidding +her access to the Adriatic, and by imposing upon her an unnatural +boundary, even after her great victories of the Balkan War. + +The heir to the Hapsburgs--the man who, seeing the great age of his +uncle, might at any moment ascend the throne--was the Archduke +Francis. He had for years pursued one consistent policy for the +aggrandizement of his House, which policy was the pitting of the +Catholic Slavs against the Orthodox Slavs, thereby rendering himself +in person particularly odious to the Orthodox Serbs, so many of whose +compatriots and co-religionists were autocratically governed against +their will in the newly annexed provinces. + +To the capital of these provinces, Sarajevo, he proceeded in state in +the latter part of last June, and there, through the emissaries of +certain secret societies (themselves Austrian subjects, but certainly +connected with the population of independent Servia, and, as some +claimed, not unconnected with the Servian Government itself), he was +assassinated upon Saturday, the 28th of June, 1914. + +For exactly a month, the consequences of this event--the provocation +which it implied to Austria, the opportunity which it gave the +Hapsburgs for a new and more formidable expression of Germanic power +against the Slavs--were kept wholly underground. _That is the most +remarkable of all the preliminaries to the war._ There was a month of +silence after so enormous a moment. Why? In order to give Germany and +Austria a start in the conflict already long designed. Military +measures were being taken secretly, stores of ammunition overhauled, +and all done that should be necessary for a war which was premeditated +in Berlin, half-feared, half-desired in Vienna, and dated for the end +of July--after the harvest. + +The Government of Berlin was, during the whole of this period, +actively engaged in forcing Austria forward in a path to which she was +not unwilling; and, at last, upon the 23rd of July, Europe was amazed +to read a note sent by the Imperial Governor at Vienna to the Royal +Government in the Servian capital of Belgrade, which note was of a +kind altogether unknown hitherto in the relations between Christian +States. This note demanded not only the suppression of patriotic, and +therefore anti-Austrian, societies in Servia (the assassins of the +Crown Prince had been, as I have said, not Servian but Austrian +subjects), but the public humiliation of the Servian Government by an +apology, and even an issue of the order of the day to the Servian +Army, so recently victorious, abasing that army to the worst +humiliation. The note insisted upon a specific pledge that the Servian +Government should renounce all hope of freeing the Servian nation as a +whole from foreign government, and in many another clause subjected +this small nation to the most thorough degradation ever suggested by a +powerful European people towards a lesser neighbour. + +So far, though an extreme hitherto unknown in European history had +been reached, the matter was one of degree. Things of the same sort, +less drastic, had been known in the past. + +But what was novel in the note, and what undoubtedly proceeded from +the suggestion of the Prussian Government (which was in all this the +real agent behind Austria), _was the claim of the Austrian Government +to impose its own magistrates upon the Servian courts, and to condemn +at will those subjects of the Servian king and those officers holding +his commission whom Austria might select so to condemn, and that to +penalties at the goodwill and pleasure of Austria alone_. In other +words, Austria claimed full rights of sovereignty within the territory +of her small neighbour and enemy, and the acceptation of the note by +Servia meant not only the preponderance of Austria for the future over +the Slavs of the Balkans, but her continued and direct power over that +region in the teeth of national and religious sentiment, and in clean +despite of Russia. + +So strong was the feeling still throughout Europe in favour of +maintaining peace and of avoiding the awful crash of our whole +international system that Russia advised Servia to give way, and the +Germanic Powers were on the eve of yet another great success, far more +important and enduring than anything they had yet achieved. The only +reservation which Servia was permitted by the peaceful Powers of +Europe, and in particular by Russia, to make was that, upon three +points which directly concerned her sovereignty, Austria should admit +the decision of a Court of Arbitration at the Hague. But the +time-limit imposed--which was the extraordinarily short one of +forty-eight hours--was maintained by Austria, and upon the advice, as +we now know, of Berlin, no modification whatever in the demands was +tolerated. Upon the 25th, therefore, the Austrian Minister left +Belgrade. There followed ten days, the exact sequence of events in +which must be carefully noted if we are to obtain a clear view of the +origin of the war. + +Upon that same day, Saturday, July 25th, the English Foreign Office, +through Sir Edward Grey, suggested a scheme whereby the approaching +cataclysm (for Russia was apparently determined to support Servia) +might be averted. He proposed that all operations should be suspended +while the Ambassadors of Germany, Italy, and France consulted with him +in London. + +What happened upon the next day, Sunday, is exceedingly important. +The German Government refused to accept the idea of such a conference, +but at the same time the German Ambassador in London, Prince +Lichnowski, was instructed to say that the principle of such a +conference, or at least of mediation by the four Powers, was agreeable +to Berlin. _The meaning of this double move was that the German +Government would do everything it could to retard the entry into the +business of the Western Powers, but would do nothing to prevent +Russia, Servia, and the Slav civilization as a whole from suffering +final humiliation or war._ + +That game was played by Germany clumsily enough for nearly a full +week. Austria declared war upon Servia upon Monday the 27th; but we +now know that her intention of meeting Russia halfway, when she saw +that Russia would not retire, was stopped by the direct intervention +of the Prussian Government. In public the German Foreign Office still +pretended that it was seeking some way out of the crisis. In private +it prevented Austria from giving way an inch from her extraordinary +demands. And all the while Germany was secretly making her first +preparations for war. + +It might conceivably be argued by a special pleader that war was not +the only intention of Berlin, as most undoubtedly it had not been the +only intention of Vienna. Such a plea would be false, but one can +imagine its being advanced. What is not capable even of discussion is +the fact that both the Germanic Powers, under the unquestioned +supremacy of Prussia, _were_ determined to push Russia into the +dilemma between an impossible humiliation and defeat in the field. +They allowed for the possibility that she would prefer humiliation, +because they believed it barely possible (though all was ready for the +invasion of France at a moment already fixed) that the French would +again fail to support their ally. But war was fixed, and its date was +fixed, with Russia, or even with Russia and France, and the Germanic +Powers arranged to be ready before their enemies. In order to effect +this it was necessary to deceive the West at least into believing that +war could after all be avoided. + +One last incident betrays in the clearest manner how thoroughly +Prussia had determined on war, and on a war to break out at her own +chosen moment. It was as follows: + +As late as Thursday, the 30th of July, Austria was still willing to +continue a discussion with Russia. The Austrian Government on that day +expressed itself as willing to reopen negotiations with Russia. The +German Ambassador at Vienna got wind of this. He communicated it at +once to Berlin. _Germany immediately stopped any compromise, by +framing that very night and presenting upon the next day, Friday the +31st, an ultimatum to Russia and to France._ + +Now, the form of these two ultimata and the events connected with them +are again to be carefully noted, for they further illuminate us upon +the German plan. That to Russia, presented by the German Ambassador +Portales, had been prepared presupposing the just possible humiliation +and giving way of Russia; and all those who observed this man's +attitude and manner upon discovering that Russia would indeed fight +rather than suffer the proposed humiliation, agreed that it was the +attitude and manner of an anxious man. The ultimatum to France had, +upon the contrary, not the marks of coercion, but of unexpected and +violent haste. If Russia was really going to fight, what could Prussia +be sure of in the West? It was the second great and crude blunder of +Prussian diplomacy that, instead of making any efforts to detach +France from Russia, it first took the abandonment of Russia by France +for granted, and then, with extreme precipitancy, asked within the +least possible delay whether France would fight. That precipitancy +alone lent to the demand a form which ensured the exact opposite of +what Prussia desired. + +This double misconception of the effect of her diplomatic action +dates, I say, from Friday, the 31st of July, and that day is the true +opening day of the great war. Upon Sunday, the 2nd of August, the +German army violated the neutrality of Luxembourg, seizing the railway +passing through that State into France, and pouring into its neutral +territory her covering troops. On the same day, the French general +mobilization was ordered; the French military authorities having lost, +through the double action of Germany, about five days out of, say, +eleven--nearly half the mobilization margin--by which space of time +German preparations were now ahead of theirs. + +There followed, before the action state of general European conflict, +the third German blunder, perhaps the most momentous, and certainly +the most extraordinary: that by which Germany secured the hitherto +exceedingly uncertain intervention of England against herself. + +Of all the great Powers involved, Great Britain had most doubtfully to +consider whether she should or should not enter the field. + +On the one hand, she was in moral agreement with Russia and France; on +the other hand, she was bound to them by no direct alliance, and +successive British Governments had, for ten years past, repeatedly +emphasized the fact that England was free to act or not to act with +France according as circumstances might decide her. + +Many have criticized the hesitation, or long weighing of circumstance, +which astonished us all in the politicians during these few days, but +no one, whether friendly to or critical of a policy of neutrality, can +doubt that such a policy was not only a possible but a probable one. +The Parliamentarians were not unanimous, the opposition to the great +responsibility of war was weighty, numerous, and strong. The +financiers, who are in many things the real masters of our +politicians, were all for standing out. In the face of such a +position, in the crisis of so tremendous an issue, Germany, instead of +acting as best she could to secure the neutrality of Great Britain, +simply took that neutrality for granted! + +Upon one specific point a specific question was asked of her +Government. To Great Britain, as we have seen in these pages, the +keeping from the North Sea coast of all great hostile Powers is a +vital thing. The navigable Scheldt, Antwerp, the approaches to the +Straits of Dover, are, and have been since the rise of British +sea-power, either in the hands of a small State or innocuous to us +through treaty. Today they are the possession of Belgium, an +independent State erected by treaty after the great war, and +neutralized by a further guarantee in 1839. This neutrality of Belgium +had been guaranteed in a solemn treaty not only by France and England, +but by Prussia herself; and the British Government put to the French +and to the Germans alike the question whether (now they were at war) +that neutrality would be respected. The French replied in the +affirmative; the Germans, virtually, in the negative. But it must not +be said that this violation of international law and of her own word +by Germany automatically caused war with England. + +_The German Ambassador was not told that if Belgian territory was +violated England would fight_; he was only told that if that territory +were violated England _might_ fight. + +The Sunday passed without a decision. On Monday the point was, as a +matter of form, laid before Parliament, though the House of Commons +has no longer any real control over great national issues. In a speech +which certainly inclined towards English participation in the war +should Germany invade Belgium, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs +summed up the situation before a very full House. + +In the debate that followed many, and even passionate, speeches were +delivered opposing the presence of England in the field and claiming +neutrality. Some of these speeches insisted upon the admiration felt +by the speaker for modern Germany and Prussia; others the ill judgment +of running the enormous risk involved in such a campaign. These +protests will be of interest to history, but the House of Commons as a +whole had, of course, no power in the matter, and sat only to register +the decisions of its superiors. There was in the Cabinet resignation +of two members, in the Ministry the resignation of a third, the +threatened resignation of many more. + +Meanwhile, upon that same day, August 3rd, following with +superstitious exactitude the very hour upon which, on the very same +day, the French frontier had been crossed in 1870, the Germans entered +Belgian territory. + +The Foreign Office's thesis underlying the declaration of its +spokesman, Sir Edward Grey, carried the day with the politicians in +power, and upon Tuesday, August 4th, Great Britain joined Russia and +France, at war with the Prussian Power. There followed later the +formal declaration of war by France as by England against Austria, and +with the first week in August the general European struggle had +opened. + + + + +PART II. + +THE FORCES OPPOSED. + + +Here, then, at the beginning of August 1914, are the five great Powers +about to engage in war. + +Russia, France, and Great Britain, whom we will call the Allies, are +upon one side; the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, whom we will +call the Germanic Powers, are upon the other. + +We must at the outset, if we are to understand the war at all, see how +these two combatant groups stood in strength one against the other +when the war broke out. And to appreciate this contrast we must know +two things--their geographical situation, and their respective weight +in arms. For before we can judge the chances of two opponents in war, +we have to know how they stand physically one to the other upon the +surface of the earth, or we cannot judge how one will attack the +other, or how each will defend itself against the other. And we must +further be able to judge the numbers engaged both at the beginning of +the struggle and arriving in reinforcement as the struggle proceeds, +because upon those numbers will mainly depend the final result. + +Having acquired these two fundamental pieces of information, we must +acquire a third, which is _the theories of war_ held upon either side, +and some summary showing which of these theories turned out in +practice to be right, and which wrong. + +For, after a long peace, the fortune of the next war largely depends +upon which of various guesses as to the many changes that have taken +place in warfare and in weapons will be best supported by practice, +and what way of using new weapons will prove the most effective. Until +the test of war is applied, all this remains guess-work; but under the +conditions of war it ceases to be guess-work, and becomes either +corroborated by experience or exploded, as the case may be. And of two +opponents after a long peace, that one which has had the most +foresight and has guessed best what the effect of changes in armament +and the rest will effect in practice is that one who has the best +chance of victory. + +We are going, then, in this Second Part, of the little book, to see, +first, the geographical position of the belligerents; secondly, their +effective numbers; and, thirdly, what theories of war each held, and +how far each was right or wrong. + + +(1) THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE BELLIGERENTS. + +The position of the original belligerent countries (excluding Turkey) +upon the map of Europe was that which will be seen upon the +accompanying sketch map. + +Of this belligerent area, which is surrounded by a thick black line, +the part left white represents the territory of the Allies at the +origin of the war--Great Britain, France, Russia, and Servia. This +reservation must, however, be made: that in the case of Russia only +the effective part is shown, and only the European part at that; +Arctic Russia and Siberia are omitted. The part lightly shaded with +cross lines represents the Germanic body--to wit, the German Empire +and Austria-Hungary. + +1. The first thing that strikes the eye upon such a map is the great +size of the Germanic body. + +[Illustration: Sketch 4.] + +When one reads that "Germany" was being attacked by not only France +and England, but also Russia; when one reads further that in the Far +East, in Asia, Japan was putting in work for the Allies; and when one +goes on to read that Belgium added her effort of resistance to the +"German" invasion, one gets a false impression that one single nation +was fighting a vast coalition greatly superior to it. Most people had +an impression of that kind, in this country at least, at the outset of +the war. It was this impression that led to the equally false +impression that "Germany" must necessarily be beaten, and probably +quickly beaten. + +The truth was, of course, that we were fighting something very much +bigger than "Germany." We set out to fight something more than twice +as big as Germany in area, and very nearly twice as big as the German +Empire in mere numbers. For what we set out to fight was not the +German Empire, but the German Empire _plus_ the whole of the dominions +governed by the Hapsburg dynasty at Vienna. + +How weighty this Germanic body was geographically is still more +clearly seen if we remember that Russia north of St. Petersburg is +almost deserted of inhabitants, and that the true European areas of +population which are in conflict--that is, the fairly well populated +areas--are more accurately represented by a modification of the map +on page 81 in some such form as that on page 84, where the comparative +density of population is represented by the comparative distances +between the parallel cross-lines. + +2. The next thing that strikes one is the position of the neutral +countries. Supposing Belgium to have remained neutral, or, rather, to +have allowed German armies to pass over her soil without actively +resisting, the Germanic body would have been free to trade with +neutral countries, and to receive support from their commerce, and to +get goods through them over the whole of their western front, with the +exception of the tiny section which stands for the frontier common to +France and Germany. On the north, supposing the Baltic to be open, the +Germanic body had a vast open frontier of hundreds of miles, and +though Russia closed most of the eastern side, all the Roumanian +frontier was open, and so was the frontier of the Adriatic, right away +from the Italian border to Cattaro. So was the Swiss frontier and the +Italian. + +[Illustration: Sketch 5.] + +Indeed, if we draw the Germanic body by itself surrounded by a +frontier of dots, as in the accompanying sketch, and mark in a thick +line upon that frontier those parts which touched on enemy's +territory, and were therefore closed to supply, we shall be +immediately arrested by the comparatively small proportion of that +frontier which is thus closed. + +[Illustration: Sketch 6.] + +It is well to carry this in mind during the remainder of our study of +this war, because it has a great effect upon the fighting power of +Germany and Austria after a partial--but very partial--blockade is +established by the Allied and especially by the British naval power. + +3. The third thing that strikes one in such a map of the belligerent +area is the way in which the Germanic body stands in the middle facing +its two groups of enemies East and West. + + +_The Geographical Advantages and Disadvantages of the Germanic Body_. + +With this last point we can begin a comparison of the advantages and +disadvantages imposed by geographical conditions upon the two +opponents, and first of these we will consider the geographical +advantages and disadvantages of the Germanic body--that is, of the +Austrian and German Empires--passing next to the corresponding +advantages and disadvantages of the Allies. + +The advantages proceeding from geographical position to Germany in +particular, and to the Germanic body as a whole, gravely outweigh the +disadvantages. We will consider the disadvantages first. + +The chief disadvantage under which the Germanic body suffered in this +connection was that, from the outset of hostilities, it had to fight, +as the military phrase goes, upon two fronts. That is, the commanders +of the German and Austrian armies had to consider two separate +campaigns, to keep them distinct in their minds, and to co-ordinate +them so that they should not, by wasting too many men on the East or +the West, weaken themselves too much on the other side of the field. + +To this disadvantage some have been inclined to add that the central +position of Austria and Germany in Europe helped the British and +Allied blockade (I repeat, a very partial, timid, and insufficient +blockade) of their commerce. + +But this view is erroneous. The possibility of blockading +Austria-Hungary and Germany from imports across the ocean was due not +to their central but to their continental position; to the fact that +they were more remote from the ocean than France and Great Britain. It +had nothing to do with their central position between the two groups +of the Allies. + +Supposing, for instance, that Germany and Austria-Hungary had stood +where Russia stands, and that Western Europe had been in alliance +against them. Then they would have been in no way central; their +position would have been an extreme position upon one side; and yet, +so far as blockading goes, the blockade of them would have been +infinitely easier. + +Conversely, if Germany and Austria had been in the west, where Great +Britain and France are, their enemies lying to the east of them could +not have blockaded them at all. + +As things are the blockade that has been established exists but is +partial. As will be seen upon the following sketch map, the British +Fleet, being sufficiently powerful, can search vessels the cargoes of +which might reach the Germanic body directly through the Strait of +Gibraltar (1), the Strait of Dover (2), or the North Sea between +Scotland and Norway (3). But it is unable to prevent supplies reaching +the Germanic body from Italy, whether by land or by sea (4), or +through Switzerland (5), or through Holland (6), or through Denmark +(7), or across the frontier of Roumania (8); or, so long as the German +Fleet is strongest in the Baltic, by way of Norway and Sweden across +the Baltic (9). + +[Illustration: Sketch 7.] + +The blockading fleet is even embarrassed as to the imports the +Germanic body receives indirectly through neutral countries--that is, +imports not produced in the importing countries themselves, but +provided through the neutral countries as middlemen. + +It is embarrassed in three ways. + +(_a_) Because it does not want to offend the European neutral +countries, which count in the general European balance of power. + +(_b_) Because it does not wish to offend Powers outside Europe which +are neutral in this war, and particularly the United States. Such +great neutral Powers are very valuable not only for their moral +support if it can be obtained, but on account of their great financial +resources untouched by this prolonged struggle, and, what lies behind +these, their power of producing materials which the Allies need just +as much as Austria and Germany do. + +(_c_) Because, even if you watch the supplies of contraband to +neutrals, and propose to stop supplies obviously destined for German +use, you cannot prevent Germany from buying the same material "made +up" by the neutral: for example, an Italian firm can import copper ore +quite straightforwardly, smelt it, and offer the metal in the open +market. There is nothing to prevent a German merchant entering that +market and purchasing, unless Italy forbids all export of copper, +which it is perfectly free not to do. + +To leave this side question of blockade, and to return to the relative +advantages and disadvantages of our enemy's central position, we may +repeat as a summary of its disadvantages the single truth that it +compels our enemy to fight upon two fronts. + +All the rest is advantage. + +It is an advantage that Germany and Austria-Hungary, as a corollary to +their common central position, are in some part of similar race and +altogether of a common historical experience. For more than a hundred +years every part of the area dominated by the Germanic body--with the +exception of Bosnia and Alsace-Lorraine--has had a fairly intimate +acquaintance with the other part. The Magyars of Hungary, the Poles of +Galicia, of Posen, of Thorn, the Croats of the Adriatic border, the +Czechs of Bohemia, have nothing in race or language in common with +German-speaking Vienna or German-speaking Berlin. But they have the +experience of generations uniting them with Vienna and with Berlin. +In administration, and to some extent in social life, a common +atmosphere spreads over this area, nearly all of which, as I have +said, has had something in common for a hundred years, and much of +which has had something in common for a thousand. + +In a word, as compared with the Allies, the Germanic central body in +Europe has a certain advantage of moral homogeneity, especially as the +governing body throughout is German-speaking and German in feeling. + +That is the first point of advantage--a moral one. + +The second is more material. The Governments of the two countries, +their means of communication and of supply, are all in touch one with +another. Those governments are working in one field within a ring +fence, and working for a common object. They are not only spiritually +in touch; they are physically in touch. An administrator in Berlin can +take the night express after dinner and breakfast with his +collaborator in Vienna the next morning. + +It so happens, also, that the communications of the two Germanic +empires are exactly suited to their central position. There is +sufficient fast communication from north to south to serve all the +purposes necessary to the intellectual conduct of a war; there is a +most admirable communication from east to west for the material +conduct of that war upon two fronts. Whenever it may be necessary to +move troops from the French frontier to the Russian, or from the +Russian to the French, or for Germany to borrow Hungarian cavalry for +the Rhine, or for Austria to borrow German army corps to protect +Galicia, all that is needed is three or four days in which to entrain +and move these great masses of men. There is no area in Europe which +is better suited by nature for thus fighting upon two land frontiers +than is the area of the combined Austrian and German Empire. + +With these three points, then--the great area of our enemy in Europe, +his advantage through neutral frontiers, and his advantage in +homogeneity of position between distant and morally divided +Allies--you have the chief marks of the geographical position he +occupies, in so far as this is the great central position of +continental Europe. + +But it so happens that the Germanic body in general, and the German +Empire in particular, suffer from grave geographical disadvantages +attached to their political character. And of these I will make my +next points. + +The Germanic body as a whole suffers by its geographical disposition, +coupled with its political constitution, a grave disadvantage in its +struggle against the Allies, particularly towards the East, because +just that part of it which is thrust out and especially assailable by +Russia happens to be the part most likely to be disaffected to the +whole interests of the Germanic body; and how this works I will +proceed to explain. + +Here are two oblongs--A, left blank, and B, lightly shaded. Supposing +these two oblongs combined to represent the area of two countries +which are in alliance, and which are further so situated that B is the +weaker Power to the alliance both (1) in his military strength, and +(2) in his tenacity of purpose. Next grant that B is divided by the +dotted line, CD, into two halves--B not being one homogeneous State, +but two States, B1 and B2. + +Next let it be granted that while B1 is more likely to remain attached +in its alliance to A, B2 is more separate from the alliance in moral +tendency, and is also materially the weaker half of B. Finally, let +the whole group, AB, be subject to the attack of enemies from the +right and from the left (from the right along the arrows XX, and from +the left along the arrows YY) by two groups of enemies represented by +the areas M and N respectively. + +[Illustration: Sketch 8.] + +It is obvious that in such a situation, if A is the chief object of +attack, and is the Power which has both provoked the conflict and made +itself the chief object of assault by M and N, A is by this +arrangement in a position _politically_ weak. + +That is, the strategical position of A is gravely embarrassed by the +way in which his ally, B, separated into the two halves, B1 and B2, +stands with regard to himself. B2 is isolated and thrust outward. The +enemy, M, upon the right, attacking along the lines XX, may be able to +give B2 a very bad time before he gets into the area of B1, and long +before he gets into the area of the stronger Power, A. It is open to M +so to harass B2 that B2 is prepared to break with B1 and give up the +war; or, if the bond between B2 and B1 is strong enough, to persuade +B1 to give up the struggle at the same time that he does. And if B2 is +thus harassed to the breaking-point, the whole alliance, A plus B, +will lose the men and materials and wealth represented by B2, and +_may_ lose the whole shaded area, B, leaving A to support singly for +the future the combined attacks of M and N along the lines of attack, +XX and YY. + +Now, that diagram accurately represents the political embarrassment in +strategy of the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance. B1 is Austria and +Bohemia; B2 is Hungary; A is the German Empire; M is the Russians; N +is the Allies in the West. With a geographical arrangement such as +that of the Germanic alliance, a comparatively small proportion of the +Russian forces detached to harry the Hungarian plain can make the +Hungarians, who have little moral attachment to the Austrians and none +whatever to the Germans, abandon the struggle to save themselves; +while it is possible that this outlier, being thus detached, will drag +with it its fellow-half, the Austrian half of the dual monarchy, cause +the Government of the dual monarchy to sue for peace, and leave the +German Empire isolated to support the undivided attention of the +Russians from the East and of the French from the West. + +It is clear that if a strong Power, A, allied with and dependent for +large resources in men upon a weaker Power, B, is attacked from the +left and from the right, the ideal arrangement for the strong Power, +A, would be something in the nature of the following diagram (Sketch +9), where the weaker Power stands protected in the territory of the +stronger Power, and where of the two halves of the weaker Power, B2, +the less certain half, is especially protected from attack. + +[Illustration: Sketch 9.] + +Were Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Rhineland, upon the one +hand, the Hungarian plain, Russian Poland, and East Prussia, upon the +other hand, united in one strong, patriotic, homogeneous +German-speaking group with the Government of Berlin and the Baltic +plain, and were Bavaria, Switzerland, the Tyrol, Bohemia, to +constitute the weaker and less certain ally, while the least certain +half of that uncertain ally lay in Eastern Bohemia and in what is now +Lower Austria, well defended from attack upon the East, the conditions +would be exactly reversed, and the Austro-German alliance would be +geographically and politically of the stronger sort. As it is, the +combined accidents of geography and political circumstance make it +peculiarly vulnerable. + +[Illustration: Sketch 10.] + +Having already considered in a diagram the way in which the +geographical disposition of Austria-Hungary weakens Germany in the +face of the Allies, let us translate that diagram into terms of actual +political geography. These two oblongs, with their separate parts, +are, as a fact, as follows: Where A is the German Empire, the shaded +portion, B, is Austria-Hungary, and this last divided into B1, the +more certain Austrian part, and B2, the less certain exposed +Hungarian part, the latter of which is only protected from Russian +assault by the Carpathian range of mountains, CCC, with its passes at +DDD. M, the enemy on the right, Russia, is attacking the alliance, AB, +along XX; while the enemy on the left, N, France and her Allies, is +attacking along the lines YY. + +Hungary, B2, is not only geographically an outlier, but politically is +the weakest link in the chain of the Austro-Germanic alliance. The +area of Hungary is almost denuded of men, for most of these have been +called up to defend Germany, A, and in particular to prevent the +invasion of Germany's territory in Silesia at S. The one defence +Hungary has against being raided and persuaded to an already tempting +peace is the barrier of the Carpathian mountains, CCC. When or if the +passes shall be in Russian possession and the Russian cavalry reappear +upon the Hungarian side of the hills, the first great political +embarrassment of the enemy will have begun--I mean the first great +political embarrassment to his strategy. + +(_a_) Shall he try to defend those passes above all? Then he must +detach German corps, and detach them very far from the areas which are +vital to the core of the alliance--that is, to the German Empire, A. + +(_b_) Shall he use only Hungarian troops to defend Hungary? Then he +emphasizes the peculiar moral isolation of Hungary, and leaves her +inclined, if things go ill, to make a separate peace. + +(_c_) Shall he abandon Hungary? And let the Russians do what they will +with the passes over the Carpathians and raid the Hungarian plain at +large? Then he loses a grave proportion of his next year's wheat, much +of his dwindling horse supply, his almost strangled sources of petrol. +He tempts Roumania to come in (for a great sweep of Eastern Hungary is +nationally Roumanian); and he loses the control in men and financial +resources of one-half of his Allies if the danger and the distress +persuade Hungary to stand out. For the Hungarians have no quarrel +except from their desire to dominate the southern Slavs; to fight +Austria's battles means very little to them, and to fight Germany's +battles means nothing at all. + +There is, of course, much more than this. If Hungary dropped out, +could Austria remain? Would not the Government at Vienna, rather than +lose the dual monarchy, follow Hungary's lead? In that case, the +Germanic alliance would lose at one stroke eleven-twenty-fifths of its +men. It would lose more than half of its reserves of men, for the +Austrian reserve is, paradoxically enough, larger than the German +reserve, though not such good material. + +Admire how in every way this geographical and political problem of +Hungary confuses the strategical plan of the German General Staff! +They cannot here act upon pure strategics. They _cannot_ treat the +area of operations like a chessboard, and consider the unique object +of inflicting a military defeat upon the Russians. Their inability to +do so proceeds from the fact that this great awkward salient, +Hungarian territory, is not politically subject to Berlin, is not in +spiritual union with Berlin; may be denuded of men to save Berlin, and +is the most exposed of all our enemy's territory to attack. Throughout +the war it will be found that this problem perpetually presents itself +to the Great General Staff of the Prussians: "How can we save Hungary +without weakening our Eastern line? If we abandon Hungary, how are we +to maintain our effectives?" + +Such, in detail, is the political embarrassment to German strategy +produced by the geographical situation and the political traditions of +Hungary itself, and of Hungary's connection with the Hapsburgs at +Vienna. Let us now turn to the even more important embarrassment +caused to German strategy by the corner positions of the four +essential areas of German territory. + +This last political weakness attached to geographical condition +concerns the German Empire alone. + +Let us suppose a Power concerned to defend itself against invasion and +situated between two groups of enemies, from the left and from the +right, we will again call that Power A, the enemy upon the right M, +and the enemy upon the left N, the first attacking along the lines XX, +and the second along the lines YY. + +Let us suppose that A has _political_ reasons for particularly +desiring to save from invasion four districts, the importance of +which I have indicated on Sketch 12 by shading, and which I have +numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. + +[Illustration: Sketch 11.] + +Let us suppose that those four districts happen to lie at the four +exposed corners of the area which A has to defend. The Government of A +knows it to be essential to success in the war that his territory +should not be invaded. Or, at least, if it is invaded, it must not, +under peril of collapse, be invaded in the shaded areas. + +It is apparent upon the very face of such a diagram, that with the +all-important shaded areas situated in the corners of his +quadrilateral, A is heavily embarrassed. He must disperse his forces +in order to protect all four. If wastage of men compels him to +shorten his line on the right against M, he will be immediately +anxious as to whether he can dare sacrifice 4 to save 2, or whether he +should run the dreadful risk of sacrificing 2 to save 4. + +[Illustration: Sketch 12.] + +If wastage compels him to shorten his defensive line upon the left, he +is in a similar quandary between 1 and 3. + +The whole situation is one in which he is quite certain that a +defensive war, long before he is pushed to extremities, will compel +him to "scrap" one of the four corners, yet each one is, for some +political reason, especially dear to him and even perhaps necessary to +him. Each he desires, with alternating anxieties and indecisions, to +preserve at all costs from invasion; yet he cannot, as he is forced +upon the defensive, preserve all four. + +Here, again, the ideal situation for him would be to possess against +the invader some such arrangement as is suggested by Sketch 11. In +this arrangement, if one were compelled unfortunately to consider four +special districts as more important than the mass of one's territory, +one would have the advantage of knowing that they were clearly +distinguishable into less and more important, and the further +advantage of knowing that the more important the territory was, the +more central it was and the better protected against invasion. + +Thus, in this diagram, the government of the general oblong, A, may +distinguish four special zones, the protection of which from invasion +is important, but which vary in the degree of their importance. The +least important is the outermost, 1; the more important is an inner +one, 2; still more important is 3; and most important of all is the +black core of the whole. + +Some such arrangement has been the salvation of France time and time +again, notably in the Spanish wars, and in the wars of Louis XIV., and +in the wars of the Revolution. To some extent you have seen the same +thing in the present war. + +To save Paris was exceedingly important, next came the zone outside +Paris, and so on up to the frontier. + +But with the modern German Empire it is exactly the other way, and the +situation is that which we found in Sketch 12; the four external +corners are the essentials which must be preserved from invasion, and +if any one of them goes, the whole political situation is at once in +grave peril. + +The strategical position of modern Germany is embarrassed because each +of these four corners must be saved by the armies. 1 is +Belgium--before the war indifferent to Germany, but now destined to be +vital to her position--2 is East Prussia, 3 is Alsace-Lorraine, 4 is +Silesia, and the German commanders, as well as the German Government, +must remain to the last moment--if once they are thrown on the +defensive--in grave indecision as to which of the four can best be +spared when invasion threatens; or else, as is more probable, they +must disperse their forces in the attempt to hold all four at once. It +is a situation which has but rarely occurred before in the history of +war, and which has always proved disastrous. + +Germany then must--once she is in Belgium--hold on to Belgium, or she +is in peril; she must hold on to East Prussia, or she is in peril; she +must hold on to Alsace-Lorraine, or she is in peril; and she must hold +on to Silesia, or it is all up with her. If there were some common +strategical factor binding these four areas together, so that the +defence of one should involve and aid the defence of all, the +difficulties thus imposed upon German strategy would be greatly +lessened. Though even then the mere having to defend four outlying +corners instead of a centre would produce confusion and embarrassment +the moment numerical inferiority had appeared upon the side of the +defence. But, as a fact, there is no such common factor. +Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium, East Prussia and Silesia, stand +strategically badly separated one from the other. Even the two on the +East and the two on the West, though apparently forming pairs upon the +map, are not dependent on one system of communications, and are cut +off from each other by territory difficult or hostile, while between +the Eastern and the Western group there is a space of five hundred +miles. + +Let us, before discussing the political embarrassment to strategy +produced by these four widely distant and quite separate areas, +translate the diagram in the terms of a sketch map. + +On the following sketch map, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia, +and Silesia are shaded, as were the four corners of the diagram. No. 1 +is Belgium, 2 is East Prussia, 3 is Alsace-Lorraine, 4 is Silesia. The +area occupied by the German Empire, including its present occupation +of Belgium, is marked by the broad outline; and the areas shaded +represent, not the exact limits of the four territories that are so +important, but those portions of them which are essential: the +non-Polish portion of Silesia, the non-Polish portion of East Prussia, +the plain of Belgium, and all Alsace-Lorraine. + +[Illustration: Sketch 13.] + +Now the reason that each of these must at all costs be preserved from +invasion is, as I have said, different in each case, and we shall do +well to examine what those reasons are; for upon them depends the +political hesitation they inevitably, cause to arise in the plans of +the Great General Staff. + +1. _Belgium._ The military annexation of Belgium has been a result of +the war, and, from the German point of view, an unexpected result. +Germany both hoped and expected that her armies would pass through +Belgium as they did, in fact, pass through Luxembourg. The resistance +of Belgium produced the military annexation of that country; the reign +of terror exercised therein has immobilized about 100,000 of the +German troops who would otherwise be free for the front; the checking +of the advance into France has turned the German general political +objective against England, and, to put the matter in the vaguest but +most fundamental terms, the German mind has gradually come, since +October, to regard the retention of Belgium as something quite +essential. And this because:--(_a_) It gives a most weighty asset in +the bargaining for peace. (_b_) It gives a seaboard against England. +(_c_) It provides ample munition, house-room, and transport facility, +without which the campaign in North-eastern France could hardly be +prolonged. (_d_) It puts Holland at the mercy of Germany, for she can, +by retaining Belgium, strangle Dutch trade, if she chooses to divert +her carriage of goods through Belgian ports. (_e_) It is a specific +conquest; the Government will be able to say to the German people, "It +is true we had to give up this or that, but Belgium is a definite new +territory, the occupation of which and the proposed annexation of +which is a proof of victory." (_f_) The retention of Belgium has been +particularly laid down as the cause of quarrel between Great Britain +and Germany; to retain Belgium is to mark that score against what is +now the special enemy of Germany in the German mind. (_g_) Antwerp is +the natural port for all the centre of Europe in commerce westward +over the ocean. (_h_) With Belgium may go the Belgian colonies--that +is, the Congo--for the possession of which Germany has worked +ceaselessly year in and year out during the last fifteen years by a +steady and highly subsidized propaganda against the Belgian +administration. She has done it through conscious and unconscious +agents; by playing upon the cupidity of French and British +Parliamentarians, of rum shippers, upon religious differences, and +upon every agency to her hand. + +We may take it, then, that the retention of Belgium is in German eyes +now quite indispensable. "If I abandon Belgium," she says, "it is much +more than a strategic retreat; it is a political confession of +failure, and the moral support behind me at home will break down." + +If I were writing not of calculable considerations, but of other and +stronger forces, I should add that to withdraw from Belgium, where so +many women and children have been massacred, so many jewels of the +past befouled or destroyed, so wanton an attack upon Christ and His +Church delivered, would be a loss of Pagan prestige intolerably +strong, and a triumph of all that against which Prussia set out to +war. + +2. _Alsace-Lorraine._ But Alsace-Lorraine is also "indispensable." We +have seen on an earlier page what the retention of that territory +means. Alsace-Lorraine is the symbol of the old victory. It is the +German-speaking land which the amazingly unreal superstitions of +German academic pedantry discovered to be something sacredly necessary +to the unity of an ideal Germany, though the people inhabiting it +desired nothing better than the destruction of the Prussian name. It +is more than that. It is the bastion beyond the Rhine which keeps the +Rhine close covered; it is the two great historic fortresses of +Strassburg and Metz which are the challenge Germany has thrown down +against European tradition and the civilization of the West; it is +something which has become knit up with the whole German soul, and to +abandon it is like a man abandoning his title or his name, or +surrendering his sword. Through what must not the German mind pass +before its directors would consent to the sacrifice of such a +fundamentally symbolic possession? There is defeat in the very +suggestion; and the very suggestion, though it has already occurred to +the Great General Staff, and has already, I believe, been mentioned in +one proposal for peace, would be intolerable to the mass of the +enemy's opinion. + +3. _East Prussia._ East Prussia is sacred in another, but also an +intense fashion. It is the very kernel of the Prussian monarchy. When +Berlin was but a market town for the Electors of Brandenburg, those +same Electors had contrived that East Prussia, which was outside the +empire, should be recognized as a kingdom. Frederick the Great's +father, while of Brandenburg an Elector, was in Prussia proper a king, +a man who had emancipated that cradle of the Prussian power. The +province in all save its southern belt (which is Polish) is the very +essence of Prussian society: a mass of serfs, technically free, +economically abject, governed by those squires who own them, their +goods, and what might be their soil. The Russians wasted East Prussia +in their first invasion, and they did well though they paid so heavy a +price, for to wound East Prussia was to wound the very soul of that +which now governs the German Empire. When the landed proprietors fled +before the Russian invasion, and when there fled with them the +townsfolk, the serfs rose and looted the country houses. In a way +quite different from Belgium, quite different from Alsace-Lorraine, +East Prussia is essential. Forces will and must be sent periodically +to defend that territory, however urgently they may be needed +elsewhere, as the pressure upon Germany increases. The German +commanders, if they forget East Prussia for a moment in the +consideration of the other essential points, will, the moment their +eyes are turned upon East Prussia again, remember with violent emotion +all that the province means to the reigning dynasty and its +supporters, and they will do anything rather than let that frontier +go. The memory of the first invasion is too acute, the terror of its +repetition too poignant, to permit its abandonment. + +4. _Silesia._ Silesia, for quite other reasons (and remember that +these different reasons for defending such various points are the +essence of the embarrassment in which German strategy will find +itself), must be saved. It has been insisted over and over again in +these pages what Silesia means. Its meaning is twofold. If Silesia +goes, the safest, the most remote from the sea, the most independent +of imports of the German industrial regions, is gone. Silesia is, +again, the country of the great proprietors. Amuse yourselves by +remembering the names of Pless and of Lichnowsky. There are dozens of +others. But, most important of all, Silesia is what Belgium is not, +what Alsace-Lorraine is not, what East Prussia is not--it is the +strategic key. Who holds Silesia commands the twin divergent roads to +Berlin northwards, to Vienna southwards. Who holds Silesia holds the +Moravian Gate. Who holds Silesia turns the line of the Oder, and +passes behind the barrier fortresses which Germany has built upon her +Eastern front. Who holds Silesia strikes his wedge in between the +German-speaking north and the German-speaking south, and joins hands +with the Slavs of Bohemia. Not that we should exaggerate the Slav +factor, for religion and centuries of varying culture disturb its +unity. But it is something. The Russian forces are Slav; the +resurrection of Poland has been promised; the Czechs are not +submissive to the German claim of natural mastery, and whoever holds +Silesia throws a bridge between Slav and Slav if his aims are an +extension of power in that race. For a hundred reasons Silesia must be +saved. + + * * * * * + +Now put yourself in the position of the men who must make a decision +between these four outliers--Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia, +and Silesia--and understand the hesitation such divergent aims impose +upon them. Hardly are they prepared to sacrifice one of the four when +the defensive problem becomes acute, but its claims will be pressed in +every conceivable manner--by public sentiment, by economic +considerations, by mere strategy, by a political tradition, by the +influence of men powerful with the Prussian monarchy, whose homes and +wealth are threatened. "If I am to hold Belgium, I must give up +Alsace. How dare I do that? To save Silesia I must expose East +Prussia. How dare I? I am at bay, and the East must at all costs be +saved. I will hold Prussia and Silesia, but to withdraw from Belgium +and from beyond the Rhine is defeat." The whole thing is an embroglio. +That conclusion is necessary and inexorable. It would not appear at +all until, or if, numerical weakness imposed on the enemy a gradual +concentration of the defensive; but once that numerical weakness has +come, the fatal choices must be made. It may be that a strict, silent, +and virile resolution, such as saved France this summer, a +preparedness for particular sacrifices calculated beforehand, will +determine first some one retirement and then another. It may +be--though it is not in the modern Prussian temperament--that a +defensive as prolonged as possible will be attempted even with +inferior numbers, and that, as circumstances may dictate, +Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium, Silesia or East Prussia will be the first +to be deliberately sacrificed; but one must be, and, it would seem, +another after, and in the difficulty of choice a wound to the German +strategy will come. + +The four corners are differently defensible--Alsace-Lorraine and +Belgium only by artifice, and with great numbers of men; Silesia only +so long as Austria (and Hungary) stand firm. East Prussia has her +natural arrangement of lakes to make invasion tedious, and to permit +defence with small numbers. + +Between the two groups, Eastern and Western, is all the space of +Germany--the space separating Aberdeen from London. Between each part +of each pair, in spite of an excellent railway system, is the block in +the one case of the Ardennes and the Eifel, in the other of empty, +ill-communicated Poland. But each is strategically a separate thing; +the political value of each a separate thing; the embarrassment +between all four insuperable. + +Such is the situation imposed by the geography of the European +continent upon our enemies, with the opportunities and the drawbacks +which that situation affords and imposes. + +I repeat, upon the balance, our enemies had geographical opportunities +far superior to our own. + +Our power of partial blockade (to which I will return in a moment) is +more than counterbalanced by the separation which Nature has +determined between the two groups of Allies. The ice of the North, the +Narrows of the Dardanelles, establish this, as do the Narrows of the +Scandinavian Straits. + +The necessity of fighting upon two fronts, to which our enemies are +compelled, is more than compensated by that natural arrangement of the +Danube valley and of the Baltic plain which adds to the advantage of a +central situation the power of rapid communication between East and +West; while the chief embarrassment of our enemies in their +geographical arrangement, which is the outlying situation of Hungary +coupled with the presence of four vital regions at the four external +corners of the German Empire, is rather political than geographical in +nature. + +I will now turn to the converse advantages and disadvantages afforded +and imposed by geographical conditions upon the Allies. + + +_The Geographical Advantages and Disadvantages of the Allies._ + +It has been apparent from the above in what way the geographical +circumstance of Germany and Austria-Hungary advantaged and +disadvantaged those two empires in the course of a war against East +and West. + +Let us next see how the Allies were advantaged and disadvantaged by +their position. + +1. The first great disadvantage which the Allies most obviously suffer +is their separation one from the other by the Germanic mass. + +The same central position which gives Germany and Austria-Hungary +their power of close intercommunion, of exactly coordinating all their +movements, of using their armies like one army, and of dealing with +rapidity alternate blows eastward and westward, produces contrary +effects in the case of the Allies. Even if hourly communication were +possible by telegraph between the two main groups, French and Russian, +that would not be at all the same thing as personal, sustained, and +continuous contact such as is enjoyed by the group of their enemies. + +But, as a fact, even the very imperfect and indirect kind of contact +which can be established by telegraphing over great distances is +largely lacking. The French and the Russians are in touch. The +commanders can and do pursue a combined plan. But the communication of +results and the corresponding arrangement of new dispositions are +necessarily slow and gravely interrupted. Indeed, it is, as we shall +see in a moment, one of the main effects of geography upon this +campaign that Russia must suffer during all its early stages a very +severe isolation. + +In general, the Allies as a whole suffer from the necessity under +which they find themselves of working in two fields, remote the one +from the other by a distance of some six hundred miles, not even +connected by sea, and geographically most unfortunately independent. + +2. A second geographical disadvantage of the Allies consists in the +fact that one of them, Great Britain, is in the main a maritime Power. + +That this has great compensating advantages we shall also see, but for +the moment we are taking the disadvantages separately, and, so +counting them one by one, we must recognize that England's being an +island (her social structure industrialized and free from +conscription, her interests not only those of Europe but those of such +a commercial scattered empire as is always characteristic of secure +maritime Powers) produces, in several of its aspects, a geographical +weakness to the Allied position, and that for several reasons, which I +will now tabulate:-- + +(_a_) The position of England in the past, her very security as an +island, has led her to reject the conception of universal service. She +could only, at the outset of hostilities, provide a small +Expeditionary Force, the equivalent at the most of a thirtieth of the +Allied forces. + +(_b_) Her reserves in men who could approach the continental field in, +say, the first year, even under the most vigorous efforts, would never +reach anything like the numbers that could be afforded by a conscript +nation. The very maximum that can be or is hoped for by the most +sanguine is the putting into the field, after at least a year of war, +of less than three-sixteenths of the total Allied forces, although her +population is larger than that of France, and more than a third that +of the enemy. + +(_c_) She is compelled to garrison and defend, and in places to +police, dependencies the population of which will in some cases +furnish no addition to the forces of the Allies, and in all cases +furnish but a small proportion. + +(_d_) The isolation of her territory by the sea, coupled with her +large population and its industrial character, makes Britain +potentially the most vulnerable point in the alliance. + +So long as her fleet is certainly superior to that of the enemy, and +has only to meet oversea attack, this vulnerability is but little +felt; but once let her position at sea be lost, or even left +undecided, or once let the indiscriminate destruction of commercial +marine be seriously begun, and she is at the mercy of that enemy. For +she cannot feed herself save by supplies from without, and she cannot +take part in the supplying of armies with men and munitions upon the +continent. + +(_e_) She is open to fear aggression upon any one of her independent +colonies oversea, and yet she is not able to draw upon them for the +whole of their potential strength, or, indeed, for more than a very +small proportion of it. In other words, the British Fleet guarantees +some fifteen million of European race beyond the seas from attack by +the enemy, but cannot draw from these fifteen million more than an +insignificant fraction of the million of men and more which, fully +armed, they might furnish; nor has she any control over their finance, +so as to be able to count upon the full weight of their wealth; nor +can she claim their resources in goods and munitions. She can only +obtain these by paying for them. + +There is here a very striking contrast between her position and that +of the Germanic Powers. + +(_f_) Her isolation and maritime supremacy, coupled with her +industrial character, make her during the strain of equipment the +workshop of the Allies. That this is a great advantage is evident; but +the disadvantage attaching to it is that very large proportions of her +manhood are necessarily withdrawn from the field for the purposes of +her shipbuilding, her communications, her manufactory of arms and all +kinds of supplies, her seafaring work, both civil and military. + +Of the two other main Allies, the French disadvantage may be thus +summarized, and it is slight:-- + +(_a_) The French political frontier, as established since the defeat +of the French in 1871, is an open frontier. It has no natural features +upon which the defensive can rely. In the lack of this the French +fortified at very heavy expense that portion of their frontier which +faced their certain enemy, and established a line from Verdun to +Belfort calculated to check the first movement of his offensive. But +all the two hundred miles to the north of this, the whole line between +Verdun and the North Sea, was virtually open. There were, indeed, +certain fortified places upon that line, but they formed no +consecutive system, and, as their armaments grew old, they were not +brought up to date. The truth is, that the defence of France upon this +frontier was really left to the co-operation of Belgium. If, as was +believed to be almost certain, Prussian morals being what they are, +the Prussian guarantee to respect Belgian neutrality would be torn up +at the outbreak of war, then three great fortresses--Liége, Namur, and +Antwerp--would hold up the enemy's advance in this quarter, and +perform the function of delay which the obsolete armament of the +north-eastern French frontier could not perform. We shall see, when we +come to the conflicting theories of warfare held by the various +belligerents, what a grievous miscalculation this was, and how largely +it accounted for the first disasters of the war. But, at any rate, let +us remember, as our first point, the absence of any natural line of +defence in France as against a German invasion, remembering, also, +that the French would necessarily, at the beginning of any war, be +upon the defensive on account of their inferior numbers. Had France, +for instance, had along her frontiers, and just within them, such a +line as Germany possesses in the Rhine, she would have fallen back at +the outset upon that line. But she has no such advantage. + +(_b_) The second disadvantage of the French geographically is one +immixed with political considerations. The French have for centuries +produced, and have for two thousand years believed in, central +government. For at least three hundred years all the life of the +nation has centred upon Paris; all the railways and all the great +system of roads and most of the waterways of the north similarly have +Paris for their nucleus. Now, this central ganglion of the whole +French organism is but 120 miles from the frontier, ten days' easy +marching. An enemy coming in from the north-east not only finds no +natural obstacle in his way, but has Paris as nearly within his grasp +as, say, Cologne is within the grasp of a French invasion of North +Germany. This feature has had the most important consequences upon the +whole of French history. It was particularly the determining point of +1870. + +To meet the handicap, the French of our generation have combined two +policies. + +First, they have fortified the whole region of Paris so thoroughly +that it has sometimes been called "a fortified province;" an area of +nearly thirty miles across at its narrowest, and of something like +from seven to eight hundred square miles, is comprised within this +plan. + +The weakness of this in the face of modern fire will again be dealt +with when we come to the conflicting theories upon war established +during the long peace. + +Secondly, the French established a policy whereby, if Paris were +menaced in a future campaign, the Government should abandon that +central point, and, in spite of the grave inconvenience proceeding +from the way in which all material communications centred upon the +capital and all established offices were grouped there, would withdraw +the whole central system of government to Bordeaux, and leave Paris to +defend itself, precisely as though it were of no more importance than +any other fortified point. They would recognize the strategic values +of the district; they would deliberately sacrifice its political and +sentimental value. They would never again run the risk of losing a +campaign because one particular area of the national soil happened to +be occupied. The plans of their armies and the instructions of their +Staff particularly warned commanders against disturbing any defensive +scheme by too great an anxiety to save Paris. + +If this were the disadvantage geographically of France, what was that +of Russia? + +Russia's geographical disadvantage was twofold. First, she had no +outlet to an open sea in Europe save through the arctic port of +Archangel. This port was naturally closed for nearly half the year, +and how long it might be artificially kept partially open by +ice-breakers it remained for the war to prove. But even if it were +kept open the whole year in this precarious fashion, it lay on the +farther side of hundreds of miles of waste and deserted land connected +only with the active centre of Russia by one narrow-gauge line of +railway with very little rolling stock. The great eastern port of +Vladivostok was nearly as heavily handicapped, and its immense +distance from the scene of operations in the West, with which it was +only connected by a line six thousand miles long, was another +drawback. Russia might, indeed, by the favour of neutrals or of +Allies, use warm water ports. If the Turks should remain neutral and +permit supply to reach her through the Dardanelles, the Black Sea +ports were open all the year round, and Port Arthur (nearly as far off +as Vladivostok) was also open in the Far East. But the Baltic, in a +war with Germany, was closed to her. Certain goods from outside could +reach her from Scandinavia, round by land along the north of the +Baltic, but very slowly and at great expense. It so happened also +that, as the war proceeded, this question of supply became +unexpectedly important, because all parties found the expenditure of +heavy artillery high-explosive ammunition far larger than had been +calculated for, and Russia was particularly weak therein and dependent +upon the West. This disadvantage under which Russia lay was largely +the cause of her embarrassment, and of the prolongation of hostilities +in the winter that followed the declaration of war. + +The fact that Russia was ill supplied with railways, and hardly +supplied at all with hard roads (in a climate where the thaw turned +her deep soil into a mass of mud) is political rather than +geographical, but it must be remembered in connection with this +difficulty of supply. + +If these, then, were the various disadvantages which geographical +conditions had imposed upon the Allies, what were the corresponding +advantages? + +They were considerable, and may be thus tabulated:-- + +1. The western Allies stood between their enemies and the ocean. If +they could maintain superiority at sea through the great size and +efficiency of the British Fleet, and through its additional power when +combined with the French, they could at the least embarrass, and +perhaps ultimately starve out the enemy in certain essential materials +of war. They could not reduce the enemy to famine, for with care his +territories, so long as they were not ravaged, would be just +self-supporting. The nitrates for his explosives the enemy could also +command, and, in unlimited quantity, iron and coal. But the raw +material of textiles for his clothing, cotton for his explosives, +copper for his shell, cartridge cases, and electrical instruments, +antimony for the hardening of the lead necessary to his small-arm +ammunition, to some extent petrol for his aeroplanes and his +motor-cars, and india-rubber for his tyres and other parts of +machinery, he must obtain from abroad. That he would be able in part +to obtain these through the good offices of neutrals was probable; but +the Allied fleets in the West would certainly closely watch the extent +of neutral imports, and attempt, with however much difficulty and with +however partial success, to prevent those neutrals acting as a mere +highroad by which such goods could pass into Germany and Austria. They +would hardly allow, especially in the later phases of the war, Italy +and Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia, to act as open avenues for +the supply of the Germanic body. Though they would have to go warily, +and would find it essential to remain at peace with the nations whose +commerce they thus hampered and in some sense controlled, the Allies +in the West could in some measure, greater or less, embarrass the +enemy in these matters. + +Conversely, they could supply themselves freely with tropical and +neutral goods, and even with munitions of war obtained from across the +ocean, from Africa and from America. + +So long as North-western France and the ports of Great Britain were +free from the enemy this partial blockade would endure, and this +freedom of supply for France and Britain from overseas would also +endure. + +2. The Allies had further the geographical advantage of marine +transport for their troops--an important advantage to the French, who +had a recruiting ground in North Africa, and to the British, who had a +recruiting ground in their dominions oversea, and, above all, an +advantage in that it permitted the constant reinforcement of the +continental armies by increasing contingents arriving from these +islands. + + * * * * * + +Of geographical advantages attaching to the position of Russia only +one can be discovered, and it consists in the immense extent and unity +of the Russian Empire. This permitted operations upon a western front +from the Baltic to the Carpathians, or rather to the Roumanian border, +which vast line could never be firmly held against them by the enemy +when once the Russians had trained and equipped a superior number of +men. The German forces were sufficient, as events proved, long to +maintain a strict cordon upon the shorter front between the Swiss +frontiers and the sea, but upon the other side of the great field, +between the Baltic and the Carpathians, they could never hope to +establish one continued wall of resistance. + + +(2) THE OPPOSING STRENGTHS. + +When nations go to war their probable fortunes, other things being +equal, are to be measured in numbers. + +Other things being equal, the numbers one party can bring against the +other in men, coupled with the numbers of weapons, munitions, and +other material, will decide the issue. + +But in European civilization other things are more or less equal. +Civilian historians are fond of explaining military results in many +other ways, particularly in terms of moral values that will flatter +the reader. But a military history, however elementary, is compelled +to recognize the truth that normally modern war in Europe has followed +the course of numbers. + +Among the very first, therefore, of the tasks set us in examining the +great struggle is a general appreciation of the numbers that were +about to meet in battle, and of their respective preparation in +material. + +More than the most general numbers--more than brief, round +statements--I shall not attempt. I shall not do more than state upon +such grounds as I can discover proportions in the terms of single +units--as, to say that one nation stood to another in its immediate +armed men as eight to five, or as two to twenty. Neither shall I give +positive numbers in less than the large fractions of a million. But, +even with such large outlines alone before one, the task is +extraordinarily difficult. + +It will almost certainly be found, when full details are available +after the war, that the most careful estimates have been grievously +erroneous in some particular. Almost every statement of fact in this +department can be reasonably challenged, and the evidence upon matters +which in civilian life are amply recorded and easily ascertainable is, +in this department, everywhere purposely confused or falsified. + +To the difficulty provided by the desire for concealment necessary in +all military organization, one must add the difficulty presented by +the cross categories peculiar to this calculation. You have to +consider not only the distinction between active and reserve, but also +between men and munitions, between munitions available according to +one theory of war, and munitions available according to another. You +have to modify statical conclusions by dynamic considerations (thus +you have to modify the original numbers by the rate of wastage, and +the whole calculus varies progressively with the lapse of time as the +war proceeds). + +In spite of these difficulties, I believe it to be possible to put +before the general reader a clear and simple table of the numbers a +knowledge of which any judgment of the war involves, and to be fairly +certain that this table will, when full details are available, be +discovered not too inaccurate. + +We must begin by distinguishing between the two sets of numbers with +which we have to deal--the numbers of men, and the amount of munitions +which these men have to use. + +The third essential element, equipment, we need not separately +consider, because, when one says "men" in talking of military affairs, +one only means equipped, trained, and organized men, for no others can +be usefully present in the field. + +Let us start, then, with some estimate of the number of men who are +about to take part in battle; let us take for our limits the +convenient limits of a year, and let us divide that space of time +arbitrarily into three parts or periods. + +There was a first period in which the nations opposed brought into the +field the men available in the first few weeks for immediate action. +It is not possible to set a precise limit, and to say, "This period +covers the first six" or "the first eight weeks;" but we can say +roughly that, when we are speaking of this first period, we mean the +time during which men for whom the equipment was all ready, whose +progress and munitioning had all been organized, were being as rapidly +as possible brought into play. Such an estimate is not equivalent to +an estimate of the very first numbers that met in the shock of battle; +those numbers were far smaller, and differed according to the rate of +mobilization and the intention of the various parties. The estimate is +only that of the total number which the various parties could, and +therefore did, bring into play before men not hitherto trained as +soldiers, or trained but not believed to be required in the course of +the campaign--according as that campaign had been variously foreseen +by various governments--came in to swell the figures. + +The conclusion of this first period would come, of course, gradually +in the case of every combatant, and would come more rapidly in the +case of some than in the case of others. But we are fairly safe if we +take the general turning-point from the first period to the second to +be the month of October 1914. The second period had begun for +some--notably for Germany--with the first days of that month; it had +already appeared for all, especially for England, before the beginning +of November. + +The second period is marked for all the combatants by the bringing +into play of such forces as, for various reasons, the Government of +each had once hoped would not be required. The German Empire might +have marked them as not required, in the reasonable hope that victory +would be quickly assured. The British Government might, from a very +different standpoint, have believed them not to be required, because +it regarded the work of its continental Allies as sufficient to gain +the common object, etc. But in the case of all, however various the +motives, the particular mark of this second period is the straining to +put into the field newly trained and equipped bodies which in the +first period were, it was imagined, neither needed nor perhaps +available. + +This second period merges very gradually into the third, or final, +period, which is that of the last effort possible to the belligerents. +There comes a moment before the end of the first year when, in the +case of most of the belligerents, every man who is available at all +has been equipped, trained, and put forward, and after which there is +nothing left but the successive batches of yearly recruits growing up +from boyhood to manhood. + +Although Britain is in a peculiar position, and Russia, through her +tardiness in equipment, in a peculiar position of another kind, yet +one may fairly say that the vague margin between the second period of +growth and the third period of finality appears roughly somewhere +round the month of June. It will fall earlier with Germany, a good +deal earlier with France; but from the middle of May at earliest to +the end of June at latest may be said to mark the entry of the +numerical factor into its third and final phase. + +Let us take these three periods one by one. + +The first period is by far the most important to our judgment of the +campaign; a misapprehension of it has warped most political statements +made in this country, and most contemporary judgments of the war as a +whole. It is impossible to get our view of the great European +struggle--of its nature in the bulk--other than fantastically wrong, +if we misapprehend the opening numbers with which it was waged. + +There are three ways of getting at those numbers. + +The first and worst way is the consulting of general statistics +published before the war broke out. Thus we may see in almanacs the +French army put down as a little over four million, the German at the +same amount, the Russian at about five million, and so forth. + +These figures have no relation to reality, because they omit a hundred +modifying considerations--such as the age of the reserves, the degree +of training of the reserves, the organization prepared for the +enrolment of untrained men, etc. The only element in them which is of +real value is the statistics--when we can obtain them--of men actually +present with the colours before mobilization, to which one may add, +perhaps--or at any rate in the case of France and Germany--the numbers +of the _active_ reserve immediately behind the conscript army in +peace. + +The second method, which is better, but imperfect, is that which has +particularly appealed to technical writers. It consists in numbering +_units_; in noting the headquarters and the tale of army corps and of +independent divisions. + +The fault of this method is twofold. First, that only actual +experience can tell one whether units are really being maintained +during peace at full strength; and secondly, that only actual +experience discovers how many new units can and will be created when +war is joined. In other words, the fault of this method (necessary +though it is as an adjunct to all military calculations) lies in its +divorce from the reality of numbers. + +At the end of the retreat from Moscow each army corps of the Grand +Army still preserved its name, each regiment its nominal identity. And +the roll was called by Ney, for instance, before the Beresina, +division by division and regiment by regiment, and even in the +regiments company by company; but in most of these last there was no +one to answer, and there is a story of one regiment for which one +surviving man answered with regularity until he also died. What fights +is numbers of living men--not headings; and if five army corps are +present, each having lost two-fifths of its men, three full army corps +are a match for them. + +The third method is that of commonsense. We must deduce from the +results obtained, from the fronts covered, from the energy remaining +after known losses, from the reports of intelligence, from the avenues +of communication available, what least and what largest numbers can be +present. We must correct such conclusions by our previous knowledge of +the way in which each service regards its strength, which most depends +upon reserves, how each uses his depots and drafts, what machinery it +has for training the untrained and for equipping them. This +complicated survey taken, we can arrive at general figures.[1] + +Using that method, and applying it to the present campaign, I think we +shall get something like the following. + + +_The Figures of the First Period, say to October 1-31, 1914._ + +Germany put across the Rhine in the first period (without counting a +certain small proportion of Hungarian cavalry and Austrian artillery) +rather more than two and a quarter million men. She put into the +Eastern field first a quarter of a million, which rapidly grew to half +a million, and before the end of October to nearly a million; a +balance of rather more than another million she used for filling gaps +and for keeping her strength at the full, and also in particular +cases (as in her violent attempt to break out through Flanders, or +rather the beginning of that attempt) for the immediate reinforcement +of a fighting line. Say that Germany put into the field altogether +five million men in the first period, and you are saying too much. Say +that she put into the field altogether in the first period four and a +quarter million men, and you are saying probably somewhat too little. + +France met the very first shock with about a million men, which +gradually grew in the fighting line to about a million and a half. +Here the limit of the French force immediately upon the front will +probably be set. The numbers continued to swell long before the end of +the first period and well on into the second, but they were kept in +reserve. Counting the men drafted in to supply losses and the reserve, +it is not unwise to put at about two and a half million men the +ultimate French figure, of which one and a half million formed, before +the end of the first period, the immediate fighting force. + +Austria was ordered by the Germans to put into the field, as an +initial body to check any Russian advance and to confuse the beginning +of Russian concentration, about a million men; which in the first +period very rapidly grew to two million, and probably before the end +of the first period to about two million and a half. + +Russia put into the field during the first weeks of the war some +million and a quarter, which grew during the first period (that is, +before the coming of winter had created a very serious handicap, to +which allusion will presently be made) to perhaps two million and a +half at the very most. I put that number as an outside limit. + +Servia, of men actually present and able to fight, we may set down at +a quarter of a million; and Belgium, if we like, at one hundred +thousand--though the Belgian service being still in a state of +transition, and the degree of training very varied within it, that +minor point is disputable. Indeed it is better, in taking a general +survey, to consider only the five Great Powers concerned. + +Of these the fifth, Great Britain, though destined to exercise by sea +power and by her recruiting field a very great ultimate effect upon +the war, could only provide, in this first period upon the Continent, +an average of one hundred thousand men. To begin with, some +seventy-five thousand, dwindling through losses to little more than +fifty thousand, replenished and increased to about one hundred and +twenty-five thousand, and approaching, as the end of the first period +was reached, one hundred and fifty thousand men actually present upon +the front. + +We can now set down these figures in the shape of simple units, and +see how the numerical chances stood at the opening of the campaign. + +The enemy sets out with =32= men, of whom he bids =10= men against the +Russians, and sends =22= against the French. The Russians meet the +=10= men with about =12=, and the French meet the =22= with about +=10=; but as they have not the whole =22= to meet in the first shock, +they are struck rather in the proportion of =10= to =16= or =17=, +while the presence of the British contingent makes them rather more +than =10˝=. But these initial figures rapidly change with the growth +of the armies, and before the first period is over the Germans have +=22= in the West against =15= French and =1= British, making =16=; +while in the East the Russian =12= has grown to, say, =24=, but the +Austro-Germans in the East, against those =24=, have grown to be quite +=32=. And there is the numerical situation of the first period +clearly, and I think accurately, put, _supposing the wastage to be +equal in proportion throughout all the armies_. The importance of +appreciating these figures is that they permit us to understand why +the enemy was morally certain of winning, quite apart from his right +judgment on certain disputed theories of war (to which I shall turn in +a moment), and quite apart from his heavy secret munitioning, which +was of such effect in the earlier part of the campaign. He was ready +with forces which he knew would be overwhelming, and how superior he +was thus numerically in that first period can best be appreciated, I +think, by a glance at the diagram on the next page. + +[Illustration: Sketch 14.] + +It is no wonder that he made certain of a decisive success in the +West, and of the indefinite holding up or pushing back of the Russian +forces in the East. It is no wonder that he confidently expected a +complete victory before the winter, and the signing of peace before +the end of the year. To that end all his munitioning, and even the +details of his tactics, were directed. + + +_The Figures of the Second Period, say to April 15-June 1, 1915._ + +The second period saw in the West, and, in the enemy's case, a very +great change proceeding by a number of minute steps, but fairly rapid +in character. + +The French numbers could not grow very rapidly, because the French had +armed every available man. They could bring in a certain number of +volunteers; but neither was it useful to equip the most of the older +men, nor could they be spared from those duties behind the front line +which the much larger population of the enemy entrusted to men who, +for the most part, had received no regular training. The French did, +however, in this second period, gradually grow to some two and a half +million men, behind which, ready to come in for the final period, were +about a third of a million young recruits. + +Great Britain discovered a prodigious effort. She had already, +comparatively early in the second period, put across the sea nearly +half a million men, and drafts were perpetually arriving as the second +period came to a close; while behind the army actually upon the +Continent very large bodies--probably another million in +number--hastily trained indeed, and presented with a grave problem in +the matter of officering, but of excellent material and _moral_, were +ready to appear, before the end of the second period or at its close, +the moment their equipment should be furnished. Counting the British +effort and the French together, one may say that, without regard to +wastage, the Allies in the West grew in the second period from the +original 16 to over 30, and might grow even before the second period +was over to 35 or even more. + +On the enemy's side (neglecting wastage for the moment) there were the +simplest elements of growth. Each Power had docketed every untrained +man, knew his medical condition, where to find him, where and how to +train him. The German Empire had during peace taken about one-half of +its young men for soldiers. It had in pure theory five million +untrained men in the reserve, excluding the sick, and those not +physically efficient for service. + +In practice, however, a very large proportion of men, even of the +efficients, must be kept behind for civilian work; and in an +industrial country such as Germany, mainly urban in population, this +proportion is particularly large. We are safe in saying that the +German army would not be reinforced during the second period by more +than two and a half million men. These were trained in batches of some +800,000 each; the equipment had long been ready for them, and they +appeared mainly as drafts for filling gaps, but partly as new +formations in groups--the first going in or before November, the +second in or before February. A third and last group was expected to +have finished this rather elementary training somewhere about the end +of April, so that May would complete the second period in the German +forces. + +Austria-Hungary, by an easily appreciable paradox, possessed, though +but 80 per cent. of the Germans in population, a larger available +untrained reserve. This was because that empire trained a smaller +proportion of its population by far than did the Germans. It is +probable that Austria-Hungary was able to train and put forward during +the second period some three million men. + +It is a great error, into which most critics have fallen, to +underestimate or to neglect the Austro-Hungarian factor in the enemy's +alliance. Without thus nearly doubling her numbers, Germany could not +have fought France and Russia at all, and a very striking feature of +all the earlier weeks of 1915 was the presence in the Carpathians of +increasing Austro-Hungarian numbers, which checked for more than three +months all the Russian efforts upon that front. + +Say that Austria-Hungary nearly doubled her effectives (apart from +wastage) in this second period, and you will not be far wrong. + +Russia, which upon paper could almost indefinitely increase during the +second period her numbers in the field, suffered with the advent of +winter an unexpected blow. Her equipment, and in particular her +munitioning (that is, her provision of missiles, and in especial of +heavy shell), must in the main come from abroad. Now the German +command of the Baltic created a complete blockade on the eastern +frontier of Russia, save upon the short Roumanian frontier; and the +entry of Turkey into the campaign on the side of the enemy, which +marked the second period, completed that blockade upon the south, and +shut upon Russia the gate of the Dardanelles. The port of Archangel in +the north was ice-bound, or with great difficulty kept partially open +by ice-breakers, and was in any case only connected with Russia by one +narrow-gauge and lengthy line; while the only remaining port of +Vladivostok was six thousand miles away, and closed also during a part +of the winter. + +In this situation it was impossible for the great reserves of men +which Russia counted on to be put into the field, and the Russians +remained throughout the whole of this second period but little +stronger than they had been at the end of the first. If we set them +down at perhaps somewhat over three millions (excluding wastage) +towards the end of this second period, we shall be near to a just +estimate. + +We can now sum up and say that, _apart from wastage_, the forces +arrayed against each other after this full development should have +been about 120 men for the central powers of the enemy--35 (and +perhaps ultimately 40) men against them upon the West, and, until +sufficient Russian equipment could at least be found, only some 30 men +against them upon the East. + +Luckily such figures are wholly changed by the enormous rate of the +enemy's wastage. The Russians had lost men almost as rapidly as the +enemy, but the Russian losses could be and were made good. The +handicap of the blockade under which Russia suffered permitted her to +maintain only a certain number at the front, but she could continually +draft in support of those numbers; and though she lost in the first +seven months of the war quite four hundred thousand in prisoners, and +perhaps three-quarters of a million in other casualties, her strength +of somewhat over three millions was maintained at the close of the +first period. + +In the same way drafts had further maintained the British numbers. The +French had lost not more than one-fifth of a million in prisoners, and +perhaps a third of a million or a little more in killed and +permanently disabled--that is, unable to return to the fighting line. +In the case of both the French and the British sanitary conditions +were excellent. + +You have, then, quite 35 for your number in the West, and quite 33 for +your number in the East of the Allied forces at the end of the winter; +but of your enemy forces you may safely deduct 45-50 might be a truer +estimate; and it is remarkable that those who have watched the matter +carefully at the front are inclined to set the total enemy losses +higher than do the critics working at home. But call it only 45 (of +which 5 are prisoners), and you have against the 68 Allies in East and +West no more at the end of this second period than 75 of the enemy. + +The following diagram illustrates in graphic form the change that six +months have produced. + +[Illustration: Sketch 15.] + +In other words, at the end of the winter and with the beginning of the +spring, although the enemy still has a numerical preponderance, it is +no longer the overwhelming thing it was when the war began, and that +change in numbers explains the whole change in the campaign. + +The enemy was certain of winning mainly because he was fighting more +than equal in the East, and at first nearly two to one, later quite +four to three, in the West. Those are the conditions of the late +summer of 1914. 1915, before it was a third over, had seen the numbers +nearly equalized. With the summer of 1915 we might hope to see the +numbers at last reversed, and, after so many perilous months, a total +(not local) numerical majority at last appearing upon the side of the +Allies. If ever this condition shall arrive before the enemy can +accomplish a decisive result in either field the tide will have +turned. + +The third period belongs at the moment of writing to the future. All +we can say of it is that it presents for the enemy no considerable +field of recruitment; but while in the West it offers no increase to +the French, it does offer another five units at least, and possibly +another six or eight, to the British; and to the Russians, if the +blockade can be pierced at any point, or if the change of weather, +coupled with the broadening of the gauge of the railway to Archangel, +permits large imports, an almost indefinite increase in +number--certainly an increase of two millions, or twenty of the units +we were dealing with in the figures given above. + +So much, then, for the numerical factor in men which dominates the +whole campaign. + +When we turn from this to the second factor--that of munitions--we +discover something which can be dealt with far more briefly, but which +follows very much the same line. + +The enemy in the first period of the war had, if anything, an even +greater superiority in munitioning than in men. This superiority was +due to two distinct causes. In the first place, as we shall see in a +few pages, his theory upon a number of military details was well +founded; in the second place, _he made war at his own chosen moment, +after three years of determined and largely secret preparation_. + +As to the first point:-- + +We may take as a particular example of these theories of war the +enemies' reliance upon heavy artillery--and in particular upon the +power of the modern high explosive and the big howitzer--to destroy +permanent fortification rapidly, and to have an effect in the field, +particularly in the preparation of an assault, which the military +theories of the Allies had wrongly underestimated. It is but one +example out of many. It must serve for the rest, and it will be dealt +with more fully in the next section. The Germans to some extent, and +much more the Austrians, prepared an immensely greater provision of +heavy ammunition than their opponents, and entered the field with +large pieces of a calibre and in number quite beyond anything that +their opponents had at the outset of the campaign. + +As to the second point:-- + +No peaceful nations, no nations not designing a war at their own hour, +lock up armament which may be rendered obsolete, or, in equipment more +extensive than the reasonable chances of a campaign may demand, the +public resources which it can use on what it regards as more useful +things. Such nations, to use a just metaphor, "insure" against war at +what they think a reasonable rate. But if some one Government in +Europe is anarchic in its morals, and proposes, while professing +peace, to declare war at an hour and a day chosen by itself, it will +obviously have an overwhelming advantage in this respect. The energy +and the money which it devotes to the single object of preparation +cannot possibly be wasted; and, if its sudden aggression is not fixed +too far ahead, will not run the risk of being sunk in obsolete +weapons. + +Now it is clearly demonstrable from the coincidence of dates, from the +exact time required for a special effort of this kind, and from the +rate at which munitions and equipment were accumulated, that the +Government at Berlin came to a decision in the month of July 1911 to +force war upon Russia and upon France immediately after the harvest of +1914; and of a score of indications which all converge upon these +dates, not one fails to strike them exactly by more than a few weeks +in the matter of preparation, by more than a few days in the date at +which war was declared. + +Under those circumstances, Berlin with her ally at Vienna had the +immense numerical advantage over the French and the Russians when war +was suddenly forced upon those countries on the 31st of July last +year. + +But, as in the case of men, the advantage would only be overwhelming +during the first period. The very fact that the war had to be won +quickly involved an immense expenditure of heavy ammunition in the +earlier part of it, and this expenditure, if it were not successful, +would be a waste. + +It takes about five months to produce a heavy piece, and the rate of +production of heavy ammunition, though slow, is measurable. At the +moment of writing this, towards the close of the second period, the +balance is not yet redressed, but it is in a fair way to be redressed. +The imperfect and too tardy blockade to which the enemy is somewhat +timidly subjected is a factor in aid of this; and we may be fairly +confident that, if a third period is reached before the enemy shall +have the advantage of a decision, there will be a preponderance of +munitioning upon the Allied side in the West and the East which will +be, if anything, of superior importance to the approaching +preponderance in numbers. + +Having thus briefly surveyed the opposing strength of either +combatant, checked and measured as it varied with the progress of the +war, we will turn to the _moral_ opposition of military theory +between the one party and the other, and show how here again that, +_save in the most important matter of all, grand strategy_, the enemy +was on the highroad to the victory which he confidently and, for that +matter, reasonably expected. + + +(3) THE CONFLICTING THEORIES OF WAR. + +The long peace which the most civilized parts of Europe had enjoyed +for now a generation left more and more uncertain the value of +theories upon the conduct of war, which theories had for the most part +developed as mere hypotheses untested by experience during that +considerable period. The South African and the Manchurian war had +indeed proved certain theories sound and others unsound, so far as +their experience went; but they were fought under conditions very +different from those of an European campaign, and the progress of +material science was so rapid in the years just preceding the great +European conflict that the mass of debated theories still remained +untried at its outbreak. + +The war in its first six months thoroughly tested these theories, and +proved, for the greater part of them, which were sound in practice and +which unsound. I will tabulate them here, and beg the special +attention of the reader, because upon the accuracy of these forecasts +the first fortunes of the war depended. + +I. A German theory maintained that, with the organization of and the +particular type of discipline in the German service, attacks could be +delivered in much closer formation than either the French or the +English believed to be possible. + +The point is this: After a certain proportion of losses inflicted +within a certain limit of time, troops break or are brought to a +standstill. That was the universal experience of all past war. When +the troops that are attacking break or are brought to a standstill, +the attack fails. But what you cannot determine until you test the +matter in actual war is what numbers of losses in what time will thus +destroy an offensive movement. You cannot determine it, because the +chief element in the calculation is the state of the soldier's mind, +and that is not a measurable thing. One had only the lessons of the +past to help one. + +The advantages of attacking in close formation are threefold. + +(_a_) You launch your attack with the least possible delay. It is +evident that spreading troops out from the column to the line takes +time, and that the more extended your line the more time you consume +before you can strike. + +[Illustration: Sketch 16.] + +If I have here a hundred units advancing in a column towards the place +where they are to attack (and to advance in column is necessary, +because a broad line cannot long keep together), then it is evident +that if I launched them to the attack thus:-- + +[Illustration: Sketch 17.] + +packed close together, I get them into that formation much more +quickly than if, before attacking, I have to spread them out thus:-- + +[Illustration: Sketch 18.] + +(_b_) The blow which I deliver has also evidently more weight upon it +at a given point. If I am attacking a hundred yards of front with a +hundred units of man and missile power, I shall do that front more +harm in a given time than if I am attacking with only fifty such +units. + +(_c_) In particular circumstances, where troops _have_ to advance on a +narrow front, as in carrying a bridge or causeway or a street or any +other kind of defile, my troops, if they can stand close formation and +the corresponding punishment it entails, will be more likely to +succeed than troops not used to or not able to bear such close +formation. Now, such conditions are very numerous in war. Troops are +often compelled, if they are to succeed, to rush narrow gaps of this +kind, and their ability to do so is a great element in tactical +success. + +I have here used the phrase "if they can stand close formation and the +corresponding punishment it entails," and that is the whole point. +There are circumstances--perhaps, on the whole, the most numerous of +all the various circumstances in war--in which close formation, if it +can be used, is obviously an advantage; but it is equally self-evident +that the losses of troops in close formation will be heavier than +their losses in extended order. A group is a better target than a +number of dispersed, scattered points. + +Now, the Germans maintained in this connection not only, as I have +said, that they could get their men to stand the punishment involved +in close formation, but also that:-- + +(_a_) The great rapidity of such attacks would make the _total_ and +_final_ wastage less than was expected, and further:-- + +(_b_) That the heavy wastage, such as it was, was worth while, because +it would lead to very rapid strategical decision as well as tactical. +In other words, because once you had got your men to stand these heavy +_local_ losses and to suffer heavy _initial_ wastage, you would win +your campaign in a short time, so that the high-rate wastage not being +prolonged need not be feared. + +Well, in the matter of this theory, the war conclusively proved the +following points:-- + +(_a_) The Germans were right and the Allies were wrong with regard to +the mere possibility of using close formations. The German temper, +coupled with the type of discipline in the modern German service, did +prove capable of compelling men to stand losses out of all proportion +to what the Allies expected they could stand, and yet to continue to +advance neither broken nor brought to a standstill. But-- + +(_b_) The war also proved that, upon the whole, and taking the +operations in their entirety, such formations were an error. In case +after case, a swarm of Germans advancing against inferior numbers got +home after a third, a half, or even more than a half of their men had +fallen in the first few minutes of the rush. But in many, many more +cases this tactical experiment failed. Those who can speak as +eye-witnesses tell us that, though the occasions on which such attacks +actually broke were much rarer than was expected before the war began, +yet the occasions on which the attack was thrown into hopeless +confusion, and in which the few members of it that got home had lost +all power to do harm to the defenders, were so numerous that the +experiment must be regarded as, upon the whole, a failure. It may be +one that no troops but Germans could employ. It is certainly not one +which any troops, after the experience of this war, will copy. + +(_c_) Further, the war proved even more conclusively that the wastage +was not worth while. The immense expense in men only succeeded where +there was an overwhelming superiority in number. The strategical +result was not arrived at quickly (as the Germans had expected) +through this tactical method, and after six months of war, the enemy +had thrown away more than twice and nearly three times as many men as +he need have sacrificed had he judged sanely the length of time over +which operations might last. + +II. Another German theory had maintained that modern high explosives +fired from howitzers and the accuracy of their aim controlled by +aircraft would rapidly and promptly dominate permanent fortification. + +This theory requires explanation. Its partial success in practice was +the most startling discovery and the most unpleasant one to the Allies +of the early part of the war. + +In the old days, say up to ten years ago or less, permanent +fortification mounting heavy guns was impregnable to direct assault if +it were properly held and properly munitioned. It could hold out for +months. Its heavy guns had a range superior to any movable guns that +could be brought against it--indeed, so very heavily superior that +movable guns, even if they were howitzers, would be smashed or their +crews destroyed long before the fortress was seriously damaged by +them. + +A howitzer is but a form of mortar, and all such pieces are designed +to lob a projectile instead of throwing it. The advantage of using +these instruments when you are besieging permanent works is that you +can hide them behind an obstacle, such as a hill, and that the heavy +gun in the fortress cannot get its shell on to them because that shell +has a flatter trajectory. The disadvantage is that the howitzer has a +very much shorter range than the gun size for size. + +[Illustration: Sketch 19.] + +Here is a diagram showing how necessarily true this is. The howitzer, +lobbing its shell with a comparatively small charge, has the advantage +of being able to hide behind a steep bit of ground, but on such a +trajectory the range is short. The gun in the fortress does not lob +its shell, but throws it. The course of the gun shell is much more +straight. It therefore can only hit the howitzer and its crew +indirectly by exploding its shell just above them. Until recently, the +gun was master of the howitzer for three reasons:-- + +First, because the largest howitzers capable of movement and of being +brought up against any fortress and shifted from one place of +concealment to another were so small that their range was +insignificant. Therefore the circumference on which they could be used +was also a small one; their opportunities for hiding were consequently +reduced; the chances of their emplacement being immediately spotted +from the fortress were correspondingly high, and the big gun in the +fortress was pretty certain to overwhelm the majority of them at least. +It is evident that the circumference {~GREEK SMALL LETTER +ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~} offers +far more chances of hiding than the circumference ABC, but a still more +powerful factor in favour of the new big howitzer is the practical one +that at very great ranges in our climate the chances of spotting a +particular place are extremely small. Secondly, because the explosives +used, even when they landed and during the short time that the howitzer +remained undiscovered and unheard, were not sufficiently powerful nor, +with the small howitzers then in existence, sufficiently large in +amount in each shell to destroy permanent fortification. Thirdly, +because the effect of the aim is always doubtful. You are firing at +something well above yourself, and you could not tell very exactly +where your howitzer shell had fallen. + +[Illustration: Sketch 20.] + +What has modified all this in the last few years is-- + +First, the successful bringing into the field of very large howitzers, +which, though they do lob their shells, lob them over a very great +distance. The Austrians have produced howitzers of from 11 to 12 +inches in calibre, which, huge as they are, can be moved about in the +field and fired from any fairly steady ground; and the Germans have +probably produced (though I cannot find actual proof that they have +used them with effect) howitzers of more than 16 inches calibre, to be +moved, presumably, only upon rails. But 11-inch was quite enough to +change all the old conditions. It must be remembered that a gun varies +as the _cube_ of its calibre. A 12-inch piece is not twice as powerful +as a 6-inch. It is _eight times_ as powerful. The howitzer could now +fire from an immense distance. The circumference on which it worked +was very much larger; its opportunities for finding suitable steep +cover far greater. Its opportunities for moving, if it was endangered +by being spotted, were also far greater; and the chances of the gun in +the fortress knocking it out were enormously diminished. + +Secondly, the high explosives of recent years, coupled with the vast +size of this new mobile howitzer shell, is capable, when the howitzer +shell strikes modern fortification, of doing grievous damage which, +repeated over several days, turns the fort into a mass of ruins. + +Thirdly, the difficulty of accurate aiming over such distances and of +locating your hits so that they destroy the comparative small area of +the fort is got over by the use of aircraft, which fly above the fort, +note the hits, and signal the results. + +Now, the Germans maintained that under these quite recently modified +conditions not even the best handled and heaviest gunned permanent +fort could hold out more than a few days. The French believed that it +could, and they trusted in the stopping power not only of individual +works (such as the fortress of Manonvilliers on the frontier), but +more especially of great rings of forts, such as surround Liége, +Namur, Verdun, etc., and enclose an area within the security of which +large bodies of troops can be held ready, armies which no one would +dare to leave behind them without having first reduced them to +surrender. + +The very first days of the war proved that the German theory was right +and the French wrong. The French theory, upon which such enormous +funds had been expended, had been perfectly right until within quite +recent years the conditions had changed. Port Arthur, for instance, +only ten years ago, could hold out for months and months. In this war +no individual fort has held out for more than eleven days. + +It might be imagined under such circumstances that the very existence +of fortresses was doomed; yet we note that Verdun continues to make a +big bulge in the German line four months after the first shots fell on +its forts, and that the Germans are actively restoring the great +Belgian rings they have captured at Liége, Antwerp, and Namur. + +Why is this? It is because another German theory has proved right in +practice. + +III. This German theory which has proved right in practice is what may +be called "the mobile defence of a fortress." It proposes no longer to +defend upon expensive permanent works precisely located upon the map, +but upon a number of improvised batteries in which heavy guns can move +somewhat behind field-works concealed as much as possible, numerous +and constructed rapidly under the conditions of the campaign. Such +works dotted round the area you desire to defend are quite a different +thing to reduce from isolated, restricted, permanent forts. In the +first place, the enemy does not know where they are; in the second +place, you can make new ones at short notice; in the third place, if a +howitzer does spot your heavy gun, you can move it or its neighbours +to a new position; in the fourth place, the circumference you are +defending is much larger, and the corresponding area that the +besiegers have to search with their fire more extended. Thus, in the +old forts round Verdun, about a dozen permanent works absolutely fixed +and ascertainable upon the map, and covering altogether but a few +acres, constituted the defence of the town. Before September was out +the heavy guns had been moved to trenches far advanced into the field +to the north and east, temporary rails had been laid down to permit +their lateral movement--that is, to let them shift from a place where +they had perhaps been spotted to a new place, under cover of darkness, +and the sectors thus thrown out in front of the old fortifications in +this improvised mobile fashion were at least three times as long as +the line made by the ring of old forts, while the area that had to be +searched was perhaps a hundred times as large. For in the place of the +narrowly restricted permanent fort, with, say, ten heavy guns, you had +those same ten heavy guns dotted here and there in trenches rapidly +established in half a dozen separate, unknown, and concealed spots, +along perhaps a mile of wooded hill, and free to operate when moved +over perhaps double that front. + +IV. _In Grand Strategy a German general theory of strategics was +opposed to a French general theory of strategics, and upon which of +the two should prove right depended, much more than on any of the +previous points, the ultimate issue of the campaign._ + +This is far the most important point for the reader's consideration. +It may be said with justice that no one can understand this war who +has not grasped the conflict between these two fundamental conceptions +of armed bodies in action, and the manner in which (by the narrowest +and most fortunate margin!) events in the first phase of the war +justified the French as against the German school. + +I must therefore beg the reader's leave to go somewhat thoroughly into +the matter, for it is the foundation of all that will follow when we +come to the narration of events and the story of the Western battle +which began in the retreat from the Sambre and ended in the Battle of +the Marne. + +The first postulate in all military problems is that, other things +being equal, numbers are the decisive factor in war. This does not +mean that absolute superiority of numbers decides a campaign +necessarily in favour of the superior power. What it means is that _in +any particular field_, if armament and discipline are more or less +equal on the two sides, the one that has been able to mass the greater +number _in that field_ will have the victory. He will disperse or +capture his enemy, or at the least he will pin him and take away his +_initiative_--of which word "initiative" more later. Now, this field +in which one party has the superior numbers can only be a portion of +the whole area of operations. But if it is what is called the decisive +portion, then he who has superior numbers _in the decisive time and +place_ will win not only there but everywhere. His local victory +involves consequent success along the whole of his line. + +For instance, supposing five men are acting against three. Five is +more than three; and if the forces bear upon each other equally, the +five will defeat the three. But if the five are so badly handled that +they get arranged in groups of two, two, and one, and if the three are +so well handled that they strike swiftly at the first isolated two and +defeat them, thus bringing up the next isolated two, who are in their +turn defeated, the three will, at the end of the struggle, have only +one to deal with, and the five will have been beaten by the three +because, although five is larger than three, yet _in the decisive time +and place_ the three never have more than two against them. It may be +broadly laid down that the whole art of strategics consists for the +man with superior numbers in bringing all his numbers to bear, and for +the man with inferior numbers in attempting by his cunning to compel +his larger opponent to fight in separated portions, and to be defeated +in detail. + +As in every art, the developments of these elementary first principles +become, with variations of time and place, indefinitely numerous and +various. Upon their variety depends all the interest of military +history. And there is one method in particular whereby the lesser +number may hope to pin and destroy the power of the greater upon which +the French tradition relied, and the value of which modern German +criticism refused. + +Before going into that, however, we must appreciate the mental +qualities which led to the acceptance of the theory upon the one side +and its denial upon the other. + +The fundamental contrast between the modern German military temper and +the age-long traditions of the French service consists in this: That +the German theory is based upon a presumption of superiority, moral, +material, and numerical. The theory of the French--as their national +temperament and their Roman tradition compel them--is based upon an +_envisagement_ of inferiority: moral, material, and numerical. + +There pervades the whole of the modern German strategic school this +feeling: "I shall win if I act and feel as though I was bound to win." +There pervades the whole French school this sentiment: "I have a +better chance of winning if I am always chiefly considering how I +should act if I found myself inferior in numbers, in material, and +even in moral at any phase in the struggle, especially at its origins, +but even also towards its close." + +This contrast appears in everything, from tactical details to the +largest strategical conception, and from things so vague and general +as the tone of military writings, to things so particular as the +instruction of the conscript in his barrack-room. The German soldier +is taught--or was--that victory was inevitable, and would be as swift +as it would be triumphant: the French soldier was taught that he had +before him a terrible and doubtful ordeal, one that would be long, one +in which he ran a fearful risk of defeat, and one in which he might, +even if victorious, have to wear down his enemy by the exercise of a +most burdensome tenacity. In the practice of the field, the contrast +appeared in the French use of a great reserve, and the German contempt +for such a precaution: in the elaborate thinking out of the use of a +reserve, which is the core of French military thought; in the +superficial treatment of the same, which is perhaps the chief defect +of Germany. + +It would be of no purpose to debate here which of these two mental +attitudes, with all their consequences, is either morally the better +or in practice the more successful. The French and Latin tradition +seems to the German pusillanimous, and connected with that decadence +which he perceives in every expression of civilization from Athens to +Paris. The modern German conception seems to the French theatrical, +divorced from reality, and hence fundamentally weak. Either critic may +be right or either wrong. Our interest is to follow the particular +schemes developing from that tone of mind. We shall see how, in the +first phases of the war, the German conception strikingly justified +itself for more than ten days; how, after a fortnight, it was +embarrassed by its opponent; and how at the end of a month the German +initiative was lost under the success--only barely achieved after +dreadful risk--of the French plan. + +That plan, inherited from the strategy of Napoleon, and designed in +particular to achieve the success of a smaller against a larger +number, may be most accurately defined as _the open strategic square_, +and its leading principle is "the method of detached reserves." + +This strategic conception, which I shall now describe, and which (in a +diagram it is put far too simply) underlies the whole of the +complicated movements whereby the French staved off disaster in the +first weeks of the war, is one whose whole object it is to permit the +inferior number to bring up a _locally_ superior weight against a +_generally_ superior enemy in the decisive time and at the decisive +place. + +Let us suppose that a general commanding _twelve_ large units--say, +twelve army corps--knows that he is in danger of being attacked by an +enemy commanding no less than _sixteen_ similar units. + +Let us call the forces of the first or weaker general "White," and +those of the second or stronger general "Black." + +It is manifest that if White were merely to deploy his line and await +the advance of Black thus, + +[Illustration: Sketch 21.] + +he would be outflanked and beaten; or, in the alternative, Black might +mass men against White's centre and pierce it, for Black is vastly +superior to White in numbers. White, therefore, must adopt some +special disposition in order to avoid immediate defeat. + +Of such special dispositions one among many is the French Open +Strategic Square. + +This disposition is as follows:-- + +White arranges his twelve units into four quarters of three each, and +places one quarter at each corner of a square thus:-- + +[Illustration: Sketch 22.] + +We will give them titles, and call them A, B, C, and D. + +If, as is most generally the case in a defensive campaign at its +opening, White cannot be certain from which exact direction the main +blow is coming, he may yet know that it is coming from some one +general direction, from one sector of the compass at least, and he +arranges his square to face towards that sector. + +For instance, in the above diagram, he may not know whether the blow +is coming from the precise direction 1, or 2, or 3, but he knows that +it is coming somewhere within the sector XY. + +Then he will draw up his square so that its various bodies all face +towards the average direction from which the blow may come. + +The SIZE of his square--which is of great importance to the +result--he makes as restricted as possible, _subject to two prime +conditions_. These conditions are:-- + +First, that there shall be room for the troops composing each corner +to be deployed--that is, spread out for fighting. Secondly, that there +shall be room between any two corners (A and C, for instance) for a +third corner (D, for instance) to move in between them and spread out +for fighting in support of them. He makes his square as close and +restricted as possible, because his success depends--as will be seen +in a moment--upon the rapidity with which any one corner can come up +in support of the others. But he leaves enough room for the full +numbers to spread out for fighting, because otherwise he loses in +efficiency; and he leaves room enough between any two squares for a +third one to come in, because the whole point of the formation is the +aid each corner can bring to the others. + +In this posture he awaits the enemy. + +That enemy will necessarily come on in a lengthy line, lengthy in +proportion to the number of his units. For it is essential to the +general commanding _superior_ numbers to make the _whole_ of the +superior numbers tell, and this can only be done if they march along +parallel roads, and these roads are sufficiently wide apart for the +various columns to have plenty of room to deploy--that is, to spread +out into a fighting line--when the shock comes. + +[Illustration: Sketch 23.] + +This extended line of Black marching thus against White strikes White +first upon some one corner of his square. Suppose that corner to be +corner A. Then the position when contact is established and the first +serious fighting begins is what you will observe in the above diagram. +A is the corner (now spread out for fighting) which gets the first +shock. + +Note you (for this is the crucial point of the whole business) that +upon the exposed corner A will fall a very dangerous task indeed. A +will certainly be attacked by forces superior to itself. Normally +forces more than half as large again as A will be near enough to A to +concentrate upon him in the first shock. The odds will be at least as +much as five to three, the Black units, 4, 5, and 6, will be right on +A, and 3 and 7 will be near enough to come in as well in the first day +or two of the combat, while possibly 2 may have a look in as well. + +A, thus tackled, has become what may be called "the _operative corner_ +of the square." It is his task "to retreat and hold the enemy" while +B, C, and D, "the masses of manoeuvre," swing up. But under that +simple phrase "operative corner" is hidden all the awful business of a +fighting retreat: it means leaving your wounded behind you, marching +night and day, with your men under the impression of defeat; leaving +your disabled guns behind you, keeping up liaison between all your +hurrying, retreating units, with a vast force pressing forward to your +destruction. A's entire force is deliberately imperilled in order to +achieve the success of the plan as a whole, and upon A's tenacity, as +will be seen in what follows, the success of that plan entirely +depends. + +[Illustration: Sketch 24.] + +Well, while A is thus retreating--say, from his old position at A_1 on +the foregoing diagram to such a position as A_2, with Black swarming +up to crush him--the other corners of the square, B, C, and D, receive +the order to "swing"--that is, to go forward inclining to the left or +the right according to the command given. + +Mark clearly that, until the order is given, the general commanding +Black cannot possibly tell whether the "swing" will be directed to +the left or to the right. Either B will close up against A, C spread +out farther to the left, and D come in between A and C (which is a +"swing" to the left) as in Sketch 25, or C will close up against A, B +will spread well out to the right, and D come up between A and B, as +in Sketch 26 (which is a "swing" to the right). + +[Illustration: Sketch 25.] + +Until the "swing" actually begins, Black, the enemy, cannot possibly +tell whether it is his left-hand units (1 to 8) or his right-hand +units (9 to 16) which will be affected. One of the two ends of his +line will have to meet White's concentrated effort; the other will be +left out in the cold. Black cannot make dispositions on the one +hypothesis or on the other. Whichever he chose, White would, of +course, swing the other way and disconcert him. + +Black, therefore, has to keep his line even until he knows which way +White is going to swing. + +[Illustration: Sketch 26.] + +Let us suppose that White swings to the left. + +Mark what follows. The distances which White's units have got to go +are comparatively small. B will be up at A's side, and so will D in a +short time after the swing is over, and when the swing is completed, +the position is after this fashion. Black's numbers, 1 to 9 inclusive, +find themselves tackled by all Black's twelve. There is a superiority +of number against Black on his right, White's left, and the remaining +part of Black's line (10 to 16 inclusive), is out in the cold. + +If it were a tactical problem, and all this were taking place in a +small field, Black's left wing, 10-16, would, of course, come up at +once and redress the balance. But being a strategical problem, and +involving very large numbers and very great distances, Black's left +wing, 10-16, can do nothing of the kind. For Black's left wing, 10-16, +_cannot possibly get up in time_. Long before it has arrived on the +scene, White's 12 will have broken Black's 9 along Black's right wing. + +[Illustration: Sketch 27.] + +There are three elements which impose this delay upon Black's left +wing. + +First, to come round in aid of the right wing means the marching +forward of one unit after another, so that each shall overlap the +last, and so allow the whole lot to come up freely. This means that +the last unit will have to go forward six places before turning, and +that means several days' marching. For with very large bodies, and +with a matter of 100 miles to come up, all in one column, it would be +an endless business (Sketch 28). + +[Illustration: Sketch 28.] + +Next you have the delay caused by the _conversion of direction_ +through a whole right angle. That cause of delay is serious. For when +you are dealing with very large bodies of men, such as half a dozen +army corps, to change suddenly from the direction S (see Sketch 29) +for which your Staff work was planned, and to break off at a moment's +notice in direction E, while you are on the march towards S, is +impossible. You have to think out a whole new set of dispositions, +and to re-order all your great body of men. White was under no such +compulsion, for though he had to swing, the swing faced the same +general direction as his original dispositions. And the size of the +units and the distances to be traversed--the fact that the problem is +strategical and not tactical--is the essence of the whole thing. If, +for instance, you have (as in Sketch 30) half a dozen, not army corps, +but mere battalions of 1,000 men, deployed over half a dozen miles of +ground, AB, and advancing in the direction SS, and they are suddenly +sent for in the direction E, it is simple enough. You form your 6,000 +men into column; in a few hours' delay they go off in the direction +E, and when they get to the place where they are wanted, the column +can spread out quickly again on the front CD, and soon begin to take +part in the action. But when you are dealing with half a dozen army +corps--240,000 men--it is quite another matter. The turning of any one +of these great bodies through a whole right angle is a lengthy +business. You cannot put a quarter of a million men into one +column--they would take ages to deploy--so you must, as we have seen, +make each unit of them overlap the next before the turn can begin. + +[Illustration: Sketch 29.] + +[Illustration: Sketch 30.] + +Nor is that all the delay involved. It would never do for these six +separate corps to come up in driblets and get defeated in detail; 10, +11, and 12 will have to wait until 13, 14, 15, and even 16, have got +up abreast of them--and that is the third cause of delay. + +Here are three causes of delay which, between them and accumulated, +have disastrous effect; and in general we may be certain that where +very large bodies and very extensive stretches of territory are +concerned, that wing of Black which has been left out in the cold can +never come up in time to retrieve the situation created by White's +twelve pinning Black's engaged wing of only nine. + +If the square has worked, and if the twelve White have pinned the +right-hand wing of Black, 1 to 9 inclusive, there is nothing for Black +to do but to order his right wing, 1 to 9, to retreat as fast as +possible before superior numbers, and to order his left wing, 10 to +16, to fall back at the same time and keep in line; and you then have +the singular spectacle of twelve men compelling the retreat of and +pursuing sixteen. + +_That is exactly what happened in the first three weeks of active +operations in the West. The operative corner A in the annexed diagram +was the Franco-British force upon the Sambre. The retirement of that +operative corner and its holding of the enemy was what is called in +this country "The Retreat from Mons." BB are the "masses of manoeuvre" +behind A. The swinging up of these masses involving the retirement of +the whole was the Battle of the Marne._ + +[Illustration: Sketch 31.] + +Now, it is evident that in all this everything depends upon the +tenacity and military value of the operative corner, which is exposed +and sacrificed that the whole scheme of the Open Square may work. + +If that operative corner is destroyed as a force--is overwhelmed or +dispersed or surrounded--while it is fighting its great odds, the +whole square goes to pieces. Its centre is penetrated by the enemy, +and the army is in a far worse plight than if recourse had never been +had to the open strategic square at all. For if the operative corner, +A, is out of existence before the various bodies forming the +"manoeuvring mass" behind it have had time to "swing," then the enemy +will be right in their midst, and destroying, in overwhelming force, +these remaining _separated_ bodies in detail. + +It was here that the German strategic theory contrasted so violently +with the French. The Germans maintained that an ordeal which Napoleon +might have been able to live through with his veterans and after +fifteen years of successful war, a modern conscript army, most of its +men just taken from civilian life and all of short service, would +never endure. They believed the operative corner would go to pieces +and either be pounded to disintegration, or outflanked, turned, and +caught in the first days of the shock before the rest of the square +had time to "work." The French believed the operative corner would +stand the shock, and, though losing heavily, would remain in being. +They believed that the operative corner of the square would, even +under modern short service and large quasi-civilian reserve +conditions, remain an army. They staked their whole campaign upon that +thesis, and they turned out to be right. But they only just barely won +through, and by the very narrowest margin. Proving right as they did, +however, the success of their strategical theory changed the whole +course of the war. + +With this contrast of the great opposing theories considered, I come +to the conclusion of my Second Part, which examines the forces +opposed. I will now turn to the Third Part of my book, which concerns +the first actual operations from the Austrian note to the Battle of +the Marne. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Thus, after these lines were written, I had occasion in _Land and +Water_ to estimate the garrison of Przemysl before the figures were +known. The element wherewith to guide one's common sense was the known +perimeter to be defended; and arguing from this, I determined that a +minimum of not less than 100,000 men would capitulate. I further +conceived that the total losses could hardly be less than 40,000, and +I arrived at an original force of between three and four corps. + +[Illustration: Sketch 32.] + + + + +PART III. + +THE FIRST OPERATIONS. + + +In any general view of the great war which aims both at preserving +proportion between its parts, and at presenting especially the main +lines in relief, the three weeks between the German sudden forcing of +war and the seventeen or eighteen days between the English declaration +and the main operations upon the Sambre, will have but a subsidiary +importance. They were occupied for at least half the period in the +mobilization of the great armies. They were occupied for the second +half of the period in the advance across the Rhine of German numbers +greatly superior to the Allies, and also through the plain of Northern +Belgium. The operation, as calculated by the German General Staff, was +delayed by but a very few days--one might almost say hours--by the +hastily improvised resistance of Liége, and the imperfect defence of +their country which was all the Belgian forces, largely untrained, +could offer. + +We must, therefore, pass briefly enough over that preliminary period, +though the duty may be distasteful to the reader, on account of the +very exaggerated importance which its operations took, especially in +British eyes. + +For this false perspective there were several reasons, which it is +worth while to enumerate, as they will aid our judgment in obtaining a +true balance between these initial movements and the great conflicts +to which they were no more than an introduction. + +1. War, as a whole, had grown unfamiliar to Western Europe. War on +such a scale as this was quite untried. There was nothing in +experience to determine our judgment, and after so long a peace, +during which the habits of civil life had ceased to be conventioned +and had come to seem part of the necessary scheme of things, the first +irruption of arms dazzled or confounded the imagination of all. + +2. The first shock, falling as it did upon the ring fortress of +Liége, at once brought into prominence one of the chief questions of +modern military debate, the value of the modern ring fortress, and +promised to put to the test the opposing theories upon this sort of +stronghold. + +3. The violation of Belgian territory, though discounted in the +cynical atmosphere of our time, when it came to the issue was, without +question, a stupendous moral event. It was the first time that +anything of this sort had happened in the history of Christian Europe. +Historians unacquainted with the spirit of the past may challenge that +remark, but it is true. One of the inviolable conventions, or rather +sacred laws, of our civilization was broken, which is that European +territory not involved in hostilities by any act of its Government is +inviolable to opposing armies. The Prussian crime of Silesia, nearly +two centuries before, the succeeding infamies of 1864, and the forgery +of the Ems dispatch, the whole proclaimed tradition of contempt for +the sanctities of Christendom, proceeding from Frederick the Great, +had indeed accustomed men to successive stages in the decline of +international morals; but nothing of the wholly crude character which +this violation of Belgium bore was to be discovered in the past, even +of Prussia, and posterity will mark it as a curious term and possibly +a turning-point in the gradual loss of our common religion, and of the +moral chaos accompanying that loss. + +4. The preparations of this country by land were not complete. Those +of the French were belated compared with those of the Germans, and the +prospect of even a short delay in the falling of the blow was +exaggerated in value by all the intensity of that anxiety with which +the blow was awaited. + +To proceed from these preliminaries to the story. + + * * * * * + +The German Army had for its ultimate object, when it should be fully +mobilized, the passage of the greater part of its forces over the +Belgian Plain. + +This Belgian Plain has for now many centuries formed the natural +avenue for an advance upon the Gauls. + +It has been represented too often as a sort of meeting-place, where +must always come the shock between what is called Latin civilization +and the Germanic tribes. But this view is both pedantic and +historically false. There never was here a shock or conflict between +two national ideals. What is true is, that civilization spread far +more easily up from the Gauls through that fertile land towards the +forests of Germany, and that when the Roman Empire broke down, or +rather when its central government broke down, the frontier garrisons +could here depend upon wealthier and more numerous populations for the +support of their local government. That body of auxiliary soldiers in +the Roman army which was drawn from the Frankish tribes ruled here +when Rome could no longer rule. It was from Tournai that the father of +Clovis exercised his power; and in the resettlement of the local +governments in the sixth century, the Belgian Plain was the avenue +through which the effort of the civilized West was directed towards +the Rhine. It has Roman Cologne for its outpost; later it evangelized +the fringes of German barbarism, and later still conquered them with +the sword. All through the succeeding centuries the ambitions of kings +in France, or of emperors upon the Rhine, were checked or satisfied in +that natural avenue of advance. Charlemagne's frontier palace and +military centre facing the Pagans was rather at Aix than at Trčves or +Metz; and though the Irish missionaries, who brought letters and the +arts and the customs of reasonable men to the Germans, worked rather +from the south, the later forced conversion of the Saxons, which +determined the entry of the German tribes as a whole into Christendom, +was a stroke struck northwards from the Belgian Plain. Cćsar's +adventurous crossing of the Rhine was a northern crossing. The +Capetian monarchy was saved on its eastern front at Bouvines, in that +same territory. The Austro-Spanish advance came down from it, to be +checked at St. Quentin. Louis XIV.'s main struggle for power upon the +marches of his kingdom concentrated here. The first great check to it +was Marlborough's campaign upon the Meuse; the last battle was within +sound of Mons, at Malplaquet. The final decision, as it was +hoped--the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo--again showed what this +territory meant in the military history of the West. It was following +upon this decision that Europe, in the great settlement, decided to +curb the chaos of future war by solemnly neutralizing the Belgian +Plain for ever; and to that pact a seal was set not only by the French +and the British, but also by the Prussian Government, with what +results we know. + +The entries into this plain are very clearly defined by natural +limits. It is barred a few hours' march beyond the German frontier by +the broad and deep river Meuse, which here runs from the rough and +difficult Ardennes country up to the Dutch frontier. The whole passage +is no more than twelve miles across, and at the corner of it, where +the Meuse bends, is the fortress of Liége. West of this fortress the +upper reaches of the river run, roughly east and west upon Namur, and +after Namur turn south again, passing through a very deep ravine that +extends roughly from the French town of Mezičres to Namur through the +Ardennes country. The Belgian Plain is therefore like a bottle with a +narrow neck, a bottle defined by the Dutch frontier and the Middle +Meuse on either side, and a neck extending only from the Ardennes +country to the Dutch frontier, with the fortress of Liége barring the +way. Now the main blow was to be delivered ultimately upon the line +Namur-Charleroi-Mons. That is, the situation was roughly that of the +accompanying diagram: by the bottle neck at D the whole mass of troops +must pass--or most of them--which are later to strike on the front AB. +To reach that front was available to the invader the vast network of +Belgian railways RRR crammed with rolling stock, and provided such +opportunities for rapid advance as no other district in Europe could +show. But all this system converged upon the main line which ran +through the ring of forts round Liége, L, and so passed through +Aix-la-Chapelle, A, and to Germany. + +[Illustration: Sketch 33.] + +The German Government, therefore, could not be secure of its intention +to pass great bodies through the Belgian Plain until Liége was +grasped, and it was determined to grasp Liége long before the +mobilization of the German forces was completed. For this purpose only +a comparatively small force, rapidly gathered, was available. It was +placed under the command of General von Emmerich, and its first bodies +exchanged shots with the Belgian outposts early in the afternoon of +Tuesday, August 4, 1914. + +The hour and date should always be remembered for the solemnity which +attaches to the beginning of any great thing; and the full observer of +European affairs, who understands what part religion or superstition +plays in the story of Europe, will note this enormously significant +detail. The first Germans to cross the violated frontier accomplished +that act upon the same day and at the same hour as that in which +their forerunners had crossed the French frontier forty-four years +before. + +The afternoon wore on to night, with no more than a conflict between +outposts. Just before midnight the cannonade was first heard. It also +was the moment in which the ultimatum delivered to Germany by this +country, by a coincidence, expired.[2] + +This night attack with guns was only delivered against one sector of +the Liége forts, and only with field-pieces. + +As to the first of these points, it will be found repeated throughout +the whole of the campaign wherever German forces attack a ring of +permanent works. For the German theory in this matter (which +experience has now amply supported) is that since modern permanent +works _of known and restricted position_ go under to a modern siege +train if the fire of the latter be fully concentrated and the largest +pieces available, everything should be sacrificed to the putting into +the narrowest area of all the projectiles available. The ring once +broken on a sufficient single sector point is broken altogether. + +The second point, that only field-pieces as yet were used (which was +due to the fact that the siege train was not yet come up), is an +important indication of the weakness of the defence--on all of which +the enemy were, of course, thoroughly informed. + +There were perhaps 20,000 men in and upon the whole periphery of +Liége, a matter of over thirty miles, and what was most serious, no +sufficient equipment or preparation of the forts, or, what was more +serious still, no sufficient trained body of gunners. + +It is almost true to say that the resistance of Liége, such as it was, +was effected by rifle fire. + +With the dawn of August 5th, and in the first four hours of daylight, +a German infantry attack upon the same south-eastern forts which had +been subjected to the first artillery fire in the night developed, and +after some loss withdrew, but shortly after the first of the forts, +that of Fléron, was silenced. The accompanying sketch map will show +how wide a gap was left henceforward in the defences. Further, Fléron +was the strongest of the works upon this side of the river. Seeing +that, in any case, even if there had been a sufficient number of +trained gunners in the forts, and a sufficient equipment and full +preparation of the works for a siege (both of which were lacking), +the absence of sufficient men to hold the gaps between would in any +case have been fatal to the defence. With such a new gap as this open +by the fall of Fléron, the defence was hopeless, even if it were only +to be counted in hours. + +[Illustration: Sketch 34.] + +It is high praise of the Belgian people and character to point out +that, after the fall of Fléron, for forty-eight full hours such a gap +was still contested by men, a great part of whom were little better +than civilian in training, and who, had they been all tried regulars, +would have been far too few for their task. General Leman, who +commanded them, knew well in those early hours of Wednesday, the 5th, +that the end had already come. He also knew the value of even a few +hours' hopeless resistance, not perhaps to the material side of the +Allied strategy, but to the support of those moral forces lacking +which men are impotent in maintaining a challenge. Not only all that +Wednesday, the 5th, but all the Thursday, the 6th, he maintained a +line against the pressure of the invaders with his imperfect and +insufficient troops. + +During those forty-eight hours, the big howitzer, which is the type +of the heavy German siege train--the 225 mm.--was brought up, and it +is possible that a couple of the still larger Austrian pieces of 280 +mm. (what we call in this country the 11-inch), which are constructed +with flat treadles to their wheels to fire from mats laid on any +reasonably hard surface (such as a roadway), had been brought up as +well. At any rate, in the course of the Thursday, the fort next +westward from Fléron, Chaudefontaine, was smashed. The gap was now +quite untenable, and the first body of German cavalry entered the +city. The incident has been reported as a _coup de main_, with the +object of capturing the Belgian general. Its importance to the +military story is simply that it proved the way to be open. In the +afternoon and evening of the day, the Belgians were retiring into the +heart of the city, and it is typical of the whole business that the +great railway bridge upon which the main communications depended was +left intact for the Germans to use. + +With the morning of Friday, the 7th August, the first bodies of German +infantry entered the town. The forts on the north and two remaining +western forts upon the south of the river were still untaken, and +until a large breach should be made in the northern forts at least, +the railway communication of the German advance into the Belgian plain +was still impeded. Great masses of the enemy, and, in proportion to +those masses, still greater masses of advance stores were brought in. + +In all that follows, until we reach the date of Monday, August 24th, I +propose to consider no more than the fortunes of the troops who passed +through Belgium to attack the French armies upon the Sambre and the +Meuse, with the British contingent that had come to their aid. And my +reasons for thus segregating and dealing later with contemporary +events in the south will appear in the sequel. + +This reservation made--an important one in the scheme of this book--I +return to what I have called the preliminaries, the advance through +Belgium. + +We have already seen that the reduction of the northern forts of Liége +was the prime necessity to that advance. + +We have also seen that meanwhile it was possible and advisable to +accumulate stores for the advance as far forward as could be managed, +and that it was also possible, with caution, to bring certain +bodies--not the bulk of the army--forward through the Ardennes, to +command the passages of the Meuse above Liége, between that fortress +and Namur. + +This latter operation was effected by the 12th of August, when the +town of Huy, with its bridge and its railway leading from the Belgian +Ardennes right into the Belgian Plain, was seized. + +Meanwhile, upon the north of the river Meuse, cavalry and armed +motor-cars were similarly preparing the way for the general advance +when the northern forts of Liége should be dominated; and on this same +Wednesday, August 12th, the most advanced bodies of the invader lay in +a line roughly north and south from the neighbourhood of Diest along +the Gethe and thence towards Huy. + +Of the outrages committed upon the civilian inhabitants in all these +country-sides, the Government of which was neutral, and the territory +of which was by the public law of Europe free not only from such +novel crimes but from legitimate acts of war, I shall not speak, just +as I shall not allude, save where they happen to have military +importance, to the future increase of similar abominations which +marked the progress of the campaign. For my only object in these pages +is to lay before the reader a commentary which will explain the +general strategy of the war. + +[Illustration: Sketch 35.] + +While this advance line of cavalry was engaging in unimportant minor +actions, or rather skirmishes (grossly exaggerated in the news of +those days), the attack on the northern forts of Liége, upon which +everything now depended, was opened. It was upon Thursday, August +13th, that the 280 mm. howitzers opened upon Loncin. Other of the +remaining forts were bombarded; but, as in the case of Fléron a week +before, we need not consider the subsidiary operations, because +everything depended upon the fort of Loncin, which, as the +accompanying diagram shows, commanded the railway line westward from +Liége. General Leman himself was within that work, the batteries +against which were now operating from _within_ the ring--that is, from +the city itself, or in what soldiers technically call "reverse"--that +is, from the side upon which no fort is expected to stand, the side +which is expected to defend and not to be attacked from. Whether +Loncin held out the full forty-eight hours, or only forty, or only +thirty-six, we do not know; but that moral factor to which I have +already alluded, and which must be fully weighed in war, was again +strengthened by the nature of such a resistance. For nearly all that +garrison was dead and its commander found unconscious when the +complete destruction of the work by the high explosive shells +permitted the enemy to enter. + +[Illustration: Sketch 36.] + +It was upon Saturday, the 15th of August, that the great bulk of the +two main German armies set aside for passage through the Belgian Plain +began to use the now liberated railway, and the week between that date +and the first great shock upon the Sambre is merely a record of the +almost uninterrupted advance, concentration, and supply of something +not far short of half a million men coming forward in a huge tide +over, above, and round on to, the line Namur-Charleroi-Mons, which was +their ultimate objective, and upon which the Anglo-French +body--perhaps half as numerous--had determined to stand. + +[Illustration: Sketch 37.] + +The story of that very rapid advance is merely one of succeeding +dates. By the 17th the front was at Tirlemont, by the 19th it was +across the Dyle and running thence south to Wavre (the first army), +the second army continuing south of this with a little east in it to a +point in front of Namur. On the 20th there was enacted a scene of no +military importance (save that it cost the invaders about a day), but +of some moral value, because it strongly impressed the opinion in this +country and powerfully affected the imagination of Europe as a whole: +I mean the triumphal march through Brussels. + +Far more important than this display was the opening on the evening of +the same day, Thursday, August 20th, of the first fire against the +eastern defences of Namur. This fire was directed upon that evening +against the two and a half miles of trench between the forts of +Cognelée and Marchovelette, and in the morning of Friday, the 21st, +the trenches were given up, and the German infantry was within the +ring of forts north of the city. The point of Namur, as we shall see +in a moment, was twofold. First, its fortifications, so long as they +held out, commanded the crossings both of the Sambre and of the Meuse +within the angle of which the French defensive lay; secondly, its +fortified zone formed the support whereupon the whole French right +reposed. It was this unexpected collapse of the Belgian defence of +Namur which, coupled with the unexpected magnitude of the forces +Germany had been able to bring through the Belgian plain, determined +what was to follow. + +Once Namur was entered, the reduction of the forts was not of +immediate importance, though it was immediately and successfully +achieved. For the German business was not here, as at Liége, to grasp +a railway within the zone of the fortifications, but to destroy the +buttress upon which the French depended for their defensive position, +and to prevent the French from holding the crossings over the two +rivers Sambre and Meuse at their junction. + +With this entry of the Germans into Namur, their passage of the lines +upon Friday, August 21st, their capture of the bridgeheads on +Saturday, August 22nd, we reach the beginning of those great +operations which threatened for a moment to decide the war in the +West, and to establish the German Empire in that position to attain +which it had planned and forced the war upon its appointed day. + +It behoves us before entering into the detail of this large affair to +see the plan of it clearly before our eyes. + + * * * * * + +I have already described that general conception underlying the whole +modern French school of strategy for which the best title (though one +liable to abuse by too mechanical an interpretation) is "the open +strategic square." + +I have further warned the reader that, in spite of the way in which +the intricacy of organization inseparable from great masses and the +manifold disposition of a modern army will mask the general nature of +such an operation, that operation cannot be understood unless its +simplest lines are clear. I have further insisted that in practice +those lines remain only in the idea of the scheme of the whole, and +are not to be discovered save in the loosest way from the actual +positions of men upon the map. + +We have seen that this "open strategic square" involved essentially +two conceptions--the fixed "operative corner" and the swinging +"manoeuvring masses." + +The manoeuvring masses, at this moment when the great German blow fell +upon the Sambre and the Meuse, and when Namur went down immediately +before it, were (_a_) upon the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine, (_b_) +in the centre of the country, (_c_) near the capital and to the west +of it, and even, some of them, upon the sea. + +The operative corner was this group of armies before Namur on the +Sambre and Meuse, the 4th French Army under Langle, the 5th French +Army under Lanrezac, the British contingent under French. + +We know from what has been written above in this book that it is the +whole business of an operative corner to "take on" superior numbers, +and to hold them as well as possible, even though compelled to +retreat, until the manoeuvring masses can swing and come up in aid, +and so pin the enemy. + +We further know from what has gone before that the whole crux of this +manoeuvre lies in the power of the operative corner to stand the +shock. + +It was the business of the French in this operative corner before +Namur and of their British Allies there to await and, if possible, to +withstand by a careful choice of position the first shock of enemies +who would certainly be numerically superior. It was the whole business +of the German commanders to make the shock overwhelming, in order that +the operative corner should be pounded to pieces, or should be +surrounded and annihilated before the manoeuvring masses could swing +up in aid. Should this destruction of the operative corner take place +before the manoeuvring masses behind it could swing, the campaign in +the West was lost to the Allies, and the Germans pouring in between +the still separated corners of the square were the masters for good. + +It behoves us, therefore, if we desire to understand the campaign, to +grasp how this operative corner stood, upon what defences it relied, +in what force it was, what numbers it thought were coming against it, +and what numbers were, as a fact, coming against it. + +To get all this clear, it is best to begin with a diagram. + +Suppose two lines perpendicular one to the other, and therefore +forming a right angle, AB and BC. Suppose at their junction, B, a +considerable zone or segment, SSS, of a circle, as shaded in the +following diagram. Supposing the line AB to be protected along the +outer half of it, AK, by no natural obstacle--the state of affairs +which I have represented by a dotted line {~GREEK SMALL LETTER +ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}; but suppose the second half of it, +KB, should be protected by a natural obstacle, though not a very +formidable one--such as I have represented by the continuous line +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}. Supposing the +perpendicular line BC to be protected by a really formidable natural +obstacle {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}, and +supposing the shaded segment of the circle at B to represent a +fortified zone (1) accessible to any one within the angle KBC, as from +the arrow M; (2) inaccessible (until it was captured or forced) to any +one coming from outside the angle, as from the arrows NNN; (3) +containing within itself, protected by its ring of fortifications, +passages, PP, for traversing the two natural obstacles, {~GREEK SMALL +LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~} and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER +BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}, which meet at the point {~GREEK +SMALL LETTER BETA~}. + +[Illustration: Sketch 38.] + +There you have the elements of the position in which the advance +corner of the great French square was situated just before it took the +shock of the main German armies. The two lines AB and BC are the French +and British armies lying behind the Sambre, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER +GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}, and the Middle Meuse, {~GREEK SMALL +LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}, respectively; but the line +of the Sambre ceases to protect eastward along the dotted line {~GREEK +SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~} beyond the point up to +which the river forms a natural obstacle, while from K to B the line is +protected by the river Sambre itself. The more formidable obstacle, +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}, represents the +great trench or ravine of the Meuse which stretches south from Namur. +The town of Namur itself is at B, the junction of the two rivers; and +the fortified zone, SSS, is the ring of forts lying far out all round +Namur; while the passages, PP, over the obstacles contained within that +fortified zone, and accessible to the people _inside_ the angle from M, +but not to the people _outside_ the angle from NNN, are the bridges +across both the Sambre and the Meuse at Namur. + +All this is, of course, put merely diagrammatically, and a diagram is +something very distant from reality. The "open strategic square" in +practice comes to mean little more than two main elements--one the +operative corner, the other a number of separate units disposed in all +sorts of different places behind, and generally denominated "the +manoeuvring mass." If you had looked down from above at all the French +armies towards the end of August, when the first great shock came, you +would have seen nothing remotely resembling a square. + +[Illustration: Sketch 39.] + +You would have seen something like Sketch 31 where the bodies enclosed +under the title A were the operative corner; various garrisons and +armies in the field, enclosed under the title B, were the manoeuvring +mass. But it is only by putting the matter quite clearly in the +abstract diagrammatic form that its principle can be grasped. + +With this digression I will return and conclude with the main points +of debate in the use of the open strategic square. + +We have seen that the operative corner is in this scheme deliberately +imperilled at the outset. + +The following is a sketch map of the actual position, and it will be +seen that the topographical features of this countryside are fairly +represented by Sketch 39; while this other sketch shows how these +troops that were about to take the shock stood to the general mass of +the armies. + +But to return to the diagram (which I repeat and amplify as Sketch +41), let us see how the Allied force in the operative corner before +Namur stood with relation to this angle of natural obstacles, the +two rivers Sambre and Meuse, and the fortified zone round the point +where they met. + +[Illustration: Sketch 40.] + +The situation of that force was as follows:-- + +[Illustration: Sketch 41.] + +Along and behind {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER +GAMMA~} stretched the 5th Army of the French, prolonged on its left by +the British contingent. I have marked the first in the diagram with the +figure 5, the second with the letters Br, and the latter portion I have +also shaded. At right angles to the French 5th Army stretched the +French 4th Army, which I have marked with the figure 4. It depended +upon the obstacle of the Meuse {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL +LETTER DELTA~} for its defence, just as the French 5th Army depended +upon the Sambre, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER +BETA~}. It must, of course, be understood that when one says these +forces "lay along" the aforesaid lines, one does not mean that they +merely lay behind them. One means that they held the bridges and +prepared to dispute the crossing of them. + +Now, the French plan was as follows. They said to themselves: "There +will come against us an enemy acting along the arrows VWXYZ, and this +enemy will certainly be in superior force to our own. He will perhaps +be as much as fifty per cent. stronger than we are. But he will suffer +under these disadvantages:-- + +"The one part of his forces, V and W, will find it difficult to act in +co-operation with the other part of his forces, Y and Z, because Y and +Z (acting as they are on an outside circumference split by the +fortified zone SSS) will be separated, or only able to connect in a +long and roundabout way. The two lots, V and W, and Y and Z, could +only join hands by stretching round an awkward angle--that is, by +stretching round the bulge which SSS makes, SSS being the ring of +forts round Namur. Part of their forces (that along the arrow X) will +further be used up in trying to break down the resistance of SSS. +That will take a good deal of time. If our horizontal line AB holds +its own, naturally defended as it is, against the attack from V and W, +while our perpendicular line BC holds its own still more firmly +(relying on its much better natural obstacle) against YZ, we shall +have ample time to break the first and worst shock of the enemy's +attack, and to allow, once we have concentrated that attack upon +ourselves, the rest of our forces, the masses of manoeuvre, or at any +rate a sufficient portion of them, to come up and give us a majority +in _this_ part of the field. We shall still be badly outnumbered on +the line as a whole; but the resistance of our operative corner, +relying on the Sambre and Meuse and the fortress of Namur, will gather +much of the enemy unto itself. It will thus make of this part of the +field the critical district of the whole campaign. Our masses, +arriving while we resist, will give us a local superiority here which +will hold up the whole German line. We may even by great good luck so +break the shock of the attack as ourselves to begin taking the +counter-offensive after a little while, and to roll back either Y and +Z or V and W by the advance of our forces across the rivers when the +enemy has exhausted himself." + +It will be clear that this calculation (whether of the expected and +probable least favourable issue--a lengthy defence followed by an +orderly and slow retreat designed to allow the rest of the armies to +come up--or of the improbable and more favourable issue--the taking of +the counter-offensive) depended upon two presumptions which the +commander of the Allies had taken for granted: (1) that the German +shock would not come in more than a certain admitted maximum, say +thirty per cent. superiority at the most over the Allied forces at +this particular point; (2) that the ring of forts round Namur would be +able to hold out for at least three or four days, and thus absorb the +efforts of part of the enemy as well as awkwardly divide his forces, +while that enemy's attack was being delivered. + +Both these presumptions were erroneous. The enemy, as we shall see in +a moment, came on in much larger numbers than had been allowed for. +Namur, as we have already seen, fell, not in three or four days, but +instantly--the moment it was attacked. And the result was that, +instead of an orderly and slow retirement, sufficiently tardy to +permit of the swinging up of the rest of the French "square"--that is, +of the arrival of the other armies or manoeuvring masses--there came +as a fact the necessity for very rapid retirement of the operative +corner over more than one hundred miles and the immediate peril for +days of total disaster to it. + +To appreciate how superior the enemy proved to be in number, and how +heavy the miscalculation here was, we must first see what the numbers +of this Allied operative corner were. + +I have in Sketch 42 indicated the approximate positions and relative +sizes of the three parts of the Allied forces. + +Beginning from the left, we have barely two army corps actually +present of the British contingent in the fighting line: for certain +contingents of the outermost army corps had not yet arrived. We may +perhaps call the numbers actually present at French's command when +contact was taken 70,000 men, but that is probably beyond the mark. +To the east lay the 5th French Army, three army corps amounting, say, +to 120,000 men, and immediately south of this along the Meuse lay the +4th French Army, another three army corps amounting to at the most +another 120,000 men. + +We may then call the whole of the operative corner (if we exclude +certain cavalry reserves far back, which never came into play) just +over 300,000 men. That there were as many as 310,000 is improbable. + +The French calculation was that against these 300,000 men there would +arrive at the very most 400,000. + +That, of course, meant a heavy superiority in number for the enemy; +but, as we have seen, the scheme allowed for such an inconvenience at +the first contact. + +That more than 400,000 could strike in the region of Namur no one +believed, for no one believed that the enemy could provision and +organize transport for more than that number. + +A very eminent English critic had allowed for seven army corps of +first-line men as all that could be brought across the Belgian Plain. +The French went so far as to allow for ten, a figure represented by +the 400,000 men of the enemy they expected. + +We had then the Allied forces expecting an attack in about the +superiority indicated upon this diagram, where the British contingent +and the two French armies are marked in full, and the supposed enemy +in dotted lines. + +[Illustration: Sketch 42.] + +Roughly speaking, the Allies were allowing for a thirty per cent. +superiority. + +Now, lying as they did behind the rivers, and with the ring of forts +around Namur to shield their point of junction and to split the +enemy's attack, this superiority, though heavy, was not crushing. The +hopes of the defensive that it would stand firm, or at least retire +slowly so as to give time for the manoeuvring masses to come up was, +under this presumption, just. It was even thought possible that, if +the enemy attacked too blindly and spent himself too much, the +counter-offensive might be taken after the first two or three days. + +As for the remainder of the German forces, it was believed that they +were stretched out very much in even proportion, without any thin +places, from the Meuse to Alsace. + +Now, as a matter of fact, the German forces were in no such +disposition. 1. The Germans had added to every army corps a reserve +division. 2. They had brought through the Belgian plains a very much +larger number than seven army corps: they had brought nine. 3. They +had further brought against Namur yet another four army corps through +the Ardennes, the woods of which helped to hide their progress from +air reconnaissance. To all this mass of thirteen army corps, each +army corps half as large again as the active or first line allowed +for, add some imperfectly trained but certainly large bodies of +independent cavalry. We cannot accurately say what the total numbers +of this vast body were, but we can be perfectly certain that more than +700,000 men were massed in this region of Namur. The enemy was coming +on, not four against three, but certainly seven against three, and +perhaps eight or even nine against three. + +The real situation was that given in the accompanying diagram (Sketch +43). + +Five corps, each with its extra division, were massed under von Kluck, +and called the 1st German Army. Four more, including the Guards, were +present with von Buelow, and stretched up to and against the first +defences of Namur. Now, around the corner of that fortress, two Saxon +corps, a Wurtemberg corps, a Magdeburg corps, and a corps of reserve +under the Duke of Wurtemberg formed the 3rd Army, the right wing of +which opposed the forts of Namur, the rest of which stretched along +the line of the Meuse. + +Even if the forts of Namur had held out, the position of so hopelessly +inferior a body as was the Franco-British force, in face of such +overwhelming numbers, would have been perilous in the extreme. With +the forts of Namur abandoned almost at the first blow, the peril was +more than a peril. It had become almost certain disaster. + +[Illustration: Sketch 43.] + +With the fall of Namur, the angle between the rivers--that is, the +crossings of the rivers at their most difficult part where they were +broadest--was in the hands of the enemy, and the whole French body, +the 4th and 5th Armies, was at some time on that Saturday falling +back. + +The exact hour and the details of that movement we do not yet know. We +do not know what loss the French sustained, we do not know whether any +considerable bodies were cut off. We do not know even at what hour the +French General Staff decided that the position was no longer tenable, +and ordered the general retreat. + +All we know is that, so far from being able to hold out two or three +days against a numerical superiority of a third and under the buttress +of Namur, the operative corner, with Namur fallen and, not 30 per +cent., but something more like 130 per cent. superiority against it, +began not the slow retreat that had been envisaged, but a retirement +of the most rapid sort. + +Such a retirement was essential if the cohesion of the Allied forces +was to be maintained at all, and if the combined 4th and 5th French +Armies and British contingent were to escape being surrounded or +pierced. + +By the Saturday night at latest the French retirement was ordered; by +Sunday morning it was in full progress, and it was proceeding +throughout the triangle of the Thierarche all that day. + +But the rate of that retirement, corresponding to the pressure upon +the French front, differed very much with varying sections of the +line. It was heaviest, of course, in those advanced bodies which had +lain just under Namur. It was least at the two ends of the bow, for +the general movement was on to the line Maubeuge-Mezičres. The farther +one went east towards Maubeuge, the slower was the necessary movement, +and to this cause of delay must be added the fact that von Kluck, +coming round by the extreme German line, had farthest to go, and +arrived latest against the line of the Allies. + +Therefore the British contingent at the western extreme of the Allied +line felt the shock latest of all, and all that Sunday morning the +British were still occupied in taking up their positions. They had +arrived but just in time for what was to follow. + +It was not till the early afternoon of the Sunday that contact was +first taken seriously between Sir John French and von Kluck. At that +moment the British commander believed, both from a general and +erroneous judgment which the French command had tendered him and from +his own air work, that he had in front of him one and a half or at the +most two army corps; and though the force, as we shall see in a +moment, was far larger, its magnitude did not appear as the afternoon +wore on. Full contact was established perhaps between three and four, +by which hour the pressure was beginning to be severely felt, and upon +the extreme right of the line it had already been necessary to take up +defensive positions a little behind those established in the morning. +But by five o'clock, with more than two good hours of daylight before +it, the British command, though perhaps already doubtful whether the +advancing masses of the enemy did not stand for more men, and +especially for more guns than had been expected, was well holding its +own, when all its dispositions were abruptly changed by an unexpected +piece of news. + +It was at this moment in the afternoon--that is, about five +o'clock--that the French General Staff communicated to Sir John French +information bearing two widely different characteristics: the first +that it came late; the second that had it not come when it did, the +whole army, French as well as British, would have been turned. + +The first piece of information, far too belated, was the news that +Namur had fallen, and that the enemy had been in possession of the +bridge-heads over the Sambre and the Meuse since the preceding day, +Saturday. Consequent upon this, the enemy had been able to effect the +passage of the Sambre, not only in Namur itself, but in its immediate +neighbourhood, and, such passages once secured, it was but a question +of time for the whole line to fall into the enemy's hands. When +superior numbers have passed one end of an obstacle it is obvious that +the rest of the obstacle gradually becomes useless.[3] At what hour +the French knew that they had to retire, we have not been told. As we +have seen, the enemy was right within Namur on the early afternoon of +Saturday, the 22nd, and it is to be presumed that the French +retirement was in full swing by the Sunday morning, in which case the +British contingent, which this retirement left in peril upon the +western extreme of the line, ought to have been warned many hours +before five o'clock in the afternoon. + +To what the delay was due we are again as yet in ignorance, but +probably to the confusion into which the unexpected fall of Namur and +the equally unexpected strength of the enemy beyond the Sambre and the +Meuse had thrown the French General Staff. + +At any rate, the news did come thus late, and its lateness was of +serious consequence to the British contingent, and might have been +disastrous to it. + +The second piece of news, on the other hand, was the saving of it; and +that second piece of news was the information that Sir John French had +in front of him not one German army corps, and possibly part or even +the whole of a second, but at least three. As the matter turned out, +the British contingent was really dealing first and last with four +army corps, and the essential part of the news conveyed was that the +extreme western portion of this large German force _was attempting to +turn the flank of the whole army_. + +It was not only attempting to do so, it was in number sufficient to do +so; and unless prompt measures were taken, what was now discovered to +be the general German plan would succeed, and the campaign in the +West would be in two days decided adversely to the Allies--the same +space of time in which the campaign of 1815 was decided adversely to +Napoleon in just these same country-sides. + +It is here necessary to describe what this German plan was. + +The reader has already seen, when the general principles of the open +strategic square were described on a previous page, that everything +depends upon the fate of the operative corner. This operative corner +in the present campaign had turned out to be the two French armies, +the 4th and the 5th, upon the Lower Sambre and the Meuse, and the +British contingent lying to the left of the 5th on the Upper Sambre +and by Mons. + +If the operative corner of a strategic open square is annihilated as a +military force, or so seriously defeated that it can offer no +effective opposition for some days, then the whole plan of a strategic +square breaks to pieces, and the last position of the inferior forces +which have adopted it is worse than if they had not relied upon the +manoeuvre at all, but had simply spread out in line to await defeat +in bulk at the hands of their superior enemy. + +Now there are two ways in which a military force can be disposed of by +its opponent. There are two ways in which it can be--to use the rather +exaggerated language of military history--"annihilated." + +The first is this: You can break up its cohesion by a smashing blow +delivered somewhere along its line, and preferably near its centre. +But if you do that, the results will never be quite complete, and may +be incomplete in any degree according to the violence and success of +your blow. + +The second way is to get round the enemy with your superior numbers, +to get past his flank, to the back of him, and so envelop him. If that +manoeuvre is carried out successfully, you bag his forces entire. It +is to this second manoeuvre that modern Prussian strategy and tactics +are particularly attached. It is obvious that its fruits are far more +complete than those of the first manoeuvre, when, or if, it is wholly +successful. For to get round your enemy and bag him whole is a larger +result than merely to break him up and leave _some_ of him able to +re-form and perhaps fight again. Two things needful to such success +are (_a_) superior numbers, save in case of gross error upon the part +of the opponents; (_b_) great rapidity of action on the part of the +outflanking body, coupled, if possible, with surprise. That rapidity +of action is necessary is obvious; for the party on the flank has got +to go much farther than the rest of the army. It has to go all the +length of the arrow (1), and an element of surprise is usually +necessary. For if the army AA which BB was trying to outflank learned +of the manoeuvre in time he only has to retreat upon his left by the +shorter arrow (2) to escape from the threatened clutch. + +[Illustration: Sketch 45.] + +Now, von Kluck with his five army corps, four of which were in +operation against Sir John French, was well able to count on all +these elements. He had highly superior numbers, his superiority had +not been discovered until it was almost too late, and for rapidity of +action he had excellent railways and a vast equipment of petrol +vehicles. + +What he proposed to do was, while engaging the British contingent of +less than two army corps with three full army corps of his own, to +swing his extreme western army corps right round, west through +Tournai, and so turn the British line. If he succeeded in doing that, +he had at the same time succeeded in turning the whole of the +Franco-British forces on the Sambre and Meuse. In other words, he was +in a fair way to accomplishing the destruction of the operative corner +of the great square, and consequently, as a last result, the +destruction of the whole Allied force in the West. + +The thing may be represented on a sketch map in this form. + +Of von Kluck's five corps, 1 is operating against the junction of the +English and French lines beyond Binche, 2, 3, and 4 are massing +against the rather more than one and a half of Sir John French at AA, +and 5, after the capture of Tournai, is going to take a big sweep +round in the direction of the arrow towards Cambrai, and so to turn +the whole line. Meanwhile, the cavalry, still farther west, acting +independently, is to sweep the country right out to Arras and beyond. + +[Illustration: Sketch 46.] + +The particular titles of corps are of no great value in following the +leading main lines of a military movement; but it may be worth +remembering that this "number 5," to which von Kluck had allotted the +turning movement, was the _Second_ German Corps. With its cavalry it +numbered alone (and apart from all the other forces of von Kluck which +were engaging the British line directly) quite three-quarters as many +men as all that British line for the moment mustered. + +It was not possible, from local circumstances which the full history +of the war, when it is written, will explain, for the British +contingent to fall back in the remaining hours of daylight upon that +Sunday. + +Belated by at the most twelve hours, as the news of the French +retirement had been, the British retirement followed it fully twenty +hours after. It was not until daylight of Monday, the 24th, that all +the organizations for this retirement were completed, the plans drawn +up, and the first retrograde movements made. + +To permit a retirement before such a great superiority of the enemy to +be made without disaster, it was necessary to counter-attack not only +at this inception of the movement, but throughout all the terrible +strain of the ensuing eight days. + +Here it may be necessary to explain why, in any retirement, continual +counter-attacks on the pursuing enemy are necessary. + +It is obvious that, under equal conditions, the pursuing enemy can +advance as fast as can your own troops which are retreating before +him. If, therefore, a retreat, once contact has been established, +consisted in merely walking away from the enemy, that enemy would be +able to maintain a ceaseless activity against one portion of your +united force--its rear--which activity would be exercised against +bodies on the march, and incapable of defence. To take but one example +out of a hundred: his guns would be always unlimbering, shooting at +you, then limbering up again to continue the pursuit; unlimbering +again, shooting again--and so forth; while your guns would never +reply, being occupied in an unbroken retirement, and therefore +continually limbered up and useless behind their teams. + +A retiring force, therefore, of whatever size--from a company to an +army--can only safely effect its retirement by detaching one fraction +from its total which shall hold up the pursuit for a time while the +main body gets away. + +When this detached fraction is wearied or imperilled, another fraction +relieves it, taking up the same task in its turn; the first fraction, +which had hitherto been checking the pursuit, falls back rapidly on to +the main body, under cover of the new rearguard's fire as it turns to +face the enemy. And the process is kept up, first one, then another +portion of the whole force being devoted to it, until the retirement +of the whole body has been successfully effected, and it is well ahead +of its pursuers and secure. + +[Illustration: Sketch 47.] + +For example: two White army corps, I., II., as in the annexed diagram, +each of two divisions, 1, 2, and 3, 4, have to retire before a greatly +superior Black force, _abcde_. They succeed in retiring by the action +expressed in the following diagram. White corps No. I. first +undertakes to hold up the enemy while No. II. makes off. No. I. +detaches one division for the work (Division 2), and for a short time +it checks the movement of _a_, _b_, and _c_, at least, of the enemy. +Now _d_ and _e_ press on. But they cannot press on at any pace they +choose, for an army must keep together, and the check to _a_, _b_, and +_c_ somewhat retards _d_ and _e_. They advance, say, to the positions +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}. + +[Illustration: Sketch 48.] + +Next, White corps No. II. stops, puts out one of its divisions (say 4) +to check _d_ and _e_, while its other division either helps or falls +back, according to the severity of the pressure, and White corps No. +I. makes off as fast as it can. _a_, _b_, _c_, no longer checked by a +White rearguard, are nevertheless retarded from two causes--first, +the delay already inflicted on them; secondly, that they must not, if +the army is to keep together, get too far ahead of their colleagues, +_d_ and _e_, which White corps II. is holding up. + +[Illustration: Sketch 49.] + +Thus, on the second or third day the retreat of White is being secured +by an increasing gap between pursued and pursuers. The process is +continued. Every succeeding day--if that process is successful--should +further widen the gap until White can feel free from immediate +pressure. + +Such is the principle--modified indefinitely in practice by variations +of ground and numbers--under which a retirement must be conducted if +it is to have any hope of ultimate success in saving the pursued. + +But it is clear that the process must always be a perilous one. Unless +the most careful co-ordination is maintained between the moving parts +of the retreat; unless the rearguard in each action falls back only +_just upon_ and not a _little while after_ the precise moment when it +can last safely do so; unless the new rearguard comes into play in +time, etc., etc.--the pursuers may get right in among the pursued and +break their cohesion; or they may get round them, cut them off, and +compel them to surrender. In either case the retreating force ceases +to exist as an army. + +In proportion as the pursuers are numerous (mobility being equal) +compared with the pursued, in that proportion is the peril. And with +the best luck in the world some units are sure to be cut off, many +guns lost, all stragglers and nearly all wounded abandoned in the +course of a pressed retreat, and, above all, there will be the +increasing discouragement and bewilderment of the men as the strain, +the losses, and the ceaseless giving way before the enemy continue day +after day with cumulative effect. + +The accomplishment of such a task, the maintenance of the "operative +corner" in being during its ordeal of retreat before vastly superior +numbers, and in particular the exceedingly perilous retirement of the +British contingent at what was, during the first part of the strain, +the extreme of the line, are what we are now about to follow. + +The initial counter-attack, then, on this Monday, the first day of the +retreat, was undertaken by the 2nd British Division from the region of +Harmignies, which advanced as though with the object of retaking +Binche. The demonstration was supported by all the artillery of the +1st Army Corps, while the 1st Division, lying near Peissant, supported +this action of the 2nd. While that demonstration was in full activity, +the 2nd Corps to the west or left (not all of it was yet in the field) +retired on to the line Dour-Frameries, passing through Quaregnon. It +suffered some loss in this operation from the masses of the enemy, +which were pressing forward from Mons. When the 2nd Corps had thus +halted on the line Dour-Frameries, the 1st Corps, which had been +making the demonstration, took the opportunity to retire in its turn, +and fell back before the evening to a line stretching from Bavai to +Maubeuge. + +[Illustration: Sketch 50.] + +The 2nd Corps had entrenched itself, while the 1st Corps was thus +falling back upon its right; and when it came to the turn of the 2nd +Corps to play the part of rearguard in these alternate movements, the +effort proved to be one of grave peril. + +[Illustration: Sketch 51.] + +Since the whole movement of the enemy was an outflanking movement, +the pressure upon this left and extreme end of the line was +particularly severe. The German advance in such highly superior +numbers overlapped the two British corps to _their_ left or west, +which was at this moment the extreme end of the Allied Franco-British +line. They overlapped them as these pursuing Black units overlap the +lesser retiring White units. It is evident that in such a case the +last unit in the line at A will be suffering the chief burden of the +attack. An attempt was made to relieve that burden by sending the and +Cavalry Brigade in this direction to ride round the enemy's outlying +body; but the move failed, with considerable loss to the 9th Lancers +and the 18th Hussars, which came upon wire entanglements five hundred +yards from the enemy's position. There did arrive in aid of the +imperilled end of the line reinforcement in the shape of a new body. +One infantry brigade, the 19th, which had hitherto been upon the line +of communications, reached the army on this its central left near +Quarouble and a little behind that village before the morning was +spent. It was in line before evening. This reinforcement lent some +strength to the sorely tried 2nd Corps, but it had against it still +double its own strength in front, and half as much again upon its +exposed left or western flank, and it suffered heavily. + +By the night of that Monday, the 24th of August, however, the whole of +the British Army was again in line, and stretched from Maubeuge, which +protected its right, through Bavai, on to the fields between the +villages of Jenlain and Bry, where the fresh 19th Infantry Brigade had +newly arrived before the evening, while beyond this extreme left again +was the cavalry. + +The whole operation, then, of that perilous Monday, the first day of +the retreat, may be planned in general as in Sketch 52. At the +beginning, at daybreak, you have the three German army corps lying as +the shaded bodies are given opposite to the unshaded, which represent +the British contingent of not quite two full army corps. By nightfall +the British contingent, including now the 19th Brigade of infantry, +lay in the positions from Maubeuge westward, with the 1st Corps next +to Maubeuge, the 2nd Corps beyond Bavai, the 1st being commanded by +Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien; while the +Germans lay more or less as the dotted shaded markings are. + +The fortress of Maubeuge was, under these circumstances, clearly a +lure. An army in the field in danger of envelopment will always be +tempted to make for the nearest fortified zone in order to save +itself. The British commander was well advised in his judgment to +avoid this opportunity, and that for two reasons. First, that the +locking up of any considerable portion of the Anglo-French force in +its retirement would have jeopardized the chance of that +counter-offensive which the French hoped sooner or later to initiate; +secondly, that, as will be seen later, the works of Maubeuge were +quite insufficient to resist for more than a few days a modern siege +train. + +[Illustration: Sketch 52.] + +This point of Maubeuge and of its fall must be discussed later; for +the moment all we need note is that the fortress afforded for a few +hours--that is, during the night of Monday to Tuesday, the 24th-25th +August--support to the British line during its first halt upon the +rapid and perilous retirement from Mons. + +Meanwhile the whole of the French 5th Army had been falling back with +equal rapidity, and upon its right the 4th Army had followed soon; and +as this French retirement had preceded the retirement of the British, +its general line lay farther south. + +On the other hand, from the nature of the topography in this section +of the Franco-Belgian border, the units of the French command had to +fall back farther and more rapidly in proportion as they stretched +eastward. The attack of the enemy in forces of rather more than two to +one had come, as we have seen, not only from across the line of the +Sambre, but, once Namur had fallen, from across the line of the Meuse +at right angles to the line of the Sambre. Therefore the 5th and the +4th Armies, contained within the triangle bounded by the Sambre and +Meuse, retiring from blows struck from the direction of the arrows 1-5 +over all that hilly and wooded country known as the Thiérache, were, +as to the extreme salient of them at A, compelled to a very rapid +retirement indeed; and on this Sunday night the French line was +deflected southward, not without heavy losses, until either on that +night or on the Monday morning it joined up with the forces which +stretched northward through and from Mézičres. An attempt to +counter-attack through the precipitous ravines and deep woods on to +the valley of the Semois had failed, and the line as a whole ran, upon +this night between the Sunday and the Monday, much as is indicated +upon the accompanying sketch. + +[Illustration: Sketch 53.] + +From this it will be seen that the British contingent away upon the +extreme left was in very grave peril, not only because the turning +movement was wholly directed round their exposed flank, but also +because, their retirement having come late, they stood too far forward +in the general scheme at this moment, and therefore more exposed to +the enemy's blow than the rest of the line. With this it must be +remembered Tournai had already fallen. It was very imperfectly held by +a French Territorial brigade, accompanied by one battery of English +guns; and the entering German force, in a superiority of anything you +like--two, three, or four to one--easily swept away the resistance +proffered in this quarter. + +These German forces from Tournai had not yet, by the nightfall of +Monday, come up eastward against the British, but they were on the +way, and they might appear at any moment. The corps next to them, the +4th of von Kluck's five, was already operating upon that flank, and +the next day, Wednesday, 26th of August, was to be the chief day of +trial for this exposed British wing of the army. + +So far the operations of the British Army had not differed greatly +from the expected or at least one of the expected developments of the +campaign. + +The operative corner, if it should not have the luck, through losses +or blunders on the part of the enemy, to take the counter-offensive +after receiving the third shock, is intended to retire, and to draw +upon itself a maximum of the enemy's efforts. + +But between what had been intended as the most probable, and in any +case perilous, task of this body (which comprised, it will be +remembered, six French and ultimately two British army corps) turned +out, within twenty-four hours of the retreat, and within forty-eight +of the fall of Namur, to be an operation of a difficulty so extreme as +to imperil the whole campaign, and in this operation it was the +British force upon the outer left edge of the line--the unsupported +extremity round which the enemy made every effort to get--which was +bound to receive the severest treatment. This peculiar burden laid +upon the Expeditionary Force from this country was, of course, gravely +increased by the delay in beginning its retreat, which we have seen to +be due to the delay in the communication to it by the French of the +news of the fall of Namur. On account of this delay not only was the +extreme of the line which the British held immediately threatened with +outflanking, but it still lay somewhat forward of the rest of the +force. It was in danger of being turned round its exposed edge C, not +only because it lay on the extreme of the line, but also because, +instead of occupying its normal position, AB, which it would have +occupied had the retreat begun with all the rest, it actually occupied +the position CD, which made it far more likely to be surrounded than +if it had been a day's march farther back, as it would have been if +the French Staff work had suffered no delays. + +[Illustration: Sketch 54.] + +There lay in the gap formed by this untoward tardiness in the British +retirement, at the point M, the fortress of Maubeuge. It was +garrisoned by French reserves, or Territorial troops, not of the same +quality as the active army, and its defensive power was, even if the +old ring of fortress theory had proved sound, of very doubtful order. + +The French 5th Army being no longer present to support the British +right, but having fallen back behind the alignment of that right, +General Sir John French had no support for what should have been his +secure flank save this fortress of Maubeuge, and it will be evident +from the above diagram that the enemy, should he succeed in +outflanking the British line, would compel it to fall back within the +ring of forts surrounding Maubeuge. To avoid destruction it would have +no alternative but to do that. For, counting the forces in front of it +and the forces trying to get round its back, it was fighting odds of +two to one. + +Maubeuge was a stronghold that had played a great part in the +revolutionary war. Its resistance in the month of October 1793 had +made possible the French victory of Wattigines, just outside its +walls, and had, perhaps, done more than any other feat of arms in that +year to save the French Revolution from the allied governments of +Europe. It was, indeed, full of historic memories, from the moment +when Cćsar had defeated the Nervii upon the Sambre just to the west of +the town (his camp can still be traced in an open field above the +river bank) to the invasion of 1815. + +But this rôle which it had played throughout French history had not +led to any illusion with regard to the rôle it might play in any +modern war; and at the best Maubeuge, in common with the other +ill-fortified points of the Belgian frontier, suffered from the only +error--and that a grave one--which their thorough unnational political +system had imposed upon the military plan of the French. This error +was the capital error of indecision. No consistent plan had been +adopted with regard to the fortification of the Belgian frontier. + +The French had begun, after the recuperation following upon the war of +1870, an elaborate and very perfect system of fortification along +their German frontier--that is, along the new frontier which divided +the annexed territory of Alsace-Lorraine from the rest of the country. +They had taken it for granted that the next German attempt would be +made somewhere between Longwy and Belfort. And they had spent in this +scheme of fortification, first and last, the cost of a great campaign. +They had spent some three hundred million pounds; and it will be +possible for the reader to gauge the magnitude of this effort if he +will consider that it was a military operation more costly than was +the whole of the South African War to Great Britain, or of the +Manchurian War to Russia. The French were wise to have undertaken this +expense, because it had hitherto been an unheard-of offence against +European morals that one nation in Christendom should violate the +declared neutrality of another. And the attack upon Belgium as a means +of invading France by Germany had not then crossed the mind of any but +a few theorists who had, so to speak, "marched ahead" of the rapid +decline in our common religion which had marked now three +generations. + +But when the French had completed this scheme of fortification, Europe +heard it proposed by certain authorities in Prussia that, as the cost +of invading France through the now fortified zone would be +considerable, the German forces should not hesitate to originate yet +another step in the breakdown of European morality, and to sacrifice +in their attack upon France the neutrality of Belgium, of which +Prussia was herself a guarantor. + +Men have often talked during this war, especially in England, as +though the crime accompanying Prussian activities in the field were +normal to warfare; and this error is probably due to the fact that war +upon a large scale has never come home to the imagination of the +country, and that it is without experience of invasion. + +Yet it is of the very first importance to appreciate the truth that +Prussia in this campaign has postulated in one point after another new +doctrines which repudiate everything her neighbours have held sacred +from the time when a common Christianity first began to influence the +states of Europe. The violation of the Belgian territory is on a par +with the murder of civilians in cold blood, and after admission of +their innocence, with the massacre of priests, and the sinking without +warning of unarmed ships with their passengers and crews. To regard +these things as something normal to warfare in the past is as +monstrous an historical error as it would be to regard the reign of +terror during the French Revolution as normal to civil disputes within +the State. And to appreciate such a truth is, I repeat, of especial +moment to the understanding of the mere military character of the +campaign. For if the violation of Belgium in particular had not been +the unheard of thing it was, the fortification of the Franco-Belgian +frontier with which we are here concerned would have had a very +different fortune. + +As it was, the French could never quite make up their minds--or rather +the French parliamentarians could never make up their minds--upon the +amount of money that might wisely be expended in the defence of this +neutral border. There were moments when the opinion that Prussia +would be restrained by no fear of Europe prevailed among the +professional politicians of Paris. The fortification of the Belgian +frontier was undertaken in such moments; a full plan of it was drawn +up. But again doubt would succeed, the very large sums involved would +appal some new ministry, and the effort would be interrupted. To such +uncertainty of aim characteristic of parliamentary government in a +military nation was added, unfortunately, the consideration of the +line of the Meuse. Liége and Namur were fortresses of peculiar +strength, Antwerp was thought the strongest thing in Europe; and that +triangle was conceived, even by many who believed that the violation +of Belgian territory would take place, as affording a sufficient +barrier against the immediate invasion of France from the north-east. +Those who made this calculation did not forget that fortresses are +nothing without their full complement of men, guns, and stores; but +they could neither control, nor had they the elements properly to +appreciate, the deficiency of organization in a foreign and not +military country. + +For all these causes Maubeuge, in common with other points along the +Belgian frontier less important than itself, was left imperfect. Even +if the ring fortress had remained after 1905 what it had been before +that date, and even if modern howitzer fire and modern high explosives +had not rendered its tenure one of days rather than months, Maubeuge +was not a first-class fortress. As it was, with fortifications +unrenewed, and with the ring fortress in any case doomed, Maubeuge was +a death-trap. + +The rôle assigned to the fortress in the original French plan was no +more than the support of the retiring operative corner, as it +"retreated, manoeuvred, and held the enemy." Maubeuge was considered +as part of a line beyond which the operative corner would not have to +fall before the rest of the square, the "manoeuvring mass," had swung +up. Hence it was that the French General Staff and its Chief had put +within the ring of its insufficient forts nothing more than a garrison +of Territorials--that is, of the older classes of the reserve. + +Had the British General accepted the lure of Maubeuge as Bazaine did +the lure of Metz in 1870, the Expeditionary Force would have been +destroyed. But it would have been destroyed, not after a long delay, +as was the army at Metz, but immediately; for Maubeuge was not Metz, +and the fortress power of resistance of to-day is not that of a +generation ago. Maubeuge, as a fact, fell within a fortnight of the +date when this temptation was offered to the sorely pressed British +army, and had that temptation been yielded to, the whole force would +have been, in a military sense, annihilated before the middle of +September. + +What preserved it was the immediate decision undertaken upon that +Monday night to proceed, in spite of the fatigues that were already +felt after the first day's retreat, with a retirement upon the +south-west, and to proceed with it as vigorously as possible. + +It was not yet daylight upon the morning of Tuesday, August 25th, when +the move began. The Field-Marshal counted justly upon some exhaustion +in his immensely superior enemy, especially in those troops of his +upon the west (the 2nd German Corps) which had to perform the heavy +marching task of getting round the end of the British line. This +element, combined with the considerable distance which the British +marched that morning, saved the army; though not until another week of +almost intolerable suffering had passed, and not until very heavy +losses indeed had been sustained. The great Maubeuge-Bavai road, which +is prolonged to Eth, and which was, roughly, the British front of that +night, was cleared shortly after sunrise. A couple of brigades of +cavalry and the divisional cavalry of the 2nd Corps covered the +operation on the centre of the right, in front of the main body of the +2nd Corps, while the rest of the cavalry similarly covered the exposed +western edge and corner of the line. + +Delays, with the criticism of which this short summary has no concern, +had forbidden the whole force which should have been present with the +British Army in Flanders at the outset of the campaign to arrive in +time, and the contingents that had already come up had taken the +shock, as we have already described, in the absence of the 4th +Division. This 4th Division had only begun to detrain from the +junction at Le Cateau at the same hour that General Sir John French +was reading that Sunday message which prompted his immediate +retirement from before Mons. When the full official history of the war +comes to be written, few things will prove of more credit to the +Expeditionary Force and its command than the way in which this belated +division--belated through no fault of the soldiers--was incorporated +with the already existing organization, in the very midst of its +retreat, and helped to support the army. There are few parallels in +history to the successful accomplishment of so delicate and perilous +an operation. + +At any rate, in less than forty-eight hours after its arrival, the 4th +Division--eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery--were +incorporated with the British line just as the whole force was falling +back upon this Tuesday morning, the 25th; and the newly arrived +division of fresh men did singular service in the further covering of +the retirement. General Snow, who was in command of this division, +was deployed upon a line running from just south of Solesmes, on the +right, to a point just south of La Chatrie, upon the road from Cambrai +to Le Cateau, upon his left; and, as will be seen by the accompanying +sketch map, such a line effectually protected the falling back of the +rest of the force. Behind it the 1st and the 2nd British Corps fell +back upon the line Cambrai to Landrecies. The small inset map shows +how the various points in this two days' retreat stood to one another. + +[Illustration: Sketch 55.] + +This line from Landrecies towards Cambrai had already been in part +prepared in the course of that day--Tuesday--and entrenched, and it +may be imagined what inclination affected commanders and men towards +a halt upon that position. The pressure had been continuous and heavy, +the work of detraining and setting in line the newly arrived division +had added to the anxieties of the day, and an occupation of the +prepared line seemed to impose itself. Luckily, the unwisdom of such a +stand in the retirement was perceived in time, and the British +Commander decided not to give his forces rest until some considerable +natural object superior to imperfect and hurriedly constructed +trenches could be depended upon to check the enemy's advance. The +threat of being outflanked was still very grave, and the few hours' +halt which would have been involved in the alternative decision might, +or rather would, have been fatal. + +The consequences, however, to the men of this decision in favour of +continual retirement were severe. The 1st Corps did not reach +Landrecies till ten o'clock at night. They had been upon the move for +eighteen hours; but even so, the enemy, in that avalanche of advance +(which was possible to him, as we now know, by the organization of +mechanical transport), was well in touch. The Guards in Landrecies +itself (the 4th Brigade) were attacked by the advance body of the 9th +German Army Corps, which came on in overwhelming numbers right into +the buildings of the town, debouching from the wood to the north under +cover of the darkness. Their effort was unsuccessful. They did not +succeed in piercing or even in decisively confusing the British line +at this point; and, packed in the rather narrow street of Landrecies, +the enemy suffered losses equivalent to a battalion in that desperate +night fighting. But though the enemy here failed to achieve his +purpose, his action compelled the continued retreat of men who were +almost at the limit of exhaustion, and who had now been marching and +fighting for the better part of twenty-four hours. + +In that same darkness the 1st Division, under Sir Douglas Haig, was +heavily engaged south-east of Maroilles. They obtained ultimately the +aid of two French reserve divisions which lay upon the right of the +British line, and extricated themselves from the peril they were in +before dawn. By daylight this 1st Corps was still continuing its +retirement in the direction of Wassigny, with Guise as its objective. + +[Illustration: Sketch 56.] + +Meanwhile the 2nd Corps, which had not been so heavily attacked, and +which lay to the west--that is, still upon the extreme of the +line--had come, before the sunset of that Tuesday, the 25th, into a +line stretching from Le Cateau to near Caudry, and thence prolonged by +the 4th Division towards Seranvillers. + +[Illustration: Sketch 57.] + +It will be seen that this line was bent--its left refused. This +disposition was, of course, designed to meet the ceaseless German +attempt to outflank on the west; and with the dawn of Wednesday, the +26th, it was already apparent how serious would be the task before +this 2nd Corps, which covered all the rest of the army, and, in a +sense, the whole of the Anglo-French retirement. General Sir Horace +Smith-Dorrien, who was here in command, was threatened with a disaster +that might carry in its train disaster to the whole British +contingent, and ultimately, perhaps, to the whole Franco-British line. + +Although the German bodies which were attempting the outflanking had +not yet all come up, the field artillery of no less than four German +corps was already at work against this one body, and a general action +was developing upon which might very well depend the fate of the +campaign. Indeed, the reader will do well to fix his attention upon +this day, Wednesday, the 26th August, as the key to all that followed. +There are always to be found, in the history of war, places and times +which are of this character--nuclei, as it were, round which the +business of all that comes before and after seems to congregate. Of +such, for instance, was the Friday before Waterloo, when Erlon's +counter-orders ultimately decided the fate of Napoleon; and of such +was Carnot's night march on October 15, 1793, which largely decided +the fate of the revolutionary army. + +The obvious action to take in such a position as that in which the 2nd +Corps found themselves was to break contact with the enemy, to call +for support from the 1st Corps, and to maintain the retreat as +indefatigably as it had already been maintained in the preceding +twenty-four hours. + +But men have limits to their physical powers, which limits commonly +appear sharply, not gradually, at the end of a great movement. The 1st +Corps had been marching and fighting a day and a night, and that after +a preceding whole day of retirement from before Mons. It was unable to +execute a further effort. Further, the general in command of the 2nd +Corps reported that the German pressure had advanced too far to permit +of breaking contact in the face of such an attack. + +It would have been of the utmost use if at this moment a large body of +French cavalry--no less than three divisions--under General Sordet, +could have intervened upon that critical moment, the morning of +Wednesday, the 26th, to have covered the retirement of the 1st Corps. +They were in the neighbourhood; the British commander had seen their +commander in the course of the 25th, and had represented his need. +Through some error or misfortune in the previous movement of this +corps--such that its horses were incapable of further action through +fatigue--it failed to appear upon the field in this all-important +juncture, and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was left facing +overwhelming odds, which in artillery--the arm that was doing all the +heavy work of that morning--were not less than four to one. + +The fact that the retirement was at last made possible was due more +than anything else to the handling of the British guns upon this day, +and to the devotion with which the batteries sacrificed themselves to +the covering of that movement; while the cavalry, as in the preceding +two days, co-operated in forming a screen for the retreat. + +It was about half-past three in the afternoon when the general in +command of this exposed left flank judged it possible to break +contact, and to give the order for falling back. The experiment--for +it seems to have been no more secure than such a word suggests--was +perilous in the extreme. It was not known whether the consequences of +this fierce artillery duel against an enemy of four-fold superiority +had been sufficient to forbid that enemy to make good the pursuit. +Luckily, as the operation developed, it was apparent that the check +inflicted upon such enormous odds by the British guns was sufficient +for its purpose. The enemy had received losses that forbade him to +move with the rapidity necessary to him if he was to decide the +matter. He failed to press the retiring 2nd British Corps in any +conclusive fashion: this 2nd Corps, the left wing, was saved; and with +it the whole army, and perhaps the whole line. + +The retreat of this body, which had thus covered all its comrades, +continued under terrible conditions of strain (and after so heavy an +action) right through the afternoon, and on hour after hour through +the darkness; but though such an effort meant the loss of stragglers +and of wounded, of guns whose teams had been destroyed, of material, +and of all that accompanies a perilous retreat, one may justly say +that well before midnight of that Wednesday, the 26th, the operation +had proved successful and its purpose was accomplished. + +Two more days of almost equal strain were, as we shall see, to be +suffered by the whole army before it had reached a natural obstacle +behind which it could draw breath (the river Oise), and might fairly +be regarded as no longer in peril of destruction; but the breaking +point that had come on that Wednesday, the 26th, had been successfully +passed without disaster, and had been so passed, in the main, by +virtue of the guns. + +This critical day, upon which depended the fortunes certainly of the +British contingent, and in some degree of all the "operative corner" +of the French plan, turned in favour of the Allies, not only through +the military excellence of the action which was broken off by Sir +Horace Smith-Dorrien during the afternoon, but also through the vigour +and tenacity of the retreat. + +I must here beg the reader's leave for a short digression in +connection with those two phrases--"in favour of," and "vigour." +History in general treats a retirement, particularly a rapid +retirement accompanied by heavy losses, as a disaster; and the +conception that such a movement may seem to the military historian a +success, and that the energy of its conduct is just as important as +the energy of an assault, is unfamiliar to most students of civilian +record. But I am writing here, though an elementary, yet a military +history; and to the military historian a retreat may be just as much a +factor in victory as an advance; while the energy and tenacity +required for its carriage are, if anything, more important than the +corresponding qualities required for an advance. And in the case of +this critical day and a half, the Wednesday, August 26th, and the +Wednesday and Thursday night, August 26th-27th, the preservation of +the British forces, and to some extent of all that lay east of them, +was made possible by the very fact that the retirement was prosecuted +with the utmost rapidity and without a halt. Had the retreat been +interrupted in the hope of making a stand, or in the hope of repose, +the whole army would have gone. + +Throughout the night, then, with heavy losses from stragglers, and in +one case with the surrounding and annihilation by wounds and capture +of nearly a whole battalion (the Gordons), the retreat of the 2nd +Corps proceeded, and, in line with it, the retreat of the 1st Corps to +the east. + +But this 1st Corps, though set an easier task than the 2nd (which, at +the extreme of the line, was under the perpetual menace of +development), did not retire without losses of a serious character. It +was marching on Guise, just as the 2nd Corps to the west of it was +marching across the watershed to St. Quentin. The Munster Fusiliers, +who were on its extreme right, had halted for the night on that same +evening of the 26th; for the 1st Corps, being less hard pressed, had +more leisure for such repose. During the night a messenger was sent to +this body with orders for the resumption of the march next morning. He +was taken prisoner, and never reached his goal. The Munsters were +attacked at dawn by the German pursuit in greatly superior numbers, +surrounded and destroyed, as the Gordons of the 2nd Corps had been; +the unwounded remnant was compelled to surrender. + +[Illustration: Sketch 58.] + +The whole of Thursday, the 27th, and Friday, the 28th of August, the +British retreat continued, the 1st Corps following on at the valley of +the Oise towards La Fčre, while the 2nd Corps to the west passed St. +Quentin, and made for Noyon, in the neighbourhood of the same river +farther down; and on the night of that Friday the Expeditionary Force +was at last in line, and in some kind of order, organized for the +first breathing space possible after so terrible an ordeal. + +[Illustration: Sketch 59.] + +It is clear from the accompanying sketch map that the position the +British had now reached gave to the whole Allied force a bent contour. +The French armies to the east lay along line AB, which, had it been +directly prolonged, would have stretched towards C; but the British +contingent, which, on account of its extreme position, had suffered +most heavily, was turned right back on the scheme AD, and even so, +was still in some peril of being outflanked by the German forces along +the arrow (1) to the west of it. At this moment the French, whose +fortunes we shall next describe, found it possible to check the fury +of the pursuit. The drive of the German masses, which had so nearly +annihilated the British end of the line, was blocked, and the +remainder of the great retreat followed a more orderly fashion, +proceeded at a much slower rate, and approached that term at which a +counter-offensive might be attempted. + +The whole process may be compared to the flood of a very rapid tide, +which, after the first few hours, is seen to relax its speed +considerably, and to promise in the immediate future an ebb. + +In order to appreciate how this was, let us next consider what the +larger French forces to the east of the British had been doing. There +are no details available, very few published records, and it will not +be possible until an official history of the war appears to give more +than the most general sketch of the French movements in this retreat; +but the largest lines are sufficient for our judgment of the result. + +It will be remembered that what I have called "the operative corner" +of the Allied army had stood in the angle between the Sambre and the +Meuse. It had consisted in the British contingent upon the left, or +west, in front of Mons; the 5th French Army, composed of three army +corps, under Lanrezac, to the east of it, along the Sambre, past +Charleroi; and the 4th French Army, also of three army corps, under +Langle, along the Middle Meuse, being in general disposition what we +have upon the accompanying sketch. It had been attacked upon Saturday, +the 22nd August, by seventeen German army corps--that is, by forces +double its own. On that same day Namur, at the corner, had fallen into +complete possession of the Germans, the French retreat had begun, and +on the following day the English force had, after the regrettable +delay of half a day, also begun its retirement. + +We have seen that the British retirement (following the dotted lines +upon Sketch 60) had reached, upon the Friday night, the position from +Noyon to La Fčre, marked also in dots upon the sketch. + +What had happened meanwhile to their French colleagues upon the east? + +[Illustration: Sketch 60.] + +The first thing to note is that the fortress of Maubeuge, with its +garrison of reserve and second line men, had, of course, been at once +invested by the Germans when the British and French line had fallen +behind it and left it isolated. The imperfection of this fortress I +have already described, and the causes of that imperfection. Maubeuge +commanded the great railway line leading from Belgium to Paris, which +is the main avenue of supply for an invasion or for a retreat, running +north-east to south-west on the Belgian frontier upon the capital. + +The 5th French Army retired parallel to the British along the belt +marked in Sketch Map 60 by diagonal lines. At first, as its retirement +had begun earlier, it was behind, or to the south of, the British, who +were thus left almost unsupported. It lay, for instance, on Monday, +the 24th, much along the position 1, at which moment the British Army +was lying along the position 2. That was the day on which the Germans +attempted to drive the British into Maubeuge. + +But during the succeeding two days the French 5th Army (to which the +five corps, including the Prussian Guard, under Buelow, were opposed) +held the enemy fairly well. They were losing, of course, heavily in +stragglers, in abandoned wounded, and in guns; but their retreat was +sufficiently strongly organized to keep this section of the line well +bent up northwards, and just before the British halted for their first +breathing space along the line La Fčre and Noyon, the French 5th Army +attempted, and succeeded in, a sharp local attack against the superior +forces that were pursuing them. This local attack was undertaken from +about the position marked 3 on Sketch 60, and was directed against +Guise. It was undertaken by the 1st and 3rd French Corps, under +General Maunoury. He, acting under Lanrezac, gave such a blow to the +Prussian Guard that he here bent the Prussian line right in. + +Meanwhile the 4th French Army, which had also been retiring rapidly +parallel to the 5th French Army, lay in line with it to the east along +that continuation of 3 which I have marked with a 4 upon the sketch. +Farther east the French armies, linking up the operative corner with +the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, had also been driven back from the Upper +Meuse, and upon Friday, the 28th of August, when the British halt had +come between La Fčre and Noyon (a line largely protected by the +Oise), the whole disposition of the Allied forces between the +neighbourhood of Verdun and Noyon was much what is laid down in the +accompanying sketch. At A were the British; at B the successful +counter-offensive of the French 5th Army had checked and bent back the +Prussian centre under von Buelow; at C, the last section of what had +been the old operative corner, the army under Langle was thrust back +to the position here shown, and pressed there by the Wurtembergers and +the Saxons opposed to it. Meanwhile further French forces, D and E, +had also been driven back from the Upper Meuse, and were retiring with +Verdun as a pivot, leaving isolated the little frontier town of +Longwy. This was not seriously fortified, had held out with only +infantry work and small pieces, and had not been thought worthy of +attack by a siege train. It surrendered to the Crown Prince upon +Friday, 28th August. + +[Illustration: Sketch 61.] + +[Illustration: Sketch 62.] + +On that date, then, the two opposing lines might be compared, the one +to a great encircling arm AA, the elbow of which was bent at Guise, +the other to a power BB which had struck into the hollow of the elbow, +and might expect, with further success, to bend the arm so much more +at that point as to embarrass its general sweep. + +Those who saw the position as a whole on this Friday, the 28th of +August, wondered whether or not the French Commander-in-chief would +order the continuation of the successful local attack at Guise, and so +attempt to break the whole German line. He did not give this order, +and his reasons for retiring in the face of such an opportunity may be +briefly stated thus:-- + +1. The French forces in line from Verdun to La Fčre, and continued by +the British contingent to the neighbourhood of Noyon, were still +gravely inferior to the German forces opposed to them. Even, +therefore, if the French success at Guise had been pushed farther, and +had actually broken the German line, either half of the French line +upon either side of the forward angle would have been heavily +outnumbered by the two limbs of the enemy opposed to each, and that +enemy might perfectly well have defeated, though separated, each +portion of the force opposed to it. + +2. To the west, at the position FF on Sketch 62, were acting large +bodies of the enemy, which had swept, almost without meeting +resistance, through Arras to Amiens. Against that advance there was +nothing but small garrisons of French Territorials, which were brushed +aside without difficulty. + +Now these bodies, though they were mainly of cavalry which were +operating thus to the west, had already cut the main line of +communications from Boulogne, upon which the British had hitherto +depended, and were close enough to the Allied left flank to threaten +it with envelopment, or, rather, to come up in aid of von Kluck at A, +and make certain what he already could regard as probable--his power +to get round the British, and turn the whole left of the Allied line. + +3. More important even than these two first conclusive considerations +was the fact that the French Commander-in-chief, had he proposed to +follow up this success of his subordinate at Guise, would have had to +change the whole of his general plan, and to waste, or at best to +delay, the action of his chief factor in that plan. This chief factor +was the great manoeuvring mass behind the French line which had not +yet come into play, and the advent of which, at a chosen moment, was +the very soul of the French strategy. + +It is so essential to the comprehension of the campaign to seize this +last point that, at the risk of repetition, I will restate for the +reader the main elements of that strategy. + +[Illustration: Sketch 63.] + +I have called it in the earlier pages of this book "the open strategic +square," and I have shown how this theoretical arrangement was in +practice complicated and modified so that it came to mean, under the +existing circumstances of the campaign, the deliberate thrusting forth +of the fraction called "the operative corner," behind which larger +masses, "the mass of manoeuvre," were to come up in aid and assume the +general counter-offensive when the operative corner should have drawn +the enemy down to that position in which such a general +counter-offensive would be most efficacious. + +To concentrate the great mass of manoeuvre was a business of some +days, and having ordered its concentration in one district, it would +be impossible to change the plan at a moment's notice. The district +into which a great part of this mass of manoeuvre had been +concentrated--or, rather, was in course of concentration at this +moment, the 28th August--was the district behind and in the +neighbourhood of Paris. It lay far from the scene of operation at +Guise. It was intended to come into play only when the general retreat +should have reached a line stretching from Verdun to the neighbourhood +of Paris itself. To have pursued the success at Guise, therefore, +would have been to waste all this great concentration of the mass of +manoeuvre which lay some days behind the existing line, and in +particular to waste the large body which was being gathered behind and +in the neighbourhood of Paris. + +With these three main considerations in mind, and in particular the +third, which was far the most important, General Joffre determined to +give up the advantage obtained at Guise, to order the two successful +army corps under Maunoury, who had knocked the Prussian Guard at that +point, to retire, and to continue the general retreat until the Allied +line should be evenly stretched from Paris to Verdun. The whole +situation may be put in a diagram as follows: You have the Allied line +in an angle, ABC. You have opposed to it the much larger German forces +in a corresponding angle, DEF. Farther east you have a continuation of +the French line, more or less immovable, on the fortified frontier of +Alsace-Lorraine at M, opposed by a greater immovable German force at +N. At P you have coming up as far as Amiens large German bodies +operating in the west, and at Q a small newly-formed French body, the +6th French Army, supporting the exposed flank of the British +contingent at A, near Noyon. Meanwhile you have directed towards S, +behind Paris, and coming up at sundry other points, a concentration of +the mass of manoeuvre. + +[Illustration: Sketch 64.] + +It is evident that if the French offensive at B which has successfully +pushed in the German elbow at E round Guise is still sent forward, and +even succeeds in breaking the German line at E, "the elbow," the two +limbs into which the Germans will be divided, DE and EF, are each +superior in number to the forces opposed to them, and that DE in +particular, with the help of P, may very probably turn AB and its new +small supporter at Q, roll it up, and begin a decisive victory, while +the other large German force, EF, may press back or pierce the smaller +opposed French force, BC. + +Meanwhile you would not only be risking this peril, but you would also +be wasting your great mass of manoeuvre, SS, which is still in process +of concentration, most of it behind Paris, and which could not +possibly come into play in useful time at E. + +It is far better to pursue the original plan to continue the retreat +as far as the dotted line from Paris to Verdun, where you will have +the whole German force at its farthest limit of effort and +corresponding exhaustion, and where you will have, after the salutary +delay of the few intervening days, your large mass of manoeuvre, SS, +close by to Paris and ready to strike. + +From such a diagram we see the wisdom of the decision that was taken +to continue the retirement, and the fruits which that decision was to +bear. + +The whole episode is most eminently characteristic of the French +military temper, which has throughout the whole of French history +played this kind of game, and invariably been successful when it has +attained success from a concentration of energy upon purely military +objects and a sacrificing of every domestic consideration to the +single object of victory in foreign war. + +It is an almost invariable rule in French history that when the +military temper of the nation is allowed free play its success is +assured, and that only when the cross-current of a political object +disturbs this temper do the French fail, as they failed in 1870, as +they failed in 1812, or as they failed in the Italian expeditions of +the Renaissance. By geographical accident, coupled with the +conditions, economic and other, to which their aggression gives rise, +the French are nearly always numerically inferior at the beginning of +a campaign. They have almost invariably begun their great wars with +defeats and retirements. They have only succeeded when a patient, +tenacious, and consistently military policy has given them the +requisite delay to achieve a defensive-offensive plan. It was so +against Otto the Second a thousand years ago; it was so in the wars of +the Revolution; it was so in this enormous campaign of 1914. There is +in their two thousand years of constant fighting one great and +salutary exception to the rule--their failure against Cćsar; from +which failure they date the strength of their Roman tradition--still +vigorous. + + * * * * * + +The minor fortified posts lying behind the French line were not +defended. Upon 29th August the French centre fell back behind Rethel, +the Germans crossed the Aisne, occupied Rheims and Châlons, while the +British contingent on the left and the French 6th Army now protecting +its flank continued also to fall back towards Paris. And on Sedan day, +2nd September, we may regard the great movement as having reached its +end. + +The German advance had nowhere hesitated, save at Guise, and the +French retirement after their success at Guise can only have seemed to +the German commanders a further French defeat. Those commanders knew +their overwhelming numerical superiority against the total of the +Allied forces--a superiority of some 60 per cent. They may have +guessed that the French were keeping a considerable reserve; but in +their imagination that reserve was thought far less than it really +was, for they could hardly believe that under the strain of the great +retreat the French commanders would have had the implacable fortitude +which permitted them to spare for further effort the reinforcements of +which the retiring army seemed in vital and even in despairing need. + +Upon this anniversary of Sedan day it cannot but have appeared to the +Great General Staff of the enemy that the purpose of their great +effort in the West was already achieved. + +They had reached the gates of Paris. They had, indeed, not yet +destroyed the enemy's main army in the field, but they had swept up +garrison after garrison; they had captured, perhaps, 150,000 wounded +and unwounded men; their progress had been that of a whirlwind, and +had been marked by a bewildering series of incessant victories. They +were now in such a situation that either they could proceed to the +reduction of the forts outside Paris (to which their experience of +their hitherto immediate reduction of every other permanent work left +them contemptuous), or they could proceed to break at will the +insufficient line opposed to them. + +[Illustration: Sketch 65.] + +They stood, on this anniversary of Sedan, in the general situation +apparent on the accompanying sketch. The 6th French Army was forced +back right upon the outer works of Paris; the British contingent, to +its right, lay now beyond the Marne; the 5th French Army, to its right +again, close along the Seine; the 4th and 3rd continuing the great bow +up to the neighbourhood of Verdun, three-quarters of the way round +which fortress the Crown Prince had now encircled; and in front of +this bent line, in numbers quite double its effectives, pressed the +great German front over 150 miles of French ground. Upon the left or +west of the Allies--the German right--stood the main army of von +Kluck, the 1st, with its supporters to the north and west, that had +already pressed through Amiens. Immediately to the east of this, von +Buelow, with the 2nd Army, continued the line. The Saxons and the +Wurtembergers, a 3rd Army, pressed at the lowest point of the curve in +occupation of Vitry. To the east, again, beyond and in the Argonne, +the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia was upon the point of reducing +Verdun, the permanent works of which fortress had already suffered the +first days of that bombardment from the new German siege train which +had hitherto at every experiment completely destroyed the defence in a +few hours. If we take for the terminal of this first chapter in the +Great War the morning of 4th September, we may perceive how nearly the +enemy had achieved his object, to which there now stood as a threat +nothing more but the French reserves, unexpected in magnitude, though +their presence was already discovered, which had for the most part +been gathered in the neighbourhood of and behind the fortified zone of +Paris. + +With this position, of what it meant in immediate alternatives to the +enemy, I will deal a few pages on at the close of this book, when I +will also consider in one conspectus on the map the whole of that ten +days' sweep down from the north, and summarize its effect upon the +Allied attitude towards the next phase of the war. + +But to understand a campaign, one must seize not only the +topographical positions of troops, nor only their number: one must +also gauge the temper of their commanders and of the political opinion +at home behind them, for upon this moral factor everything ultimately +depends. The men that fight are living men, and the motive power is +the soul. + +It is, therefore, necessary for the reader to appreciate at this +terminal date, September 2-4, the moral strength of the enemy, and to +comprehend in what mood of confidence the Germans now lay. With this +object we must add to the story of the advance on Paris the subsidiary +events which had accompanied that great sweep into the West. We must +turn to the "holding up of Russia" upon the East by the Austrian +forces, and see how the partial failure of this effort (news of which +was just reaching the Western armies) was quite eclipsed by the +splendid tidings of Tannenberg. We must see with German eyes the +secondary but brilliant victory in front of Metz; we must stand in +their shoes to feel as they did the clearing of Alsace, and to +comprehend with what contempt they must have watched the false picture +of the war which the governments and the press of the Allies, +particularly in Britain, presented to public opinion in their doomed +territories; and we must, in general, grasp the now apocalyptic temper +of the nervous, over-strained industrialized population which is the +tissue of modern Germany. + +Not until we have a good general aspect of that mood can we understand +either the war at this turning-point in its fortunes, or the future +developments which will be traced in the succeeding volumes of this +series. + +I will, therefore, now turn to the three main elements productive of +that mood in their historical order: the Battle of Metz, the Austrian +operations against Russia, and, lastly, the great victory of +Tannenberg in East Prussia, before concluding this volume with a +summary of the whole situation in those first days of September, just +before the tide turned. + + +THE BATTLE OF METZ. + +The Battle of Metz, though quite subsidiary to the general operations +of the war, and upon a scale which later operations have dwarfed, will +be mentioned with special emphasis in any just account of the great +war on account of its moral significance. + +It took place before the main shock of the armies; it had no decisive +effect upon the future of the campaign; but it was of the very highest +weight, informing the German mind, and leading it into that attitude +of violent exaltation on which I shall later insist in these pages, +and which largely determined all the first months of the war, with +their enormous consequences for the future. For the action in front of +Metz was the first pitched battle fought in Western Europe during our +generation, and to an unexpected degree it fulfilled in its narrow +area all the dreams upon which military Germany had been nourished for +forty years. It thrilled the whole nation with the news, at the very +outset of hostilities, of a sharp and glorious victory; it seemed a +presage of far more to come. The Battle of Metz was the limited +foundation upon which was rapidly erected that triumphant mood that +lasted long after the tide had turned, and that matured, when bad +blundering had lost the victory in the West, into the unsoldierly, +muddled hope that could fail to win, and yet somehow not lose, a +campaign. + +We have seen that the disposition of the French armies at the moment +when the shock was being delivered through Belgium involved along the +frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine the presence of considerable forces. +These, once the operative corner had taken the shock, formed part of +the mass of manoeuvre, and were destined in large part to swing up in +aid of the men retreating from the Sambre. + +But in the very first days of the war, before the main blow had +fallen, and when the French General Staff were still in doubt as to +precisely where the blow _would_ fall, considerable bodies had been +operating in Alsace and over the Lorraine frontier. The whole range of +the Vosges was carried in the second week after the British +declaration of war--that is, between 10th August and 15th August. +Mulhouse was occupied; upon Monday, the 17th of August, Saarburg, the +most important railway junction between Strassburg and Metz, was in +French hands. Up to that date, though such comparatively small forces +were involved, the French had possessed a very decisive numerical +superiority. It was not destined to last, for there was moving down +from the north the now mobilized strength of Germany in this region; +and a blow struck against the French left, with no less than four +army corps, was speedily to decide the issue upon this subsidiary +front. + +[Illustration: Sketch 66.] + +This great force was based upon Metz, from which fortress the action +will presumably take its name in history. It stretched upon the 20th +of August from the north of Pont-ŕ-Mousson to beyond Château Salins. +Before this overwhelming advance the French left rapidly retired. It +did not retire quickly enough, and one portion of the French force--it +is believed the 15th Division (that is, the first division of the 15th +Army Corps)--failed in its task of supporting the shock. + +Details of the action are wholly lacking. We depend even for what may +be said at this date upon little more than rumour. The Germans claimed +a capture of ten batteries and of the equivalent of as many +battalions, and many colours. Upon the 21st the whole French left fell +back, carrying with them as a necessary consequence the centre in the +Vosges Mountains and the right upon the plains of Alsace. So rapid was +the retreat that upon the 22nd of August the Bavarians were at +Lunéville, and marching on Nancy; the extreme right of the German line +had come within range of the forts north of Toul; and in those same +hours during which, on that same Saturday, the 22nd of August, the 5th +French Army in the north fell back at the news of Namur and lost the +Sambre, those forces on the borders of Alsace-Lorraine had lost all +the first advantages of their thrust into the lost provinces, had +suffered defeat in the first striking action of the war, and had put +Nancy in peril. + +Nancy itself was saved. The French counter-offensive was organized on +the 23rd of August, at a moment when the German line lay from St. Dié +northwards and westwards up to positions just in front of Nancy. It +was delivered about a week later. That counter-offensive which +ultimately saved Nancy belongs to the next volume, for it did not +develop its strength until after Sedan Day, and after the end of the +great sweep on Paris. + +The situation, then, in this field (the very names of which have such +great moral effects upon the French and the German minds) was, by the +2nd of September, as follows:-- + +The French had suffered in the first considerable action of the war a +disaster. They had lost their foothold in the annexed provinces. They +had put the capital of French Lorraine, Nancy, in instant peril. They +had fallen back from the Vosges. They were beginning, with grave +doubts of its success, a counter-offensive, to keep the enemy, if +possible, from entering Nancy. They had lost thousands of men, many +colours, and scores of guns, and all Germany was full of the news. + + +LEMBERG. + +The foundation of the Germanic plan upon the Eastern front at the +origin of the war was, as we have said, the holding up of Russia +during her necessarily slow mobilization, while the decisive stroke +was delivered in the West. + +That is the largest view of the matter. + +In more detail, we know that the main part of this task was entrusted +to the Austro-Hungarian forces. The German forces had indeed entered +and occupied the west fringe of Russian Poland, seizing the small +industrial belt which lies immediately east of Silesia, and the two +towns of Czestochowa and Kalish--the latter, in the very centre of the +bend of the frontier, because it was a big railway depot, and, as it +were, a gage of invasion; the former, both because the holding of one +line demanded it (if Kalish and the industrial portion were held), and +because Czestochowa being the principal shrine of the Poles, some +strange notion may have passed through the German mind that the +presence therein of Prussian officers would cajole the Poles into an +action against Russia. If this were part of the motive (and probably +it was), it would be a parallel to many another irony in the present +campaign and its preliminaries, proceeding from the incapacity of the +enemy to gauge the subtler and more profound forces of a civilization +to which it is a stranger. + +[Illustration: Sketch 67.] + +This local German move was almost entirely political. The main task, +as I have said, was left to the Austrians farther south; and, +proceeding to further detail, we must see the Austrians stretched in a +line from near the middle Carpathians past the neighbourhood of +Tomasow towards Tarnow, and this line distinctly divided into two +armies, a northern and a southern. The two met in an angle in front of +the great fortress of Przemysl. The northern, or first, army faced, as +will be seen, directly towards the Russian frontier. It was the +operative wing; upon its immediate action and on the rapidity of the +blow it was to deliver depended the success of this first chapter in +the Eastern war. + +[Illustration: Sketch 68.] + +The southern, or second, army, which stretched all along the Galician +plain at the foot of the Carpathians to the town of Halicz, had for +its mission the protection of the first army from the south. It was +known, or expected, that the first army would advance right into +Russian Poland, with but inferior forces in front of it. It was +feared, however, that the main Russian concentration to the south-east +of it might turn its right flank. The business of the second army was +to prevent this. The first army (I), being the operative body, was +more homogeneous in race, more picked in material than the second +(II), the latter containing many elements from the southern parts of +the empire, including perhaps not a few disaffected contingents, such +as certain regiments of Italian origin from the Adriatic border. + +So far as we can judge, perhaps--and it is a very rough estimate--we +may put the whole body which Austria-Hungary was thus moving in the +first phase of the war beyond the Carpathians at more than 750,000, +but less than 1,000,000 men. Call the mass 800,000, and one would not +be far wrong. Of this mass quite a quarter lay in reserve near the +mountains behind the first army. The remaining three-quarters, or +600,000 men, were fairly evenly divided between the two groups of the +first and of the second army--the first, or northern, one being under +the command of Dankl, the second under that of von Auffenberg. Each +of these forces was based upon one group of depots of particular +importance, the northern operative army (I) relying upon Przemysl, and +the southern one (II) upon Lemberg. + +It was less than a week after the first German advance bodies had +taken the outer forts of Liége when Dankl crossed the frontier, +heading, with his centre, towards Krosnik and farther towards Lublin. +His troops were in Russian territory upon the Monday evening or the +Tuesday, 10th-11th August. + +The second army meanwhile stood fulfilling its rôle of awaiting and +containing any Russians that might strike in upon the south. It had +advanced no more than watching bodies towards the frontier, such as +the 35th Regiment of the Austrian Landwehr, which occupied Sokal, and +smaller units cordonned out southward between that town and Brody. +Here, at the outset of the large operations that were to follow, it is +important for the reader to note that everything depended upon the +resisting power of the second, or southern, army. + +Observe the problem. Two men, a left-hand man and a right-hand man, +go out to engage two other men whom they hope and believe to be +unready. The left-hand man is particularly confident of being able to +drive back his opponent, but he knows that sooner or later upon his +right the second enemy, a stronger man, may come in and disturb his +action. He says therefore to his right-hand companion: "Stand firm and +engage and contain the energy of your opponent until I have finished +with mine. When I have done that, I shall turn round towards you, and +between us we will finish the second man." + +Seeing the paucity of Russian communications, and the physical +necessity under which the Russians were, on account of the position of +their depots and centres of mobilization, of first putting the mass of +their men on the south, the physical impossibility under which they +lay of putting the mass of their men in the north for the moment, the +plan was a sound one; _but_ its success depended entirely upon the +tenacity of the second Austrian army, which would have to meet large, +and might have to meet superior, numbers. + +The first army went forward with very little loss and against very +little resistance. The Russian forces which were against it, which we +may call the first Russian army, were inferior in number, and fell +back, though not rapidly, towards the Bug. It relied to some extent in +this movement upon the protection afforded by the forts of Zamosc, but +it was never in any serious danger until, or unless, things went wrong +in the south. The Austrians remained in contact (but no more), turned +somewhat eastward in order to keep hold of the foe, when their advance +was checked by the news, first of unexpected Russian strength, later +of overwhelming Russian advances towards the south. Long before the +third week in August, the first Austrian army was compelled to check +its advance upon the news reaching it from the second, and its +fortunes, in what it had intended to be a successful invasion of +Russian Poland, had ended. For the whole meaning of the first Galician +campaign turns after the 14th of August upon the great Russian advance +in the south. + +It was upon that day, August 14, that the Russian force, under General +Russky (which we will call the second army), crossed the frontier. +Its right occupied Sokal, its centre left moved in line with the right +upon von Auffenberg's force directly before it. + +The Russian mobilization had proceeded at a greater pace than the +enemy had allowed for. The Russian numbers expected in this field +appeared in far greater strength than this expectation had allowed +for, and it was soon apparent that von Auffenberg's command would have +to resist very heavy pressure. + +But it would be an error to imagine, as was too hastily concluded in +the press of Western Europe at the time, that this pressure upon the +front of the second Austrian army, with its dogged day after day +fighting and mile by mile advance, was the principal deciding factor +in the issue. That deciding factor was, in fact, the appearance upon +the right flank of von Auffenberg of yet another Russian army (which +we will call the third) under Brussilov. It was the menace of this +force, unexpected, or at least unexpected in its great strength, which +really determined the issue, though this was again affected by the +tardiness of the Austrian retirement. Russky's direct advance upon +the front of his enemy extended for a week. It had begun when it had +destroyed the frontier posts upon Friday, the 14th. It was continued +until the evening of the succeeding Thursday, regularly, slowly, but +without intermission. It stood upon the Friday, the 21st--the day on +which the first shots were fired at the main Franco-British forces in +the West, and the day on which the first shell fell into Charleroi +station--not more than one day's cavalry advance from the outer works +of Lemberg, but it was just in that week-end that the pressure of +Brussilov began to be felt. + +This third Russian army had come up from the south-east, supplied by +the main Odessa railway through Tarnopol. It was manifestly +threatening the right flank of von Auffenberg, and if a guess may be +hazarded upon operations on which we have so little detail as yet, and +which took place so far from our own standpoint, the error of the +Austrian general seems to have consisted in believing that he could +maintain himself against this flank attack. If this were the case (and +it is the most probable explanation of what followed), the error +would have been due to the same cause which affected all Austrian +plans in these first days of the war--the mistake as to the rapidity +with which Russia would complete her preparations. + +[Illustration: Sketch 69.] + +The first outpost actions with the enemy, and even the more vigorous +struggles when full contact had been established with this third army +arrived thus from the south-east, only led the Austrian commander +deeper into his mistaken calculation; for upon the Sunday, August +23rd, a local success was achieved which seems to be magnified by the +Austrians into a decisive check administered to the enemy. If this was +their view, they were soon to be undeceived. In those very days which +saw the greatest peril in the West, the last days of August, during +which the Franco-British Allies were falling back from the Sambre, +pursued by the numbers we have seen upon an earlier page, the third +and the second Russian armies effected their junction, the moment of +their first joining hands being apparently that same Monday, the 24th +of August, during which Sir John French was falling back upon +Maubeuge. By the middle of the ensuing week they had already advanced +with a very heavy numerical superiority upon the part of the Russians, +which threatened to involve the Austrian second army in disaster. If +that went, the first army was at the mercy of the victors upon the +south, and with every day that passed the chance of collapse +increased. Now, too late (so far as we can judge), the second Austrian +army disposed itself for retreat, but that retreat was not allowed to +proceed in the orderly fashion which its commander had decided, and +in the event part of it turned into a rout, all of it developed into a +definite disaster for the enemy, and as conspicuous a success for our +ally. That this success was not decisive, as this great war must count +decisions, the reader will perceive before its description is +concluded; but it set a stamp upon the whole of the war in the East, +which months of fighting have not removed but rather accentuated. It +delivered the province of Galicia into the hands of Russia, it brought +that Power to the Carpathians, it ultimately compelled Germany to +decide upon very vigorous action of her own immediately in Poland, and +it may therefore be justly said to have changed the face of the war. + +To this great series of actions, which history will probably know by +the name of Lemberg, we will now turn. + +When this large Russian movement against the right of von Auffenberg's +army, and the considerable Russian concentration there, was clearly +discerned, the Austrian force was immediately augmented, and it was +not until after the first stages of the conflict we are about to +describe that it counted the full numbers mentioned above. But, even +so reinforced, it was inadequate for the very heavy task which there +fell upon it. It is not to be denied that its heterogeneous +composition--that is, its necessary weakness in quality--affected its +value; but the principal factor in its ill success was still the +superiority of Russian numbers in this field, and this, in its turn, +proceeded from a rapidity and completeness in the Russian mobilization +for which the enemy had never made provision. + +The action of the Russian left against von Auffenberg was twofold: +Russky, from the north, was coming across the river Bug, and struck an +Austrian entrenched line in front of Lemberg. His numbers permitted +him to turn that entrenched line, or, at any rate, to threaten its +turning, for Russky's right stretched almost to within cavalry touch +of Tomasow. In combination with this movement, and strictly +synchronizing with it, Brussilov was advancing from the Sereth River. +Both these movements were being carried out full during the last days +of August. + +[Illustration: Sketch 70.] + +It was on Friday, the 28th of that month, that Tarnopol fell, as we +have seen, into the hands of the Russians, and that Brussilov was, +therefore, able to effect his junction with Russky in the north, and +this success was the occasion of the first of those bayonet actions on +a large scale wherein the Russians throughout the war continued to +show such considerable personal superiority over their opponents. + +When Tarnopol had gone, not on account of the loss of their +geographical point, but because its occupation rendered the junction +of the Russian armies possible, and their advance in one great concave +line upon Lemberg, it was no longer doubtful that von Auffenberg had +lost this preliminary campaign. + +There are moments in war where the historian can fix a turning-point, +although the decision itself shall not yet have been reached. Thus, in +the campaign of 1793 between the French Revolution and its enemies, +Turcoing was not a decisive action, but it was the necessary breeder +of the decisive actions that followed. And in the same way Tarnopol, +though but a local success, decided Lemberg. In the last days of +August all von Auffenberg's right had to fall back rather rapidly upon +entrenched positions to the south and east of Lemberg itself, just as +his left had had to fall back on similar positions against Russky. + +The action for Lemberg itself opened, by a curious coincidence, the +campaign which was the anniversary of the first fighting round Sedan, +and closed precisely at the moment when the tide of German advance in +the West was turned. + +Forty-eight hours decided the issue. It was, perhaps, Russky's +continual extended threat to envelop the left of the Austrian position +and to come upon Auffenberg's communications which was the chief +factor in the result; but that result was, after the junction of the +two Russian armies, no longer really in doubt. The first heavy assault +upon the trenches had taken place upon the Wednesday morning at dawn; +before nightfall of Thursday the two extremes of the Austrian line +were bent back into such a horseshoe that any further delay would have +involved complete disaster. It is true that the central trenches in +front--that is, to the east of the great town--still held secure, and +had not, indeed, been severely tried. But it remains true that von +Auffenberg had committed the serious error of risking defeat in front +of such a city. And here some digression upon the nature of this +operation may be of service to the reader, because it is one which +reoccurs more than once in the first phases of the war, and must, in +the nature of things, occur over and over again before the end of it. + +Examples of it already appeared in the first six months of the war, in +the case of Lille and in the case of Lodz; and it is a necessarily +recurrent case in all modern warfare. + +A great _modern_ town, particularly if it has valuable industries, is +a lure as powerful over the modern commander as was a capital or the +seat of any government or even a fortress for those of earlier times. +To abandon such a centre is to let fall into the enemy's hands +opportunities for provisionment and _machinery_ for his further +supply; it is to allow great numbers of one's nationals to pass as +hostages into his power; it is nearly always to give up to him the +junction of several great railways; it is to permit him to levy heavy +indemnities, and even, if he is in such a temper, to destroy in great +quantities the accumulated wealth of the past. + +On account of all this, it requires a single eye to the larger issues +of war, and a sort of fanaticism for pure strategy in a commander +before he will consent to fall behind a position of such political +and material value, and to let it fall to his opponent. + +But, on the other hand, such a position is as bad in strategical value +as it is good in material and political value. + +If you suffer defeat in front of a great modern town, and have to +retreat through it under the blows of the victorious enemy, you are in +the worst possible position for conducting that retreat. The streets +of the town (but few of which will run parallel to your course and +can, therefore, serve as avenues of escape for your army) are so many +defiles in which your columns will get hopelessly congested. The +operation may be compared to the pouring of too much liquid into a +funnel which has too small an orifice. Masses of your transport will +remain clogged outside the place; you run the risk of a partial and +perhaps of a complete disaster as the enemy presses on. + +There is very much more than this. A great town cannot but contain, if +you have long occupied it, the material of your organization; you will +probably abandon documents which the enemy should not see. You will +certainly, in the pressure of such a flight, lose accumulated stores. +Again, the transverse streets are so many points of "leakage," into +which your congested columns will bulge out and get confused. Again, +you will be almost necessarily dealing with the complication of a mass +of civilian conditions which should never be allowed to interrupt a +military operation. + +In general, to fight in front of a great town, when the chances are +against you, is as great an error as to fight in front of a marsh with +few causeways; so far as mere topography is concerned, it is a greater +error still. + +Lemberg did not, indeed, fulfil all these conditions. It is very large +(not far from a quarter of a million people), with all its suburbs it +is nearly two miles in extreme extent, and its older or central part +is a confusion of narrow streets; but it is not highly industrialized, +and the position of the Austrian armies was such that the retreat +could be effected mainly from either side of the built area, +particularly as the main enemy pressure had not come in front of the +city along the Busk Road, but far to the east and south in the open +field. But Lemberg was an exceedingly important railway centre (seven +lines converge there), and it contained an immense amount of war +munitions. When, therefore, the retreat was tardily undertaken, the +fact that the more precipitate retirement had begun in front of the +city and not behind it was of considerable effect in what followed. + +To some extent von Auffenberg, in spite of the tardiness of his +decision to retire, had protected his retreat. The main line of that +retreat was established for him, of course, by the main Galician +railway, which runs back from Lemberg to Przemysl. He prepared a +position some two days' march behind Lemberg, and defended with a +rearguard at Grodek the belated withdrawal of his main force. But from +the nature of the Russian advance, Russky, upon von Auffenberg's left, +perpetually threatened this railway; and Brussilov, upon his right, +pressed the rapidly-melting mass of the varied contingents opposed to +him through the difficult, hilly, and woody country of the foothills. + +[Illustration: Sketch 71.] + +It was upon the Friday, September 4th, that the Austrian evacuation of +Lemberg was complete, and that the Russian administration was +established in the town. Before Monday, the 7th, the Austrian right +had already half converted their retirement into a rout, and the great +captures of prisoners and of guns had begun. That important arm, the +irregular light cavalry of the Russians, notably the great Cossack +contingent, found its opportunity, and the captures began upon a scale +far exceeding anything which the war had hitherto shown or was to +show for at least the next six months. The matter is of more +importance, to our judgment of the war, in its quality than in its +scale. In the very same week at Tannenberg nearly as many Russians had +been eliminated from the Russian forces as Austrians were here +eliminated from the Austrian forces. But the point is that, whereas in +the Battle of Tannenberg envelopment, with its consequent slaughter of +men who cannot escape and its wholesale captures, left the rest of the +Russian army with its _moral_ intact, the Austrian losses were the +product of a partial dissolution, and affected the whole of their +southern army. First and last one-third of it had fallen _as +prisoners_ into Russian hands, apart from the enormous number of +killed and removed wounded. It could only just be said that that army +remained in being upon Monday, the 7th September, with which date this +section of my work ends. The other Austrian army to the north, its +flank thus uncovered, was compelled to fall back rapidly, though the +forces in front of it were small; and the Austro-Hungarian service +never fully recovered from this great blow. + + +TANNENBERG. + +The province of East Prussia is of a character peculiar in the German +Empire and in Europe. + +That character must be grasped if the reader is to understand what +fortunes attended the war in this region; for it is a district which +in its history, in its political value, and in its geographical +arrangements has very powerfully affected the whole of the campaign. + +Historically this district is the cradle of that mixed race whose +strict, narrow, highly defined, but quite uncreative policy has now +piqued, now alarmed, civilized Europe for almost two hundred years. + +[Illustration: Sketch 72.] + +The Prussian, or rather the Prussian aristocracy, which, by achieving +the leadership of Germany, has flung so heavy a mass at Europe, +originated in the rough admixture of certain West German and Christian +knights with the vague pagan population of the Eastern Baltic plain, +which, until almost the close of the Middle Ages, was still a field +for missionary effort and for crusade. It was the business of the +Teutonic knights to tame this march of Christendom. They accomplished +their work almost out of sight of the governing empire, the Papacy, +and Christendom in general, with what infamies history records. The +district thus occupied was not within the belt of that high Polish +culture which is one of the glories of Europe. Nations may not +inexactly be divided into those who seek and those who avoid the sea. +The Poles are of the latter type. This belt, therefore, of _Borussia_ +(whence our word Prussia is derived)--roughly from the Vistula up on +to the Bight of Libau--was held by the Teutonic knights in a sort of +savage independence. The Christian faith, which it had been their +pretext and at first their motive to spread, took little root; but +they did open those avenues whereby the civilization which Germany +itself had absorbed from the south and west could filter in; and the +northern part of the district, that along the sea (which is the least +marshy, and, as that poor country goes, the least barren), was from +the close of the Middle Ages German-owned, though for some generations +nominally adherent to the Polish crown. The Polish race extended no +farther northward in the present province than the lake country of its +southern half, and even there suffered an admixture of Lithuanian and +German blood. + +That lake country well merits a particular description, for its +topography has powerfully affected the war in the East; but for the +moment we must chiefly grasp the political character following upon +the history of this land. The chief noble of "Borussia," the governing +duke, acquired, not from the empire nor perhaps in the eyes of Europe, +but from the Polish monarchy, the title of king, and it must never be +forgotten that the capital at Berlin, and the "Mark"--that is, the +frontier march--of Brandenburg, though now the centre, are neither the +origins nor the pride of the Hohenzollern power. They were kings of +Prussia because Prussia was extraneous to the European system. There +came a moment, as I have pointed out in an earlier page in this book, +when the Prussian kingship and the electorate of Brandenburg coincided +in one person. All men of education know, and all men whatsoever feel, +what influence an historical origin will have upon national outlook. +East Prussia, therefore, remains to-day something of a political +fetish. Its towns may be called colonies of the Germans, the +birthplaces or the residences of men famous in the German story. Its +country-sides, although still largely inhabited by a population of +servile memories and habits not thoroughly welded with their masters, +do not take up great space in the view the German takes of the region. +He sees rather the German landowner, the German bailiff, the German +schoolmaster, and the numerous German tenants of the wealthier type +who, though a minority, form the chief part of this social system. We +shall see later what this miscalculation cost the great landowners +during the Russian invasion, but we must note in passing that it is a +miscalculation common to every people. Only that which is articulate +in the States stands out large in the social perspective during +periods of order and of peace. + +The Prussian royal house, the Prussian aristocracy, have then for this +bastion towards the east an especial regard, which has not been +without its sentimental influence upon the course of the war; and that +regard is very highly increased by the artificial political boundaries +of modern times. + +East Prussia is, for the Germans as a whole, their rampart against the +Slav; and though, beyond the present purely political and only +century-old frontier, a large German-speaking population is to be +discovered (especially in the towns under Russian rule), yet such is +the influence of a map upon a people essentially bookish in their +information, that East Prussia stands to the whole German Empire, as +well as to its wealthier inhabitants, for a proof of the German power +to withstand the dreaded pressure of the Russian from the East. + +It was to be expected, therefore, that two strategical consequences +would flow from these non-strategical conditions: first, that the +Russians would be tempted--though, no doubt, in very small force for +such a secondary operation--to raid a district towards which the +enemy's opinion was so sensitive; secondly, that enemy would be +tempted, after each such effort, to extend a disproportionate force in +ridding the country of such raids. + +The Germans, for all the dictates of pure strategics, would hardly +hold firm under the news that Slav soldiers were in the farms and +country-houses, and were threatening the townsfolk of East Prussia. +The Russians, though no direct advantage was to be gained, and though +the bulk of their force must be used elsewhere, would certainly be +drawn to move into East Prussia in spite of the known and peculiarly +heavy difficulties to an advance which that province presented. + +What were those difficulties? + +They were of two kinds, the second of which has been, perhaps, unduly +emphasized at the expense of the first. + +The first was, that the Baltic extreme of this region lay at the very +end of the longest possible line the Russians could move on. Even +supposing their front extended (as soon it did) from the Carpathians +to the sea, this Baltic piece was the end of the line and farthest +from their material bases and their sources of equipment. It was badly +served with railways, difficult of access from the soil lying to the +east, and backed by that sparsely inhabited belt of Russian territory +in which the modern capital of St. Petersburg has been artificially +erected, but which is excentric to the vital process of Russia. As a +fact, even after eight months of war, let alone in the first phases +which we are here about to describe, the extreme end of this line was +not attempted by the Russians at all. + +Next to this extreme position, which was the first handicap, comes the +region of the lakes, the nature of which was the second handicap. + +The Masurian Lake district can best be appreciated by some description +of its geology and its landscape. It was probably moulded by the work +of ice in the past. Great masses of ice have ground out, in their very +slow progress towards the sea over the very slight incline northwards +of that line, hollows innumerable, and varying from small pools to +considerable lakes; the ice has left, upon a background of sand, +patches of clay, which hold the waters of all this countryside in +brown stretches of shallow mere, and in wider extents of marsh and +bog. The rare travellers who explore this confusion of low rounded +swells and flats carry back with them to better lands a picture of one +grossly monotonous type continuing day upon day. Pine and birch woods, +often ordered with the regularity and industry of the German forest +organization, but often also straggling and curiously stunted and +small, break or confuse the view upon either side. + +The impression of the district is most clearly conveyed from some +sandy summit, bare of trees, whence a man may overlook, though not +from any great height, the desolate landscape for some miles. He +obtains from such a view neither the sense of forest which wooded +lands of great height convey in spite of their clearings, nor the +sense of endless plain which he would find farther to the east or to +the north. He perceives through the singularly clear air in autumn +brown heaths and plains set here and there with the great stretches of +woodland and farmsteads, the stubble of which is soon confused by the +eye in the distance with the barren heaths around. In winter, the +undulating mass of deep and even snow is marked everywhere by the +small, brown, leafless trees in their great groupings, and by the +pines, as small, and weighted with the burden of the weather; but much +the most striking of the things seen in such a landscape are the +stretches of black water, or, if the season be hard, of black ice +which, save when the snow has recently fallen, fierce winds will +commonly have swept bare. + +The military character of such a region will be clear. It is, in the +technical language of military art, a labyrinth of _defiles_. Care has +been expended upon the province, especially in the last two +generations, and each narrow passage between the principal sheets of +water carries a road, often a hard causeway. A considerable system of +railways takes advantage of the same natural narrow issues; but even +to those familiar with the country, the complexity of these narrow dry +gates or defiles, and their comparative rarity (contrasted with the +vast extent of waterlogged soil or of open pool), render an advance +against any opposition perilous, and even an unopposed advance slow, +and dependent upon very careful Staff work. Columns in their progress +are for hours out of touch one with the other, and an unexpected check +in some one narrow must be met by the force there present alone, for +it will not be able to obtain immediate reinforcement. + +Again, all this line, with its intermixture of sand and clay, which is +due to its geological origin, is a collection of traps for any +commander who has not thoroughly studied his lines of advance or of +retreat--one might almost say for any commander who has not had long +personal experience of the place. There will be across one mere a belt +of sand or gravel, carrying the heaviest burdens through the shallow +water as might a causeway. Its neighbour, with a surface precisely +twin, with the same brown water, fringed by the same leaves and dreary +stretches of stunted wood, will be deep in mud, but a natural platform +may stretch into a lake and fail the column which uses it before the +farther shore is reached. In the strongest platforms of this kind gaps +of deep clay or mud unexpectedly appear. But even with these +deceptions, a column is lucky which has only to deal in its march with +open water and firm banks; for the whole place is sown with what were +formerly the beds of smaller meres, and are now bogs hardened in +places, in others still soft--the two types of soil hardly +distinguishable. + +During any orderly advance, an army proceeding through the Masurian +Lakes will strictly confine itself to the great causeways and to the +railway. During any retreat in which it is permitted to observe the +same order it will be similarly confined to the only possible issues; +but let the retreat be confused, and disaster at once threatens. + +A congested column attempting to spread out to the right or to the +left will fall into marsh. Guns which it has attempted to save by the +crossing of a ford will sooner or later find mud and be abandoned. Men +will be drowned in the unexpected deeps, transport embedded and lost; +and apart from all this vast wastage, the confusion of units will +speedily put such a brake upon the whole process of retirement that +envelopment by an enemy who knows the district more thoroughly is +hardly to be avoided. + +It was this character in the dreary south of East Prussia which was +the cause of Tannenberg, and as we read the strategical plan of that +disaster, we must keep in mind the view so presented of an empty land, +thus treacherous with marsh and reed and scrub and stretches of barren +flat, which may be heath, or may be a horse's height and more of +slightly covered slime. + +The first phase of the business lasts until the 24th of August, +beginning with the 7th of that month, and may be very briefly dealt +with. + +Two Russian armies, numbering altogether perhaps 200,000 men, or at +the most a quarter of a million, advanced, the one from the Niemen, +the other from the Narew--that is, the one from the east, the other +from the south, into East Prussia. The Germans had here reserve +troops, in what numbers we do not know, but perhaps half the combined +numbers of the Russian invasion, or perhaps a little more. The main +shock was taken upon the eastern line of invasion at Gumbinnen; the +Germans, defeated there, and threatened by the continued advance of +the other army to the west of them, which forbade their retreat +westward, fell back in considerable disorder upon Königsberg, lost +masses of munitions and guns, and were shut up in that fortress. The +defeat at Gumbinnen occupied four days--from the 16th to the 20th of +August. + +Meanwhile the Russian army which was advancing from the Narew had +struck a single German army corps--the 20th--in the neighbourhood of +Frankenau. The Russian superiority in numbers was very great; the +German army corps was turned and divided. Half of it fled westward, +abandoning many guns and munitions; the other half fled north-eastward +towards Königsberg, and the force as a whole disappeared from the +field. The Russians pushed their cavalry westward; Allenstein was +taken, and by the 25th of August the most advanced patrols of the +Russians had almost reached the Vistula. + +The necessity for retaking East Prussia by the Germans was a purely +political one. The vast crowd of refugees flying westward spread panic +within the empire. The personal feeling of the Emperor and of the +Prussian aristocracy in the matter of the defeated province was keen. +Had that attempt to retake East Prussia failed, military history would +point to it as a capital example of the error of neglecting purely +strategical for political considerations. As a fact, it succeeded +beyond all expectation, and its success is known as the German victory +of Tannenberg. + +The nature of this victory may be grasped from the accompanying sketch +map. + +From the town of Mlawa, just within Russian Poland, beyond the +frontier, runs, coming up from Warsaw, a railway to Soldau, just upon +the Prussian side of the frontier. At Soldau three railways +converge--one from the east, one going west to Niedenberg and the +junction of Ortelsberg, a third coming in from the north-east and +Eylau. + +[Illustration: Sketch 73.] + +From Eylau, through Osterode, the main international line runs +through Allenstein, and so on eastward, while a branch from this goes +through Passenheim to the junction at Ortelsberg. + +Here, then, you have a quadrilateral of railways about fifty miles in +length. Within that quadrilateral is extremely bad country--lakes, +marshes, and swamps--and the only good roads within it are those +marked in single lines upon my sketch--the road from Allenstein +through Hohenstein to Niedenberg, and the road from Niedenberg to +Passenheim. As one goes eastwards on that road from Niedenberg to +Passenheim, in the triangle Niedenberg-Passenheim-Ortelsberg, the +country gets worse and worse, and is a perfect labyrinth of marsh, +wood, and swamp. The development of the action in such a ground was as +follows:-- + +The Russian commander, Samsonoff, with his army running from +Allenstein southwards, was facing towards the west. He had with him +perhaps 200,000 men, perhaps a trifle less. His reconnaissance was +faulty, partly because the aeroplanes could discover little in that +wooded country, partly because the Staff work was imperfect, and his +Intelligence Department not well informed by his cavalry patrols. He +thought he had against him to the west only weak forces. As a fact, +the Germans were sending against him what they themselves admit to be +150,000 men, and what were quite possibly nearer 200,000, for they had +drawn largely upon the troops within Germany. They had brought round +by sea many of the troops shut up in Königsberg, and they had brought +up the garrisons upon the Vistula. Further, they possessed, drawn from +these garrisons, a great superiority in that arm which throughout all +the earlier part of the great war was the German stand-by--heavy +artillery, and big howitzers capable of use in the field. + +On Wednesday, 26th August, Samsonoff first discovered that he had a +formidable force in front of him. + +It was under the command of von Hindenburg, a man who had studied this +district very thoroughly, and who, apart from his advantage in heavy +artillery, knew that difficult country infinitely better than his +opponents. During the Wednesday, the 26th, Hindenburg stood upon the +defensive, Samsonoff attacking him upon the line Allenstein-Soldau. At +the end of that defensive, the attack on which was badly hampered in +so difficult a country, von Hindenburg massed men upon his right near +Soldau. This move had two objects: first, by pushing the Russians back +there to make them lose the only good road and railway by which they +could retire south upon their communications into the country whence +they had come; secondly, to make them think, in their natural anxiety +for those communications, that his main effort would be delivered +there to the south. As a fact, it was his intention to act elsewhere. +But the effect of his pressure along the arrow _a_ was to give the +Russian line by the evening of that Wednesday, the 26th of August, the +form of the line 1 upon Sketch 73. + +The advantage he had thus gained in front of Soldau, Hindenburg +maintained by rapid and successful entrenchment; and the next day, +Thursday, 27th August, he moved great numbers round by railway to his +left near Allenstein, and appeared there with a great local +superiority in numbers and in heavy guns. By the evening of that day, +then, the 27th, he had got the Russian line into the position 2, and +the chief effort was being directed along the arrow _b_. On the 28th +and 29th the pressure continued, and increased here upon the north; +the Russian right was pushed back upon Passenheim, for which there was +a most furious fight; and by the evening of the 29th Samsonoff's whole +body was bent right round into the curve of the line 3, and vigorous +blows were being dealt against it along the arrow _c_, which bent it +farther and farther in. + +It was clearly evident by that evening, the 29th of August, that +Samsonoff must retreat; but his opportunities for such a retreat were +already difficult. All he had behind him was the worst piece in the +whole country--the triangle Passenheim-Ortelsberg-Niedenberg--and his +main avenue of escape was a defile between the lake which the railway +at Ortelsberg uses. + +His retirement became hopelessly congested. Further pressure along the +arrow _d_, during the 30th and 31st, broke that retirement into two +halves, one half (as at 5) making off eastwards, the other half (as +at 4) bunched together in a hopeless welter in a country where every +egress was blocked by swamp and mire, and subjected to the pounding of +the now concentrated ring of heavy guns. The body at 5 got away in the +course of the 1st and 2nd of September, but only at the expense of +leaving behind them great numbers of guns, wounded, and stragglers. +The body at 4 was, in the military sense of the word, "annihilated." +It numbered at least two army corps, or 80,000 men, and of these it is +probable that 50,000 fell into the hands of the enemy, wounded and +unwounded. The remainder, representing the killed, and the chance +units that were able to break out, could hardly have been more than +20,000 to 30,000 men. + +Such was the victory of Tannenberg--an immensely successful example of +that enveloping movement which the Germans regarded as their peculiar +inheritance; a victory in nature recalling Sedan, and upon a scale not +inferior to that battle. + +The news of that great triumph reached Berlin upon Sedan Day, at the +very moment when the corresponding news from the West was that von +Kluck had reached the gates of Paris, and had nothing in front of him +but the broken and inferior armies of a disastrous defeat. + + +THE SPIRITS IN CONFLICT. + +At this point it is well to pause and consider an element of the +vastest consequence to the whole conduct of these great campaigns--I +mean the element of German confidence. + +Here we have a nation which has received within a fortnight of its +initial large operations, within the first five weeks of a war which +it had proudly imposed upon its enemies, the news of a victory more +startlingly triumphant than its most extreme expectation of success +had yet imagined possible. + +Let the reader put himself into the position of a German subject in +his own station of life, a town dweller, informed as is the English +reader by a daily press, which has come to be his sole source of +opinion, enjoying or suffering that almost physical self-satisfaction +and trust in the future which is, unfortunately, not peculiar to the +North German, but common in varying degree to a whole school of morals +to-day. Let him remember that this man has been specially tutored and +coached into a complete faith in the superiority of himself and his +kind over the rest of the human race, and this in a degree superior +even to that in which other nations, including our own, have indulged +after periods of expanding wealth and population. + +Let the reader further remember that in this the Germans' rooted faith +their army was for them at once its cause and its expression; then +only can he conceive what attitude the mind of such men would assume +upon the news from East and from West during those days--the news of +the avalanche in France and the news of Tannenberg. It would seem to +the crowd in Berlin during the great festival which marked the time +that they were indeed a part of something not only necessarily +invincible, but of a different kind in military superiority from other +men. + +These, from what would seem every quarter of the globe, had been +gathered to oppose him, merely because the German had challenged his +two principal enemies. Though yet far from being imperilled by so +universal a movement, he crushes it utterly, and in a less time than +it takes for a great nation to realize that it is under arms, he is +overwhelmed by the news not of his enemy's defeat, but rather of his +annihilation. Miles of captured guns and hour upon hour of marching +columns of prisoners are the visible effect of his triumph and the +confirmation of it; and he hears, after the awful noise of his +victories, a sort of silence throughout the world--a silence of awe +and dread, which proclaims him master. It is the anniversary of Sedan. + +I do not set down this psychological phenomenon for the mere pleasure +of its description, enormous as that phenomenon is, and worthy of +description as it is. I set it down because I think that only in an +appreciation of it can one understand the future development of the +war. After the Battle of Metz, after the sweep down upon Paris from +the Sambre, after this immense achievement of Tannenberg, the +millioned opinion of a now united North Germany was fixed. It was so +fixed that even a dramatically complete disaster (and the German +armies have suffered none) might still leave the North German unshaken +in his confidence. Defeats would still seem to him but episodes upon a +general background, whose texture was the necessary predominance of +his race above the lesser races of the world. This is the mood we +shall discover in all that Germany does from that moment forward. It +is of the first importance to realize it, because that mood is, so to +speak, the chemical basis of all the reactions that follow. That mood, +disappointed, breeds fury and confusion; in the event of further +slight successes, it breeds a vast exaggeration of such success; in +the presence of any real though but local advance, it breeds the +illusion of a final victory. + +It is impossible to set down adequately in these few pages this +intoxication of the first German victories. It must be enough to +recall to the reader that the strange mood with which we have to deal +was also one of a century's growth, a century during which not only in +Germany, but in Scandinavia, in the universities (and many other +cliques) of England, even largely in the United States, a theory had +grown and prospered that something called "the Teutonic race" was the +origin of all we valued; that another thing, called in one aspect "the +Latin" or in another aspect "the Celt," was something in the one case +worn out, in the other negligible through folly, instability, and +decay. The wildest history gathered round this absurd legend, not only +among the Germans but wherever the "Teutonic theory" flourished, and +the fatuous vanity of the North German was fed by the ceaseless +acceptance of that legend on the part of those who believed themselves +to be his kinsmen. + +They still believe it. In every day that passes the press of Great +Britain reveals the remains of this foolery. And while the real +person, England, is at grips with another real thing, Prussia, which +is determined to kill her by every means in its power, the empty +theorizing of professors who do not see _things_, but only the +imaginary figures of their theories, continues to regard England as in +some way under a German debt, and subject to the duty of admiring her +would-be murderer. + +Before leaving this digression, I would further remind the reader +that nowhere in the mass of the British population is this strange +theory of German supremacy accepted, and that outside the countries I +have named not even the academic classes consider it seriously. In the +eyes of the Frenchman, the Italian, and the Pole, the North German is +an inferior. His numbers and his equipment for war do not affect that +sentiment, for it is recognized that all he has and does are the +product of a lesson carefully learned, and that his masters always +were and still are the southern and the western nations, with their +vastly more creative spirit, their hardier grip in body as in mind, +their cleaner souls, and their more varied and developed ideals. + +If this was the mood of the German people when the war in its first +intense moment had, as it were, cast into a permanent form the molten +popular soul, what was that of the nation which the Germans knew in +their hearts, in spite of the most pitiable academic illusion, to be +the permanent and implacable enemy--I mean the French people? + +Comprehend the mood of the French, contrast and oppose it to that of +the Germans, and you will have viewed almost in its entirety the +spiritual theatre of this gigantic struggle. No don's talk of "Slav" +or "Teuton," of "progressive" or "backward" nations, mirrors in any +way the realities of the great business. This war was in some almost +final fashion, and upon a scale quite unprecedented, the returning +once again of those conflicting spirits which had been seen over the +multitudes in the dust of the Rhone valley when Marius came up from +Italy and met the chaos in the North. They had met again in the damp +forests of the Ardennes and the vague lands beyond the Rhine, when the +Roman auxiliaries of the decline pushed out into the Germanies to set +back the frontiers of barbarism. It was the clash between strong +continuity, multiple energies, a lucid possession of the real world, a +creative proportion in all things--all that we call the ancient +civilization of Europe--and the unstable, quickly growing, quickly +dissolving outer mass which continually learns its lesson from the +civilized man, and yet can never perfectly learn that lesson; which +sees itself in visions and has dreams of itself: which now servilely +accepts the profound religion of its superior; now, the brain fatigued +by mysteries, shakes off that burden which it cannot comprehend. + +By an accident comparatively recent, the protagonist of chaos in these +things happened to be that rigid but curiously amorphous power which +Prussia has wielded for many years to no defined end. The protagonist +upon the other side of the arena was that same Romanized Gaul which +had ever since the fall of the Empire least lost the continuity with +the past whereby we live. + +But the defender of ancient things was (again by an accident in what +is but a moment for universal history) the weaker power. In the +tremendous issue it looked as though numbers and values had fallen +apart, and as though the forces of barbarism, though they could never +make, would now at last permanently destroy. + +In what mood, I say, did the defenders of the European story enter the +last and most perilous of their debates? We must be able to answer +that question if we are to understand even during the course of the +war its tendency and its probable end. + +By the same road, the valley of the Oise, which had seen twenty times +before lesser challenges of the kind, the North had rushed down. It +was a gauge of its power that all the West was gathered there in +common, with contingents from Britain in the heart of the press. + +The enemy had come on in a flood of numbers: the defence, and half as +much as the defence, and more again. The line swung down irresistible, +with the massy weight of its club aimed at Paris. If the eastern forts +at Toul and at Verdun and the resistance before Nancy had held back +its handle, that resistance had but enabled it to pivot with the freer +swing. Not only had there fallen back before its charge all the +arrayed armies of the French and their new Ally, but also all that had +counted in the hopes of the defenders had failed. All that the last +few years had promised in the new work of the air, all that a +generation had built up of permanent fortified work, had been proved +impotent before the new siege train. The barrier fortresses of the +Meuse, Liége and Namur, had gone up like paper in a fire. Maubeuge was +at its last days. Another week's bombardment and the ring of Verdun +would be broken. + +The sweep has no parallel in the monstrous things of history. Ten days +had sufficed for the march upon the capital. Nor had there been in +that ten days a moment's hope or an hour of relaxation. + +No such strain has yet been endured, so concentrated, so exact an +image of doom. + +And all along the belt of that march the things that were the +sacrament of civilization had gone. Rheims was possessed, the village +churches of the "Island of France" and of Artois were ruins or +desolations. The peasantry already knew the destruction of something +more than such material things, the end of a certain social pact which +war in Christendom had spared. They had been massacred in droves, with +no purpose save that of terror; they had been netted in droves, the +little children and the women with the men, into captivity. The track +of the invasion was a wound struck not, as other invasions have been, +at some territory or some dynasty; it was a wound right home to the +heart of whatever is the West, of whatever has made our letters and +our buildings and our humour between them. There was a death and an +ending in it which promised no kind of reconstruction, and the fools +who had wasted words for now fifty years upon some imagined excellence +in the things exterior to the tradition of Europe, were dumb and +appalled at the sight of barbarism in action--in its last action after +the divisions of Europe had permitted its meaningless triumph for so +long. Were Paris entered, whether immediately or after that +approaching envelopment of the armies, it would be for destruction; +and all that is not replaceable in man's work would be lost to our +children at the hands of men who cannot make. + +The immediate approach of this death and the cold wind of it face to +face produced in the French people a singular reaction, which even +now, after eight months of war, is grimly seen. Their irony was +resolved into a strained silence. Their expectation was halted and +put aside. They prophesied no future; they supported the soul neither +with illusions nor with mere restraint; but they threw their whole +being into a tension like that of the muscles of a man's face when it +is necessary for him to pass and to support some overmastering moment. +There was no will at issue with the small group of united wills whose +place was at the headship of the army. The folly of the politicians +had not only ceased, but had fallen out of memory. + +It is no exaggeration to say that the vividness of that +self-possession for a spring annihilated time. It was not a fortnight +since the blow had come of the 15th Corps breaking before Metz, and +the stunning fall of Namur. But to the mind of the People it was +already a hundred years, and conversely the days that passed did not +pass in hours, or with any progression, but stood still. + +There was to come--it was already in the agony of birth--the moment, a +day and a night, in which one effort rolled the wave right back. That +effort did not release the springs of the national soul. They +remained stretched to the utmost. By a character surely peculiar to +this unexampled test of fire, no relaxation came as, month after +month, the war proceeded. + +But the passage of so many days, with the gradual broadening of vision +and, in time, the aspect, though distant, of slow victory; the +creeping domination acquired over the mass of spiritually sodden +things that had all but drowned the race; the pressure of the hand +tightening upon the throat of the murderer; released a certain high +potential which those who do not know it can no more comprehend than a +savage can comprehend the lightning which civilized man regulates and +holds in the electric wire. And this potential made, and is making, +for an intense revenge. + +That is the vision that should remain with those who desire to +understand the future the war must breed, and that is the white heat +of energy which will explain very terrible things, still masked by the +future, and undreamt of here. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] The ultimatum expired at midnight (August 4-5) by Greenwich time, +11 p.m. (August 4) by German, or Central European, time. + +[3] AA is holding the obstacle OO against a superior number BB. There +are six passages across OO. If BB forces No. 5 and No. 6 he creates +the situation in the following diagram, where it is obvious that BB is +now on the flank of AA, and that AA must retire, even if he still +holds passages 1, 2, 3, and 4. That is what happened when Namur fell. +The French could hold, and were holding, the Germans along the Sambre, +above Namur; but the bridges of Namur, which were thought safe behind +the forts, had fallen into German hands. + +[Illustration: Sketch 44.] + + +PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN. + + + * * * * * + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A General Sketch of the European War, by +Hilaire Belloc + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SKETCH OF THE EUROPEAN WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 18042-8.txt or 18042-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/8/0/4/18042/ + +Produced by Thierry Alberto, Jeannie Howse and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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