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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Before the War, by Viscount Richard Burton
+Haldane
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Before the War
+
+
+Author: Viscount Richard Burton Haldane
+
+
+
+Release Date: March 16, 2006  [eBook #17998]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BEFORE THE WAR***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Jeannie Howse, and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net/)
+
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+
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+
+      +--------------------------------------------------------------+
+      | Transcriber's Note:                                          |
+      |                                                              |
+      | While the author of this work uses unusual spelling, a       |
+      | number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected.  |
+      | A complete list will be found at the end of the book.        |
+      |                                                              |
+      +--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
+
+
+BEFORE THE WAR
+
+by
+
+VISCOUNT HALDANE
+
+Secretary of State for War from December, 1905 to June, 1912;
+Lord High Chancellor from June, 1912 to May, 1915.]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: _London Stereoscopic Co_.
+
+
+
+
+Funk & Wagnalls Company
+New York and London
+1920
+Copyright, 1920, by Funk & Wagnalls Company
+[Printed in the United States of America]
+Published in February, 1920
+Copyright under the Articles of the Copyright Convention of the
+Pan-American Republics of the United States, August 11, 1910
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFATORY NOTE
+
+
+The chapters of which this little volume consists were constructed with
+a definite purpose. It was to render clear the line of thought and
+action followed by the Government of this country before the war,
+between January, 1906, and August, 1914. The endeavor made was directed
+in the first place to averting war, and in the second place to preparing
+for it as well as was practicable if it should come. In reviewing what
+happened I have made use of the substance of various papers recently
+contributed to the _Westminster Gazette_, the _Atlantic Monthly_, _Land
+and Water_, and the _Sunday Times_. The gist of these, which were
+written with their inclusion in this book in view, has been incorporated
+in the text together with other material. I have to thank the Editors of
+these journals for their courtesy in agreeing that the substance of what
+they published should be made use of here as part of a connected
+whole.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                             PAGE
+INTRODUCTION                                                   13
+
+DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR                                       35
+
+THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR                            101
+
+THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS                                     177
+
+EPILOG                                                        207
+
+INDEX                                                         227
+
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+VISCOUNT HALDANE                                   _Frontispiece_
+
+COUNT METTERNICH                                   Facing page 57
+
+M. PAUL CAMBON                                                 78
+
+VISCOUNT GREY (SIR EDWARD GREY)                                87
+
+CHANCELLOR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG                               101
+
+ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ                                           137
+
+COUNT BERCHTOLD                                               153
+
+COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN                                         170
+
+
+
+
+BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+The purpose of the pages which follow is, as I have said in the
+Prefatory Note, to explain the policy pursued toward Germany by Great
+Britain through the eight years which immediately preceded the great war
+of 1914. It was a policy which had two branches, as inseparable as they
+were distinct. The preservation of peace, by removing difficulties and
+getting rid of misinterpretations, was the object of the first branch.
+The second branch was concerned with what might happen if we failed in
+our effort to avert war. Against any outbreak by which such failure
+might be followed we had to insure. The form of the insurance had to be
+one which, in our circumstances, was practicable, and care had to be
+taken that it was not of a character that would frustrate the main
+purpose by provoking, and possibly accelerating, the very calamity
+against which it was designed to provide.
+
+The situation was delicate and difficult. The public most properly
+expected of British Ministers that they should spare no effort for peace
+and for security. It was too sensible to ask for every detail of the
+steps taken for the attainment of this end. There are matters on which
+it is mischievous to encourage discussion, even in Parliament. Members
+of Parliament know this well, and are sensible about it. The wisest
+among them do not press for open statements which if made to the world
+would imperil the very object which Parliament and the public have
+directed those responsible to them to seek to attain. What is objected
+to in secret diplomacy hardly includes that which from its very nature
+must be negotiated in the first instance between individuals.
+
+The policy actually followed was in principle satisfactory to the great
+majority of our people. To them it was familiar in its general outlines.
+But for the minority, which included both our pacifists and our
+chauvinists, it was either too much or too little. For, on the one hand,
+its foundation was the theory that, amid the circumstances of Europe in
+which it had to be built up, human nature could not be safely relied on
+unswervingly to resist warlike impulses. On the other hand, this peril
+notwithstanding, it was the considered view of those responsible that
+war neither ought to be regarded as being inevitable, nor was so in
+fact. It was quite true that the development of military preparations
+had been so great as to make Europe resemble an armed camp; but, if
+actual conflict could be averted, the burden this state of things
+implied ought finally to render its continuance no longer tolerable.
+What was really required was that unbroken peace should be preserved,
+and the hand of time left to operate.
+
+In the course of history it has rarely been the case that any war that
+has broken out was really inevitable, and there does not appear to be
+any sufficient reason for thinking that the war of 1914 was an exception
+to the general rule. It seems clear that, if Germany had resolved to do
+so, she could quite safely have abstained from entering upon it and from
+encouraging Austria in a mad adventure. The reason why the war came
+appears to have been that at some period in the year 1913 the German
+Government finally laid the reins on the necks of men whom up to then it
+had held in restraint. The decision appears to have been allowed at this
+point to pass from civilians to soldiers. I do not believe that even
+then the German Government as a whole intended deliberately to invoke
+the frightful consequences of actual war, even if it seemed likely to be
+victorious. But I do believe that it elected to take the risk of what
+it thought improbable, a general resistance by the Entente Powers if
+Germany were to threaten to use her great strength. In thus departing in
+1913 from the appearance of self-restraint which in the main they had
+displayed up to then, the Emperor and his Ministers misjudged the
+situation. They did not foresee the crisis to which their policy was
+conducting, and when that crisis arrived they lost their heads and
+blundered in trying to deal with it. They did not perceive the whirlpool
+toward which they were heading. They thought that they could safely
+expose what was precarious to a strain, and secure the substance of a
+real victory without having to overcome actual resistance. Had they put
+an extreme ambition for their country aside, and been careful in their
+language to others, they might have attained a considerable success
+without a shot being fired. But they were over ambitious and in their
+language they were far from careful. A few unlucky words made all the
+difference in the concluding days of July, 1914:
+
+  "Ten lines, a statesman's life in each."
+
+We here had done the best we could, according to our lights, to keep
+Germany from misjudging us. It was not always easy to do this. The
+genius of our people was not well adapted for the particular task. If
+the only question to-day were whether we always rendered ourselves
+intelligible to her, she might say with some show of reason that we did
+not. She might have grumbled, as Bismarck used to do, over our apparent
+indefiniteness. But that indefiniteness in policy was only apparent. Its
+form was due to the habit of mind which was, what it always has been and
+probably always will be, the habit of mind of the people of these
+islands. It was the defect of her qualities that prevented Germany from
+understanding what this habit of mind truly imported, and we have never
+fully taken in at any period of our history how little she has ever
+understood it. Let anyone who doubts this read the German memoirs which
+have appeared since the war. But it remains not the less true and
+obvious that the purpose of the British Government which fashioned the
+policy in question was to leave no stone unturned in the endeavor to
+find a way of keeping the peace between Germany and the Entente Powers.
+Now success in that endeavor was not a certainty, and it was necessary
+to insure against the risk of failure. The second branch of British
+policy related to the provision for defense rendered imperative by the
+element of uncertainty which was unavoidable. The duty of the
+Government of this country was to make sure that, if their endeavor to
+preserve peace failed, the country should be prepared, in the best way
+of those that were practicable, to face the situation that might emerge.
+
+Impetuous persons ask why, if there was even a chance of a great
+European war in which we might be involved, we did not appreciate the
+magnitude of what was at stake, and, laying everything else aside,
+concentrate our efforts on the immediate fashioning of such vast
+military forces as we possessed toward the end of the war? The answer
+will be found in the fourth chapter. We were aware of the risk, and we
+took what we thought the best means to meet it. Had we tried to do what
+we are reproached for not having done, we must have become weaker before
+we could have become stronger. For this statement I have given the
+military reasons. In a time of peace, even if the country had assented
+to the attempt being made, it is certain that we could not have
+accomplished such a purpose without long delay. It is probable that the
+result would have been failure, and it is almost certain that we should
+have provoked a "preventive war" on the part of Germany, a war not only
+with a very fair prospect, as things then stood, of a German success,
+but with something else that would have looked like the justification of
+a German effort to prevent that country from being encircled. Such a war
+would, with equal likelihood, have been the outcome even of the
+proclamation at such a time of a military alliance between the Entente
+Powers.
+
+Other critics, belonging to a wholly different school of political
+thought, ask why we moved at all, and why we did not adhere to the good
+old policy of holding aloof from interference in Continental affairs.
+The answer is simple. The days when "splendid isolation" was possible
+were gone. Our sea power, even as an instrument of self-defense, was in
+danger of becoming inadequate in the absence of friendships which should
+insure that other navies would remain neutral if they did not actively
+co-operate with ours. It was only through the medium of such friendships
+that ultimate naval preponderance could be secured. The consciousness of
+that fact pervaded the Entente. With those responsible for the conduct
+of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The
+question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to
+happen.
+
+On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the
+spirit in which it was sought to carry it out, the second and third
+chapters of the book may serve to throw some light. The fourth chapter
+relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration,
+for the possible event of failure. The plan was throughout based on the
+maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument. As is
+indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential
+close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia. Had
+there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the
+desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great
+nations, the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command
+the sea in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente. This
+conclusion was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for
+self-defense which the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with
+the growing organization for war of the Central Powers.
+
+To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this
+country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable to
+do so. We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of
+"splendid isolation." But the growing preparations of the Central Powers
+compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety for each
+of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety as a
+common interest. In the face of a new and growing danger we dared not
+leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail. The first
+thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers that
+it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete agreement with
+us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to that which Lord
+Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with France, and accompanied
+by cessation of the reasons which had led them to pile up armaments.
+There were highly influential persons in Germany who were far from
+averse to the suggested business arrangement. The armament question
+presented greater difficulty in that country, largely because of its
+tradition. But its solution was vital, for there were also those in
+Germany whose aim was to dispute with Great Britain the possession of
+the trident. Now for us, who constituted the island center of a
+scattered Empire, and who depended for food and raw materials on freedom
+to sail our ships, the question of sea power adequate for security was
+one of life or death. We could not sit still and allow Germany so to
+increase her navy in comparison with ours that she could make other
+Powers believe that their safest course was to throw in their lot and
+join their fleets with hers. We were bound to seek to make and maintain
+friendships, and to this end not only to preserve our margin of strength
+at sea, but to make ourselves able, if it became essential, to help our
+friends in case of aggression, thereby securing ourselves. That was the
+new situation which in the final result the old military spirit in
+Germany had created.
+
+The balance of power is a dangerous principle; a general friendship
+between all Great Powers, or, better still, a League of the Nations, is
+by far preferable. But that consideration does not touch the actual
+point, which is that we did not seek to set up the principle of
+balancing that has given rise to so many questions. It was forced on us
+and was a sheer necessity of the situation. We did all we could to avoid
+it by negotiations with Germany, which, had they succeeded in the end,
+would have relieved France and Russia as much as ourselves and would
+have prevented the war.
+
+Our efforts to preserve the peace ended in failure. The cause of that
+failure was nothing that we failed to do or that France did. It was
+proximately Austrian recklessness and indirectly, but just as strongly,
+German ambition. A real desire in July, 1914, on the part of the Central
+Powers to avoid war would have averted it. That Serbia may have been a
+provocative neighbor is no answer to the reproaches made to-day against
+the old Governments in Vienna and Berlin. They failed to take the steps
+requisite if peace were to be preserved.
+
+People ask why the British Government between 1906 and 1914 did not
+discuss in public a situation which it understood well, and appeal to
+the nation. The answer is that to have done so would have been greatly
+to increase the difficulty of averting war. Up to the middle of 1913 the
+indications were that it was far from unlikely that war might in the
+result be averted. That was the view of some, both here and on the
+Continent, who were most competent to judge, men who had real
+opportunities for close observation from day to day. It is a view which
+is not in material conflict with anything we have since learned. The
+question whether war is inevitable has always been, as Bismarck more
+than once insisted, one for the statesmen of the countries concerned,
+and not for the soldiers and sailors who have a restricted field to work
+in, and for whom it is in consequence difficult to see things as a
+whole. Nor does great importance attach to-day to the triumphant
+declarations of those who, having chanced to guess aright, take pride in
+the cheap title to wisdom which has become theirs after the event.
+Still less does respect attach to the small but noisy minority in each
+of the countries concerned who in the years before 1914 were
+continuously contributing to bringing war on our heads by expressions of
+dislike to neighboring nations, and by prophecies that war with them
+must come. In the main Germany was worse in this feature than ourselves.
+But there were those here whose language made them useful propagandists
+for the German military party, to whom they were of much service.
+
+Few wars are really inevitable. If we knew better how we should be
+careful to comport ourselves it may be that none are so. But extremists,
+whether chauvinist or pacifist, are not helpful in avoiding wars. That
+is because human nature is what it is.
+
+Those who had to make the effort to keep the peace failed. But that
+neither shows that they ought not to have tried with all the strength
+they possessed in the way they did, nor that they would have done better
+had they discussed delicate details in public. There are topics and
+conjunctures in the almost daily changing relations between Governments
+as to which silence is golden. For however proper it may be in point of
+broad principle that the people should be fully informed of what
+concerns them vitally, the most important thing is those to whom they
+have confided their concerns should be given the best chance of success
+in averting danger to their interests. To have said more in Parliament
+and on the platform in the years in question, or to have said it
+otherwise, would have been to run grave risks of more than one sort. It
+is my strong impression that Lord Grey of Fallodon took the only course
+that was practicable, and that, had the danger of the catastrophe to be
+faced again and for the first time, the course he took would, even in
+the light of all we know to-day, again afford the best chance of
+avoiding it. He succeeded in improving greatly for the time the
+relations between this country and Germany, and but for the outbreak in
+the Near East he would probably have succeeded in navigating the
+dangerous waters successfully. The chance was far from being a hopeless
+one, and subsequent study of the facts has strengthened my impression
+that down to at least about the middle of the year 1913 the chances were
+substantially in his favor. A sufficiency at least of the leaders in
+other countries were co-operating with him, not all the leaders, but
+those who were in reality most important. The war when it came was due,
+not only to the failure of certain of the prominent men in the capitals
+of the Central Powers to adhere to principles to which for a long time
+they had held fast, but to the accident of untoward circumstances and
+the contingency that is inseparable from human affairs.
+
+Such are some of the reasons which have led me to say what I have tried
+to express in the pages which follow. I have never been able to bring
+myself to believe that there are vast differences between the ways of
+thinking and habits of mind of the great and most highly civilized
+peoples of Europe. I have seen something of the Germans, and what I have
+learned of them and of their history has led me to the conclusion that,
+certain traditions of theirs notwithstanding, they resemble us more than
+they differ from us. If this be so, the sooner we take advantage of our
+present victory by seeking to turn our eyes from the past as far as can
+be, and to look steadily toward a future in which the misery and sin
+which that past saw shall be dwelt on to the least extent that is
+practicable, the better it will be for ourselves as well as for the rest
+of the world.
+
+That world has been reminded of a great truth which had been partly
+forgotten by those whose faith lay in militarism. It is that to set up
+might as the foundation of right may in the end be to inspire those
+around with a passionate desire to hold such might in check and to
+overcome it. Democracy is not a system that lends itself easily to
+scientific preparation for war, but when democratic nations are really
+aroused their staying power, just because it rests on a true General
+Will, is without rival. The latent force in humanity which has its
+foundation in ethical idealism is the greatest of all forces for the
+vindication of right. German militarism managed to fail to understand
+this. Let us take pains to show our late enemies that if they make it
+clear that they have extinguished such militarism in a lasting fashion,
+the quarrel with them is at an end.
+
+I am far from thinking that we here are perfect in our habits as a
+nation. We are apt not to keep in view how what we do is likely to look
+to others. We are somewhat deficient in the faculty of self-examination
+and self-criticism. Want of clarity of ground-principle in higher ideals
+is apt to prove a hindrance to more than the individual only. It
+generally brings with it want of clarity in the sense of social
+obligation. And this sometimes extends even to our relations to other
+countries.
+
+It leads to our being misinterpreted as a nation. We have suffered a
+good deal in the past from having attributed to us motives which were
+not ours. The reason was the assumption that the apparent absence of
+definiteness in national purpose must have been designed as a cover for
+hidden and selfish ends. It is not true. We are indeed very insular, and
+what has been called the international mind is not common among the
+people of these islands. But we are kindly at heart, and when we have
+seemed self-regarding it has been simply because we were not conscious
+of our own limitations and had not much appreciation of the modes of
+thought of other people. We have paid the penalty for this defect at
+periods in our history. At one time France suspected us, I think in the
+main unjustly. Later on Germany suspected us, I think of a certainty
+unjustly. Now these things arise in part at least from our reputation
+for a particular kind of disposition, our supposed habitual and
+deliberately adopted desire to wait until the particular international
+situation of the moment should show how we could profit, before we gave
+any assurance as to the way in which we should act. What has given rise
+to this misunderstanding of our attitude in our relations to other
+countries is simply an exemplification of what has prevented us from
+fully understanding ourselves. It is our gift to be able to apply
+ourselves in emergencies, at home and abroad, with immense energy, and
+our success in promptly pulling ourselves together and coping with the
+unexpected has often suggested to outsiders that we had long ago looked
+ahead. This has been said of us on the Continent. It is not so. We do
+not study the art of fishing in troubled waters. The waiting habit in
+our transactions, domestic as well as foreign, arises from our
+inveterate preference for thinking in images rather than in concepts. We
+put off decisions until the whole of the facts can be visualized. This
+carries with it that we often do not act until it is very late. Our
+gifts enable us to move with energy, if not always with precision. To
+predict what we will do in a given case is not easy for a foreigner. It
+is not easy even for ourselves. We have few abstract principles, and
+reliable induction from our past is not easy. We are often guided by
+what Mr. Justice Wendell Holmes has called "the intuition more subtle
+than any particular major premise." Nor is help to be derived from any
+study of our general outlook on life, for that outlook is hard to
+formulate even to ourselves.
+
+Now all this, our peculiar gift, if kept under control, may well have
+its practical advantage, but, as the case stands, it is apt to bring in
+its train a good deal of disadvantage. In periods when nations are
+trying to render firm the basis of peace by remolding and giving
+precision to their aims, so that these can be made common aims, lack of
+definiteness in national ideals is a sure source of embarrassment. At a
+time when democracy is more and more claiming in terms to occupy the
+whole field it becomes increasingly desirable that the higher purposes
+of democracy should become clear to the people themselves. For the
+practise of a country can never be wholly divorced from its theory of
+life. The tendencies of the national will are bound up with the nation's
+science, with its literature, with its art, and with its religion. These
+tendencies are affected by the capacity of the nation to understand and
+express its own soul. Beyond science, literature, art and religion there
+lies something that may be called the national philosophy, a disposition
+rather than a definite creed. This sort of philosophy is different in
+France from what it is in Germany, and in Germany from what it is in the
+English-speaking countries. The philosophy of a people takes shape in
+the attitude its leaders adopt in their estimation of values and of the
+order in which they should be placed. And this turns on the conceptions
+and ideas which are current in the various departments of mental
+activity. It is thus that a philosophy of life has to be given some
+sort of place in his professions even by the statesman who has to
+address Parliament and the public. He is driven to make speeches in
+which a good many conceptions and ideas have to be brought together. And
+it gives rise to a great difference of quality in such utterances if the
+general outlook of the speaker be a large one. But this requires that he
+should know himself and be aware of the conceptions and ideas which
+dominate his mind, and should have examined their scope before employing
+them.
+
+How some of those who were deeply responsible for the conduct of affairs
+tried to think in the anxious years before the war, and how they
+endeavored to apply their conclusions, is what I have endeavored to
+state in the course of what follows. They doubtless made mistakes and
+fell short of accomplishment in what they were aiming at. It is human so
+to do. But they tried what seemed to them the wisest course, and I have
+yet to learn that it was practicable to have followed any different
+course without a failure worse than any that occurred. After all, in the
+end the British Empire won, however hard it had to fight.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+If in this chapter I speak frequently in the first person and of my own
+part in the negotiations which it records, it is not from any desire to
+make prominent either my own personality or the part it fell to me to
+play. The reason is that I have endeavored to write of what I myself
+heard and saw, and that in consequence most of what follows is, for the
+sake of accuracy, largely transcribed from my personal diaries and
+records made at the time when the events to which they related took
+place. So frequent an employment of the personal pronoun as has been
+made in these pages would ordinarily be a blemish in taste, if not in
+style also, but in this case it seemed safer not to try to avoid it.
+
+Many things that happened in the years just before 1914, as well as the
+events of the great war itself, are still too close to permit of our
+studying them in their full context. But before much time has passed
+the historians will have accumulated material that will overflow their
+libraries, and their hands will remain occupied for generations to come.
+At this moment all that safely can be attempted is that actual observers
+should set down what they have themselves observed. For there has rarely
+been a time when the juridical maxim that "hearsay is not evidence"
+ought to be more sternly insisted on.
+
+If I now venture to set down what follows in these pages, it is because
+I had certain opportunities for forming a judgment at first hand for
+myself. I am not referring to the circumstance that for a brief period I
+once, long ago, lived the life of a student at a German University, or
+that I was frequently in Germany in the years that followed. Nor do I
+mean that I have tried to explore German habits of reflection, as they
+may be studied in the literature of Germany. Other people have done all
+these things more thoroughly and more extensively than I have. What I do
+mean is that from the end of 1905 to the summer of 1912 I had special
+chances for direct observation of quite another kind. During that period
+I was Secretary of State for War in Great Britain, and from the latter
+year to April, 1915, I was the holder of another office and a member of
+the British Cabinet.
+
+During the first of the above periods it fell to me to work out the
+military organization that would be required to insure, as far as was
+practicable, against risk, should those strenuous efforts fail into
+which Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, had thrown his strength. He was
+endeavoring with all his might to guard the peace of Europe from danger.
+As he and I had for many years been on terms of close intimacy, it was
+not unnatural that he should ask me to do what I could by helping in
+some of the diplomatic work which was his, as well as by engaging in my
+own special task. Indeed, the two phases of activity could hardly be
+separable.
+
+I was not in Germany after May, 1912, for the duties of Lord Chancellor,
+on which office I then entered, made it unconstitutional for me to leave
+the United Kingdom, save under such exceptional conditions as were
+conceded by the King and the Cabinet when, in the autumn of 1913, I made
+a brief yet memorable visit to the United States and Canada. But in
+1906, while War Minister, I paid, on the invitation of the German
+Emperor, a visit to him at Berlin, to which city I went on after
+previously staying with King Edward at Marienbad, where he and the then
+Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, were resting.
+
+While at Berlin I saw much of the Emperor, and I also saw certain of his
+Ministers, notably Prince von Bülow, Herr von Tschirsky and General von
+Einem, the first being at that time Chancellor, and the last two being
+respectively the Foreign and War Ministers. I was invited to examine for
+myself the organization of the German War Office, which I wished to
+study for purposes of reform at home; and this I did in some detail, in
+company with an expert adviser from my personal staff, Colonel Ellison,
+my military private secretary, who accompanied me on this journey.[1]
+There the authorities explained to us the general nature of the
+organization for rapid mobilization which had been developed under the
+great von Moltke, and subsequently carried farther. The character of
+this organization was, in its general features, no secret in Germany,
+altho it was somewhat unfamiliar in Anglo-Saxon countries; and it
+interested my adviser and myself intensely.
+
+At that time there was an active militarist party in Germany, which, of
+course, was not wholly pleased at the friendly reception with which we
+met from the Emperor and from crowds in the streets of Berlin. We were
+well aware of the activity of this party. But it stood then unmistakably
+for a minority, and I formed the opinion that those who wanted Germany
+to remain at peace, quite as much as to be strong, had at least an
+excellent chance of keeping their feet. I realized, and had done so for
+years past, that it was not merely because of the _beaux yeux_ of
+foreign peoples that Germany desired to maintain good relations all
+round. She had become fully conscious of a growing superiority in the
+application to industry of scientific knowledge and in power to organize
+her resources founded on it; and her rulers hoped, and not without good
+ground, to succeed by these means in the peaceful penetration of the
+world.
+
+I had personally for some time been busy in pressing the then somewhat
+coldly received claims for a better system of education, higher and
+technical as well as elementary, among my own countrymen, and had met
+with some success in asking for the establishment of teaching
+universities and of technical colleges, such as the new Imperial
+College of Science and Technology at South Kensington. Of these we had
+very substantially increased the number during the eight years which
+preceded my visit to Berlin; but I had learned from visits of inspection
+to Germany that much more remained to be done before we could secure our
+commercial and industrial position against the unhasting but unresting
+efforts of our formidable competitor.
+
+As to the German people outside official circles and the universities, I
+thought of them then what I think of them now. They were very much like
+our own people, except in one thing. This was that they were trained
+simply to obey, and to carry out whatever they were told by their
+rulers. I used, during numerous unofficial tours in Germany, to wander
+about incognito, and to smoke and drink beer with the peasants and the
+people whenever I could get the chance. What impressed me was the little
+part they had in directing their own government, and the little they
+knew about what it was doing. There was a general disposition to accept,
+as a definition of duty which must not be questioned, whatever they were
+told to do by the _Vorstand_. It is this habit of mind, dating back to
+the days of Frederick the Great, with only occasional and brief
+interruptions, which has led many people to think that the German
+people at large have in them "a double dose of original sin." Even when
+their soldiers have been exceptionally brutal in methods of warfare, I
+do not think that this is so. The habit of mind which prevails is that
+of always looking to the rulers for orders, and the brutality has been
+that enjoined--in accordance with its own military policy of shortening
+war by making it terrible to the enemy--by the General Staff of Germany,
+a body before whose injunctions even the Emperor, so far as my
+observation goes, always has bowed.
+
+But I must now return to my formal visit to Berlin in the autumn of
+1906. I was, as I have already said, everywhere cordially welcomed, and
+at the end the heads of the German Army entertained me at a dinner in
+the War Office, at which the War Minister presided, and there was
+present, among others, the Chief of the German General Staff. They were
+all friendly. I do not think that my impression was wrong that even the
+responsible heads of the Army were then looking almost entirely to
+"peaceful penetration," with only moral assistance from the prestige
+attaching to the possession of great armed forces in reserve. Our
+business in the United Kingdom was therefore to see that we were
+prepared for perils that might unexpectedly arise out of this policy,
+and not less, by developing our educational and industrial organization,
+to make ourselves fit to meet the greater likelihood of a coming keen
+competition in the peaceful arts.
+
+One thing that seemed to me essential for the preservation of good
+relations was that cordial and frequent intercourse between the people
+of the two countries should be encouraged and developed. I set myself in
+my speeches to avoid all expressions which might be construed as
+suggesting a critical attitude on our part, or a failure to recognize
+the existence of peaceful ideas among what was then, as I still think, a
+large majority of the people of Germany. The attitude of some newspapers
+in England, and still more that of the chauvinist minority in Germany
+itself, did not render this quite an easy task. But there were good
+people in these days in Germany as well as in England, and the United
+States might be counted on as likely to co-operate in discouraging
+friction.
+
+Meanwhile there was the chance that the course of this policy might be
+interrupted by some event which we could not control. A conversation
+with the then Chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, the
+nephew of the great man of that name, satisfied me that he did not
+really look with any pleasurable military expectation to the results of
+a war with the United Kingdom alone. It would, he observed to me, be in
+his opinion a long and possibly indecisive war, and must result in much
+of the overseas trade of both countries passing to a _tertius gaudens_,
+by which he meant the United States.
+
+I had little doubt that what he said to me on this occasion represented
+his real opinion. But I had in my mind the apprehension of an emergency
+of a different nature. Germany was more likely to attack France than
+ourselves. The German Emperor had told me that, altho he was trying to
+develop good relations with France, he was finding it difficult. This
+seemed to me ominous. The paradox presented itself that a war with
+Germany in which we were alone would be easier to meet than a war in
+which France was attacked along with us; for if Germany succeeded in
+over-running France she might establish naval bases on the northern
+Channel ports of that country, quite close to our shores, and so, with
+the possible aid of the submarines, long-range guns and air-machines of
+the future, interfere materially with our naval position in the Channel
+and our fleet defenses against invasion.
+
+I knew, too, that the French Government was apprehensive. In the
+historical speech which Sir Edward Grey made on August 3, 1914, the day
+before the British Government directed Sir Edward Goschen, our
+Ambassador in Berlin, to ask for his passports, he informed the House of
+Commons that so early as January, 1906, the French Government, after the
+Morocco difficulty, had drawn his attention to the international
+situation. It had informed him that it considered the danger of an
+attack on France by Germany to be a real one, and had inquired whether,
+in the event of an unprovoked attack, Great Britain would think that she
+had so much at stake as to make her willing to join in resisting it. If
+this were to be even a possible attitude for Great Britain, the French
+Government had intimated to him that it was in its opinion desirable
+that conversation should take place between the General Staff of France
+and the newly created General Staff of Great Britain, as to the form
+which military co-operation in resisting invasion of the northern
+portions of France might best assume. We had a great Navy, and the
+French had a great Army. But our Navy could not operate on land, and the
+French Army, altho large, was not so large as that which Germany, with
+her superior resources in population, commanded. Could we, then,
+reconsider our military organization, so that we might be able rapidly
+to dispatch, if we ever thought it necessary in our own interests, say,
+100,000 men in a well-formed army, not to invade Belgium, which no one
+thought of doing, but to guard the French frontier of Belgium in case
+the German Army should seek to enter France in that way. If the German
+attack were made farther south, where the French chain of modern
+fortresses had rendered their defensive positions strong, the French
+Army would then be able, set free from the difficulty of mustering in
+full strength opposite the Belgian boundary, to guard the southern
+frontier.
+
+Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, and
+myself as War Minister, and I was instructed, in January, 1906, a month
+after assuming office, to take the examination of the question in hand.
+This occurred in the middle of the General Election which was then in
+progress. I went at once to London and summoned the heads of the British
+General Staff and saw the French military attaché, Colonel Huguet, a man
+of sense and ability. I became aware at once that there was a new army
+problem. It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly
+to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate
+(with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the
+inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the
+entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even farther
+south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.
+
+But an investigation of a searching character presently revealed great
+deficiencies in the British military organization of these days. We had
+never contemplated the preparation of armies for warfare of the
+Continental type. The older generals had not been trained for this
+problem. We had, it was true, excellent troops in India and elsewhere.
+These were required as outposts for Imperial defense. As they had to
+serve for long periods and to be thoroughly disciplined, they had to be
+professional soldiers, engaged to serve in most cases for seven years
+with the colors and afterwards for five in the reserve. They were highly
+trained men, and there was a good reserve of them at home. But that
+reserve was not organized in the great self-contained divisions which
+would be required for fighting against armies organized for rapid action
+on modern Continental principles. Its formations in peace time were not
+those which would be required in such a war. There was in addition a
+serious defect in the artillery organization which would have prevented
+more than a comparatively small number of batteries (about forty-two
+only in point of fact) from being quickly placed on a war footing. The
+transport and supply and the medical services were as deficient as the
+artillery.
+
+In short, the close investigation made at that time disclosed that it
+was not possible, under the then existing circumstances, to put in the
+field more than about 80,000 men, and even these only after an interval
+of over two months, which would be required for conversion of our
+isolated units into the new war formations of an army fit to take the
+field against the German first line of active corps. The French
+naturally thought that a machine so slow moving would be of little use
+to them. They might have been destroyed before it could begin to operate
+effectively. Both they and the Germans had organized on the basis that
+modern Continental warfare had become a high science. Hitherto we had
+not, and it was only our younger generals who had even studied this
+science.
+
+There was, therefore, nothing for it but to attempt a complete
+revolution in the organization of the British Army at home. The nascent
+General Staff was finally organized in September, 1906, and its
+organization was shortly afterwards developed so as to extend to the
+entire Empire, as soon as a conference had taken place with the
+Ministers of the Dominions early in the following year. The outcome was
+a complete recasting, which, after three years' work, made it
+practicable rapidly to mobilize, not only 100,000, but 160,000 men; to
+transport them, with the aid of the Navy, to a place of concentration
+which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain; and to
+have them at their appointed place within twelve days, an interval based
+on what the German Army required on its side for a corresponding
+concentration.
+
+All the arrangements for this were worked out by the end of 1910. Both
+Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig took an active part in the work.
+Behind the first-line army so organized, a second-line army of larger
+size, tho far less trained, and so designed that it could be expanded,
+was organized. This was the citizen or "Territorial" army, consisting in
+time of peace of fourteen divisions of infantry and artillery and
+fourteen brigades of cavalry, with the appropriate medical, sanitary,
+transport and other auxiliary services. Those serving in this
+second-line army were civilians, and, of course, much less disciplined
+than the officers and men of the first line. Its primary function was
+home defense, but its members were encouraged to undertake for service
+abroad, if necessary; and a large part of this army, in point of fact,
+fought in France, Flanders and in the East soon after the beginning of
+the war, in great measure making up by intelligence for shortness of
+training.
+
+To say, therefore, that we were caught unprepared is not accurate.
+Compulsory service in a period of peace was out of the question for us.
+Moreover, it would have taken at least two generations to organize, and
+meanwhile we should have been weaker than without it. We had studied the
+situation and had done the only thing we thought we could do, after full
+deliberation. Our main strength was in our Navy and its tradition. Our
+secondary contribution was a small army fashioned to fulfil a
+scientifically measured function. It was, of course, a very small army,
+but it had a scientific organization on the basis of which a great
+expansion was possible. After all, what we set ourselves to accomplish
+we did accomplish. If the margin by which a just sufficient success was
+attained in the early days of the war seems to-day narrow, the reason of
+the narrow margin lay largely in the unprepared condition of the armies
+of Russia, on which we and France had reckoned for rapid co-operation.
+Anyhow, we fulfilled our contract, for at eleven o'clock on Monday
+morning, August 3, 1914, we mobilized without a hitch the whole of the
+Expeditionary Force, amounting to six divisions and nearly two cavalry
+divisions, and began its transport over the Channel when war was
+declared thirty-six hours later. We also at the same time successfully
+mobilized the Territorial Force and other units, the whole amounting to
+over half a million men. The Navy was already in its war stations, and
+there was no delay at all in putting what we had prepared into
+operation.
+
+I speak of this with direct knowledge, for as the Prime Minister, who
+was holding temporarily the seals of the War Secretary, was overwhelmed
+with business, he asked me, tho I had then become Lord Chancellor, to go
+to the War Office and give directions for the mobilization of the
+machinery with which I was so familiar, and I did this on the morning of
+Monday, August 3, and a day later handed it over, in working order, to
+Lord Kitchener.
+
+I now return to what was the main object of British foreign policy
+between 1905 and 1914, the prevention of the danger of any outbreak
+with Germany. Sir Edward Grey worked strenuously with this well-defined
+object. If France were overrun, our island security would be at least
+diminished, and he had, therefore, in addition to his anxiety to avert a
+general war, a direct national interest to strive for, in the
+preservation of peace between Germany and France. Ever since the
+mutilation which the latter country had suffered, as the outcome of the
+War of 1870, she had felt sore, and her relations with Germany were not
+easy. But she did not seek a war of revenge. It would have been too full
+of risk even if she had not desired peace, the Franco-Russian Dual
+Alliance notwithstanding. The notion of an encirclement of Germany,
+excepting in defense against aggression by Germany herself, existed only
+in the minds of nervous Germans. Still, there was suspicion, and the
+question was, how to get rid of it.
+
+I have already referred to the visit I paid to the Emperor at Berlin in
+the autumn of 1906. He invited me to a review which he held of his
+troops there, and in the course of it rode up to the carriage in which I
+was seated and said, "A splendid machine I have in this army, Mr.
+Haldane; now isn't it so? And what could I do without it, situated as I
+am between the Russians and the French? But the French are your
+allies--are they not? So I beg pardon."
+
+I shook my head and smiled deprecatingly, and replied that, were I in
+his Majesty's place, I should in any case feel safe from attack with the
+possession of this machine, and that for my own part I enjoyed being
+behind it much more than if I had to be in front of it.
+
+Next day, when at the Schloss, he talked to me fully and cordially. What
+follows I extract from the record I made after the conversation in my
+diaries, which were kept by desire of King Edward, and which were
+printed by the Government on my return to London.
+
+He spoke of the Anglo-French Entente. He said that it would be wrong to
+infer that he had any critical thought about our entente with France. On
+the contrary he believed that it might even facilitate good relations
+between France and Germany. He wished for these good relations, and was
+taking steps through gentlemen of high position in France to obtain
+them. Not one inch more of French territory would he ever covet. Alsace
+and Lorraine originally had been German, and now even the least German
+of the two, Lorraine, because it preferred a monarchy to a republic, was
+welcoming him enthusiastically whenever he went there. That he should
+have gone to Tangier, where both English and French welcomed him, was
+quite natural. He desired no quarrel, and the whole fault was
+Delcassé's, who had wanted to pick a quarrel and bring England into it.
+
+I told the Emperor that, if he would allow me to speak my mind freely, I
+would do so. He assented, and I said to him that his attitude had caused
+great uneasiness in England, and that this, and not any notion of
+forming a tripartite alliance of France, Russia, and England against
+him, was the reason of the feeling there had been. We were bound by no
+military alliance. As for our entente, some time since we had
+difficulties with France over Newfoundland and Egypt, and we had made a
+good business arrangement (_gutes Geschäft_) about these complicated
+matters of detail, and had simply carried out our word to France.
+
+He said that he had no criticism to make on this, except that if we had
+told him so early there would have been no misunderstanding. Things were
+better now, but we had not always been pleasant to him and ready to meet
+him. His army was for defense, not for offense. As to Russia, he had no
+Himalayas between him and Russia, more was the pity. Now what about our
+Two-Power standard. All this was said with earnestness, but in a
+friendly way, the Emperor laying his finger on my shoulder as he spoke.
+Sometimes the conversation was in German, but often in English.
+
+I said that our fleet was like his Majesty's army. It was of the _Wesen_
+of the nation, and the Two-Power standard, while it might be rigid and
+so awkward, was a way of maintaining a deep-seated national tradition,
+and a Liberal Government must hold to it as firmly as a Conservative.
+Both countries were increasing in wealth--ours, like Germany, very
+rapidly--and if Germany built we must build. But, I added, there was an
+excellent opportunity for co-operation in other things. I instanced
+international free trade developments which would smooth other
+relations.
+
+The Emperor agreed. He was convinced that free trade was the true policy
+for Germany also, but Germany could not go so quickly here as England
+had gone.
+
+I referred to Friedrich List's great book as illustrating how military
+and geographical considerations had affected matters for Germany in this
+connection.
+
+The Emperor then spoke of Chamberlain's policy of Tariff Reform, and
+said that it had caused him anxiety.
+
+I replied that with care we might avoid any real bad feeling over trade.
+The undeveloped markets of the world were enormous, and we wanted no
+more of the surface of the globe than we had got.
+
+The Emperor's reply was that what he sought after was not territory but
+trade expansion. He quoted Goethe to the effect that if a nation wanted
+anything it must concentrate and act from within the sphere of its
+concentration.
+
+We then spoke of the fifty millions sterling per annum of chemical trade
+which Germany had got away from us. I said that this was thoroughly
+justified as the result of the practical application of high German
+science.
+
+"That," said he, "I delight to think, because it is legitimate and to
+the credit of my people."
+
+I agreed, and said that similarly we had got the best of the world's
+shipbuilding. Each nation had something to learn.
+
+The Emperor then passed to the topic of The Hague Conference, trusting
+that disarmament would not be proposed. If so, he could not go in.
+
+I observed that the word "disarmament" was perhaps unfortunately chosen.
+
+"The best testimony," said the Emperor, "to my earnest desire for peace
+is that I have had no war, tho I should have had war if I had not
+earnestly striven to avoid it."
+
+Throughout the conversation, which was as animated as it was long, the
+Emperor was cordial and agreeable. He expressed the wish that more
+English Ministers would visit Berlin, and that he might see more of our
+Royal Family. I left the Palace at 3.30 P.M., having gone there at 1.0.
+
+On another day during this visit Prince von Bülow, who was then
+Chancellor, called on me. I was out, but found him later at the Schloss,
+and had a conversation with him. He said to me that both the Emperor and
+himself were thoroughly aware of the desire of King Edward and his
+Government to maintain the new relations with France in their integrity,
+and that, in the best German opinion, this was no obstacle to building
+up close relations with Germany also.
+
+I said that this was the view held on our side too, and that the only
+danger lay in trying to force everything at once. Too great haste was to
+be deprecated.
+
+He said that he entirely agreed, and quoted Prince Bismarck, who had
+laid it down that you can not make a flower grow any sooner by putting
+fire to heat it.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT PAUL WOLFF METTERNICH
+
+GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1901 TO 1912.]
+
+I said that, none the less, frequent and cordial interchanges of view
+were very important, and that not even the smallest matters should be
+neglected.
+
+He alluded with satisfaction to my personal relations with the German
+Ambassador in London, Count Metternich.
+
+I begged him, if there were any small matters which were too minute to
+take up officially, but which seemed unsatisfactory, to let me know of
+them in a private capacity through Count Metternich. This I did because
+I had discovered some soreness at restrictions which had been placed on
+the attendance of German military officers at maneuvers in England, and
+I had found that there had been some reprisals. I did not refer to
+these, but said that I had the authority of the sovereign to give
+assistance to German officers who were sent over to the maneuvers to
+study them. I added that while our army was small, compared with theirs,
+it had had great experience in the conduct of small expeditions, and
+that there were in consequence some things worth seeing.
+
+He then spoke of the navy. It was natural that with the increase of
+German commerce Germany should wish to increase her fleet--from a
+sea-police point of view--but that they had neither the wish, nor,
+having regard to the strain their great army put on their resources,
+the power to build against Great Britain.
+
+I said that the best opinion in England fully understood this attitude,
+and that we did not in the least misinterpret their recent progress, nor
+would he misinterpret our resolve to maintain, for purely defensive
+purposes, our navy at a Two-Power standard. Some day, I said, there
+might be rivalry, but I thought we might assume that, if it ever
+happened, it would not be for many years, and that our policy for the
+present was strongly for Free Trade, so that the more Germany exported
+to Great Britain and British possessions, the more we should export in
+exchange to them.
+
+He expressed himself pleased that I should say this, and added that he
+was confident that a couple of years' interchange of friendly
+communications in this spirit would produce a great development, and
+perhaps lead for both of us to pleasant relations with other Powers
+also.
+
+There were during this visit in 1906 other conversations of which a
+record was preserved, but I have referred to the most important, and I
+will only mention, in concluding my account of these days in Berlin in
+September, 1906, the talk I had with the Foreign Minister, Herr von
+Tschirsky, afterward the German Ambassador at Vienna before the war,
+and reported as having been a fomenter of the Austrian outbreak against
+Serbia. He may have been anti-Slav and anti-Russian, but I did not find
+him, in the long conversation we had in 1906, otherwise than sensible as
+regards France.
+
+I explained that my business in Berlin was merely with War Office
+matters, and, even as regards these, quite unofficial.
+
+He said that there had been much tendency to misinterpret in both
+countries, but that things were now better. I might take it that our
+precision about the Entente with France, and our desire to rest firmly
+on the arrangement we had made, were understood in Germany, and that it
+was realized that we were not likely to be able to build up anything
+with his own country which did not rest on this basis. But he thought,
+and the Emperor agreed, that the Entente was no hindrance to all that
+was necessary between Germany and England, which was not an alliance but
+a thoroughly good business understanding. Some day we might come into
+conflict, if care were not taken; but if care was taken, there was no
+need of apprehension.
+
+I said that I believed this to be Sir Edward Grey's view also, and that
+he was anxious to communicate with the German Government beforehand
+whenever there was a chance of German interests being touched.
+
+He went on to speak of the approaching Hague Conference, and of the
+difficulty Germany would have if asked to alter the proportion of her
+army to her population--a proportion which rested on a fundamental law.
+For Germany alone to object to disarmament would be to put herself in a
+hole, and it would be a friendly act if we could devise some way out of
+a definite vote on reduction. Germany might well enter a conference to
+record and emphasize the improvement all round in international
+relations, the desirability of further developing this improvement, and
+the hope that with it the growth of armaments would cease. But he was
+afraid of the kind of initiative which might come from America. The
+United States had no sympathy with European military and naval
+difficulties.
+
+I said that I thought that we, as a Government, were pledged to try to
+bring about something more definite than what he suggested as a limit,
+but that I would report what he had told me.
+
+He then passed to general topics. He was emphatic in his assurance that
+what Germany wanted was increase of commercial development. Let the
+nations avoid inflicting pin-pricks, and leave each other free to
+breathe the air. He said that he thought we might have opportunities of
+helping them to get the French into an easier mood. They were difficult
+and suspicious, he observed, and it was hard to transact business with
+them, for they made trouble over small points.
+
+On my return to London I sent to Herr von Tschirsky some English
+newspapers containing articles with a friendly tone, so far as the
+preservation of good relations was concerned. He replied in a letter
+from which I translate the material portion:
+
+"I see with pleasure from the articles which your Excellency has sent me
+for his Majesty, and from other expressions of public opinion in English
+newspapers, that in the leading Liberal papers of England a more
+friendly tone toward Germany is making itself apparent. You would have
+been able to derive the same impression from reading our newspapers,
+with the exception of a few Pan-German prints. Alas! papers like _The
+Times_, _Morning Post_ and _Standard_ can not bring themselves to
+refrain from their attitude of dislike, and are always rejoicing in
+being suspicious of every action of the Imperial Government. They
+contribute in this fashion appreciably to render weak the new tone of
+diminishing misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries.
+If I fear that under these circumstances it will be a long time before
+mutual understanding has grown up to the point at which it stood more
+than a century ago, and as you and I desire it in the well-understood
+interests of England and Germany, still I hope and am persuaded that the
+relations of the two Governments will remain good."
+
+A year after the visit I had paid to Berlin the Emperor came over to
+stay with King Edward at Windsor. This was in November, 1907. The visit
+lasted several days, and I was present most of the time. The Emperor was
+accompanied by Baron von Schoen, who had become Foreign Minister of
+Prussia, after having been Ambassador to the Court of Russia, and by
+General von Einem, the War Minister, whose inclusion in the invitation I
+had ventured to suggest to the King, as an acknowledgment of his
+civility to myself as War Minister when in Berlin. There were also at
+Windsor Count Metternich and several high military officers of the
+Emperor's personal staff and military cabinet. To these officers and to
+the War Minister I showed all the hospitality I could in London, and I
+received them officially at the War Office.
+
+But the really interesting incident of this visit, so far as I was
+concerned, took place at Windsor. The first evening of my visit there,
+just after his arrival in November, the Emperor took me aside and said
+he was sorry that there was a good deal of friction over the Bagdad
+Railway, and that he did not know what we wanted as a basis for
+co-operation.
+
+I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that,
+speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a "gate" to
+protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what
+I meant by a "gate," and I said that meant the control of the section
+which would come near to the Persian Gulf. "I will give you the 'gate,'"
+replied the Emperor.
+
+I had no opportunity at the moment, which was just before dinner, for
+pursuing the conversation further, but I thought the answer too
+important not to be followed up. There were private theatricals after
+dinner, which lasted till nearly one o'clock in the morning. I was
+seated in the theater of the Castle just behind the Emperor, and, as the
+company broke up, I went forward and asked him whether he really meant
+seriously that he was willing to give us the "gate," because, if he did
+mean it, I would go to London early and see Sir Edward Grey at the
+Foreign Office.
+
+Next morning, about 7.30 o'clock, a helmeted guardsman, one of those
+whom the Emperor had brought over with him from Berlin, knocked loudly
+at the door and came into my bedroom, and said that he had a message
+from the Emperor. It was that he did mean what he had said the night
+before. I at once got up and caught a train for London. There I saw the
+Foreign Secretary, who, after taking time to think things over, gave me
+a memorandum he had drawn up. The substance of it was that the British
+Government would be very glad to discuss the Emperor's suggestion, but
+that it would be necessary, before making a settlement, to bring into
+the discussion France and Russia, whose interests also were involved. I
+was requested to sound the Emperor further.
+
+After telling King Edward of what was happening, I had another
+conversation in Windsor Castle with the Emperor, who said that he feared
+that the bringing in of Russia particularly, not to speak of France,
+would cause difficulty; but he asked me to come that night, after a
+performance that was to take place in the Castle theater had ended, to
+his apartments, to a meeting to which he would summon the Ministers he
+had brought with him. He took the memorandum which I had brought from
+London, a copy of which I had made for him in my own handwriting, so as
+to present it as the informal document it was intended to be. Just
+before dinner Baron von Schoen spoke to me, and told me that he had
+heard from the Emperor what had happened, and that the Emperor was wrong
+in thinking that the attempt to bring in Russia would lead to
+difficulty, because he, Baron von Schoen, when he was Ambassador to
+Russia, had already discussed the general question with its Government,
+and had virtually come to an understanding. At the meeting that night we
+could therefore go on to negotiate.
+
+I attended the Emperor in his state rooms at the Castle at one o'clock
+in the morning, and sat smoking with him and his Ministers for over two
+hours. His Foreign Minister and Count Metternich and the War Minister,
+von Einem, were present. I said that I felt myself an intruder, because
+it was very much like being present at a sitting of his Cabinet. He
+replied, "Be a member of my Cabinet for the evening." I said that I was
+quite agreeable.
+
+They then engaged in a very animated conversation, some of them
+challenging the proposal of the Emperor to accept the British
+suggestions, with an outspokenness which would have astonished the
+outside world, with its notions of Teutonic autocracy. Count Metternich
+did not like what I suggested, that there should be a conference in
+Berlin on the subject of the Bagdad Railway between England, France,
+Russia, and Germany.
+
+In the end, but not until after much keen argument, the idea was
+accepted, and the Emperor directed von Schoen to go next morning to
+London and make an official proposal to Sir Edward Grey, This was
+carried out, and the preliminary details were discussed between von
+Schoen and Sir Edward at the Foreign Office.
+
+Some weeks afterward difficulties were raised from Berlin. Germany said
+that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question
+of the terminal portion of the railway, but she did not desire to bring
+the other two Powers into that discussion, because the conference would
+probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other
+Powers.
+
+The matter thus came to an end. It was, I think, a great pity, because I
+have reason to believe that the French view was that, if the Bagdad
+Railway question could have been settled, one great obstacle in the way
+of reconciling German with French and English interests would have
+disappeared. I came to the conclusion afterward that it was probably
+owing to the views of Prince von Bülow that the proposal had come to an
+untimely end. Whether he did not wish for an expanded entente; whether
+the feeling was strong in Germany that the Bagdad Railway had become a
+specially German concern and should not be shared; or what other reason
+he may have had, I do not know; but it was from Berlin, after the
+Emperor's return there at the end of November, 1907, that the
+negotiations were finally blocked.
+
+Altho these negotiations had no definite result, they assisted in
+promoting increasing frankness between the two Foreign Offices, and
+other things went with more smoothness. Sir Edward Grey kept France and
+Russia informed of all we did, and he was also very open with the
+Germans. Until well on in 1911 all went satisfactorily. In the early
+part of that year the Emperor came to London to visit the present King,
+who had by that time succeeded to the throne. I had ventured to propose
+to the King that during the Emperor's visit I should, as War Minister,
+give a luncheon to the generals who were on his staff. But when the
+Emperor heard of this he sent a message that he would like to come and
+lunch with me himself, and to meet people whom otherwise he might not
+see.
+
+I acted on my own discretion, and when he came to luncheon at my house
+in Queen Anne's Gate there was a somewhat widely selected party of about
+a dozen to meet him. For it included not only Lord Morley, Lord
+Kitchener, and Lord Curzon, whom he was sure to meet elsewhere, but Mr.
+Ramsay MacDonald, who was then leading the Labor Party, Admiral Sir
+Arthur Wilson, our great naval commander, Lord Moulton, Mr. Edmund
+Gosse, Mr. Sargent, Mr. Spender, the editor of the _Westminster
+Gazette_, and others representing various types of British opinion. The
+Emperor engaged in conversation with everyone, and all went with
+smoothness.
+
+He had a great reception in London. But enthusiasm about him was
+somewhat damped when, in July, 1911, not long after his return to
+Germany, he sent the afterwards famous warship _Panther_ to Agadir. The
+French were naturally alarmed, and the situation which had become so
+promising was overcast. Our naval arrangements and our new military
+organization were ready, and our mobilization plans were fairly
+complete, as the German General Staff knew from their military attaché.
+But the point was, how to avoid an outbreak, and to get rid of the
+feeling and friction to which the Agadir crisis was giving rise. Our
+growing good relations were temporarily clouded.
+
+The sending of the _Panther_ to Agadir was not a prudent act. It
+imported either too much or too little. It is said to have been the plan
+of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, at that time the Foreign Secretary and
+generally a sensible statesman, and to have been done in spite of
+misgivings expressed by the Emperor about its danger. The circumstances
+of the moment were such that one can not but feel a certain sympathy
+with the German perturbation at the time. The march of the French Army
+to Fez had come on them suddenly, and it at least suggested a
+development of French claims going beyond what Germany had agreed to at
+the Algeciras Conference nearly six years previously. Those who wish to
+inform themselves about the commotion the expedition of the French
+stirred up in Germany, and of the efforts the Emperor and Bethmann
+Hollweg had to make to restrain it, will do well to read the latter's
+account of what happened there in the second chapter of his recent book.
+But to think that the sending of a German warship could make things
+better was to repeat the error of judgment which had characterized "the
+ally in shining armor" speech of the German Emperor to Austria when she
+formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina three years before. Instead of
+using diplomatic methods something that looked like a threat was allowed
+to appear, and the answer was Mr. Lloyd George's well-known declaration
+of July 21, 1911, in the City of London. The sending of the _Panther_,
+if intelligible, was certainly unfortunate.
+
+In the winter, after the actual crisis had been got over, there was
+evidence of continuing ill-feeling in Germany, and the suspicion in
+London did not diminish. In January, 1912, an informal message was given
+by the Emperor to Sir Ernest Cassel for transmission through one of my
+colleagues to the Foreign Office.[2] I knew nothing of this at the time,
+but learned shortly afterward that it was to the effect that the Emperor
+was concerned at the state of feeling that had arisen in both countries,
+and thought that the most hopeful method of improving matters would be
+that the Cabinet of St. James's should exchange views directly with the
+Cabinet of Berlin. For this course there was a good deal to be said. The
+peace had indeed been preserved, but, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg told
+me later on, not without effort. The attitude of Germany toward France
+had seemed ominous. The British Government had done all it could to
+avert a breach, but its sympathy was opposed to language used in
+Germany, the spirit of which seemed to us to have in it an aggressive
+element. We did not hesitate to say what we thought about this.
+
+Even after the Agadir incident was quite closed, the tension between
+Germany and England had not passed away. The military party in the
+former country began to talk of a "preventive" war pretty loudly. Even
+so moderate an organ in Berlin as the _Post_ wrote of German opinion
+that "we all know that blood is assuredly about to be shed, and the
+longer we wait the more there will be. Few, however, have the courage to
+imitate Frederick the Great, and not one dares the deed."
+
+The Emperor therefore sent his message in the beginning of 1912, to the
+effect that feeling had become so much excited that it was not enough to
+rely on the ordinary diplomatic intercourse for softening it, and that
+he was anxious for an exchange of views between the Cabinets of Berlin
+and London, of a personal and direct kind. As the result of this
+intimation, the British Cabinet decided to send one of its members to
+Berlin to hold "conversations," with a view to exploring and, if
+practicable, softening the causes of tension, and I was requested by the
+Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and my other colleagues to go to
+Berlin and undertake the task. Our Ambassador there came over to London
+specially to discuss arrangements, and he returned to Berlin to make
+them before I started.
+
+I arrived in the German capital on February 8, 1912, and spent some days
+in interviews with the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, the Naval
+Minister (Admiral von Tirpitz), and others of the Emperor's Ministry.
+The narrative of my conversations I have extracted from the records I
+made after each interview, for the preservation so far as possible of
+the actual expressions used during it.
+
+My first interview was one with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial
+Chancellor. We met in the British Embassy, and the conversation, which
+was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one. My impression, and I
+still retain it, was that Bethmann Hollweg was then as sincerely
+desirous of avoiding war as I was myself. I told him of certain dangers
+quite frankly, and he listened and replied with what seemed to me to be
+a full understanding of our position. I said that the increasing action
+of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the
+unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable
+consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of
+their own security. This was what was happening. I told him frankly that
+we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defense
+required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine. I
+went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any
+nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no
+secret military treaties. But, I added, if France were attacked and an
+attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be
+reckoned on by Germany. For one thing, it was obvious that our position
+as an island protected by the sea would be affected seriously if Germany
+had possession of the Channel ports on the northern shores of France.
+Again, we were under treaty obligation to come to the aid of Belgium in
+case of invasion, just as we were bound to defend Portugal and Japan in
+certain eventualities. In the third place, owing to our dependence on
+freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not
+sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an extent as
+to imperil our naval protection. She might build more ships, but we
+should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down.
+
+The Chancellor said that he did not take my observations at all in bad
+part, but I must understand that his admirals and generals were pretty
+difficult.
+
+I replied that the difficulty would be felt at least as much with the
+admirals and generals in my own country.
+
+The Chancellor, in the course of our talk, proposed a formula of
+neutrality to which I will refer later on.
+
+I left the Chancellor with the sense that I had been talking with an
+honest man struggling somewhat with adversity. However, next day I was
+summoned to luncheon with the Emperor and Empress at the Schloss, and
+afterward had a long interview, which lasted nearly three hours, with
+the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz in the Emperor's cabinet room. The
+conversation was mainly in German, and was confined to naval questions.
+My reception by the Emperor was very agreeable; that by Tirpitz seemed
+to me a little strained. The question was, whether Germany must not
+continue her program for expanding her fleet. What that program really
+amounted to we had not known in London, except that it included an
+increase in battleships; but the Emperor handed me at this meeting a
+confidential copy of the draft of the proposed new Fleet Law, with an
+intimation that he had no objection to my communicating it privately to
+my colleagues. I was careful to abstain even from looking at it then,
+for I saw that, from its complexity and bulk, it would require careful
+study. So I simply put it in my pocket. But I repeated what I had said
+to the Chancellor, that the necessity for secure sea-communications
+rendered it vital for us to be able to protect ourselves on the seas.
+Germany was quite free to do as she pleased, but so were we, and we
+should probably lay down two keels for every one which she added to her
+program. The initiative in slackening competition was really not with
+us, but with Germany. Any agreement for settling our differences and
+introducing a new spirit into the relations of the two nations would be
+bones without flesh if Germany began by fresh shipbuilding, and so
+forced us to do twice as much. Indeed, the world would laugh at such an
+agreement, and our people would think that we had been fooled. I did not
+myself take that view, because I thought that the mere fact of an
+agreement was valuable. But the Emperor would see that the public would
+attach very little importance to his action unless the agreement largely
+modified what it believed to be his shipbuilding program.
+
+We then discussed the proposal of the German Admiralty for the new
+program. Admiral von Tirpitz struggled for it. I insisted that
+fundamental modification was essential if better relations were to
+ensue. The tone was friendly, but I felt that I was up against the
+crucial part of my task. The admiral wanted us to enter into some
+understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the Two-Power
+standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any
+admission about it.
+
+I said it was not matter for admission. They were free and so were we,
+and we must for the sake of our safety remain so. The idea then occurred
+to us that, as we should never agree about it, we should avoid trying to
+define a standard proportion in any general agreement that we might come
+to, and, indeed, say nothing in it about shipbuilding; but that the
+Emperor should announce to the German public that the agreement on
+general questions, if we should have concluded one, had entirely
+modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally conceived, and
+that it should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be
+spread over a longer period.
+
+The Emperor thought such an agreement would certainly make a great
+difference, and he informed me that his Chancellor would propose to me a
+formula as a basis for it. I said that I would see the Chancellor and
+discuss a possible formula, as well as territorial and other questions
+with him, and would then return to London and report to the King (from
+whom I had brought him a special and friendly message) and to my
+colleagues the good disposition I had found, and leave the difficulties
+about shipbuilding and indeed all other matters to their judgment. For I
+had come to Berlin, not to make an actual agreement, but only to explore
+the ground for one with the Emperor and his ministers. I had been struck
+with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and a not less friendly
+disposition would be found in London.
+
+The evening after my interview with the Emperor I dined with the
+Chancellor. I met there and talked with several prominent politicians,
+soldiers, and men of letters, including Kiderlen-Waechter (the then
+Foreign Secretary), the afterward famous General von Hindenburg,
+Zimmermann of the Foreign Office, and Professor Harnack.
+
+Later on, after dinner, I went off to meet the French Ambassador, M.
+Jules Cambon, at the British Embassy, for I wished to keep him informed
+of our object, which was simply to improve the state of feeling between
+London and Berlin, but on the basis, and only on the basis, of complete
+loyalty to our Entente with France. It was, to use a phrase which he
+himself suggested in our conversation, a _détente_ rather than an
+_entente_ that I had in view, with possible developments to follow it
+which might assume a form which would be advantageous to France and
+Russia, as well as to ourselves and Germany. He showed me next day the
+report of our talk which he had prepared in order to telegraph it to
+Paris.
+
+I had other interviews the next day, but the only one which is important
+for the purposes of the present narrative is that at my final meeting
+with the German Chancellor on the Saturday (February 10). I pressed on
+him how important it was for public opinion and the peace of the world
+that Germany should not force us into a shipbuilding competition with
+her, a competition in which it was certain that we should have to spare
+no effort to preserve our margin of safety by greater increases.
+
+[Illustration: M. PAUL CAMBON
+
+FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1898.]
+
+He did not controvert my suggestion. I could see that personally he
+was of the same mind. But he said that the forces he had to contend with
+were almost insuperable. The question of a retardation of building under
+the proposed Fleet Law was not susceptible of being treated apart from
+that of the formula of which he and the Emperor had both spoken. He
+suggested that we might agree on the following formula:
+
+  1. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their
+  desire for peace and friendship.
+
+  2. They will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in
+  any combination, which is directed against the other. They
+  expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination.
+
+  3. If either of the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a
+  war with one or more other powers, the other of the High
+  Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the power so
+  entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavor for
+  the localization of the conflict.
+
+  4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding article
+  has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with
+  existing agreements which the High Contracting Parties have
+  already made. The making of new agreements which make it
+  impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe
+  neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the
+  preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the
+  provisions contained in Article 2.
+
+Anxious as I was to agree with the Chancellor, who seemed as keen as I
+was to meet me with expressions which I might take back to England for
+friendly consideration, I was unable to hold out to him the least
+prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just
+proposed. Under Article 2, for example, we should find ourselves, were
+it accepted, precluded from coming to the assistance of France should
+Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as
+Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, a friendly occupation of which was so
+important for our island security. Difficulties might also arise which
+would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to
+Belgium, Portugal, and Japan. The most hopeful way out was to revise the
+draft fundamentally by confining its terms to an undertaking by each
+Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any
+combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or
+become party to any plan or naval or military combination, alone or in
+conjunction with any other Power, directed to such an end.
+
+He and I then sat down and redrafted what he had prepared, on this
+basis, but without his committing himself to the view that it would be
+sufficient. We also had a satisfactory conversation about the Bagdad
+Railway and other things in Turkey connected with the Persian Gulf, and
+we discussed possibilities of the rearrangement of certain interests of
+both Powers in Africa. He said to me that he was not there to make any
+immediate bargain, but that we should look at the African question on
+both sides from a high point of view, and that if we had any
+difficulties we should tell him, and he would see whether he could get
+round them for us.
+
+I replied that I also was not there to make a bargain, but only to
+explore the ground, and that I much appreciated the tone of his
+conversation with me, and the good feeling he had shown. I should go
+back to London and without delay report to my colleagues all that had
+passed.
+
+I entertain no doubt that the German Chancellor was sincerely in earnest
+in what he said to me on these occasions, and in his desire to improve
+relations with us and keep the peace. So I think was the Emperor; but he
+was pulled at by his naval and military advisers, and by the powerful,
+if then small, chauvinist party in Germany. In 1912, when the
+conversations recorded took place, this party was less potent, I think a
+good deal less, than it appears to have become a year and a half later,
+when Germany had increased her army still further. But I formed the
+opinion even then that the power of the Emperor in Germany was a good
+deal misinterpreted and overestimated. My impression was that the really
+decisive influence was that of the Minister who had managed to secure
+the strongest following throughout Germany; and it was obvious to me
+that Admiral von Tirpitz had a powerful and growing following from many
+directions, due to the backing of the naval party.
+
+Moreover, sensible as a large number of Germans were, there was a
+certain tendency to swelled-headedness in the nation. It had had an
+extraordinarily rapid development, based on principles of organization
+in every sphere of activity--principles derived from the lesson of the
+necessity of thinking before acting enjoined by the great teachers of
+the beginning of the nineteenth century. The period down to about 1832
+seems to me to correspond, in the intellectual prodigies it produced, to
+our Elizabethan period. It came no doubt to an end in its old and
+distinctive aspect. But its spirit assumed, later on, a new form, that
+of organization for material ends based on careful reflection and
+calculation. In industry, in commerce, in the army, and in the navy, the
+work of mind was everywhere apparent. "_Aus einem Lernvolk wollen wir
+ein Thatvolk werden_" was the new watchword.
+
+No doubt there was much that was defective. When it came to actual war
+in 1914, it turned out that Germany had not adequately thought out her
+military problems. If she had done so, she would have used her fleet at
+the very outset, and particularly her destroyers and submarines, to try
+to hinder the transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France,
+and, having secured the absence of this force, she would have sought to
+seize the northern ports of France. Small as the Expeditionary Force
+was, it was enough, when added to the French armies, to make them so
+formidable as to render the success of von Kluck uncertain if the troops
+could be concentrated to resist him swiftly enough. Again, Germany never
+really grasped the implications of our command of the sea. Had she done
+so, I do not think she would have adventured war. She may have counted
+on England not coming in, owing to entanglements in Irish difficulties.
+If so, this was just another instance of her bad judgment about the
+internal affairs of other nations.
+
+In fine, Germany had not adequately thought out or prepared for the
+perils which she undertook when she assumed the risks of the war of
+1914. No doubt she knew more about the shortcomings of the Russian army
+than did the French or the British. On these, pretty exact knowledge of
+the Russian shortages enabled her to reckon. There we miscalculated more
+than she did. But she was not strong enough to make sure work of a brief
+but conclusive campaign in the West, which was all she could afford
+while Russia was organizing. Then, later on, she ought to have seen
+that, if the submarine campaign which she undertook should bring the
+United States into the war, her ultimate fate would be sealed by
+blockade. In the end she no doubt fought magnificently. But she made
+these mistakes, which were mainly due to that swelled-headedness which
+deflected her reasoning and prevented her from calculating consequences
+aright.
+
+There was a good deal of this apparent even in 1912. It had led to the
+Agadir business in the previous summer, and the absence of wise
+prevision was still apparent. I believed that this phase of militarism
+would pass when Imperial Germany became a more mature nation. Indeed, it
+was passing under the growing influence of Social Democracy, which was
+greatly increased by the elections which took place while I was in
+Berlin in 1912.[3] But still there was the possibility of an explosion;
+and when I returned to London, altho I was full of hope that relations
+between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my
+colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which
+I was uneasy.
+
+The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be
+insisted on.
+
+The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor of
+the Empire in place of Bethmann Hollweg. This was being talked of as
+possible when I was in Berlin.
+
+The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German
+policy. Foreign policy especially was under divided control. Von
+Tschirsky observed to me in 1906 that what he had been saying about a
+question we were discussing represented his view as Foreign Minister of
+Prussia, but that next door was the Chancellor, who might express quite
+a different view to me if I asked him; and that if, later on, I went to
+the end of the Wilhelmstrasse and turned down Unter den Linden I would
+come to the Schloss, where I might derive from the Emperor's lips an
+impression quite different from that given by either himself or the
+Chancellor. This made me feel that, desirous as Bethmann Hollweg had
+shown himself to establish and preserve good relations, we could not
+count on his influence being maintained or prevailing. As an eminent
+foreign diplomatist observed, "In this highly organized nation, when you
+have ascended to the very top story you find not only confusion but
+chaos."
+
+However, after I had reported fully on all the details and the Foreign
+Office had received my written report, matters were taken in hand by Sir
+Edward Grey, and by him I was kept informed. Presently it became
+apparent that there were those in Berlin who were interfering with the
+Chancellor in his efforts for good relations. A dispatch came which was
+inconsistent with the line he had pursued with me, and it became evident
+that the German Government was likely to insist on proceeding with the
+new Fleet Law. When we looked closely into the copy of the draft which
+the Emperor had given to me, we found very large increases
+contemplated, of which we had no notion earlier, not only in the
+battleships, about which we did know before, but in small craft and
+submarines and personnel. As these increases were to proceed further,
+discussion about the terms of a formula became rather futile, and we had
+only one course left open to us--to respond by quietly increasing our
+navy and concentrating its strength in northern seas. This was done with
+great energy by Mr. Churchill, the result being that, as the outcome of
+the successive administrations of the fleet by Mr. McKenna and himself,
+the estimates were raised by over twenty millions sterling to fifty-one
+millions.
+
+[Illustration: _International_
+
+VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON
+
+SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM 1905 TO 1916.]
+
+In the summer of 1912 I became Lord Chancellor, and the engrossing
+duties, judicial as well as administrative, of that office cut me off
+from any direct participation in the carrying on of our efforts for
+better relations with Germany. But these relations continued to be
+extended in the various ways practicable and left open to Sir Edward
+Grey and the German Chancellor. The discussions which had been begun
+when I was in Berlin, about Africa and the Bagdad Railway, were
+continued between them through the Ambassadors; and just before the war
+the draft of an extensive treaty had been agreed on.
+
+Then, after an interval of two years, came a time of extreme anxiety. No
+one had better opportunities than I of watching Sir Edward's
+concentration of effort to avoid the calamity which threatened. For he
+was living with me in my house in Queen Anne's Gate through the whole of
+these weeks, and he was devoting himself, with passionate earnestness of
+purpose, to inducing the German Government to use its influence with
+Austria for a peaceful settlement. But it presently became evident that
+the Emperor and his Ministers had made up their minds that they were
+going to make use of an opportunity that appeared to have come. As I
+have already said, I think their calculations were framed on a wholly
+erroneous basis. It is clear that their military advisers had failed to
+take account, in their estimates of probabilities, of the tremendous
+moral forces that might be brought into action against them. The
+ultimate result we all know. May the lesson taught to the world by the
+determined entry of the United States into the conflict between right
+and wrong never be forgotten by the world!
+
+Why Germany acted as she did then is a matter that still requires
+careful investigation. My own feeling is that she has demonstrated the
+extreme risk of confiding great political decisions to military
+advisers. It is not their business to have the last word in deciding
+between peace and war. The problem is too far-reaching for their
+training. Bismarck knew this well, and often said it, as students of his
+life and reflections are aware. Had he been at the helm I do not believe
+that he would have allowed his country to drift into a disastrous
+course. He was far from perfect in his ethical standards, but he had
+something of that quality which Mommsen, in his history, attributes to
+Julius Cĉsar. Him the historian describes as one of those "mighty ones
+who has preserved to the end of his career the statesman's tact of
+discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and has not
+broken down in the task which for greatly gifted natures is the most
+difficult of all--the task of recognizing, when on the pinnacle of
+success, its natural limits. What was possible he performed, and never
+left the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible better;
+never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives evils that were
+incurable. But where he recognized that fate had spoken, he always
+obeyed. Alexander on the Hypanis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back
+because they were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for
+bestowing even on its favorites merely limited successes. Cĉsar turned
+back voluntarily on the Thames and on the Rhine, and thought of
+carrying into effect even at the Danube and the Euphrates, not unbounded
+plans of world-conquest, but merely well-considered frontier
+regulations."
+
+If only Germany, whose great historian thus explained these things, had
+remembered them, how different might have been her position to-day. But
+it may be that she had carried her policy too far to be left free. With
+her certainly rests the main responsibility for what has happened; for
+apart from her, Austria would not have acted as she did, nor would
+Turkey, nor Bulgaria. The fascinating glitter of her armies, and the
+assurances given by her General Staff, were too much for the minor
+nations whom she had induced to accept her guidance, and too much I
+think also for her own people. No doubt the ignorance of these about the
+ways of their own Government counted for a great deal. There has never
+been such a justification of the principle of democratic control as this
+war affords. But a nation must be held responsible for the action of its
+own rulers, however much it has simply submitted itself to them. I have
+the impression that even to-day in its misery the German public does not
+fully understand, and still believes that Germany was the victim of a
+plot to entrap and encircle her, and that with this in view Russia
+mobilized on a great scale for war. It is difficult for us to understand
+how real the Slav peril appeared to Germany and to Austria, and there is
+little doubt that to the latter Serbia was an unquiet neighbor. But
+these considerations must be taken in their context--a context of which
+the German public ought to have made itself fully aware. The leaders of
+its opinion were bent on domination to the Near East. No wonder that the
+Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula became progressively alarmed, and looked
+to Russia more and more for protection. For it had become plain that
+moral considerations would not be allowed by the authorities at Berlin
+to weigh in the balance against material advantages to be gained by
+power of domination.
+
+If there is room for reproach to us Anglo-Saxons, it is reproach of a
+very different kind. Germany was quite intelligent enough to listen to
+reason, and, besides, she had the prospect of becoming the dominating
+industrial and commercial power in the world by dint merely of peaceful
+penetration. It is possible that, if her relations with her Western
+neighbors, including Great Britain, had been more intimate than they
+actually were, she might have been saved from a great blunder, and might
+have come to understand that the English-speaking races were not really
+so inferior to herself as she took them to be. Her _hubris_ was in part,
+at all events, the result of ignorance. Speaking for my own countrymen,
+I think that neither did we know enough about the Germans nor did the
+Germans know enough about us. They were ignorant of the innate capacity
+for fighting, in industrial and military conflicts alike, which our
+history shows we have always hitherto brought to light in great
+emergencies. And they little realized how tremendously moral issues
+could stir and unite democracies. We, on the other hand, knew little of
+their tradition, their literature, or their philosophy. Our statesmen
+did not read their newspapers, and rarely visited their country. We were
+deficient in that quality which President Murray Butler has spoken of as
+the "international mind."
+
+I do not know whether, had it been otherwise, we could have brought
+about the better state of things in Europe for which I tried to express
+the hope, altho not without misgiving, in the address on "Higher
+Nationality" which I was privileged to deliver before distinguished
+representatives of the United States and of Canada at Montreal on
+September 1, 1913. I spoke then of the possibility of a larger entente,
+an entente which might become a real concert of the Great Powers of the
+world; and I quoted the great prayer with which Grotius concludes his
+book on "War and Peace." There was at least the chance, if we strove
+hard enough, that we might find a response from the best in other
+countries, and in the end attain to a new and real _Sittlichkeit_ which
+should provide a firmer basis for International Law and reverence for
+international obligations. But for the realization of this dream a
+sustained and strenuous search after fuller mutual knowledge was
+required.
+
+After this address had been published, I received a letter from the
+German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, in which--writing in German and so
+late as September 26, 1913--he expressed himself to me as follows:
+
+  "If I had the happiness of finding myself in one mind with you in
+  these thoughts in February, 1912, it has been to me a still
+  greater satisfaction that our two countries have since then had a
+  number of opportunities of working together in this spirit. Like
+  you, I hold the optimistic view that the great nations will be
+  able to progress further on this path, and will do so. Anyhow, I
+  shall, in so far as it is within my power, devote my energies to
+  this cause, and I am happy in the certainty of finding in you an
+  openly declared fellow-worker."
+
+But events swept him from a course which, so far as I know, he at least
+individually desired to follow. The great increase of armaments took
+place that year in Germany, and, when events were too strong for him, he
+elected, not to resign, but to throw in his lot with his country. His
+position was one of great difficulty. He took a course for which many
+would applaud him. But inherently a wrong course, surely. What he said
+when Belgium was invaded in breach of solemn treaty shows that he felt
+this. He let himself be swept into devoting his energies to bolstering
+up his country's cause, instead of resigning. His career only proves
+that, given the political conditions that obtained in Germany shortly
+before the war, it was almost impossible for a German statesman to keep
+his feet or to avoid being untrue to himself. And yet there were many
+others there in the same frame of mind, and one asks oneself whether,
+had they had more material to work with, they might not have been able
+to present a more attractive alternative than the notion of military
+domination which in the end took possession of all, from the Emperor
+downward.
+
+It is, however, useless to speculate at present on these things. We know
+too little of the facts. The historians of another generation will know
+more. But of one thing I feel sure. The Germans think that Great Britain
+declared war of pre-conceived purpose and her own initiative. There is a
+sense in which she did. The opinion of Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and
+of those of us who were by their side, was unhesitating. She could not
+have taken any other course than she did without the prospect of ruin
+and failure to enter on the only path of honor. For honor and safety
+alike necessitated that she should take, without the delay which would
+have been fatal, the step she did take without delay and unswervingly.
+The responsibility for her entry comes back wholly to Germany herself,
+who would not have brought it about had she not plunged into war. And
+to-day Germany lies prostrate.
+
+But she is not dead. I do not think that for generations to come she
+will dream of building again on military foundations. Her people have
+had a lesson in the overwhelming forces which are inevitably called into
+action where there is brutal indifference to the moral rights of others.
+What remains to her is that which she has inherited and preserved of the
+results of the great advancement in knowledge which began under the
+inspiration of Lessing and Kant, and culminated in the teaching of
+Goethe and Schiller and of the thinkers who were their contemporaries.
+That movement only came to a partial end in 1832. No doubt its character
+changed after that. The idealists in poetry, music, and philosophy gave
+place to great men of science, to figures such as those of Ludwig and
+Liebig, of Gauss, Riemann, and Helmholtz. There came also historians
+like Ranke and Mommsen, musicians like Wagner, philosophers like
+Schopenhauer and Lotze, a statesman like Bismarck. To-day there are few
+men of great stature in Germany; there are, indeed, few men of genius
+anywhere in the world. But Germany still has a high general level in
+science, and of recent years she has produced great captains of
+industry. The gift for organization founded on principle, and for
+applying science to practical uses, was there before the war, and it is
+very unsafe to assume that it is not there in a latent form to-day. If
+it is, Germany will be heard of again with a field of activity that
+probably will not include devotion to military affairs in the old way.
+Against her competition of this other kind, formidable as soon as she
+has recovered from her misery, we must prepare ourselves in the only way
+that can succeed in the long run. We, too, must study and organize on
+the basis of widely diffused exact knowledge, and not less of high
+ethical standards. I think, if I read the signs of the times aright,
+that people are coming to realize this, both in the United States and
+throughout the British Empire.
+
+[Illustration: _Press Illustrating Service_
+
+CHANCELLOR THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG
+
+CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
+AFFAIRS FROM 1909 TO 1917.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Of course I neither tried to obtain nor did obtain from the
+authorities in Germany any information that was not available to the
+general public there. I went simply to see the system of administration
+and how it was worked. Not even Count Reventlow, in his highly critical
+accounts of my visits in the book "Deutschlands Auswartige Politik,"
+imagines that I had access to information which I was not free to use.
+The German Government had ascertained for itself that a new organization
+of the British Army was on foot, but it neither told its own secrets nor
+asked for ours.]
+
+[Footnote 2: This message was the response to a memorandum which Sir
+Ernest Cassel had brought to Berlin from some influential members of the
+Cabinet in London, and it contained suggestions for the improvement of
+the relations between the two countries. An account of Sir Ernest
+Cassel's visit, and of what passed when he delivered his message from
+London, is given in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's recent book.]
+
+[Footnote 3: An anecdote illustrating the change that was coming over
+political opinion in Germany in 1912, may be worth relating. I was
+present at a supper party, given by one of the professors in a
+well-known German University town, in May of that year. I asked him
+whether the old Conservative member who had for long represented the
+town had been again returned. "Returned! no," he replied. "It was
+impossible to return a man of moderate opinions. We only escaped a
+Social Democrat by a few votes. We managed to get enough of the popular
+vote to return a fairly sensible railway servant for this University
+town." I inquired what party he belonged to. "No old party," was his
+answer, and it will interest you to know that his program was an English
+one: "_Lloyd Georgianismus_." I then inquired what was his text book.
+"_Die Reden von Lloyd George_," was the answer. Did it contain anything
+about a place called Limehouse? "_Limhaus, ach ja; das war eine
+vortreffliche Rede!_"]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+We now have before us the considered opinions of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg, the late Imperial Chancellor, and of Admiral von Tirpitz, the
+Minister who did much to develop the naval power of Germany, about the
+origin and significance of the war. Both have written books on the
+subject.[4] It is to be desired that in the case of each of these
+authors his book should be studied in English-speaking countries as well
+as on the Continent. For it is important that the Anglo-Saxon world
+should understand the divergences in policy which the two books
+disclose, not less than the points of agreement. That world has suffered
+in the past from failure to understand Germany, while the German world
+has displayed a total inability to interpret aright the Anglo-Saxon
+disposition. When I speak of two worlds I mean the governing classes of
+these worlds. The nations themselves, taken as aggregates of individual
+citizens, by a probable majority in each case, desired the continuance
+of peace and of the prosperity of which it is the condition. So, of
+course, did the rulers, those in Germany as much as those in London. But
+the German rulers had a theory of how to secure peace which was the
+outcome of the abstract mind that was their inheritance. It was the
+theory that was wrong, a theory of which Anglo-Saxondom knew little, and
+which it would have rejected decisively had it realized its tendency.
+This theory is described in Admiral Tirpitz's book, with an account of
+the efforts made to indoctrinate with it the people of Germany.
+
+The two volumes are profoundly interesting. For in that of Admiral
+Tirpitz we have the doctrine set forth that in the end led to the war.
+In that written by the late Imperial Chancellor we have quite another
+principle laid down as the one which he was endeavoring to apply in his
+direction of German policy. But in this endeavor he failed. The school
+of Tirpitz in the main prevailed, and this was the more easy, inasmuch
+as it was simply continuing the policy which had been advocated by a
+noisy section of Germans, nearly without a break, since the days of
+Frederick the Great. It was a policy which had in reality outlived the
+days in which it was practicable. The world had become too crowded and
+too small to permit of any one Power asserting its right to jostle its
+way where it pleased without regard to its neighbors. An affair of
+police on a colossal scale had begun to look as if it would ensue, and
+ensue it ultimately did. No doubt had we all been cleverer we might have
+been able to explain to Germany whither she was heading. But we did not
+understand her, least of all our chauvinists, nor did she understand us.
+In the main what she really wanted was to develop herself by the
+application of her talent for commerce and industry. To her success in
+attaining this end we had no objection, provided her procedure was
+decent and in order. But she chose a means to her end which was becoming
+progressively more and more inadmissible. Tirpitz describes the
+illegitimate _means_. Bethmann Hollweg describes the legitimate _end_.
+Tirpitz thinks Bethmann Hollweg was a weakling because he would not back
+up the means. Bethmann Hollweg, firm in his faith that the end was
+legitimate and thinking of this alone, dwells on it with little
+reference to what his colleague was about. His accusation against the
+Entente Powers is that, at the instigation of Russia primarily, and in a
+less degree of France, they set themselves to ring round and crush
+Germany. It was really, he believes, a war of aggression, and England
+was ultimately responsible for it. Without her co-operation it was
+impossible, and altho she did not enter into any formal military
+alliance for the purpose, she began in the time of Edward VII. a policy
+of close friendship which enabled Russia and France in the end to reckon
+on her as morally bound to help. It was easy for these Powers to
+represent as a defensive war what was really a war of aggression. Such
+was truly its nature, and England decided to join in it, actually
+because she was jealous of Germany's growing success in the world, and
+was desirous of setting a check to it.
+
+Such is Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's explanation. He is, I have no doubt,
+sincerely convinced of its truth, and he explains the grounds of his
+conviction in detail and with much ability. But there is a fallacy in
+his reasoning which becomes transparent when one reads along with his
+book that of his colleague. If we put out of sight the deep feeling
+awakened here by the brutality of the invasion of Belgium, to which
+violation of Treaty obligations the former declares that Germany was
+compelled by military considerations that were unanswerable, and look at
+the history of Anglo-German relations before the war, the inference is
+irresistible that it was not the object of developing in a peaceful
+atmosphere German commerce and industry that England objected to. Such a
+development might have been formidable for us. It would have compelled
+great efforts on our part to improve the education of our people and our
+organization for peaceful enterprises. But it would have been
+legitimate. The objection of this country was directed against quite
+other things that were being done by Germany in order to attain her
+purpose. The essence of these was the attempt to get her way by creating
+armaments which should in effect place her neighbors at her mercy. We
+who live on islands, and are dependent for our food and our raw
+materials on our being able to protect their transport and with it
+ourselves from invasion, could not permit the sea-protection which had
+been recognized from generation to generation as a necessity for our
+preservation to be threatened by the creation of naval forces intended
+to make it precarious. As the navies of Europe were growing, not only
+those of France and Russia, but the navy of Italy also, we had to look,
+in the interests of our security, to friendly relations with these
+countries. We aimed at establishing such friendly relations, and our
+method was to get rid of all causes of friction, in Newfoundland, in
+Egypt, in the East, and in the Mediterranean. That was the policy which
+was implied in our Ententes. We were not willing to enter into military
+alliances and we did not do so. Our policy was purely a business policy,
+and everything else was consequential on this, including the growing
+sense of common interests and of the desire for the maintenance of
+peace. I do not think that Admiral Tirpitz wanted actual war. But he did
+want power to enforce submission to the expansion of Germany at her
+will. And this power was his means to the end which was what less
+Prussianized minds in Germany contemplated as attainable in less
+objectionable ways. Such a means he could not fashion in the form of
+strength in sea power which would have placed us at his mercy, without
+arousing our instinct for self-preservation.
+
+All this the late Imperial Chancellor in substance ignores. The fact is
+that he can only defend his theory on the hypothesis that no such policy
+as that of his colleague was on foot, and that the truth was that
+France, Russia, and England had come to a decision to take the
+initiative in a policy embracing, for France revenge for the loss of
+Alsace and Lorraine, for Russia the acquisition of Constantinople with
+domination over the Balkans and the Bosporus, and for England the
+destruction of German commerce. If this hypothesis be not true, and the
+real explanation of the alarm of the Entente Powers was the policy
+exemplified by Tirpitz and the other exponents of German militarism,
+then the whole of the reasoning in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's book
+falls to the ground.
+
+It may be asked how it was possible that two members of the Imperial
+Government should have been pursuing in the same period two policies
+wholly inconsistent with each other. The answer is not difficult. The
+direction of affairs in Germany was admirably organized for some
+purposes and very badly for others. Her autocratic system lent itself to
+efficiency in the preparation of armaments. But it was not really a
+system under which her Emperor was left free to guide policy. There is
+no greater mistake made than that under which it is popularly supposed
+that the Emperor was absolute master. The development in recent years of
+the influence of the General and Admiral Staffs, which was a necessity
+from the point of view of modern organization for war but required
+keeping in careful check from other points of view, had produced forces
+which the Emperor was powerless to hold in. Even in Bismarck's time
+readers of his "Reflections and Recollections" will remember how he felt
+the embarrassment of his foreign policy caused by the growing and
+deflecting influences of Moltke, and even of his friend Roon. And there
+was no Bismarck to hold the Staffs in check for reasons of expediency in
+the years before 1914. The military mind when it is highly developed is
+dangerous. It sees only its own bit, but this it sees with great
+clearness, and in consequence becomes very powerful. There is only one
+way of holding it to its legitimate function, and that is by the
+supremacy of public opinion in a Parliament as its final exponent.
+Parliaments may be clumsy and at times ignorant. But they do express, it
+may be vaguely, but yet sufficiently, the sense of the people at large.
+Now, notwithstanding all that had been done to educate them up to it, I
+do not think that the people at large in Germany had ever endorsed the
+implications of the policy of German militarism. The Social Democrats
+certainly had not. They ought, I think, to be judged even now by what
+they said before the war, and not by what some, tho not all of them,
+said when it was pressed on them in 1914 that Germany had to fight for
+her life. Had she possessed a true Parliamentary system for a generation
+before the war there would probably have been no war. What has happened
+to her is a vindication of Democracy as the best political system
+despite certain drawbacks which attach to it.
+
+The great defect of the German Imperial system was that, unless the
+Emperor was strong enough to impose his will on his advisers, he was
+largely at their mercy. Had they been chosen by the people, the people
+and not the Emperor would have borne the responsibility, if the views of
+these advisers diverged from their own. But they were chosen by the
+Emperor, and chosen in varying moods as to policy. The result was that,
+excellent as were the departments at their special work in most cases,
+on general policy there was no guarantee for unity of mind. The Emperor
+lived amid a sea of conflicting opinions. The Chancellor might have one
+idea, the Foreign Secretary, a Prussian and not Imperial Minister, a
+different one, the Chief of the General Staff a third, the War Minister
+a fourth, and the Head of the Admiralty a fifth. Thus the Kaiser was
+constantly being pulled at from different sides, and whichever Minister
+had the most powerful combination at his back generally got the best of
+the argument. Were the Kaiser in an impulsive mood he might side now
+with one and again with another, and the result would necessarily be
+confusion. Moreover, he had constantly to fix one eye on public opinion
+in Germany, and another on public opinion abroad. It is therefore not
+surprising that Germany seemed to foreigners a strange and
+unintelligible country, and that sudden manifestations of policy were
+made which shocked us here, accustomed as we were to something quite
+different. Neither our pacifists nor our chauvinists really succeeded in
+diagnosing Germany. On the other hand, we ourselves were a standing
+puzzle to the Germans. They could not understand how Government could be
+conducted in the absence of abstract principles exactly laid down. And
+because our democratic system was one of choosing our rulers and
+trusting them with a large discretion within limits, the Germans always
+suspected that this system, with which they were unfamiliar, covered a
+device for concealing hidden policies. I wrote in some detail about this
+in an address delivered at Oxford in the autumn of 1911, and afterward
+published in a little volume called "Universities and National Life."
+
+The war has not altered the views to which I had then come.
+
+But it was not really so on either side, and it is deplorable that the
+two nations knew so little of each other. For I believe that the German
+system, wholly unadapted as it was to the modern spirit, was bound to
+become modified before long, and had we shown more skill and more zeal
+in explaining ourselves, we should probably have accelerated the process
+of German acceptance of the true tendencies of the age. But our
+statesmen took little trouble to get first-hand knowledge of the genesis
+of what appeared to them to be the German double dose of original sin,
+and, on the other hand, our chauvinists were studied in Germany out of
+all proportion to their small number and influence. Thus the Berlin
+politicians got the wrong notions to which their tradition predisposed
+them. I believe that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was himself really more
+enlightened, but he could not control the admirals and generals, or the
+economists or historians or professors whom the admirals and generals
+were always trying to enlist on the side of the doctrine of _Weltmacht
+oder Niedergang_. Under these circumstances all that seemed possible was
+to try to influence German opinion, and at the same time to insure
+against the real risk of failure to accomplish this before it was too
+late.
+
+In order to make this view of German conditions intelligible, it will be
+convenient in the first place to give some account of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg's opinions as expressed in his book, and afterward to contrast
+them with the views of his powerful colleague, Admiral von Tirpitz.
+
+The ex-Imperial Chancellor commences his "_Betrachtungen zum
+Weltkriege_" by going back to the day when he assumed office. When
+Prince Bülow handed over the reins to him in July, 1909, the Prince gave
+him his views on what, in the attitude of England, had been causing the
+former much concern. We are not told what he actually said, but we can
+guess it, for Bethmann Hollweg goes on to indicate the origin of the
+cause of anxiety. It was King Edward's "encirclement" policy. It might
+well be that the late King had no desire for war. But the result of the
+policy for which he and the Ministers behind him stood was, so he
+believes, that, in all differences of opinion as to external policy,
+Germany found England, France, and Russia solidly against her, and was
+conscious of a continuous attempt to lead Italy away from the Triple
+Alliance. "People may call this '_Einkreisung_,' or policy of the
+balance of power, or whatever they like. The object and the achievement
+resulted in the founding of a group of nations of great power, whose
+purpose was to hinder Germany at least by diplomatic means in the free
+development of her growing strength." Sir Edward Grey, when taking over
+the conduct of foreign policy in 1905, had declared that he would
+continue the policy of the late Government. He hoped for improved
+relations with Russia, and even for more satisfactory relations with
+Germany, provided always that in the latter case these did not interfere
+with the friendship between England and France. This, says Bethmann
+Hollweg, had been the theme of English policy since the end of the days
+of "splendid isolation," and it remained so until the war broke out. He
+says nothing of the rapid advances which were proceeding from stage to
+stage in the organization of German battle-fleets to be added to her
+formidable army, or of the risk these advances made for England if she
+were to find herself without any friends outside.
+
+As regards Russia, Isvolsky, who had never forgiven the Austrian Foreign
+Minister, Count d'Aerenthal, for his diplomatic victory in getting the
+annexation to Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, was very
+hostile to Austria, and consequently to her Ally. In the case of France,
+again, it was indeed true that M. Jules Cambon had repeatedly emphasized
+to the ex-Chancellor the desire for more intimate relations between
+France and Germany. But the French had never forgiven the driving of
+Delcassé out of office, and the result of the Algeciras conference had
+not healed the wound. Besides this, there was the undying question of
+Alsace-Lorraine.
+
+The outcome of the precarious situation, says the ex-Chancellor, was
+that England, following her traditional policy of balancing the Powers
+of Europe, was taking a firm position on the side of France and Russia,
+while Germany was increasing her naval power and giving a very definite
+direction to her policy in the East. The commercial rivalry between
+England and Germany was being rendered acute politically by the growth
+of the German fleet. In this state of things Bethmann Hollweg formed the
+opinion that there was only one thing that could be done, to aim at
+withdrawing from the Dual Alliance the backing of England for its
+anti-German policy. The Emperor entirely agreed with him, and it was
+resolved to attempt to attain this purpose by coming to an understanding
+with England.
+
+Reading between the lines, it is pretty obvious that the ex-Chancellor
+was at times embarrassed by the public utterances of his imperial
+Master. Him he defends throughout the book with conspicuous loyalty, and
+is emphatic about his desire to keep the peace, a desire founded in
+religious conviction. But the Emperor's way was to see only one thing
+at the moment. I translate[5] a passage from his Chancellor's book:
+
+  "If from time to time he indulged in passionate expressions about
+  the strong position in the world of Germany, his desire was that
+  the nation, whose development beyond all expectation was filling
+  him with conscious pride, should be spurred on to a fresh
+  heightening of its energies. He sought to give it a continuous
+  impulse with the energy of his enthusiastic nature. He wished his
+  people to be strong and powerful in capacity to arm for their
+  defense, but the German mission, which was for him a consuming
+  faith, was yet to be a mission of work and of peace. That this
+  work and this peace should not be destroyed by the dangers that
+  surrounded us, was his increasing anxiety. Again and again has the
+  Kaiser told me that his journey to Tangier in 1904, as to which he
+  was quite unaware that it would lead to dangerous complications,
+  was undertaken much against his own will, and only under pressure
+  from his political advisers. Moreover, his personal influence was
+  strongly exerted for a settlement of the Morocco crisis of 1905.
+  And the same sense of the need of peace gave rise to his attitude
+  during the Boer War and also during the Russo-Japanese War. To a
+  ruler who really wanted war, opportunities for military
+  intervention in the affairs of the world were truly not lacking.
+
+  "Critics in Germany had in that period frequently pressed the
+  point that a too frequent insistence in public on our readiness
+  for peace was less likely to further it than, on the contrary, to
+  strengthen the Entente in its policy of altering the _status quo_.
+  In a period of Imperialism in which the talk about material power
+  was loud, and in which the preservation of the peace of the world
+  was considered only accidentally, like the ten years before the
+  war, considerations such as these are undoubtedly full of
+  significance, and perhaps the same sort of thing explains a good
+  deal of strong language on the part of the Kaiser about Germany's
+  capacity in case of war. It is certain that such utterances did
+  not lessen the feeling of nervousness that filled the
+  international atmosphere. But the true ground of such nervousness
+  was the policy of the balance of power, which had split Europe
+  into two armed camps full of distrust of each other. The
+  Ambassadors of the Great Powers knew the Kaiser intimately enough
+  to realize what his intentions, in spite of everything, were, and
+  it required an untruthfulness only explicable by the psychological
+  effect of war to permit the suggestion of a hateful and distorted
+  picture of him as a tyrant seeking for the domination of the world
+  and for war and bloodshed."
+
+I have translated this passage from the book because I think it is
+instructive in its disclosure of uneasy self-consciousness on the part
+of the author. Obviously, the Emperor made his quiet-loving Minister at
+times uncomfortable. I do not doubt that the Emperor really desired
+peace, just as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg tells us. Yet he not only
+indulged himself in warlike talk, but was surrounded by a group of
+military and naval advisers who were preaching openly that war was
+inevitable, and were instructing many of the prominent intellectual
+leaders in their doctrine. The Emperor may well have been in a difficult
+situation. But he was playing with fire when he made such speeches to
+the world as he frequently did. I believe him to have most genuinely
+desired to keep the peace. But I doubt whether he was willing to pay the
+price for entry on the only path along which it could have been made
+secure. He was a man of many sides, with a genius for speaking winged
+words as part of his equipment. He was a dangerous leader for Germany
+under conditions which had already caused even a Bismarck concern. The
+result was that the world took him to be the ally, not of Bethmann
+Hollweg, but of Tirpitz, and what that meant we shall see when we come
+to the latter's book. I can not say that I think the judgment of the
+world was other than, to put the matter at its lowest, the natural and
+probable result of his language, and I find nothing in the
+ex-Chancellor's volume to lead me to a different conclusion.
+
+The argument of that volume is that England should never have entered
+the Entente, for that by doing so she strengthened France and Russia so
+as to enable them to indulge the will for war. He assumes that there was
+this will as beyond doubt. But suppose England had not entered the
+Entente, what then? On Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's own showing France
+and Russia would have remained too weak to entertain the hope of success
+in a conflict with the Triple Alliance. Germany could, under these
+circumstances, have herself compelled these Powers to an entente or even
+an alliance. England would have been in such a case left in isolation in
+days in which isolation had ceased to be "splendid." For great as was
+her navy, it could not have been relied upon as sufficient to protect
+her adequately against the combined navies of Germany, France, Russia,
+and Austria, with that of Italy possibly added. It was the apprehension
+occasioned by Germany's warlike policy that made it an unavoidable act
+of prudence to enter into the Entente. It was our only means of making
+our sea power secure and able to protect us against threats of invasions
+by great Continental armies. The Emperor and his Chancellor should
+therefore have thought of some other way of securing the peace than that
+of trying to detach us from the Entente.
+
+The alternative was obvious. Germany should have offered to cease to
+pile up armaments, if our desire for friendly relations all round could
+be so extended as to bring all the Powers belonging to both groups into
+them, along with England. But the German policy of relying on superior
+strength in armaments as the true guarantee of peace did not admit of
+this. I am no admirer of the principle of the balance of power. I should
+like to say good-bye to it. I prefer the principle of a League of
+Nations, if that be practicable, or, at the very least, of an Entente
+comprising all the Powers. But if neither of these alternatives be
+possible there remains, for the people who desire to be secure, only the
+method of the balance of power. Now Germany drove us to this by her
+indisposition to change her traditional policy and to be content to
+rely on the settlement of specific differences for the good feeling that
+always tends to result. She had, it is true, the misfortune for so
+strong a nation to have been born a hundred years too late. She had got
+less in Africa than she might have had. We were ready to help her to a
+place in the sun there and elsewhere in the world, and to give up
+something for this end, if only we could secure peace and contentment on
+her part. But she would not have it so, and she chose to follow the
+principle of relying on the "Mailed Fist." Of this policy, when pursued
+recklessly, Bismarck well understood the danger. "Prestige politics," as
+he called them, he hated. In February, 1888, he laid down in a
+well-known speech what he held to be the true principle. "Every Great
+Power which seeks to exert pressure on the politics of other countries,
+and to direct affairs outside the sphere of interest which God has
+assigned to it, carries on politics of power, and not of interest; it
+works for prestige." But that principle was not consistently followed by
+William the Second. Into the detailed story of his departure from it I
+have not space to enter. But those who wish to follow this will do well
+to read the narrative contained in an admirable and open-minded book by
+Mr. Harbutt Dawson, "The German Empire from 1867 to 1914," in the
+second volume of which the story is told in detail.
+
+Instead of trying to alter the traditional attitude of Germany to her
+neighbors, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg let it continue. That he did not
+want it to continue I am pretty sure. At page 130 of his book he appeals
+to me, personally, to recall the words he used in a conversation we had
+one evening in February, 1912, words in which he sought to show me that
+"a proper understanding between our two nations would guarantee the
+peace of the world, and would lead the Powers by degrees from the
+phantom of armed Imperialism to the opposite pole of peaceful work
+together in the world." I remember his words, and with them I would
+remind him that I wholly agreed. I had myself used similar language in
+anticipation, and had begged him not to insist on our accepting an
+obligation of absolute neutrality under all conditions which might prove
+inconsistent with our duty of loyalty to France, now a friendly
+neighbor, a duty which rested on no military obligation, but on kindly
+feeling and regard. It was such friendship and mutual regard that I was
+striving, with the assent of the British Cabinet, to bring about with
+Germany also, and by the same means through which it had been
+accomplished in the case of France. Not by any secret military
+convention, for we had entered into no communications which bound us to
+do more than study conceivable possibilities in a fashion which the
+German General Staff would look on as mere matter of routine for a
+country the shores of which lay so near to those of France, but by
+removing all material causes of friction. And when Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg adds of my reply that "even he preferred the power of English
+Dreadnoughts and the friendship of France," I must remind him of the
+words sanctioned beforehand when submitted by me to Sir Edward Grey,
+with which I began our conversation. I reproduce them from the record I
+made immediately after the conversation to which I have already referred
+in the preceding chapter, on which I again draw for further minor
+details. And I wish to say, in passing, that both Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have given in their books accounts of
+what passed in my conversations with them which tally substantially, so
+far as the words used are concerned, with my own notes and
+recollections. It is mainly as to the inferences they now draw from my
+then attitude that I have any controversy with them, and, in the case of
+Admiral von Tirpitz, to some slight inaccuracies which have arisen from
+misconstruction.
+
+The ex-Imperial Chancellor asked the question whether I was to talk to
+him officially, the difficulty being that he could not divest himself of
+his official position, and that it would be awkward to speak with me in
+a purely private capacity. I said I had come officially, so far as the
+approval of the King and the Cabinet was concerned, but merely to talk
+over the ground, and not to commit either himself or my own Government
+at this stage to definite propositions. At the first interview, which
+took place in the British Embassy, on Thursday, February 8, 1912, and
+lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him a message
+of good wishes for the Conversations and for the future of Anglo-German
+relations, with which the King had entrusted me at the audience I had
+before leaving London. I proceeded to ask whether he wished to make the
+first observations himself, or desired that I should begin. He wished me
+to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him in the sense arranged in
+the discussions I had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London.
+
+I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away
+between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was
+the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken
+into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent
+armaments, and, with the aid of the Triple Alliance, she had become the
+center of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other
+Powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment
+Germany's right to her policy, but this was the natural and inevitable
+consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same
+situation with France, when she was very powerful on the seas, that we
+had with Germany now. While the fact to which I had referred created a
+difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of Powers
+might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing
+sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me
+to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was
+now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia
+except those that were in writing and published to the world.
+
+The Chancellor here interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really
+so. I said it was so, and that, in the situation which now existed, I
+saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new
+and cordial friendship carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps to the
+profit of Russia and France, as well as of Germany herself. He replied
+that he had no reason to differ from this view.
+
+He and I both referred to the war scare of the autumn of 1911, and he
+observed that we had made military preparations. I was aware that the
+German Military Attaché in London had reported at that time to Berlin
+that we had so reorganized our army as to be in a position, if we
+desired to do so, to send six of our new infantry divisions and at least
+one cavalry division swiftly to France. The Chancellor obviously had
+this in his mind, and I told him that the preparations made were only
+those required to bring the capacity of our small British Army, in point
+of mobilization for eventualities which must be clear to him, to
+something approaching the standard of that celerity in its operations
+which Moltke had long ago accomplished for Germany and which was with
+her now a matter of routine. For this purpose we had studied our
+deficiencies and modes of operation. This, however, concerned our own
+direct interests, and was a purely departmental matter concerning the
+War Office, and the Minister who had the most to do with it was the one
+who was now talking to him and who was not wanting in friendly feeling
+toward Germany. We could not run the risk of being caught unprepared.
+
+As both Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have devoted a
+good deal of attention to these and other conversations in their books,
+I have felt at liberty here and in the last chapter to state what, I am
+bound to observe, had better not, as it seems to me personally, have
+been held back for so long--the exact nature of that which actually
+passed when I was sent to Berlin in February, 1912. Accordingly, it is
+only necessary that I should add here a few words more about what indeed
+appears in most of its detail from the versions given by the two German
+Ministers concerned themselves.
+
+I refused, not only because I had been instructed to do so, but because
+in my own opinion it was vital that I should refuse, to negotiate
+excepting on the basis of absolute loyalty to the Entente with France
+and Russia. The German Government asked for a covenant of absolute
+neutrality. This I could not look at. I had the same feeling about such
+an agreement for unconditional neutrality as Caprivi had when he was
+asked to renew the Reinsurance Treaty which Bismarck made with Russia at
+Skiernevice in 1884, and under which, notwithstanding that Germany might
+come to owe a duty to Austria to support her as her military Ally, he
+bound Germany to observe neutrality in case Russia were attacked by
+her. So far as appeared this Reinsurance Treaty probably had suggested
+the wording of the analogous formula which the Chancellor was proposing
+to myself. But altho we were not under the obligation to France which
+Germany was under to Austria in 1884, I felt, to use the words of
+Caprivi himself, when he succeeded Bismarck, and was asked to renew the
+engagement with Russia, that the arrangement was "too complicated" for
+my comprehension. It would have been not only wrong to expose a friendly
+France to the risk of being dismembered by an unjustifiable invasion,
+while her friend England merely stood looking on, but it would also have
+been prejudicial to our safety. For to have allowed Germany to take
+possession of the northern ports of France would have been to imperil
+our island security. The Chancellor was entitled to make the request he
+did, but I was bound to refuse it. I also, at the same time, told him
+that if Germany went on increasing her Navy, any agreement with us meant
+to lead to better relations would be little more than "bones without
+flesh." Germany might, indeed, as he had said, need a third training
+squadron, in addition to the two she had already in the North Sea. This
+we could easily meet by moving more of our ships to northern waters,
+without having to increase the number we were building independently.
+But if she had the idea of adding to her fleet on a considerable scale
+we should be bound to lay down two keels to every one of her new ships,
+and the inevitable result would be, no proportionate increase in her
+strength relatively to ours, but of a certainty a good deal of bad
+feeling.
+
+I may observe that at the date of this conversation the new German Fleet
+Bill had not been made public, and we knew nothing of its contents in
+London, excepting that a third squadron for training was to be added to
+the two which were already there. For this purpose it had been said that
+a few ships and a moderate increase in personnel would be all that was
+required. Before I left Berlin the Emperor, as I mentioned in the
+preceding chapter, handed to me, with friendly frankness and with
+permission to show it to my colleagues, an advance copy of the new Bill.
+It looked to me as if, when scrutinized, its proposals might prove more
+formidable than we had anticipated. But I asked his permission to
+abstain from trying to form any judgment on this question without the
+aid of the British Admiralty, and I put it in my pocket and handed it to
+the First Lord of the Admiralty at a Cabinet held on Monday, February
+12, in the afternoon of the day on which I returned to London. I was not
+very sure as to what might prove to be contained in this Bill, and my
+misgivings were confirmed by our Admiralty experts, who found in it a
+program of destroyers, submarines, and personnel far in excess of
+anything indicated in the only rumors that had reached us. After we had
+to abandon the idea of getting Germany to accept the carefully guarded
+formula of neutrality which was all that we could entertain, the Cabinet
+sanctioned without delay the additions to our navy which were required
+to counter these increases. Our policy was to avoid conflagration by
+every effort possible, and at the same time to insure the house in case
+of failure.
+
+I felt throughout these conversations that the Chancellor was sincerely
+desirous of meeting me in the effort to establish good relations between
+the two countries. But he was hampered by the difficulty of changing the
+existing policy of building up armaments which was imposed on him. In
+only one way could he manage this, and that was by getting me to agree
+to a formula of absolute neutrality under all circumstances. The other,
+the better, and the only way that was admissible for us, the way in
+which we had surmounted all difficulties with France and Russia, he was
+not free to enter on, tho I believe that he really wished to. Hence the
+attempt at a complete agreement failed. But, as he says himself, much
+good came of these initial conversations, and still more of the
+subsequent conversations which followed on them in London between Sir
+Edward Grey and the German Ambassador. Candor became the order of the
+day, minor difficulties were smoothed over, and a treaty for territorial
+rearrangements, of the general character discussed in Berlin, was
+finally agreed on, and was likely to have been signed had the war not
+intervened.
+
+As to the rest of the narrative in the ex-Chancellor's book, this is not
+the place to deal with it. His view that Germany was doing her best to
+moderate the rash action in Vienna which resulted in the declaration of
+war on Serbia, while England was doing much less to restrain the course
+of events at St. Petersburg, is not one which it is easy to bring into
+harmony with the documents published. This is a part of the history of
+events before the war which has already been exhaustively dealt with by
+others, and it is no part of the purpose of these pages to write of
+matters about which I have no first-hand knowledge. For I had little
+opportunity of taking any direct part in our affairs with Germany after
+my final visit to that country, which was in 1912. My duties as Lord
+Chancellor were too engrossing.
+
+There are, however, in this connection just two topics toward the end of
+the book which are of such interest that I will refer to them before
+passing away from it. The first is the story that there was a Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the Emperor determined on
+war. This Herr von Bethmann Hollweg denies. He explains that in the
+morning of that day the Austrian Ambassador lunched with the Emperor,
+presumably at Potsdam, and took the opportunity of handing to him a
+letter written by the Emperor of Austria personally, together with a
+memorandum on policy drawn up in Vienna. This memorandum contained a
+detailed plan for opposing Russian enterprise in the Balkan peninsula by
+energetic diplomatic pressure. Against a hostile Serbia and an
+unreliable Roumania resort was to be had to Bulgaria and Turkey, with a
+view to the establishment of a Balkan League, excluding Serbia, to be
+formed under the ĉgis of the Central Powers. The Serajevo murder was
+declared to have demonstrated the aggressive and irreconcilable
+character of Serbian policy. The Austrian Emperor's letter endorsed the
+views contained in the memorandum, and added that, if the agitation in
+Belgrade continued, the pacific views of the Powers were in danger. The
+German Emperor said that he must consult his Chancellor before
+answering, and sent for Bethmann Hollweg and the Under-Secretary,
+Zimmermann. He saw them in the afternoon in the park of the Neues Palais
+at Potsdam. The Chancellor thinks that no one else was present. It was
+agreed that the situation was very serious. The ex-Chancellor says that
+he had already learned the tenor of these Austrian documents, altho he
+did not see the text of the subsequent ultimatum to Serbia until July
+22. It was determined that it was no part of the duty of Germany to give
+advice to her Ally as to how she should deal with the Serajevo murder.
+But every effort was to be made to prevent the controversy between
+Austria and Serbia from developing into an international conflict. It
+was useful to try to bring in Bulgaria, but Roumania had better be left
+out of account. These conclusions were in accordance with the
+Chancellor's own opinion, and when he returned to Berlin he communicated
+them to the Austrian Ambassador. Germany would do what she could to make
+Roumania friendly, and Austria was told that in any case she might rely
+on her Ally, Germany, to stand firmly by her side.
+
+The next day the Emperor set off in his yacht for the northern seas. The
+Chancellor says he advised him to do this because the expedition was one
+which the Emperor had been in the habit of making every year at that
+season, and it would cause talk if this usual journey were to be
+abandoned.
+
+The other point relates to the date on which the German Chancellor saw
+the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He tells us that it was
+brought to him for the first time on the evening of July 22 by Herr von
+Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, who had just received it from the Austrian
+Ambassador. The Chancellor says that von Jagow thought the ultimatum too
+strongly worded, and wished for some delay. But when he told the
+Ambassador this the answer was that the document had already been
+dispatched, and it was published in the Vienna _Telegraph_ the next
+morning.
+
+The conclusion of the Chancellor is that the stories of the Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, and of the co-operation of the German
+Government in preparing the ultimatum, are mere legends. The question of
+substance as regards the first may be left for interpretation by
+posterity. As to the controversy about the second, it would be
+interesting to know whether Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador
+at Vienna, knew of the ultimatum before it assumed the form in which it
+reached Berlin on July 22. I shall have more to say about these
+incidents later on when I come to Admiral von Tirpitz's account of them.
+
+My criticism of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg is in no case founded on any
+doubt at all as to his veracity. I formed, in the course of my dealings
+with him, a high opinion of his integrity. But in his reasoning he is
+apt to let circumstances escape his notice which are in a large degree
+material for forming a judgment. This does not seem to me to arise from
+any deliberate intention to be otherwise than candid. I am sure that he
+believes that he is telling the full truth at all times. But he became a
+convinced partizan, quite intelligibly. This fact, however creditable to
+his patriotism, seems to me not only to explain why he thought it right
+to continue in office and stand by his country as long as he could
+through the war, but also to detract somewhat from the weight that would
+otherwise attach to the opinions of an honorable and well-meaning man.
+
+I pass to the examination of the concurrent policy against which he
+could not prevail, and the existence of which takes the edge off his
+reasoning. That policy is expounded fully and clearly by Admiral von
+Tirpitz, a German of the traditional Military School, a man of great
+ability, and one who rarely if ever allowed himself to be deflected from
+pursuing a concentrated purpose to the utmost of his power.
+
+Of the general character of this purpose his colleague, Bethmann
+Hollweg, was conscious, as appears from passages in the book just
+discussed, of which I have selected one for translation.
+
+"The fleet was the favorite child of Germany, for in it the
+onward-pressing energies of the nation seemed to be most vividly
+illustrated. The application of the most modern technical skill, and the
+organization that had been worked out with so much care, were admired,
+and rightly so. To the doubts of those versed in affairs whether we were
+pursuing our true path by building great battleships, there was opposed
+a fanatical public opinion which was not disciplined in the interest of
+those responsible for the direction of affairs. Reflections about the
+difficult international troubles to which our naval policy was giving
+rise were held in check by a robust agitation. In the navy itself the
+consciousness was by no means everywhere present that the navy must be
+only an instrument of policy and not its determining factor. The conduct
+of naval policy had for many years rested in the hands of a man who
+claimed to exercise _political_ authority over his department, and who
+influenced unbrokenly the political opinion of wider circles. Where
+differences arose between the Admiralty and the civilian leadership,
+public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the
+Admiralty. Any attempt to take into consideration relative proportions
+in the strength of other nations was treated as being the outcome of a
+weak-minded apprehension of the foreigner."
+
+When I was in Berlin in 1912, the last year in which, as I have already
+said, I visited Germany, there were those who thought that Bethmann
+Hollweg would shortly be superseded as Chancellor by his powerful rival,
+Admiral von Tirpitz. But in these days the peace party in that country
+was pretty strong, and the then Chancellor was regarded as a cautious
+and safe man. It was later on, in 1913, when the new Military Law, with
+£50,000,000 of fresh expenditure, was passed, that the situation became
+much more doubtful. But the hesitation that existed in Government
+circles in Berlin earlier was never shared by the author of the
+"_Erinnerungen_," to which I now pass. One has only to look at the
+portrait at the beginning of that volume to see what sort of a man the
+author is. A strong man certainly, a descendant of the class which
+clustered round the great Moltke, and gave much anxiety at times to
+Bismarck himself.
+
+[Illustration: ADMIRAL ALFRED P. VON TIRPITZ
+
+LORD HIGH ADMIRAL OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL NAVY FROM 1911 TO 1916.]
+
+The Admiral possesses a "General Staff" mind of a high order. A mind of
+this type has never been given a chance of systematic development in the
+English Navy, where the distinction between strategy and tactics, on the
+one hand, and administration on the other, has never been so sharply
+laid down as it has been, following the great Moltke, in Germany. Even
+Moltke himself was not satisfied with what had been accomplished in
+Germany in this direction by the Army. He is said to have complained
+that the General Staff building, which was put in the Thiergarten, while
+the War Office was in Berlin itself, near the corner of the
+Wilhelmstrasse, was only one mile distant from the War Office, when it
+should have been two. For he held that the exactness of demarcation of
+function, which was only to be attained if strategy and tactics were
+studied continuously by a specially chosen body of experts, could not be
+made complete if the War Office could get too easily at the General
+Staff. But what he accomplished at least gave rise to a school of exact
+military thought far in advance of any that had preceded it. The fruits
+of this were reaped in the war with Austria in 1866, and still more in
+that with France in 1870. And when the navy was first organized this
+principle was introduced into its organization, first by Stosch and then
+by Caprivi. Both of these had been trained in the great Moltke's ideas,
+and it was because of this that, altho soldiers, they were chosen to
+model the organization of the German Navy. It is true that we have
+beaten the German Navy. That was because, as Tirpitz himself admits, we
+possessed, not only superior numbers, but a tradition of long standing
+and a spirit in our fleet which Germany had not built up. But we shall
+do well not to overlook what he has to say about the procedure of basing
+strategy and tactics on exact knowledge, and careful study, especially
+when such ideas as that of landing small expeditionary forces on enemy
+territory by means of a naval expedition, are being considered, nor what
+he says of his efforts to make this procedure real. Numbers are not
+always sufficient. They are not likely to be large for a long time to
+come, and the study of all possibilities and of modern conditions is
+therefore more important than ever. The British Army knows this. It is
+not so clear that the British Navy is equally informed about the
+necessity of bearing the principle in mind.
+
+Tirpitz never served in the army, but he was brought up under the
+influence of these great soldiers. His first experience was indeed
+mainly in technical matters of construction. But he never let go the
+true principle of an Admiral or War Staff, and the result was that he
+considered, and not wholly without reason, that he was leading the
+German Navy on lines which were in the end likely to make it, when fully
+developed, a more powerful instrument than the British Navy. Instead of
+studying merely the lessons of the past, as we here seek them in, for
+instance, the history of the Seven Years' War of more than a century and
+a half ago, or in the operations of Nelson carried out a hundred years
+since, he insisted that the German Navy should study systematically
+modern problems, and in particular combined naval and military
+operations. In England we had no War Staff for the Navy until 1911, and
+our Senior Admirals disliked the idea. Consequently such staff study of
+military problems has never been properly developed, the wishes of our
+junior naval officers notwithstanding. In Germany the idea was regarded
+as a vital one throughout by Tirpitz.
+
+The first chapter of Tirpitz's book describes the beginnings of the
+German Navy. The second deals with the Stosch period. The third is
+devoted to the administration of Caprivi during the time when he was
+head of the Admiralty, and extends to the period when he became
+Chancellor. The fourth is devoted to construction. The fifth describes
+the disastrous breaking up of the Naval Administration into Boards, to
+which the author says the Emperor William II. allowed himself to be
+persuaded. The sixth chapter is directed to tactical developments, a
+subject in which Admiral Tirpitz himself did much. The seventh deals
+with naval plans. The eighth contains a very interesting description of
+how he was sent to find a naval base in Chinese waters, and how he
+selected and developed, with German thoroughness, Tsingtau (Kiaochow).
+The ninth chapter begins the story of the difficulties he experienced
+when refused sufficient money and freedom while he was Minister of
+Marine. The tenth gives a vividly written account of his visits to
+Bismarck. The next five chapters are devoted to the development of the
+German Navy and its relation to foreign policy. The sixteenth,
+seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters are concerned with the author's
+views of the reasons for the outbreak of the war of 1914, and its
+history. The nineteenth is a chapter devoted to the submarine war, and
+to a farewell apostrophe to a Germany lost by bad leading and vagueness
+in objectives. There is also a supplement, containing letters written
+by him from time to time during the war, and his observations on what
+ought to have been the consistent policy of Germany in construction of
+battleships and submarines.
+
+The great thesis of the book is that the only way to preserve the peace
+was to make Europe fear German strength, and that this imported such
+battle-fleets as would attract allies to Germany for protection, and
+would thus in the end weaken the Entente. England was the real enemy,
+and England could not be dislodged from her powerful position in the
+world so long as she was allowed to continue in command of the ocean.
+For Bethmann Hollweg's alternative policy of a peaceful _rapprochement_
+with England he has no words but those of contempt. He, too, he says,
+had ideas as to how to keep the peace, but they were diametrically
+different from those of his colleague the Chancellor. On him he pours
+scorn for his attempts at departure from the policy of Frederick the
+Great and Bismarck.
+
+Tirpitz had been deeply impressed by the writings of Admiral Mahan. He
+himself drew from them the lesson that in ultimate analysis world-power
+for Germany depended on the sea-power which she had not got, and he set
+himself to build it up. He endeavored to educate on this subject, not
+only the Reichstag, where he says he had much opposition, but the
+public. Under Prince Bülow this was less difficult than he subsequently
+found it. His account of how the Minister of Education and the
+University professors helped him, and of how he contrived to enlist the
+Press, is as interesting as it is significant. But his great difficulty
+was obviously with William the Second. The Emperor had done much for
+fleet construction, and was so interested in it that he meddled at every
+turn in technical and strategical matters alike. The Ministry of Marine
+was not allowed to carry out the Admiral's own plans and conceptions.
+And when Bethmann came on the scene the situation became, according to
+the former, even worse. He moans over the apparent limitlessness of the
+money and authority with which the English Admiralty was provided by
+Parliament and the nation. At last he carried with his colleagues and in
+the Reichstag the policy of Fleet Laws, under which the Reichstag passed
+measures which took construction, in part at least, from off the annual
+navy vote, and he got through the succession of Acts that laid down
+programs extending over several years. Richter and other distinguished
+public men fought Tirpitz over these, but, in part at least, he got his
+way, and secured the nearest approach to continuity that his
+ever-supervising Sovereign would permit to him.
+
+What Tirpitz says he asked for above everything was a definite policy
+for war, and this he could not get the leave of Bethmann to lay down,
+nor could he get the volatile Emperor to stick to definite conceptions
+of it. For coast defense he had a supreme contempt. The great German
+Army would take care of this, so far as invasion was concerned, and an
+adequate battle-fleet would do the rest. It is noticeable that
+apparently he never even dreamed of trying to invade England with her
+fleet protection. It was in quite another way that he intended, if
+necessary, to harass this country. He wanted to threaten our commerce
+and to be able to break any blockade of Germany. German sea-power was to
+be made strong enough to attract allies by its ability to rally all free
+nations without any curatorship by the Anglo-Saxons.
+
+This is what he says his war objectives were. He bitterly complains of
+the opposition to them and to himself which he met with from such papers
+as the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, and from the influence of certain of his
+colleagues. Constitutionalism he appears to have hated. The democracy
+of Germany was not suited to such leading as Lloyd George, during the
+war, gave to England, and Clemenceau to France. In Germany, he declares,
+a strong hand is always required, and a revolution is inevitable in case
+the hand is weak, and defeat follows. For Germany needed "the
+Prussian-German State." The tradition of Frederick the Great and
+Bismarck was its protecting spirit.
+
+Can we wonder, if the narrative of this capable man is accurate, that
+Bethmann struggled for his rival policy of conciliation in the face of
+almost insuperable difficulties? Tirpitz had a strong party at his back,
+both in Prussia and elsewhere. What made it strong was largely that its
+members shared his view of England and of the situation. "They looked to
+us," he says, "it was the last chance of international freedom." I
+thought in 1912 that Bethmann might in the end win, for in the main at
+that time the Emperor was with him, and so were Ballin and many others
+of great influence. The Social Democrats, too, were gaining influence
+rapidly. But the presence of a powerful school of thought at the back of
+Tirpitz, a school which, had it succeeded, would have secured the place
+it desired by reducing to a precarious state the life of my own country,
+made me feel that, while we must do all we could to extend our
+friendships so as to convert and bring in Germany, the chances of
+success did not preponderate sufficiently to justify relaxation of
+either vigilance in preparation or resolution in policy. My feeling
+remained what I had tried to express in the address delivered at Oxford
+in August of 1911. "I wish," I said then, "all our politicians who
+concern themselves with Anglo-German relations, those who are pro-German
+as well as those who are not, could go to Berlin and learn something,
+not only of the language and intellectual history of Prussia, but of the
+standpoint of her people--and of the disadvantages as well as the
+advantages of an excessive lucidity of conception. Nowhere else in
+Germany that I know of is this to be studied so advantageously and so
+easily as in Berlin, the seat of Government, the headquarters of
+_Real-politik_, and it seems to me most apparent among the highly
+educated classes there."
+
+Bismarck does not appear to have known much while in office about
+Tirpitz, and when the latter desired later on to enlist his outside
+support he did not find it at first easy. But, having with some
+difficulty got the assent of the Emperor to a new ship being named after
+Bismarck, he in the end got from the latter permission to visit him at
+Friedrichsruh in 1897. There Tirpitz arrived at noon. The family were
+at luncheon. He tells us how the Prince sat at the head of the table,
+and how he rose, cool but polite, and remained standing till Tirpitz was
+seated. The Prince assumed the air of one suffering from sharp neuralgic
+pain, and he kept pressing the side of his head with a small indiarubber
+hot-water bottle. It was only with an appearance of difficulty that he
+uttered, and his food was minced meat. However, when he had drunk a
+bottle and a half of German champagne (_Sect_) he became animated. After
+the dishes were removed, Countess Wilhelm Bismarck lit his great pipe
+for him, and with the other ladies quitted the room. The atmosphere was
+one of gloomy silence. But the great man suddenly broke it by raising
+his formidable eyebrows, and directing a grim look at Tirpitz, whom he
+appears next to have asked whether he himself was a tomcat that needed
+only to be stroked in order to procure sparks to be emitted. Tirpitz
+then timidly unfolded his plans and his policy of building big
+battleships. Bismarck was critical, and turned his criticism to other
+matters also. He denounced as disastrous the abrogation by Caprivi and
+William the Second of the treaty he (Bismarck) had made with Russia for
+Reinsurance. Bismarck declared that, in case of an Anglo-Russian war,
+our policy was contained in the simple words: neutrality as regards
+Russia. The modest Tirpitz ventured to suggest that only a fleet strong
+enough to be respected could make Germany worthy of an alliance in the
+eyes of Russia and other powers. Bismarck rejected this almost angrily.
+The English he thought little of. If they tried to invade Germany the
+Landwehr would knock them down with the butt-ends of their rifles. That
+a close blockade might knock Germany down never seemed to occur to him.
+However, in the end Tirpitz says that the Prince became mollified and
+expressed agreement with the view that an increased fleet was necessary.
+
+Bismarck then invited the Admiral to go with him for a drive in the
+forest. Despite the neuralgia, this drive, which took place amid showers
+of rain, lasted for two hours. The carriage, moreover, was open. There
+were two bottles of beer, one on the right and the other on the left of
+the Prince, which they drank on the way, and he smoked his pipe
+continuously. "It was not easy to keep pace with his giant
+constitution."
+
+For the details of the conversation, which was conducted in English so
+that the coachman might not understand it, I must refer the reader to
+the chapter in which it is described. The old warrior spoke with
+affection of the Emperor Frederick, but as regarded his son William, he
+appears to have let himself go. Tirpitz was to tell the latter that he,
+Bismarck, only wanted to be let alone, and die in peace. His task was
+ended. He had "no future and no hopes."
+
+Tirpitz saw Bismarck twice subsequently. The last time was on the
+occasion of a surprize visit to him by the Emperor. This visit was not
+wholly a success. The conversation got on to unfortunate lines. Bismarck
+began to speak of politics, and the Emperor ignored what he said and did
+not reply. The younger Moltke, who was present, whispered to Tirpitz,
+"It is terrible," alluding to the Emperor's want of reverence. When the
+Emperor left, his Minister, von Lucanus, who was with him, held out his
+hand to the old Prince. But Lucanus had formerly intrigued against him.
+Consequently he "sat like a statue, not a muscle moved. He gazed into
+the air, and before him Lucanus made gestures in vain."
+
+All this notwithstanding, Tirpitz seems to have made a good impression.
+For after these visits the Bismarck press began to speak favorably of
+him.
+
+But I must not linger over side issues. The book is so full of
+interesting material that in writing about it one has to resolve not to
+be led away from the vital points by its digressions. One of these
+points is that to which I have already made reference in giving the
+Chancellor's views about it, the responsibility for what happened in
+July, 1914, and in particular for the decision taken on the 5th of that
+month at Potsdam.
+
+It is interesting to compare Tirpitz's account of the meeting that took
+place then, on the invitation of the Emperor, with that of Bethmann,
+altho the former was not present, and bases his judgment only on what
+was reported to him as Minister. He gives an account of what happened
+which makes the meeting seem a more important one than the ex-Chancellor
+takes it to have been. The Admiral's view is that at this date what was
+urgently wanted was "prompt and frank" action. Austria should not have
+been allowed to rush upon Serbia, however just her causes for anger. On
+the other hand the German Emperor should have at once and directly
+appealed to the Czar to co-operate with him in endeavoring to secure
+such a response to reason and expression of contrition on the part of
+Serbia as would have eased off the situation, which was full of danger.
+For, with an unfriendly Entente interesting itself, no war which broke
+out was likely to be capable of being kept localized.
+
+Tirpitz was not in Berlin on July 5, but he received reports from there
+of what was happening. Neither he nor von Moltke, the Chief of the
+General Staff, was consulted, but Tirpitz declares that the Emperor saw
+at Potsdam the Minister of War, von Falkenhayn, and also the Minister of
+the Military Cabinet, von Lyncker. If so, whether or not the conference
+was technically a Crown Council, the meeting was a very important one.
+
+Tirpitz confirms Bethmann in saying that, prompted by chivalrous
+feeling, the German Emperor responded to the Emperor of Austria by
+promising support and fidelity. He declares that the Emperor William did
+not consider the intervention of Russia to protect Serbia as probable,
+because he thought that the Czar would never support regicides, and
+that, besides, Russia was not prepared for war, either in a military or
+financial sense. Moreover, the Emperor somewhat optimistically presumed
+that France would hold Russia back on account of her own disadvantageous
+state of finance and her lack of heavy artillery. The Emperor did not
+refer to England; complications with that country were not thought of.
+The Emperor's view thus was that a further extension of dangerous
+complications was unlikely. His hope was that Serbia would give in, but
+he considered it desirable that Germany should be prepared in case of a
+different issue of the Austro-Serbian dispute. It was for that reason
+that he had on the 5th commanded the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; the
+Minister of War, von Falkenhayn; the Under-Secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann; and the Minister of the War Cabinet, von
+Lyncker, to Potsdam. It was then decided that all steps should be
+avoided which would attract political attention or involve much expense.
+After this decision the Emperor, on the advice of the Chancellor,
+started on his journey to the North Cape, for which arrangements had
+already been made. The duty of the Chancellor under the circumstances
+was to consider any promise to be given to Austria from the standpoint
+of German interests, and to keep watch on the method of its fulfilment.
+The Chancellor, says his critic, did not hesitate to accept the decision
+of the Emperor, apparently imagining that Austria's position as a Great
+Power was already shaken and would collapse unless she could insist on
+being compensated at the expense of the greedy Serbians. He probably had
+in his mind the success obtained in the earlier Balkan crisis over
+Bosnia and Herzegovina. He goes on to tell us that he was not informed
+as to what the Emperor was thinking of during his tour in northern
+waters, but that he had reason to believe that he did not anticipate
+serious danger to the peace of the world. And he observes, as a
+characteristic of the Emperor, that when he was not apprehensive of
+danger he would express himself without restraint about the traditions
+of his illustrious predecessors, but the moment matters began to look
+critical his became a hesitating mood. The Admiral thinks that if the
+Emperor had not left Berlin, and if the full Government machinery had
+been at work, means might have been found by the Emperor and the
+Ministry of averting the danger of war. As, however, the Chief of the
+General Staff, the Head of the Admiralty Staff, and Tirpitz himself were
+kept away from Berlin during the following weeks, the matter was handled
+solely by the Chancellor, who, being in truth not sufficiently
+experienced in great European affairs, was not able to estimate the
+reliability of those who were advising him in the Foreign Office.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD
+
+MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM FEB. 1912 TO JAN.
+1915.]
+
+Von Tirpitz goes on to say that by July 11 the Berlin Foreign Office had
+heard that the Entente had advised yielding at Belgrade. The Chancellor,
+he declares, could now have brought about a peaceful solution, but,
+convinced as he was that the Entente did not mean war, he drew the
+shortsighted conclusion that Austria, without considering the Entente,
+might force a march into Serbia and yet not endanger the world's peace.
+His optimism was disastrous. On July 13 he (the Chancellor) was,
+according to Tirpitz, informed of the essential points in the proposed
+Austrian ultimatum. Bethmann, as already stated, says that he did not
+see the ultimatum itself until the 22nd, when it had already been
+dispatched. But he does not say that he had been given no forecast of
+its contents from the German Ambassador at Vienna. Tirpitz quotes, but
+without giving its exact date, a memorandum sent to him at Tarasp
+apparently just after the 13th. It was forwarded from the Admiralty, and
+was in these terms: "Our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, has
+ascertained privately, as well as from Count Berchtold, that the
+ultimatum to be sent by Austria to Serbia will contain the following
+demands: I. A proclamation of King Peter to his people in which he will
+command them to abstain from greater Serbian agitation. II.
+Participation of a higher Austrian official in the investigation of the
+assassination. III. Dismissal and punishment of all officers and
+officials proved to be accomplices."
+
+Tirpitz says that his first impression, when he received this document
+in Tarasp, was that Serbia could not possibly accept the terms of such
+an ultimatum. And he adds that he believed neither in the possibility of
+localizing the war nor in the neutrality of England. In his view the
+greatest care was required to reassure the Russian Government,
+especially as England would wish "to let war break out in order to
+establish the balance of power on the Continent as she understood it."
+But the Chancellor expressed the wish that he should not return to
+Berlin, for his doing so might give rise to remarks. If this be so, it
+seems to have been a very unfortunate step. The Emperor and his most
+important Ministers should all have been in Berlin at such a time.
+Bethmann's advice appears intelligible only if he thought, as is quite
+possible, that he could himself handle the negotiations best if the
+Emperor and Tirpitz were both out of the way. If so, he was not
+successful. He did not in the end respond to Sir Edward Grey's wish for
+a conference, and earlier he had failed to bridle the impulsive ally who
+was dashing wildly about. It looks as tho, however good his intentions
+may have been, he was taking terrible risks.
+
+Now this was the crucial period. Grey was doing his very utmost to avert
+war, and was even pressing Serbia to accept the bulk of what was in the
+ultimatum. As to his real intentions, I may, without presumption, claim
+to be better informed than Admiral von Tirpitz. Sir Edward Grey and I
+had been intimate friends for over a quarter of a century before the
+period in which the Admiral, who, so far as I know, never saw him,
+diagnoses the state of his intentions. During the eight years previous
+to July, 1914, we had been closely associated and were working as
+colleagues in the Cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr.
+Asquith. And in that July, throughout the weeks in question, Sir Edward
+was staying with me in my house in London, and considering with me the
+telegrams and incidents, great or small.
+
+It is a pure myth that he had, at the back of his mind, any such
+intentions as the Admiral imagines. He was working with every fiber put
+in action for the keeping of the peace. He was pressing for that in St.
+Petersburg, in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in Belgrade. He was not
+in the least influenced either by jealousy of Germany's growth or by
+fear of a naval engagement with her, as Tirpitz infers. All he wanted
+was to fulfil what, for him, was the sacred trust that had been
+committed to him, the duty of throwing the whole weight of England's
+influence on the side of peace. And that was not less the view of Mr.
+Asquith, whom I knew equally intimately, and it was the view of all my
+colleagues in the Cabinet.
+
+Germany was going ahead with giant strides in commerce and industry, but
+we had not the slightest title to be jealous or to complain when she was
+only reaping the fruits of her own science and concentration on peaceful
+arts. I had said this myself emphatically to the Emperor at Berlin in
+1906 in a conversation the record of which has already been given. There
+was no responsible person in this country who dreamt, either in 1914 or
+in the years before then, of interfering with Germany's Fleet
+development merely because it could protect her growing commerce. What
+responsible people did object to was the method of those who belonged to
+the Tirpitz school. The peace was to be preserved; I give that school
+full credit for this desire; but preserved on what terms? On the terms
+that the German was to be so strong by land and sea that he could
+swagger down the High Street of the world, making his will prevail at
+every turn.
+
+But this was not the worst, so far as England was concerned. The school
+of von Tirpitz would not be content unless they could control England's
+sea power. They would have accepted a two-to-three keel standard
+because it would have been enough to enable them to secure allies and to
+break up the Entente. Now it was vital to us that Germany should not
+succeed in attaining this end. For if she did succeed in attaining it,
+not only our security from invasion, but our transport of food and raw
+materials, would be endangered. With a really friendly Germany or with a
+League of Nations the situation would have mattered much less. It was
+the policy of the school to which Tirpitz and the Emperor himself
+belonged which made the situation one of growing danger and the Entente
+a necessity, for these were days when other nations near us were
+beginning to organize great battle-fleets. If Bethmann Hollweg's policy
+had prevailed there would have been no necessity for any such Entente as
+was the only way of safety for us. But he could not carry his policy
+through, earnestly tho he desired to do so, and thus provide the true
+way to permanent peaceful relations. I think he believed that the only
+use Britain ever contemplated making of her Navy, should peace continue,
+was that of a policeman who co-operates with others in watching lest
+anyone should jostle his neighbor on the maritime highway. He believed
+in the _Sittlichkeit_, which we here mean when we speak of "good form."
+But that was not the faith of his critics in Berlin. They wanted to have
+Russia, and if possible France also, along with their navies, on the
+side of Germany. Peace, yes, but peace compelled by fear--a very
+unwholesome and unstable kind of peace, and deadly for the interests of
+an island nation. Hence the Entente!
+
+What we had to do was to prevent, if we could, the Tirpitz school from
+getting its way, and we tried this not without some measure of success.
+Even to-day our pacifists now join with chauvinist critics of a policy
+which was pursued steadily for many years, and was that of
+Campbell-Bannerman as well as of Asquith. They reproach us for having
+entered on our path without having adequately increased our naval and
+military resources. The reproach is not a just one. It is founded on a
+complete misconception of the true military situation. It is only
+necessary to read carefully through Admiral von Tirpitz's very
+instructive volume to see that he took precisely the same view as we
+did, and as was held to unswervingly by our Committee of Imperial
+Defense. England's might lay in final analysis in her sea power. She
+needed also a small but very perfect army, capable of high rapidity in
+concentration by the side of the great French Army, in order to prevent
+the coasts of France close to our own from being occupied by an enemy
+invading French territory.
+
+In his book the Admiral refers to a letter I wrote to _The Times_ on
+December 16, 1918, pointing this out and the grounds on which the
+strategical conception was based. The Admiral expresses his agreement,
+and says that it was a fatal blunder of the German Highest Command not
+to use their submarine power at the very outbreak of the war to prevent
+our Expeditionary Force from crossing the Channel and co-operating in
+resisting the German advance towards Calais. From there Germany could
+have commanded the Channel and bombarded London.
+
+So he says, and we were quite aware all along that he might well think
+so. The other thing that he makes plain by implication is that the
+direct invasion of England was never contemplated by Germany in the face
+of our command of the sea. I had long ago satisfied myself that this was
+the German view, by a study of their military textbooks and from
+conversations with high German officers. But, what was more important
+than what I personally thought, the Committee of Imperial Defense, on
+which I sat regularly during eight years, was clear about it, and this
+after close study, and after hearing what the most eminent exponents in
+this country of a different view had to urge before them.
+
+Consequently our military policy was not doubtful. No doubt it would
+have been a nice thing could we have possessed in 1914 a great army
+fashioned and trained, not for firing rifles on the seashore, but for a
+struggle on French and Belgian soil. But such an army would have taken
+two generations at least to raise and train in peace time, and if we had
+laid out our money on it after 1870 instead of on ships, we should not
+have had the sea power which Tirpitz says gave us "bulldog" strength. In
+strategy and in military organization you can not successfully bestride
+two horses at once. He who would accomplish anything has to limit
+himself. Possibly it was because this was not clearly kept in view even
+in Germany that the volume before us is an exposition of a thesis which
+is novel in these islands, that it was not England that was unprepared,
+but Germany herself. For the confusion of objectives that led to this
+Tirpitz blames Bethmann's peace policy, the parsimony of the Reichstag,
+and the Emperor's failure to attain to clear notions about war aims.
+
+He criticizes me for saying that there was in Germany before 1914 a war
+party alongside of a peace party. It was really only the Bethmann
+group, he declares, that believed in peace being built on anything else
+than preponderance in armed power. The tradition of the German nation
+and the view of all sensible statesmen in Germany, _e.g._, Prince Bülow
+and the Emperor himself as a rule, was that the foundation of a lasting
+peace could only be laid with armaments. Now if this is so it is plain
+how the war came about. The "shining armor" oration in Austria, some
+years before war broke out, was simply one among many illustrations
+which so alarmed civilized nations that they huddled together for
+protection against this school of statesmen. Bethmann's was the true
+policy had he been allowed to carry it out. It is possible that he
+thought he had a better chance of carrying it out than could have been
+the case were they to be present, when he got the Emperor and Tirpitz to
+keep away from Berlin after the meeting at Potsdam on July 5.
+Unfortunately he underestimated the tendencies of Berchtold, Conrad von
+Hoetzendorf, Forgasch, and others in Vienna, who, with no misgivings
+such as those of Tirpitz as to the outcome, had determined on
+"_losgehen_." The proximate cause of the war was Austrian policy. A
+secondary cause was the absence of any effective attempt at control from
+Berlin. The third and principal cause was the Tirpitz theory of how to
+keep the peace, the theory that had come down from Frederick the Great
+and his father, and was barely a safe one in the hands of even a
+Bismarck.
+
+The only circumstances that could have justified Germany in her tacit
+encouragement to Austria to take a highly dangerous step--a step which
+was almost certain to bring Russia, France, and England into sharp
+conflict with the Central Powers--would have been clear proof that the
+three Entente nations were preparing to seize a chance and to encircle
+and attack Germany or Austria or both.
+
+Now for this there is no foundation whatever. Russia, whatever Isvolsky
+and other Russian statesmen may have said in moments of irritation over
+the affair of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not want to plunge into war;
+France did not desire anything of the kind; and, as for England, nothing
+was more remote from her wishes. It was only in order to preserve the
+general peace that we had entered the Entente, and the method of the
+Entente policy, the getting rid of all specific causes of difference,
+was one which had nothing objectionable in it. We urged Germany also to
+enter upon this path with us. We offered to help her in her progress
+toward the attainment of a "place in the sun." The negotiations which
+took place with Sir Edward Grey in London after my return from Berlin
+in 1912 are evidence of our sincerity in this, for they culminated in
+agreement on the terms of a detailed Treaty, under which a vast number
+of territorial questions were settled to mutual satisfaction. We did not
+either in 1912, as Admiral von Tirpitz appears to imagine, in the
+conversation at the Schloss, or later on, offer territory that was not
+our own but belonged to Portugal, or Belgium, or France. The contrary is
+evident from the fact that the British government pressed Germany to
+consent to the immediate publication of the draft Treaty, agreed early
+in 1914, when signed. All we did on both occasions was to propose
+exchanges with Germany of territory that was ours for territory that was
+hers, to undertake not to compete for the purchase of certain other
+territory that might come into the market, in consideration of a
+corresponding undertaking on her part, and to agree about zones within
+which each nation should distribute its industrial energies and give
+financial assistance to undertakings.
+
+The gallant Admiral gives an account of the meeting which took place on
+February 9, 1912, in the Emperor's Cabinet room in the Schloss between
+himself, the Emperor and myself. He represents me as making a "generous
+offer of colonial territories which the English neither possessed nor of
+which they had the least right of disposal, in order to flatter the
+Kaiser's desires." Now in this impression the Admiral was wholly wrong.
+What I spoke of was what I have just referred to, exchanges of parts of
+our own territory for parts belonging to Germany, and undertakings such
+as I have just referred to. These things I had considered the previous
+day with the Chancellor, and I do not think the Emperor was in the least
+under the impression which von Tirpitz entertained. The matter was
+indeed not one with which the Department of the Minister of Marine was
+likely to be familiar. My suggestions were made in accordance with my
+instructions, and were, of course, _bona fide_ in all respects. What I
+was pressing for was the means for making possible a slackening in naval
+construction on both sides, and for acceptance of the Entente and of our
+position in it. What I desired was to extend its friendly relations so
+as to bring Germany and Austria and Italy within them and get rid of
+anxiety about the balance of power and the growth of armaments. I think
+the Emperor throughout understood this, and certainly the Chancellor
+did. Tirpitz appears to have suspected, in an attitude in which I was
+only aiming at being friendly and even cordial, concealment of an
+encircling and aggressive purpose. After studying his book I do not
+wonder! When one rises from reading it one understands the fixity of an
+idea, which amounted to an obsession, and compelled him to believe in
+the necessity for what would have amounted to the overthrow of Britain
+as a Great Power.
+
+From the Emperor, on this as on other occasions, I met with nothing but
+the kindliest of receptions. Admiral von Tirpitz describes the luncheon
+party which preceded the conference in the Cabinet Room. He speaks of a
+certain "_spanning_" or tension which prevailed during the luncheon
+which the Emperor and Empress gave to the Berlin Cabinet and myself, and
+of restraint in the conversation. I can not say that I perceived any of
+these things, but then, of course, I was a foreigner. What I do remember
+was the general kindly feeling and the evident satisfaction produced by
+the production of the famous red champagne and great cigars with which
+the Emperor regaled his guests. For myself, special distinction was
+reserved. For, before proceeding to business, the Emperor read to me
+Goethe's poem, _Ilmenau_, of which he thought I might like to be
+reminded before we sat down to our task. He then observed that, out of
+consideration for Tirpitz, we must confer in German, while on the other
+hand this would be the harder on me because the naval matters with which
+we had to deal were not in my department, as they were in that of the
+Admiral. This was, of course, true. And then, in compensation for
+disadvantages which, as he said, would otherwise be unfair, he smilingly
+remarked that he had a plan for adjusting the balance of power on this
+occasion. He insisted on my occupying the Imperial chair, which stood at
+the head of the narrow Cabinet table, while His Majesty himself should
+sit on an ordinary chair on my left hand and the Admiral on another on
+my right. I thought that these arrangements suggested the possibility of
+a tough controversy, and as far as the Admiral was concerned it proved
+to be so. For the discussion lasted for two and three-quarter hours, and
+was fairly close. I said throughout that, while I came here to explore
+the ground with the authority of my Sovereign and his Cabinet, I had
+come, not to make a treaty at that stage, but on a preliminary voyage of
+discovery with a view to taking back materials with which the Cabinet of
+St. James's might be able to construct one, and that I had been
+delighted with the graciousness of my reception. I mention this because
+the Admiral appears not to have quite understood my position. I have no
+doubt that the Emperor understood it.
+
+At the end of the conversation I felt for once a little tired, and was
+glad when the Emperor asked von Tirpitz to drive me back to the Hotel
+Bristol. I thought the manner of the latter during the journey highly
+polite and correct, but not wholly sympathetic. I can only say that on
+my part I had endeavored to put every card I had upon the table.
+
+I have now touched on what seem to me the salient points in both of the
+volumes by these two famous statesmen. I have, I hope, brought out
+sufficiently the fact that on their own showing they were pursuing
+contradictory policies, and that it was the consequent failure to follow
+a policy that was consistent and continuous that in the end led Germany
+to the slippery slope down which she glided into war. The circumstances
+of the world before and in 1914 were so difficult, the piling up of
+armaments had been so great, that nothing but the utmost caution could
+secure a safe path. I believe the Emperor and Bethmann to have desired
+wholeheartedly the preservation of the peace. But to that end they took
+inadequate means, and the result was a disastrous failure to accomplish
+it.
+
+The disturbing presence of the policy of relying on a preponderance in
+power over England, to be gained by a great navy, to the side of which
+the smaller navies would be attracted, imposed on England the necessity
+of guarding against what was menacing the national life. As the outcome
+of this situation she was compelled, so long as Germany insisted on
+developing her naval policy, to sit down and take thought. The result of
+her deliberations may be summed up in eight propositions:
+
+  1. It was necessary, if the safety of England by sea was not to be
+  put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close
+  friendships with other nations.
+
+  2. The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the
+  maintenance of British sea power.
+
+  3. While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance
+  to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed
+  in such peril as made it desirable that we should be able to
+  render her help by land also.
+
+  4. But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were
+  great enough to make it reasonable to estimate that a small army
+  from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to
+  break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.
+
+  5. Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great
+  Britain to raise in time of peace a great army for use on the
+  Continent. The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary
+  corps of professional officers required to train and command such
+  an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task
+  were to be taken in hand in peace time. But it was possible to
+  organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary
+  Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions,
+  and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation
+  with those who were best able to throw light on them.
+
+  6. Altho more than modern and scientific military organization on
+  a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in
+  carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable
+  expansion in time of war to take place.
+
+  7. In the result, as was believed here, and as Admiral von Tirpitz
+  himself seems to have anticipated, sea power and capacity for
+  blockade would decide the issue of the war. In this respect
+  Germany seemed less well prepared than Great Britain.
+
+  8. The last thing wished for was war, and if we had to enter upon
+  it we should do so only in defense of our own vital interests, as
+  well as those of the other Entente Powers. Our entry, if it was to
+  come, must be immediate and unhesitating. For if we delayed
+  Germany might succeed in occupying the northern coast of France,
+  and in impairing our security by sea.
+
+I will conclude this chapter by appending an estimate of the Emperor
+William II, which is worth comparing with that of his German Ministers
+already referred to.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN
+
+MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM DEC. 1916 TO APRIL,
+1918.]
+
+In the chapter on William II in Count Czernin's book on "The World War"
+there is a passage which may, I think, turn out to be pretty near the
+truth about the late Emperor's mood: "Altho the Emperor was always very
+powerful in speech and gesture, still, during the war he was much less
+independent in his actions than is usually assumed, and, in my opinion,
+this is one of the principal reasons that gave rise to a mistaken
+understanding of all the Emperor's administrative activities. Far more
+than the public imagine, he was a driven rather than a driving factor,
+and if the Entente to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge
+in one person in order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust
+and an error, as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William
+never played the part attributed to him by the Entente:
+
+"The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in
+store for him.
+
+"He has been carried too high, and can not escape a terrible fall. Fate
+seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, if it exists at all, is
+not so much his as that of his country and his times. The Byzantine
+atmosphere in Germany was the ruin of Emperor William; it enveloped
+him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a vast crowd of
+flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the hour of trial.
+The Emperor William was merely a particularly distinctive representative
+of his class. All modern monarchs suffer from the disease; but it was
+more highly developed in the Emperor William, and therefore more obvious
+than in others. Accustomed from his youth to the subtle poison of
+flattery, at the head of one of the greatest and mightiest States in the
+world, possessing almost unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot
+that awaits men who feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who
+begin to believe in their Divine semblance.
+
+"He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with
+him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the
+best.
+
+"It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into
+the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their
+effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to
+terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of _si vis
+pacem, para bellum_, and by emphasizing the military power of Germany
+he endeavored to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from
+declaring war on him.
+
+"It can not be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and
+mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is
+asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the _dolus_ of making war, that
+he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up war.
+
+"Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the
+injurious effects of his behavior and to make him feel the growing
+mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two but
+dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on the
+Emperor. It is equally true that of all the inhabitants of the earth the
+German is the one least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of
+other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were perhaps but few in
+the immediate entourage of the Emperor who recognized the growing
+anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of them who so continuously extolled
+the Emperor were really honestly of opinion that his behavior was quite
+correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible not to believe that among the
+many clever politicians of the last decade there were some who had a
+clear grasp of the situation, and the fact remains that in order to
+spare the Emperor and themselves they had not the courage to be harsh
+with him and tell him the truth to his face. These are not reproaches,
+but reminiscences which should not be superfluous at a time when the
+Emperor is to be made the scapegoat of the whole world."
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: "Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege," Th. von Bethmann Hollweg.
+"Erinnerungen," Alfred von Tirpitz. Both translated into English under
+the Titles: "Reflections on the World War," and "My Memoirs."]
+
+[Footnote 5: In both cases I am writing with the books before me in the
+original.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS
+
+
+When more time has passed and heads have become cooler the critics will
+have to decide whether Great Britain was as fully prepared as she ought
+to have been for the possibility of the great struggle into which she
+had to enter in August, 1914. Hundreds of speeches have been made, and
+still more articles have been written, to demonstrate that she was
+caught wholly unready. On the other hand authoritative writers in
+Germany have made the counter-assertion that she had prepared copiously,
+not merely to defend herself, but to join in encircling and crushing
+Germany.
+
+I shall venture to submit some reasons for saying that neither of these
+views is the true one. During the whole of the period between the
+commencement of 1906 and the autumn of 1914 I sat on the Committee of
+Imperial Defense and took an active part in its deliberations. For over
+six of these eight years I was Minister for War, and I was in continuous
+co-operation with the colleagues who were, like myself, engaged in
+carrying into execution the methods which we had gradually worked out.
+Such as the plans were, the preparations which they required were
+completed before the war. As to the bulk of these preparations I speak
+from direct knowledge.
+
+The Expeditionary Force, the Territorial Force, and the Special Reserve
+had been organized under my own eye, by soldiers who had studied modern
+war upon what was in this country a wholly new principle. Before they
+took matters in hand not only was there no divisional organization, but
+hardly a brigade could have been sent to the Continent without being
+recast. For there used to be a peace organization that was different
+from the organization that was required for war, and to convert the
+former into the latter meant a delay that would have been deadly. Swift
+mobilization, like that of the Germans even in 1870, was in these older
+days impracticable.
+
+All this had been changed for the Regular Army at home by the end of
+1908, and it was after that year easy to mobilize. Other changes, also
+of a sweeping character, had been made to complete the new structure. On
+August 4, 1914, Lord Kitchener took delivery of an army in being, small,
+but not inferior in quality to the best that the enemy possessed. With
+the creation of the new armies, for which the Expeditionary Force was
+the pattern--and, indeed, with the general management of the war--I had
+very little to do. But I saw a good deal of Lord Kitchener, enough to
+impress me from the day when he became War Minister with his
+extraordinary individuality and his remarkable courage and energy, and
+to make me feel what an invaluable asset his personality was for putting
+heart into the British nation.
+
+I have referred to my own and earlier part in the matter only to make
+plain that I do not speak about it from mere hearsay. And to say this
+has been necessary, because I shall have to submit some observations
+which, if true, do not harmonize with assertions made by some of the
+critics of the successive Governments which were at work on the business
+of preparation for possible contingencies between 1906 and 1914. I will,
+however, begin by making these critics a present of a definite
+admission. We never intended to create an army capable of invading or
+encircling Germany, and we should, in our own view, have found ourselves
+unable to do so even had we desired any such thing.
+
+Our purpose was quite a different one. It was purely defensive. We knew
+how high a level of military organization had been attained in France.
+She had a large army, an army not so large as that of Germany, but
+comparable with it in quality. Her ally, Russia, also had a large army
+on the other side of Germany, altho one not so perfectly organized as
+that of France. By adding to the French military defensive forces a
+comparatively small British Expeditionary Force of very high quality,
+organized as far as possible on the principle about which von der Goltz,
+in the introduction to his famous book, "The Nation in Arms," had
+written, we could provide what that eminent writer had suggested would
+be formidable, could it be properly organized, even against the German
+masses of troops. In the introduction to his "Nation in Arms" he had
+declared that, "Looking forward into the future we seem to feel the
+coming of a time when the armed millions of the present will have played
+out their part. A new Alexander will arise who, with a small body of
+well-equipped and skilled warriors, will drive the impotent hordes
+before him, when, in their eagerness to multiply, they shall have
+overstepped all proper bounds, have lost internal cohesion, and, like
+the green-banner army of China, have become transformed into a
+numberless but effete host of Philistines."
+
+This, of course, did not mean that the little Expeditionary Force could
+by itself cope with the admirably organized and enormous German Army,
+but it did point to the growing importance in these times of high morale
+and quality, and to the value that even a small force, if sufficiently
+long and closely trained, might prove to have, if placed in a proper
+position alongside the excellent soldiers of France. A careful study had
+made us think that the addition of even a small force of such quality to
+those of France and Russia would provide the combined armies with a good
+chance of defeating any German attempt at the invasion and dismemberment
+of France.
+
+But in addition to and apart from all this, the British Navy had been
+raised before 1914 to a strength unexampled in its history, and Mr.
+Churchill had for the first time introduced in the autumn of 1911 the
+valuable principle of a war staff, fashioned with a view to the
+systematic study of modern naval war in co-operation with the forces on
+land.
+
+These naval reforms had helped to confer the fresh power which took
+shape in the blockade which was in the end to prove decisive in the
+struggle. The heads of the newly organized Military General Staff met
+the representatives of the Admiralty War Staff at systematically held
+meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defense, under the presidency of
+the successive Prime Ministers--first of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+and then of Mr. Asquith. Not only were the Ministers at the head of the
+Admiralty and the War Office present to listen to what their experts had
+to say and to assist in arriving at conclusions on the questions
+discussed at these meetings, but other Ministers (including Lord Crewe,
+Sir Edward Grey, Lord Morley, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Harcourt)
+attended regularly. The function of this committee was to consider
+strategical difficulties with which the nation might conceivably find
+itself confronted, and to work out the solutions. It was a committee the
+members of which were selected and summoned by the Prime Minister, to
+whom it was advisory. He determined the subjects to be investigated.
+Secrecy was of course essential, excepting so far as the Cabinet was
+concerned. The presence of the non-military Ministers to whom I have
+referred was a proper guarantee that from the Cabinet there was no
+desire to withhold information. Possible operations on the Continent of
+our army occupied much of the time of the committee. About the propriety
+of the conversations which took place between members of the General
+Staffs of France and England questions have been raised. But these
+conversations were concerned with purely technical matters, and doubts
+as to their justification will hardly arise in the minds of people who
+are aware what modern war implies in the way of preliminary inquiries as
+to its conditions.
+
+We were not engaging in any secret undertaking. We were merely providing
+what modern military requirements had rendered essential. Without study
+beforehand by a General Staff military operations in these days are
+bound to fail. If at any time we had, by any chance whatever, to operate
+in France it was essential that our generals should possess long in
+advance the knowledge that was requisite, and this could only be
+obtained with the assistance of the General Staff of France itself. We
+committed ourselves to no undertaking of any kind, and it was from the
+first put in writing that we could not do so. The conversations were
+just the natural and informal outcome of our close friendship with
+France.
+
+The French had said that if it was to be regarded as even possible that
+we should come to their assistance in resisting an attack, which might,
+moreover, result if successful in great prejudice to our own security in
+the Channel, we should find this study vital. Our General Staff took the
+same view, and at the request of Sir Edward Grey, who had written to
+him, I saw Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at his house in London in
+January, 1906. He was a very cautious man, but he was also an old War
+Minister. He at once saw the point, and he gave me authority for
+directing the Staff at the War Office to take the necessary steps. He
+naturally laid down that the study proposed was to be carefully guarded,
+so far as any possible claim of commitment was concerned, that it was
+not to go beyond the limits of purely General Staff work, and further
+that it should not be talked about. The inquiry into conditions thus set
+on foot was conducted by the three successive generals who occupied the
+position of Director of Military Operations--the late General Grierson,
+General Ewart, and General Wilson. Each of these distinguished soldiers
+from time to time explained the progress made in working out conceivable
+plans for using the Expeditionary Force in France and in more distant
+regions, to the full Committee of Imperial Defense, and obtained its
+provisional approval.
+
+I should like to say how much the Committee of Imperial Defense, which
+was originally a very valuable contribution made by Mr. Balfour, when
+Prime Minister, to the organization of our preparedness for war, owed
+to its secretaries. To such men as Admiral Sir Charles Ottley and, after
+his time, to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, the nation is under a great
+debt, and it was the least that could be done to include the latter in
+the thanks of Parliament to the sailors and soldiers to whom our actual
+success was due. It was he who, assisted by a brilliant staff on which
+the late Colonel Grant Duff was prominent, planned and prepared that
+remarkable War Book, which was completed in excellent time before the
+outbreak of hostilities, and which contained full instructions for every
+department of Government which could be called on to assist if war broke
+out. Not only the drafts of the necessary orders, but those of the
+necessary telegrams, were written out in advance under Sir Maurice
+Hankey's instructions. He and Sir Charles Ottley, themselves sailors,
+formed real links between the navy and the army, and did an enormous
+amount of work in co-ordinating war objectives.
+
+Of the Navy I need say nothing, for its preparations are well
+understood. Nor need I say much of the details in the reorganization of
+the army. The general principle of this was to complete the Cardwell
+system by shaping the home battalions into six great divisions, and so
+providing them with transport, munitions, stores, and medical and other
+equipment, as to make them instantly ready for war. The characteristic
+of the old British Army, as it was up to 1907, was, as I have already
+observed, that it lived in peace formations only, in small and detached
+units which would have to be refashioned into quite different formations
+before they could be ready to be sent to fight.
+
+This state of things involved much delay in mobilization. A careful
+inquiry made in 1906 disclosed that in order to put even 80,000 men on
+the Continent, a period which might be well over two months was the
+minimum required. Besides this great difficulty, the other items to
+which I have referred as required for the six divisions were not there
+in any shape even approaching sufficiency. The artillery too was
+deficient.
+
+There is no more amusing myth than the one according to which the horse
+and field artillery were reduced. The batteries which could be made
+instantly effective for war were, in fact, raised from forty-two to
+eighty-one. The personnel of this artillery was increased by a third for
+mobilization. For the first time the horse and field artillery was given
+the modern organization which Cardwell had not been able to give it. The
+establishments had been merely peace establishments. There were
+ninety-nine batteries which could parade about on ceremonial occasions,
+but if war had broken out they would have had to be rolled up, and the
+personnel of fifty-seven of them taken to produce the mobilized
+forty-two which were all that could be put into the field. The
+difficulty was got over by the organization of eighteen of the
+ninety-nine into training brigades, and the additional men needed for
+the mobilization of eighty-one fighting batteries were thus obtained. No
+doubt some of the artillery officers did not like being set to training
+work, and complained that they were being reduced. But it was a
+reduction from unreal work of parade in order to double fighting
+efficiency. Not a man or a gun of the regular horse and field artillery
+was ever reduced in any shape or form, and not only were the effective
+batteries largely increased, but over 150 serviceable batteries were
+created and made part of the Second Line, or Territorial, Army. This was
+a force which could be used either for home defense or for expansion of
+an expeditionary force of Regulars. The Militia, which was not under
+obligation to serve abroad, was abolished, and its substance was
+converted into third regular battalions, organized for the purpose of
+training and providing drafts to meet the wastage of war in the first
+and second regular battalions of their regiments. Some of those third
+battalions are said to have trained and sent out as many as twelve
+thousand men apiece in the course of the war.
+
+All these things were done under the direction of such young and
+modern soldiers as Sir Douglas Haig on the General Staff side, and as
+Sir John Cowans on the administrative side. Both of these officers
+were brought home from India for the purpose. Sir Herbert Miles, as
+Quartermaster-General, and Sir Stanley von Donop, as Master-General of
+the Ordnance also rendered much help. The newly organized General Staff
+thought the plans out under the direction, first of Sir Neville
+Lyttelton, and then of Sir William Nicholson, its successive chiefs. The
+latter and Sir Douglas Haig in addition worked out, in consultation with
+the representatives of the Dominions, the organization of their troops
+in units and with staffs and weapons corresponding as nearly as was
+practicable to our own. Systematic conferences between the British and
+Dominion War and other Ministers prepared the ground for this. Sir
+Wilfrid Laurier and General Botha and others of the Dominion Ministers
+came to London and co-operated.
+
+It is sometimes said that all these things were very well, but that we
+should have at once raised a much larger army, as in the course of the
+war we ultimately had to do. The answer is that in a time of peace we
+could not possibly have raised a large army on the Continental scale. If
+we had tried to we should have made a miserable and possibly disastrous
+failure. The utmost we could do toward it was to provide the
+organization in which the comparatively small force which was all we
+could create might be expanded after a war broke out.
+
+How this nucleus organization, on the basis of which the later
+expansions took place, was fashioned so as to afford a general pattern,
+anyone may see who chooses to expend a shilling on the purchase of the
+little volume called "Field Service Regulations, Part II." This piece of
+work took nearly three years to prepare. With the organization of which
+I have spoken, which was made in accordance with its principles, the
+whole of the task of recasting the British Army was performed by 1911.
+
+What we had by that time attained was the power to send an army of, not
+100,000 men, which was all that had originally been suggested, but of
+160,000, to a place of concentration opposite the Belgian frontier, and
+to have it concentrated there within a time which was fifteen days in
+1911, but was a little later reduced to twelve. No German army could
+mobilize and concentrate at such a distance more rapidly. So far as I
+know none of the necessary details were overlooked, and the timetables
+and arrangements for the concentration worked out, when the moment for
+their use came, without a hitch. What had been done was to take the
+old-fashioned British Army and to rid it of superfluous fat, to develop
+muscle in place of mere flesh, and to put the whole force into proper
+training. If the warrior looked slender he was at least as well prepared
+for the ring as science could make him.
+
+It is said that this army ought to have been provided from the first
+with more heavy artillery. But the reason why its artillery, and that of
+the French armies also, were of a comparatively light pattern was not
+due to any notion of economy or to civilian interference. We had enough
+money, even in those difficult days, for every necessary purpose.
+
+The real reason was that the General Staffs of both the French and the
+British Armies had advised that the campaign would probably be one in
+which swiftness in moving troops would prove the determining factor.
+Heavy artillery, and even any large number of the ponderous machine-guns
+of that period (the Lewis gun had not yet appeared), would have been a
+serious impediment to such mobility. What was anticipated was a series
+of great battles. "It was supposed by certain soldiers," says a
+well-informed military critic (Colonel A'Court Repington, at page 276 of
+his "Vestigia"), "that the war against Germany would be decided by the
+fighting of some seven great battles _en rase campagne_, where heavies
+would be a positive encumbrance."
+
+So far the staffs proved to be right, for in the early period of the war
+mobility did count for a very great deal, and it was not until later
+that trench warfare became the dominant factor, a stage for which even
+the Germans themselves, as we now know, from the memoirs of Admiral
+Tirpitz and other books, were not adequately prepared in point of guns,
+or of shells and powder, either.
+
+It is said that we in Great Britain ought, before entering on the
+Entente, to have provided an army, not of 160,000, but of 2,000,000 men.
+And it is remarked that this is what we had to do in the end. This
+suggestion does not, however, bear scrutiny. No doubt it would have been
+a great advantage if, in addition to our tremendous navy, we could have
+produced, at the outbreak of the war, 2,000,000 men, so trained as to
+be the equals in this respect of German troops, and properly fashioned
+into the great divisions that were necessary, with full equipment and
+auxiliary services. But to train the recruits, and to command such an
+army when fashioned, would have required a very great corps of
+professional officers of high military education, many times as large as
+we had actually raised. How were these to have been got?
+
+I sometimes read speeches, made even by officers who have served with
+distinction at the head of their men in the field, which express regret
+that the British nation was so shortsighted as not to have provided such
+an army before the war. They point to the effort it made later on with
+such success during the war. But to raise armies under the stress of
+war, when the people submit cheerfully to compulsion, and when highly
+intelligent civilian men of business readily quit their occupations to
+be trained as rapidly as possible for the work of every kind of officer,
+is one thing. To do it in peace time is quite another. I doubt whether
+more was possible in this direction than, in the days prior to the war,
+to organize the Officers' Training Corps, which contained over twenty
+thousand partially prepared young men, and began at once to expand to
+yet larger dimensions from the day when war broke out. For the corps of
+matured officers, required to train recruits and to command them in war
+when organized in their units, would have had to consist of soldiers,
+themselves highly trained in military organization, who had devoted
+their lives to this work as a profession. It takes many years in peace
+time to train such officers. Because they must be professional, they can
+only be recruited under a voluntary system.
+
+Now, before the war it was difficult enough to recruit even so many as
+the number we then had got, a number totally inadequate for any army
+larger than the small one we actually put into shape at home. Every
+source had been tried in my time by the able administrative generals who
+were working under me at the War Office. I say "administrative
+generals," for here comes in the source of the confusion which at times
+leads not a few--including some whose military training has been
+exclusively in the leading of troops and in strategy and tactics--to
+miss the point.
+
+Under the modern military principle, which is the secret of rapidity and
+efficiency in mobilization, duties are carefully defined and divided.
+The General Staff does not administer, and is not trained in the
+business of administration. This kind of military business is entrusted
+to the administrative side of the army, the officers of which receive a
+different kind of training. The General Staff says what is necessary.
+The administrative side provides it as far as it can. And among the
+exclusive functions of the administrative side of the War Office is the
+recruiting of personnel by the Adjutant-General and the Military
+Secretary. It is true that the Director of Military Training, who
+supervises the training of the young officer when obtained, belongs to
+the General Staff. That is because his work is educational. With
+obtaining the young officer it is only accidentally that he is at all
+concerned.
+
+When, therefore, even distinguished commanders in the field express
+regret at the want of foresight of the British nation in not having
+prepared a much larger army before 1914, I would respectfully ask them
+how they imagine it could have been done.
+
+To raise a great corps of officers who have voluntarily selected the
+career of an officer as an exclusive and absorbing profession has been
+possible in Germany and in France. But it has only become possible there
+after generations of effort and under pressure of a long-standing
+tradition, extending from decade to decade, under which a nation, armed
+for the defense of its land frontiers, has expended its money and its
+spirit in creating such an officer caste.
+
+Now, the British nation has put its money and its fighting spirit
+primarily into its Navy and its oversea forces. Why? Because, just as
+the Continental tradition had its genesis in the necessity for instant
+readiness to defend land frontiers, so our tradition has had its genesis
+in the vital necessity of always commanding the sea.
+
+Possibly if, just after the war of 1870, we had endeavored to enter on a
+new tradition, and to develop a great army, we might have succeeded in
+doing so. With forty years' time devoted to the task and a very large
+expenditure we might conceivably have succeeded. But I think that had we
+done so we should have been very foolish. Our navy would inevitably have
+been diminished and deteriorated. You can not ride two horses at once,
+and no more can you possess in their integrity two great conflicting
+military traditions.
+
+But what I am saying does not rest on my own conclusions alone. In the
+year 1912 the then Chief of the General Staff told me that he and the
+General Staff would like to investigate, as a purely military problem,
+the question whether we could or could not raise a great army. I thought
+this a reasonable inquiry and sanctioned and found money for it, only
+stipulating that they should consult with the Administrative Staffs when
+assembling the materials for the investigation. The outcome was embodied
+in a report made to me by Lord Nicholson, himself a soldier who had a
+strong desire for compulsory service and a large army. He reported, as
+the result of a prolonged and careful investigation, that, alike as
+regarded officers and as regarded buildings and equipment, the
+conclusion of the General Staff was that it would be in a high degree
+unwise to try, during a period of unrest on the Continent, to commence a
+new military system. It could not be built up excepting after much
+unavoidable delay. We might at once experience a falling off in
+voluntary recruiting, and so become seriously weaker before we had a
+chance of becoming stronger. And the temptation to a foreign General
+Staff to make an early end of what it might insist on interpreting as
+preparation for aggression on our part would be too strong to be risked.
+What we should get might prove to be a mob in place of an army. I quite
+agreed, and not the less because it was highly improbable that the
+country would have looked at anything of the sort.
+
+What we actually could produce in the form of an army had to be
+estimated, not as if we were standing alone, but as being an adjunct to
+what was possessed by France and Russia. They had large armies and small
+navies. We had a large navy and a small army. When these were considered
+in conjunction, I do not think that the hope of some of our best
+military authorities, that an aggressive attempt by the Central Powers
+could be made abortive, was an over-sanguine one.
+
+Much of what we did owe for the excellence of the Expeditionary Force,
+such as it was in point of size, and much of what we have since owed for
+the excellence of the great armies that we subsequently raised, was due
+to the unbroken work of the fine Administrative Staff, developed in
+those days, to which I have already referred. I often regret that when
+the nation gave its thanks through Parliament to the army, the splendid
+contribution made by those who prepared the administrative services was
+not adequately recognized. But this arose from the old British tradition
+under which fighting and administration were not distinguished as being
+quite separate and yet equally essential for fighting. The public had
+not got into its head the reality of the process of defining the two
+different functions with precision, and of confiding them to different
+sets of officers differently trained.
+
+The principle was a novel one in the army itself, and why one set of
+officers should be trained at the Staff College and another at the
+London School of Economics was not a question the answer to which was
+quite familiar, even to all soldiers.
+
+It is, I think, certain that for purely military reasons, even if, in
+view of political (including diplomatic) difficulties any party in the
+State had felt itself able to undertake the task of raising a great army
+under compulsory service, and to set itself to accomplish it, say,
+within the ten years before the war, the fulfilment of the undertaking
+could not have been accomplished, and failure in it would have made us
+much weaker than we were when the war broke out. The only course really
+open was to make use of the existing voluntary system, and bring its
+organization for war up to the modern requirements, of which they were
+in 1906 far short. It is true that the voluntary system could not give
+us a substantially larger army, or more than a better one in point of
+quality. The stream of voluntary recruits was limited. When the 156
+battalions of the line which existed on paper in 1906 were in that year
+nominally reduced to 148, there was no real reduction, altho some money
+was saved which was required for some other essential military purposes.
+For the remaining battalions were short of their proper strength, and
+it took all the recruits set free by the so-called reductions to bring
+the 148--some of which were badly short of officers and men alike--to
+the proper establishment required for the six new divisions of the
+Expeditionary Force.
+
+I remember well the then Adjutant-General, Sir Charles Douglas, one of
+the ablest men of business who ever filled that position in this
+country, informing me at that time that he could not raise a single
+further division to be added to the six at home.
+
+But if the voluntary system had disadvantages, it also presented us with
+advantages. The professional and therefore voluntary nature of our army,
+which, because it was professional, was always ready for sending
+overseas on expeditions, was in reality made necessary by our position
+as the island center of a great and scattered Empire. We had increased
+that Empire enormously by the possession of a voluntarily serving army.
+Whether this vast increase of the Empire has been always defensible I am
+not discussing. What I am saying is that we owe the actual increases
+largely to this, that we were the only Power in the world that was ready
+to step in at short notice and occupy vacant territory. We always had a
+much larger Expeditionary Force available for this special purpose than
+Germany or any other country. That has been our tradition, as contrasted
+with the tradition of other nations who have been limited in this kind
+of capacity by the necessity of putting their military forces on a
+compulsory basis and keeping them at home for the protection of their
+land frontiers. Ours was the method in which we had been schooled by
+experience.
+
+It is for such reasons as I have now submitted that I am wholly unable
+to assent to the suggestion that we did not look ahead, or considered
+within the years just before the war whether we were preparing to make
+the sort of contribution that our own interests and our friendships
+alike required. Sea power was for us then, as always before in our
+history, the dominant element in military policy. I have little doubt
+that we made mistakes over details. That is inherent in human and
+therefore finite effort. But I believe that we did in the main the best
+we could for the fulfilment of our only purpose, which was to preserve
+the peace of the world and avoid contributing to its disturbance, and
+also to prepare to defend ourselves and our friends against aggression.
+Talk to the public we could not, for it would have hindered and not
+helped us to do so. A "preventive war," which the Entente Powers would
+not have been so ready to meet as they became later on, might well have
+been the result. Rhetorical declarations on platforms would have been
+wholly out of place. But we could think, and to the best of such
+abilities as we and our expert advisers possessed, we did try to think.
+
+A curious legend which had its origin in Berlin, in October, 1914, has
+obtained such currency that it is worth while to make an end of it. The
+legend is that the British Military Attaché at Brussels, the late
+General Barnardiston, had informed the Chief of the Belgian General
+Staff of secret plans, prepared at the War Office in London, to invade
+Belgium, and if necessary to violate her neutrality, in order to make an
+expedition, the purpose of which was to attack Germany through that
+country. The story appears to have emanated from Baron Greindl, who was
+the Belgian Minister at Berlin in 1911. He had been completely
+misinformed, no doubt in that capital, and there is no truth whatever in
+what he had been told about what he called the "perfidious and naïf
+revelations" of the British Military Attaché at Brussels. Him the story
+represents as having said that his Minister (by whom I presume myself,
+as the then Secretary of State for War, to have been intended) and the
+British General Staff were the only persons in the secret. I have to
+observe, in the first place, that I never during my tenure of office,
+either suggested any such plan, or heard of anyone else suggesting it.
+When the story was brought to my knowledge, which was not until
+November, 1914, I inquired at once of General Barnardiston and of his
+successor, Colonel Bridges, whether there was any foundation for it. The
+reply from each of these distinguished officers was that there was none.
+
+We were among the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, and it was of course
+conceivable that, if she called on us to do so, we might have had to
+defend her. It would be part of the duty of our Military Attaché to
+remember this, and, if opportunity offered, to ascertain in informal
+conversation the view of the Belgian General Staff as to what form of
+help they would be likely to ask us for. This he doubtless did, and
+indeed it appears from what the Chief of the Belgian General Staff wrote
+to the Belgian War Minister that the former had discussed the
+contingency of Belgium desiring our help with General Barnardiston, and
+had done so gladly. But even so the conversation must have been very
+informal, for in the account of it by the Chief of the Belgian General
+Staff there are errors about the composition of the possible British
+Force which indicate that either he took no notes, or else that Colonel
+Barnardiston had not thought it an occasion which required him to obtain
+details from London. At all events, such talk as there was appears to
+have had relation only to what we ought to do, if requested by Belgium
+to help, in case of her being invaded by another Power.
+
+The documents will be found in the volume of Collected Diplomatic
+Documents relating to the outbreak of the war, presented to Parliament
+in May, 1915 (Cd. 7860). This volume includes a vigorous denial by Sir
+Edward Grey of the insinuation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+EPILOG
+
+
+The great war is over, and the Powers of the West have conquered. In the
+earlier pages I have given my own view of why they won in the tremendous
+struggle that now belongs to history. They had on their side moral
+forces which were lacking to their adversaries.
+
+Germany went into the war with a conviction that had been carefully
+instilled into her people. It was that she was being ringed round with
+the intention that she should be crushed, and that presently it would be
+too late for her to deliver herself. The lesson so taught to her was not
+a true one. She might easily have obtained guarantees of peace which
+ought to have satisfied her, without undertaking a risk which in the end
+was to prove disastrous. No one here wanted to ruin her, no one who
+counted seriously in this country. And if we did not want to, no more in
+reality did France or Russia. She brought her fate on her head by the
+unwisdom of her methods. But her people hardly desired the dangers of
+unnecessary war, and her rulers dared not have ventured these dangers
+had they not first of all preached a wrong doctrine to those over whom
+they ruled. They had their way in the end, and disaster to sixty-eight
+millions of Germans was the consequence. The calculations of their
+chiefs were bad from the beginning. It is almost certain that the best
+and most eminent among even these really desired peace. They blundered
+in method. It was not by continually flashing the saber that peace was
+to be secured.
+
+It is scarcely likely that the conditions under which this war became
+possible will recur. It is more than unlikely that they will recur in
+our time. But it is none the less worth while to consider how the
+unlikelihood can be made to approach most nearly to a certainty.
+
+Not, I think, by causing the millions of German-speaking people to feel
+that they are in chains without possibility of freedom. More certainly,
+surely, by leading them to the faith that if they will play a part in
+the great world effort for permanent peace and for reconstruction they
+will be welcomed to the brotherhood of nations. The individual German
+citizen is more like the individual Anglo-Saxon than he is different
+from him. The same hopes and the same fears animate him, and he is
+sober and industrious quite as much as we are. He has similar problems
+and similar interests.
+
+Time must pass before the angry feeling that a great struggle produces
+can die down. But there are already indications that this feeling is not
+as intense with us as it was even a short time ago. Germany made a
+colossal and unjustifiable blunder. She is responsible for the action of
+her late Government. We think so, and we are not likely to change our
+opinion on this point. The grief of our people over their dead, over the
+lives that were laid down for the nation from the highest kind of
+inspiration, will keep the public mind fixed on this conclusion. And so
+will the waste and misery to the whole world which an unnecessary war
+has brought in its train. But presently we shall ask ourselves, in
+moments of reflection, whether this ought to be our final word, and
+also, perhaps, whether some want of care on our own part, and certain
+deficiencies of which we are now more conscious than we used to be, may
+not have had something to do with the failure of other people to divine
+our real mood and intentions. I am not sure that in days that are to
+come we shall give ourselves the whole benefit of the doubt. However
+this may be, we are in no case a vindictive people.
+
+But in any view something serious is at stake. It will be a bad thing
+for us, and it will be a bad thing for the world, if the people of the
+vanquished nations are left to feel that they have no hope of being
+restored to decent conditions of existence. At present despair is
+threatening them. Their estimate is that the crushing burden of the
+terms of peace, if carried out to their full possibilities, bars them
+from the prospect of a better future. Their only way of deliverance may
+well come to seem to them to lie in the grouping of the discontented
+nationalities, and the faith that by this means, at some time which may
+come hereafter, a new balance of power may begin to be set up.
+
+Now this is not a good prospect, and the sooner we succeed in softening
+the sense of real hardship out of which it arises the better. Germany
+and Austria must pay the penalty they have incurred before the tribunal
+of international justice. But that penalty ought to be tempered by
+something that depends on even more than mercy. It is intended to be
+inflicted for the good of the world, and if it assumes a form which
+threatens the future safety of the world it is not wise to press it to
+its extreme consequences. We have to work toward a better state of
+things than that which is promised to-day. We have never hitherto kept
+up old animosities unduly long, and that has been one of the secrets of
+our strength in the world. The lessons of history point to the
+expediency of trying to heal instead of to keep open the wound which
+exists. Those who know the growth in the past of literature, of music,
+of science, of philosophy, of industry and of commerce, do not wish the
+German people to die out. It is only the ignorant that can desire this,
+and, hitherto in the course of our history, the ignorant have neither
+proved to be safe guides nor have they prevailed. To-day, as before, we
+must think of generations other than our own if we would preserve our
+strength.
+
+I hope that a time is near in which we shall no longer proclaim old
+grievances, but instead cease to dwell on the past in this case, just as
+we have ceased in the cases of the French, the Spanish, the Russians,
+and the Boers. It is best in every way that it should come to be so.
+
+It is not with any hope that these pages will satisfy the extremists of
+to-day that they have been written. They are intended for those who try
+to be dispassionate, and for them only, as a contribution to a vast heap
+of material that is being gathered together for consideration. It is
+well that those who were in any way directly connected with the story
+to which they relate should place on record what they saw. But the whole
+story in its fulness is beyond the knowledge of anyone of our time. The
+history of the world is, as has been said, the judgment of the world. It
+is therefore only after an interval that it can be sufficiently written.
+The ultimate and real origin of this war, the greatest humanity has ever
+had to endure, was a set of colossal suspicions of each other by the
+nations concerned. I do not mean that none of them were in the right or
+that some of them were not deeply in the wrong. What I do mean is that
+if there had been insight sufficient all round the nations concerned
+would not have misinterpreted each other.
+
+To us it looks as tho Germany had been inspired throughout by a bad
+tradition, a spirit older than even the days of Frederick the Great. Had
+she been wise we think that she would have changed her national policy
+after Bismarck had brought it to unexampled success in things material.
+There are not wanting indications that he himself had the sense of the
+necessity of great caution in pursuing this policy farther, and felt
+that it could not be safely continued without modification. It was no
+policy that was safe for any but the strongest and sanest of minds, and
+even for those it had ceased to be safe. The potential resistance to it
+was becoming too serious.
+
+But we do not need to doubt that there were many in Germany itself who
+saw this and did not desire to rely merely on blood and iron. The men
+and women in every country resemble those in other countries more than
+they differ from them. Germany was no exception to the rule. It is a
+great mistake to judge her as she was merely from a few newspapers and
+by the reports from Berlin of their special correspondents. Sixty-eight
+millions of people could not be estimated in their opinions by the
+attitude of a handful, however eminent and prominent, in the home of
+"_Real politik_." It is, of course, true that the Germans were taught to
+believe that they were a very great nation which had not got its full
+share of the good things of this world, a share of which they were more
+worthy and for which they were better organized than any other. But it
+is also true that we here thought that we ourselves were entitled to a
+great deal to which other people did not admit our moral title. It was
+not only Germany that was lacking in imagination. No doubt many Germans
+had the idea that we wished to hem them in and that we did not like
+them. Our failure to make ourselves understood left them not without
+reason for this belief. But dislike of Germany was not the attitude of
+the great mass of sober and God-fearing Englishmen, and I do not believe
+that the counter-attitude was that of the bulk of sober and God-fearing
+Germans. They and we alike mutually misjudged each other from what was
+written in newspapers and said in speeches by people who were not
+responsible exponents of opinion, and neither nation took sufficient
+trouble to make clear that what was thus written and said was not
+sufficient material on which to judge it. It is very difficult to
+diagnose general opinion in a foreign nation, and one of the reasons of
+the difficulty is that people at home do not pay sufficient attention to
+the fact that their unfriendly utterances about their neighbors are
+likely to receive more publicity and attention than the utterances that
+are friendly. It makes little difference that the latter may greatly
+preponderate in number. They are read in the main only in the country in
+which they are made.
+
+Neither Germans nor Englishmen were careful before the war always to be
+pleasant to each other, and the same used to be true of Frenchmen and
+Englishmen. But just as we are coming to understand why and how France
+and England misinterpreted each other systematically a century and a
+half ago, so we may yet learn how we came to present, more than a
+hundred years later, difficulties to the Germans not wholly unlike those
+which they presented to us. No mere record of the dry facts will be
+enough to render this intelligible in its full significance. The
+historian who is to carry conviction must do more than present
+photographs. He must create a picture inspired by his own study and from
+the depth of his own mind, and presented in its real proportions with
+its proper lights and shadows, as a true artist alone can present it.
+Browning has told us something worth remembering. It is at the end of
+"The Ring and the Book":
+
+                            Art may tell a truth
+    Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
+    Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
+    So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,
+    Beyond mere imagery on the wall,--
+    So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
+    Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,--
+    So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,
+    Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.
+
+The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any
+single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history
+depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only
+kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and
+exacting, can rely on having the whole of the materials before his eye,
+and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints
+depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using
+more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole.
+Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be
+selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his
+personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man
+on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great
+historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of
+the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his
+narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his
+details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for
+this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as
+much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert
+and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian.
+It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the
+materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is
+only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of
+grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or
+the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which
+are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits.
+They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits
+may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of
+what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many
+expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It
+is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we
+continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.
+
+The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the
+present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to
+collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care
+as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the
+later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to
+make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as
+necessary action is concerned.
+
+And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events
+possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one
+in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge
+her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our
+forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians have
+impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis
+XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to
+bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were
+perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible
+national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no
+doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could
+hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so.
+And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the
+mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the
+adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance
+from calamity, even at the price of violent action.
+
+We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we
+judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been
+well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an
+exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even
+so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and
+treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into
+existence, had we and others been less hasty.
+
+It is therefore a good thing to keep before us that it is at least
+possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the
+victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry
+and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms
+of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near
+East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs
+were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people
+either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no
+one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the
+likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to
+disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply
+responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy
+and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government
+can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been
+due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was
+so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not
+as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us.
+No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central
+Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to
+reparation. This the Germans do not appear to controvert. They are a
+people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do
+something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have
+also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the
+German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the
+spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to
+fall again into the mistake that Burke made.
+
+The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a
+League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the
+supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the
+absence of a League of Nations, or--what is the same thing in a less
+organized form--of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none
+are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be
+relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente
+between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for
+safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held
+in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance
+on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never
+for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If the principle is
+resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of
+aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with
+another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection
+and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification
+for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke
+out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to
+that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central
+Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this
+difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the
+Entente Powers.
+
+Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous
+number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and
+Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into
+account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war,
+but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which
+may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that
+statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough,
+it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of
+people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a
+prolonged period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our
+relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the
+Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more
+than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the
+Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly
+institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there
+is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to
+our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in
+which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone
+can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new
+balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if
+they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What
+really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is
+given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with
+us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which
+contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must
+attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is
+requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the
+people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people
+of the American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses
+on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking
+population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and
+Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to
+avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is
+for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent
+enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.
+
+How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the
+Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain
+divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to
+suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of
+the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made.
+Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling.
+The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was
+unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be
+enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in
+human nature.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Agadir incident, the, 68
+
+Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 114
+
+Alsace-Lorraine, question of, 114
+  the Kaiser on, 52, 53
+
+America, Tschirsky on, 60
+
+Anglo-French Entente, Bülow on, 56
+  Tschirsky, 59
+  views of German Emperor on, 52
+
+Armaments, difficulty of question of, 21
+  Germany's, 94, 161
+
+Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, 199
+  question of compulsory service, 198
+
+Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, 45
+  Premier and War Secretary, 50
+  presides at Imperial Defense Committee, 182
+
+Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 113
+  ultimatum to Serbia, 133
+
+
+Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, 63 _et seq._
+
+Balance of power, and the League of Nations, 222
+  principle of, 20, 22, 119
+
+Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, 144
+
+Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, 201
+
+Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
+
+Berlin, a curious legend originating in, 201
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  author's visit to, 37
+
+Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, 69, 71
+  at Potsdam conference, 151
+  author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, 71, 73, 78,
+    79, 124
+  desires preservation of peace, 161
+  his accusation against Entente Powers, 103
+  informed of Austrian ultimatum, 153
+  letter to author after the Montreal address, 93
+  loyalty to the Kaiser, 114
+  succeeds Prince Bülow as Chancellor, 112
+
+Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, 146
+
+Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, 56
+  and Britain's indefinite policy, 17
+  and the inevitability of war, 23
+  and the military party in Germany, 89
+  and Tirpitz, 145-48
+  denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, 146
+  his affection for Emperor Frederick, 148
+  his hatred of "prestige politics," 120
+  Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, 126
+
+Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, 115
+
+Bosnia, annexation of, 70, 113
+
+Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, 188
+
+Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attaché at Brussels, 202
+
+Britain's command of the sea, 195
+
+British Army, the reorganization of, 47
+
+British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, 50
+  organization of, 178
+  unrecognized work of, 197
+
+British Government, the, paramount duty of, 18
+
+British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, 139, 181
+  (_See_ also Navy, British)
+
+Bülow, Prince von, author's meeting with, 38
+  on the Anglo-French Entente, 56
+  opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, 67
+  succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, 112
+
+
+Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, 113
+  informed of Berlin "conversations," 78
+
+Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, 182, 184
+  at Marienbad, 38
+
+Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, 138
+  and the Reinsurance Treaty, 126, 127
+
+Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, 70 (and note)
+
+Central Powers, the, preparations for war, 20
+  their responsibility for the world war, 22
+
+Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, 54
+
+Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, 87, 181
+
+Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, 158, 159, 177, 182
+
+Compulsory service, author's views on, 198
+
+Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, 188
+
+Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
+
+Czernin, Count, on William II., 170
+
+
+D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, 113
+
+Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, 120
+
+Democracy and war, 27
+  vindicated by the war, 108
+  (_See_ also Social Democracy)
+
+Diplomacy before the war, 35 _et seq._
+
+Disarmament, German objections to, 55, 60
+
+Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, 188
+
+Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, 199
+
+
+Education, author's activities for, 39
+
+Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, 38
+  "encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, 112
+  entertains the German Emperor, 62
+
+Einem, General von, at Windsor, 62
+  author's interview with, 38
+
+Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, 38
+
+England, a War Staff for the Navy in, 139, 181
+  commercial rivalry with Germany, 114
+  conservation of sea power and what it implied, 20, 21
+  efforts to preserve peace end in failure, 22
+  her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, 201
+  propagandists for German military party in, 24
+  reorganization of army in, 185
+  voluntary military system of, and its advantages, 199
+  (_See_ also Great Britain)
+
+England's precautions against Germany's war designs, 168-69
+
+Englishmen, defects and failings of, 28
+  psychology of, 17
+
+Entente, the, England's entry into--and the alternative, 118, 119, 162
+  policy of, 106
+
+Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Expeditionary Force (_see_ British Expeditionary Force)
+
+
+Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
+
+France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, 44
+  army of, 180
+
+_Frankfurter Zeitung_ opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, 143
+
+Free Trade, Prince von Bülow's views on, 58
+  William II. on, 54
+
+French Revolution, the, 217
+
+French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, 48
+
+
+George V., King, entertains German Emperor, 67
+
+George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, 70
+  at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+German desire of commercial development, 55, 58, 60
+  foreign policy: divided control of, 85
+
+Germans, psychology of, 40
+
+Germany, and the Agadir incident, 68
+  and the Hague Conference, 60
+  attitude of, before the war, 101 _et seq._
+  cause of her downfall, 167
+  Chauvinist party in, 81
+  commercial rivalry with England, 114
+  decides upon war, 88
+  defect of Imperial system in, 109
+  desire for commercial expansion, 103
+  Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, 142
+  her responsibility for the world war, 90
+  increases her armaments, 21, 94, 161
+  influence of General Staff, 41, 107
+  militarist party of, 39, 89, 108
+  miscalculations at outbreak of war, 83, 159
+  naval program of, 142, 156
+  new Military Law passed, 136
+  organization of her Navy, 138
+  over-ambition of, 16
+  peaceful penetration policy of, 39, 41
+  politics in: an anecdote of, 85 (note)
+  result of military spirit in, 15, 22
+  scaremongers in, 24
+  shipbuilding program of, 74
+  the new Fleet Law, 75, 79, 87, 128
+  the Press and Tirpitz, 143
+  two inconsistent policies in, 107
+  why she entered the war, 207
+
+Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," 180
+
+Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, 44
+
+Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Grant Duff, Colonel, 185
+
+Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, 202
+  ante-war policy of, 13, 17
+  deficiencies in military organization of, 46
+  enters the war, 95
+  her sea power before the war, 19
+  indefinite policy of, 17, 28, 30
+  question of her preparedness for war, 18, 177
+  the educational problem in, 39
+
+Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, 15
+  causes of, 161
+
+Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, 201
+
+Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, 44
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 64
+  at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, 182
+  Bethmann-Hollweg on, 113
+  denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, 203
+  his efforts for peace, 88, 154, 155
+  negotiates with Germany, 163
+  presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, 155
+  proposes a conference, 154
+
+Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+
+Hague Conference, the, 55
+  Germany's difficulty, 60
+
+Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, 188
+  and the reorganization of British Army, 48
+
+Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, 67
+  a visit to the United States and Canada, 37
+  addresses at Montreal and Oxford, 92, 145
+  advocates improved system of education, 39
+  and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, 48, 50, 178
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 63 _et seq._
+  becomes Lord Chancellor, 37, 87
+  "conversations" at Berlin, 72, 124
+  criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, 101 _et seq._
+  dines with the Chancellor, 77
+  entertained by General Staff, 41
+  examines organization of German War Office, 38
+  frank conversation with William II., 52 _et seq._
+  lunches with Emperor and Empress, 74
+  on military preparations, 177 _et seq._
+  post-war problems and how they should be met, 208 _et seq._
+  rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, 164
+  Secretary of State for War, 36
+  studies in Germany, 36
+  visits German Emperor, 37
+  witnesses review of German troops, 51
+
+Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, 185
+
+Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, 182
+
+Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, 77
+
+Herzegovina, annexation of, 70, 113
+
+Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, 77
+
+Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, 45
+
+
+Imperial Defense Committee, the, 158, 159, 177, 182
+
+Isvolsky, M., 113, 162
+
+
+Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 133
+
+
+Kiaochow (_see_ Tsingtau)
+
+Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von,
+  a talk with, 77
+  and the Agadir incident, 69
+
+Kitchener, Lord,
+  meets the Emperor, 68
+  personality of, 179
+
+Kitchener's Army, 50, 178
+
+
+Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, 21
+
+Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, 188
+
+League of Nations, the, 220, 222
+
+Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, 148
+
+Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
+
+Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 188
+
+
+MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, 68
+
+Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, 141
+
+McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, 87
+
+Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  at Windsor, 62
+  author's relations with, 57
+
+Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, 188
+
+Military preparations, the, 177 _et seq._
+
+Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, 38
+
+Moltke, General von, a chat with, 42
+  present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, 148
+
+Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, 68
+  attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+Morocco difficulty, the, 115
+  France's request to England, 44
+
+Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
+
+
+National philosophy, German, 30
+
+Navy, British, mobilization of, 50
+  sea power the dominant element in military policy, 200
+  why strengthened and increased, 87, 129, 181
+
+Navy, German, Bülow on, 57
+  William II. and, 54
+
+Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, 196
+  chief of General Staff, 188
+
+
+Officers' Training Corps, organization of, 192
+
+Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial
+    Defense, 185
+
+
+_Panther_ sent to Agadir, 68
+
+Peace terms, the, burden of, 210
+
+Post-war problems, and how they should be met, 208
+
+Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, 131, 149
+
+
+Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, 126, 146
+
+Repington, Col. A'Court, 191
+
+Reventlow, Count, 38 (note)
+
+Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, 142
+
+Russia, army of, 180
+  her hostility to Austria, 113
+  not wishful for war, 162
+
+Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, 116
+
+
+Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, 68
+
+Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, 62
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 65
+
+Serbia as "provocative neighbor," 23
+  ultimatum to, 133
+
+Skiernevice (_see_ Reinsurance Treaty)
+
+Social Democracy, and militarism, 108
+  in Germany, 84, 144
+
+Special Reserve, the, organization of, 178
+
+Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Stosch, and the German Navy, 138
+
+
+Tangier, William II. at, 53, 115
+
+Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, 55
+
+Teaching universities, author and, 39
+
+Technical colleges in England, 40
+
+Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, 49
+  mobilization of, 50
+  organization of, 48, 178
+
+Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, 138
+  an interview with, 74
+  and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, 141
+  criticizes author, 160
+  demands a definite policy for war, 143
+  his "Erinnerungen" discussed, 137 _et seq._
+  his influence in Germany, 82
+  informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, 153
+  mentality of, 137
+  outstanding thesis of his book, 141
+  tribute to British sea power, 161
+  visits Bismarck, 145, 148
+
+Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, 191
+
+Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
+  author's interview with, 38
+  on Anglo-French Entente, 59
+  on the English Press, 61
+
+Tsingtau as German naval base, 140
+
+Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince Bülow, 54, 57
+  Tirpitz and, 76
+
+
+United States (_see_ America)
+
+
+Voluntary system, the, advantages of, 199
+
+
+William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, 43
+  and the Agadir crisis, 69, 70
+  and the Anglo-French Entente, 52
+  Bismarck's message to, 148
+  consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, 132
+  Count Czernin on, 170
+  desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, 70, 71
+  Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, 131
+  frank speech with author, 52 _et seq_.
+  his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  his reception in London, 68
+  incautious speeches of, 69, 117, 161
+  pays surprise visit to Bismarck, 148
+  promises support to Austria, 150
+  reads a poem to author, 165
+  reviews his troops, 51
+  Tirpitz and, 142
+  visits King Edward and King George, 62, 67
+
+Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, 62
+
+
+Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, 151
+  meets author, 77
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Typographical errors corrected in text:                      |
+|                                                              |
+| Page 231: Landsdowne replaced by Lansdowne                   |
+|                                                              |
+| Unusual spellings left in the text:                          |
+|                                                              |
+|   maneuvers                                                  |
+|   altho                                                      |
+|   tho                                                        |
+|   Bethmann Hollweg versus Bethmann-Hollweg                   |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
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+<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, Before the War, by Viscount Richard Burton
+Haldane</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: Before the War</p>
+<p>Author: Viscount Richard Burton Haldane</p>
+<p>Release Date: March 16, 2006  [eBook #17998]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BEFORE THE WAR***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3 class="pg">E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Jeannie Howse,<br />
+    and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br />
+    (http://www.pgdp.net/)</h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<div class="tr">
+<p class="cen" style="font-weight: bold;">Transcriber's Note:</p>
+<br />
+<p class="noin">While the author of this work uses unusual spelling, a
+number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected.<br />
+A complete list will be found at the <a href="#TN">end of the book</a>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+
+<div class="img" style="width: 65%;"><a name="frontis" id="frontis"></a>
+<a href="images/frontis.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/frontis.jpg" width="65%" alt="Viscount Haldane" /></a><br />
+<p class="right" style="font-size: 80%; margin-top: .2em; margin-bottom: .1em;"><i>London Stereoscopic Co</i>.</p>
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">VISCOUNT HALDANE<br />
+<span class="scfake">SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR FROM DECEMBER, 1905 TO JUNE, 1912;<br />
+LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR FROM JUNE, 1912 TO MAY, 1915.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h1>BEFORE THE WAR</h1>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<h3>BY</h3>
+<br />
+<h2>VISCOUNT HALDANE</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<h5>FUNK &amp; WAGNALLS COMPANY<br />
+New York and London<br />
+1920</h5>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+
+
+<h5>Copyright, 1920, by Funk &amp; Wagnalls Company<br />
+<br />
+[<span class="sc">Printed in the United States of America</span>]<br />
+<br />
+Published in February, 1920</h5>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<h5>Copyright under the Articles of the Copyright Convention of the<br />
+Pan-American Republics of the United States, August 11, 1910</h5>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span><br />
+<h3><a name="PREFATORY_NOTE" id="PREFATORY_NOTE"></a>PREFATORY NOTE</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The chapters of which this little volume consists were constructed with
+a definite purpose. It was to render clear the line of thought and
+action followed by the Government of this country before the war,
+between January, 1906, and August, 1914. The endeavor made was directed
+in the first place to averting war, and in the second place to preparing
+for it as well as was practicable if it should come. In reviewing what
+happened I have made use of the substance of various papers recently
+contributed to the <i>Westminster Gazette</i>, the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, <i>Land
+and Water</i>, and the <i>Sunday Times</i>. The gist of these, which were
+written with their inclusion in this book in view, has been incorporated
+in the text together with other material. I have to thank the Editors of
+these journals for their courtesy in agreeing that the substance of what
+they published should be made use of here as part of a connected
+whole.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span>
+<br />
+<a name="toc" id="toc"></a><hr />
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span><br />
+<h3>CONTENTS</h3>
+<br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="Table of Contents">
+  <tr>
+  <td width="80%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="20%"><span style="font-size: 90%;">PAGE</span></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Introduction</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">13</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Diplomacy Before the War</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">35</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">The German Attitude Before the War</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">101</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">The Military Preparations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">177</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Epilog</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">207</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Index</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#INDEX">227</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<a name="toi" id="toi"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h3>
+<br />
+
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="Table of Contents">
+  <tr>
+  <td width="80%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="20%"><span style="font-size: 90%;">PAGE</span></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Viscount Haldane</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#frontis"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Count Metternich</td>
+  <td class="tdr">Facing page <a href="#imagep057">57</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">M. Paul Cambon</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep078">78</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Viscount Grey (Sir Edward Grey)</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep087">87</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep101">101</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Admiral von Tirpitz</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep137">137</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Count Berchtold</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep153">153</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdlsc">Count Ottokar Czernin</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#imagep170">170</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[x]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[xi]</a></span><br />
+<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[xii]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span><br />
+<h2>BEFORE THE WAR</h2>
+
+<h3>CHAPTER I<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>INTRODUCTION</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>The purpose of the pages which follow is, as I have said in the
+Prefatory Note, to explain the policy pursued toward Germany by Great
+Britain through the eight years which immediately preceded the great war
+of 1914. It was a policy which had two branches, as inseparable as they
+were distinct. The preservation of peace, by removing difficulties and
+getting rid of misinterpretations, was the object of the first branch.
+The second branch was concerned with what might happen if we failed in
+our effort to avert war. Against any outbreak by which such failure
+might be followed we had to insure. The form of the insurance had to be
+one which, in our circumstances, was practicable, and care had to be
+taken that it was not of a character that would frustrate the main
+purpose by provoking, and possibly accelerating, the very calamity
+against which it was designed to provide.</p>
+
+<p>The situation was delicate and difficult. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span>public most properly
+expected of British Ministers that they should spare no effort for peace
+and for security. It was too sensible to ask for every detail of the
+steps taken for the attainment of this end. There are matters on which
+it is mischievous to encourage discussion, even in Parliament. Members
+of Parliament know this well, and are sensible about it. The wisest
+among them do not press for open statements which if made to the world
+would imperil the very object which Parliament and the public have
+directed those responsible to them to seek to attain. What is objected
+to in secret diplomacy hardly includes that which from its very nature
+must be negotiated in the first instance between individuals.</p>
+
+<p>The policy actually followed was in principle satisfactory to the great
+majority of our people. To them it was familiar in its general outlines.
+But for the minority, which included both our pacifists and our
+chauvinists, it was either too much or too little. For, on the one hand,
+its foundation was the theory that, amid the circumstances of Europe in
+which it had to be built up, human nature could not be safely relied on
+unswervingly to resist warlike impulses. On the other hand, this peril
+notwithstanding, it was the considered view of those responsible that
+war neither ought <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span>to be regarded as being inevitable, nor was so in
+fact. It was quite true that the development of military preparations
+had been so great as to make Europe resemble an armed camp; but, if
+actual conflict could be averted, the burden this state of things
+implied ought finally to render its continuance no longer tolerable.
+What was really required was that unbroken peace should be preserved,
+and the hand of time left to operate.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of history it has rarely been the case that any war that
+has broken out was really inevitable, and there does not appear to be
+any sufficient reason for thinking that the war of 1914 was an exception
+to the general rule. It seems clear that, if Germany had resolved to do
+so, she could quite safely have abstained from entering upon it and from
+encouraging Austria in a mad adventure. The reason why the war came
+appears to have been that at some period in the year 1913 the German
+Government finally laid the reins on the necks of men whom up to then it
+had held in restraint. The decision appears to have been allowed at this
+point to pass from civilians to soldiers. I do not believe that even
+then the German Government as a whole intended deliberately to invoke
+the frightful consequences of actual war, even if it seemed likely to be
+victorious. But <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span>I do believe that it elected to take the risk of what
+it thought improbable, a general resistance by the Entente Powers if
+Germany were to threaten to use her great strength. In thus departing in
+1913 from the appearance of self-restraint which in the main they had
+displayed up to then, the Emperor and his Ministers misjudged the
+situation. They did not foresee the crisis to which their policy was
+conducting, and when that crisis arrived they lost their heads and
+blundered in trying to deal with it. They did not perceive the whirlpool
+toward which they were heading. They thought that they could safely
+expose what was precarious to a strain, and secure the substance of a
+real victory without having to overcome actual resistance. Had they put
+an extreme ambition for their country aside, and been careful in their
+language to others, they might have attained a considerable success
+without a shot being fired. But they were over ambitious and in their
+language they were far from careful. A few unlucky words made all the
+difference in the concluding days of July, 1914:</p>
+
+<p class="cen" style="padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">"Ten lines, a statesman's life in each."</p>
+
+<p>We here had done the best we could, according to our lights, to keep
+Germany from misjudging us. It was not always easy to do this. The
+genius <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span>of our people was not well adapted for the particular task. If
+the only question to-day were whether we always rendered ourselves
+intelligible to her, she might say with some show of reason that we did
+not. She might have grumbled, as Bismarck used to do, over our apparent
+indefiniteness. But that indefiniteness in policy was only apparent. Its
+form was due to the habit of mind which was, what it always has been and
+probably always will be, the habit of mind of the people of these
+islands. It was the defect of her qualities that prevented Germany from
+understanding what this habit of mind truly imported, and we have never
+fully taken in at any period of our history how little she has ever
+understood it. Let anyone who doubts this read the German memoirs which
+have appeared since the war. But it remains not the less true and
+obvious that the purpose of the British Government which fashioned the
+policy in question was to leave no stone unturned in the endeavor to
+find a way of keeping the peace between Germany and the Entente Powers.
+Now success in that endeavor was not a certainty, and it was necessary
+to insure against the risk of failure. The second branch of British
+policy related to the provision for defense rendered imperative by the
+element of uncertainty which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span>was unavoidable. The duty of the
+Government of this country was to make sure that, if their endeavor to
+preserve peace failed, the country should be prepared, in the best way
+of those that were practicable, to face the situation that might emerge.</p>
+
+<p>Impetuous persons ask why, if there was even a chance of a great
+European war in which we might be involved, we did not appreciate the
+magnitude of what was at stake, and, laying everything else aside,
+concentrate our efforts on the immediate fashioning of such vast
+military forces as we possessed toward the end of the war? The answer
+will be found in the fourth chapter. We were aware of the risk, and we
+took what we thought the best means to meet it. Had we tried to do what
+we are reproached for not having done, we must have become weaker before
+we could have become stronger. For this statement I have given the
+military reasons. In a time of peace, even if the country had assented
+to the attempt being made, it is certain that we could not have
+accomplished such a purpose without long delay. It is probable that the
+result would have been failure, and it is almost certain that we should
+have provoked a "preventive war" on the part of Germany, a war not only
+with a very fair <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span>prospect, as things then stood, of a German success,
+but with something else that would have looked like the justification of
+a German effort to prevent that country from being encircled. Such a war
+would, with equal likelihood, have been the outcome even of the
+proclamation at such a time of a military alliance between the Entente
+Powers.</p>
+
+<p>Other critics, belonging to a wholly different school of political
+thought, ask why we moved at all, and why we did not adhere to the good
+old policy of holding aloof from interference in Continental affairs.
+The answer is simple. The days when "splendid isolation" was possible
+were gone. Our sea power, even as an instrument of self-defense, was in
+danger of becoming inadequate in the absence of friendships which should
+insure that other navies would remain neutral if they did not actively
+co-operate with ours. It was only through the medium of such friendships
+that ultimate naval preponderance could be secured. The consciousness of
+that fact pervaded the Entente. With those responsible for the conduct
+of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The
+question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to
+happen.</p>
+
+<p>On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the
+spirit in which it was sought <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span>to carry it out, the second and third
+chapters of the book may serve to throw some light. The fourth chapter
+relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration,
+for the possible event of failure. The plan was throughout based on the
+maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument. As is
+indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential
+close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia. Had
+there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the
+desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great
+nations, the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command
+the sea in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente. This
+conclusion was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for
+self-defense which the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with
+the growing organization for war of the Central Powers.</p>
+
+<p>To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this
+country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable to
+do so. We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of
+"splendid isolation." But the growing preparations of the Central Powers
+compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span>for each
+of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety as a
+common interest. In the face of a new and growing danger we dared not
+leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail. The first
+thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers that
+it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete agreement with
+us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to that which Lord
+Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with France, and accompanied
+by cessation of the reasons which had led them to pile up armaments.
+There were highly influential persons in Germany who were far from
+averse to the suggested business arrangement. The armament question
+presented greater difficulty in that country, largely because of its
+tradition. But its solution was vital, for there were also those in
+Germany whose aim was to dispute with Great Britain the possession of
+the trident. Now for us, who constituted the island center of a
+scattered Empire, and who depended for food and raw materials on freedom
+to sail our ships, the question of sea power adequate for security was
+one of life or death. We could not sit still and allow Germany so to
+increase her navy in comparison with ours that she could make other
+Powers believe that their safest course was to throw in their lot and
+join <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span>their fleets with hers. We were bound to seek to make and maintain
+friendships, and to this end not only to preserve our margin of strength
+at sea, but to make ourselves able, if it became essential, to help our
+friends in case of aggression, thereby securing ourselves. That was the
+new situation which in the final result the old military spirit in
+Germany had created.</p>
+
+<p>The balance of power is a dangerous principle; a general friendship
+between all Great Powers, or, better still, a League of the Nations, is
+by far preferable. But that consideration does not touch the actual
+point, which is that we did not seek to set up the principle of
+balancing that has given rise to so many questions. It was forced on us
+and was a sheer necessity of the situation. We did all we could to avoid
+it by negotiations with Germany, which, had they succeeded in the end,
+would have relieved France and Russia as much as ourselves and would
+have prevented the war.</p>
+
+<p>Our efforts to preserve the peace ended in failure. The cause of that
+failure was nothing that we failed to do or that France did. It was
+proximately Austrian recklessness and indirectly, but just as strongly,
+German ambition. A real desire in July, 1914, on the part of the Central
+Powers to avoid war would have averted it. That <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span>Serbia may have been a
+provocative neighbor is no answer to the reproaches made to-day against
+the old Governments in Vienna and Berlin. They failed to take the steps
+requisite if peace were to be preserved.</p>
+
+<p>People ask why the British Government between 1906 and 1914 did not
+discuss in public a situation which it understood well, and appeal to
+the nation. The answer is that to have done so would have been greatly
+to increase the difficulty of averting war. Up to the middle of 1913 the
+indications were that it was far from unlikely that war might in the
+result be averted. That was the view of some, both here and on the
+Continent, who were most competent to judge, men who had real
+opportunities for close observation from day to day. It is a view which
+is not in material conflict with anything we have since learned. The
+question whether war is inevitable has always been, as Bismarck more
+than once insisted, one for the statesmen of the countries concerned,
+and not for the soldiers and sailors who have a restricted field to work
+in, and for whom it is in consequence difficult to see things as a
+whole. Nor does great importance attach to-day to the triumphant
+declarations of those who, having chanced to guess aright, take pride in
+the cheap <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>title to wisdom which has become theirs after the event.
+Still less does respect attach to the small but noisy minority in each
+of the countries concerned who in the years before 1914 were
+continuously contributing to bringing war on our heads by expressions of
+dislike to neighboring nations, and by prophecies that war with them
+must come. In the main Germany was worse in this feature than ourselves.
+But there were those here whose language made them useful propagandists
+for the German military party, to whom they were of much service.</p>
+
+<p>Few wars are really inevitable. If we knew better how we should be
+careful to comport ourselves it may be that none are so. But extremists,
+whether chauvinist or pacifist, are not helpful in avoiding wars. That
+is because human nature is what it is.</p>
+
+<p>Those who had to make the effort to keep the peace failed. But that
+neither shows that they ought not to have tried with all the strength
+they possessed in the way they did, nor that they would have done better
+had they discussed delicate details in public. There are topics and
+conjunctures in the almost daily changing relations between Governments
+as to which silence is golden. For however proper it may be in point of
+broad <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>principle that the people should be fully informed of what
+concerns them vitally, the most important thing is those to whom they
+have confided their concerns should be given the best chance of success
+in averting danger to their interests. To have said more in Parliament
+and on the platform in the years in question, or to have said it
+otherwise, would have been to run grave risks of more than one sort. It
+is my strong impression that Lord Grey of Fallodon took the only course
+that was practicable, and that, had the danger of the catastrophe to be
+faced again and for the first time, the course he took would, even in
+the light of all we know to-day, again afford the best chance of
+avoiding it. He succeeded in improving greatly for the time the
+relations between this country and Germany, and but for the outbreak in
+the Near East he would probably have succeeded in navigating the
+dangerous waters successfully. The chance was far from being a hopeless
+one, and subsequent study of the facts has strengthened my impression
+that down to at least about the middle of the year 1913 the chances were
+substantially in his favor. A sufficiency at least of the leaders in
+other countries were co-operating with him, not all the leaders, but
+those who were in reality most important. The war when it came <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span>was due,
+not only to the failure of certain of the prominent men in the capitals
+of the Central Powers to adhere to principles to which for a long time
+they had held fast, but to the accident of untoward circumstances and
+the contingency that is inseparable from human affairs.</p>
+
+<p>Such are some of the reasons which have led me to say what I have tried
+to express in the pages which follow. I have never been able to bring
+myself to believe that there are vast differences between the ways of
+thinking and habits of mind of the great and most highly civilized
+peoples of Europe. I have seen something of the Germans, and what I have
+learned of them and of their history has led me to the conclusion that,
+certain traditions of theirs notwithstanding, they resemble us more than
+they differ from us. If this be so, the sooner we take advantage of our
+present victory by seeking to turn our eyes from the past as far as can
+be, and to look steadily toward a future in which the misery and sin
+which that past saw shall be dwelt on to the least extent that is
+practicable, the better it will be for ourselves as well as for the rest
+of the world.</p>
+
+<p>That world has been reminded of a great truth which had been partly
+forgotten by those whose faith lay in militarism. It is that to set up
+might <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span>as the foundation of right may in the end be to inspire those
+around with a passionate desire to hold such might in check and to
+overcome it. Democracy is not a system that lends itself easily to
+scientific preparation for war, but when democratic nations are really
+aroused their staying power, just because it rests on a true General
+Will, is without rival. The latent force in humanity which has its
+foundation in ethical idealism is the greatest of all forces for the
+vindication of right. German militarism managed to fail to understand
+this. Let us take pains to show our late enemies that if they make it
+clear that they have extinguished such militarism in a lasting fashion,
+the quarrel with them is at an end.</p>
+
+<p>I am far from thinking that we here are perfect in our habits as a
+nation. We are apt not to keep in view how what we do is likely to look
+to others. We are somewhat deficient in the faculty of self-examination
+and self-criticism. Want of clarity of ground-principle in higher ideals
+is apt to prove a hindrance to more than the individual only. It
+generally brings with it want of clarity in the sense of social
+obligation. And this sometimes extends even to our relations to other
+countries.</p>
+
+<p>It leads to our being misinterpreted as a nation. We have suffered a
+good deal in the past from <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span>having attributed to us motives which were
+not ours. The reason was the assumption that the apparent absence of
+definiteness in national purpose must have been designed as a cover for
+hidden and selfish ends. It is not true. We are indeed very insular, and
+what has been called the international mind is not common among the
+people of these islands. But we are kindly at heart, and when we have
+seemed self-regarding it has been simply because we were not conscious
+of our own limitations and had not much appreciation of the modes of
+thought of other people. We have paid the penalty for this defect at
+periods in our history. At one time France suspected us, I think in the
+main unjustly. Later on Germany suspected us, I think of a certainty
+unjustly. Now these things arise in part at least from our reputation
+for a particular kind of disposition, our supposed habitual and
+deliberately adopted desire to wait until the particular international
+situation of the moment should show how we could profit, before we gave
+any assurance as to the way in which we should act. What has given rise
+to this misunderstanding of our attitude in our relations to other
+countries is simply an exemplification of what has prevented us from
+fully understanding ourselves. It is our gift to be able to apply
+ourselves in emergencies, at home <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span>and abroad, with immense energy, and
+our success in promptly pulling ourselves together and coping with the
+unexpected has often suggested to outsiders that we had long ago looked
+ahead. This has been said of us on the Continent. It is not so. We do
+not study the art of fishing in troubled waters. The waiting habit in
+our transactions, domestic as well as foreign, arises from our
+inveterate preference for thinking in images rather than in concepts. We
+put off decisions until the whole of the facts can be visualized. This
+carries with it that we often do not act until it is very late. Our
+gifts enable us to move with energy, if not always with precision. To
+predict what we will do in a given case is not easy for a foreigner. It
+is not easy even for ourselves. We have few abstract principles, and
+reliable induction from our past is not easy. We are often guided by
+what Mr. Justice Wendell Holmes has called "the intuition more subtle
+than any particular major premise." Nor is help to be derived from any
+study of our general outlook on life, for that outlook is hard to
+formulate even to ourselves.</p>
+
+<p>Now all this, our peculiar gift, if kept under control, may well have
+its practical advantage, but, as the case stands, it is apt to bring in
+its train a good deal of disadvantage. In periods when <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span>nations are
+trying to render firm the basis of peace by remolding and giving
+precision to their aims, so that these can be made common aims, lack of
+definiteness in national ideals is a sure source of embarrassment. At a
+time when democracy is more and more claiming in terms to occupy the
+whole field it becomes increasingly desirable that the higher purposes
+of democracy should become clear to the people themselves. For the
+practise of a country can never be wholly divorced from its theory of
+life. The tendencies of the national will are bound up with the nation's
+science, with its literature, with its art, and with its religion. These
+tendencies are affected by the capacity of the nation to understand and
+express its own soul. Beyond science, literature, art and religion there
+lies something that may be called the national philosophy, a disposition
+rather than a definite creed. This sort of philosophy is different in
+France from what it is in Germany, and in Germany from what it is in the
+English-speaking countries. The philosophy of a people takes shape in
+the attitude its leaders adopt in their estimation of values and of the
+order in which they should be placed. And this turns on the conceptions
+and ideas which are current in the various departments of mental
+activity. It is thus that a philosophy of life has to be given some
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span>sort of place in his professions even by the statesman who has to
+address Parliament and the public. He is driven to make speeches in
+which a good many conceptions and ideas have to be brought together. And
+it gives rise to a great difference of quality in such utterances if the
+general outlook of the speaker be a large one. But this requires that he
+should know himself and be aware of the conceptions and ideas which
+dominate his mind, and should have examined their scope before employing
+them.</p>
+
+<p>How some of those who were deeply responsible for the conduct of affairs
+tried to think in the anxious years before the war, and how they
+endeavored to apply their conclusions, is what I have endeavored to
+state in the course of what follows. They doubtless made mistakes and
+fell short of accomplishment in what they were aiming at. It is human so
+to do. But they tried what seemed to them the wisest course, and I have
+yet to learn that it was practicable to have followed any different
+course without a failure worse than any that occurred. After all, in the
+end the British Empire won, however hard it had to fight.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span><br />
+<h2>DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER II<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>If in this chapter I speak frequently in the first person and of my own
+part in the negotiations which it records, it is not from any desire to
+make prominent either my own personality or the part it fell to me to
+play. The reason is that I have endeavored to write of what I myself
+heard and saw, and that in consequence most of what follows is, for the
+sake of accuracy, largely transcribed from my personal diaries and
+records made at the time when the events to which they related took
+place. So frequent an employment of the personal pronoun as has been
+made in these pages would ordinarily be a blemish in taste, if not in
+style also, but in this case it seemed safer not to try to avoid it.</p>
+
+<p>Many things that happened in the years just before 1914, as well as the
+events of the great war itself, are still too close to permit of our
+studying them in their full context. But before <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span>much time has passed
+the historians will have accumulated material that will overflow their
+libraries, and their hands will remain occupied for generations to come.
+At this moment all that safely can be attempted is that actual observers
+should set down what they have themselves observed. For there has rarely
+been a time when the juridical maxim that "hearsay is not evidence"
+ought to be more sternly insisted on.</p>
+
+<p>If I now venture to set down what follows in these pages, it is because
+I had certain opportunities for forming a judgment at first hand for
+myself. I am not referring to the circumstance that for a brief period I
+once, long ago, lived the life of a student at a German University, or
+that I was frequently in Germany in the years that followed. Nor do I
+mean that I have tried to explore German habits of reflection, as they
+may be studied in the literature of Germany. Other people have done all
+these things more thoroughly and more extensively than I have. What I do
+mean is that from the end of 1905 to the summer of 1912 I had special
+chances for direct observation of quite another kind. During that period
+I was Secretary of State for War in Great Britain, and from the latter
+year to April, 1915, I was the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>holder of another office and a member of
+the British Cabinet.</p>
+
+<p>During the first of the above periods it fell to me to work out the
+military organization that would be required to insure, as far as was
+practicable, against risk, should those strenuous efforts fail into
+which Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, had thrown his strength. He was
+endeavoring with all his might to guard the peace of Europe from danger.
+As he and I had for many years been on terms of close intimacy, it was
+not unnatural that he should ask me to do what I could by helping in
+some of the diplomatic work which was his, as well as by engaging in my
+own special task. Indeed, the two phases of activity could hardly be
+separable.</p>
+
+<p>I was not in Germany after May, 1912, for the duties of Lord Chancellor,
+on which office I then entered, made it unconstitutional for me to leave
+the United Kingdom, save under such exceptional conditions as were
+conceded by the King and the Cabinet when, in the autumn of 1913, I made
+a brief yet memorable visit to the United States and Canada. But in
+1906, while War Minister, I paid, on the invitation of the German
+Emperor, a visit to him at Berlin, to which city I went on after
+previously staying with King <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span>Edward at Marienbad, where he and the then
+Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, were resting.</p>
+
+<p>While at Berlin I saw much of the Emperor, and I also saw certain of his
+Ministers, notably Prince von B&uuml;low, Herr von Tschirsky and General von
+Einem, the first being at that time Chancellor, and the last two being
+respectively the Foreign and War Ministers. I was invited to examine for
+myself the organization of the German War Office, which I wished to
+study for purposes of reform at home; and this I did in some detail, in
+company with an expert adviser from my personal staff, Colonel Ellison,
+my military private secretary, who accompanied me on this journey.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>
+There the authorities explained to us the general nature of the
+organization for rapid mobilization which had been developed under the
+great von Moltke, and subsequently carried farther. The character of
+this organization was, in its general features, no secret in Germany,
+altho it was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span>somewhat unfamiliar in Anglo-Saxon countries; and it
+interested my adviser and myself intensely.</p>
+
+<p>At that time there was an active militarist party in Germany, which, of
+course, was not wholly pleased at the friendly reception with which we
+met from the Emperor and from crowds in the streets of Berlin. We were
+well aware of the activity of this party. But it stood then unmistakably
+for a minority, and I formed the opinion that those who wanted Germany
+to remain at peace, quite as much as to be strong, had at least an
+excellent chance of keeping their feet. I realized, and had done so for
+years past, that it was not merely because of the <i>beaux yeux</i> of
+foreign peoples that Germany desired to maintain good relations all
+round. She had become fully conscious of a growing superiority in the
+application to industry of scientific knowledge and in power to organize
+her resources founded on it; and her rulers hoped, and not without good
+ground, to succeed by these means in the peaceful penetration of the
+world.</p>
+
+<p>I had personally for some time been busy in pressing the then somewhat
+coldly received claims for a better system of education, higher and
+technical as well as elementary, among my own countrymen, and had met
+with some success in asking for the establishment of teaching
+universities and of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span>technical colleges, such as the new Imperial
+College of Science and Technology at South Kensington. Of these we had
+very substantially increased the number during the eight years which
+preceded my visit to Berlin; but I had learned from visits of inspection
+to Germany that much more remained to be done before we could secure our
+commercial and industrial position against the unhasting but unresting
+efforts of our formidable competitor.</p>
+
+<p>As to the German people outside official circles and the universities, I
+thought of them then what I think of them now. They were very much like
+our own people, except in one thing. This was that they were trained
+simply to obey, and to carry out whatever they were told by their
+rulers. I used, during numerous unofficial tours in Germany, to wander
+about incognito, and to smoke and drink beer with the peasants and the
+people whenever I could get the chance. What impressed me was the little
+part they had in directing their own government, and the little they
+knew about what it was doing. There was a general disposition to accept,
+as a definition of duty which must not be questioned, whatever they were
+told to do by the <i>Vorstand</i>. It is this habit of mind, dating back to
+the days of Frederick the Great, with only occasional and brief
+interruptions, which has led many <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span>people to think that the German
+people at large have in them "a double dose of original sin." Even when
+their soldiers have been exceptionally brutal in methods of warfare, I
+do not think that this is so. The habit of mind which prevails is that
+of always looking to the rulers for orders, and the brutality has been
+that enjoined&mdash;in accordance with its own military policy of shortening
+war by making it terrible to the enemy&mdash;by the General Staff of Germany,
+a body before whose injunctions even the Emperor, so far as my
+observation goes, always has bowed.</p>
+
+<p>But I must now return to my formal visit to Berlin in the autumn of
+1906. I was, as I have already said, everywhere cordially welcomed, and
+at the end the heads of the German Army entertained me at a dinner in
+the War Office, at which the War Minister presided, and there was
+present, among others, the Chief of the German General Staff. They were
+all friendly. I do not think that my impression was wrong that even the
+responsible heads of the Army were then looking almost entirely to
+"peaceful penetration," with only moral assistance from the prestige
+attaching to the possession of great armed forces in reserve. Our
+business in the United Kingdom was therefore to see that we were
+prepared for perils that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>might unexpectedly arise out of this policy,
+and not less, by developing our educational and industrial organization,
+to make ourselves fit to meet the greater likelihood of a coming keen
+competition in the peaceful arts.</p>
+
+<p>One thing that seemed to me essential for the preservation of good
+relations was that cordial and frequent intercourse between the people
+of the two countries should be encouraged and developed. I set myself in
+my speeches to avoid all expressions which might be construed as
+suggesting a critical attitude on our part, or a failure to recognize
+the existence of peaceful ideas among what was then, as I still think, a
+large majority of the people of Germany. The attitude of some newspapers
+in England, and still more that of the chauvinist minority in Germany
+itself, did not render this quite an easy task. But there were good
+people in these days in Germany as well as in England, and the United
+States might be counted on as likely to co-operate in discouraging
+friction.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile there was the chance that the course of this policy might be
+interrupted by some event which we could not control. A conversation
+with the then Chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, the
+nephew of the great man of that name, satisfied me that he did not
+really <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>look with any pleasurable military expectation to the results of
+a war with the United Kingdom alone. It would, he observed to me, be in
+his opinion a long and possibly indecisive war, and must result in much
+of the overseas trade of both countries passing to a <i>tertius gaudens</i>,
+by which he meant the United States.</p>
+
+<p>I had little doubt that what he said to me on this occasion represented
+his real opinion. But I had in my mind the apprehension of an emergency
+of a different nature. Germany was more likely to attack France than
+ourselves. The German Emperor had told me that, altho he was trying to
+develop good relations with France, he was finding it difficult. This
+seemed to me ominous. The paradox presented itself that a war with
+Germany in which we were alone would be easier to meet than a war in
+which France was attacked along with us; for if Germany succeeded in
+over-running France she might establish naval bases on the northern
+Channel ports of that country, quite close to our shores, and so, with
+the possible aid of the submarines, long-range guns and air-machines of
+the future, interfere materially with our naval position in the Channel
+and our fleet defenses against invasion.</p>
+
+<p>I knew, too, that the French Government was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>apprehensive. In the
+historical speech which Sir Edward Grey made on August 3, 1914, the day
+before the British Government directed Sir Edward Goschen, our
+Ambassador in Berlin, to ask for his passports, he informed the House of
+Commons that so early as January, 1906, the French Government, after the
+Morocco difficulty, had drawn his attention to the international
+situation. It had informed him that it considered the danger of an
+attack on France by Germany to be a real one, and had inquired whether,
+in the event of an unprovoked attack, Great Britain would think that she
+had so much at stake as to make her willing to join in resisting it. If
+this were to be even a possible attitude for Great Britain, the French
+Government had intimated to him that it was in its opinion desirable
+that conversation should take place between the General Staff of France
+and the newly created General Staff of Great Britain, as to the form
+which military co-operation in resisting invasion of the northern
+portions of France might best assume. We had a great Navy, and the
+French had a great Army. But our Navy could not operate on land, and the
+French Army, altho large, was not so large as that which Germany, with
+her superior resources in population, commanded. Could we, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>then,
+reconsider our military organization, so that we might be able rapidly
+to dispatch, if we ever thought it necessary in our own interests, say,
+100,000 men in a well-formed army, not to invade Belgium, which no one
+thought of doing, but to guard the French frontier of Belgium in case
+the German Army should seek to enter France in that way. If the German
+attack were made farther south, where the French chain of modern
+fortresses had rendered their defensive positions strong, the French
+Army would then be able, set free from the difficulty of mustering in
+full strength opposite the Belgian boundary, to guard the southern
+frontier.</p>
+
+<p>Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, and
+myself as War Minister, and I was instructed, in January, 1906, a month
+after assuming office, to take the examination of the question in hand.
+This occurred in the middle of the General Election which was then in
+progress. I went at once to London and summoned the heads of the British
+General Staff and saw the French military attach&eacute;, Colonel Huguet, a man
+of sense and ability. I became aware at once that there was a new army
+problem. It was, how to mobilize and concentrate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span>at a place of assembly
+to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate
+(with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the
+inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the
+entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even farther
+south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.</p>
+
+<p>But an investigation of a searching character presently revealed great
+deficiencies in the British military organization of these days. We had
+never contemplated the preparation of armies for warfare of the
+Continental type. The older generals had not been trained for this
+problem. We had, it was true, excellent troops in India and elsewhere.
+These were required as outposts for Imperial defense. As they had to
+serve for long periods and to be thoroughly disciplined, they had to be
+professional soldiers, engaged to serve in most cases for seven years
+with the colors and afterwards for five in the reserve. They were highly
+trained men, and there was a good reserve of them at home. But that
+reserve was not organized in the great self-contained divisions which
+would be required for fighting against armies organized for rapid action
+on modern Continental principles. Its formations in peace time <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span>were not
+those which would be required in such a war. There was in addition a
+serious defect in the artillery organization which would have prevented
+more than a comparatively small number of batteries (about forty-two
+only in point of fact) from being quickly placed on a war footing. The
+transport and supply and the medical services were as deficient as the
+artillery.</p>
+
+<p>In short, the close investigation made at that time disclosed that it
+was not possible, under the then existing circumstances, to put in the
+field more than about 80,000 men, and even these only after an interval
+of over two months, which would be required for conversion of our
+isolated units into the new war formations of an army fit to take the
+field against the German first line of active corps. The French
+naturally thought that a machine so slow moving would be of little use
+to them. They might have been destroyed before it could begin to operate
+effectively. Both they and the Germans had organized on the basis that
+modern Continental warfare had become a high science. Hitherto we had
+not, and it was only our younger generals who had even studied this
+science.</p>
+
+<p>There was, therefore, nothing for it but to attempt a complete
+revolution in the organization of the British Army at home. The nascent
+General <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span>Staff was finally organized in September, 1906, and its
+organization was shortly afterwards developed so as to extend to the
+entire Empire, as soon as a conference had taken place with the
+Ministers of the Dominions early in the following year. The outcome was
+a complete recasting, which, after three years' work, made it
+practicable rapidly to mobilize, not only 100,000, but 160,000 men; to
+transport them, with the aid of the Navy, to a place of concentration
+which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain; and to
+have them at their appointed place within twelve days, an interval based
+on what the German Army required on its side for a corresponding
+concentration.</p>
+
+<p>All the arrangements for this were worked out by the end of 1910. Both
+Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig took an active part in the work.
+Behind the first-line army so organized, a second-line army of larger
+size, tho far less trained, and so designed that it could be expanded,
+was organized. This was the citizen or "Territorial" army, consisting in
+time of peace of fourteen divisions of infantry and artillery and
+fourteen brigades of cavalry, with the appropriate medical, sanitary,
+transport and other auxiliary services. Those serving in this
+second-line army were civilians, and, of course, much less disciplined
+than <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>the officers and men of the first line. Its primary function was
+home defense, but its members were encouraged to undertake for service
+abroad, if necessary; and a large part of this army, in point of fact,
+fought in France, Flanders and in the East soon after the beginning of
+the war, in great measure making up by intelligence for shortness of
+training.</p>
+
+<p>To say, therefore, that we were caught unprepared is not accurate.
+Compulsory service in a period of peace was out of the question for us.
+Moreover, it would have taken at least two generations to organize, and
+meanwhile we should have been weaker than without it. We had studied the
+situation and had done the only thing we thought we could do, after full
+deliberation. Our main strength was in our Navy and its tradition. Our
+secondary contribution was a small army fashioned to fulfil a
+scientifically measured function. It was, of course, a very small army,
+but it had a scientific organization on the basis of which a great
+expansion was possible. After all, what we set ourselves to accomplish
+we did accomplish. If the margin by which a just sufficient success was
+attained in the early days of the war seems to-day narrow, the reason of
+the narrow margin lay largely in the unprepared <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span>condition of the armies
+of Russia, on which we and France had reckoned for rapid co-operation.
+Anyhow, we fulfilled our contract, for at eleven o'clock on Monday
+morning, August 3, 1914, we mobilized without a hitch the whole of the
+Expeditionary Force, amounting to six divisions and nearly two cavalry
+divisions, and began its transport over the Channel when war was
+declared thirty-six hours later. We also at the same time successfully
+mobilized the Territorial Force and other units, the whole amounting to
+over half a million men. The Navy was already in its war stations, and
+there was no delay at all in putting what we had prepared into
+operation.</p>
+
+<p>I speak of this with direct knowledge, for as the Prime Minister, who
+was holding temporarily the seals of the War Secretary, was overwhelmed
+with business, he asked me, tho I had then become Lord Chancellor, to go
+to the War Office and give directions for the mobilization of the
+machinery with which I was so familiar, and I did this on the morning of
+Monday, August 3, and a day later handed it over, in working order, to
+Lord Kitchener.</p>
+
+<p>I now return to what was the main object of British foreign policy
+between 1905 and 1914, the prevention of the danger of any outbreak
+with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span>Germany. Sir Edward Grey worked strenuously with this well-defined
+object. If France were overrun, our island security would be at least
+diminished, and he had, therefore, in addition to his anxiety to avert a
+general war, a direct national interest to strive for, in the
+preservation of peace between Germany and France. Ever since the
+mutilation which the latter country had suffered, as the outcome of the
+War of 1870, she had felt sore, and her relations with Germany were not
+easy. But she did not seek a war of revenge. It would have been too full
+of risk even if she had not desired peace, the Franco-Russian Dual
+Alliance notwithstanding. The notion of an encirclement of Germany,
+excepting in defense against aggression by Germany herself, existed only
+in the minds of nervous Germans. Still, there was suspicion, and the
+question was, how to get rid of it.</p>
+
+<p>I have already referred to the visit I paid to the Emperor at Berlin in
+the autumn of 1906. He invited me to a review which he held of his
+troops there, and in the course of it rode up to the carriage in which I
+was seated and said, "A splendid machine I have in this army, Mr.
+Haldane; now isn't it so? And what could I do without it, situated as I
+am between the Russians and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>French? But the French are your
+allies&mdash;are they not? So I beg pardon."</p>
+
+<p>I shook my head and smiled deprecatingly, and replied that, were I in
+his Majesty's place, I should in any case feel safe from attack with the
+possession of this machine, and that for my own part I enjoyed being
+behind it much more than if I had to be in front of it.</p>
+
+<p>Next day, when at the Schloss, he talked to me fully and cordially. What
+follows I extract from the record I made after the conversation in my
+diaries, which were kept by desire of King Edward, and which were
+printed by the Government on my return to London.</p>
+
+<p>He spoke of the Anglo-French Entente. He said that it would be wrong to
+infer that he had any critical thought about our entente with France. On
+the contrary he believed that it might even facilitate good relations
+between France and Germany. He wished for these good relations, and was
+taking steps through gentlemen of high position in France to obtain
+them. Not one inch more of French territory would he ever covet. Alsace
+and Lorraine originally had been German, and now even the least German
+of the two, Lorraine, because it preferred a monarchy to a republic, was
+welcoming him enthusiastically <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>whenever he went there. That he should
+have gone to Tangier, where both English and French welcomed him, was
+quite natural. He desired no quarrel, and the whole fault was
+Delcass&eacute;'s, who had wanted to pick a quarrel and bring England into it.</p>
+
+<p>I told the Emperor that, if he would allow me to speak my mind freely, I
+would do so. He assented, and I said to him that his attitude had caused
+great uneasiness in England, and that this, and not any notion of
+forming a tripartite alliance of France, Russia, and England against
+him, was the reason of the feeling there had been. We were bound by no
+military alliance. As for our entente, some time since we had
+difficulties with France over Newfoundland and Egypt, and we had made a
+good business arrangement (<i>gutes Gesch&auml;ft</i>) about these complicated
+matters of detail, and had simply carried out our word to France.</p>
+
+<p>He said that he had no criticism to make on this, except that if we had
+told him so early there would have been no misunderstanding. Things were
+better now, but we had not always been pleasant to him and ready to meet
+him. His army was for defense, not for offense. As to Russia, he had no
+Himalayas between him and Russia, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>more was the pity. Now what about our
+Two-Power standard. All this was said with earnestness, but in a
+friendly way, the Emperor laying his finger on my shoulder as he spoke.
+Sometimes the conversation was in German, but often in English.</p>
+
+<p>I said that our fleet was like his Majesty's army. It was of the <i>Wesen</i>
+of the nation, and the Two-Power standard, while it might be rigid and
+so awkward, was a way of maintaining a deep-seated national tradition,
+and a Liberal Government must hold to it as firmly as a Conservative.
+Both countries were increasing in wealth&mdash;ours, like Germany, very
+rapidly&mdash;and if Germany built we must build. But, I added, there was an
+excellent opportunity for co-operation in other things. I instanced
+international free trade developments which would smooth other
+relations.</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor agreed. He was convinced that free trade was the true policy
+for Germany also, but Germany could not go so quickly here as England
+had gone.</p>
+
+<p>I referred to Friedrich List's great book as illustrating how military
+and geographical considerations had affected matters for Germany in this
+connection.</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor then spoke of Chamberlain's <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>policy of Tariff Reform, and
+said that it had caused him anxiety.</p>
+
+<p>I replied that with care we might avoid any real bad feeling over trade.
+The undeveloped markets of the world were enormous, and we wanted no
+more of the surface of the globe than we had got.</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor's reply was that what he sought after was not territory but
+trade expansion. He quoted Goethe to the effect that if a nation wanted
+anything it must concentrate and act from within the sphere of its
+concentration.</p>
+
+<p>We then spoke of the fifty millions sterling per annum of chemical trade
+which Germany had got away from us. I said that this was thoroughly
+justified as the result of the practical application of high German
+science.</p>
+
+<p>"That," said he, "I delight to think, because it is legitimate and to
+the credit of my people."</p>
+
+<p>I agreed, and said that similarly we had got the best of the world's
+shipbuilding. Each nation had something to learn.</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor then passed to the topic of The Hague Conference, trusting
+that disarmament would not be proposed. If so, he could not go in.</p>
+
+<p>I observed that the word "disarmament" was perhaps unfortunately chosen.</p>
+
+<p>"The best testimony," said the Emperor, "to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span>my earnest desire for peace
+is that I have had no war, tho I should have had war if I had not
+earnestly striven to avoid it."</p>
+
+<p>Throughout the conversation, which was as animated as it was long, the
+Emperor was cordial and agreeable. He expressed the wish that more
+English Ministers would visit Berlin, and that he might see more of our
+Royal Family. I left the Palace at 3.30 <span class="scfake">P.M.</span>, having
+gone there at 1.0.</p>
+
+<p>On another day during this visit Prince von B&uuml;low, who was then
+Chancellor, called on me. I was out, but found him later at the Schloss,
+and had a conversation with him. He said to me that both the Emperor and
+himself were thoroughly aware of the desire of King Edward and his
+Government to maintain the new relations with France in their integrity,
+and that, in the best German opinion, this was no obstacle to building
+up close relations with Germany also.</p>
+
+<p>I said that this was the view held on our side too, and that the only
+danger lay in trying to force everything at once. Too great haste was to
+be deprecated.</p>
+
+<p>He said that he entirely agreed, and quoted Prince Bismarck, who had
+laid it down that you can not make a flower grow any sooner by putting
+fire to heat it.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img"><a name="imagep057" id="imagep057"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep057.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep057.jpg" width="45%" alt="Count Paul Wolff Metternich" /></a><br />
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">COUNT PAUL WOLFF METTERNICH<br />
+<span class="scfake">GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1901 TO 1912.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span>I said that, none the less, frequent and cordial interchanges of view
+were very important, and that not even the smallest matters should be
+neglected.</p>
+
+<p>He alluded with satisfaction to my personal relations with the German
+Ambassador in London, Count Metternich.</p>
+
+<p>I begged him, if there were any small matters which were too minute to
+take up officially, but which seemed unsatisfactory, to let me know of
+them in a private capacity through Count Metternich. This I did because
+I had discovered some soreness at restrictions which had been placed on
+the attendance of German military officers at maneuvers in England, and
+I had found that there had been some reprisals. I did not refer to
+these, but said that I had the authority of the sovereign to give
+assistance to German officers who were sent over to the maneuvers to
+study them. I added that while our army was small, compared with theirs,
+it had had great experience in the conduct of small expeditions, and
+that there were in consequence some things worth seeing.</p>
+
+<p>He then spoke of the navy. It was natural that with the increase of
+German commerce Germany should wish to increase her fleet&mdash;from a
+sea-police point of view&mdash;but that they had neither the wish, nor,
+having regard to the strain <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span>their great army put on their resources,
+the power to build against Great Britain.</p>
+
+<p>I said that the best opinion in England fully understood this attitude,
+and that we did not in the least misinterpret their recent progress, nor
+would he misinterpret our resolve to maintain, for purely defensive
+purposes, our navy at a Two-Power standard. Some day, I said, there
+might be rivalry, but I thought we might assume that, if it ever
+happened, it would not be for many years, and that our policy for the
+present was strongly for Free Trade, so that the more Germany exported
+to Great Britain and British possessions, the more we should export in
+exchange to them.</p>
+
+<p>He expressed himself pleased that I should say this, and added that he
+was confident that a couple of years' interchange of friendly
+communications in this spirit would produce a great development, and
+perhaps lead for both of us to pleasant relations with other Powers
+also.</p>
+
+<p>There were during this visit in 1906 other conversations of which a
+record was preserved, but I have referred to the most important, and I
+will only mention, in concluding my account of these days in Berlin in
+September, 1906, the talk I had with the Foreign Minister, Herr von
+Tschirsky, afterward the German Ambassador at Vienna <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span>before the war,
+and reported as having been a fomenter of the Austrian outbreak against
+Serbia. He may have been anti-Slav and anti-Russian, but I did not find
+him, in the long conversation we had in 1906, otherwise than sensible as
+regards France.</p>
+
+<p>I explained that my business in Berlin was merely with War Office
+matters, and, even as regards these, quite unofficial.</p>
+
+<p>He said that there had been much tendency to misinterpret in both
+countries, but that things were now better. I might take it that our
+precision about the Entente with France, and our desire to rest firmly
+on the arrangement we had made, were understood in Germany, and that it
+was realized that we were not likely to be able to build up anything
+with his own country which did not rest on this basis. But he thought,
+and the Emperor agreed, that the Entente was no hindrance to all that
+was necessary between Germany and England, which was not an alliance but
+a thoroughly good business understanding. Some day we might come into
+conflict, if care were not taken; but if care was taken, there was no
+need of apprehension.</p>
+
+<p>I said that I believed this to be Sir Edward Grey's view also, and that
+he was anxious to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>communicate with the German Government beforehand
+whenever there was a chance of German interests being touched.</p>
+
+<p>He went on to speak of the approaching Hague Conference, and of the
+difficulty Germany would have if asked to alter the proportion of her
+army to her population&mdash;a proportion which rested on a fundamental law.
+For Germany alone to object to disarmament would be to put herself in a
+hole, and it would be a friendly act if we could devise some way out of
+a definite vote on reduction. Germany might well enter a conference to
+record and emphasize the improvement all round in international
+relations, the desirability of further developing this improvement, and
+the hope that with it the growth of armaments would cease. But he was
+afraid of the kind of initiative which might come from America. The
+United States had no sympathy with European military and naval
+difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>I said that I thought that we, as a Government, were pledged to try to
+bring about something more definite than what he suggested as a limit,
+but that I would report what he had told me.</p>
+
+<p>He then passed to general topics. He was emphatic in his assurance that
+what Germany wanted was increase of commercial development. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>Let the
+nations avoid inflicting pin-pricks, and leave each other free to
+breathe the air. He said that he thought we might have opportunities of
+helping them to get the French into an easier mood. They were difficult
+and suspicious, he observed, and it was hard to transact business with
+them, for they made trouble over small points.</p>
+
+<p>On my return to London I sent to Herr von Tschirsky some English
+newspapers containing articles with a friendly tone, so far as the
+preservation of good relations was concerned. He replied in a letter
+from which I translate the material portion:</p>
+
+<p>"I see with pleasure from the articles which your Excellency has sent me
+for his Majesty, and from other expressions of public opinion in English
+newspapers, that in the leading Liberal papers of England a more
+friendly tone toward Germany is making itself apparent. You would have
+been able to derive the same impression from reading our newspapers,
+with the exception of a few Pan-German prints. Alas! papers like <i>The
+Times</i>, <i>Morning Post</i> and <i>Standard</i> can not bring themselves to
+refrain from their attitude of dislike, and are always rejoicing in
+being suspicious of every action of the Imperial Government. They
+contribute in this fashion appreciably to render weak the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span>new tone of
+diminishing misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries.
+If I fear that under these circumstances it will be a long time before
+mutual understanding has grown up to the point at which it stood more
+than a century ago, and as you and I desire it in the well-understood
+interests of England and Germany, still I hope and am persuaded that the
+relations of the two Governments will remain good."</p>
+
+<p>A year after the visit I had paid to Berlin the Emperor came over to
+stay with King Edward at Windsor. This was in November, 1907. The visit
+lasted several days, and I was present most of the time. The Emperor was
+accompanied by Baron von Schoen, who had become Foreign Minister of
+Prussia, after having been Ambassador to the Court of Russia, and by
+General von Einem, the War Minister, whose inclusion in the invitation I
+had ventured to suggest to the King, as an acknowledgment of his
+civility to myself as War Minister when in Berlin. There were also at
+Windsor Count Metternich and several high military officers of the
+Emperor's personal staff and military cabinet. To these officers and to
+the War Minister I showed all the hospitality I could in London, and I
+received them officially at the War Office.</p>
+
+<p>But the really interesting incident of this visit, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>so far as I was
+concerned, took place at Windsor. The first evening of my visit there,
+just after his arrival in November, the Emperor took me aside and said
+he was sorry that there was a good deal of friction over the Bagdad
+Railway, and that he did not know what we wanted as a basis for
+co-operation.</p>
+
+<p>I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that,
+speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a "gate" to
+protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what
+I meant by a "gate," and I said that meant the control of the section
+which would come near to the Persian Gulf. "I will give you the 'gate,'"
+replied the Emperor.</p>
+
+<p>I had no opportunity at the moment, which was just before dinner, for
+pursuing the conversation further, but I thought the answer too
+important not to be followed up. There were private theatricals after
+dinner, which lasted till nearly one o'clock in the morning. I was
+seated in the theater of the Castle just behind the Emperor, and, as the
+company broke up, I went forward and asked him whether he really meant
+seriously that he was willing to give us the "gate," because, if he did
+mean it, I would go to London early and see Sir Edward Grey at the
+Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span>Next morning, about 7.30 o'clock, a helmeted guardsman, one of those
+whom the Emperor had brought over with him from Berlin, knocked loudly
+at the door and came into my bedroom, and said that he had a message
+from the Emperor. It was that he did mean what he had said the night
+before. I at once got up and caught a train for London. There I saw the
+Foreign Secretary, who, after taking time to think things over, gave me
+a memorandum he had drawn up. The substance of it was that the British
+Government would be very glad to discuss the Emperor's suggestion, but
+that it would be necessary, before making a settlement, to bring into
+the discussion France and Russia, whose interests also were involved. I
+was requested to sound the Emperor further.</p>
+
+<p>After telling King Edward of what was happening, I had another
+conversation in Windsor Castle with the Emperor, who said that he feared
+that the bringing in of Russia particularly, not to speak of France,
+would cause difficulty; but he asked me to come that night, after a
+performance that was to take place in the Castle theater had ended, to
+his apartments, to a meeting to which he would summon the Ministers he
+had brought with him. He took the memorandum which I <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span>had brought from
+London, a copy of which I had made for him in my own handwriting, so as
+to present it as the informal document it was intended to be. Just
+before dinner Baron von Schoen spoke to me, and told me that he had
+heard from the Emperor what had happened, and that the Emperor was wrong
+in thinking that the attempt to bring in Russia would lead to
+difficulty, because he, Baron von Schoen, when he was Ambassador to
+Russia, had already discussed the general question with its Government,
+and had virtually come to an understanding. At the meeting that night we
+could therefore go on to negotiate.</p>
+
+<p>I attended the Emperor in his state rooms at the Castle at one o'clock
+in the morning, and sat smoking with him and his Ministers for over two
+hours. His Foreign Minister and Count Metternich and the War Minister,
+von Einem, were present. I said that I felt myself an intruder, because
+it was very much like being present at a sitting of his Cabinet. He
+replied, "Be a member of my Cabinet for the evening." I said that I was
+quite agreeable.</p>
+
+<p>They then engaged in a very animated conversation, some of them
+challenging the proposal of the Emperor to accept the British
+suggestions, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>with an outspokenness which would have astonished the
+outside world, with its notions of Teutonic autocracy. Count Metternich
+did not like what I suggested, that there should be a conference in
+Berlin on the subject of the Bagdad Railway between England, France,
+Russia, and Germany.</p>
+
+<p>In the end, but not until after much keen argument, the idea was
+accepted, and the Emperor directed von Schoen to go next morning to
+London and make an official proposal to Sir Edward Grey, This was
+carried out, and the preliminary details were discussed between von
+Schoen and Sir Edward at the Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<p>Some weeks afterward difficulties were raised from Berlin. Germany said
+that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question
+of the terminal portion of the railway, but she did not desire to bring
+the other two Powers into that discussion, because the conference would
+probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other
+Powers.</p>
+
+<p>The matter thus came to an end. It was, I think, a great pity, because I
+have reason to believe that the French view was that, if the Bagdad
+Railway question could have been settled, one great obstacle in the way
+of reconciling German with French and English interests would have
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span>disappeared. I came to the conclusion afterward that it was probably
+owing to the views of Prince von B&uuml;low that the proposal had come to an
+untimely end. Whether he did not wish for an expanded entente; whether
+the feeling was strong in Germany that the Bagdad Railway had become a
+specially German concern and should not be shared; or what other reason
+he may have had, I do not know; but it was from Berlin, after the
+Emperor's return there at the end of November, 1907, that the
+negotiations were finally blocked.</p>
+
+<p>Altho these negotiations had no definite result, they assisted in
+promoting increasing frankness between the two Foreign Offices, and
+other things went with more smoothness. Sir Edward Grey kept France and
+Russia informed of all we did, and he was also very open with the
+Germans. Until well on in 1911 all went satisfactorily. In the early
+part of that year the Emperor came to London to visit the present King,
+who had by that time succeeded to the throne. I had ventured to propose
+to the King that during the Emperor's visit I should, as War Minister,
+give a luncheon to the generals who were on his staff. But when the
+Emperor heard of this he sent a message that he would like to come and
+lunch with me himself, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span>to meet people whom otherwise he might not
+see.</p>
+
+<p>I acted on my own discretion, and when he came to luncheon at my house
+in Queen Anne's Gate there was a somewhat widely selected party of about
+a dozen to meet him. For it included not only Lord Morley, Lord
+Kitchener, and Lord Curzon, whom he was sure to meet elsewhere, but Mr.
+Ramsay MacDonald, who was then leading the Labor Party, Admiral Sir
+Arthur Wilson, our great naval commander, Lord Moulton, Mr. Edmund
+Gosse, Mr. Sargent, Mr. Spender, the editor of the <i>Westminster
+Gazette</i>, and others representing various types of British opinion. The
+Emperor engaged in conversation with everyone, and all went with
+smoothness.</p>
+
+<p>He had a great reception in London. But enthusiasm about him was
+somewhat damped when, in July, 1911, not long after his return to
+Germany, he sent the afterwards famous warship <i>Panther</i> to Agadir. The
+French were naturally alarmed, and the situation which had become so
+promising was overcast. Our naval arrangements and our new military
+organization were ready, and our mobilization plans were fairly
+complete, as the German General Staff knew from their military attach&eacute;.
+But the point was, how to avoid an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span>outbreak, and to get rid of the
+feeling and friction to which the Agadir crisis was giving rise. Our
+growing good relations were temporarily clouded.</p>
+
+<p>The sending of the <i>Panther</i> to Agadir was not a prudent act. It
+imported either too much or too little. It is said to have been the plan
+of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, at that time the Foreign Secretary and
+generally a sensible statesman, and to have been done in spite of
+misgivings expressed by the Emperor about its danger. The circumstances
+of the moment were such that one can not but feel a certain sympathy
+with the German perturbation at the time. The march of the French Army
+to Fez had come on them suddenly, and it at least suggested a
+development of French claims going beyond what Germany had agreed to at
+the Algeciras Conference nearly six years previously. Those who wish to
+inform themselves about the commotion the expedition of the French
+stirred up in Germany, and of the efforts the Emperor and Bethmann
+Hollweg had to make to restrain it, will do well to read the latter's
+account of what happened there in the second chapter of his recent book.
+But to think that the sending of a German warship could make things
+better was to repeat the error of judgment which had characterized "the
+ally in shining armor" speech of the German <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span>Emperor to Austria when she
+formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina three years before. Instead of
+using diplomatic methods something that looked like a threat was allowed
+to appear, and the answer was Mr. Lloyd George's well-known declaration
+of July 21, 1911, in the City of London. The sending of the <i>Panther</i>,
+if intelligible, was certainly unfortunate.</p>
+
+<p>In the winter, after the actual crisis had been got over, there was
+evidence of continuing ill-feeling in Germany, and the suspicion in
+London did not diminish. In January, 1912, an informal message was given
+by the Emperor to Sir Ernest Cassel for transmission through one of my
+colleagues to the Foreign Office.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> I knew nothing of this at the time,
+but learned shortly afterward that it was to the effect that the Emperor
+was concerned at the state of feeling that had arisen in both countries,
+and thought that the most hopeful method of improving matters would be
+that the Cabinet of St. James's should exchange views directly with the
+Cabinet of Berlin. For this course there was a good deal to be said. The
+peace had indeed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span>been preserved, but, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg told
+me later on, not without effort. The attitude of Germany toward France
+had seemed ominous. The British Government had done all it could to
+avert a breach, but its sympathy was opposed to language used in
+Germany, the spirit of which seemed to us to have in it an aggressive
+element. We did not hesitate to say what we thought about this.</p>
+
+<p>Even after the Agadir incident was quite closed, the tension between
+Germany and England had not passed away. The military party in the
+former country began to talk of a "preventive" war pretty loudly. Even
+so moderate an organ in Berlin as the <i>Post</i> wrote of German opinion
+that "we all know that blood is assuredly about to be shed, and the
+longer we wait the more there will be. Few, however, have the courage to
+imitate Frederick the Great, and not one dares the deed."</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor therefore sent his message in the beginning of 1912, to the
+effect that feeling had become so much excited that it was not enough to
+rely on the ordinary diplomatic intercourse for softening it, and that
+he was anxious for an exchange of views between the Cabinets of Berlin
+and London, of a personal and direct kind. As <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>the result of this
+intimation, the British Cabinet decided to send one of its members to
+Berlin to hold "conversations," with a view to exploring and, if
+practicable, softening the causes of tension, and I was requested by the
+Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and my other colleagues to go to
+Berlin and undertake the task. Our Ambassador there came over to London
+specially to discuss arrangements, and he returned to Berlin to make
+them before I started.</p>
+
+<p>I arrived in the German capital on February 8, 1912, and spent some days
+in interviews with the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, the Naval
+Minister (Admiral von Tirpitz), and others of the Emperor's Ministry.
+The narrative of my conversations I have extracted from the records I
+made after each interview, for the preservation so far as possible of
+the actual expressions used during it.</p>
+
+<p>My first interview was one with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial
+Chancellor. We met in the British Embassy, and the conversation, which
+was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one. My impression, and I
+still retain it, was that Bethmann Hollweg was then as sincerely
+desirous of avoiding war as I was myself. I told him of certain dangers
+quite frankly, and he listened and replied with what seemed to me to be
+a full <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span>understanding of our position. I said that the increasing action
+of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the
+unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable
+consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of
+their own security. This was what was happening. I told him frankly that
+we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defense
+required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine. I
+went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any
+nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no
+secret military treaties. But, I added, if France were attacked and an
+attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be
+reckoned on by Germany. For one thing, it was obvious that our position
+as an island protected by the sea would be affected seriously if Germany
+had possession of the Channel ports on the northern shores of France.
+Again, we were under treaty obligation to come to the aid of Belgium in
+case of invasion, just as we were bound to defend Portugal and Japan in
+certain eventualities. In the third place, owing to our dependence on
+freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not
+sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span>extent as
+to imperil our naval protection. She might build more ships, but we
+should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down.</p>
+
+<p>The Chancellor said that he did not take my observations at all in bad
+part, but I must understand that his admirals and generals were pretty
+difficult.</p>
+
+<p>I replied that the difficulty would be felt at least as much with the
+admirals and generals in my own country.</p>
+
+<p>The Chancellor, in the course of our talk, proposed a formula of
+neutrality to which I will refer later on.</p>
+
+<p>I left the Chancellor with the sense that I had been talking with an
+honest man struggling somewhat with adversity. However, next day I was
+summoned to luncheon with the Emperor and Empress at the Schloss, and
+afterward had a long interview, which lasted nearly three hours, with
+the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz in the Emperor's cabinet room. The
+conversation was mainly in German, and was confined to naval questions.
+My reception by the Emperor was very agreeable; that by Tirpitz seemed
+to me a little strained. The question was, whether Germany must not
+continue her program for expanding her fleet. What that program really
+amounted to we <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span>had not known in London, except that it included an
+increase in battleships; but the Emperor handed me at this meeting a
+confidential copy of the draft of the proposed new Fleet Law, with an
+intimation that he had no objection to my communicating it privately to
+my colleagues. I was careful to abstain even from looking at it then,
+for I saw that, from its complexity and bulk, it would require careful
+study. So I simply put it in my pocket. But I repeated what I had said
+to the Chancellor, that the necessity for secure sea-communications
+rendered it vital for us to be able to protect ourselves on the seas.
+Germany was quite free to do as she pleased, but so were we, and we
+should probably lay down two keels for every one which she added to her
+program. The initiative in slackening competition was really not with
+us, but with Germany. Any agreement for settling our differences and
+introducing a new spirit into the relations of the two nations would be
+bones without flesh if Germany began by fresh shipbuilding, and so
+forced us to do twice as much. Indeed, the world would laugh at such an
+agreement, and our people would think that we had been fooled. I did not
+myself take that view, because I thought that the mere fact of an
+agreement was valuable. But the Emperor would see <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>that the public would
+attach very little importance to his action unless the agreement largely
+modified what it believed to be his shipbuilding program.</p>
+
+<p>We then discussed the proposal of the German Admiralty for the new
+program. Admiral von Tirpitz struggled for it. I insisted that
+fundamental modification was essential if better relations were to
+ensue. The tone was friendly, but I felt that I was up against the
+crucial part of my task. The admiral wanted us to enter into some
+understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the Two-Power
+standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any
+admission about it.</p>
+
+<p>I said it was not matter for admission. They were free and so were we,
+and we must for the sake of our safety remain so. The idea then occurred
+to us that, as we should never agree about it, we should avoid trying to
+define a standard proportion in any general agreement that we might come
+to, and, indeed, say nothing in it about shipbuilding; but that the
+Emperor should announce to the German public that the agreement on
+general questions, if we should have concluded one, had entirely
+modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally conceived, and
+that it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span>should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be
+spread over a longer period.</p>
+
+<p>The Emperor thought such an agreement would certainly make a great
+difference, and he informed me that his Chancellor would propose to me a
+formula as a basis for it. I said that I would see the Chancellor and
+discuss a possible formula, as well as territorial and other questions
+with him, and would then return to London and report to the King (from
+whom I had brought him a special and friendly message) and to my
+colleagues the good disposition I had found, and leave the difficulties
+about shipbuilding and indeed all other matters to their judgment. For I
+had come to Berlin, not to make an actual agreement, but only to explore
+the ground for one with the Emperor and his ministers. I had been struck
+with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and a not less friendly
+disposition would be found in London.</p>
+
+<p>The evening after my interview with the Emperor I dined with the
+Chancellor. I met there and talked with several prominent politicians,
+soldiers, and men of letters, including Kiderlen-Waechter (the then
+Foreign Secretary), the afterward famous General von Hindenburg,
+Zimmermann of the Foreign Office, and Professor Harnack.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span>Later on, after dinner, I went off to meet the French Ambassador, M.
+Jules Cambon, at the British Embassy, for I wished to keep him informed
+of our object, which was simply to improve the state of feeling between
+London and Berlin, but on the basis, and only on the basis, of complete
+loyalty to our Entente with France. It was, to use a phrase which he
+himself suggested in our conversation, a <i>d&eacute;tente</i> rather than an
+<i>entente</i> that I had in view, with possible developments to follow it
+which might assume a form which would be advantageous to France and
+Russia, as well as to ourselves and Germany. He showed me next day the
+report of our talk which he had prepared in order to telegraph it to
+Paris.</p>
+
+<p>I had other interviews the next day, but the only one which is important
+for the purposes of the present narrative is that at my final meeting
+with the German Chancellor on the Saturday (February 10). I pressed on
+him how important it was for public opinion and the peace of the world
+that Germany should not force us into a shipbuilding competition with
+her, a competition in which it was certain that we should have to spare
+no effort to preserve our margin of safety by greater increases.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img"><a name="imagep078" id="imagep078"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep078.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep078.jpg" width="45%" alt="M. Paul Cambon" /></a><br />
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">M. PAUL CAMBON<br />
+<span class="scfake">FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1898.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>He did not controvert my suggestion. I could <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span>see that personally he
+was of the same mind. But he said that the forces he had to contend with
+were almost insuperable. The question of a retardation of building under
+the proposed Fleet Law was not susceptible of being treated apart from
+that of the formula of which he and the Emperor had both spoken. He
+suggested that we might agree on the following formula:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>1. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their
+desire for peace and friendship.</p>
+
+<p>2. They will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in
+any combination, which is directed against the other. They
+expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination.</p>
+
+<p>3. If either of the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a
+war with one or more other powers, the other of the High
+Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the power so
+entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavor for
+the localization of the conflict.</p>
+
+<p>4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding article
+has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with
+existing agreements which the High Contracting Parties have
+already made. The making of new agreements which make it
+impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe
+neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the
+preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the
+provisions contained in Article 2.</p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span>Anxious as I was to agree with the Chancellor, who seemed as keen as I
+was to meet me with expressions which I might take back to England for
+friendly consideration, I was unable to hold out to him the least
+prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just
+proposed. Under Article 2, for example, we should find ourselves, were
+it accepted, precluded from coming to the assistance of France should
+Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as
+Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, a friendly occupation of which was so
+important for our island security. Difficulties might also arise which
+would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to
+Belgium, Portugal, and Japan. The most hopeful way out was to revise the
+draft fundamentally by confining its terms to an undertaking by each
+Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any
+combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or
+become party to any plan or naval or military combination, alone or in
+conjunction with any other Power, directed to such an end.</p>
+
+<p>He and I then sat down and redrafted what he had prepared, on this
+basis, but without his committing himself to the view that it would be
+sufficient. We also had a satisfactory conversation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span>about the Bagdad
+Railway and other things in Turkey connected with the Persian Gulf, and
+we discussed possibilities of the rearrangement of certain interests of
+both Powers in Africa. He said to me that he was not there to make any
+immediate bargain, but that we should look at the African question on
+both sides from a high point of view, and that if we had any
+difficulties we should tell him, and he would see whether he could get
+round them for us.</p>
+
+<p>I replied that I also was not there to make a bargain, but only to
+explore the ground, and that I much appreciated the tone of his
+conversation with me, and the good feeling he had shown. I should go
+back to London and without delay report to my colleagues all that had
+passed.</p>
+
+<p>I entertain no doubt that the German Chancellor was sincerely in earnest
+in what he said to me on these occasions, and in his desire to improve
+relations with us and keep the peace. So I think was the Emperor; but he
+was pulled at by his naval and military advisers, and by the powerful,
+if then small, chauvinist party in Germany. In 1912, when the
+conversations recorded took place, this party was less potent, I think a
+good deal less, than it appears to have become a year and a half later,
+when Germany had increased her army still <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span>further. But I formed the
+opinion even then that the power of the Emperor in Germany was a good
+deal misinterpreted and overestimated. My impression was that the really
+decisive influence was that of the Minister who had managed to secure
+the strongest following throughout Germany; and it was obvious to me
+that Admiral von Tirpitz had a powerful and growing following from many
+directions, due to the backing of the naval party.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, sensible as a large number of Germans were, there was a
+certain tendency to swelled-headedness in the nation. It had had an
+extraordinarily rapid development, based on principles of organization
+in every sphere of activity&mdash;principles derived from the lesson of the
+necessity of thinking before acting enjoined by the great teachers of
+the beginning of the nineteenth century. The period down to about 1832
+seems to me to correspond, in the intellectual prodigies it produced, to
+our Elizabethan period. It came no doubt to an end in its old and
+distinctive aspect. But its spirit assumed, later on, a new form, that
+of organization for material ends based on careful reflection and
+calculation. In industry, in commerce, in the army, and in the navy, the
+work of mind was everywhere apparent. "<i>Aus einem <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span>Lernvolk wollen wir
+ein Thatvolk werden</i>" was the new watchword.</p>
+
+<p>No doubt there was much that was defective. When it came to actual war
+in 1914, it turned out that Germany had not adequately thought out her
+military problems. If she had done so, she would have used her fleet at
+the very outset, and particularly her destroyers and submarines, to try
+to hinder the transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France,
+and, having secured the absence of this force, she would have sought to
+seize the northern ports of France. Small as the Expeditionary Force
+was, it was enough, when added to the French armies, to make them so
+formidable as to render the success of von Kluck uncertain if the troops
+could be concentrated to resist him swiftly enough. Again, Germany never
+really grasped the implications of our command of the sea. Had she done
+so, I do not think she would have adventured war. She may have counted
+on England not coming in, owing to entanglements in Irish difficulties.
+If so, this was just another instance of her bad judgment about the
+internal affairs of other nations.</p>
+
+<p>In fine, Germany had not adequately thought out or prepared for the
+perils which she undertook when she assumed the risks of the war of
+1914. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span>No doubt she knew more about the shortcomings of the Russian army
+than did the French or the British. On these, pretty exact knowledge of
+the Russian shortages enabled her to reckon. There we miscalculated more
+than she did. But she was not strong enough to make sure work of a brief
+but conclusive campaign in the West, which was all she could afford
+while Russia was organizing. Then, later on, she ought to have seen
+that, if the submarine campaign which she undertook should bring the
+United States into the war, her ultimate fate would be sealed by
+blockade. In the end she no doubt fought magnificently. But she made
+these mistakes, which were mainly due to that swelled-headedness which
+deflected her reasoning and prevented her from calculating consequences
+aright.</p>
+
+<p>There was a good deal of this apparent even in 1912. It had led to the
+Agadir business in the previous summer, and the absence of wise
+prevision was still apparent. I believed that this phase of militarism
+would pass when Imperial Germany became a more mature nation. Indeed, it
+was passing under the growing influence of Social Democracy, which was
+greatly increased by the elections which took place while I was in
+Berlin <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span>in 1912.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> But still there was the possibility of an explosion;
+and when I returned to London, altho I was full of hope that relations
+between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my
+colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which
+I was uneasy.</p>
+
+<p>The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be
+insisted on.</p>
+
+<p>The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor of
+the Empire in place of Bethmann Hollweg. This was being talked of as
+possible when I was in Berlin.</p>
+
+<p>The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German
+policy. Foreign policy especially was under divided control. Von
+Tschirsky observed to me in 1906 that what he had been saying about a
+question we were discussing represented his view as Foreign Minister of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span>Prussia, but that next door was the Chancellor, who might express quite
+a different view to me if I asked him; and that if, later on, I went to
+the end of the Wilhelmstrasse and turned down Unter den Linden I would
+come to the Schloss, where I might derive from the Emperor's lips an
+impression quite different from that given by either himself or the
+Chancellor. This made me feel that, desirous as Bethmann Hollweg had
+shown himself to establish and preserve good relations, we could not
+count on his influence being maintained or prevailing. As an eminent
+foreign diplomatist observed, "In this highly organized nation, when you
+have ascended to the very top story you find not only confusion but
+chaos."</p>
+
+<p>However, after I had reported fully on all the details and the Foreign
+Office had received my written report, matters were taken in hand by Sir
+Edward Grey, and by him I was kept informed. Presently it became
+apparent that there were those in Berlin who were interfering with the
+Chancellor in his efforts for good relations. A dispatch came which was
+inconsistent with the line he had pursued with me, and it became evident
+that the German Government was likely to insist on proceeding with the
+new Fleet Law. When we looked closely into the copy of the draft which
+the Emperor had given <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span>to me, we found very large increases
+contemplated, of which we had no notion earlier, not only in the
+battleships, about which we did know before, but in small craft and
+submarines and personnel. As these increases were to proceed further,
+discussion about the terms of a formula became rather futile, and we had
+only one course left open to us&mdash;to respond by quietly increasing our
+navy and concentrating its strength in northern seas. This was done with
+great energy by Mr. Churchill, the result being that, as the outcome of
+the successive administrations of the fleet by Mr. McKenna and himself,
+the estimates were raised by over twenty millions sterling to fifty-one
+millions.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img" style="width: 60%;"><a name="imagep087" id="imagep087"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep087.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep087.jpg" width="72%" alt="Viscount Grey Of Fallodon" /></a><br />
+<p style="font-size: 80%; margin-top: .2em; margin-bottom: .1em; padding-left: 5em;"><i>International</i></p>
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON<br />
+<span class="scfake">SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM 1905 TO 1916.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the summer of 1912 I became Lord Chancellor, and the engrossing
+duties, judicial as well as administrative, of that office cut me off
+from any direct participation in the carrying on of our efforts for
+better relations with Germany. But these relations continued to be
+extended in the various ways practicable and left open to Sir Edward
+Grey and the German Chancellor. The discussions which had been begun
+when I was in Berlin, about Africa and the Bagdad Railway, were
+continued between them through the Ambassadors; and just before the war
+the draft of an extensive treaty had been agreed on.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span>Then, after an interval of two years, came a time of extreme anxiety. No
+one had better opportunities than I of watching Sir Edward's
+concentration of effort to avoid the calamity which threatened. For he
+was living with me in my house in Queen Anne's Gate through the whole of
+these weeks, and he was devoting himself, with passionate earnestness of
+purpose, to inducing the German Government to use its influence with
+Austria for a peaceful settlement. But it presently became evident that
+the Emperor and his Ministers had made up their minds that they were
+going to make use of an opportunity that appeared to have come. As I
+have already said, I think their calculations were framed on a wholly
+erroneous basis. It is clear that their military advisers had failed to
+take account, in their estimates of probabilities, of the tremendous
+moral forces that might be brought into action against them. The
+ultimate result we all know. May the lesson taught to the world by the
+determined entry of the United States into the conflict between right
+and wrong never be forgotten by the world!</p>
+
+<p>Why Germany acted as she did then is a matter that still requires
+careful investigation. My own feeling is that she has demonstrated the
+extreme risk of confiding great political decisions to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span>military
+advisers. It is not their business to have the last word in deciding
+between peace and war. The problem is too far-reaching for their
+training. Bismarck knew this well, and often said it, as students of his
+life and reflections are aware. Had he been at the helm I do not believe
+that he would have allowed his country to drift into a disastrous
+course. He was far from perfect in his ethical standards, but he had
+something of that quality which Mommsen, in his history, attributes to
+Julius C&aelig;sar. Him the historian describes as one of those "mighty ones
+who has preserved to the end of his career the statesman's tact of
+discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and has not
+broken down in the task which for greatly gifted natures is the most
+difficult of all&mdash;the task of recognizing, when on the pinnacle of
+success, its natural limits. What was possible he performed, and never
+left the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible better;
+never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives evils that were
+incurable. But where he recognized that fate had spoken, he always
+obeyed. Alexander on the Hypanis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back
+because they were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for
+bestowing even on its favorites merely limited successes. C&aelig;sar turned
+back voluntarily on the Thames and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span>on the Rhine, and thought of
+carrying into effect even at the Danube and the Euphrates, not unbounded
+plans of world-conquest, but merely well-considered frontier
+regulations."</p>
+
+<p>If only Germany, whose great historian thus explained these things, had
+remembered them, how different might have been her position to-day. But
+it may be that she had carried her policy too far to be left free. With
+her certainly rests the main responsibility for what has happened; for
+apart from her, Austria would not have acted as she did, nor would
+Turkey, nor Bulgaria. The fascinating glitter of her armies, and the
+assurances given by her General Staff, were too much for the minor
+nations whom she had induced to accept her guidance, and too much I
+think also for her own people. No doubt the ignorance of these about the
+ways of their own Government counted for a great deal. There has never
+been such a justification of the principle of democratic control as this
+war affords. But a nation must be held responsible for the action of its
+own rulers, however much it has simply submitted itself to them. I have
+the impression that even to-day in its misery the German public does not
+fully understand, and still believes that Germany was the victim of a
+plot to entrap and encircle her, and that with this in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span>view Russia
+mobilized on a great scale for war. It is difficult for us to understand
+how real the Slav peril appeared to Germany and to Austria, and there is
+little doubt that to the latter Serbia was an unquiet neighbor. But
+these considerations must be taken in their context&mdash;a context of which
+the German public ought to have made itself fully aware. The leaders of
+its opinion were bent on domination to the Near East. No wonder that the
+Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula became progressively alarmed, and looked
+to Russia more and more for protection. For it had become plain that
+moral considerations would not be allowed by the authorities at Berlin
+to weigh in the balance against material advantages to be gained by
+power of domination.</p>
+
+<p>If there is room for reproach to us Anglo-Saxons, it is reproach of a
+very different kind. Germany was quite intelligent enough to listen to
+reason, and, besides, she had the prospect of becoming the dominating
+industrial and commercial power in the world by dint merely of peaceful
+penetration. It is possible that, if her relations with her Western
+neighbors, including Great Britain, had been more intimate than they
+actually were, she might have been saved from a great blunder, and might
+have come to understand <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>that the English-speaking races were not really
+so inferior to herself as she took them to be. Her <i>hubris</i> was in part,
+at all events, the result of ignorance. Speaking for my own countrymen,
+I think that neither did we know enough about the Germans nor did the
+Germans know enough about us. They were ignorant of the innate capacity
+for fighting, in industrial and military conflicts alike, which our
+history shows we have always hitherto brought to light in great
+emergencies. And they little realized how tremendously moral issues
+could stir and unite democracies. We, on the other hand, knew little of
+their tradition, their literature, or their philosophy. Our statesmen
+did not read their newspapers, and rarely visited their country. We were
+deficient in that quality which President Murray Butler has spoken of as
+the "international mind."</p>
+
+<p>I do not know whether, had it been otherwise, we could have brought
+about the better state of things in Europe for which I tried to express
+the hope, altho not without misgiving, in the address on "Higher
+Nationality" which I was privileged to deliver before distinguished
+representatives of the United States and of Canada at Montreal on
+September 1, 1913. I spoke then of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>the possibility of a larger entente,
+an entente which might become a real concert of the Great Powers of the
+world; and I quoted the great prayer with which Grotius concludes his
+book on "War and Peace." There was at least the chance, if we strove
+hard enough, that we might find a response from the best in other
+countries, and in the end attain to a new and real <i>Sittlichkeit</i> which
+should provide a firmer basis for International Law and reverence for
+international obligations. But for the realization of this dream a
+sustained and strenuous search after fuller mutual knowledge was
+required.</p>
+
+<p>After this address had been published, I received a letter from the
+German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, in which&mdash;writing in German and so
+late as September 26, 1913&mdash;he expressed himself to me as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>"If I had the happiness of finding myself in one mind with you in
+these thoughts in February, 1912, it has been to me a still
+greater satisfaction that our two countries have since then had a
+number of opportunities of working together in this spirit. Like
+you, I hold the optimistic view that the great nations will be
+able to progress further on this path, and will do so. Anyhow, I
+shall, in so far as it is within my power, devote my energies to
+this cause, and I am happy in the certainty of finding in you an
+openly declared fellow-worker."</p></div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span>But events swept him from a course which, so far as I know, he at least
+individually desired to follow. The great increase of armaments took
+place that year in Germany, and, when events were too strong for him, he
+elected, not to resign, but to throw in his lot with his country. His
+position was one of great difficulty. He took a course for which many
+would applaud him. But inherently a wrong course, surely. What he said
+when Belgium was invaded in breach of solemn treaty shows that he felt
+this. He let himself be swept into devoting his energies to bolstering
+up his country's cause, instead of resigning. His career only proves
+that, given the political conditions that obtained in Germany shortly
+before the war, it was almost impossible for a German statesman to keep
+his feet or to avoid being untrue to himself. And yet there were many
+others there in the same frame of mind, and one asks oneself whether,
+had they had more material to work with, they might not have been able
+to present a more attractive alternative than the notion of military
+domination which in the end took possession of all, from the Emperor
+downward.</p>
+
+<p>It is, however, useless to speculate at present on these things. We know
+too little of the facts. The historians of another generation will know
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span>more. But of one thing I feel sure. The Germans think that Great Britain
+declared war of pre-conceived purpose and her own initiative. There is a
+sense in which she did. The opinion of Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and
+of those of us who were by their side, was unhesitating. She could not
+have taken any other course than she did without the prospect of ruin
+and failure to enter on the only path of honor. For honor and safety
+alike necessitated that she should take, without the delay which would
+have been fatal, the step she did take without delay and unswervingly.
+The responsibility for her entry comes back wholly to Germany herself,
+who would not have brought it about had she not plunged into war. And
+to-day Germany lies prostrate.</p>
+
+<p>But she is not dead. I do not think that for generations to come she
+will dream of building again on military foundations. Her people have
+had a lesson in the overwhelming forces which are inevitably called into
+action where there is brutal indifference to the moral rights of others.
+What remains to her is that which she has inherited and preserved of the
+results of the great advancement in knowledge which began under the
+inspiration of Lessing and Kant, and culminated in the teaching of
+Goethe and Schiller and of the thinkers who <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span>were their contemporaries.
+That movement only came to a partial end in 1832. No doubt its character
+changed after that. The idealists in poetry, music, and philosophy gave
+place to great men of science, to figures such as those of Ludwig and
+Liebig, of Gauss, Riemann, and Helmholtz. There came also historians
+like Ranke and Mommsen, musicians like Wagner, philosophers like
+Schopenhauer and Lotze, a statesman like Bismarck. To-day there are few
+men of great stature in Germany; there are, indeed, few men of genius
+anywhere in the world. But Germany still has a high general level in
+science, and of recent years she has produced great captains of
+industry. The gift for organization founded on principle, and for
+applying science to practical uses, was there before the war, and it is
+very unsafe to assume that it is not there in a latent form to-day. If
+it is, Germany will be heard of again with a field of activity that
+probably will not include devotion to military affairs in the old way.
+Against her competition of this other kind, formidable as soon as she
+has recovered from her misery, we must prepare ourselves in the only way
+that can succeed in the long run. We, too, must study and organize on
+the basis of widely diffused exact knowledge, and not less of high
+ethical standards. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span>I think, if I read the signs of the times aright,
+that people are coming to realize this, both in the United States and
+throughout the British Empire.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img" style="width: 65%;"><a name="imagep101" id="imagep101"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep101.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep101.jpg" width="66%" alt="Chancellor Theobald Von Bethmann-Hollweg" /></a><br />
+<p style="font-size: 80%; margin-top: .2em; margin-bottom: .2em; padding-left: 5em;"><i>Press Illustrating Service</i></p>
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">CHANCELLOR THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG<br />
+<span class="scfake">CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR
+FOREIGN AFFAIRS <br />FROM 1909 TO 1917.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br style="width: 15%;" />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Of course I neither tried to obtain nor did obtain from the
+authorities in Germany any information that was not available to the
+general public there. I went simply to see the system of administration
+and how it was worked. Not even Count Reventlow, in his highly critical
+accounts of my visits in the book "Deutschlands Auswartige Politik,"
+imagines that I had access to information which I was not free to use.
+The German Government had ascertained for itself that a new organization
+of the British Army was on foot, but it neither told its own secrets nor
+asked for ours.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> This message was the response to a memorandum which Sir
+Ernest Cassel had brought to Berlin from some influential members of the
+Cabinet in London, and it contained suggestions for the improvement of
+the relations between the two countries. An account of Sir Ernest
+Cassel's visit, and of what passed when he delivered his message from
+London, is given in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's recent book.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> An anecdote illustrating the change that was coming over
+political opinion in Germany in 1912, may be worth relating. I was
+present at a supper party, given by one of the professors in a
+well-known German University town, in May of that year. I asked him
+whether the old Conservative member who had for long represented the
+town had been again returned. "Returned! no," he replied. "It was
+impossible to return a man of moderate opinions. We only escaped a
+Social Democrat by a few votes. We managed to get enough of the popular
+vote to return a fairly sensible railway servant for this University
+town." I inquired what party he belonged to. "No old party," was his
+answer, and it will interest you to know that his program was an English
+one: "<i>Lloyd Georgianismus</i>." I then inquired what was his text book.
+"<i>Die Reden von Lloyd George</i>," was the answer. Did it contain anything
+about a place called Limehouse? "<i>Limhaus, ach ja; das war eine
+vortreffliche Rede!</i>"</p></div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span><br />
+<h2>THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER III<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>We now have before us the considered opinions of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg, the late Imperial Chancellor, and of Admiral von Tirpitz, the
+Minister who did much to develop the naval power of Germany, about the
+origin and significance of the war. Both have written books on the
+subject.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> It is to be desired that in the case of each of these
+authors his book should be studied in English-speaking countries as well
+as on the Continent. For it is important that the Anglo-Saxon world
+should understand the divergences in policy which the two books
+disclose, not less than the points of agreement. That world has suffered
+in the past from failure to understand Germany, while the German world
+has displayed a total inability to interpret aright the Anglo-Saxon
+disposition. When I speak of two worlds I mean the governing classes of
+these worlds. The nations themselves, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span>taken as aggregates of individual
+citizens, by a probable majority in each case, desired the continuance
+of peace and of the prosperity of which it is the condition. So, of
+course, did the rulers, those in Germany as much as those in London. But
+the German rulers had a theory of how to secure peace which was the
+outcome of the abstract mind that was their inheritance. It was the
+theory that was wrong, a theory of which Anglo-Saxondom knew little, and
+which it would have rejected decisively had it realized its tendency.
+This theory is described in Admiral Tirpitz's book, with an account of
+the efforts made to indoctrinate with it the people of Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The two volumes are profoundly interesting. For in that of Admiral
+Tirpitz we have the doctrine set forth that in the end led to the war.
+In that written by the late Imperial Chancellor we have quite another
+principle laid down as the one which he was endeavoring to apply in his
+direction of German policy. But in this endeavor he failed. The school
+of Tirpitz in the main prevailed, and this was the more easy, inasmuch
+as it was simply continuing the policy which had been advocated by a
+noisy section of Germans, nearly without a break, since the days of
+Frederick the Great. It was a policy which had in reality outlived the
+days <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span>in which it was practicable. The world had become too crowded and
+too small to permit of any one Power asserting its right to jostle its
+way where it pleased without regard to its neighbors. An affair of
+police on a colossal scale had begun to look as if it would ensue, and
+ensue it ultimately did. No doubt had we all been cleverer we might have
+been able to explain to Germany whither she was heading. But we did not
+understand her, least of all our chauvinists, nor did she understand us.
+In the main what she really wanted was to develop herself by the
+application of her talent for commerce and industry. To her success in
+attaining this end we had no objection, provided her procedure was
+decent and in order. But she chose a means to her end which was becoming
+progressively more and more inadmissible. Tirpitz describes the
+illegitimate <i>means</i>. Bethmann Hollweg describes the legitimate <i>end</i>.
+Tirpitz thinks Bethmann Hollweg was a weakling because he would not back
+up the means. Bethmann Hollweg, firm in his faith that the end was
+legitimate and thinking of this alone, dwells on it with little
+reference to what his colleague was about. His accusation against the
+Entente Powers is that, at the instigation of Russia primarily, and in a
+less degree of France, they set themselves to ring round and crush
+Germany. It <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span>was really, he believes, a war of aggression, and England
+was ultimately responsible for it. Without her co-operation it was
+impossible, and altho she did not enter into any formal military
+alliance for the purpose, she began in the time of Edward VII. a policy
+of close friendship which enabled Russia and France in the end to reckon
+on her as morally bound to help. It was easy for these Powers to
+represent as a defensive war what was really a war of aggression. Such
+was truly its nature, and England decided to join in it, actually
+because she was jealous of Germany's growing success in the world, and
+was desirous of setting a check to it.</p>
+
+<p>Such is Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's explanation. He is, I have no doubt,
+sincerely convinced of its truth, and he explains the grounds of his
+conviction in detail and with much ability. But there is a fallacy in
+his reasoning which becomes transparent when one reads along with his
+book that of his colleague. If we put out of sight the deep feeling
+awakened here by the brutality of the invasion of Belgium, to which
+violation of Treaty obligations the former declares that Germany was
+compelled by military considerations that were unanswerable, and look at
+the history of Anglo-German relations before the war, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span>inference is
+irresistible that it was not the object of developing in a peaceful
+atmosphere German commerce and industry that England objected to. Such a
+development might have been formidable for us. It would have compelled
+great efforts on our part to improve the education of our people and our
+organization for peaceful enterprises. But it would have been
+legitimate. The objection of this country was directed against quite
+other things that were being done by Germany in order to attain her
+purpose. The essence of these was the attempt to get her way by creating
+armaments which should in effect place her neighbors at her mercy. We
+who live on islands, and are dependent for our food and our raw
+materials on our being able to protect their transport and with it
+ourselves from invasion, could not permit the sea-protection which had
+been recognized from generation to generation as a necessity for our
+preservation to be threatened by the creation of naval forces intended
+to make it precarious. As the navies of Europe were growing, not only
+those of France and Russia, but the navy of Italy also, we had to look,
+in the interests of our security, to friendly relations with these
+countries. We aimed at establishing such friendly relations, and our
+method was to get rid of all causes of friction, in Newfoundland, in
+Egypt, in the East, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span>and in the Mediterranean. That was the policy which
+was implied in our Ententes. We were not willing to enter into military
+alliances and we did not do so. Our policy was purely a business policy,
+and everything else was consequential on this, including the growing
+sense of common interests and of the desire for the maintenance of
+peace. I do not think that Admiral Tirpitz wanted actual war. But he did
+want power to enforce submission to the expansion of Germany at her
+will. And this power was his means to the end which was what less
+Prussianized minds in Germany contemplated as attainable in less
+objectionable ways. Such a means he could not fashion in the form of
+strength in sea power which would have placed us at his mercy, without
+arousing our instinct for self-preservation.</p>
+
+<p>All this the late Imperial Chancellor in substance ignores. The fact is
+that he can only defend his theory on the hypothesis that no such policy
+as that of his colleague was on foot, and that the truth was that
+France, Russia, and England had come to a decision to take the
+initiative in a policy embracing, for France revenge for the loss of
+Alsace and Lorraine, for Russia the acquisition of Constantinople with
+domination over the Balkans and the Bosporus, and for England the
+destruction of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span>German commerce. If this hypothesis be not true, and the
+real explanation of the alarm of the Entente Powers was the policy
+exemplified by Tirpitz and the other exponents of German militarism,
+then the whole of the reasoning in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's book
+falls to the ground.</p>
+
+<p>It may be asked how it was possible that two members of the Imperial
+Government should have been pursuing in the same period two policies
+wholly inconsistent with each other. The answer is not difficult. The
+direction of affairs in Germany was admirably organized for some
+purposes and very badly for others. Her autocratic system lent itself to
+efficiency in the preparation of armaments. But it was not really a
+system under which her Emperor was left free to guide policy. There is
+no greater mistake made than that under which it is popularly supposed
+that the Emperor was absolute master. The development in recent years of
+the influence of the General and Admiral Staffs, which was a necessity
+from the point of view of modern organization for war but required
+keeping in careful check from other points of view, had produced forces
+which the Emperor was powerless to hold in. Even in Bismarck's time
+readers of his "Reflections and Recollections" will remember how he felt
+the embarrassment of his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>foreign policy caused by the growing and
+deflecting influences of Moltke, and even of his friend Roon. And there
+was no Bismarck to hold the Staffs in check for reasons of expediency in
+the years before 1914. The military mind when it is highly developed is
+dangerous. It sees only its own bit, but this it sees with great
+clearness, and in consequence becomes very powerful. There is only one
+way of holding it to its legitimate function, and that is by the
+supremacy of public opinion in a Parliament as its final exponent.
+Parliaments may be clumsy and at times ignorant. But they do express, it
+may be vaguely, but yet sufficiently, the sense of the people at large.
+Now, notwithstanding all that had been done to educate them up to it, I
+do not think that the people at large in Germany had ever endorsed the
+implications of the policy of German militarism. The Social Democrats
+certainly had not. They ought, I think, to be judged even now by what
+they said before the war, and not by what some, tho not all of them,
+said when it was pressed on them in 1914 that Germany had to fight for
+her life. Had she possessed a true Parliamentary system for a generation
+before the war there would probably have been no war. What has happened
+to her is a vindication of Democracy as the best political <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span>system
+despite certain drawbacks which attach to it.</p>
+
+<p>The great defect of the German Imperial system was that, unless the
+Emperor was strong enough to impose his will on his advisers, he was
+largely at their mercy. Had they been chosen by the people, the people
+and not the Emperor would have borne the responsibility, if the views of
+these advisers diverged from their own. But they were chosen by the
+Emperor, and chosen in varying moods as to policy. The result was that,
+excellent as were the departments at their special work in most cases,
+on general policy there was no guarantee for unity of mind. The Emperor
+lived amid a sea of conflicting opinions. The Chancellor might have one
+idea, the Foreign Secretary, a Prussian and not Imperial Minister, a
+different one, the Chief of the General Staff a third, the War Minister
+a fourth, and the Head of the Admiralty a fifth. Thus the Kaiser was
+constantly being pulled at from different sides, and whichever Minister
+had the most powerful combination at his back generally got the best of
+the argument. Were the Kaiser in an impulsive mood he might side now
+with one and again with another, and the result would necessarily be
+confusion. Moreover, he had constantly to fix one eye on public opinion
+in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span>Germany, and another on public opinion abroad. It is therefore not
+surprising that Germany seemed to foreigners a strange and
+unintelligible country, and that sudden manifestations of policy were
+made which shocked us here, accustomed as we were to something quite
+different. Neither our pacifists nor our chauvinists really succeeded in
+diagnosing Germany. On the other hand, we ourselves were a standing
+puzzle to the Germans. They could not understand how Government could be
+conducted in the absence of abstract principles exactly laid down. And
+because our democratic system was one of choosing our rulers and
+trusting them with a large discretion within limits, the Germans always
+suspected that this system, with which they were unfamiliar, covered a
+device for concealing hidden policies. I wrote in some detail about this
+in an address delivered at Oxford in the autumn of 1911, and afterward
+published in a little volume called "Universities and National Life."</p>
+
+<p>The war has not altered the views to which I had then come.</p>
+
+<p>But it was not really so on either side, and it is deplorable that the
+two nations knew so little of each other. For I believe that the German
+system, wholly unadapted as it was to the modern <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span>spirit, was bound to
+become modified before long, and had we shown more skill and more zeal
+in explaining ourselves, we should probably have accelerated the process
+of German acceptance of the true tendencies of the age. But our
+statesmen took little trouble to get first-hand knowledge of the genesis
+of what appeared to them to be the German double dose of original sin,
+and, on the other hand, our chauvinists were studied in Germany out of
+all proportion to their small number and influence. Thus the Berlin
+politicians got the wrong notions to which their tradition predisposed
+them. I believe that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was himself really more
+enlightened, but he could not control the admirals and generals, or the
+economists or historians or professors whom the admirals and generals
+were always trying to enlist on the side of the doctrine of <i>Weltmacht
+oder Niedergang</i>. Under these circumstances all that seemed possible was
+to try to influence German opinion, and at the same time to insure
+against the real risk of failure to accomplish this before it was too
+late.</p>
+
+<p>In order to make this view of German conditions intelligible, it will be
+convenient in the first place to give some account of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg's opinions as expressed in his book, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span>afterward to contrast
+them with the views of his powerful colleague, Admiral von Tirpitz.</p>
+
+<p>The ex-Imperial Chancellor commences his "<i>Betrachtungen zum
+Weltkriege</i>" by going back to the day when he assumed office. When
+Prince B&uuml;low handed over the reins to him in July, 1909, the Prince gave
+him his views on what, in the attitude of England, had been causing the
+former much concern. We are not told what he actually said, but we can
+guess it, for Bethmann Hollweg goes on to indicate the origin of the
+cause of anxiety. It was King Edward's "encirclement" policy. It might
+well be that the late King had no desire for war. But the result of the
+policy for which he and the Ministers behind him stood was, so he
+believes, that, in all differences of opinion as to external policy,
+Germany found England, France, and Russia solidly against her, and was
+conscious of a continuous attempt to lead Italy away from the Triple
+Alliance. "People may call this '<i>Einkreisung</i>,' or policy of the
+balance of power, or whatever they like. The object and the achievement
+resulted in the founding of a group of nations of great power, whose
+purpose was to hinder Germany at least by diplomatic means in the free
+development of her growing strength." Sir Edward Grey, when <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span>taking over
+the conduct of foreign policy in 1905, had declared that he would
+continue the policy of the late Government. He hoped for improved
+relations with Russia, and even for more satisfactory relations with
+Germany, provided always that in the latter case these did not interfere
+with the friendship between England and France. This, says Bethmann
+Hollweg, had been the theme of English policy since the end of the days
+of "splendid isolation," and it remained so until the war broke out. He
+says nothing of the rapid advances which were proceeding from stage to
+stage in the organization of German battle-fleets to be added to her
+formidable army, or of the risk these advances made for England if she
+were to find herself without any friends outside.</p>
+
+<p>As regards Russia, Isvolsky, who had never forgiven the Austrian Foreign
+Minister, Count d'Aerenthal, for his diplomatic victory in getting the
+annexation to Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, was very
+hostile to Austria, and consequently to her Ally. In the case of France,
+again, it was indeed true that M. Jules Cambon had repeatedly emphasized
+to the ex-Chancellor the desire for more intimate relations between
+France and Germany. But the French had never forgiven the driving of
+Delcass&eacute; out of office, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span>result of the Algeciras conference had
+not healed the wound. Besides this, there was the undying question of
+Alsace-Lorraine.</p>
+
+<p>The outcome of the precarious situation, says the ex-Chancellor, was
+that England, following her traditional policy of balancing the Powers
+of Europe, was taking a firm position on the side of France and Russia,
+while Germany was increasing her naval power and giving a very definite
+direction to her policy in the East. The commercial rivalry between
+England and Germany was being rendered acute politically by the growth
+of the German fleet. In this state of things Bethmann Hollweg formed the
+opinion that there was only one thing that could be done, to aim at
+withdrawing from the Dual Alliance the backing of England for its
+anti-German policy. The Emperor entirely agreed with him, and it was
+resolved to attempt to attain this purpose by coming to an understanding
+with England.</p>
+
+<p>Reading between the lines, it is pretty obvious that the ex-Chancellor
+was at times embarrassed by the public utterances of his imperial
+Master. Him he defends throughout the book with conspicuous loyalty, and
+is emphatic about his desire to keep the peace, a desire founded in
+religious conviction. But the Emperor's way was to see <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span>only one thing
+at the moment. I translate<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> a passage from his Chancellor's book:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>"If from time to time he indulged in passionate expressions about
+the strong position in the world of Germany, his desire was that
+the nation, whose development beyond all expectation was filling
+him with conscious pride, should be spurred on to a fresh
+heightening of its energies. He sought to give it a continuous
+impulse with the energy of his enthusiastic nature. He wished his
+people to be strong and powerful in capacity to arm for their
+defense, but the German mission, which was for him a consuming
+faith, was yet to be a mission of work and of peace. That this
+work and this peace should not be destroyed by the dangers that
+surrounded us, was his increasing anxiety. Again and again has the
+Kaiser told me that his journey to Tangier in 1904, as to which he
+was quite unaware that it would lead to dangerous complications,
+was undertaken much against his own will, and only under pressure
+from his political advisers. Moreover, his personal influence was
+strongly exerted for a settlement of the Morocco crisis of 1905.
+And the same sense of the need of peace gave rise to his attitude
+during the Boer War and also during the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span>Russo-Japanese War. To a
+ruler who really wanted war, opportunities for military
+intervention in the affairs of the world were truly not lacking.</p>
+
+<p>"Critics in Germany had in that period frequently pressed the
+point that a too frequent insistence in public on our readiness
+for peace was less likely to further it than, on the contrary, to
+strengthen the Entente in its policy of altering the <i>status quo</i>.
+In a period of Imperialism in which the talk about material power
+was loud, and in which the preservation of the peace of the world
+was considered only accidentally, like the ten years before the
+war, considerations such as these are undoubtedly full of
+significance, and perhaps the same sort of thing explains a good
+deal of strong language on the part of the Kaiser about Germany's
+capacity in case of war. It is certain that such utterances did
+not lessen the feeling of nervousness that filled the
+international atmosphere. But the true ground of such nervousness
+was the policy of the balance of power, which had split Europe
+into two armed camps full of distrust of each other. The
+Ambassadors of the Great Powers knew the Kaiser intimately enough
+to realize what his intentions, in spite of everything, were, and
+it required an untruthfulness only explicable by the psychological
+effect of war to permit the suggestion <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span>of a hateful and distorted
+picture of him as a tyrant seeking for the domination of the world
+and for war and bloodshed."</p></div>
+
+<p>I have translated this passage from the book because I think it is
+instructive in its disclosure of uneasy self-consciousness on the part
+of the author. Obviously, the Emperor made his quiet-loving Minister at
+times uncomfortable. I do not doubt that the Emperor really desired
+peace, just as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg tells us. Yet he not only
+indulged himself in warlike talk, but was surrounded by a group of
+military and naval advisers who were preaching openly that war was
+inevitable, and were instructing many of the prominent intellectual
+leaders in their doctrine. The Emperor may well have been in a difficult
+situation. But he was playing with fire when he made such speeches to
+the world as he frequently did. I believe him to have most genuinely
+desired to keep the peace. But I doubt whether he was willing to pay the
+price for entry on the only path along which it could have been made
+secure. He was a man of many sides, with a genius for speaking winged
+words as part of his equipment. He was a dangerous leader for Germany
+under conditions which had already caused even a Bismarck concern. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span>The
+result was that the world took him to be the ally, not of Bethmann
+Hollweg, but of Tirpitz, and what that meant we shall see when we come
+to the latter's book. I can not say that I think the judgment of the
+world was other than, to put the matter at its lowest, the natural and
+probable result of his language, and I find nothing in the
+ex-Chancellor's volume to lead me to a different conclusion.</p>
+
+<p>The argument of that volume is that England should never have entered
+the Entente, for that by doing so she strengthened France and Russia so
+as to enable them to indulge the will for war. He assumes that there was
+this will as beyond doubt. But suppose England had not entered the
+Entente, what then? On Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's own showing France
+and Russia would have remained too weak to entertain the hope of success
+in a conflict with the Triple Alliance. Germany could, under these
+circumstances, have herself compelled these Powers to an entente or even
+an alliance. England would have been in such a case left in isolation in
+days in which isolation had ceased to be "splendid." For great as was
+her navy, it could not have been relied upon as sufficient to protect
+her adequately against the combined navies of Germany, France, Russia,
+and Austria, with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span>that of Italy possibly added. It was the apprehension
+occasioned by Germany's warlike policy that made it an unavoidable act
+of prudence to enter into the Entente. It was our only means of making
+our sea power secure and able to protect us against threats of invasions
+by great Continental armies. The Emperor and his Chancellor should
+therefore have thought of some other way of securing the peace than that
+of trying to detach us from the Entente.</p>
+
+<p>The alternative was obvious. Germany should have offered to cease to
+pile up armaments, if our desire for friendly relations all round could
+be so extended as to bring all the Powers belonging to both groups into
+them, along with England. But the German policy of relying on superior
+strength in armaments as the true guarantee of peace did not admit of
+this. I am no admirer of the principle of the balance of power. I should
+like to say good-bye to it. I prefer the principle of a League of
+Nations, if that be practicable, or, at the very least, of an Entente
+comprising all the Powers. But if neither of these alternatives be
+possible there remains, for the people who desire to be secure, only the
+method of the balance of power. Now Germany drove us to this by her
+indisposition to change her traditional policy and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span>to be content to
+rely on the settlement of specific differences for the good feeling that
+always tends to result. She had, it is true, the misfortune for so
+strong a nation to have been born a hundred years too late. She had got
+less in Africa than she might have had. We were ready to help her to a
+place in the sun there and elsewhere in the world, and to give up
+something for this end, if only we could secure peace and contentment on
+her part. But she would not have it so, and she chose to follow the
+principle of relying on the "Mailed Fist." Of this policy, when pursued
+recklessly, Bismarck well understood the danger. "Prestige politics," as
+he called them, he hated. In February, 1888, he laid down in a
+well-known speech what he held to be the true principle. "Every Great
+Power which seeks to exert pressure on the politics of other countries,
+and to direct affairs outside the sphere of interest which God has
+assigned to it, carries on politics of power, and not of interest; it
+works for prestige." But that principle was not consistently followed by
+William the Second. Into the detailed story of his departure from it I
+have not space to enter. But those who wish to follow this will do well
+to read the narrative contained in an admirable and open-minded book by
+Mr. Harbutt Dawson, "The German Empire <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span>from 1867 to 1914," in the
+second volume of which the story is told in detail.</p>
+
+<p>Instead of trying to alter the traditional attitude of Germany to her
+neighbors, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg let it continue. That he did not
+want it to continue I am pretty sure. At page 130 of his book he appeals
+to me, personally, to recall the words he used in a conversation we had
+one evening in February, 1912, words in which he sought to show me that
+"a proper understanding between our two nations would guarantee the
+peace of the world, and would lead the Powers by degrees from the
+phantom of armed Imperialism to the opposite pole of peaceful work
+together in the world." I remember his words, and with them I would
+remind him that I wholly agreed. I had myself used similar language in
+anticipation, and had begged him not to insist on our accepting an
+obligation of absolute neutrality under all conditions which might prove
+inconsistent with our duty of loyalty to France, now a friendly
+neighbor, a duty which rested on no military obligation, but on kindly
+feeling and regard. It was such friendship and mutual regard that I was
+striving, with the assent of the British Cabinet, to bring about with
+Germany also, and by the same means through which it had been
+accomplished in the case of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span>France. Not by any secret military
+convention, for we had entered into no communications which bound us to
+do more than study conceivable possibilities in a fashion which the
+German General Staff would look on as mere matter of routine for a
+country the shores of which lay so near to those of France, but by
+removing all material causes of friction. And when Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg adds of my reply that "even he preferred the power of English
+Dreadnoughts and the friendship of France," I must remind him of the
+words sanctioned beforehand when submitted by me to Sir Edward Grey,
+with which I began our conversation. I reproduce them from the record I
+made immediately after the conversation to which I have already referred
+in the preceding chapter, on which I again draw for further minor
+details. And I wish to say, in passing, that both Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have given in their books accounts of
+what passed in my conversations with them which tally substantially, so
+far as the words used are concerned, with my own notes and
+recollections. It is mainly as to the inferences they now draw from my
+then attitude that I have any controversy with them, and, in the case of
+Admiral von Tirpitz, to some slight inaccuracies which have arisen from
+misconstruction.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>The ex-Imperial Chancellor asked the question whether I was to talk to
+him officially, the difficulty being that he could not divest himself of
+his official position, and that it would be awkward to speak with me in
+a purely private capacity. I said I had come officially, so far as the
+approval of the King and the Cabinet was concerned, but merely to talk
+over the ground, and not to commit either himself or my own Government
+at this stage to definite propositions. At the first interview, which
+took place in the British Embassy, on Thursday, February 8, 1912, and
+lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him a message
+of good wishes for the Conversations and for the future of Anglo-German
+relations, with which the King had entrusted me at the audience I had
+before leaving London. I proceeded to ask whether he wished to make the
+first observations himself, or desired that I should begin. He wished me
+to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him in the sense arranged in
+the discussions I had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London.</p>
+
+<p>I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away
+between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was
+the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken
+into account. Germany <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>had built up, and was building up, magnificent
+armaments, and, with the aid of the Triple Alliance, she had become the
+center of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other
+Powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment
+Germany's right to her policy, but this was the natural and inevitable
+consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same
+situation with France, when she was very powerful on the seas, that we
+had with Germany now. While the fact to which I had referred created a
+difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of Powers
+might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing
+sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me
+to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was
+now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia
+except those that were in writing and published to the world.</p>
+
+<p>The Chancellor here interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really
+so. I said it was so, and that, in the situation which now existed, I
+saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new
+and cordial friendship carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps to the
+profit of Russia and France, as well as of Germany herself. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span>He replied
+that he had no reason to differ from this view.</p>
+
+<p>He and I both referred to the war scare of the autumn of 1911, and he
+observed that we had made military preparations. I was aware that the
+German Military Attach&eacute; in London had reported at that time to Berlin
+that we had so reorganized our army as to be in a position, if we
+desired to do so, to send six of our new infantry divisions and at least
+one cavalry division swiftly to France. The Chancellor obviously had
+this in his mind, and I told him that the preparations made were only
+those required to bring the capacity of our small British Army, in point
+of mobilization for eventualities which must be clear to him, to
+something approaching the standard of that celerity in its operations
+which Moltke had long ago accomplished for Germany and which was with
+her now a matter of routine. For this purpose we had studied our
+deficiencies and modes of operation. This, however, concerned our own
+direct interests, and was a purely departmental matter concerning the
+War Office, and the Minister who had the most to do with it was the one
+who was now talking to him and who was not wanting in friendly feeling
+toward Germany. We could not run the risk of being caught unprepared.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span>As both Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have devoted a
+good deal of attention to these and other conversations in their books,
+I have felt at liberty here and in the last chapter to state what, I am
+bound to observe, had better not, as it seems to me personally, have
+been held back for so long&mdash;the exact nature of that which actually
+passed when I was sent to Berlin in February, 1912. Accordingly, it is
+only necessary that I should add here a few words more about what indeed
+appears in most of its detail from the versions given by the two German
+Ministers concerned themselves.</p>
+
+<p>I refused, not only because I had been instructed to do so, but because
+in my own opinion it was vital that I should refuse, to negotiate
+excepting on the basis of absolute loyalty to the Entente with France
+and Russia. The German Government asked for a covenant of absolute
+neutrality. This I could not look at. I had the same feeling about such
+an agreement for unconditional neutrality as Caprivi had when he was
+asked to renew the Reinsurance Treaty which Bismarck made with Russia at
+Skiernevice in 1884, and under which, notwithstanding that Germany might
+come to owe a duty to Austria to support her as her military Ally, he
+bound Germany to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span>observe neutrality in case Russia were attacked by
+her. So far as appeared this Reinsurance Treaty probably had suggested
+the wording of the analogous formula which the Chancellor was proposing
+to myself. But altho we were not under the obligation to France which
+Germany was under to Austria in 1884, I felt, to use the words of
+Caprivi himself, when he succeeded Bismarck, and was asked to renew the
+engagement with Russia, that the arrangement was "too complicated" for
+my comprehension. It would have been not only wrong to expose a friendly
+France to the risk of being dismembered by an unjustifiable invasion,
+while her friend England merely stood looking on, but it would also have
+been prejudicial to our safety. For to have allowed Germany to take
+possession of the northern ports of France would have been to imperil
+our island security. The Chancellor was entitled to make the request he
+did, but I was bound to refuse it. I also, at the same time, told him
+that if Germany went on increasing her Navy, any agreement with us meant
+to lead to better relations would be little more than "bones without
+flesh." Germany might, indeed, as he had said, need a third training
+squadron, in addition to the two she had already in the North Sea. This
+we could easily meet by moving more of our ships <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span>to northern waters,
+without having to increase the number we were building independently.
+But if she had the idea of adding to her fleet on a considerable scale
+we should be bound to lay down two keels to every one of her new ships,
+and the inevitable result would be, no proportionate increase in her
+strength relatively to ours, but of a certainty a good deal of bad
+feeling.</p>
+
+<p>I may observe that at the date of this conversation the new German Fleet
+Bill had not been made public, and we knew nothing of its contents in
+London, excepting that a third squadron for training was to be added to
+the two which were already there. For this purpose it had been said that
+a few ships and a moderate increase in personnel would be all that was
+required. Before I left Berlin the Emperor, as I mentioned in the
+preceding chapter, handed to me, with friendly frankness and with
+permission to show it to my colleagues, an advance copy of the new Bill.
+It looked to me as if, when scrutinized, its proposals might prove more
+formidable than we had anticipated. But I asked his permission to
+abstain from trying to form any judgment on this question without the
+aid of the British Admiralty, and I put it in my pocket and handed it to
+the First Lord of the Admiralty at a Cabinet held on Monday, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span>February
+12, in the afternoon of the day on which I returned to London. I was not
+very sure as to what might prove to be contained in this Bill, and my
+misgivings were confirmed by our Admiralty experts, who found in it a
+program of destroyers, submarines, and personnel far in excess of
+anything indicated in the only rumors that had reached us. After we had
+to abandon the idea of getting Germany to accept the carefully guarded
+formula of neutrality which was all that we could entertain, the Cabinet
+sanctioned without delay the additions to our navy which were required
+to counter these increases. Our policy was to avoid conflagration by
+every effort possible, and at the same time to insure the house in case
+of failure.</p>
+
+<p>I felt throughout these conversations that the Chancellor was sincerely
+desirous of meeting me in the effort to establish good relations between
+the two countries. But he was hampered by the difficulty of changing the
+existing policy of building up armaments which was imposed on him. In
+only one way could he manage this, and that was by getting me to agree
+to a formula of absolute neutrality under all circumstances. The other,
+the better, and the only way that was admissible for us, the way in
+which we had surmounted all difficulties with France and Russia, he was
+not free to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span>enter on, tho I believe that he really wished to. Hence the
+attempt at a complete agreement failed. But, as he says himself, much
+good came of these initial conversations, and still more of the
+subsequent conversations which followed on them in London between Sir
+Edward Grey and the German Ambassador. Candor became the order of the
+day, minor difficulties were smoothed over, and a treaty for territorial
+rearrangements, of the general character discussed in Berlin, was
+finally agreed on, and was likely to have been signed had the war not
+intervened.</p>
+
+<p>As to the rest of the narrative in the ex-Chancellor's book, this is not
+the place to deal with it. His view that Germany was doing her best to
+moderate the rash action in Vienna which resulted in the declaration of
+war on Serbia, while England was doing much less to restrain the course
+of events at St. Petersburg, is not one which it is easy to bring into
+harmony with the documents published. This is a part of the history of
+events before the war which has already been exhaustively dealt with by
+others, and it is no part of the purpose of these pages to write of
+matters about which I have no first-hand knowledge. For I had little
+opportunity of taking any direct part in our affairs with Germany after
+my final visit to that country, which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span>was in 1912. My duties as Lord
+Chancellor were too engrossing.</p>
+
+<p>There are, however, in this connection just two topics toward the end of
+the book which are of such interest that I will refer to them before
+passing away from it. The first is the story that there was a Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the Emperor determined on
+war. This Herr von Bethmann Hollweg denies. He explains that in the
+morning of that day the Austrian Ambassador lunched with the Emperor,
+presumably at Potsdam, and took the opportunity of handing to him a
+letter written by the Emperor of Austria personally, together with a
+memorandum on policy drawn up in Vienna. This memorandum contained a
+detailed plan for opposing Russian enterprise in the Balkan peninsula by
+energetic diplomatic pressure. Against a hostile Serbia and an
+unreliable Roumania resort was to be had to Bulgaria and Turkey, with a
+view to the establishment of a Balkan League, excluding Serbia, to be
+formed under the &aelig;gis of the Central Powers. The Serajevo murder was
+declared to have demonstrated the aggressive and irreconcilable
+character of Serbian policy. The Austrian Emperor's letter endorsed the
+views contained in the memorandum, and added that, if the agitation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span>in
+Belgrade continued, the pacific views of the Powers were in danger. The
+German Emperor said that he must consult his Chancellor before
+answering, and sent for Bethmann Hollweg and the Under-Secretary,
+Zimmermann. He saw them in the afternoon in the park of the Neues Palais
+at Potsdam. The Chancellor thinks that no one else was present. It was
+agreed that the situation was very serious. The ex-Chancellor says that
+he had already learned the tenor of these Austrian documents, altho he
+did not see the text of the subsequent ultimatum to Serbia until July
+22. It was determined that it was no part of the duty of Germany to give
+advice to her Ally as to how she should deal with the Serajevo murder.
+But every effort was to be made to prevent the controversy between
+Austria and Serbia from developing into an international conflict. It
+was useful to try to bring in Bulgaria, but Roumania had better be left
+out of account. These conclusions were in accordance with the
+Chancellor's own opinion, and when he returned to Berlin he communicated
+them to the Austrian Ambassador. Germany would do what she could to make
+Roumania friendly, and Austria was told that in any case she might rely
+on her Ally, Germany, to stand firmly by her side.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span>The next day the Emperor set off in his yacht for the northern seas. The
+Chancellor says he advised him to do this because the expedition was one
+which the Emperor had been in the habit of making every year at that
+season, and it would cause talk if this usual journey were to be
+abandoned.</p>
+
+<p>The other point relates to the date on which the German Chancellor saw
+the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He tells us that it was
+brought to him for the first time on the evening of July 22 by Herr von
+Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, who had just received it from the Austrian
+Ambassador. The Chancellor says that von Jagow thought the ultimatum too
+strongly worded, and wished for some delay. But when he told the
+Ambassador this the answer was that the document had already been
+dispatched, and it was published in the Vienna <i>Telegraph</i> the next
+morning.</p>
+
+<p>The conclusion of the Chancellor is that the stories of the Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, and of the co-operation of the German
+Government in preparing the ultimatum, are mere legends. The question of
+substance as regards the first may be left for interpretation by
+posterity. As to the controversy about the second, it would be
+interesting to know whether Herr von Tschirsky, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span>German Ambassador
+at Vienna, knew of the ultimatum before it assumed the form in which it
+reached Berlin on July 22. I shall have more to say about these
+incidents later on when I come to Admiral von Tirpitz's account of them.</p>
+
+<p>My criticism of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg is in no case founded on any
+doubt at all as to his veracity. I formed, in the course of my dealings
+with him, a high opinion of his integrity. But in his reasoning he is
+apt to let circumstances escape his notice which are in a large degree
+material for forming a judgment. This does not seem to me to arise from
+any deliberate intention to be otherwise than candid. I am sure that he
+believes that he is telling the full truth at all times. But he became a
+convinced partizan, quite intelligibly. This fact, however creditable to
+his patriotism, seems to me not only to explain why he thought it right
+to continue in office and stand by his country as long as he could
+through the war, but also to detract somewhat from the weight that would
+otherwise attach to the opinions of an honorable and well-meaning man.</p>
+
+<p>I pass to the examination of the concurrent policy against which he
+could not prevail, and the existence of which takes the edge off his
+reasoning. That policy is expounded fully and clearly <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span>by Admiral von
+Tirpitz, a German of the traditional Military School, a man of great
+ability, and one who rarely if ever allowed himself to be deflected from
+pursuing a concentrated purpose to the utmost of his power.</p>
+
+<p>Of the general character of this purpose his colleague, Bethmann
+Hollweg, was conscious, as appears from passages in the book just
+discussed, of which I have selected one for translation.</p>
+
+<p>"The fleet was the favorite child of Germany, for in it the
+onward-pressing energies of the nation seemed to be most vividly
+illustrated. The application of the most modern technical skill, and the
+organization that had been worked out with so much care, were admired,
+and rightly so. To the doubts of those versed in affairs whether we were
+pursuing our true path by building great battleships, there was opposed
+a fanatical public opinion which was not disciplined in the interest of
+those responsible for the direction of affairs. Reflections about the
+difficult international troubles to which our naval policy was giving
+rise were held in check by a robust agitation. In the navy itself the
+consciousness was by no means everywhere present that the navy must be
+only an instrument of policy and not its determining factor. The conduct
+of naval policy had for many years rested in the hands <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span>of a man who
+claimed to exercise <i>political</i> authority over his department, and who
+influenced unbrokenly the political opinion of wider circles. Where
+differences arose between the Admiralty and the civilian leadership,
+public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the
+Admiralty. Any attempt to take into consideration relative proportions
+in the strength of other nations was treated as being the outcome of a
+weak-minded apprehension of the foreigner."</p>
+
+<p>When I was in Berlin in 1912, the last year in which, as I have already
+said, I visited Germany, there were those who thought that Bethmann
+Hollweg would shortly be superseded as Chancellor by his powerful rival,
+Admiral von Tirpitz. But in these days the peace party in that country
+was pretty strong, and the then Chancellor was regarded as a cautious
+and safe man. It was later on, in 1913, when the new Military Law, with
+&pound;50,000,000 of fresh expenditure, was passed, that the situation became
+much more doubtful. But the hesitation that existed in Government
+circles in Berlin earlier was never shared by the author of the
+"<i>Erinnerungen</i>," to which I now pass. One has only to look at the
+portrait at the beginning of that volume to see what sort of a man the
+author is. A strong man certainly, a descendant of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span>class which
+clustered round the great Moltke, and gave much anxiety at times to
+Bismarck himself.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img"><a name="imagep137" id="imagep137"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep137.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep137.jpg" width="45%" alt="Admiral Alfred P. Von Tirpitz" /></a><br />
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">ADMIRAL ALFRED P. VON TIRPITZ<br />
+<span class="scfake">LORD HIGH ADMIRAL OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL NAVY FROM 1911 TO
+1916.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Admiral possesses a "General Staff" mind of a high order. A mind of
+this type has never been given a chance of systematic development in the
+English Navy, where the distinction between strategy and tactics, on the
+one hand, and administration on the other, has never been so sharply
+laid down as it has been, following the great Moltke, in Germany. Even
+Moltke himself was not satisfied with what had been accomplished in
+Germany in this direction by the Army. He is said to have complained
+that the General Staff building, which was put in the Thiergarten, while
+the War Office was in Berlin itself, near the corner of the
+Wilhelmstrasse, was only one mile distant from the War Office, when it
+should have been two. For he held that the exactness of demarcation of
+function, which was only to be attained if strategy and tactics were
+studied continuously by a specially chosen body of experts, could not be
+made complete if the War Office could get too easily at the General
+Staff. But what he accomplished at least gave rise to a school of exact
+military thought far in advance of any that had preceded it. The fruits
+of this were reaped in the war with Austria in 1866, and still more in
+that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span>with France in 1870. And when the navy was first organized this
+principle was introduced into its organization, first by Stosch and then
+by Caprivi. Both of these had been trained in the great Moltke's ideas,
+and it was because of this that, altho soldiers, they were chosen to
+model the organization of the German Navy. It is true that we have
+beaten the German Navy. That was because, as Tirpitz himself admits, we
+possessed, not only superior numbers, but a tradition of long standing
+and a spirit in our fleet which Germany had not built up. But we shall
+do well not to overlook what he has to say about the procedure of basing
+strategy and tactics on exact knowledge, and careful study, especially
+when such ideas as that of landing small expeditionary forces on enemy
+territory by means of a naval expedition, are being considered, nor what
+he says of his efforts to make this procedure real. Numbers are not
+always sufficient. They are not likely to be large for a long time to
+come, and the study of all possibilities and of modern conditions is
+therefore more important than ever. The British Army knows this. It is
+not so clear that the British Navy is equally informed about the
+necessity of bearing the principle in mind.</p>
+
+<p>Tirpitz never served in the army, but he was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span>brought up under the
+influence of these great soldiers. His first experience was indeed
+mainly in technical matters of construction. But he never let go the
+true principle of an Admiral or War Staff, and the result was that he
+considered, and not wholly without reason, that he was leading the
+German Navy on lines which were in the end likely to make it, when fully
+developed, a more powerful instrument than the British Navy. Instead of
+studying merely the lessons of the past, as we here seek them in, for
+instance, the history of the Seven Years' War of more than a century and
+a half ago, or in the operations of Nelson carried out a hundred years
+since, he insisted that the German Navy should study systematically
+modern problems, and in particular combined naval and military
+operations. In England we had no War Staff for the Navy until 1911, and
+our Senior Admirals disliked the idea. Consequently such staff study of
+military problems has never been properly developed, the wishes of our
+junior naval officers notwithstanding. In Germany the idea was regarded
+as a vital one throughout by Tirpitz.</p>
+
+<p>The first chapter of Tirpitz's book describes the beginnings of the
+German Navy. The second deals with the Stosch period. The third is
+devoted to the administration of Caprivi during the time <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span>when he was
+head of the Admiralty, and extends to the period when he became
+Chancellor. The fourth is devoted to construction. The fifth describes
+the disastrous breaking up of the Naval Administration into Boards, to
+which the author says the Emperor William II. allowed himself to be
+persuaded. The sixth chapter is directed to tactical developments, a
+subject in which Admiral Tirpitz himself did much. The seventh deals
+with naval plans. The eighth contains a very interesting description of
+how he was sent to find a naval base in Chinese waters, and how he
+selected and developed, with German thoroughness, Tsingtau (Kiaochow).
+The ninth chapter begins the story of the difficulties he experienced
+when refused sufficient money and freedom while he was Minister of
+Marine. The tenth gives a vividly written account of his visits to
+Bismarck. The next five chapters are devoted to the development of the
+German Navy and its relation to foreign policy. The sixteenth,
+seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters are concerned with the author's
+views of the reasons for the outbreak of the war of 1914, and its
+history. The nineteenth is a chapter devoted to the submarine war, and
+to a farewell apostrophe to a Germany lost by bad leading and vagueness
+in objectives. There is also a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span>supplement, containing letters written
+by him from time to time during the war, and his observations on what
+ought to have been the consistent policy of Germany in construction of
+battleships and submarines.</p>
+
+<p>The great thesis of the book is that the only way to preserve the peace
+was to make Europe fear German strength, and that this imported such
+battle-fleets as would attract allies to Germany for protection, and
+would thus in the end weaken the Entente. England was the real enemy,
+and England could not be dislodged from her powerful position in the
+world so long as she was allowed to continue in command of the ocean.
+For Bethmann Hollweg's alternative policy of a peaceful <i>rapprochement</i>
+with England he has no words but those of contempt. He, too, he says,
+had ideas as to how to keep the peace, but they were diametrically
+different from those of his colleague the Chancellor. On him he pours
+scorn for his attempts at departure from the policy of Frederick the
+Great and Bismarck.</p>
+
+<p>Tirpitz had been deeply impressed by the writings of Admiral Mahan. He
+himself drew from them the lesson that in ultimate analysis world-power
+for Germany depended on the sea-power which she had not got, and he set
+himself <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>to build it up. He endeavored to educate on this subject, not
+only the Reichstag, where he says he had much opposition, but the
+public. Under Prince B&uuml;low this was less difficult than he subsequently
+found it. His account of how the Minister of Education and the
+University professors helped him, and of how he contrived to enlist the
+Press, is as interesting as it is significant. But his great difficulty
+was obviously with William the Second. The Emperor had done much for
+fleet construction, and was so interested in it that he meddled at every
+turn in technical and strategical matters alike. The Ministry of Marine
+was not allowed to carry out the Admiral's own plans and conceptions.
+And when Bethmann came on the scene the situation became, according to
+the former, even worse. He moans over the apparent limitlessness of the
+money and authority with which the English Admiralty was provided by
+Parliament and the nation. At last he carried with his colleagues and in
+the Reichstag the policy of Fleet Laws, under which the Reichstag passed
+measures which took construction, in part at least, from off the annual
+navy vote, and he got through the succession of Acts that laid down
+programs extending over several years. Richter and other distinguished
+public men fought <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span>Tirpitz over these, but, in part at least, he got his
+way, and secured the nearest approach to continuity that his
+ever-supervising Sovereign would permit to him.</p>
+
+<p>What Tirpitz says he asked for above everything was a definite policy
+for war, and this he could not get the leave of Bethmann to lay down,
+nor could he get the volatile Emperor to stick to definite conceptions
+of it. For coast defense he had a supreme contempt. The great German
+Army would take care of this, so far as invasion was concerned, and an
+adequate battle-fleet would do the rest. It is noticeable that
+apparently he never even dreamed of trying to invade England with her
+fleet protection. It was in quite another way that he intended, if
+necessary, to harass this country. He wanted to threaten our commerce
+and to be able to break any blockade of Germany. German sea-power was to
+be made strong enough to attract allies by its ability to rally all free
+nations without any curatorship by the Anglo-Saxons.</p>
+
+<p>This is what he says his war objectives were. He bitterly complains of
+the opposition to them and to himself which he met with from such papers
+as the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, and from the influence of certain of his
+colleagues. Constitutionalism he appears to have hated. The democracy
+of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span>Germany was not suited to such leading as Lloyd George, during the
+war, gave to England, and Clemenceau to France. In Germany, he declares,
+a strong hand is always required, and a revolution is inevitable in case
+the hand is weak, and defeat follows. For Germany needed "the
+Prussian-German State." The tradition of Frederick the Great and
+Bismarck was its protecting spirit.</p>
+
+<p>Can we wonder, if the narrative of this capable man is accurate, that
+Bethmann struggled for his rival policy of conciliation in the face of
+almost insuperable difficulties? Tirpitz had a strong party at his back,
+both in Prussia and elsewhere. What made it strong was largely that its
+members shared his view of England and of the situation. "They looked to
+us," he says, "it was the last chance of international freedom." I
+thought in 1912 that Bethmann might in the end win, for in the main at
+that time the Emperor was with him, and so were Ballin and many others
+of great influence. The Social Democrats, too, were gaining influence
+rapidly. But the presence of a powerful school of thought at the back of
+Tirpitz, a school which, had it succeeded, would have secured the place
+it desired by reducing to a precarious state the life of my own country,
+made me feel that, while we must do all we could to extend <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span>our
+friendships so as to convert and bring in Germany, the chances of
+success did not preponderate sufficiently to justify relaxation of
+either vigilance in preparation or resolution in policy. My feeling
+remained what I had tried to express in the address delivered at Oxford
+in August of 1911. "I wish," I said then, "all our politicians who
+concern themselves with Anglo-German relations, those who are pro-German
+as well as those who are not, could go to Berlin and learn something,
+not only of the language and intellectual history of Prussia, but of the
+standpoint of her people&mdash;and of the disadvantages as well as the
+advantages of an excessive lucidity of conception. Nowhere else in
+Germany that I know of is this to be studied so advantageously and so
+easily as in Berlin, the seat of Government, the headquarters of
+<i>Real-politik</i>, and it seems to me most apparent among the highly
+educated classes there."</p>
+
+<p>Bismarck does not appear to have known much while in office about
+Tirpitz, and when the latter desired later on to enlist his outside
+support he did not find it at first easy. But, having with some
+difficulty got the assent of the Emperor to a new ship being named after
+Bismarck, he in the end got from the latter permission to visit him at
+Friedrichsruh in 1897. There Tirpitz arrived at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span>noon. The family were
+at luncheon. He tells us how the Prince sat at the head of the table,
+and how he rose, cool but polite, and remained standing till Tirpitz was
+seated. The Prince assumed the air of one suffering from sharp neuralgic
+pain, and he kept pressing the side of his head with a small indiarubber
+hot-water bottle. It was only with an appearance of difficulty that he
+uttered, and his food was minced meat. However, when he had drunk a
+bottle and a half of German champagne (<i>Sect</i>) he became animated. After
+the dishes were removed, Countess Wilhelm Bismarck lit his great pipe
+for him, and with the other ladies quitted the room. The atmosphere was
+one of gloomy silence. But the great man suddenly broke it by raising
+his formidable eyebrows, and directing a grim look at Tirpitz, whom he
+appears next to have asked whether he himself was a tomcat that needed
+only to be stroked in order to procure sparks to be emitted. Tirpitz
+then timidly unfolded his plans and his policy of building big
+battleships. Bismarck was critical, and turned his criticism to other
+matters also. He denounced as disastrous the abrogation by Caprivi and
+William the Second of the treaty he (Bismarck) had made with Russia for
+Reinsurance. Bismarck declared that, in case of an Anglo-Russian war,
+our policy was contained in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span>the simple words: neutrality as regards
+Russia. The modest Tirpitz ventured to suggest that only a fleet strong
+enough to be respected could make Germany worthy of an alliance in the
+eyes of Russia and other powers. Bismarck rejected this almost angrily.
+The English he thought little of. If they tried to invade Germany the
+Landwehr would knock them down with the butt-ends of their rifles. That
+a close blockade might knock Germany down never seemed to occur to him.
+However, in the end Tirpitz says that the Prince became mollified and
+expressed agreement with the view that an increased fleet was necessary.</p>
+
+<p>Bismarck then invited the Admiral to go with him for a drive in the
+forest. Despite the neuralgia, this drive, which took place amid showers
+of rain, lasted for two hours. The carriage, moreover, was open. There
+were two bottles of beer, one on the right and the other on the left of
+the Prince, which they drank on the way, and he smoked his pipe
+continuously. "It was not easy to keep pace with his giant
+constitution."</p>
+
+<p>For the details of the conversation, which was conducted in English so
+that the coachman might not understand it, I must refer the reader to
+the chapter in which it is described. The old warrior <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span>spoke with
+affection of the Emperor Frederick, but as regarded his son William, he
+appears to have let himself go. Tirpitz was to tell the latter that he,
+Bismarck, only wanted to be let alone, and die in peace. His task was
+ended. He had "no future and no hopes."</p>
+
+<p>Tirpitz saw Bismarck twice subsequently. The last time was on the
+occasion of a surprize visit to him by the Emperor. This visit was not
+wholly a success. The conversation got on to unfortunate lines. Bismarck
+began to speak of politics, and the Emperor ignored what he said and did
+not reply. The younger Moltke, who was present, whispered to Tirpitz,
+"It is terrible," alluding to the Emperor's want of reverence. When the
+Emperor left, his Minister, von Lucanus, who was with him, held out his
+hand to the old Prince. But Lucanus had formerly intrigued against him.
+Consequently he "sat like a statue, not a muscle moved. He gazed into
+the air, and before him Lucanus made gestures in vain."</p>
+
+<p>All this notwithstanding, Tirpitz seems to have made a good impression.
+For after these visits the Bismarck press began to speak favorably of
+him.</p>
+
+<p>But I must not linger over side issues. The book is so full of
+interesting material that in writing about it one has to resolve not to
+be led away from <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>the vital points by its digressions. One of these
+points is that to which I have already made reference in giving the
+Chancellor's views about it, the responsibility for what happened in
+July, 1914, and in particular for the decision taken on the 5th of that
+month at Potsdam.</p>
+
+<p>It is interesting to compare Tirpitz's account of the meeting that took
+place then, on the invitation of the Emperor, with that of Bethmann,
+altho the former was not present, and bases his judgment only on what
+was reported to him as Minister. He gives an account of what happened
+which makes the meeting seem a more important one than the ex-Chancellor
+takes it to have been. The Admiral's view is that at this date what was
+urgently wanted was "prompt and frank" action. Austria should not have
+been allowed to rush upon Serbia, however just her causes for anger. On
+the other hand the German Emperor should have at once and directly
+appealed to the Czar to co-operate with him in endeavoring to secure
+such a response to reason and expression of contrition on the part of
+Serbia as would have eased off the situation, which was full of danger.
+For, with an unfriendly Entente interesting itself, no war which broke
+out was likely to be capable of being kept localized.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span>Tirpitz was not in Berlin on July 5, but he received reports from there
+of what was happening. Neither he nor von Moltke, the Chief of the
+General Staff, was consulted, but Tirpitz declares that the Emperor saw
+at Potsdam the Minister of War, von Falkenhayn, and also the Minister of
+the Military Cabinet, von Lyncker. If so, whether or not the conference
+was technically a Crown Council, the meeting was a very important one.</p>
+
+<p>Tirpitz confirms Bethmann in saying that, prompted by chivalrous
+feeling, the German Emperor responded to the Emperor of Austria by
+promising support and fidelity. He declares that the Emperor William did
+not consider the intervention of Russia to protect Serbia as probable,
+because he thought that the Czar would never support regicides, and
+that, besides, Russia was not prepared for war, either in a military or
+financial sense. Moreover, the Emperor somewhat optimistically presumed
+that France would hold Russia back on account of her own disadvantageous
+state of finance and her lack of heavy artillery. The Emperor did not
+refer to England; complications with that country were not thought of.
+The Emperor's view thus was that a further extension of dangerous
+complications was unlikely. His hope was that Serbia would give in, but
+he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span>considered it desirable that Germany should be prepared in case of a
+different issue of the Austro-Serbian dispute. It was for that reason
+that he had on the 5th commanded the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; the
+Minister of War, von Falkenhayn; the Under-Secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann; and the Minister of the War Cabinet, von
+Lyncker, to Potsdam. It was then decided that all steps should be
+avoided which would attract political attention or involve much expense.
+After this decision the Emperor, on the advice of the Chancellor,
+started on his journey to the North Cape, for which arrangements had
+already been made. The duty of the Chancellor under the circumstances
+was to consider any promise to be given to Austria from the standpoint
+of German interests, and to keep watch on the method of its fulfilment.
+The Chancellor, says his critic, did not hesitate to accept the decision
+of the Emperor, apparently imagining that Austria's position as a Great
+Power was already shaken and would collapse unless she could insist on
+being compensated at the expense of the greedy Serbians. He probably had
+in his mind the success obtained in the earlier Balkan crisis over
+Bosnia and Herzegovina. He goes on to tell us that he was not informed
+as to what the Emperor was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span>thinking of during his tour in northern
+waters, but that he had reason to believe that he did not anticipate
+serious danger to the peace of the world. And he observes, as a
+characteristic of the Emperor, that when he was not apprehensive of
+danger he would express himself without restraint about the traditions
+of his illustrious predecessors, but the moment matters began to look
+critical his became a hesitating mood. The Admiral thinks that if the
+Emperor had not left Berlin, and if the full Government machinery had
+been at work, means might have been found by the Emperor and the
+Ministry of averting the danger of war. As, however, the Chief of the
+General Staff, the Head of the Admiralty Staff, and Tirpitz himself were
+kept away from Berlin during the following weeks, the matter was handled
+solely by the Chancellor, who, being in truth not sufficiently
+experienced in great European affairs, was not able to estimate the
+reliability of those who were advising him in the Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img"><a name="imagep153" id="imagep153"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep153.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep153.jpg" width="45%" alt="Count Leopold Berchtold" /></a><br />
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD<br />
+<span class="scfake">MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM FEB. 1912 TO
+JAN. 1915.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Von Tirpitz goes on to say that by July 11 the Berlin Foreign Office had
+heard that the Entente had advised yielding at Belgrade. The Chancellor,
+he declares, could now have brought about a peaceful solution, but,
+convinced as he was that the Entente did not mean war, he drew <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span>the
+shortsighted conclusion that Austria, without considering the Entente,
+might force a march into Serbia and yet not endanger the world's peace.
+His optimism was disastrous. On July 13 he (the Chancellor) was,
+according to Tirpitz, informed of the essential points in the proposed
+Austrian ultimatum. Bethmann, as already stated, says that he did not
+see the ultimatum itself until the 22nd, when it had already been
+dispatched. But he does not say that he had been given no forecast of
+its contents from the German Ambassador at Vienna. Tirpitz quotes, but
+without giving its exact date, a memorandum sent to him at Tarasp
+apparently just after the 13th. It was forwarded from the Admiralty, and
+was in these terms: "Our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, has
+ascertained privately, as well as from Count Berchtold, that the
+ultimatum to be sent by Austria to Serbia will contain the following
+demands: I. A proclamation of King Peter to his people in which he will
+command them to abstain from greater Serbian agitation. II.
+Participation of a higher Austrian official in the investigation of the
+assassination. III. Dismissal and punishment of all officers and
+officials proved to be accomplices."</p>
+
+<p>Tirpitz says that his first impression, when he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span>received this document
+in Tarasp, was that Serbia could not possibly accept the terms of such
+an ultimatum. And he adds that he believed neither in the possibility of
+localizing the war nor in the neutrality of England. In his view the
+greatest care was required to reassure the Russian Government,
+especially as England would wish "to let war break out in order to
+establish the balance of power on the Continent as she understood it."
+But the Chancellor expressed the wish that he should not return to
+Berlin, for his doing so might give rise to remarks. If this be so, it
+seems to have been a very unfortunate step. The Emperor and his most
+important Ministers should all have been in Berlin at such a time.
+Bethmann's advice appears intelligible only if he thought, as is quite
+possible, that he could himself handle the negotiations best if the
+Emperor and Tirpitz were both out of the way. If so, he was not
+successful. He did not in the end respond to Sir Edward Grey's wish for
+a conference, and earlier he had failed to bridle the impulsive ally who
+was dashing wildly about. It looks as tho, however good his intentions
+may have been, he was taking terrible risks.</p>
+
+<p>Now this was the crucial period. Grey was doing his very utmost to avert
+war, and was even <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span>pressing Serbia to accept the bulk of what was in the
+ultimatum. As to his real intentions, I may, without presumption, claim
+to be better informed than Admiral von Tirpitz. Sir Edward Grey and I
+had been intimate friends for over a quarter of a century before the
+period in which the Admiral, who, so far as I know, never saw him,
+diagnoses the state of his intentions. During the eight years previous
+to July, 1914, we had been closely associated and were working as
+colleagues in the Cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr.
+Asquith. And in that July, throughout the weeks in question, Sir Edward
+was staying with me in my house in London, and considering with me the
+telegrams and incidents, great or small.</p>
+
+<p>It is a pure myth that he had, at the back of his mind, any such
+intentions as the Admiral imagines. He was working with every fiber put
+in action for the keeping of the peace. He was pressing for that in St.
+Petersburg, in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in Belgrade. He was not
+in the least influenced either by jealousy of Germany's growth or by
+fear of a naval engagement with her, as Tirpitz infers. All he wanted
+was to fulfil what, for him, was the sacred trust that had been
+committed to him, the duty of throwing the whole weight of England's
+influence on the side of peace. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span>And that was not less the view of Mr.
+Asquith, whom I knew equally intimately, and it was the view of all my
+colleagues in the Cabinet.</p>
+
+<p>Germany was going ahead with giant strides in commerce and industry, but
+we had not the slightest title to be jealous or to complain when she was
+only reaping the fruits of her own science and concentration on peaceful
+arts. I had said this myself emphatically to the Emperor at Berlin in
+1906 in a conversation the record of which has already been given. There
+was no responsible person in this country who dreamt, either in 1914 or
+in the years before then, of interfering with Germany's Fleet
+development merely because it could protect her growing commerce. What
+responsible people did object to was the method of those who belonged to
+the Tirpitz school. The peace was to be preserved; I give that school
+full credit for this desire; but preserved on what terms? On the terms
+that the German was to be so strong by land and sea that he could
+swagger down the High Street of the world, making his will prevail at
+every turn.</p>
+
+<p>But this was not the worst, so far as England was concerned. The school
+of von Tirpitz would not be content unless they could control England's
+sea power. They would have accepted a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span>two-to-three keel standard
+because it would have been enough to enable them to secure allies and to
+break up the Entente. Now it was vital to us that Germany should not
+succeed in attaining this end. For if she did succeed in attaining it,
+not only our security from invasion, but our transport of food and raw
+materials, would be endangered. With a really friendly Germany or with a
+League of Nations the situation would have mattered much less. It was
+the policy of the school to which Tirpitz and the Emperor himself
+belonged which made the situation one of growing danger and the Entente
+a necessity, for these were days when other nations near us were
+beginning to organize great battle-fleets. If Bethmann Hollweg's policy
+had prevailed there would have been no necessity for any such Entente as
+was the only way of safety for us. But he could not carry his policy
+through, earnestly tho he desired to do so, and thus provide the true
+way to permanent peaceful relations. I think he believed that the only
+use Britain ever contemplated making of her Navy, should peace continue,
+was that of a policeman who co-operates with others in watching lest
+anyone should jostle his neighbor on the maritime highway. He believed
+in the <i>Sittlichkeit</i>, which we here mean when we speak of "good form."
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span>But that was not the faith of his critics in Berlin. They wanted to have
+Russia, and if possible France also, along with their navies, on the
+side of Germany. Peace, yes, but peace compelled by fear&mdash;a very
+unwholesome and unstable kind of peace, and deadly for the interests of
+an island nation. Hence the Entente!</p>
+
+<p>What we had to do was to prevent, if we could, the Tirpitz school from
+getting its way, and we tried this not without some measure of success.
+Even to-day our pacifists now join with chauvinist critics of a policy
+which was pursued steadily for many years, and was that of
+Campbell-Bannerman as well as of Asquith. They reproach us for having
+entered on our path without having adequately increased our naval and
+military resources. The reproach is not a just one. It is founded on a
+complete misconception of the true military situation. It is only
+necessary to read carefully through Admiral von Tirpitz's very
+instructive volume to see that he took precisely the same view as we
+did, and as was held to unswervingly by our Committee of Imperial
+Defense. England's might lay in final analysis in her sea power. She
+needed also a small but very perfect army, capable of high rapidity in
+concentration by the side of the great French Army, in order to prevent
+the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>coasts of France close to our own from being occupied by an enemy
+invading French territory.</p>
+
+<p>In his book the Admiral refers to a letter I wrote to <i>The Times</i> on
+December 16, 1918, pointing this out and the grounds on which the
+strategical conception was based. The Admiral expresses his agreement,
+and says that it was a fatal blunder of the German Highest Command not
+to use their submarine power at the very outbreak of the war to prevent
+our Expeditionary Force from crossing the Channel and co-operating in
+resisting the German advance towards Calais. From there Germany could
+have commanded the Channel and bombarded London.</p>
+
+<p>So he says, and we were quite aware all along that he might well think
+so. The other thing that he makes plain by implication is that the
+direct invasion of England was never contemplated by Germany in the face
+of our command of the sea. I had long ago satisfied myself that this was
+the German view, by a study of their military textbooks and from
+conversations with high German officers. But, what was more important
+than what I personally thought, the Committee of Imperial Defense, on
+which I sat regularly during eight years, was clear about it, and this
+after close study, and after hearing what the most eminent exponents <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span>in
+this country of a different view had to urge before them.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently our military policy was not doubtful. No doubt it would
+have been a nice thing could we have possessed in 1914 a great army
+fashioned and trained, not for firing rifles on the seashore, but for a
+struggle on French and Belgian soil. But such an army would have taken
+two generations at least to raise and train in peace time, and if we had
+laid out our money on it after 1870 instead of on ships, we should not
+have had the sea power which Tirpitz says gave us "bulldog" strength. In
+strategy and in military organization you can not successfully bestride
+two horses at once. He who would accomplish anything has to limit
+himself. Possibly it was because this was not clearly kept in view even
+in Germany that the volume before us is an exposition of a thesis which
+is novel in these islands, that it was not England that was unprepared,
+but Germany herself. For the confusion of objectives that led to this
+Tirpitz blames Bethmann's peace policy, the parsimony of the Reichstag,
+and the Emperor's failure to attain to clear notions about war aims.</p>
+
+<p>He criticizes me for saying that there was in Germany before 1914 a war
+party alongside of a peace party. It was really only the Bethmann
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span>group, he declares, that believed in peace being built on anything else
+than preponderance in armed power. The tradition of the German nation
+and the view of all sensible statesmen in Germany, <i>e.g.</i>, Prince B&uuml;low
+and the Emperor himself as a rule, was that the foundation of a lasting
+peace could only be laid with armaments. Now if this is so it is plain
+how the war came about. The "shining armor" oration in Austria, some
+years before war broke out, was simply one among many illustrations
+which so alarmed civilized nations that they huddled together for
+protection against this school of statesmen. Bethmann's was the true
+policy had he been allowed to carry it out. It is possible that he
+thought he had a better chance of carrying it out than could have been
+the case were they to be present, when he got the Emperor and Tirpitz to
+keep away from Berlin after the meeting at Potsdam on July 5.
+Unfortunately he underestimated the tendencies of Berchtold, Conrad von
+Hoetzendorf, Forgasch, and others in Vienna, who, with no misgivings
+such as those of Tirpitz as to the outcome, had determined on
+"<i>losgehen</i>." The proximate cause of the war was Austrian policy. A
+secondary cause was the absence of any effective attempt at control from
+Berlin. The third and principal cause was the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>Tirpitz theory of how to
+keep the peace, the theory that had come down from Frederick the Great
+and his father, and was barely a safe one in the hands of even a
+Bismarck.</p>
+
+<p>The only circumstances that could have justified Germany in her tacit
+encouragement to Austria to take a highly dangerous step&mdash;a step which
+was almost certain to bring Russia, France, and England into sharp
+conflict with the Central Powers&mdash;would have been clear proof that the
+three Entente nations were preparing to seize a chance and to encircle
+and attack Germany or Austria or both.</p>
+
+<p>Now for this there is no foundation whatever. Russia, whatever Isvolsky
+and other Russian statesmen may have said in moments of irritation over
+the affair of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not want to plunge into war;
+France did not desire anything of the kind; and, as for England, nothing
+was more remote from her wishes. It was only in order to preserve the
+general peace that we had entered the Entente, and the method of the
+Entente policy, the getting rid of all specific causes of difference,
+was one which had nothing objectionable in it. We urged Germany also to
+enter upon this path with us. We offered to help her in her progress
+toward the attainment of a "place in the sun." The negotiations which
+took <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span>place with Sir Edward Grey in London after my return from Berlin
+in 1912 are evidence of our sincerity in this, for they culminated in
+agreement on the terms of a detailed Treaty, under which a vast number
+of territorial questions were settled to mutual satisfaction. We did not
+either in 1912, as Admiral von Tirpitz appears to imagine, in the
+conversation at the Schloss, or later on, offer territory that was not
+our own but belonged to Portugal, or Belgium, or France. The contrary is
+evident from the fact that the British government pressed Germany to
+consent to the immediate publication of the draft Treaty, agreed early
+in 1914, when signed. All we did on both occasions was to propose
+exchanges with Germany of territory that was ours for territory that was
+hers, to undertake not to compete for the purchase of certain other
+territory that might come into the market, in consideration of a
+corresponding undertaking on her part, and to agree about zones within
+which each nation should distribute its industrial energies and give
+financial assistance to undertakings.</p>
+
+<p>The gallant Admiral gives an account of the meeting which took place on
+February 9, 1912, in the Emperor's Cabinet room in the Schloss between
+himself, the Emperor and myself. He <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span>represents me as making a "generous
+offer of colonial territories which the English neither possessed nor of
+which they had the least right of disposal, in order to flatter the
+Kaiser's desires." Now in this impression the Admiral was wholly wrong.
+What I spoke of was what I have just referred to, exchanges of parts of
+our own territory for parts belonging to Germany, and undertakings such
+as I have just referred to. These things I had considered the previous
+day with the Chancellor, and I do not think the Emperor was in the least
+under the impression which von Tirpitz entertained. The matter was
+indeed not one with which the Department of the Minister of Marine was
+likely to be familiar. My suggestions were made in accordance with my
+instructions, and were, of course, <i>bona fide</i> in all respects. What I
+was pressing for was the means for making possible a slackening in naval
+construction on both sides, and for acceptance of the Entente and of our
+position in it. What I desired was to extend its friendly relations so
+as to bring Germany and Austria and Italy within them and get rid of
+anxiety about the balance of power and the growth of armaments. I think
+the Emperor throughout understood this, and certainly the Chancellor
+did. Tirpitz appears to have suspected, in an attitude in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span>which I was
+only aiming at being friendly and even cordial, concealment of an
+encircling and aggressive purpose. After studying his book I do not
+wonder! When one rises from reading it one understands the fixity of an
+idea, which amounted to an obsession, and compelled him to believe in
+the necessity for what would have amounted to the overthrow of Britain
+as a Great Power.</p>
+
+<p>From the Emperor, on this as on other occasions, I met with nothing but
+the kindliest of receptions. Admiral von Tirpitz describes the luncheon
+party which preceded the conference in the Cabinet Room. He speaks of a
+certain "<i>spanning</i>" or tension which prevailed during the luncheon
+which the Emperor and Empress gave to the Berlin Cabinet and myself, and
+of restraint in the conversation. I can not say that I perceived any of
+these things, but then, of course, I was a foreigner. What I do remember
+was the general kindly feeling and the evident satisfaction produced by
+the production of the famous red champagne and great cigars with which
+the Emperor regaled his guests. For myself, special distinction was
+reserved. For, before proceeding to business, the Emperor read to me
+Goethe's poem, <i>Ilmenau</i>, of which he thought I might like to be
+reminded before we sat down to our task. He then <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>observed that, out of
+consideration for Tirpitz, we must confer in German, while on the other
+hand this would be the harder on me because the naval matters with which
+we had to deal were not in my department, as they were in that of the
+Admiral. This was, of course, true. And then, in compensation for
+disadvantages which, as he said, would otherwise be unfair, he smilingly
+remarked that he had a plan for adjusting the balance of power on this
+occasion. He insisted on my occupying the Imperial chair, which stood at
+the head of the narrow Cabinet table, while His Majesty himself should
+sit on an ordinary chair on my left hand and the Admiral on another on
+my right. I thought that these arrangements suggested the possibility of
+a tough controversy, and as far as the Admiral was concerned it proved
+to be so. For the discussion lasted for two and three-quarter hours, and
+was fairly close. I said throughout that, while I came here to explore
+the ground with the authority of my Sovereign and his Cabinet, I had
+come, not to make a treaty at that stage, but on a preliminary voyage of
+discovery with a view to taking back materials with which the Cabinet of
+St. James's might be able to construct one, and that I had been
+delighted with the graciousness of my reception. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span>I mention this because
+the Admiral appears not to have quite understood my position. I have no
+doubt that the Emperor understood it.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of the conversation I felt for once a little tired, and was
+glad when the Emperor asked von Tirpitz to drive me back to the Hotel
+Bristol. I thought the manner of the latter during the journey highly
+polite and correct, but not wholly sympathetic. I can only say that on
+my part I had endeavored to put every card I had upon the table.</p>
+
+<p>I have now touched on what seem to me the salient points in both of the
+volumes by these two famous statesmen. I have, I hope, brought out
+sufficiently the fact that on their own showing they were pursuing
+contradictory policies, and that it was the consequent failure to follow
+a policy that was consistent and continuous that in the end led Germany
+to the slippery slope down which she glided into war. The circumstances
+of the world before and in 1914 were so difficult, the piling up of
+armaments had been so great, that nothing but the utmost caution could
+secure a safe path. I believe the Emperor and Bethmann to have desired
+wholeheartedly the preservation of the peace. But to that end they took
+inadequate means, and the result was a disastrous failure to accomplish
+it.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span>The disturbing presence of the policy of relying on a preponderance in
+power over England, to be gained by a great navy, to the side of which
+the smaller navies would be attracted, imposed on England the necessity
+of guarding against what was menacing the national life. As the outcome
+of this situation she was compelled, so long as Germany insisted on
+developing her naval policy, to sit down and take thought. The result of
+her deliberations may be summed up in eight propositions:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>1. It was necessary, if the safety of England by sea was not to be
+put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close
+friendships with other nations.</p>
+
+<p>2. The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the
+maintenance of British sea power.</p>
+
+<p>3. While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance
+to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed
+in such peril as made it desirable that we should be able to
+render her help by land also.</p>
+
+<p>4. But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were
+great enough to make it reasonable to estimate that a small army
+from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to
+break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.</p>
+
+<p>5. Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great
+Britain to raise in time of peace a great army <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span>for use on the
+Continent. The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary
+corps of professional officers required to train and command such
+an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task
+were to be taken in hand in peace time. But it was possible to
+organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary
+Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions,
+and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation
+with those who were best able to throw light on them.</p>
+
+<p>6. Altho more than modern and scientific military organization on
+a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in
+carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable
+expansion in time of war to take place.</p>
+
+<p>7. In the result, as was believed here, and as Admiral von Tirpitz
+himself seems to have anticipated, sea power and capacity for
+blockade would decide the issue of the war. In this respect
+Germany seemed less well prepared than Great Britain.</p>
+
+<p>8. The last thing wished for was war, and if we had to enter upon
+it we should do so only in defense of our own vital interests, as
+well as those of the other Entente Powers. Our entry, if it was to
+come, must be immediate and unhesitating. For if we delayed
+Germany might succeed in occupying the northern coast of France,
+and in impairing our security by sea.</p></div>
+
+<p>I will conclude this chapter by appending an estimate of the Emperor
+William II, which is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span>worth comparing with that of his German Ministers
+already referred to.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img"><a name="imagep170" id="imagep170"></a>
+<a href="images/imagep170.jpg">
+<img border="0" src="images/imagep170.jpg" width="45%" alt="Count Ottokar Czernin" /></a><br />
+<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN<br />
+<span class="scfake">MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM DEC. 1916 TO
+APRIL, 1918.</span>
+<span class="totoi"><a href="#toi">ToList</a></span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the chapter on William II in Count Czernin's book on "The World War"
+there is a passage which may, I think, turn out to be pretty near the
+truth about the late Emperor's mood: "Altho the Emperor was always very
+powerful in speech and gesture, still, during the war he was much less
+independent in his actions than is usually assumed, and, in my opinion,
+this is one of the principal reasons that gave rise to a mistaken
+understanding of all the Emperor's administrative activities. Far more
+than the public imagine, he was a driven rather than a driving factor,
+and if the Entente to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge
+in one person in order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust
+and an error, as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William
+never played the part attributed to him by the Entente:</p>
+
+<p>"The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in
+store for him.</p>
+
+<p>"He has been carried too high, and can not escape a terrible fall. Fate
+seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, if it exists at all, is
+not so much his as that of his country and his times. The Byzantine
+atmosphere in Germany <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span>was the ruin of Emperor William; it enveloped
+him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a vast crowd of
+flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the hour of trial.
+The Emperor William was merely a particularly distinctive representative
+of his class. All modern monarchs suffer from the disease; but it was
+more highly developed in the Emperor William, and therefore more obvious
+than in others. Accustomed from his youth to the subtle poison of
+flattery, at the head of one of the greatest and mightiest States in the
+world, possessing almost unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot
+that awaits men who feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who
+begin to believe in their Divine semblance.</p>
+
+<p>"He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with
+him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the
+best.</p>
+
+<p>"It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into
+the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their
+effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to
+terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of <i>si vis
+pacem, para bellum</i>, and by emphasizing the military <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span>power of Germany
+he endeavored to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from
+declaring war on him.</p>
+
+<p>"It can not be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and
+mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is
+asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the <i>dolus</i> of making war, that
+he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up war.</p>
+
+<p>"Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the
+injurious effects of his behavior and to make him feel the growing
+mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two but
+dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on the
+Emperor. It is equally true that of all the inhabitants of the earth the
+German is the one least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of
+other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were perhaps but few in
+the immediate entourage of the Emperor who recognized the growing
+anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of them who so continuously extolled
+the Emperor were really honestly of opinion that his behavior was quite
+correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible not to believe that among the
+many clever politicians of the last decade there were some who had a
+clear <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span>grasp of the situation, and the fact remains that in order to
+spare the Emperor and themselves they had not the courage to be harsh
+with him and tell him the truth to his face. These are not reproaches,
+but reminiscences which should not be superfluous at a time when the
+Emperor is to be made the scapegoat of the whole world."</p>
+
+<br />
+<br style="width: 15%;" />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> "Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege," Th. von Bethmann Hollweg.
+"Erinnerungen," Alfred von Tirpitz. Both translated into English under
+the Titles: "Reflections on the World War," and "My Memoirs."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In both cases I am writing with the books before me in the
+original.</p></div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span><br />
+<h2>THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER IV<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>When more time has passed and heads have become cooler the critics will
+have to decide whether Great Britain was as fully prepared as she ought
+to have been for the possibility of the great struggle into which she
+had to enter in August, 1914. Hundreds of speeches have been made, and
+still more articles have been written, to demonstrate that she was
+caught wholly unready. On the other hand authoritative writers in
+Germany have made the counter-assertion that she had prepared copiously,
+not merely to defend herself, but to join in encircling and crushing
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>I shall venture to submit some reasons for saying that neither of these
+views is the true one. During the whole of the period between the
+commencement of 1906 and the autumn of 1914 I sat on the Committee of
+Imperial Defense and took an active part in its deliberations. For over
+six of these eight years I was Minister for War, and I was in continuous
+co-operation with the colleagues who were, like myself, engaged in
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span>carrying into execution the methods which we had gradually worked out.
+Such as the plans were, the preparations which they required were
+completed before the war. As to the bulk of these preparations I speak
+from direct knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>The Expeditionary Force, the Territorial Force, and the Special Reserve
+had been organized under my own eye, by soldiers who had studied modern
+war upon what was in this country a wholly new principle. Before they
+took matters in hand not only was there no divisional organization, but
+hardly a brigade could have been sent to the Continent without being
+recast. For there used to be a peace organization that was different
+from the organization that was required for war, and to convert the
+former into the latter meant a delay that would have been deadly. Swift
+mobilization, like that of the Germans even in 1870, was in these older
+days impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>All this had been changed for the Regular Army at home by the end of
+1908, and it was after that year easy to mobilize. Other changes, also
+of a sweeping character, had been made to complete the new structure. On
+August 4, 1914, Lord Kitchener took delivery of an army in being, small,
+but not inferior in quality to the best that the enemy possessed. With
+the creation of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>new armies, for which the Expeditionary Force was
+the pattern&mdash;and, indeed, with the general management of the war&mdash;I had
+very little to do. But I saw a good deal of Lord Kitchener, enough to
+impress me from the day when he became War Minister with his
+extraordinary individuality and his remarkable courage and energy, and
+to make me feel what an invaluable asset his personality was for putting
+heart into the British nation.</p>
+
+<p>I have referred to my own and earlier part in the matter only to make
+plain that I do not speak about it from mere hearsay. And to say this
+has been necessary, because I shall have to submit some observations
+which, if true, do not harmonize with assertions made by some of the
+critics of the successive Governments which were at work on the business
+of preparation for possible contingencies between 1906 and 1914. I will,
+however, begin by making these critics a present of a definite
+admission. We never intended to create an army capable of invading or
+encircling Germany, and we should, in our own view, have found ourselves
+unable to do so even had we desired any such thing.</p>
+
+<p>Our purpose was quite a different one. It was purely defensive. We knew
+how high a level of military organization had been attained in France.
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span>She had a large army, an army not so large as that of Germany, but
+comparable with it in quality. Her ally, Russia, also had a large army
+on the other side of Germany, altho one not so perfectly organized as
+that of France. By adding to the French military defensive forces a
+comparatively small British Expeditionary Force of very high quality,
+organized as far as possible on the principle about which von der Goltz,
+in the introduction to his famous book, "The Nation in Arms," had
+written, we could provide what that eminent writer had suggested would
+be formidable, could it be properly organized, even against the German
+masses of troops. In the introduction to his "Nation in Arms" he had
+declared that, "Looking forward into the future we seem to feel the
+coming of a time when the armed millions of the present will have played
+out their part. A new Alexander will arise who, with a small body of
+well-equipped and skilled warriors, will drive the impotent hordes
+before him, when, in their eagerness to multiply, they shall have
+overstepped all proper bounds, have lost internal cohesion, and, like
+the green-banner army of China, have become transformed into a
+numberless but effete host of Philistines."</p>
+
+<p>This, of course, did not mean that the little <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span>Expeditionary Force could
+by itself cope with the admirably organized and enormous German Army,
+but it did point to the growing importance in these times of high morale
+and quality, and to the value that even a small force, if sufficiently
+long and closely trained, might prove to have, if placed in a proper
+position alongside the excellent soldiers of France. A careful study had
+made us think that the addition of even a small force of such quality to
+those of France and Russia would provide the combined armies with a good
+chance of defeating any German attempt at the invasion and dismemberment
+of France.</p>
+
+<p>But in addition to and apart from all this, the British Navy had been
+raised before 1914 to a strength unexampled in its history, and Mr.
+Churchill had for the first time introduced in the autumn of 1911 the
+valuable principle of a war staff, fashioned with a view to the
+systematic study of modern naval war in co-operation with the forces on
+land.</p>
+
+<p>These naval reforms had helped to confer the fresh power which took
+shape in the blockade which was in the end to prove decisive in the
+struggle. The heads of the newly organized Military General Staff met
+the representatives of the Admiralty War Staff at systematically held
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span>meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defense, under the presidency of
+the successive Prime Ministers&mdash;first of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+and then of Mr. Asquith. Not only were the Ministers at the head of the
+Admiralty and the War Office present to listen to what their experts had
+to say and to assist in arriving at conclusions on the questions
+discussed at these meetings, but other Ministers (including Lord Crewe,
+Sir Edward Grey, Lord Morley, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Harcourt)
+attended regularly. The function of this committee was to consider
+strategical difficulties with which the nation might conceivably find
+itself confronted, and to work out the solutions. It was a committee the
+members of which were selected and summoned by the Prime Minister, to
+whom it was advisory. He determined the subjects to be investigated.
+Secrecy was of course essential, excepting so far as the Cabinet was
+concerned. The presence of the non-military Ministers to whom I have
+referred was a proper guarantee that from the Cabinet there was no
+desire to withhold information. Possible operations on the Continent of
+our army occupied much of the time of the committee. About the propriety
+of the conversations which took place between members of the General
+Staffs of France and England questions <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span>have been raised. But these
+conversations were concerned with purely technical matters, and doubts
+as to their justification will hardly arise in the minds of people who
+are aware what modern war implies in the way of preliminary inquiries as
+to its conditions.</p>
+
+<p>We were not engaging in any secret undertaking. We were merely providing
+what modern military requirements had rendered essential. Without study
+beforehand by a General Staff military operations in these days are
+bound to fail. If at any time we had, by any chance whatever, to operate
+in France it was essential that our generals should possess long in
+advance the knowledge that was requisite, and this could only be
+obtained with the assistance of the General Staff of France itself. We
+committed ourselves to no undertaking of any kind, and it was from the
+first put in writing that we could not do so. The conversations were
+just the natural and informal outcome of our close friendship with
+France.</p>
+
+<p>The French had said that if it was to be regarded as even possible that
+we should come to their assistance in resisting an attack, which might,
+moreover, result if successful in great prejudice to our own security in
+the Channel, we should find this study vital. Our General Staff took the
+same <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span>view, and at the request of Sir Edward Grey, who had written to
+him, I saw Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at his house in London in
+January, 1906. He was a very cautious man, but he was also an old War
+Minister. He at once saw the point, and he gave me authority for
+directing the Staff at the War Office to take the necessary steps. He
+naturally laid down that the study proposed was to be carefully guarded,
+so far as any possible claim of commitment was concerned, that it was
+not to go beyond the limits of purely General Staff work, and further
+that it should not be talked about. The inquiry into conditions thus set
+on foot was conducted by the three successive generals who occupied the
+position of Director of Military Operations&mdash;the late General Grierson,
+General Ewart, and General Wilson. Each of these distinguished soldiers
+from time to time explained the progress made in working out conceivable
+plans for using the Expeditionary Force in France and in more distant
+regions, to the full Committee of Imperial Defense, and obtained its
+provisional approval.</p>
+
+<p>I should like to say how much the Committee of Imperial Defense, which
+was originally a very valuable contribution made by Mr. Balfour, when
+Prime Minister, to the organization of our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span>preparedness for war, owed
+to its secretaries. To such men as Admiral Sir Charles Ottley and, after
+his time, to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, the nation is under a great
+debt, and it was the least that could be done to include the latter in
+the thanks of Parliament to the sailors and soldiers to whom our actual
+success was due. It was he who, assisted by a brilliant staff on which
+the late Colonel Grant Duff was prominent, planned and prepared that
+remarkable War Book, which was completed in excellent time before the
+outbreak of hostilities, and which contained full instructions for every
+department of Government which could be called on to assist if war broke
+out. Not only the drafts of the necessary orders, but those of the
+necessary telegrams, were written out in advance under Sir Maurice
+Hankey's instructions. He and Sir Charles Ottley, themselves sailors,
+formed real links between the navy and the army, and did an enormous
+amount of work in co-ordinating war objectives.</p>
+
+<p>Of the Navy I need say nothing, for its preparations are well
+understood. Nor need I say much of the details in the reorganization of
+the army. The general principle of this was to complete the Cardwell
+system by shaping the home battalions into six great divisions, and so
+providing <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span>them with transport, munitions, stores, and medical and other
+equipment, as to make them instantly ready for war. The characteristic
+of the old British Army, as it was up to 1907, was, as I have already
+observed, that it lived in peace formations only, in small and detached
+units which would have to be refashioned into quite different formations
+before they could be ready to be sent to fight.</p>
+
+<p>This state of things involved much delay in mobilization. A careful
+inquiry made in 1906 disclosed that in order to put even 80,000 men on
+the Continent, a period which might be well over two months was the
+minimum required. Besides this great difficulty, the other items to
+which I have referred as required for the six divisions were not there
+in any shape even approaching sufficiency. The artillery too was
+deficient.</p>
+
+<p>There is no more amusing myth than the one according to which the horse
+and field artillery were reduced. The batteries which could be made
+instantly effective for war were, in fact, raised from forty-two to
+eighty-one. The personnel of this artillery was increased by a third for
+mobilization. For the first time the horse and field artillery was given
+the modern organization which Cardwell had not been able to give it. The
+establishments had been merely peace establishments. There were
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span>ninety-nine batteries which could parade about on ceremonial occasions,
+but if war had broken out they would have had to be rolled up, and the
+personnel of fifty-seven of them taken to produce the mobilized
+forty-two which were all that could be put into the field. The
+difficulty was got over by the organization of eighteen of the
+ninety-nine into training brigades, and the additional men needed for
+the mobilization of eighty-one fighting batteries were thus obtained. No
+doubt some of the artillery officers did not like being set to training
+work, and complained that they were being reduced. But it was a
+reduction from unreal work of parade in order to double fighting
+efficiency. Not a man or a gun of the regular horse and field artillery
+was ever reduced in any shape or form, and not only were the effective
+batteries largely increased, but over 150 serviceable batteries were
+created and made part of the Second Line, or Territorial, Army. This was
+a force which could be used either for home defense or for expansion of
+an expeditionary force of Regulars. The Militia, which was not under
+obligation to serve abroad, was abolished, and its substance was
+converted into third regular battalions, organized for the purpose of
+training and providing drafts to meet the wastage of war in the first
+and second <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span>regular battalions of their regiments. Some of those third
+battalions are said to have trained and sent out as many as twelve
+thousand men apiece in the course of the war.</p>
+
+<p>All these things were done under the direction of such young and modern
+soldiers as Sir Douglas Haig on the General Staff side, and as Sir John
+Cowans on the administrative side. Both of these officers were brought
+home from India for the purpose. Sir Herbert Miles, as
+Quartermaster-General, and Sir Stanley von Donop, as Master-General of
+the Ordnance also rendered much help. The newly organized General Staff
+thought the plans out under the direction, first of Sir Neville
+Lyttelton, and then of Sir William Nicholson, its successive chiefs. The
+latter and Sir Douglas Haig in addition worked out, in consultation with
+the representatives of the Dominions, the organization of their troops
+in units and with staffs and weapons corresponding as nearly as was
+practicable to our own. Systematic conferences between the British and
+Dominion War and other Ministers prepared the ground for this. Sir
+Wilfrid Laurier and General Botha and others of the Dominion Ministers
+came to London and co-operated.</p>
+
+<p>It is sometimes said that all these things were <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>very well, but that we
+should have at once raised a much larger army, as in the course of the
+war we ultimately had to do. The answer is that in a time of peace we
+could not possibly have raised a large army on the Continental scale. If
+we had tried to we should have made a miserable and possibly disastrous
+failure. The utmost we could do toward it was to provide the
+organization in which the comparatively small force which was all we
+could create might be expanded after a war broke out.</p>
+
+<p>How this nucleus organization, on the basis of which the later
+expansions took place, was fashioned so as to afford a general pattern,
+anyone may see who chooses to expend a shilling on the purchase of the
+little volume called "Field Service Regulations, Part II." This piece of
+work took nearly three years to prepare. With the organization of which
+I have spoken, which was made in accordance with its principles, the
+whole of the task of recasting the British Army was performed by 1911.</p>
+
+<p>What we had by that time attained was the power to send an army of, not
+100,000 men, which was all that had originally been suggested, but of
+160,000, to a place of concentration opposite the Belgian frontier, and
+to have it concentrated there within a time which was fifteen days in
+1911, but <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>was a little later reduced to twelve. No German army could
+mobilize and concentrate at such a distance more rapidly. So far as I
+know none of the necessary details were overlooked, and the timetables
+and arrangements for the concentration worked out, when the moment for
+their use came, without a hitch. What had been done was to take the
+old-fashioned British Army and to rid it of superfluous fat, to develop
+muscle in place of mere flesh, and to put the whole force into proper
+training. If the warrior looked slender he was at least as well prepared
+for the ring as science could make him.</p>
+
+<p>It is said that this army ought to have been provided from the first
+with more heavy artillery. But the reason why its artillery, and that of
+the French armies also, were of a comparatively light pattern was not
+due to any notion of economy or to civilian interference. We had enough
+money, even in those difficult days, for every necessary purpose.</p>
+
+<p>The real reason was that the General Staffs of both the French and the
+British Armies had advised that the campaign would probably be one in
+which swiftness in moving troops would prove the determining factor.
+Heavy artillery, and even any large number of the ponderous machine-guns
+of that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span>period (the Lewis gun had not yet appeared), would have been a
+serious impediment to such mobility. What was anticipated was a series
+of great battles. "It was supposed by certain soldiers," says a
+well-informed military critic (Colonel A'Court Repington, at page 276 of
+his "Vestigia"), "that the war against Germany would be decided by the
+fighting of some seven great battles <i>en rase campagne</i>, where heavies
+would be a positive encumbrance."</p>
+
+<p>So far the staffs proved to be right, for in the early period of the war
+mobility did count for a very great deal, and it was not until later
+that trench warfare became the dominant factor, a stage for which even
+the Germans themselves, as we now know, from the memoirs of Admiral
+Tirpitz and other books, were not adequately prepared in point of guns,
+or of shells and powder, either.</p>
+
+<p>It is said that we in Great Britain ought, before entering on the
+Entente, to have provided an army, not of 160,000, but of 2,000,000 men.
+And it is remarked that this is what we had to do in the end. This
+suggestion does not, however, bear scrutiny. No doubt it would have been
+a great advantage if, in addition to our tremendous navy, we could have
+produced, at the outbreak of the war, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span>2,000,000 men, so trained as to
+be the equals in this respect of German troops, and properly fashioned
+into the great divisions that were necessary, with full equipment and
+auxiliary services. But to train the recruits, and to command such an
+army when fashioned, would have required a very great corps of
+professional officers of high military education, many times as large as
+we had actually raised. How were these to have been got?</p>
+
+<p>I sometimes read speeches, made even by officers who have served with
+distinction at the head of their men in the field, which express regret
+that the British nation was so shortsighted as not to have provided such
+an army before the war. They point to the effort it made later on with
+such success during the war. But to raise armies under the stress of
+war, when the people submit cheerfully to compulsion, and when highly
+intelligent civilian men of business readily quit their occupations to
+be trained as rapidly as possible for the work of every kind of officer,
+is one thing. To do it in peace time is quite another. I doubt whether
+more was possible in this direction than, in the days prior to the war,
+to organize the Officers' Training Corps, which contained over twenty
+thousand partially prepared young men, and began at once to expand to
+yet larger dimensions from <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span>the day when war broke out. For the corps of
+matured officers, required to train recruits and to command them in war
+when organized in their units, would have had to consist of soldiers,
+themselves highly trained in military organization, who had devoted
+their lives to this work as a profession. It takes many years in peace
+time to train such officers. Because they must be professional, they can
+only be recruited under a voluntary system.</p>
+
+<p>Now, before the war it was difficult enough to recruit even so many as
+the number we then had got, a number totally inadequate for any army
+larger than the small one we actually put into shape at home. Every
+source had been tried in my time by the able administrative generals who
+were working under me at the War Office. I say "administrative
+generals," for here comes in the source of the confusion which at times
+leads not a few&mdash;including some whose military training has been
+exclusively in the leading of troops and in strategy and tactics&mdash;to
+miss the point.</p>
+
+<p>Under the modern military principle, which is the secret of rapidity and
+efficiency in mobilization, duties are carefully defined and divided.
+The General Staff does not administer, and is not trained in the
+business of administration. This kind of military business is entrusted
+to the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span>administrative side of the army, the officers of which receive a
+different kind of training. The General Staff says what is necessary.
+The administrative side provides it as far as it can. And among the
+exclusive functions of the administrative side of the War Office is the
+recruiting of personnel by the Adjutant-General and the Military
+Secretary. It is true that the Director of Military Training, who
+supervises the training of the young officer when obtained, belongs to
+the General Staff. That is because his work is educational. With
+obtaining the young officer it is only accidentally that he is at all
+concerned.</p>
+
+<p>When, therefore, even distinguished commanders in the field express
+regret at the want of foresight of the British nation in not having
+prepared a much larger army before 1914, I would respectfully ask them
+how they imagine it could have been done.</p>
+
+<p>To raise a great corps of officers who have voluntarily selected the
+career of an officer as an exclusive and absorbing profession has been
+possible in Germany and in France. But it has only become possible there
+after generations of effort and under pressure of a long-standing
+tradition, extending from decade to decade, under which a nation, armed
+for the defense of its land <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span>frontiers, has expended its money and its
+spirit in creating such an officer caste.</p>
+
+<p>Now, the British nation has put its money and its fighting spirit
+primarily into its Navy and its oversea forces. Why? Because, just as
+the Continental tradition had its genesis in the necessity for instant
+readiness to defend land frontiers, so our tradition has had its genesis
+in the vital necessity of always commanding the sea.</p>
+
+<p>Possibly if, just after the war of 1870, we had endeavored to enter on a
+new tradition, and to develop a great army, we might have succeeded in
+doing so. With forty years' time devoted to the task and a very large
+expenditure we might conceivably have succeeded. But I think that had we
+done so we should have been very foolish. Our navy would inevitably have
+been diminished and deteriorated. You can not ride two horses at once,
+and no more can you possess in their integrity two great conflicting
+military traditions.</p>
+
+<p>But what I am saying does not rest on my own conclusions alone. In the
+year 1912 the then Chief of the General Staff told me that he and the
+General Staff would like to investigate, as a purely military problem,
+the question whether we could or could not raise a great army. I thought
+this a reasonable inquiry and sanctioned and found <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span>money for it, only
+stipulating that they should consult with the Administrative Staffs when
+assembling the materials for the investigation. The outcome was embodied
+in a report made to me by Lord Nicholson, himself a soldier who had a
+strong desire for compulsory service and a large army. He reported, as
+the result of a prolonged and careful investigation, that, alike as
+regarded officers and as regarded buildings and equipment, the
+conclusion of the General Staff was that it would be in a high degree
+unwise to try, during a period of unrest on the Continent, to commence a
+new military system. It could not be built up excepting after much
+unavoidable delay. We might at once experience a falling off in
+voluntary recruiting, and so become seriously weaker before we had a
+chance of becoming stronger. And the temptation to a foreign General
+Staff to make an early end of what it might insist on interpreting as
+preparation for aggression on our part would be too strong to be risked.
+What we should get might prove to be a mob in place of an army. I quite
+agreed, and not the less because it was highly improbable that the
+country would have looked at anything of the sort.</p>
+
+<p>What we actually could produce in the form of an army had to be
+estimated, not as if we were <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span>standing alone, but as being an adjunct to
+what was possessed by France and Russia. They had large armies and small
+navies. We had a large navy and a small army. When these were considered
+in conjunction, I do not think that the hope of some of our best
+military authorities, that an aggressive attempt by the Central Powers
+could be made abortive, was an over-sanguine one.</p>
+
+<p>Much of what we did owe for the excellence of the Expeditionary Force,
+such as it was in point of size, and much of what we have since owed for
+the excellence of the great armies that we subsequently raised, was due
+to the unbroken work of the fine Administrative Staff, developed in
+those days, to which I have already referred. I often regret that when
+the nation gave its thanks through Parliament to the army, the splendid
+contribution made by those who prepared the administrative services was
+not adequately recognized. But this arose from the old British tradition
+under which fighting and administration were not distinguished as being
+quite separate and yet equally essential for fighting. The public had
+not got into its head the reality of the process of defining the two
+different functions with precision, and of confiding them to different
+sets of officers differently trained.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span>The principle was a novel one in the army itself, and why one set of
+officers should be trained at the Staff College and another at the
+London School of Economics was not a question the answer to which was
+quite familiar, even to all soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>It is, I think, certain that for purely military reasons, even if, in
+view of political (including diplomatic) difficulties any party in the
+State had felt itself able to undertake the task of raising a great army
+under compulsory service, and to set itself to accomplish it, say,
+within the ten years before the war, the fulfilment of the undertaking
+could not have been accomplished, and failure in it would have made us
+much weaker than we were when the war broke out. The only course really
+open was to make use of the existing voluntary system, and bring its
+organization for war up to the modern requirements, of which they were
+in 1906 far short. It is true that the voluntary system could not give
+us a substantially larger army, or more than a better one in point of
+quality. The stream of voluntary recruits was limited. When the 156
+battalions of the line which existed on paper in 1906 were in that year
+nominally reduced to 148, there was no real reduction, altho some money
+was saved which was required for some other essential military purposes.
+For the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span>remaining battalions were short of their proper strength, and
+it took all the recruits set free by the so-called reductions to bring
+the 148&mdash;some of which were badly short of officers and men alike&mdash;to
+the proper establishment required for the six new divisions of the
+Expeditionary Force.</p>
+
+<p>I remember well the then Adjutant-General, Sir Charles Douglas, one of
+the ablest men of business who ever filled that position in this
+country, informing me at that time that he could not raise a single
+further division to be added to the six at home.</p>
+
+<p>But if the voluntary system had disadvantages, it also presented us with
+advantages. The professional and therefore voluntary nature of our army,
+which, because it was professional, was always ready for sending
+overseas on expeditions, was in reality made necessary by our position
+as the island center of a great and scattered Empire. We had increased
+that Empire enormously by the possession of a voluntarily serving army.
+Whether this vast increase of the Empire has been always defensible I am
+not discussing. What I am saying is that we owe the actual increases
+largely to this, that we were the only Power in the world that was ready
+to step in at short notice and occupy vacant territory. We always had a
+much larger <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span>Expeditionary Force available for this special purpose than
+Germany or any other country. That has been our tradition, as contrasted
+with the tradition of other nations who have been limited in this kind
+of capacity by the necessity of putting their military forces on a
+compulsory basis and keeping them at home for the protection of their
+land frontiers. Ours was the method in which we had been schooled by
+experience.</p>
+
+<p>It is for such reasons as I have now submitted that I am wholly unable
+to assent to the suggestion that we did not look ahead, or considered
+within the years just before the war whether we were preparing to make
+the sort of contribution that our own interests and our friendships
+alike required. Sea power was for us then, as always before in our
+history, the dominant element in military policy. I have little doubt
+that we made mistakes over details. That is inherent in human and
+therefore finite effort. But I believe that we did in the main the best
+we could for the fulfilment of our only purpose, which was to preserve
+the peace of the world and avoid contributing to its disturbance, and
+also to prepare to defend ourselves and our friends against aggression.
+Talk to the public we could not, for it would have hindered and not
+helped us to do so. A <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span>"preventive war," which the Entente Powers would
+not have been so ready to meet as they became later on, might well have
+been the result. Rhetorical declarations on platforms would have been
+wholly out of place. But we could think, and to the best of such
+abilities as we and our expert advisers possessed, we did try to think.</p>
+
+<p>A curious legend which had its origin in Berlin, in October, 1914, has
+obtained such currency that it is worth while to make an end of it. The
+legend is that the British Military Attach&eacute; at Brussels, the late
+General Barnardiston, had informed the Chief of the Belgian General
+Staff of secret plans, prepared at the War Office in London, to invade
+Belgium, and if necessary to violate her neutrality, in order to make an
+expedition, the purpose of which was to attack Germany through that
+country. The story appears to have emanated from Baron Greindl, who was
+the Belgian Minister at Berlin in 1911. He had been completely
+misinformed, no doubt in that capital, and there is no truth whatever in
+what he had been told about what he called the "perfidious and na&iuml;f
+revelations" of the British Military Attach&eacute; at Brussels. Him the story
+represents as having said that his Minister (by whom I presume myself,
+as the then Secretary of State for War, to have been intended) <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span>and the
+British General Staff were the only persons in the secret. I have to
+observe, in the first place, that I never during my tenure of office,
+either suggested any such plan, or heard of anyone else suggesting it.
+When the story was brought to my knowledge, which was not until
+November, 1914, I inquired at once of General Barnardiston and of his
+successor, Colonel Bridges, whether there was any foundation for it. The
+reply from each of these distinguished officers was that there was none.</p>
+
+<p>We were among the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, and it was of course
+conceivable that, if she called on us to do so, we might have had to
+defend her. It would be part of the duty of our Military Attach&eacute; to
+remember this, and, if opportunity offered, to ascertain in informal
+conversation the view of the Belgian General Staff as to what form of
+help they would be likely to ask us for. This he doubtless did, and
+indeed it appears from what the Chief of the Belgian General Staff wrote
+to the Belgian War Minister that the former had discussed the
+contingency of Belgium desiring our help with General Barnardiston, and
+had done so gladly. But even so the conversation must have been very
+informal, for in the account of it by the Chief of the Belgian <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span>General
+Staff there are errors about the composition of the possible British
+Force which indicate that either he took no notes, or else that Colonel
+Barnardiston had not thought it an occasion which required him to obtain
+details from London. At all events, such talk as there was appears to
+have had relation only to what we ought to do, if requested by Belgium
+to help, in case of her being invaded by another Power.</p>
+
+<p>The documents will be found in the volume of Collected Diplomatic
+Documents relating to the outbreak of the war, presented to Parliament
+in May, 1915 (Cd. 7860). This volume includes a vigorous denial by Sir
+Edward Grey of the insinuation.</p>
+
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span><br />
+<h2>EPILOG</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER V<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>EPILOG</h4>
+<br />
+
+<p>The great war is over, and the Powers of the West have conquered. In the
+earlier pages I have given my own view of why they won in the tremendous
+struggle that now belongs to history. They had on their side moral
+forces which were lacking to their adversaries.</p>
+
+<p>Germany went into the war with a conviction that had been carefully
+instilled into her people. It was that she was being ringed round with
+the intention that she should be crushed, and that presently it would be
+too late for her to deliver herself. The lesson so taught to her was not
+a true one. She might easily have obtained guarantees of peace which
+ought to have satisfied her, without undertaking a risk which in the end
+was to prove disastrous. No one here wanted to ruin her, no one who
+counted seriously in this country. And if we did not want to, no more in
+reality did France or Russia. She brought her fate on her head by the
+unwisdom of her methods. But her people hardly desired the dangers of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span>unnecessary war, and her rulers dared not have ventured these dangers
+had they not first of all preached a wrong doctrine to those over whom
+they ruled. They had their way in the end, and disaster to sixty-eight
+millions of Germans was the consequence. The calculations of their
+chiefs were bad from the beginning. It is almost certain that the best
+and most eminent among even these really desired peace. They blundered
+in method. It was not by continually flashing the saber that peace was
+to be secured.</p>
+
+<p>It is scarcely likely that the conditions under which this war became
+possible will recur. It is more than unlikely that they will recur in
+our time. But it is none the less worth while to consider how the
+unlikelihood can be made to approach most nearly to a certainty.</p>
+
+<p>Not, I think, by causing the millions of German-speaking people to feel
+that they are in chains without possibility of freedom. More certainly,
+surely, by leading them to the faith that if they will play a part in
+the great world effort for permanent peace and for reconstruction they
+will be welcomed to the brotherhood of nations. The individual German
+citizen is more like the individual Anglo-Saxon than he is different
+from him. The same hopes and the same fears animate him, and he is
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>sober and industrious quite as much as we are. He has similar problems
+and similar interests.</p>
+
+<p>Time must pass before the angry feeling that a great struggle produces
+can die down. But there are already indications that this feeling is not
+as intense with us as it was even a short time ago. Germany made a
+colossal and unjustifiable blunder. She is responsible for the action of
+her late Government. We think so, and we are not likely to change our
+opinion on this point. The grief of our people over their dead, over the
+lives that were laid down for the nation from the highest kind of
+inspiration, will keep the public mind fixed on this conclusion. And so
+will the waste and misery to the whole world which an unnecessary war
+has brought in its train. But presently we shall ask ourselves, in
+moments of reflection, whether this ought to be our final word, and
+also, perhaps, whether some want of care on our own part, and certain
+deficiencies of which we are now more conscious than we used to be, may
+not have had something to do with the failure of other people to divine
+our real mood and intentions. I am not sure that in days that are to
+come we shall give ourselves the whole benefit of the doubt. However
+this may be, we are in no case a vindictive people.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>But in any view something serious is at stake. It will be a bad thing
+for us, and it will be a bad thing for the world, if the people of the
+vanquished nations are left to feel that they have no hope of being
+restored to decent conditions of existence. At present despair is
+threatening them. Their estimate is that the crushing burden of the
+terms of peace, if carried out to their full possibilities, bars them
+from the prospect of a better future. Their only way of deliverance may
+well come to seem to them to lie in the grouping of the discontented
+nationalities, and the faith that by this means, at some time which may
+come hereafter, a new balance of power may begin to be set up.</p>
+
+<p>Now this is not a good prospect, and the sooner we succeed in softening
+the sense of real hardship out of which it arises the better. Germany
+and Austria must pay the penalty they have incurred before the tribunal
+of international justice. But that penalty ought to be tempered by
+something that depends on even more than mercy. It is intended to be
+inflicted for the good of the world, and if it assumes a form which
+threatens the future safety of the world it is not wise to press it to
+its extreme consequences. We have to work toward a better state of
+things than that which is promised to-day. We have never hitherto kept
+up old <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span>animosities unduly long, and that has been one of the secrets of
+our strength in the world. The lessons of history point to the
+expediency of trying to heal instead of to keep open the wound which
+exists. Those who know the growth in the past of literature, of music,
+of science, of philosophy, of industry and of commerce, do not wish the
+German people to die out. It is only the ignorant that can desire this,
+and, hitherto in the course of our history, the ignorant have neither
+proved to be safe guides nor have they prevailed. To-day, as before, we
+must think of generations other than our own if we would preserve our
+strength.</p>
+
+<p>I hope that a time is near in which we shall no longer proclaim old
+grievances, but instead cease to dwell on the past in this case, just as
+we have ceased in the cases of the French, the Spanish, the Russians,
+and the Boers. It is best in every way that it should come to be so.</p>
+
+<p>It is not with any hope that these pages will satisfy the extremists of
+to-day that they have been written. They are intended for those who try
+to be dispassionate, and for them only, as a contribution to a vast heap
+of material that is being gathered together for consideration. It is
+well that those who were in any way directly <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span>connected with the story
+to which they relate should place on record what they saw. But the whole
+story in its fulness is beyond the knowledge of anyone of our time. The
+history of the world is, as has been said, the judgment of the world. It
+is therefore only after an interval that it can be sufficiently written.
+The ultimate and real origin of this war, the greatest humanity has ever
+had to endure, was a set of colossal suspicions of each other by the
+nations concerned. I do not mean that none of them were in the right or
+that some of them were not deeply in the wrong. What I do mean is that
+if there had been insight sufficient all round the nations concerned
+would not have misinterpreted each other.</p>
+
+<p>To us it looks as tho Germany had been inspired throughout by a bad
+tradition, a spirit older than even the days of Frederick the Great. Had
+she been wise we think that she would have changed her national policy
+after Bismarck had brought it to unexampled success in things material.
+There are not wanting indications that he himself had the sense of the
+necessity of great caution in pursuing this policy farther, and felt
+that it could not be safely continued without modification. It was no
+policy that was safe for any but the strongest and sanest of minds, and
+even <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span>for those it had ceased to be safe. The potential resistance to it
+was becoming too serious.</p>
+
+<p>But we do not need to doubt that there were many in Germany itself who
+saw this and did not desire to rely merely on blood and iron. The men
+and women in every country resemble those in other countries more than
+they differ from them. Germany was no exception to the rule. It is a
+great mistake to judge her as she was merely from a few newspapers and
+by the reports from Berlin of their special correspondents. Sixty-eight
+millions of people could not be estimated in their opinions by the
+attitude of a handful, however eminent and prominent, in the home of
+"<i>Real politik</i>." It is, of course, true that the Germans were taught to
+believe that they were a very great nation which had not got its full
+share of the good things of this world, a share of which they were more
+worthy and for which they were better organized than any other. But it
+is also true that we here thought that we ourselves were entitled to a
+great deal to which other people did not admit our moral title. It was
+not only Germany that was lacking in imagination. No doubt many Germans
+had the idea that we wished to hem them in and that we did not like
+them. Our failure to make ourselves understood left them not without
+reason <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span>for this belief. But dislike of Germany was not the attitude of
+the great mass of sober and God-fearing Englishmen, and I do not believe
+that the counter-attitude was that of the bulk of sober and God-fearing
+Germans. They and we alike mutually misjudged each other from what was
+written in newspapers and said in speeches by people who were not
+responsible exponents of opinion, and neither nation took sufficient
+trouble to make clear that what was thus written and said was not
+sufficient material on which to judge it. It is very difficult to
+diagnose general opinion in a foreign nation, and one of the reasons of
+the difficulty is that people at home do not pay sufficient attention to
+the fact that their unfriendly utterances about their neighbors are
+likely to receive more publicity and attention than the utterances that
+are friendly. It makes little difference that the latter may greatly
+preponderate in number. They are read in the main only in the country in
+which they are made.</p>
+
+<p>Neither Germans nor Englishmen were careful before the war always to be
+pleasant to each other, and the same used to be true of Frenchmen and
+Englishmen. But just as we are coming to understand why and how France
+and England misinterpreted each other systematically a century and a
+half ago, so we may yet learn how we came to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span>present, more than a
+hundred years later, difficulties to the Germans not wholly unlike those
+which they presented to us. No mere record of the dry facts will be
+enough to render this intelligible in its full significance. The
+historian who is to carry conviction must do more than present
+photographs. He must create a picture inspired by his own study and from
+the depth of his own mind, and presented in its real proportions with
+its proper lights and shadows, as a true artist alone can present it.
+Browning has told us something worth remembering. It is at the end of
+"The Ring and the Book":</p>
+
+<div class="poem"><div class="stanza">
+<span class="i24">Art may tell a truth<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Beyond mere imagery on the wall,&mdash;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">So, note by note, bring music from your mind,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,&mdash;<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,<br /></span>
+<span class="i0">Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.<br /></span>
+</div></div>
+
+<p>The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any
+single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history
+depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only
+kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and
+exacting, can rely on <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span>having the whole of the materials before his eye,
+and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints
+depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using
+more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole.
+Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be
+selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his
+personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man
+on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great
+historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of
+the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his
+narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his
+details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for
+this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as
+much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert
+and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian.
+It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the
+materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is
+only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of
+grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or
+the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span>are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits.
+They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits
+may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of
+what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many
+expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It
+is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we
+continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.</p>
+
+<p>The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the
+present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to
+collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care
+as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the
+later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to
+make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as
+necessary action is concerned.</p>
+
+<p>And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events
+possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one
+in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge
+her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our
+forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span>have
+impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis
+XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to
+bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were
+perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible
+national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no
+doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could
+hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so.
+And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the
+mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the
+adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance
+from calamity, even at the price of violent action.</p>
+
+<p>We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we
+judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been
+well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an
+exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even
+so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and
+treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into
+existence, had we and others been less hasty.</p>
+
+<p>It is therefore a good thing to keep before us <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span>that it is at least
+possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the
+victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry
+and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms
+of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near
+East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs
+were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people
+either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no
+one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the
+likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to
+disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply
+responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy
+and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government
+can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been
+due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was
+so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not
+as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us.
+No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central
+Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to
+reparation. This the Germans <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span>do not appear to controvert. They are a
+people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do
+something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have
+also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the
+German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the
+spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to
+fall again into the mistake that Burke made.</p>
+
+<p>The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a
+League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the
+supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the
+absence of a League of Nations, or&mdash;what is the same thing in a less
+organized form&mdash;of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none
+are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be
+relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente
+between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for
+safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held
+in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance
+on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never
+for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span>the principle is
+resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of
+aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with
+another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection
+and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification
+for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke
+out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to
+that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central
+Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this
+difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the
+Entente Powers.</p>
+
+<p>Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous
+number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and
+Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into
+account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war,
+but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which
+may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that
+statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough,
+it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of
+people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a
+prolonged <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span>period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our
+relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the
+Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more
+than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the
+Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly
+institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there
+is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to
+our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in
+which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone
+can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new
+balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if
+they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What
+really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is
+given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with
+us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which
+contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must
+attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is
+requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the
+people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people
+of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span>American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses
+on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking
+population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and
+Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to
+avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is
+for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent
+enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.</p>
+
+<p>How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the
+Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain
+divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to
+suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of
+the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made.
+Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling.
+The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was
+unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be
+enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in
+human nature.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span><br />
+<h2>INDEX</h2>
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>INDEX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+<br />
+
+<ul><li>Agadir incident, the, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Algeciras Conference, the, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+
+<li>Alsace-Lorraine, question of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  the Kaiser on, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>America, Tschirsky on, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li>Anglo-French Entente, B&uuml;low on, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  Tschirsky, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+  <li>  views of German Emperor on, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Armaments, difficulty of question of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  Germany's, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  question of compulsory service, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  Premier and War Secretary, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
+  <li>  presides at Imperial Defense Committee, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  ultimatum to Serbia, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+  </ul>
+<br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, <a href="#Page_63">63</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li>Balance of power, and the League of Nations, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  principle of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li>Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+
+<li>Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+
+<li>Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li>Berlin, a curious legend originating in, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
+  <li>  author's visit to, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  at Potsdam conference, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+  <li>  author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+  <li>  desires preservation of peace, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  <li>  his accusation against Entente Powers, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+  <li>  informed of Austrian ultimatum, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+  <li>  letter to author after the Montreal address, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+  <li>  loyalty to the Kaiser, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+  <li>  succeeds Prince B&uuml;low as Chancellor, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li>Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and Britain's indefinite policy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+  <li>  and the inevitability of war, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+  <li>  and the military party in Germany, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+  <li>  and Tirpitz, <a href="#Page_145">145-48</a></li>
+  <li>  denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span></li>
+  <li>  his affection for Emperor Frederick, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>  his hatred of "prestige politics," <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+  <li>  Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+
+<li>Bosnia, annexation of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+
+<li>Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attach&eacute; at Brussels, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li>
+
+<li>Britain's command of the sea, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+
+<li>British Army, the reorganization of, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+
+<li>British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  organization of, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+  <li>  unrecognized work of, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>British Government, the, paramount duty of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li>British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  (<i>See</i> also Navy, British)</li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>B&uuml;low, Prince von, author's meeting with, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  on the Anglo-French Entente, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
+  <li>  opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  <li>  succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+  </ul>
+<br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  informed of Berlin "conversations," <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  at Marienbad, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Reinsurance Treaty, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, <a href="#Page_70">70</a> (and note)</li>
+
+<li>Central Powers, the, preparations for war, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  their responsibility for the world war, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+
+<li>Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
+
+<li>Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li>Compulsory service, author's views on, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+<li>Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li>Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Czernin, Count, on William II., <a href="#Page_170">170</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+
+<li>Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li>Democracy and war, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  vindicated by the war, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  <li>  (<i>See</i> also Social Democracy)</li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Diplomacy before the war, <a href="#Page_35">35</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li>Disarmament, German objections to, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li>Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span></li>
+
+<li>Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Education, author's activities for, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li>Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  "encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+  <li>  entertains the German Emperor, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Einem, General von, at Windsor, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  author's interview with, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+
+<li>England, a War Staff for the Navy in, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  commercial rivalry with Germany, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+  <li>  conservation of sea power and what it implied, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>  efforts to preserve peace end in failure, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>  her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+  <li>  propagandists for German military party in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+  <li>  reorganization of army in, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+  <li>  voluntary military system of, and its advantages, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+  <li>  (<i>See</i> also Great Britain)</li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>England's precautions against Germany's war designs, <a href="#Page_168">168-69</a></li>
+
+<li>Englishmen, defects and failings of, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  psychology of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Entente, the, England's entry into&mdash;and the alternative, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  policy of, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li>Expeditionary Force (<i>see</i> British Expeditionary Force)<br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+
+<li>France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  army of, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li><i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li>Free Trade, Prince von B&uuml;low's views on, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  William II. on, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>French Revolution, the, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li>French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, <a href="#Page_48">48</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>George V., King, entertains German Emperor, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+
+<li>George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>German desire of commercial development, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  foreign policy: divided control of, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Germans, psychology of, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
+
+<li>Germany, and the Agadir incident, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Hague Conference, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+  <li>  attitude of, before the war, <a href="#Page_101">101</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  cause of her downfall, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>  Chauvinist party in, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+  <li>  commercial rivalry with England, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+  <li>  decides upon war, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+  <li>  defect of Imperial system in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+  <li>  desire for commercial expansion, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+  <li>  Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span></li>
+  <li>  her responsibility for the world war, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+  <li>  increases her armaments, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  <li>  influence of General Staff, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+  <li>  militarist party of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  <li>  miscalculations at outbreak of war, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+  <li>  naval program of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+  <li>  new Military Law passed, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+  <li>  organization of her Navy, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+  <li>  over-ambition of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  <li>  peaceful penetration policy of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+  <li>  politics in: an anecdote of, <a href="#Page_85">85</a> (note)</li>
+  <li>  result of military spirit in, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>  scaremongers in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+  <li>  shipbuilding program of, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>  the new Fleet Law, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+  <li>  the Press and Tirpitz, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  <li>  two inconsistent policies in, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+  <li>  why she entered the war, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li>
+
+<li>Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+
+<li>Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Grant Duff, Colonel, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li>Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  ante-war policy of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+  <li>  deficiencies in military organization of, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li>
+  <li>  enters the war, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li>
+  <li>  her sea power before the war, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+  <li>  indefinite policy of, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  <li>  question of her preparedness for war, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
+  <li>  the educational problem in, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  causes of, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+
+<li>Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+  <li>  at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+  <li>  Bethmann-Hollweg on, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+  <li>  denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>  his efforts for peace, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+  <li>  negotiates with Germany, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
+  <li>  presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+  <li>  proposes a conference, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Hague Conference, the, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  Germany's difficulty, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the reorganization of British Army, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  a visit to the United States and Canada, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+  <li>  addresses at Montreal and Oxford, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
+  <li>  advocates improved system of education, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+  <li>  and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+  <li>  and the Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_63">63</a> <i>et seq.</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span></li>
+  <li>  becomes Lord Chancellor, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
+  <li>  "conversations" at Berlin, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+  <li>  criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, <a href="#Page_101">101</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  dines with the Chancellor, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+  <li>  entertained by General Staff, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+  <li>  examines organization of German War Office, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+  <li>  frank conversation with William II., <a href="#Page_52">52</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  lunches with Emperor and Empress, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>  on military preparations, <a href="#Page_177">177</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  post-war problems and how they should be met, <a href="#Page_208">208</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+  <li>  Secretary of State for War, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+  <li>  studies in Germany, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+  <li>  visits German Emperor, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+  <li>  witnesses review of German troops, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li>Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li>Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+
+<li>Herzegovina, annexation of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+
+<li>Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+
+<li>Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Imperial Defense Committee, the, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li>Isvolsky, M., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Kiaochow (<i>see</i> Tsingtau)</li>
+
+<li>Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von,
+  <ul>
+  <li>  a talk with, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+  <li>  and the Agadir incident, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Kitchener, Lord,
+  <ul>
+  <li>  meets the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+  <li>  personality of, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Kitchener's Army, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+
+<li>Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>League of Nations, the, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
+
+<li>Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li>Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+
+<li>Lyttelton, Sir Neville, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li>McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
+
+<li>Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  at Windsor, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+  <li>  author's relations with, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Military preparations, the, <a href="#Page_177">177</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li>Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+
+<li>Moltke, General von, a chat with, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_182">182</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Morocco difficulty, the, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  France's request to England, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>National philosophy, German, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li>Navy, British, mobilization of, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  sea power the dominant element in military policy, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+  <li>  why strengthened and increased, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Navy, German, B&uuml;low on, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  William II. and, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  chief of General Staff, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+  </ul>
+<br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Officers' Training Corps, organization of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
+
+<li>Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li><i>Panther</i> sent to Agadir, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Peace terms, the, burden of, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li>Post-war problems, and how they should be met, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li>
+
+<li>Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li>Repington, Col. A'Court, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
+
+<li>Reventlow, Count, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> (note)</li>
+
+<li>Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li>Russia, army of, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  her hostility to Austria, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+  <li>  not wishful for war, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Serbia as "provocative neighbor," <a href="#Page_23">23</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  ultimatum to, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Skiernevice (<i>see</i> Reinsurance Treaty)</li>
+
+<li>Social Democracy, and militarism, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  in Germany, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Special Reserve, the, organization of, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+
+<li>Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Stosch, and the German Navy, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Tangier, William II. at, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+
+<li>Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
+
+<li>Teaching universities, author and, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li>Technical colleges in England, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
+
+<li>Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  mobilization of, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
+  <li>  organization of, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  an interview with, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>  and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+  <li>  criticizes author, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+  <li>  demands a definite policy for war, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  <li>  his "Erinnerungen" discussed, <a href="#Page_137">137</a> <i>et seq.</i></li>
+  <li>  his influence in Germany, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>  informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+  <li>  mentality of, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+  <li>  outstanding thesis of his book, <a href="#Page_141">141</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span></li>
+  <li>  tribute to British sea power, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  <li>  visits Bismarck, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
+
+<li>Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  author's interview with, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+  <li>  on Anglo-French Entente, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+  <li>  on the English Press, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Tsingtau as German naval base, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
+
+<li>Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince B&uuml;low, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  Tirpitz and, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
+  </ul>
+<br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>United States (<i>see</i> America)<br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Voluntary system, the, advantages of, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  and the Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+  <li>  and the Anglo-French Entente, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
+  <li>  Bismarck's message to, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>  consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+  <li>  Count Czernin on, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+  <li>  desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+  <li>  Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+  <li>  frank speech with author, <a href="#Page_52">52</a> <i>et seq</i>.</li>
+  <li>  his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
+  <li>  his reception in London, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+  <li>  incautious speeches of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+  <li>  pays surprise visit to Bismarck, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>  promises support to Austria, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+  <li>  reads a poem to author, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+  <li>  reviews his troops, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+  <li>  Tirpitz and, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+  <li>  visits King Edward and King George, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+
+<li>Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li>Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /><br />
+</li>
+
+
+<li>Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>
+  <ul>
+  <li>  meets author, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+  </ul>
+</li>
+</ul>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<div class="tr">
+<p class="cen"><a name="TN" id="TN"></a>Typographical errors corrected in text:</p>
+<br />
+<p class="noin">Page 231: Landsdowne replaced by Lansdowne</p>
+<br />
+<p class="cen">Unusual spellings left in the text:</p>
+<br />
+<p class="noin">maneuvers<br />
+altho<br />
+tho</p>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BEFORE THE WAR***</p>
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Before the War, by Viscount Richard Burton
+Haldane
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Before the War
+
+
+Author: Viscount Richard Burton Haldane
+
+
+
+Release Date: March 16, 2006  [eBook #17998]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BEFORE THE WAR***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Jeannie Howse, and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net/)
+
+
+
+Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
+      file which includes the original illustrations.
+      See 17998-h.htm or 17998-h.zip:
+      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/9/9/17998/17998-h/17998-h.htm)
+      or
+      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/9/9/17998/17998-h.zip)
+
+
+
+      +--------------------------------------------------------------+
+      | Transcriber's Note:                                          |
+      |                                                              |
+      | While the author of this work uses unusual spelling, a       |
+      | number of obvious typographical errors have been corrected.  |
+      | A complete list will be found at the end of the book.        |
+      |                                                              |
+      +--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
+
+
+BEFORE THE WAR
+
+by
+
+VISCOUNT HALDANE
+
+Secretary of State for War from December, 1905 to June, 1912;
+Lord High Chancellor from June, 1912 to May, 1915.]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: _London Stereoscopic Co_.
+
+
+
+
+Funk & Wagnalls Company
+New York and London
+1920
+Copyright, 1920, by Funk & Wagnalls Company
+[Printed in the United States of America]
+Published in February, 1920
+Copyright under the Articles of the Copyright Convention of the
+Pan-American Republics of the United States, August 11, 1910
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFATORY NOTE
+
+
+The chapters of which this little volume consists were constructed with
+a definite purpose. It was to render clear the line of thought and
+action followed by the Government of this country before the war,
+between January, 1906, and August, 1914. The endeavor made was directed
+in the first place to averting war, and in the second place to preparing
+for it as well as was practicable if it should come. In reviewing what
+happened I have made use of the substance of various papers recently
+contributed to the _Westminster Gazette_, the _Atlantic Monthly_, _Land
+and Water_, and the _Sunday Times_. The gist of these, which were
+written with their inclusion in this book in view, has been incorporated
+in the text together with other material. I have to thank the Editors of
+these journals for their courtesy in agreeing that the substance of what
+they published should be made use of here as part of a connected
+whole.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                             PAGE
+INTRODUCTION                                                   13
+
+DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR                                       35
+
+THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR                            101
+
+THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS                                     177
+
+EPILOG                                                        207
+
+INDEX                                                         227
+
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+VISCOUNT HALDANE                                   _Frontispiece_
+
+COUNT METTERNICH                                   Facing page 57
+
+M. PAUL CAMBON                                                 78
+
+VISCOUNT GREY (SIR EDWARD GREY)                                87
+
+CHANCELLOR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG                               101
+
+ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ                                           137
+
+COUNT BERCHTOLD                                               153
+
+COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN                                         170
+
+
+
+
+BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+The purpose of the pages which follow is, as I have said in the
+Prefatory Note, to explain the policy pursued toward Germany by Great
+Britain through the eight years which immediately preceded the great war
+of 1914. It was a policy which had two branches, as inseparable as they
+were distinct. The preservation of peace, by removing difficulties and
+getting rid of misinterpretations, was the object of the first branch.
+The second branch was concerned with what might happen if we failed in
+our effort to avert war. Against any outbreak by which such failure
+might be followed we had to insure. The form of the insurance had to be
+one which, in our circumstances, was practicable, and care had to be
+taken that it was not of a character that would frustrate the main
+purpose by provoking, and possibly accelerating, the very calamity
+against which it was designed to provide.
+
+The situation was delicate and difficult. The public most properly
+expected of British Ministers that they should spare no effort for peace
+and for security. It was too sensible to ask for every detail of the
+steps taken for the attainment of this end. There are matters on which
+it is mischievous to encourage discussion, even in Parliament. Members
+of Parliament know this well, and are sensible about it. The wisest
+among them do not press for open statements which if made to the world
+would imperil the very object which Parliament and the public have
+directed those responsible to them to seek to attain. What is objected
+to in secret diplomacy hardly includes that which from its very nature
+must be negotiated in the first instance between individuals.
+
+The policy actually followed was in principle satisfactory to the great
+majority of our people. To them it was familiar in its general outlines.
+But for the minority, which included both our pacifists and our
+chauvinists, it was either too much or too little. For, on the one hand,
+its foundation was the theory that, amid the circumstances of Europe in
+which it had to be built up, human nature could not be safely relied on
+unswervingly to resist warlike impulses. On the other hand, this peril
+notwithstanding, it was the considered view of those responsible that
+war neither ought to be regarded as being inevitable, nor was so in
+fact. It was quite true that the development of military preparations
+had been so great as to make Europe resemble an armed camp; but, if
+actual conflict could be averted, the burden this state of things
+implied ought finally to render its continuance no longer tolerable.
+What was really required was that unbroken peace should be preserved,
+and the hand of time left to operate.
+
+In the course of history it has rarely been the case that any war that
+has broken out was really inevitable, and there does not appear to be
+any sufficient reason for thinking that the war of 1914 was an exception
+to the general rule. It seems clear that, if Germany had resolved to do
+so, she could quite safely have abstained from entering upon it and from
+encouraging Austria in a mad adventure. The reason why the war came
+appears to have been that at some period in the year 1913 the German
+Government finally laid the reins on the necks of men whom up to then it
+had held in restraint. The decision appears to have been allowed at this
+point to pass from civilians to soldiers. I do not believe that even
+then the German Government as a whole intended deliberately to invoke
+the frightful consequences of actual war, even if it seemed likely to be
+victorious. But I do believe that it elected to take the risk of what
+it thought improbable, a general resistance by the Entente Powers if
+Germany were to threaten to use her great strength. In thus departing in
+1913 from the appearance of self-restraint which in the main they had
+displayed up to then, the Emperor and his Ministers misjudged the
+situation. They did not foresee the crisis to which their policy was
+conducting, and when that crisis arrived they lost their heads and
+blundered in trying to deal with it. They did not perceive the whirlpool
+toward which they were heading. They thought that they could safely
+expose what was precarious to a strain, and secure the substance of a
+real victory without having to overcome actual resistance. Had they put
+an extreme ambition for their country aside, and been careful in their
+language to others, they might have attained a considerable success
+without a shot being fired. But they were over ambitious and in their
+language they were far from careful. A few unlucky words made all the
+difference in the concluding days of July, 1914:
+
+  "Ten lines, a statesman's life in each."
+
+We here had done the best we could, according to our lights, to keep
+Germany from misjudging us. It was not always easy to do this. The
+genius of our people was not well adapted for the particular task. If
+the only question to-day were whether we always rendered ourselves
+intelligible to her, she might say with some show of reason that we did
+not. She might have grumbled, as Bismarck used to do, over our apparent
+indefiniteness. But that indefiniteness in policy was only apparent. Its
+form was due to the habit of mind which was, what it always has been and
+probably always will be, the habit of mind of the people of these
+islands. It was the defect of her qualities that prevented Germany from
+understanding what this habit of mind truly imported, and we have never
+fully taken in at any period of our history how little she has ever
+understood it. Let anyone who doubts this read the German memoirs which
+have appeared since the war. But it remains not the less true and
+obvious that the purpose of the British Government which fashioned the
+policy in question was to leave no stone unturned in the endeavor to
+find a way of keeping the peace between Germany and the Entente Powers.
+Now success in that endeavor was not a certainty, and it was necessary
+to insure against the risk of failure. The second branch of British
+policy related to the provision for defense rendered imperative by the
+element of uncertainty which was unavoidable. The duty of the
+Government of this country was to make sure that, if their endeavor to
+preserve peace failed, the country should be prepared, in the best way
+of those that were practicable, to face the situation that might emerge.
+
+Impetuous persons ask why, if there was even a chance of a great
+European war in which we might be involved, we did not appreciate the
+magnitude of what was at stake, and, laying everything else aside,
+concentrate our efforts on the immediate fashioning of such vast
+military forces as we possessed toward the end of the war? The answer
+will be found in the fourth chapter. We were aware of the risk, and we
+took what we thought the best means to meet it. Had we tried to do what
+we are reproached for not having done, we must have become weaker before
+we could have become stronger. For this statement I have given the
+military reasons. In a time of peace, even if the country had assented
+to the attempt being made, it is certain that we could not have
+accomplished such a purpose without long delay. It is probable that the
+result would have been failure, and it is almost certain that we should
+have provoked a "preventive war" on the part of Germany, a war not only
+with a very fair prospect, as things then stood, of a German success,
+but with something else that would have looked like the justification of
+a German effort to prevent that country from being encircled. Such a war
+would, with equal likelihood, have been the outcome even of the
+proclamation at such a time of a military alliance between the Entente
+Powers.
+
+Other critics, belonging to a wholly different school of political
+thought, ask why we moved at all, and why we did not adhere to the good
+old policy of holding aloof from interference in Continental affairs.
+The answer is simple. The days when "splendid isolation" was possible
+were gone. Our sea power, even as an instrument of self-defense, was in
+danger of becoming inadequate in the absence of friendships which should
+insure that other navies would remain neutral if they did not actively
+co-operate with ours. It was only through the medium of such friendships
+that ultimate naval preponderance could be secured. The consciousness of
+that fact pervaded the Entente. With those responsible for the conduct
+of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The
+question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to
+happen.
+
+On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the
+spirit in which it was sought to carry it out, the second and third
+chapters of the book may serve to throw some light. The fourth chapter
+relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration,
+for the possible event of failure. The plan was throughout based on the
+maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument. As is
+indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential
+close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia. Had
+there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the
+desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great
+nations, the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command
+the sea in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente. This
+conclusion was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for
+self-defense which the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with
+the growing organization for war of the Central Powers.
+
+To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this
+country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable to
+do so. We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of
+"splendid isolation." But the growing preparations of the Central Powers
+compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety for each
+of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety as a
+common interest. In the face of a new and growing danger we dared not
+leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail. The first
+thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers that
+it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete agreement with
+us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to that which Lord
+Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with France, and accompanied
+by cessation of the reasons which had led them to pile up armaments.
+There were highly influential persons in Germany who were far from
+averse to the suggested business arrangement. The armament question
+presented greater difficulty in that country, largely because of its
+tradition. But its solution was vital, for there were also those in
+Germany whose aim was to dispute with Great Britain the possession of
+the trident. Now for us, who constituted the island center of a
+scattered Empire, and who depended for food and raw materials on freedom
+to sail our ships, the question of sea power adequate for security was
+one of life or death. We could not sit still and allow Germany so to
+increase her navy in comparison with ours that she could make other
+Powers believe that their safest course was to throw in their lot and
+join their fleets with hers. We were bound to seek to make and maintain
+friendships, and to this end not only to preserve our margin of strength
+at sea, but to make ourselves able, if it became essential, to help our
+friends in case of aggression, thereby securing ourselves. That was the
+new situation which in the final result the old military spirit in
+Germany had created.
+
+The balance of power is a dangerous principle; a general friendship
+between all Great Powers, or, better still, a League of the Nations, is
+by far preferable. But that consideration does not touch the actual
+point, which is that we did not seek to set up the principle of
+balancing that has given rise to so many questions. It was forced on us
+and was a sheer necessity of the situation. We did all we could to avoid
+it by negotiations with Germany, which, had they succeeded in the end,
+would have relieved France and Russia as much as ourselves and would
+have prevented the war.
+
+Our efforts to preserve the peace ended in failure. The cause of that
+failure was nothing that we failed to do or that France did. It was
+proximately Austrian recklessness and indirectly, but just as strongly,
+German ambition. A real desire in July, 1914, on the part of the Central
+Powers to avoid war would have averted it. That Serbia may have been a
+provocative neighbor is no answer to the reproaches made to-day against
+the old Governments in Vienna and Berlin. They failed to take the steps
+requisite if peace were to be preserved.
+
+People ask why the British Government between 1906 and 1914 did not
+discuss in public a situation which it understood well, and appeal to
+the nation. The answer is that to have done so would have been greatly
+to increase the difficulty of averting war. Up to the middle of 1913 the
+indications were that it was far from unlikely that war might in the
+result be averted. That was the view of some, both here and on the
+Continent, who were most competent to judge, men who had real
+opportunities for close observation from day to day. It is a view which
+is not in material conflict with anything we have since learned. The
+question whether war is inevitable has always been, as Bismarck more
+than once insisted, one for the statesmen of the countries concerned,
+and not for the soldiers and sailors who have a restricted field to work
+in, and for whom it is in consequence difficult to see things as a
+whole. Nor does great importance attach to-day to the triumphant
+declarations of those who, having chanced to guess aright, take pride in
+the cheap title to wisdom which has become theirs after the event.
+Still less does respect attach to the small but noisy minority in each
+of the countries concerned who in the years before 1914 were
+continuously contributing to bringing war on our heads by expressions of
+dislike to neighboring nations, and by prophecies that war with them
+must come. In the main Germany was worse in this feature than ourselves.
+But there were those here whose language made them useful propagandists
+for the German military party, to whom they were of much service.
+
+Few wars are really inevitable. If we knew better how we should be
+careful to comport ourselves it may be that none are so. But extremists,
+whether chauvinist or pacifist, are not helpful in avoiding wars. That
+is because human nature is what it is.
+
+Those who had to make the effort to keep the peace failed. But that
+neither shows that they ought not to have tried with all the strength
+they possessed in the way they did, nor that they would have done better
+had they discussed delicate details in public. There are topics and
+conjunctures in the almost daily changing relations between Governments
+as to which silence is golden. For however proper it may be in point of
+broad principle that the people should be fully informed of what
+concerns them vitally, the most important thing is those to whom they
+have confided their concerns should be given the best chance of success
+in averting danger to their interests. To have said more in Parliament
+and on the platform in the years in question, or to have said it
+otherwise, would have been to run grave risks of more than one sort. It
+is my strong impression that Lord Grey of Fallodon took the only course
+that was practicable, and that, had the danger of the catastrophe to be
+faced again and for the first time, the course he took would, even in
+the light of all we know to-day, again afford the best chance of
+avoiding it. He succeeded in improving greatly for the time the
+relations between this country and Germany, and but for the outbreak in
+the Near East he would probably have succeeded in navigating the
+dangerous waters successfully. The chance was far from being a hopeless
+one, and subsequent study of the facts has strengthened my impression
+that down to at least about the middle of the year 1913 the chances were
+substantially in his favor. A sufficiency at least of the leaders in
+other countries were co-operating with him, not all the leaders, but
+those who were in reality most important. The war when it came was due,
+not only to the failure of certain of the prominent men in the capitals
+of the Central Powers to adhere to principles to which for a long time
+they had held fast, but to the accident of untoward circumstances and
+the contingency that is inseparable from human affairs.
+
+Such are some of the reasons which have led me to say what I have tried
+to express in the pages which follow. I have never been able to bring
+myself to believe that there are vast differences between the ways of
+thinking and habits of mind of the great and most highly civilized
+peoples of Europe. I have seen something of the Germans, and what I have
+learned of them and of their history has led me to the conclusion that,
+certain traditions of theirs notwithstanding, they resemble us more than
+they differ from us. If this be so, the sooner we take advantage of our
+present victory by seeking to turn our eyes from the past as far as can
+be, and to look steadily toward a future in which the misery and sin
+which that past saw shall be dwelt on to the least extent that is
+practicable, the better it will be for ourselves as well as for the rest
+of the world.
+
+That world has been reminded of a great truth which had been partly
+forgotten by those whose faith lay in militarism. It is that to set up
+might as the foundation of right may in the end be to inspire those
+around with a passionate desire to hold such might in check and to
+overcome it. Democracy is not a system that lends itself easily to
+scientific preparation for war, but when democratic nations are really
+aroused their staying power, just because it rests on a true General
+Will, is without rival. The latent force in humanity which has its
+foundation in ethical idealism is the greatest of all forces for the
+vindication of right. German militarism managed to fail to understand
+this. Let us take pains to show our late enemies that if they make it
+clear that they have extinguished such militarism in a lasting fashion,
+the quarrel with them is at an end.
+
+I am far from thinking that we here are perfect in our habits as a
+nation. We are apt not to keep in view how what we do is likely to look
+to others. We are somewhat deficient in the faculty of self-examination
+and self-criticism. Want of clarity of ground-principle in higher ideals
+is apt to prove a hindrance to more than the individual only. It
+generally brings with it want of clarity in the sense of social
+obligation. And this sometimes extends even to our relations to other
+countries.
+
+It leads to our being misinterpreted as a nation. We have suffered a
+good deal in the past from having attributed to us motives which were
+not ours. The reason was the assumption that the apparent absence of
+definiteness in national purpose must have been designed as a cover for
+hidden and selfish ends. It is not true. We are indeed very insular, and
+what has been called the international mind is not common among the
+people of these islands. But we are kindly at heart, and when we have
+seemed self-regarding it has been simply because we were not conscious
+of our own limitations and had not much appreciation of the modes of
+thought of other people. We have paid the penalty for this defect at
+periods in our history. At one time France suspected us, I think in the
+main unjustly. Later on Germany suspected us, I think of a certainty
+unjustly. Now these things arise in part at least from our reputation
+for a particular kind of disposition, our supposed habitual and
+deliberately adopted desire to wait until the particular international
+situation of the moment should show how we could profit, before we gave
+any assurance as to the way in which we should act. What has given rise
+to this misunderstanding of our attitude in our relations to other
+countries is simply an exemplification of what has prevented us from
+fully understanding ourselves. It is our gift to be able to apply
+ourselves in emergencies, at home and abroad, with immense energy, and
+our success in promptly pulling ourselves together and coping with the
+unexpected has often suggested to outsiders that we had long ago looked
+ahead. This has been said of us on the Continent. It is not so. We do
+not study the art of fishing in troubled waters. The waiting habit in
+our transactions, domestic as well as foreign, arises from our
+inveterate preference for thinking in images rather than in concepts. We
+put off decisions until the whole of the facts can be visualized. This
+carries with it that we often do not act until it is very late. Our
+gifts enable us to move with energy, if not always with precision. To
+predict what we will do in a given case is not easy for a foreigner. It
+is not easy even for ourselves. We have few abstract principles, and
+reliable induction from our past is not easy. We are often guided by
+what Mr. Justice Wendell Holmes has called "the intuition more subtle
+than any particular major premise." Nor is help to be derived from any
+study of our general outlook on life, for that outlook is hard to
+formulate even to ourselves.
+
+Now all this, our peculiar gift, if kept under control, may well have
+its practical advantage, but, as the case stands, it is apt to bring in
+its train a good deal of disadvantage. In periods when nations are
+trying to render firm the basis of peace by remolding and giving
+precision to their aims, so that these can be made common aims, lack of
+definiteness in national ideals is a sure source of embarrassment. At a
+time when democracy is more and more claiming in terms to occupy the
+whole field it becomes increasingly desirable that the higher purposes
+of democracy should become clear to the people themselves. For the
+practise of a country can never be wholly divorced from its theory of
+life. The tendencies of the national will are bound up with the nation's
+science, with its literature, with its art, and with its religion. These
+tendencies are affected by the capacity of the nation to understand and
+express its own soul. Beyond science, literature, art and religion there
+lies something that may be called the national philosophy, a disposition
+rather than a definite creed. This sort of philosophy is different in
+France from what it is in Germany, and in Germany from what it is in the
+English-speaking countries. The philosophy of a people takes shape in
+the attitude its leaders adopt in their estimation of values and of the
+order in which they should be placed. And this turns on the conceptions
+and ideas which are current in the various departments of mental
+activity. It is thus that a philosophy of life has to be given some
+sort of place in his professions even by the statesman who has to
+address Parliament and the public. He is driven to make speeches in
+which a good many conceptions and ideas have to be brought together. And
+it gives rise to a great difference of quality in such utterances if the
+general outlook of the speaker be a large one. But this requires that he
+should know himself and be aware of the conceptions and ideas which
+dominate his mind, and should have examined their scope before employing
+them.
+
+How some of those who were deeply responsible for the conduct of affairs
+tried to think in the anxious years before the war, and how they
+endeavored to apply their conclusions, is what I have endeavored to
+state in the course of what follows. They doubtless made mistakes and
+fell short of accomplishment in what they were aiming at. It is human so
+to do. But they tried what seemed to them the wisest course, and I have
+yet to learn that it was practicable to have followed any different
+course without a failure worse than any that occurred. After all, in the
+end the British Empire won, however hard it had to fight.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+If in this chapter I speak frequently in the first person and of my own
+part in the negotiations which it records, it is not from any desire to
+make prominent either my own personality or the part it fell to me to
+play. The reason is that I have endeavored to write of what I myself
+heard and saw, and that in consequence most of what follows is, for the
+sake of accuracy, largely transcribed from my personal diaries and
+records made at the time when the events to which they related took
+place. So frequent an employment of the personal pronoun as has been
+made in these pages would ordinarily be a blemish in taste, if not in
+style also, but in this case it seemed safer not to try to avoid it.
+
+Many things that happened in the years just before 1914, as well as the
+events of the great war itself, are still too close to permit of our
+studying them in their full context. But before much time has passed
+the historians will have accumulated material that will overflow their
+libraries, and their hands will remain occupied for generations to come.
+At this moment all that safely can be attempted is that actual observers
+should set down what they have themselves observed. For there has rarely
+been a time when the juridical maxim that "hearsay is not evidence"
+ought to be more sternly insisted on.
+
+If I now venture to set down what follows in these pages, it is because
+I had certain opportunities for forming a judgment at first hand for
+myself. I am not referring to the circumstance that for a brief period I
+once, long ago, lived the life of a student at a German University, or
+that I was frequently in Germany in the years that followed. Nor do I
+mean that I have tried to explore German habits of reflection, as they
+may be studied in the literature of Germany. Other people have done all
+these things more thoroughly and more extensively than I have. What I do
+mean is that from the end of 1905 to the summer of 1912 I had special
+chances for direct observation of quite another kind. During that period
+I was Secretary of State for War in Great Britain, and from the latter
+year to April, 1915, I was the holder of another office and a member of
+the British Cabinet.
+
+During the first of the above periods it fell to me to work out the
+military organization that would be required to insure, as far as was
+practicable, against risk, should those strenuous efforts fail into
+which Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, had thrown his strength. He was
+endeavoring with all his might to guard the peace of Europe from danger.
+As he and I had for many years been on terms of close intimacy, it was
+not unnatural that he should ask me to do what I could by helping in
+some of the diplomatic work which was his, as well as by engaging in my
+own special task. Indeed, the two phases of activity could hardly be
+separable.
+
+I was not in Germany after May, 1912, for the duties of Lord Chancellor,
+on which office I then entered, made it unconstitutional for me to leave
+the United Kingdom, save under such exceptional conditions as were
+conceded by the King and the Cabinet when, in the autumn of 1913, I made
+a brief yet memorable visit to the United States and Canada. But in
+1906, while War Minister, I paid, on the invitation of the German
+Emperor, a visit to him at Berlin, to which city I went on after
+previously staying with King Edward at Marienbad, where he and the then
+Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, were resting.
+
+While at Berlin I saw much of the Emperor, and I also saw certain of his
+Ministers, notably Prince von Buelow, Herr von Tschirsky and General von
+Einem, the first being at that time Chancellor, and the last two being
+respectively the Foreign and War Ministers. I was invited to examine for
+myself the organization of the German War Office, which I wished to
+study for purposes of reform at home; and this I did in some detail, in
+company with an expert adviser from my personal staff, Colonel Ellison,
+my military private secretary, who accompanied me on this journey.[1]
+There the authorities explained to us the general nature of the
+organization for rapid mobilization which had been developed under the
+great von Moltke, and subsequently carried farther. The character of
+this organization was, in its general features, no secret in Germany,
+altho it was somewhat unfamiliar in Anglo-Saxon countries; and it
+interested my adviser and myself intensely.
+
+At that time there was an active militarist party in Germany, which, of
+course, was not wholly pleased at the friendly reception with which we
+met from the Emperor and from crowds in the streets of Berlin. We were
+well aware of the activity of this party. But it stood then unmistakably
+for a minority, and I formed the opinion that those who wanted Germany
+to remain at peace, quite as much as to be strong, had at least an
+excellent chance of keeping their feet. I realized, and had done so for
+years past, that it was not merely because of the _beaux yeux_ of
+foreign peoples that Germany desired to maintain good relations all
+round. She had become fully conscious of a growing superiority in the
+application to industry of scientific knowledge and in power to organize
+her resources founded on it; and her rulers hoped, and not without good
+ground, to succeed by these means in the peaceful penetration of the
+world.
+
+I had personally for some time been busy in pressing the then somewhat
+coldly received claims for a better system of education, higher and
+technical as well as elementary, among my own countrymen, and had met
+with some success in asking for the establishment of teaching
+universities and of technical colleges, such as the new Imperial
+College of Science and Technology at South Kensington. Of these we had
+very substantially increased the number during the eight years which
+preceded my visit to Berlin; but I had learned from visits of inspection
+to Germany that much more remained to be done before we could secure our
+commercial and industrial position against the unhasting but unresting
+efforts of our formidable competitor.
+
+As to the German people outside official circles and the universities, I
+thought of them then what I think of them now. They were very much like
+our own people, except in one thing. This was that they were trained
+simply to obey, and to carry out whatever they were told by their
+rulers. I used, during numerous unofficial tours in Germany, to wander
+about incognito, and to smoke and drink beer with the peasants and the
+people whenever I could get the chance. What impressed me was the little
+part they had in directing their own government, and the little they
+knew about what it was doing. There was a general disposition to accept,
+as a definition of duty which must not be questioned, whatever they were
+told to do by the _Vorstand_. It is this habit of mind, dating back to
+the days of Frederick the Great, with only occasional and brief
+interruptions, which has led many people to think that the German
+people at large have in them "a double dose of original sin." Even when
+their soldiers have been exceptionally brutal in methods of warfare, I
+do not think that this is so. The habit of mind which prevails is that
+of always looking to the rulers for orders, and the brutality has been
+that enjoined--in accordance with its own military policy of shortening
+war by making it terrible to the enemy--by the General Staff of Germany,
+a body before whose injunctions even the Emperor, so far as my
+observation goes, always has bowed.
+
+But I must now return to my formal visit to Berlin in the autumn of
+1906. I was, as I have already said, everywhere cordially welcomed, and
+at the end the heads of the German Army entertained me at a dinner in
+the War Office, at which the War Minister presided, and there was
+present, among others, the Chief of the German General Staff. They were
+all friendly. I do not think that my impression was wrong that even the
+responsible heads of the Army were then looking almost entirely to
+"peaceful penetration," with only moral assistance from the prestige
+attaching to the possession of great armed forces in reserve. Our
+business in the United Kingdom was therefore to see that we were
+prepared for perils that might unexpectedly arise out of this policy,
+and not less, by developing our educational and industrial organization,
+to make ourselves fit to meet the greater likelihood of a coming keen
+competition in the peaceful arts.
+
+One thing that seemed to me essential for the preservation of good
+relations was that cordial and frequent intercourse between the people
+of the two countries should be encouraged and developed. I set myself in
+my speeches to avoid all expressions which might be construed as
+suggesting a critical attitude on our part, or a failure to recognize
+the existence of peaceful ideas among what was then, as I still think, a
+large majority of the people of Germany. The attitude of some newspapers
+in England, and still more that of the chauvinist minority in Germany
+itself, did not render this quite an easy task. But there were good
+people in these days in Germany as well as in England, and the United
+States might be counted on as likely to co-operate in discouraging
+friction.
+
+Meanwhile there was the chance that the course of this policy might be
+interrupted by some event which we could not control. A conversation
+with the then Chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, the
+nephew of the great man of that name, satisfied me that he did not
+really look with any pleasurable military expectation to the results of
+a war with the United Kingdom alone. It would, he observed to me, be in
+his opinion a long and possibly indecisive war, and must result in much
+of the overseas trade of both countries passing to a _tertius gaudens_,
+by which he meant the United States.
+
+I had little doubt that what he said to me on this occasion represented
+his real opinion. But I had in my mind the apprehension of an emergency
+of a different nature. Germany was more likely to attack France than
+ourselves. The German Emperor had told me that, altho he was trying to
+develop good relations with France, he was finding it difficult. This
+seemed to me ominous. The paradox presented itself that a war with
+Germany in which we were alone would be easier to meet than a war in
+which France was attacked along with us; for if Germany succeeded in
+over-running France she might establish naval bases on the northern
+Channel ports of that country, quite close to our shores, and so, with
+the possible aid of the submarines, long-range guns and air-machines of
+the future, interfere materially with our naval position in the Channel
+and our fleet defenses against invasion.
+
+I knew, too, that the French Government was apprehensive. In the
+historical speech which Sir Edward Grey made on August 3, 1914, the day
+before the British Government directed Sir Edward Goschen, our
+Ambassador in Berlin, to ask for his passports, he informed the House of
+Commons that so early as January, 1906, the French Government, after the
+Morocco difficulty, had drawn his attention to the international
+situation. It had informed him that it considered the danger of an
+attack on France by Germany to be a real one, and had inquired whether,
+in the event of an unprovoked attack, Great Britain would think that she
+had so much at stake as to make her willing to join in resisting it. If
+this were to be even a possible attitude for Great Britain, the French
+Government had intimated to him that it was in its opinion desirable
+that conversation should take place between the General Staff of France
+and the newly created General Staff of Great Britain, as to the form
+which military co-operation in resisting invasion of the northern
+portions of France might best assume. We had a great Navy, and the
+French had a great Army. But our Navy could not operate on land, and the
+French Army, altho large, was not so large as that which Germany, with
+her superior resources in population, commanded. Could we, then,
+reconsider our military organization, so that we might be able rapidly
+to dispatch, if we ever thought it necessary in our own interests, say,
+100,000 men in a well-formed army, not to invade Belgium, which no one
+thought of doing, but to guard the French frontier of Belgium in case
+the German Army should seek to enter France in that way. If the German
+attack were made farther south, where the French chain of modern
+fortresses had rendered their defensive positions strong, the French
+Army would then be able, set free from the difficulty of mustering in
+full strength opposite the Belgian boundary, to guard the southern
+frontier.
+
+Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, and
+myself as War Minister, and I was instructed, in January, 1906, a month
+after assuming office, to take the examination of the question in hand.
+This occurred in the middle of the General Election which was then in
+progress. I went at once to London and summoned the heads of the British
+General Staff and saw the French military attache, Colonel Huguet, a man
+of sense and ability. I became aware at once that there was a new army
+problem. It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly
+to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate
+(with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the
+inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the
+entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even farther
+south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.
+
+But an investigation of a searching character presently revealed great
+deficiencies in the British military organization of these days. We had
+never contemplated the preparation of armies for warfare of the
+Continental type. The older generals had not been trained for this
+problem. We had, it was true, excellent troops in India and elsewhere.
+These were required as outposts for Imperial defense. As they had to
+serve for long periods and to be thoroughly disciplined, they had to be
+professional soldiers, engaged to serve in most cases for seven years
+with the colors and afterwards for five in the reserve. They were highly
+trained men, and there was a good reserve of them at home. But that
+reserve was not organized in the great self-contained divisions which
+would be required for fighting against armies organized for rapid action
+on modern Continental principles. Its formations in peace time were not
+those which would be required in such a war. There was in addition a
+serious defect in the artillery organization which would have prevented
+more than a comparatively small number of batteries (about forty-two
+only in point of fact) from being quickly placed on a war footing. The
+transport and supply and the medical services were as deficient as the
+artillery.
+
+In short, the close investigation made at that time disclosed that it
+was not possible, under the then existing circumstances, to put in the
+field more than about 80,000 men, and even these only after an interval
+of over two months, which would be required for conversion of our
+isolated units into the new war formations of an army fit to take the
+field against the German first line of active corps. The French
+naturally thought that a machine so slow moving would be of little use
+to them. They might have been destroyed before it could begin to operate
+effectively. Both they and the Germans had organized on the basis that
+modern Continental warfare had become a high science. Hitherto we had
+not, and it was only our younger generals who had even studied this
+science.
+
+There was, therefore, nothing for it but to attempt a complete
+revolution in the organization of the British Army at home. The nascent
+General Staff was finally organized in September, 1906, and its
+organization was shortly afterwards developed so as to extend to the
+entire Empire, as soon as a conference had taken place with the
+Ministers of the Dominions early in the following year. The outcome was
+a complete recasting, which, after three years' work, made it
+practicable rapidly to mobilize, not only 100,000, but 160,000 men; to
+transport them, with the aid of the Navy, to a place of concentration
+which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain; and to
+have them at their appointed place within twelve days, an interval based
+on what the German Army required on its side for a corresponding
+concentration.
+
+All the arrangements for this were worked out by the end of 1910. Both
+Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig took an active part in the work.
+Behind the first-line army so organized, a second-line army of larger
+size, tho far less trained, and so designed that it could be expanded,
+was organized. This was the citizen or "Territorial" army, consisting in
+time of peace of fourteen divisions of infantry and artillery and
+fourteen brigades of cavalry, with the appropriate medical, sanitary,
+transport and other auxiliary services. Those serving in this
+second-line army were civilians, and, of course, much less disciplined
+than the officers and men of the first line. Its primary function was
+home defense, but its members were encouraged to undertake for service
+abroad, if necessary; and a large part of this army, in point of fact,
+fought in France, Flanders and in the East soon after the beginning of
+the war, in great measure making up by intelligence for shortness of
+training.
+
+To say, therefore, that we were caught unprepared is not accurate.
+Compulsory service in a period of peace was out of the question for us.
+Moreover, it would have taken at least two generations to organize, and
+meanwhile we should have been weaker than without it. We had studied the
+situation and had done the only thing we thought we could do, after full
+deliberation. Our main strength was in our Navy and its tradition. Our
+secondary contribution was a small army fashioned to fulfil a
+scientifically measured function. It was, of course, a very small army,
+but it had a scientific organization on the basis of which a great
+expansion was possible. After all, what we set ourselves to accomplish
+we did accomplish. If the margin by which a just sufficient success was
+attained in the early days of the war seems to-day narrow, the reason of
+the narrow margin lay largely in the unprepared condition of the armies
+of Russia, on which we and France had reckoned for rapid co-operation.
+Anyhow, we fulfilled our contract, for at eleven o'clock on Monday
+morning, August 3, 1914, we mobilized without a hitch the whole of the
+Expeditionary Force, amounting to six divisions and nearly two cavalry
+divisions, and began its transport over the Channel when war was
+declared thirty-six hours later. We also at the same time successfully
+mobilized the Territorial Force and other units, the whole amounting to
+over half a million men. The Navy was already in its war stations, and
+there was no delay at all in putting what we had prepared into
+operation.
+
+I speak of this with direct knowledge, for as the Prime Minister, who
+was holding temporarily the seals of the War Secretary, was overwhelmed
+with business, he asked me, tho I had then become Lord Chancellor, to go
+to the War Office and give directions for the mobilization of the
+machinery with which I was so familiar, and I did this on the morning of
+Monday, August 3, and a day later handed it over, in working order, to
+Lord Kitchener.
+
+I now return to what was the main object of British foreign policy
+between 1905 and 1914, the prevention of the danger of any outbreak
+with Germany. Sir Edward Grey worked strenuously with this well-defined
+object. If France were overrun, our island security would be at least
+diminished, and he had, therefore, in addition to his anxiety to avert a
+general war, a direct national interest to strive for, in the
+preservation of peace between Germany and France. Ever since the
+mutilation which the latter country had suffered, as the outcome of the
+War of 1870, she had felt sore, and her relations with Germany were not
+easy. But she did not seek a war of revenge. It would have been too full
+of risk even if she had not desired peace, the Franco-Russian Dual
+Alliance notwithstanding. The notion of an encirclement of Germany,
+excepting in defense against aggression by Germany herself, existed only
+in the minds of nervous Germans. Still, there was suspicion, and the
+question was, how to get rid of it.
+
+I have already referred to the visit I paid to the Emperor at Berlin in
+the autumn of 1906. He invited me to a review which he held of his
+troops there, and in the course of it rode up to the carriage in which I
+was seated and said, "A splendid machine I have in this army, Mr.
+Haldane; now isn't it so? And what could I do without it, situated as I
+am between the Russians and the French? But the French are your
+allies--are they not? So I beg pardon."
+
+I shook my head and smiled deprecatingly, and replied that, were I in
+his Majesty's place, I should in any case feel safe from attack with the
+possession of this machine, and that for my own part I enjoyed being
+behind it much more than if I had to be in front of it.
+
+Next day, when at the Schloss, he talked to me fully and cordially. What
+follows I extract from the record I made after the conversation in my
+diaries, which were kept by desire of King Edward, and which were
+printed by the Government on my return to London.
+
+He spoke of the Anglo-French Entente. He said that it would be wrong to
+infer that he had any critical thought about our entente with France. On
+the contrary he believed that it might even facilitate good relations
+between France and Germany. He wished for these good relations, and was
+taking steps through gentlemen of high position in France to obtain
+them. Not one inch more of French territory would he ever covet. Alsace
+and Lorraine originally had been German, and now even the least German
+of the two, Lorraine, because it preferred a monarchy to a republic, was
+welcoming him enthusiastically whenever he went there. That he should
+have gone to Tangier, where both English and French welcomed him, was
+quite natural. He desired no quarrel, and the whole fault was
+Delcasse's, who had wanted to pick a quarrel and bring England into it.
+
+I told the Emperor that, if he would allow me to speak my mind freely, I
+would do so. He assented, and I said to him that his attitude had caused
+great uneasiness in England, and that this, and not any notion of
+forming a tripartite alliance of France, Russia, and England against
+him, was the reason of the feeling there had been. We were bound by no
+military alliance. As for our entente, some time since we had
+difficulties with France over Newfoundland and Egypt, and we had made a
+good business arrangement (_gutes Geschaeft_) about these complicated
+matters of detail, and had simply carried out our word to France.
+
+He said that he had no criticism to make on this, except that if we had
+told him so early there would have been no misunderstanding. Things were
+better now, but we had not always been pleasant to him and ready to meet
+him. His army was for defense, not for offense. As to Russia, he had no
+Himalayas between him and Russia, more was the pity. Now what about our
+Two-Power standard. All this was said with earnestness, but in a
+friendly way, the Emperor laying his finger on my shoulder as he spoke.
+Sometimes the conversation was in German, but often in English.
+
+I said that our fleet was like his Majesty's army. It was of the _Wesen_
+of the nation, and the Two-Power standard, while it might be rigid and
+so awkward, was a way of maintaining a deep-seated national tradition,
+and a Liberal Government must hold to it as firmly as a Conservative.
+Both countries were increasing in wealth--ours, like Germany, very
+rapidly--and if Germany built we must build. But, I added, there was an
+excellent opportunity for co-operation in other things. I instanced
+international free trade developments which would smooth other
+relations.
+
+The Emperor agreed. He was convinced that free trade was the true policy
+for Germany also, but Germany could not go so quickly here as England
+had gone.
+
+I referred to Friedrich List's great book as illustrating how military
+and geographical considerations had affected matters for Germany in this
+connection.
+
+The Emperor then spoke of Chamberlain's policy of Tariff Reform, and
+said that it had caused him anxiety.
+
+I replied that with care we might avoid any real bad feeling over trade.
+The undeveloped markets of the world were enormous, and we wanted no
+more of the surface of the globe than we had got.
+
+The Emperor's reply was that what he sought after was not territory but
+trade expansion. He quoted Goethe to the effect that if a nation wanted
+anything it must concentrate and act from within the sphere of its
+concentration.
+
+We then spoke of the fifty millions sterling per annum of chemical trade
+which Germany had got away from us. I said that this was thoroughly
+justified as the result of the practical application of high German
+science.
+
+"That," said he, "I delight to think, because it is legitimate and to
+the credit of my people."
+
+I agreed, and said that similarly we had got the best of the world's
+shipbuilding. Each nation had something to learn.
+
+The Emperor then passed to the topic of The Hague Conference, trusting
+that disarmament would not be proposed. If so, he could not go in.
+
+I observed that the word "disarmament" was perhaps unfortunately chosen.
+
+"The best testimony," said the Emperor, "to my earnest desire for peace
+is that I have had no war, tho I should have had war if I had not
+earnestly striven to avoid it."
+
+Throughout the conversation, which was as animated as it was long, the
+Emperor was cordial and agreeable. He expressed the wish that more
+English Ministers would visit Berlin, and that he might see more of our
+Royal Family. I left the Palace at 3.30 P.M., having gone there at 1.0.
+
+On another day during this visit Prince von Buelow, who was then
+Chancellor, called on me. I was out, but found him later at the Schloss,
+and had a conversation with him. He said to me that both the Emperor and
+himself were thoroughly aware of the desire of King Edward and his
+Government to maintain the new relations with France in their integrity,
+and that, in the best German opinion, this was no obstacle to building
+up close relations with Germany also.
+
+I said that this was the view held on our side too, and that the only
+danger lay in trying to force everything at once. Too great haste was to
+be deprecated.
+
+He said that he entirely agreed, and quoted Prince Bismarck, who had
+laid it down that you can not make a flower grow any sooner by putting
+fire to heat it.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT PAUL WOLFF METTERNICH
+
+GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1901 TO 1912.]
+
+I said that, none the less, frequent and cordial interchanges of view
+were very important, and that not even the smallest matters should be
+neglected.
+
+He alluded with satisfaction to my personal relations with the German
+Ambassador in London, Count Metternich.
+
+I begged him, if there were any small matters which were too minute to
+take up officially, but which seemed unsatisfactory, to let me know of
+them in a private capacity through Count Metternich. This I did because
+I had discovered some soreness at restrictions which had been placed on
+the attendance of German military officers at maneuvers in England, and
+I had found that there had been some reprisals. I did not refer to
+these, but said that I had the authority of the sovereign to give
+assistance to German officers who were sent over to the maneuvers to
+study them. I added that while our army was small, compared with theirs,
+it had had great experience in the conduct of small expeditions, and
+that there were in consequence some things worth seeing.
+
+He then spoke of the navy. It was natural that with the increase of
+German commerce Germany should wish to increase her fleet--from a
+sea-police point of view--but that they had neither the wish, nor,
+having regard to the strain their great army put on their resources,
+the power to build against Great Britain.
+
+I said that the best opinion in England fully understood this attitude,
+and that we did not in the least misinterpret their recent progress, nor
+would he misinterpret our resolve to maintain, for purely defensive
+purposes, our navy at a Two-Power standard. Some day, I said, there
+might be rivalry, but I thought we might assume that, if it ever
+happened, it would not be for many years, and that our policy for the
+present was strongly for Free Trade, so that the more Germany exported
+to Great Britain and British possessions, the more we should export in
+exchange to them.
+
+He expressed himself pleased that I should say this, and added that he
+was confident that a couple of years' interchange of friendly
+communications in this spirit would produce a great development, and
+perhaps lead for both of us to pleasant relations with other Powers
+also.
+
+There were during this visit in 1906 other conversations of which a
+record was preserved, but I have referred to the most important, and I
+will only mention, in concluding my account of these days in Berlin in
+September, 1906, the talk I had with the Foreign Minister, Herr von
+Tschirsky, afterward the German Ambassador at Vienna before the war,
+and reported as having been a fomenter of the Austrian outbreak against
+Serbia. He may have been anti-Slav and anti-Russian, but I did not find
+him, in the long conversation we had in 1906, otherwise than sensible as
+regards France.
+
+I explained that my business in Berlin was merely with War Office
+matters, and, even as regards these, quite unofficial.
+
+He said that there had been much tendency to misinterpret in both
+countries, but that things were now better. I might take it that our
+precision about the Entente with France, and our desire to rest firmly
+on the arrangement we had made, were understood in Germany, and that it
+was realized that we were not likely to be able to build up anything
+with his own country which did not rest on this basis. But he thought,
+and the Emperor agreed, that the Entente was no hindrance to all that
+was necessary between Germany and England, which was not an alliance but
+a thoroughly good business understanding. Some day we might come into
+conflict, if care were not taken; but if care was taken, there was no
+need of apprehension.
+
+I said that I believed this to be Sir Edward Grey's view also, and that
+he was anxious to communicate with the German Government beforehand
+whenever there was a chance of German interests being touched.
+
+He went on to speak of the approaching Hague Conference, and of the
+difficulty Germany would have if asked to alter the proportion of her
+army to her population--a proportion which rested on a fundamental law.
+For Germany alone to object to disarmament would be to put herself in a
+hole, and it would be a friendly act if we could devise some way out of
+a definite vote on reduction. Germany might well enter a conference to
+record and emphasize the improvement all round in international
+relations, the desirability of further developing this improvement, and
+the hope that with it the growth of armaments would cease. But he was
+afraid of the kind of initiative which might come from America. The
+United States had no sympathy with European military and naval
+difficulties.
+
+I said that I thought that we, as a Government, were pledged to try to
+bring about something more definite than what he suggested as a limit,
+but that I would report what he had told me.
+
+He then passed to general topics. He was emphatic in his assurance that
+what Germany wanted was increase of commercial development. Let the
+nations avoid inflicting pin-pricks, and leave each other free to
+breathe the air. He said that he thought we might have opportunities of
+helping them to get the French into an easier mood. They were difficult
+and suspicious, he observed, and it was hard to transact business with
+them, for they made trouble over small points.
+
+On my return to London I sent to Herr von Tschirsky some English
+newspapers containing articles with a friendly tone, so far as the
+preservation of good relations was concerned. He replied in a letter
+from which I translate the material portion:
+
+"I see with pleasure from the articles which your Excellency has sent me
+for his Majesty, and from other expressions of public opinion in English
+newspapers, that in the leading Liberal papers of England a more
+friendly tone toward Germany is making itself apparent. You would have
+been able to derive the same impression from reading our newspapers,
+with the exception of a few Pan-German prints. Alas! papers like _The
+Times_, _Morning Post_ and _Standard_ can not bring themselves to
+refrain from their attitude of dislike, and are always rejoicing in
+being suspicious of every action of the Imperial Government. They
+contribute in this fashion appreciably to render weak the new tone of
+diminishing misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries.
+If I fear that under these circumstances it will be a long time before
+mutual understanding has grown up to the point at which it stood more
+than a century ago, and as you and I desire it in the well-understood
+interests of England and Germany, still I hope and am persuaded that the
+relations of the two Governments will remain good."
+
+A year after the visit I had paid to Berlin the Emperor came over to
+stay with King Edward at Windsor. This was in November, 1907. The visit
+lasted several days, and I was present most of the time. The Emperor was
+accompanied by Baron von Schoen, who had become Foreign Minister of
+Prussia, after having been Ambassador to the Court of Russia, and by
+General von Einem, the War Minister, whose inclusion in the invitation I
+had ventured to suggest to the King, as an acknowledgment of his
+civility to myself as War Minister when in Berlin. There were also at
+Windsor Count Metternich and several high military officers of the
+Emperor's personal staff and military cabinet. To these officers and to
+the War Minister I showed all the hospitality I could in London, and I
+received them officially at the War Office.
+
+But the really interesting incident of this visit, so far as I was
+concerned, took place at Windsor. The first evening of my visit there,
+just after his arrival in November, the Emperor took me aside and said
+he was sorry that there was a good deal of friction over the Bagdad
+Railway, and that he did not know what we wanted as a basis for
+co-operation.
+
+I said that I could not answer for the Foreign Office, but that,
+speaking as War Minister, one thing I knew we wanted was a "gate" to
+protect India from troops coming down the new railway. He asked me what
+I meant by a "gate," and I said that meant the control of the section
+which would come near to the Persian Gulf. "I will give you the 'gate,'"
+replied the Emperor.
+
+I had no opportunity at the moment, which was just before dinner, for
+pursuing the conversation further, but I thought the answer too
+important not to be followed up. There were private theatricals after
+dinner, which lasted till nearly one o'clock in the morning. I was
+seated in the theater of the Castle just behind the Emperor, and, as the
+company broke up, I went forward and asked him whether he really meant
+seriously that he was willing to give us the "gate," because, if he did
+mean it, I would go to London early and see Sir Edward Grey at the
+Foreign Office.
+
+Next morning, about 7.30 o'clock, a helmeted guardsman, one of those
+whom the Emperor had brought over with him from Berlin, knocked loudly
+at the door and came into my bedroom, and said that he had a message
+from the Emperor. It was that he did mean what he had said the night
+before. I at once got up and caught a train for London. There I saw the
+Foreign Secretary, who, after taking time to think things over, gave me
+a memorandum he had drawn up. The substance of it was that the British
+Government would be very glad to discuss the Emperor's suggestion, but
+that it would be necessary, before making a settlement, to bring into
+the discussion France and Russia, whose interests also were involved. I
+was requested to sound the Emperor further.
+
+After telling King Edward of what was happening, I had another
+conversation in Windsor Castle with the Emperor, who said that he feared
+that the bringing in of Russia particularly, not to speak of France,
+would cause difficulty; but he asked me to come that night, after a
+performance that was to take place in the Castle theater had ended, to
+his apartments, to a meeting to which he would summon the Ministers he
+had brought with him. He took the memorandum which I had brought from
+London, a copy of which I had made for him in my own handwriting, so as
+to present it as the informal document it was intended to be. Just
+before dinner Baron von Schoen spoke to me, and told me that he had
+heard from the Emperor what had happened, and that the Emperor was wrong
+in thinking that the attempt to bring in Russia would lead to
+difficulty, because he, Baron von Schoen, when he was Ambassador to
+Russia, had already discussed the general question with its Government,
+and had virtually come to an understanding. At the meeting that night we
+could therefore go on to negotiate.
+
+I attended the Emperor in his state rooms at the Castle at one o'clock
+in the morning, and sat smoking with him and his Ministers for over two
+hours. His Foreign Minister and Count Metternich and the War Minister,
+von Einem, were present. I said that I felt myself an intruder, because
+it was very much like being present at a sitting of his Cabinet. He
+replied, "Be a member of my Cabinet for the evening." I said that I was
+quite agreeable.
+
+They then engaged in a very animated conversation, some of them
+challenging the proposal of the Emperor to accept the British
+suggestions, with an outspokenness which would have astonished the
+outside world, with its notions of Teutonic autocracy. Count Metternich
+did not like what I suggested, that there should be a conference in
+Berlin on the subject of the Bagdad Railway between England, France,
+Russia, and Germany.
+
+In the end, but not until after much keen argument, the idea was
+accepted, and the Emperor directed von Schoen to go next morning to
+London and make an official proposal to Sir Edward Grey, This was
+carried out, and the preliminary details were discussed between von
+Schoen and Sir Edward at the Foreign Office.
+
+Some weeks afterward difficulties were raised from Berlin. Germany said
+that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question
+of the terminal portion of the railway, but she did not desire to bring
+the other two Powers into that discussion, because the conference would
+probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other
+Powers.
+
+The matter thus came to an end. It was, I think, a great pity, because I
+have reason to believe that the French view was that, if the Bagdad
+Railway question could have been settled, one great obstacle in the way
+of reconciling German with French and English interests would have
+disappeared. I came to the conclusion afterward that it was probably
+owing to the views of Prince von Buelow that the proposal had come to an
+untimely end. Whether he did not wish for an expanded entente; whether
+the feeling was strong in Germany that the Bagdad Railway had become a
+specially German concern and should not be shared; or what other reason
+he may have had, I do not know; but it was from Berlin, after the
+Emperor's return there at the end of November, 1907, that the
+negotiations were finally blocked.
+
+Altho these negotiations had no definite result, they assisted in
+promoting increasing frankness between the two Foreign Offices, and
+other things went with more smoothness. Sir Edward Grey kept France and
+Russia informed of all we did, and he was also very open with the
+Germans. Until well on in 1911 all went satisfactorily. In the early
+part of that year the Emperor came to London to visit the present King,
+who had by that time succeeded to the throne. I had ventured to propose
+to the King that during the Emperor's visit I should, as War Minister,
+give a luncheon to the generals who were on his staff. But when the
+Emperor heard of this he sent a message that he would like to come and
+lunch with me himself, and to meet people whom otherwise he might not
+see.
+
+I acted on my own discretion, and when he came to luncheon at my house
+in Queen Anne's Gate there was a somewhat widely selected party of about
+a dozen to meet him. For it included not only Lord Morley, Lord
+Kitchener, and Lord Curzon, whom he was sure to meet elsewhere, but Mr.
+Ramsay MacDonald, who was then leading the Labor Party, Admiral Sir
+Arthur Wilson, our great naval commander, Lord Moulton, Mr. Edmund
+Gosse, Mr. Sargent, Mr. Spender, the editor of the _Westminster
+Gazette_, and others representing various types of British opinion. The
+Emperor engaged in conversation with everyone, and all went with
+smoothness.
+
+He had a great reception in London. But enthusiasm about him was
+somewhat damped when, in July, 1911, not long after his return to
+Germany, he sent the afterwards famous warship _Panther_ to Agadir. The
+French were naturally alarmed, and the situation which had become so
+promising was overcast. Our naval arrangements and our new military
+organization were ready, and our mobilization plans were fairly
+complete, as the German General Staff knew from their military attache.
+But the point was, how to avoid an outbreak, and to get rid of the
+feeling and friction to which the Agadir crisis was giving rise. Our
+growing good relations were temporarily clouded.
+
+The sending of the _Panther_ to Agadir was not a prudent act. It
+imported either too much or too little. It is said to have been the plan
+of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, at that time the Foreign Secretary and
+generally a sensible statesman, and to have been done in spite of
+misgivings expressed by the Emperor about its danger. The circumstances
+of the moment were such that one can not but feel a certain sympathy
+with the German perturbation at the time. The march of the French Army
+to Fez had come on them suddenly, and it at least suggested a
+development of French claims going beyond what Germany had agreed to at
+the Algeciras Conference nearly six years previously. Those who wish to
+inform themselves about the commotion the expedition of the French
+stirred up in Germany, and of the efforts the Emperor and Bethmann
+Hollweg had to make to restrain it, will do well to read the latter's
+account of what happened there in the second chapter of his recent book.
+But to think that the sending of a German warship could make things
+better was to repeat the error of judgment which had characterized "the
+ally in shining armor" speech of the German Emperor to Austria when she
+formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina three years before. Instead of
+using diplomatic methods something that looked like a threat was allowed
+to appear, and the answer was Mr. Lloyd George's well-known declaration
+of July 21, 1911, in the City of London. The sending of the _Panther_,
+if intelligible, was certainly unfortunate.
+
+In the winter, after the actual crisis had been got over, there was
+evidence of continuing ill-feeling in Germany, and the suspicion in
+London did not diminish. In January, 1912, an informal message was given
+by the Emperor to Sir Ernest Cassel for transmission through one of my
+colleagues to the Foreign Office.[2] I knew nothing of this at the time,
+but learned shortly afterward that it was to the effect that the Emperor
+was concerned at the state of feeling that had arisen in both countries,
+and thought that the most hopeful method of improving matters would be
+that the Cabinet of St. James's should exchange views directly with the
+Cabinet of Berlin. For this course there was a good deal to be said. The
+peace had indeed been preserved, but, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg told
+me later on, not without effort. The attitude of Germany toward France
+had seemed ominous. The British Government had done all it could to
+avert a breach, but its sympathy was opposed to language used in
+Germany, the spirit of which seemed to us to have in it an aggressive
+element. We did not hesitate to say what we thought about this.
+
+Even after the Agadir incident was quite closed, the tension between
+Germany and England had not passed away. The military party in the
+former country began to talk of a "preventive" war pretty loudly. Even
+so moderate an organ in Berlin as the _Post_ wrote of German opinion
+that "we all know that blood is assuredly about to be shed, and the
+longer we wait the more there will be. Few, however, have the courage to
+imitate Frederick the Great, and not one dares the deed."
+
+The Emperor therefore sent his message in the beginning of 1912, to the
+effect that feeling had become so much excited that it was not enough to
+rely on the ordinary diplomatic intercourse for softening it, and that
+he was anxious for an exchange of views between the Cabinets of Berlin
+and London, of a personal and direct kind. As the result of this
+intimation, the British Cabinet decided to send one of its members to
+Berlin to hold "conversations," with a view to exploring and, if
+practicable, softening the causes of tension, and I was requested by the
+Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and my other colleagues to go to
+Berlin and undertake the task. Our Ambassador there came over to London
+specially to discuss arrangements, and he returned to Berlin to make
+them before I started.
+
+I arrived in the German capital on February 8, 1912, and spent some days
+in interviews with the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, the Naval
+Minister (Admiral von Tirpitz), and others of the Emperor's Ministry.
+The narrative of my conversations I have extracted from the records I
+made after each interview, for the preservation so far as possible of
+the actual expressions used during it.
+
+My first interview was one with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial
+Chancellor. We met in the British Embassy, and the conversation, which
+was quite informal, was a full and agreeable one. My impression, and I
+still retain it, was that Bethmann Hollweg was then as sincerely
+desirous of avoiding war as I was myself. I told him of certain dangers
+quite frankly, and he listened and replied with what seemed to me to be
+a full understanding of our position. I said that the increasing action
+of Germany in piling up magnificent armaments was, of course, within the
+unfettered rights of the German people. But the policy had an inevitable
+consequence in the drawing together of other nations in the interests of
+their own security. This was what was happening. I told him frankly that
+we had made naval and military preparations, but only such as defense
+required, and as would be considered in Germany matter of routine. I
+went on to observe that our faces were set against aggression by any
+nation, and I told him, what seemed to relieve his mind, that we had no
+secret military treaties. But, I added, if France were attacked and an
+attempt made to occupy her territory, our neutrality must not be
+reckoned on by Germany. For one thing, it was obvious that our position
+as an island protected by the sea would be affected seriously if Germany
+had possession of the Channel ports on the northern shores of France.
+Again, we were under treaty obligation to come to the aid of Belgium in
+case of invasion, just as we were bound to defend Portugal and Japan in
+certain eventualities. In the third place, owing to our dependence on
+freedom of sea-communications for food and raw materials, we could not
+sit still if Germany elected to develop her fleet to such an extent as
+to imperil our naval protection. She might build more ships, but we
+should in that case lay down two keels for each one she laid down.
+
+The Chancellor said that he did not take my observations at all in bad
+part, but I must understand that his admirals and generals were pretty
+difficult.
+
+I replied that the difficulty would be felt at least as much with the
+admirals and generals in my own country.
+
+The Chancellor, in the course of our talk, proposed a formula of
+neutrality to which I will refer later on.
+
+I left the Chancellor with the sense that I had been talking with an
+honest man struggling somewhat with adversity. However, next day I was
+summoned to luncheon with the Emperor and Empress at the Schloss, and
+afterward had a long interview, which lasted nearly three hours, with
+the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz in the Emperor's cabinet room. The
+conversation was mainly in German, and was confined to naval questions.
+My reception by the Emperor was very agreeable; that by Tirpitz seemed
+to me a little strained. The question was, whether Germany must not
+continue her program for expanding her fleet. What that program really
+amounted to we had not known in London, except that it included an
+increase in battleships; but the Emperor handed me at this meeting a
+confidential copy of the draft of the proposed new Fleet Law, with an
+intimation that he had no objection to my communicating it privately to
+my colleagues. I was careful to abstain even from looking at it then,
+for I saw that, from its complexity and bulk, it would require careful
+study. So I simply put it in my pocket. But I repeated what I had said
+to the Chancellor, that the necessity for secure sea-communications
+rendered it vital for us to be able to protect ourselves on the seas.
+Germany was quite free to do as she pleased, but so were we, and we
+should probably lay down two keels for every one which she added to her
+program. The initiative in slackening competition was really not with
+us, but with Germany. Any agreement for settling our differences and
+introducing a new spirit into the relations of the two nations would be
+bones without flesh if Germany began by fresh shipbuilding, and so
+forced us to do twice as much. Indeed, the world would laugh at such an
+agreement, and our people would think that we had been fooled. I did not
+myself take that view, because I thought that the mere fact of an
+agreement was valuable. But the Emperor would see that the public would
+attach very little importance to his action unless the agreement largely
+modified what it believed to be his shipbuilding program.
+
+We then discussed the proposal of the German Admiralty for the new
+program. Admiral von Tirpitz struggled for it. I insisted that
+fundamental modification was essential if better relations were to
+ensue. The tone was friendly, but I felt that I was up against the
+crucial part of my task. The admiral wanted us to enter into some
+understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the Two-Power
+standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any
+admission about it.
+
+I said it was not matter for admission. They were free and so were we,
+and we must for the sake of our safety remain so. The idea then occurred
+to us that, as we should never agree about it, we should avoid trying to
+define a standard proportion in any general agreement that we might come
+to, and, indeed, say nothing in it about shipbuilding; but that the
+Emperor should announce to the German public that the agreement on
+general questions, if we should have concluded one, had entirely
+modified his wish for the new Fleet Law, as originally conceived, and
+that it should be delayed, and future shipbuilding should at least be
+spread over a longer period.
+
+The Emperor thought such an agreement would certainly make a great
+difference, and he informed me that his Chancellor would propose to me a
+formula as a basis for it. I said that I would see the Chancellor and
+discuss a possible formula, as well as territorial and other questions
+with him, and would then return to London and report to the King (from
+whom I had brought him a special and friendly message) and to my
+colleagues the good disposition I had found, and leave the difficulties
+about shipbuilding and indeed all other matters to their judgment. For I
+had come to Berlin, not to make an actual agreement, but only to explore
+the ground for one with the Emperor and his ministers. I had been struck
+with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and a not less friendly
+disposition would be found in London.
+
+The evening after my interview with the Emperor I dined with the
+Chancellor. I met there and talked with several prominent politicians,
+soldiers, and men of letters, including Kiderlen-Waechter (the then
+Foreign Secretary), the afterward famous General von Hindenburg,
+Zimmermann of the Foreign Office, and Professor Harnack.
+
+Later on, after dinner, I went off to meet the French Ambassador, M.
+Jules Cambon, at the British Embassy, for I wished to keep him informed
+of our object, which was simply to improve the state of feeling between
+London and Berlin, but on the basis, and only on the basis, of complete
+loyalty to our Entente with France. It was, to use a phrase which he
+himself suggested in our conversation, a _detente_ rather than an
+_entente_ that I had in view, with possible developments to follow it
+which might assume a form which would be advantageous to France and
+Russia, as well as to ourselves and Germany. He showed me next day the
+report of our talk which he had prepared in order to telegraph it to
+Paris.
+
+I had other interviews the next day, but the only one which is important
+for the purposes of the present narrative is that at my final meeting
+with the German Chancellor on the Saturday (February 10). I pressed on
+him how important it was for public opinion and the peace of the world
+that Germany should not force us into a shipbuilding competition with
+her, a competition in which it was certain that we should have to spare
+no effort to preserve our margin of safety by greater increases.
+
+[Illustration: M. PAUL CAMBON
+
+FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1898.]
+
+He did not controvert my suggestion. I could see that personally he
+was of the same mind. But he said that the forces he had to contend with
+were almost insuperable. The question of a retardation of building under
+the proposed Fleet Law was not susceptible of being treated apart from
+that of the formula of which he and the Emperor had both spoken. He
+suggested that we might agree on the following formula:
+
+  1. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their
+  desire for peace and friendship.
+
+  2. They will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in
+  any combination, which is directed against the other. They
+  expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination.
+
+  3. If either of the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a
+  war with one or more other powers, the other of the High
+  Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the power so
+  entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavor for
+  the localization of the conflict.
+
+  4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding article
+  has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with
+  existing agreements which the High Contracting Parties have
+  already made. The making of new agreements which make it
+  impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe
+  neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the
+  preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the
+  provisions contained in Article 2.
+
+Anxious as I was to agree with the Chancellor, who seemed as keen as I
+was to meet me with expressions which I might take back to England for
+friendly consideration, I was unable to hold out to him the least
+prospect that we could accept the draft formula which he had just
+proposed. Under Article 2, for example, we should find ourselves, were
+it accepted, precluded from coming to the assistance of France should
+Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as
+Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, a friendly occupation of which was so
+important for our island security. Difficulties might also arise which
+would hamper us in the discharge of our existing treaty obligations to
+Belgium, Portugal, and Japan. The most hopeful way out was to revise the
+draft fundamentally by confining its terms to an undertaking by each
+Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any
+combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or
+become party to any plan or naval or military combination, alone or in
+conjunction with any other Power, directed to such an end.
+
+He and I then sat down and redrafted what he had prepared, on this
+basis, but without his committing himself to the view that it would be
+sufficient. We also had a satisfactory conversation about the Bagdad
+Railway and other things in Turkey connected with the Persian Gulf, and
+we discussed possibilities of the rearrangement of certain interests of
+both Powers in Africa. He said to me that he was not there to make any
+immediate bargain, but that we should look at the African question on
+both sides from a high point of view, and that if we had any
+difficulties we should tell him, and he would see whether he could get
+round them for us.
+
+I replied that I also was not there to make a bargain, but only to
+explore the ground, and that I much appreciated the tone of his
+conversation with me, and the good feeling he had shown. I should go
+back to London and without delay report to my colleagues all that had
+passed.
+
+I entertain no doubt that the German Chancellor was sincerely in earnest
+in what he said to me on these occasions, and in his desire to improve
+relations with us and keep the peace. So I think was the Emperor; but he
+was pulled at by his naval and military advisers, and by the powerful,
+if then small, chauvinist party in Germany. In 1912, when the
+conversations recorded took place, this party was less potent, I think a
+good deal less, than it appears to have become a year and a half later,
+when Germany had increased her army still further. But I formed the
+opinion even then that the power of the Emperor in Germany was a good
+deal misinterpreted and overestimated. My impression was that the really
+decisive influence was that of the Minister who had managed to secure
+the strongest following throughout Germany; and it was obvious to me
+that Admiral von Tirpitz had a powerful and growing following from many
+directions, due to the backing of the naval party.
+
+Moreover, sensible as a large number of Germans were, there was a
+certain tendency to swelled-headedness in the nation. It had had an
+extraordinarily rapid development, based on principles of organization
+in every sphere of activity--principles derived from the lesson of the
+necessity of thinking before acting enjoined by the great teachers of
+the beginning of the nineteenth century. The period down to about 1832
+seems to me to correspond, in the intellectual prodigies it produced, to
+our Elizabethan period. It came no doubt to an end in its old and
+distinctive aspect. But its spirit assumed, later on, a new form, that
+of organization for material ends based on careful reflection and
+calculation. In industry, in commerce, in the army, and in the navy, the
+work of mind was everywhere apparent. "_Aus einem Lernvolk wollen wir
+ein Thatvolk werden_" was the new watchword.
+
+No doubt there was much that was defective. When it came to actual war
+in 1914, it turned out that Germany had not adequately thought out her
+military problems. If she had done so, she would have used her fleet at
+the very outset, and particularly her destroyers and submarines, to try
+to hinder the transport of the British Expeditionary Force to France,
+and, having secured the absence of this force, she would have sought to
+seize the northern ports of France. Small as the Expeditionary Force
+was, it was enough, when added to the French armies, to make them so
+formidable as to render the success of von Kluck uncertain if the troops
+could be concentrated to resist him swiftly enough. Again, Germany never
+really grasped the implications of our command of the sea. Had she done
+so, I do not think she would have adventured war. She may have counted
+on England not coming in, owing to entanglements in Irish difficulties.
+If so, this was just another instance of her bad judgment about the
+internal affairs of other nations.
+
+In fine, Germany had not adequately thought out or prepared for the
+perils which she undertook when she assumed the risks of the war of
+1914. No doubt she knew more about the shortcomings of the Russian army
+than did the French or the British. On these, pretty exact knowledge of
+the Russian shortages enabled her to reckon. There we miscalculated more
+than she did. But she was not strong enough to make sure work of a brief
+but conclusive campaign in the West, which was all she could afford
+while Russia was organizing. Then, later on, she ought to have seen
+that, if the submarine campaign which she undertook should bring the
+United States into the war, her ultimate fate would be sealed by
+blockade. In the end she no doubt fought magnificently. But she made
+these mistakes, which were mainly due to that swelled-headedness which
+deflected her reasoning and prevented her from calculating consequences
+aright.
+
+There was a good deal of this apparent even in 1912. It had led to the
+Agadir business in the previous summer, and the absence of wise
+prevision was still apparent. I believed that this phase of militarism
+would pass when Imperial Germany became a more mature nation. Indeed, it
+was passing under the growing influence of Social Democracy, which was
+greatly increased by the elections which took place while I was in
+Berlin in 1912.[3] But still there was the possibility of an explosion;
+and when I returned to London, altho I was full of hope that relations
+between the two countries were going to be improved, and told my
+colleagues so, I also reported that there were three matters about which
+I was uneasy.
+
+The first was my strong impression that the new Fleet Law would be
+insisted on.
+
+The second was the possibility that Tirpitz might be made Chancellor of
+the Empire in place of Bethmann Hollweg. This was being talked of as
+possible when I was in Berlin.
+
+The third was the want of continuity in the supreme direction of German
+policy. Foreign policy especially was under divided control. Von
+Tschirsky observed to me in 1906 that what he had been saying about a
+question we were discussing represented his view as Foreign Minister of
+Prussia, but that next door was the Chancellor, who might express quite
+a different view to me if I asked him; and that if, later on, I went to
+the end of the Wilhelmstrasse and turned down Unter den Linden I would
+come to the Schloss, where I might derive from the Emperor's lips an
+impression quite different from that given by either himself or the
+Chancellor. This made me feel that, desirous as Bethmann Hollweg had
+shown himself to establish and preserve good relations, we could not
+count on his influence being maintained or prevailing. As an eminent
+foreign diplomatist observed, "In this highly organized nation, when you
+have ascended to the very top story you find not only confusion but
+chaos."
+
+However, after I had reported fully on all the details and the Foreign
+Office had received my written report, matters were taken in hand by Sir
+Edward Grey, and by him I was kept informed. Presently it became
+apparent that there were those in Berlin who were interfering with the
+Chancellor in his efforts for good relations. A dispatch came which was
+inconsistent with the line he had pursued with me, and it became evident
+that the German Government was likely to insist on proceeding with the
+new Fleet Law. When we looked closely into the copy of the draft which
+the Emperor had given to me, we found very large increases
+contemplated, of which we had no notion earlier, not only in the
+battleships, about which we did know before, but in small craft and
+submarines and personnel. As these increases were to proceed further,
+discussion about the terms of a formula became rather futile, and we had
+only one course left open to us--to respond by quietly increasing our
+navy and concentrating its strength in northern seas. This was done with
+great energy by Mr. Churchill, the result being that, as the outcome of
+the successive administrations of the fleet by Mr. McKenna and himself,
+the estimates were raised by over twenty millions sterling to fifty-one
+millions.
+
+[Illustration: _International_
+
+VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON
+
+SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM 1905 TO 1916.]
+
+In the summer of 1912 I became Lord Chancellor, and the engrossing
+duties, judicial as well as administrative, of that office cut me off
+from any direct participation in the carrying on of our efforts for
+better relations with Germany. But these relations continued to be
+extended in the various ways practicable and left open to Sir Edward
+Grey and the German Chancellor. The discussions which had been begun
+when I was in Berlin, about Africa and the Bagdad Railway, were
+continued between them through the Ambassadors; and just before the war
+the draft of an extensive treaty had been agreed on.
+
+Then, after an interval of two years, came a time of extreme anxiety. No
+one had better opportunities than I of watching Sir Edward's
+concentration of effort to avoid the calamity which threatened. For he
+was living with me in my house in Queen Anne's Gate through the whole of
+these weeks, and he was devoting himself, with passionate earnestness of
+purpose, to inducing the German Government to use its influence with
+Austria for a peaceful settlement. But it presently became evident that
+the Emperor and his Ministers had made up their minds that they were
+going to make use of an opportunity that appeared to have come. As I
+have already said, I think their calculations were framed on a wholly
+erroneous basis. It is clear that their military advisers had failed to
+take account, in their estimates of probabilities, of the tremendous
+moral forces that might be brought into action against them. The
+ultimate result we all know. May the lesson taught to the world by the
+determined entry of the United States into the conflict between right
+and wrong never be forgotten by the world!
+
+Why Germany acted as she did then is a matter that still requires
+careful investigation. My own feeling is that she has demonstrated the
+extreme risk of confiding great political decisions to military
+advisers. It is not their business to have the last word in deciding
+between peace and war. The problem is too far-reaching for their
+training. Bismarck knew this well, and often said it, as students of his
+life and reflections are aware. Had he been at the helm I do not believe
+that he would have allowed his country to drift into a disastrous
+course. He was far from perfect in his ethical standards, but he had
+something of that quality which Mommsen, in his history, attributes to
+Julius Caesar. Him the historian describes as one of those "mighty ones
+who has preserved to the end of his career the statesman's tact of
+discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and has not
+broken down in the task which for greatly gifted natures is the most
+difficult of all--the task of recognizing, when on the pinnacle of
+success, its natural limits. What was possible he performed, and never
+left the possible good undone for the sake of the impossible better;
+never disdained at least to mitigate by palliatives evils that were
+incurable. But where he recognized that fate had spoken, he always
+obeyed. Alexander on the Hypanis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back
+because they were compelled to do so, and were indignant at destiny for
+bestowing even on its favorites merely limited successes. Caesar turned
+back voluntarily on the Thames and on the Rhine, and thought of
+carrying into effect even at the Danube and the Euphrates, not unbounded
+plans of world-conquest, but merely well-considered frontier
+regulations."
+
+If only Germany, whose great historian thus explained these things, had
+remembered them, how different might have been her position to-day. But
+it may be that she had carried her policy too far to be left free. With
+her certainly rests the main responsibility for what has happened; for
+apart from her, Austria would not have acted as she did, nor would
+Turkey, nor Bulgaria. The fascinating glitter of her armies, and the
+assurances given by her General Staff, were too much for the minor
+nations whom she had induced to accept her guidance, and too much I
+think also for her own people. No doubt the ignorance of these about the
+ways of their own Government counted for a great deal. There has never
+been such a justification of the principle of democratic control as this
+war affords. But a nation must be held responsible for the action of its
+own rulers, however much it has simply submitted itself to them. I have
+the impression that even to-day in its misery the German public does not
+fully understand, and still believes that Germany was the victim of a
+plot to entrap and encircle her, and that with this in view Russia
+mobilized on a great scale for war. It is difficult for us to understand
+how real the Slav peril appeared to Germany and to Austria, and there is
+little doubt that to the latter Serbia was an unquiet neighbor. But
+these considerations must be taken in their context--a context of which
+the German public ought to have made itself fully aware. The leaders of
+its opinion were bent on domination to the Near East. No wonder that the
+Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula became progressively alarmed, and looked
+to Russia more and more for protection. For it had become plain that
+moral considerations would not be allowed by the authorities at Berlin
+to weigh in the balance against material advantages to be gained by
+power of domination.
+
+If there is room for reproach to us Anglo-Saxons, it is reproach of a
+very different kind. Germany was quite intelligent enough to listen to
+reason, and, besides, she had the prospect of becoming the dominating
+industrial and commercial power in the world by dint merely of peaceful
+penetration. It is possible that, if her relations with her Western
+neighbors, including Great Britain, had been more intimate than they
+actually were, she might have been saved from a great blunder, and might
+have come to understand that the English-speaking races were not really
+so inferior to herself as she took them to be. Her _hubris_ was in part,
+at all events, the result of ignorance. Speaking for my own countrymen,
+I think that neither did we know enough about the Germans nor did the
+Germans know enough about us. They were ignorant of the innate capacity
+for fighting, in industrial and military conflicts alike, which our
+history shows we have always hitherto brought to light in great
+emergencies. And they little realized how tremendously moral issues
+could stir and unite democracies. We, on the other hand, knew little of
+their tradition, their literature, or their philosophy. Our statesmen
+did not read their newspapers, and rarely visited their country. We were
+deficient in that quality which President Murray Butler has spoken of as
+the "international mind."
+
+I do not know whether, had it been otherwise, we could have brought
+about the better state of things in Europe for which I tried to express
+the hope, altho not without misgiving, in the address on "Higher
+Nationality" which I was privileged to deliver before distinguished
+representatives of the United States and of Canada at Montreal on
+September 1, 1913. I spoke then of the possibility of a larger entente,
+an entente which might become a real concert of the Great Powers of the
+world; and I quoted the great prayer with which Grotius concludes his
+book on "War and Peace." There was at least the chance, if we strove
+hard enough, that we might find a response from the best in other
+countries, and in the end attain to a new and real _Sittlichkeit_ which
+should provide a firmer basis for International Law and reverence for
+international obligations. But for the realization of this dream a
+sustained and strenuous search after fuller mutual knowledge was
+required.
+
+After this address had been published, I received a letter from the
+German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, in which--writing in German and so
+late as September 26, 1913--he expressed himself to me as follows:
+
+  "If I had the happiness of finding myself in one mind with you in
+  these thoughts in February, 1912, it has been to me a still
+  greater satisfaction that our two countries have since then had a
+  number of opportunities of working together in this spirit. Like
+  you, I hold the optimistic view that the great nations will be
+  able to progress further on this path, and will do so. Anyhow, I
+  shall, in so far as it is within my power, devote my energies to
+  this cause, and I am happy in the certainty of finding in you an
+  openly declared fellow-worker."
+
+But events swept him from a course which, so far as I know, he at least
+individually desired to follow. The great increase of armaments took
+place that year in Germany, and, when events were too strong for him, he
+elected, not to resign, but to throw in his lot with his country. His
+position was one of great difficulty. He took a course for which many
+would applaud him. But inherently a wrong course, surely. What he said
+when Belgium was invaded in breach of solemn treaty shows that he felt
+this. He let himself be swept into devoting his energies to bolstering
+up his country's cause, instead of resigning. His career only proves
+that, given the political conditions that obtained in Germany shortly
+before the war, it was almost impossible for a German statesman to keep
+his feet or to avoid being untrue to himself. And yet there were many
+others there in the same frame of mind, and one asks oneself whether,
+had they had more material to work with, they might not have been able
+to present a more attractive alternative than the notion of military
+domination which in the end took possession of all, from the Emperor
+downward.
+
+It is, however, useless to speculate at present on these things. We know
+too little of the facts. The historians of another generation will know
+more. But of one thing I feel sure. The Germans think that Great Britain
+declared war of pre-conceived purpose and her own initiative. There is a
+sense in which she did. The opinion of Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and
+of those of us who were by their side, was unhesitating. She could not
+have taken any other course than she did without the prospect of ruin
+and failure to enter on the only path of honor. For honor and safety
+alike necessitated that she should take, without the delay which would
+have been fatal, the step she did take without delay and unswervingly.
+The responsibility for her entry comes back wholly to Germany herself,
+who would not have brought it about had she not plunged into war. And
+to-day Germany lies prostrate.
+
+But she is not dead. I do not think that for generations to come she
+will dream of building again on military foundations. Her people have
+had a lesson in the overwhelming forces which are inevitably called into
+action where there is brutal indifference to the moral rights of others.
+What remains to her is that which she has inherited and preserved of the
+results of the great advancement in knowledge which began under the
+inspiration of Lessing and Kant, and culminated in the teaching of
+Goethe and Schiller and of the thinkers who were their contemporaries.
+That movement only came to a partial end in 1832. No doubt its character
+changed after that. The idealists in poetry, music, and philosophy gave
+place to great men of science, to figures such as those of Ludwig and
+Liebig, of Gauss, Riemann, and Helmholtz. There came also historians
+like Ranke and Mommsen, musicians like Wagner, philosophers like
+Schopenhauer and Lotze, a statesman like Bismarck. To-day there are few
+men of great stature in Germany; there are, indeed, few men of genius
+anywhere in the world. But Germany still has a high general level in
+science, and of recent years she has produced great captains of
+industry. The gift for organization founded on principle, and for
+applying science to practical uses, was there before the war, and it is
+very unsafe to assume that it is not there in a latent form to-day. If
+it is, Germany will be heard of again with a field of activity that
+probably will not include devotion to military affairs in the old way.
+Against her competition of this other kind, formidable as soon as she
+has recovered from her misery, we must prepare ourselves in the only way
+that can succeed in the long run. We, too, must study and organize on
+the basis of widely diffused exact knowledge, and not less of high
+ethical standards. I think, if I read the signs of the times aright,
+that people are coming to realize this, both in the United States and
+throughout the British Empire.
+
+[Illustration: _Press Illustrating Service_
+
+CHANCELLOR THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG
+
+CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
+AFFAIRS FROM 1909 TO 1917.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Of course I neither tried to obtain nor did obtain from the
+authorities in Germany any information that was not available to the
+general public there. I went simply to see the system of administration
+and how it was worked. Not even Count Reventlow, in his highly critical
+accounts of my visits in the book "Deutschlands Auswartige Politik,"
+imagines that I had access to information which I was not free to use.
+The German Government had ascertained for itself that a new organization
+of the British Army was on foot, but it neither told its own secrets nor
+asked for ours.]
+
+[Footnote 2: This message was the response to a memorandum which Sir
+Ernest Cassel had brought to Berlin from some influential members of the
+Cabinet in London, and it contained suggestions for the improvement of
+the relations between the two countries. An account of Sir Ernest
+Cassel's visit, and of what passed when he delivered his message from
+London, is given in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's recent book.]
+
+[Footnote 3: An anecdote illustrating the change that was coming over
+political opinion in Germany in 1912, may be worth relating. I was
+present at a supper party, given by one of the professors in a
+well-known German University town, in May of that year. I asked him
+whether the old Conservative member who had for long represented the
+town had been again returned. "Returned! no," he replied. "It was
+impossible to return a man of moderate opinions. We only escaped a
+Social Democrat by a few votes. We managed to get enough of the popular
+vote to return a fairly sensible railway servant for this University
+town." I inquired what party he belonged to. "No old party," was his
+answer, and it will interest you to know that his program was an English
+one: "_Lloyd Georgianismus_." I then inquired what was his text book.
+"_Die Reden von Lloyd George_," was the answer. Did it contain anything
+about a place called Limehouse? "_Limhaus, ach ja; das war eine
+vortreffliche Rede!_"]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE GERMAN ATTITUDE BEFORE THE WAR
+
+
+We now have before us the considered opinions of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg, the late Imperial Chancellor, and of Admiral von Tirpitz, the
+Minister who did much to develop the naval power of Germany, about the
+origin and significance of the war. Both have written books on the
+subject.[4] It is to be desired that in the case of each of these
+authors his book should be studied in English-speaking countries as well
+as on the Continent. For it is important that the Anglo-Saxon world
+should understand the divergences in policy which the two books
+disclose, not less than the points of agreement. That world has suffered
+in the past from failure to understand Germany, while the German world
+has displayed a total inability to interpret aright the Anglo-Saxon
+disposition. When I speak of two worlds I mean the governing classes of
+these worlds. The nations themselves, taken as aggregates of individual
+citizens, by a probable majority in each case, desired the continuance
+of peace and of the prosperity of which it is the condition. So, of
+course, did the rulers, those in Germany as much as those in London. But
+the German rulers had a theory of how to secure peace which was the
+outcome of the abstract mind that was their inheritance. It was the
+theory that was wrong, a theory of which Anglo-Saxondom knew little, and
+which it would have rejected decisively had it realized its tendency.
+This theory is described in Admiral Tirpitz's book, with an account of
+the efforts made to indoctrinate with it the people of Germany.
+
+The two volumes are profoundly interesting. For in that of Admiral
+Tirpitz we have the doctrine set forth that in the end led to the war.
+In that written by the late Imperial Chancellor we have quite another
+principle laid down as the one which he was endeavoring to apply in his
+direction of German policy. But in this endeavor he failed. The school
+of Tirpitz in the main prevailed, and this was the more easy, inasmuch
+as it was simply continuing the policy which had been advocated by a
+noisy section of Germans, nearly without a break, since the days of
+Frederick the Great. It was a policy which had in reality outlived the
+days in which it was practicable. The world had become too crowded and
+too small to permit of any one Power asserting its right to jostle its
+way where it pleased without regard to its neighbors. An affair of
+police on a colossal scale had begun to look as if it would ensue, and
+ensue it ultimately did. No doubt had we all been cleverer we might have
+been able to explain to Germany whither she was heading. But we did not
+understand her, least of all our chauvinists, nor did she understand us.
+In the main what she really wanted was to develop herself by the
+application of her talent for commerce and industry. To her success in
+attaining this end we had no objection, provided her procedure was
+decent and in order. But she chose a means to her end which was becoming
+progressively more and more inadmissible. Tirpitz describes the
+illegitimate _means_. Bethmann Hollweg describes the legitimate _end_.
+Tirpitz thinks Bethmann Hollweg was a weakling because he would not back
+up the means. Bethmann Hollweg, firm in his faith that the end was
+legitimate and thinking of this alone, dwells on it with little
+reference to what his colleague was about. His accusation against the
+Entente Powers is that, at the instigation of Russia primarily, and in a
+less degree of France, they set themselves to ring round and crush
+Germany. It was really, he believes, a war of aggression, and England
+was ultimately responsible for it. Without her co-operation it was
+impossible, and altho she did not enter into any formal military
+alliance for the purpose, she began in the time of Edward VII. a policy
+of close friendship which enabled Russia and France in the end to reckon
+on her as morally bound to help. It was easy for these Powers to
+represent as a defensive war what was really a war of aggression. Such
+was truly its nature, and England decided to join in it, actually
+because she was jealous of Germany's growing success in the world, and
+was desirous of setting a check to it.
+
+Such is Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's explanation. He is, I have no doubt,
+sincerely convinced of its truth, and he explains the grounds of his
+conviction in detail and with much ability. But there is a fallacy in
+his reasoning which becomes transparent when one reads along with his
+book that of his colleague. If we put out of sight the deep feeling
+awakened here by the brutality of the invasion of Belgium, to which
+violation of Treaty obligations the former declares that Germany was
+compelled by military considerations that were unanswerable, and look at
+the history of Anglo-German relations before the war, the inference is
+irresistible that it was not the object of developing in a peaceful
+atmosphere German commerce and industry that England objected to. Such a
+development might have been formidable for us. It would have compelled
+great efforts on our part to improve the education of our people and our
+organization for peaceful enterprises. But it would have been
+legitimate. The objection of this country was directed against quite
+other things that were being done by Germany in order to attain her
+purpose. The essence of these was the attempt to get her way by creating
+armaments which should in effect place her neighbors at her mercy. We
+who live on islands, and are dependent for our food and our raw
+materials on our being able to protect their transport and with it
+ourselves from invasion, could not permit the sea-protection which had
+been recognized from generation to generation as a necessity for our
+preservation to be threatened by the creation of naval forces intended
+to make it precarious. As the navies of Europe were growing, not only
+those of France and Russia, but the navy of Italy also, we had to look,
+in the interests of our security, to friendly relations with these
+countries. We aimed at establishing such friendly relations, and our
+method was to get rid of all causes of friction, in Newfoundland, in
+Egypt, in the East, and in the Mediterranean. That was the policy which
+was implied in our Ententes. We were not willing to enter into military
+alliances and we did not do so. Our policy was purely a business policy,
+and everything else was consequential on this, including the growing
+sense of common interests and of the desire for the maintenance of
+peace. I do not think that Admiral Tirpitz wanted actual war. But he did
+want power to enforce submission to the expansion of Germany at her
+will. And this power was his means to the end which was what less
+Prussianized minds in Germany contemplated as attainable in less
+objectionable ways. Such a means he could not fashion in the form of
+strength in sea power which would have placed us at his mercy, without
+arousing our instinct for self-preservation.
+
+All this the late Imperial Chancellor in substance ignores. The fact is
+that he can only defend his theory on the hypothesis that no such policy
+as that of his colleague was on foot, and that the truth was that
+France, Russia, and England had come to a decision to take the
+initiative in a policy embracing, for France revenge for the loss of
+Alsace and Lorraine, for Russia the acquisition of Constantinople with
+domination over the Balkans and the Bosporus, and for England the
+destruction of German commerce. If this hypothesis be not true, and the
+real explanation of the alarm of the Entente Powers was the policy
+exemplified by Tirpitz and the other exponents of German militarism,
+then the whole of the reasoning in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's book
+falls to the ground.
+
+It may be asked how it was possible that two members of the Imperial
+Government should have been pursuing in the same period two policies
+wholly inconsistent with each other. The answer is not difficult. The
+direction of affairs in Germany was admirably organized for some
+purposes and very badly for others. Her autocratic system lent itself to
+efficiency in the preparation of armaments. But it was not really a
+system under which her Emperor was left free to guide policy. There is
+no greater mistake made than that under which it is popularly supposed
+that the Emperor was absolute master. The development in recent years of
+the influence of the General and Admiral Staffs, which was a necessity
+from the point of view of modern organization for war but required
+keeping in careful check from other points of view, had produced forces
+which the Emperor was powerless to hold in. Even in Bismarck's time
+readers of his "Reflections and Recollections" will remember how he felt
+the embarrassment of his foreign policy caused by the growing and
+deflecting influences of Moltke, and even of his friend Roon. And there
+was no Bismarck to hold the Staffs in check for reasons of expediency in
+the years before 1914. The military mind when it is highly developed is
+dangerous. It sees only its own bit, but this it sees with great
+clearness, and in consequence becomes very powerful. There is only one
+way of holding it to its legitimate function, and that is by the
+supremacy of public opinion in a Parliament as its final exponent.
+Parliaments may be clumsy and at times ignorant. But they do express, it
+may be vaguely, but yet sufficiently, the sense of the people at large.
+Now, notwithstanding all that had been done to educate them up to it, I
+do not think that the people at large in Germany had ever endorsed the
+implications of the policy of German militarism. The Social Democrats
+certainly had not. They ought, I think, to be judged even now by what
+they said before the war, and not by what some, tho not all of them,
+said when it was pressed on them in 1914 that Germany had to fight for
+her life. Had she possessed a true Parliamentary system for a generation
+before the war there would probably have been no war. What has happened
+to her is a vindication of Democracy as the best political system
+despite certain drawbacks which attach to it.
+
+The great defect of the German Imperial system was that, unless the
+Emperor was strong enough to impose his will on his advisers, he was
+largely at their mercy. Had they been chosen by the people, the people
+and not the Emperor would have borne the responsibility, if the views of
+these advisers diverged from their own. But they were chosen by the
+Emperor, and chosen in varying moods as to policy. The result was that,
+excellent as were the departments at their special work in most cases,
+on general policy there was no guarantee for unity of mind. The Emperor
+lived amid a sea of conflicting opinions. The Chancellor might have one
+idea, the Foreign Secretary, a Prussian and not Imperial Minister, a
+different one, the Chief of the General Staff a third, the War Minister
+a fourth, and the Head of the Admiralty a fifth. Thus the Kaiser was
+constantly being pulled at from different sides, and whichever Minister
+had the most powerful combination at his back generally got the best of
+the argument. Were the Kaiser in an impulsive mood he might side now
+with one and again with another, and the result would necessarily be
+confusion. Moreover, he had constantly to fix one eye on public opinion
+in Germany, and another on public opinion abroad. It is therefore not
+surprising that Germany seemed to foreigners a strange and
+unintelligible country, and that sudden manifestations of policy were
+made which shocked us here, accustomed as we were to something quite
+different. Neither our pacifists nor our chauvinists really succeeded in
+diagnosing Germany. On the other hand, we ourselves were a standing
+puzzle to the Germans. They could not understand how Government could be
+conducted in the absence of abstract principles exactly laid down. And
+because our democratic system was one of choosing our rulers and
+trusting them with a large discretion within limits, the Germans always
+suspected that this system, with which they were unfamiliar, covered a
+device for concealing hidden policies. I wrote in some detail about this
+in an address delivered at Oxford in the autumn of 1911, and afterward
+published in a little volume called "Universities and National Life."
+
+The war has not altered the views to which I had then come.
+
+But it was not really so on either side, and it is deplorable that the
+two nations knew so little of each other. For I believe that the German
+system, wholly unadapted as it was to the modern spirit, was bound to
+become modified before long, and had we shown more skill and more zeal
+in explaining ourselves, we should probably have accelerated the process
+of German acceptance of the true tendencies of the age. But our
+statesmen took little trouble to get first-hand knowledge of the genesis
+of what appeared to them to be the German double dose of original sin,
+and, on the other hand, our chauvinists were studied in Germany out of
+all proportion to their small number and influence. Thus the Berlin
+politicians got the wrong notions to which their tradition predisposed
+them. I believe that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was himself really more
+enlightened, but he could not control the admirals and generals, or the
+economists or historians or professors whom the admirals and generals
+were always trying to enlist on the side of the doctrine of _Weltmacht
+oder Niedergang_. Under these circumstances all that seemed possible was
+to try to influence German opinion, and at the same time to insure
+against the real risk of failure to accomplish this before it was too
+late.
+
+In order to make this view of German conditions intelligible, it will be
+convenient in the first place to give some account of Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg's opinions as expressed in his book, and afterward to contrast
+them with the views of his powerful colleague, Admiral von Tirpitz.
+
+The ex-Imperial Chancellor commences his "_Betrachtungen zum
+Weltkriege_" by going back to the day when he assumed office. When
+Prince Buelow handed over the reins to him in July, 1909, the Prince gave
+him his views on what, in the attitude of England, had been causing the
+former much concern. We are not told what he actually said, but we can
+guess it, for Bethmann Hollweg goes on to indicate the origin of the
+cause of anxiety. It was King Edward's "encirclement" policy. It might
+well be that the late King had no desire for war. But the result of the
+policy for which he and the Ministers behind him stood was, so he
+believes, that, in all differences of opinion as to external policy,
+Germany found England, France, and Russia solidly against her, and was
+conscious of a continuous attempt to lead Italy away from the Triple
+Alliance. "People may call this '_Einkreisung_,' or policy of the
+balance of power, or whatever they like. The object and the achievement
+resulted in the founding of a group of nations of great power, whose
+purpose was to hinder Germany at least by diplomatic means in the free
+development of her growing strength." Sir Edward Grey, when taking over
+the conduct of foreign policy in 1905, had declared that he would
+continue the policy of the late Government. He hoped for improved
+relations with Russia, and even for more satisfactory relations with
+Germany, provided always that in the latter case these did not interfere
+with the friendship between England and France. This, says Bethmann
+Hollweg, had been the theme of English policy since the end of the days
+of "splendid isolation," and it remained so until the war broke out. He
+says nothing of the rapid advances which were proceeding from stage to
+stage in the organization of German battle-fleets to be added to her
+formidable army, or of the risk these advances made for England if she
+were to find herself without any friends outside.
+
+As regards Russia, Isvolsky, who had never forgiven the Austrian Foreign
+Minister, Count d'Aerenthal, for his diplomatic victory in getting the
+annexation to Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, was very
+hostile to Austria, and consequently to her Ally. In the case of France,
+again, it was indeed true that M. Jules Cambon had repeatedly emphasized
+to the ex-Chancellor the desire for more intimate relations between
+France and Germany. But the French had never forgiven the driving of
+Delcasse out of office, and the result of the Algeciras conference had
+not healed the wound. Besides this, there was the undying question of
+Alsace-Lorraine.
+
+The outcome of the precarious situation, says the ex-Chancellor, was
+that England, following her traditional policy of balancing the Powers
+of Europe, was taking a firm position on the side of France and Russia,
+while Germany was increasing her naval power and giving a very definite
+direction to her policy in the East. The commercial rivalry between
+England and Germany was being rendered acute politically by the growth
+of the German fleet. In this state of things Bethmann Hollweg formed the
+opinion that there was only one thing that could be done, to aim at
+withdrawing from the Dual Alliance the backing of England for its
+anti-German policy. The Emperor entirely agreed with him, and it was
+resolved to attempt to attain this purpose by coming to an understanding
+with England.
+
+Reading between the lines, it is pretty obvious that the ex-Chancellor
+was at times embarrassed by the public utterances of his imperial
+Master. Him he defends throughout the book with conspicuous loyalty, and
+is emphatic about his desire to keep the peace, a desire founded in
+religious conviction. But the Emperor's way was to see only one thing
+at the moment. I translate[5] a passage from his Chancellor's book:
+
+  "If from time to time he indulged in passionate expressions about
+  the strong position in the world of Germany, his desire was that
+  the nation, whose development beyond all expectation was filling
+  him with conscious pride, should be spurred on to a fresh
+  heightening of its energies. He sought to give it a continuous
+  impulse with the energy of his enthusiastic nature. He wished his
+  people to be strong and powerful in capacity to arm for their
+  defense, but the German mission, which was for him a consuming
+  faith, was yet to be a mission of work and of peace. That this
+  work and this peace should not be destroyed by the dangers that
+  surrounded us, was his increasing anxiety. Again and again has the
+  Kaiser told me that his journey to Tangier in 1904, as to which he
+  was quite unaware that it would lead to dangerous complications,
+  was undertaken much against his own will, and only under pressure
+  from his political advisers. Moreover, his personal influence was
+  strongly exerted for a settlement of the Morocco crisis of 1905.
+  And the same sense of the need of peace gave rise to his attitude
+  during the Boer War and also during the Russo-Japanese War. To a
+  ruler who really wanted war, opportunities for military
+  intervention in the affairs of the world were truly not lacking.
+
+  "Critics in Germany had in that period frequently pressed the
+  point that a too frequent insistence in public on our readiness
+  for peace was less likely to further it than, on the contrary, to
+  strengthen the Entente in its policy of altering the _status quo_.
+  In a period of Imperialism in which the talk about material power
+  was loud, and in which the preservation of the peace of the world
+  was considered only accidentally, like the ten years before the
+  war, considerations such as these are undoubtedly full of
+  significance, and perhaps the same sort of thing explains a good
+  deal of strong language on the part of the Kaiser about Germany's
+  capacity in case of war. It is certain that such utterances did
+  not lessen the feeling of nervousness that filled the
+  international atmosphere. But the true ground of such nervousness
+  was the policy of the balance of power, which had split Europe
+  into two armed camps full of distrust of each other. The
+  Ambassadors of the Great Powers knew the Kaiser intimately enough
+  to realize what his intentions, in spite of everything, were, and
+  it required an untruthfulness only explicable by the psychological
+  effect of war to permit the suggestion of a hateful and distorted
+  picture of him as a tyrant seeking for the domination of the world
+  and for war and bloodshed."
+
+I have translated this passage from the book because I think it is
+instructive in its disclosure of uneasy self-consciousness on the part
+of the author. Obviously, the Emperor made his quiet-loving Minister at
+times uncomfortable. I do not doubt that the Emperor really desired
+peace, just as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg tells us. Yet he not only
+indulged himself in warlike talk, but was surrounded by a group of
+military and naval advisers who were preaching openly that war was
+inevitable, and were instructing many of the prominent intellectual
+leaders in their doctrine. The Emperor may well have been in a difficult
+situation. But he was playing with fire when he made such speeches to
+the world as he frequently did. I believe him to have most genuinely
+desired to keep the peace. But I doubt whether he was willing to pay the
+price for entry on the only path along which it could have been made
+secure. He was a man of many sides, with a genius for speaking winged
+words as part of his equipment. He was a dangerous leader for Germany
+under conditions which had already caused even a Bismarck concern. The
+result was that the world took him to be the ally, not of Bethmann
+Hollweg, but of Tirpitz, and what that meant we shall see when we come
+to the latter's book. I can not say that I think the judgment of the
+world was other than, to put the matter at its lowest, the natural and
+probable result of his language, and I find nothing in the
+ex-Chancellor's volume to lead me to a different conclusion.
+
+The argument of that volume is that England should never have entered
+the Entente, for that by doing so she strengthened France and Russia so
+as to enable them to indulge the will for war. He assumes that there was
+this will as beyond doubt. But suppose England had not entered the
+Entente, what then? On Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's own showing France
+and Russia would have remained too weak to entertain the hope of success
+in a conflict with the Triple Alliance. Germany could, under these
+circumstances, have herself compelled these Powers to an entente or even
+an alliance. England would have been in such a case left in isolation in
+days in which isolation had ceased to be "splendid." For great as was
+her navy, it could not have been relied upon as sufficient to protect
+her adequately against the combined navies of Germany, France, Russia,
+and Austria, with that of Italy possibly added. It was the apprehension
+occasioned by Germany's warlike policy that made it an unavoidable act
+of prudence to enter into the Entente. It was our only means of making
+our sea power secure and able to protect us against threats of invasions
+by great Continental armies. The Emperor and his Chancellor should
+therefore have thought of some other way of securing the peace than that
+of trying to detach us from the Entente.
+
+The alternative was obvious. Germany should have offered to cease to
+pile up armaments, if our desire for friendly relations all round could
+be so extended as to bring all the Powers belonging to both groups into
+them, along with England. But the German policy of relying on superior
+strength in armaments as the true guarantee of peace did not admit of
+this. I am no admirer of the principle of the balance of power. I should
+like to say good-bye to it. I prefer the principle of a League of
+Nations, if that be practicable, or, at the very least, of an Entente
+comprising all the Powers. But if neither of these alternatives be
+possible there remains, for the people who desire to be secure, only the
+method of the balance of power. Now Germany drove us to this by her
+indisposition to change her traditional policy and to be content to
+rely on the settlement of specific differences for the good feeling that
+always tends to result. She had, it is true, the misfortune for so
+strong a nation to have been born a hundred years too late. She had got
+less in Africa than she might have had. We were ready to help her to a
+place in the sun there and elsewhere in the world, and to give up
+something for this end, if only we could secure peace and contentment on
+her part. But she would not have it so, and she chose to follow the
+principle of relying on the "Mailed Fist." Of this policy, when pursued
+recklessly, Bismarck well understood the danger. "Prestige politics," as
+he called them, he hated. In February, 1888, he laid down in a
+well-known speech what he held to be the true principle. "Every Great
+Power which seeks to exert pressure on the politics of other countries,
+and to direct affairs outside the sphere of interest which God has
+assigned to it, carries on politics of power, and not of interest; it
+works for prestige." But that principle was not consistently followed by
+William the Second. Into the detailed story of his departure from it I
+have not space to enter. But those who wish to follow this will do well
+to read the narrative contained in an admirable and open-minded book by
+Mr. Harbutt Dawson, "The German Empire from 1867 to 1914," in the
+second volume of which the story is told in detail.
+
+Instead of trying to alter the traditional attitude of Germany to her
+neighbors, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg let it continue. That he did not
+want it to continue I am pretty sure. At page 130 of his book he appeals
+to me, personally, to recall the words he used in a conversation we had
+one evening in February, 1912, words in which he sought to show me that
+"a proper understanding between our two nations would guarantee the
+peace of the world, and would lead the Powers by degrees from the
+phantom of armed Imperialism to the opposite pole of peaceful work
+together in the world." I remember his words, and with them I would
+remind him that I wholly agreed. I had myself used similar language in
+anticipation, and had begged him not to insist on our accepting an
+obligation of absolute neutrality under all conditions which might prove
+inconsistent with our duty of loyalty to France, now a friendly
+neighbor, a duty which rested on no military obligation, but on kindly
+feeling and regard. It was such friendship and mutual regard that I was
+striving, with the assent of the British Cabinet, to bring about with
+Germany also, and by the same means through which it had been
+accomplished in the case of France. Not by any secret military
+convention, for we had entered into no communications which bound us to
+do more than study conceivable possibilities in a fashion which the
+German General Staff would look on as mere matter of routine for a
+country the shores of which lay so near to those of France, but by
+removing all material causes of friction. And when Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg adds of my reply that "even he preferred the power of English
+Dreadnoughts and the friendship of France," I must remind him of the
+words sanctioned beforehand when submitted by me to Sir Edward Grey,
+with which I began our conversation. I reproduce them from the record I
+made immediately after the conversation to which I have already referred
+in the preceding chapter, on which I again draw for further minor
+details. And I wish to say, in passing, that both Herr von Bethmann
+Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have given in their books accounts of
+what passed in my conversations with them which tally substantially, so
+far as the words used are concerned, with my own notes and
+recollections. It is mainly as to the inferences they now draw from my
+then attitude that I have any controversy with them, and, in the case of
+Admiral von Tirpitz, to some slight inaccuracies which have arisen from
+misconstruction.
+
+The ex-Imperial Chancellor asked the question whether I was to talk to
+him officially, the difficulty being that he could not divest himself of
+his official position, and that it would be awkward to speak with me in
+a purely private capacity. I said I had come officially, so far as the
+approval of the King and the Cabinet was concerned, but merely to talk
+over the ground, and not to commit either himself or my own Government
+at this stage to definite propositions. At the first interview, which
+took place in the British Embassy, on Thursday, February 8, 1912, and
+lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him a message
+of good wishes for the Conversations and for the future of Anglo-German
+relations, with which the King had entrusted me at the audience I had
+before leaving London. I proceeded to ask whether he wished to make the
+first observations himself, or desired that I should begin. He wished me
+to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him in the sense arranged in
+the discussions I had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London.
+
+I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away
+between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was
+the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken
+into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent
+armaments, and, with the aid of the Triple Alliance, she had become the
+center of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other
+Powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment
+Germany's right to her policy, but this was the natural and inevitable
+consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same
+situation with France, when she was very powerful on the seas, that we
+had with Germany now. While the fact to which I had referred created a
+difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of Powers
+might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing
+sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me
+to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was
+now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia
+except those that were in writing and published to the world.
+
+The Chancellor here interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really
+so. I said it was so, and that, in the situation which now existed, I
+saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new
+and cordial friendship carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps to the
+profit of Russia and France, as well as of Germany herself. He replied
+that he had no reason to differ from this view.
+
+He and I both referred to the war scare of the autumn of 1911, and he
+observed that we had made military preparations. I was aware that the
+German Military Attache in London had reported at that time to Berlin
+that we had so reorganized our army as to be in a position, if we
+desired to do so, to send six of our new infantry divisions and at least
+one cavalry division swiftly to France. The Chancellor obviously had
+this in his mind, and I told him that the preparations made were only
+those required to bring the capacity of our small British Army, in point
+of mobilization for eventualities which must be clear to him, to
+something approaching the standard of that celerity in its operations
+which Moltke had long ago accomplished for Germany and which was with
+her now a matter of routine. For this purpose we had studied our
+deficiencies and modes of operation. This, however, concerned our own
+direct interests, and was a purely departmental matter concerning the
+War Office, and the Minister who had the most to do with it was the one
+who was now talking to him and who was not wanting in friendly feeling
+toward Germany. We could not run the risk of being caught unprepared.
+
+As both Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz have devoted a
+good deal of attention to these and other conversations in their books,
+I have felt at liberty here and in the last chapter to state what, I am
+bound to observe, had better not, as it seems to me personally, have
+been held back for so long--the exact nature of that which actually
+passed when I was sent to Berlin in February, 1912. Accordingly, it is
+only necessary that I should add here a few words more about what indeed
+appears in most of its detail from the versions given by the two German
+Ministers concerned themselves.
+
+I refused, not only because I had been instructed to do so, but because
+in my own opinion it was vital that I should refuse, to negotiate
+excepting on the basis of absolute loyalty to the Entente with France
+and Russia. The German Government asked for a covenant of absolute
+neutrality. This I could not look at. I had the same feeling about such
+an agreement for unconditional neutrality as Caprivi had when he was
+asked to renew the Reinsurance Treaty which Bismarck made with Russia at
+Skiernevice in 1884, and under which, notwithstanding that Germany might
+come to owe a duty to Austria to support her as her military Ally, he
+bound Germany to observe neutrality in case Russia were attacked by
+her. So far as appeared this Reinsurance Treaty probably had suggested
+the wording of the analogous formula which the Chancellor was proposing
+to myself. But altho we were not under the obligation to France which
+Germany was under to Austria in 1884, I felt, to use the words of
+Caprivi himself, when he succeeded Bismarck, and was asked to renew the
+engagement with Russia, that the arrangement was "too complicated" for
+my comprehension. It would have been not only wrong to expose a friendly
+France to the risk of being dismembered by an unjustifiable invasion,
+while her friend England merely stood looking on, but it would also have
+been prejudicial to our safety. For to have allowed Germany to take
+possession of the northern ports of France would have been to imperil
+our island security. The Chancellor was entitled to make the request he
+did, but I was bound to refuse it. I also, at the same time, told him
+that if Germany went on increasing her Navy, any agreement with us meant
+to lead to better relations would be little more than "bones without
+flesh." Germany might, indeed, as he had said, need a third training
+squadron, in addition to the two she had already in the North Sea. This
+we could easily meet by moving more of our ships to northern waters,
+without having to increase the number we were building independently.
+But if she had the idea of adding to her fleet on a considerable scale
+we should be bound to lay down two keels to every one of her new ships,
+and the inevitable result would be, no proportionate increase in her
+strength relatively to ours, but of a certainty a good deal of bad
+feeling.
+
+I may observe that at the date of this conversation the new German Fleet
+Bill had not been made public, and we knew nothing of its contents in
+London, excepting that a third squadron for training was to be added to
+the two which were already there. For this purpose it had been said that
+a few ships and a moderate increase in personnel would be all that was
+required. Before I left Berlin the Emperor, as I mentioned in the
+preceding chapter, handed to me, with friendly frankness and with
+permission to show it to my colleagues, an advance copy of the new Bill.
+It looked to me as if, when scrutinized, its proposals might prove more
+formidable than we had anticipated. But I asked his permission to
+abstain from trying to form any judgment on this question without the
+aid of the British Admiralty, and I put it in my pocket and handed it to
+the First Lord of the Admiralty at a Cabinet held on Monday, February
+12, in the afternoon of the day on which I returned to London. I was not
+very sure as to what might prove to be contained in this Bill, and my
+misgivings were confirmed by our Admiralty experts, who found in it a
+program of destroyers, submarines, and personnel far in excess of
+anything indicated in the only rumors that had reached us. After we had
+to abandon the idea of getting Germany to accept the carefully guarded
+formula of neutrality which was all that we could entertain, the Cabinet
+sanctioned without delay the additions to our navy which were required
+to counter these increases. Our policy was to avoid conflagration by
+every effort possible, and at the same time to insure the house in case
+of failure.
+
+I felt throughout these conversations that the Chancellor was sincerely
+desirous of meeting me in the effort to establish good relations between
+the two countries. But he was hampered by the difficulty of changing the
+existing policy of building up armaments which was imposed on him. In
+only one way could he manage this, and that was by getting me to agree
+to a formula of absolute neutrality under all circumstances. The other,
+the better, and the only way that was admissible for us, the way in
+which we had surmounted all difficulties with France and Russia, he was
+not free to enter on, tho I believe that he really wished to. Hence the
+attempt at a complete agreement failed. But, as he says himself, much
+good came of these initial conversations, and still more of the
+subsequent conversations which followed on them in London between Sir
+Edward Grey and the German Ambassador. Candor became the order of the
+day, minor difficulties were smoothed over, and a treaty for territorial
+rearrangements, of the general character discussed in Berlin, was
+finally agreed on, and was likely to have been signed had the war not
+intervened.
+
+As to the rest of the narrative in the ex-Chancellor's book, this is not
+the place to deal with it. His view that Germany was doing her best to
+moderate the rash action in Vienna which resulted in the declaration of
+war on Serbia, while England was doing much less to restrain the course
+of events at St. Petersburg, is not one which it is easy to bring into
+harmony with the documents published. This is a part of the history of
+events before the war which has already been exhaustively dealt with by
+others, and it is no part of the purpose of these pages to write of
+matters about which I have no first-hand knowledge. For I had little
+opportunity of taking any direct part in our affairs with Germany after
+my final visit to that country, which was in 1912. My duties as Lord
+Chancellor were too engrossing.
+
+There are, however, in this connection just two topics toward the end of
+the book which are of such interest that I will refer to them before
+passing away from it. The first is the story that there was a Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, at which the Emperor determined on
+war. This Herr von Bethmann Hollweg denies. He explains that in the
+morning of that day the Austrian Ambassador lunched with the Emperor,
+presumably at Potsdam, and took the opportunity of handing to him a
+letter written by the Emperor of Austria personally, together with a
+memorandum on policy drawn up in Vienna. This memorandum contained a
+detailed plan for opposing Russian enterprise in the Balkan peninsula by
+energetic diplomatic pressure. Against a hostile Serbia and an
+unreliable Roumania resort was to be had to Bulgaria and Turkey, with a
+view to the establishment of a Balkan League, excluding Serbia, to be
+formed under the aegis of the Central Powers. The Serajevo murder was
+declared to have demonstrated the aggressive and irreconcilable
+character of Serbian policy. The Austrian Emperor's letter endorsed the
+views contained in the memorandum, and added that, if the agitation in
+Belgrade continued, the pacific views of the Powers were in danger. The
+German Emperor said that he must consult his Chancellor before
+answering, and sent for Bethmann Hollweg and the Under-Secretary,
+Zimmermann. He saw them in the afternoon in the park of the Neues Palais
+at Potsdam. The Chancellor thinks that no one else was present. It was
+agreed that the situation was very serious. The ex-Chancellor says that
+he had already learned the tenor of these Austrian documents, altho he
+did not see the text of the subsequent ultimatum to Serbia until July
+22. It was determined that it was no part of the duty of Germany to give
+advice to her Ally as to how she should deal with the Serajevo murder.
+But every effort was to be made to prevent the controversy between
+Austria and Serbia from developing into an international conflict. It
+was useful to try to bring in Bulgaria, but Roumania had better be left
+out of account. These conclusions were in accordance with the
+Chancellor's own opinion, and when he returned to Berlin he communicated
+them to the Austrian Ambassador. Germany would do what she could to make
+Roumania friendly, and Austria was told that in any case she might rely
+on her Ally, Germany, to stand firmly by her side.
+
+The next day the Emperor set off in his yacht for the northern seas. The
+Chancellor says he advised him to do this because the expedition was one
+which the Emperor had been in the habit of making every year at that
+season, and it would cause talk if this usual journey were to be
+abandoned.
+
+The other point relates to the date on which the German Chancellor saw
+the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He tells us that it was
+brought to him for the first time on the evening of July 22 by Herr von
+Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, who had just received it from the Austrian
+Ambassador. The Chancellor says that von Jagow thought the ultimatum too
+strongly worded, and wished for some delay. But when he told the
+Ambassador this the answer was that the document had already been
+dispatched, and it was published in the Vienna _Telegraph_ the next
+morning.
+
+The conclusion of the Chancellor is that the stories of the Crown
+Council at Potsdam on July 5, and of the co-operation of the German
+Government in preparing the ultimatum, are mere legends. The question of
+substance as regards the first may be left for interpretation by
+posterity. As to the controversy about the second, it would be
+interesting to know whether Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador
+at Vienna, knew of the ultimatum before it assumed the form in which it
+reached Berlin on July 22. I shall have more to say about these
+incidents later on when I come to Admiral von Tirpitz's account of them.
+
+My criticism of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg is in no case founded on any
+doubt at all as to his veracity. I formed, in the course of my dealings
+with him, a high opinion of his integrity. But in his reasoning he is
+apt to let circumstances escape his notice which are in a large degree
+material for forming a judgment. This does not seem to me to arise from
+any deliberate intention to be otherwise than candid. I am sure that he
+believes that he is telling the full truth at all times. But he became a
+convinced partizan, quite intelligibly. This fact, however creditable to
+his patriotism, seems to me not only to explain why he thought it right
+to continue in office and stand by his country as long as he could
+through the war, but also to detract somewhat from the weight that would
+otherwise attach to the opinions of an honorable and well-meaning man.
+
+I pass to the examination of the concurrent policy against which he
+could not prevail, and the existence of which takes the edge off his
+reasoning. That policy is expounded fully and clearly by Admiral von
+Tirpitz, a German of the traditional Military School, a man of great
+ability, and one who rarely if ever allowed himself to be deflected from
+pursuing a concentrated purpose to the utmost of his power.
+
+Of the general character of this purpose his colleague, Bethmann
+Hollweg, was conscious, as appears from passages in the book just
+discussed, of which I have selected one for translation.
+
+"The fleet was the favorite child of Germany, for in it the
+onward-pressing energies of the nation seemed to be most vividly
+illustrated. The application of the most modern technical skill, and the
+organization that had been worked out with so much care, were admired,
+and rightly so. To the doubts of those versed in affairs whether we were
+pursuing our true path by building great battleships, there was opposed
+a fanatical public opinion which was not disciplined in the interest of
+those responsible for the direction of affairs. Reflections about the
+difficult international troubles to which our naval policy was giving
+rise were held in check by a robust agitation. In the navy itself the
+consciousness was by no means everywhere present that the navy must be
+only an instrument of policy and not its determining factor. The conduct
+of naval policy had for many years rested in the hands of a man who
+claimed to exercise _political_ authority over his department, and who
+influenced unbrokenly the political opinion of wider circles. Where
+differences arose between the Admiralty and the civilian leadership,
+public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the
+Admiralty. Any attempt to take into consideration relative proportions
+in the strength of other nations was treated as being the outcome of a
+weak-minded apprehension of the foreigner."
+
+When I was in Berlin in 1912, the last year in which, as I have already
+said, I visited Germany, there were those who thought that Bethmann
+Hollweg would shortly be superseded as Chancellor by his powerful rival,
+Admiral von Tirpitz. But in these days the peace party in that country
+was pretty strong, and the then Chancellor was regarded as a cautious
+and safe man. It was later on, in 1913, when the new Military Law, with
+L50,000,000 of fresh expenditure, was passed, that the situation became
+much more doubtful. But the hesitation that existed in Government
+circles in Berlin earlier was never shared by the author of the
+"_Erinnerungen_," to which I now pass. One has only to look at the
+portrait at the beginning of that volume to see what sort of a man the
+author is. A strong man certainly, a descendant of the class which
+clustered round the great Moltke, and gave much anxiety at times to
+Bismarck himself.
+
+[Illustration: ADMIRAL ALFRED P. VON TIRPITZ
+
+LORD HIGH ADMIRAL OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL NAVY FROM 1911 TO 1916.]
+
+The Admiral possesses a "General Staff" mind of a high order. A mind of
+this type has never been given a chance of systematic development in the
+English Navy, where the distinction between strategy and tactics, on the
+one hand, and administration on the other, has never been so sharply
+laid down as it has been, following the great Moltke, in Germany. Even
+Moltke himself was not satisfied with what had been accomplished in
+Germany in this direction by the Army. He is said to have complained
+that the General Staff building, which was put in the Thiergarten, while
+the War Office was in Berlin itself, near the corner of the
+Wilhelmstrasse, was only one mile distant from the War Office, when it
+should have been two. For he held that the exactness of demarcation of
+function, which was only to be attained if strategy and tactics were
+studied continuously by a specially chosen body of experts, could not be
+made complete if the War Office could get too easily at the General
+Staff. But what he accomplished at least gave rise to a school of exact
+military thought far in advance of any that had preceded it. The fruits
+of this were reaped in the war with Austria in 1866, and still more in
+that with France in 1870. And when the navy was first organized this
+principle was introduced into its organization, first by Stosch and then
+by Caprivi. Both of these had been trained in the great Moltke's ideas,
+and it was because of this that, altho soldiers, they were chosen to
+model the organization of the German Navy. It is true that we have
+beaten the German Navy. That was because, as Tirpitz himself admits, we
+possessed, not only superior numbers, but a tradition of long standing
+and a spirit in our fleet which Germany had not built up. But we shall
+do well not to overlook what he has to say about the procedure of basing
+strategy and tactics on exact knowledge, and careful study, especially
+when such ideas as that of landing small expeditionary forces on enemy
+territory by means of a naval expedition, are being considered, nor what
+he says of his efforts to make this procedure real. Numbers are not
+always sufficient. They are not likely to be large for a long time to
+come, and the study of all possibilities and of modern conditions is
+therefore more important than ever. The British Army knows this. It is
+not so clear that the British Navy is equally informed about the
+necessity of bearing the principle in mind.
+
+Tirpitz never served in the army, but he was brought up under the
+influence of these great soldiers. His first experience was indeed
+mainly in technical matters of construction. But he never let go the
+true principle of an Admiral or War Staff, and the result was that he
+considered, and not wholly without reason, that he was leading the
+German Navy on lines which were in the end likely to make it, when fully
+developed, a more powerful instrument than the British Navy. Instead of
+studying merely the lessons of the past, as we here seek them in, for
+instance, the history of the Seven Years' War of more than a century and
+a half ago, or in the operations of Nelson carried out a hundred years
+since, he insisted that the German Navy should study systematically
+modern problems, and in particular combined naval and military
+operations. In England we had no War Staff for the Navy until 1911, and
+our Senior Admirals disliked the idea. Consequently such staff study of
+military problems has never been properly developed, the wishes of our
+junior naval officers notwithstanding. In Germany the idea was regarded
+as a vital one throughout by Tirpitz.
+
+The first chapter of Tirpitz's book describes the beginnings of the
+German Navy. The second deals with the Stosch period. The third is
+devoted to the administration of Caprivi during the time when he was
+head of the Admiralty, and extends to the period when he became
+Chancellor. The fourth is devoted to construction. The fifth describes
+the disastrous breaking up of the Naval Administration into Boards, to
+which the author says the Emperor William II. allowed himself to be
+persuaded. The sixth chapter is directed to tactical developments, a
+subject in which Admiral Tirpitz himself did much. The seventh deals
+with naval plans. The eighth contains a very interesting description of
+how he was sent to find a naval base in Chinese waters, and how he
+selected and developed, with German thoroughness, Tsingtau (Kiaochow).
+The ninth chapter begins the story of the difficulties he experienced
+when refused sufficient money and freedom while he was Minister of
+Marine. The tenth gives a vividly written account of his visits to
+Bismarck. The next five chapters are devoted to the development of the
+German Navy and its relation to foreign policy. The sixteenth,
+seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters are concerned with the author's
+views of the reasons for the outbreak of the war of 1914, and its
+history. The nineteenth is a chapter devoted to the submarine war, and
+to a farewell apostrophe to a Germany lost by bad leading and vagueness
+in objectives. There is also a supplement, containing letters written
+by him from time to time during the war, and his observations on what
+ought to have been the consistent policy of Germany in construction of
+battleships and submarines.
+
+The great thesis of the book is that the only way to preserve the peace
+was to make Europe fear German strength, and that this imported such
+battle-fleets as would attract allies to Germany for protection, and
+would thus in the end weaken the Entente. England was the real enemy,
+and England could not be dislodged from her powerful position in the
+world so long as she was allowed to continue in command of the ocean.
+For Bethmann Hollweg's alternative policy of a peaceful _rapprochement_
+with England he has no words but those of contempt. He, too, he says,
+had ideas as to how to keep the peace, but they were diametrically
+different from those of his colleague the Chancellor. On him he pours
+scorn for his attempts at departure from the policy of Frederick the
+Great and Bismarck.
+
+Tirpitz had been deeply impressed by the writings of Admiral Mahan. He
+himself drew from them the lesson that in ultimate analysis world-power
+for Germany depended on the sea-power which she had not got, and he set
+himself to build it up. He endeavored to educate on this subject, not
+only the Reichstag, where he says he had much opposition, but the
+public. Under Prince Buelow this was less difficult than he subsequently
+found it. His account of how the Minister of Education and the
+University professors helped him, and of how he contrived to enlist the
+Press, is as interesting as it is significant. But his great difficulty
+was obviously with William the Second. The Emperor had done much for
+fleet construction, and was so interested in it that he meddled at every
+turn in technical and strategical matters alike. The Ministry of Marine
+was not allowed to carry out the Admiral's own plans and conceptions.
+And when Bethmann came on the scene the situation became, according to
+the former, even worse. He moans over the apparent limitlessness of the
+money and authority with which the English Admiralty was provided by
+Parliament and the nation. At last he carried with his colleagues and in
+the Reichstag the policy of Fleet Laws, under which the Reichstag passed
+measures which took construction, in part at least, from off the annual
+navy vote, and he got through the succession of Acts that laid down
+programs extending over several years. Richter and other distinguished
+public men fought Tirpitz over these, but, in part at least, he got his
+way, and secured the nearest approach to continuity that his
+ever-supervising Sovereign would permit to him.
+
+What Tirpitz says he asked for above everything was a definite policy
+for war, and this he could not get the leave of Bethmann to lay down,
+nor could he get the volatile Emperor to stick to definite conceptions
+of it. For coast defense he had a supreme contempt. The great German
+Army would take care of this, so far as invasion was concerned, and an
+adequate battle-fleet would do the rest. It is noticeable that
+apparently he never even dreamed of trying to invade England with her
+fleet protection. It was in quite another way that he intended, if
+necessary, to harass this country. He wanted to threaten our commerce
+and to be able to break any blockade of Germany. German sea-power was to
+be made strong enough to attract allies by its ability to rally all free
+nations without any curatorship by the Anglo-Saxons.
+
+This is what he says his war objectives were. He bitterly complains of
+the opposition to them and to himself which he met with from such papers
+as the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, and from the influence of certain of his
+colleagues. Constitutionalism he appears to have hated. The democracy
+of Germany was not suited to such leading as Lloyd George, during the
+war, gave to England, and Clemenceau to France. In Germany, he declares,
+a strong hand is always required, and a revolution is inevitable in case
+the hand is weak, and defeat follows. For Germany needed "the
+Prussian-German State." The tradition of Frederick the Great and
+Bismarck was its protecting spirit.
+
+Can we wonder, if the narrative of this capable man is accurate, that
+Bethmann struggled for his rival policy of conciliation in the face of
+almost insuperable difficulties? Tirpitz had a strong party at his back,
+both in Prussia and elsewhere. What made it strong was largely that its
+members shared his view of England and of the situation. "They looked to
+us," he says, "it was the last chance of international freedom." I
+thought in 1912 that Bethmann might in the end win, for in the main at
+that time the Emperor was with him, and so were Ballin and many others
+of great influence. The Social Democrats, too, were gaining influence
+rapidly. But the presence of a powerful school of thought at the back of
+Tirpitz, a school which, had it succeeded, would have secured the place
+it desired by reducing to a precarious state the life of my own country,
+made me feel that, while we must do all we could to extend our
+friendships so as to convert and bring in Germany, the chances of
+success did not preponderate sufficiently to justify relaxation of
+either vigilance in preparation or resolution in policy. My feeling
+remained what I had tried to express in the address delivered at Oxford
+in August of 1911. "I wish," I said then, "all our politicians who
+concern themselves with Anglo-German relations, those who are pro-German
+as well as those who are not, could go to Berlin and learn something,
+not only of the language and intellectual history of Prussia, but of the
+standpoint of her people--and of the disadvantages as well as the
+advantages of an excessive lucidity of conception. Nowhere else in
+Germany that I know of is this to be studied so advantageously and so
+easily as in Berlin, the seat of Government, the headquarters of
+_Real-politik_, and it seems to me most apparent among the highly
+educated classes there."
+
+Bismarck does not appear to have known much while in office about
+Tirpitz, and when the latter desired later on to enlist his outside
+support he did not find it at first easy. But, having with some
+difficulty got the assent of the Emperor to a new ship being named after
+Bismarck, he in the end got from the latter permission to visit him at
+Friedrichsruh in 1897. There Tirpitz arrived at noon. The family were
+at luncheon. He tells us how the Prince sat at the head of the table,
+and how he rose, cool but polite, and remained standing till Tirpitz was
+seated. The Prince assumed the air of one suffering from sharp neuralgic
+pain, and he kept pressing the side of his head with a small indiarubber
+hot-water bottle. It was only with an appearance of difficulty that he
+uttered, and his food was minced meat. However, when he had drunk a
+bottle and a half of German champagne (_Sect_) he became animated. After
+the dishes were removed, Countess Wilhelm Bismarck lit his great pipe
+for him, and with the other ladies quitted the room. The atmosphere was
+one of gloomy silence. But the great man suddenly broke it by raising
+his formidable eyebrows, and directing a grim look at Tirpitz, whom he
+appears next to have asked whether he himself was a tomcat that needed
+only to be stroked in order to procure sparks to be emitted. Tirpitz
+then timidly unfolded his plans and his policy of building big
+battleships. Bismarck was critical, and turned his criticism to other
+matters also. He denounced as disastrous the abrogation by Caprivi and
+William the Second of the treaty he (Bismarck) had made with Russia for
+Reinsurance. Bismarck declared that, in case of an Anglo-Russian war,
+our policy was contained in the simple words: neutrality as regards
+Russia. The modest Tirpitz ventured to suggest that only a fleet strong
+enough to be respected could make Germany worthy of an alliance in the
+eyes of Russia and other powers. Bismarck rejected this almost angrily.
+The English he thought little of. If they tried to invade Germany the
+Landwehr would knock them down with the butt-ends of their rifles. That
+a close blockade might knock Germany down never seemed to occur to him.
+However, in the end Tirpitz says that the Prince became mollified and
+expressed agreement with the view that an increased fleet was necessary.
+
+Bismarck then invited the Admiral to go with him for a drive in the
+forest. Despite the neuralgia, this drive, which took place amid showers
+of rain, lasted for two hours. The carriage, moreover, was open. There
+were two bottles of beer, one on the right and the other on the left of
+the Prince, which they drank on the way, and he smoked his pipe
+continuously. "It was not easy to keep pace with his giant
+constitution."
+
+For the details of the conversation, which was conducted in English so
+that the coachman might not understand it, I must refer the reader to
+the chapter in which it is described. The old warrior spoke with
+affection of the Emperor Frederick, but as regarded his son William, he
+appears to have let himself go. Tirpitz was to tell the latter that he,
+Bismarck, only wanted to be let alone, and die in peace. His task was
+ended. He had "no future and no hopes."
+
+Tirpitz saw Bismarck twice subsequently. The last time was on the
+occasion of a surprize visit to him by the Emperor. This visit was not
+wholly a success. The conversation got on to unfortunate lines. Bismarck
+began to speak of politics, and the Emperor ignored what he said and did
+not reply. The younger Moltke, who was present, whispered to Tirpitz,
+"It is terrible," alluding to the Emperor's want of reverence. When the
+Emperor left, his Minister, von Lucanus, who was with him, held out his
+hand to the old Prince. But Lucanus had formerly intrigued against him.
+Consequently he "sat like a statue, not a muscle moved. He gazed into
+the air, and before him Lucanus made gestures in vain."
+
+All this notwithstanding, Tirpitz seems to have made a good impression.
+For after these visits the Bismarck press began to speak favorably of
+him.
+
+But I must not linger over side issues. The book is so full of
+interesting material that in writing about it one has to resolve not to
+be led away from the vital points by its digressions. One of these
+points is that to which I have already made reference in giving the
+Chancellor's views about it, the responsibility for what happened in
+July, 1914, and in particular for the decision taken on the 5th of that
+month at Potsdam.
+
+It is interesting to compare Tirpitz's account of the meeting that took
+place then, on the invitation of the Emperor, with that of Bethmann,
+altho the former was not present, and bases his judgment only on what
+was reported to him as Minister. He gives an account of what happened
+which makes the meeting seem a more important one than the ex-Chancellor
+takes it to have been. The Admiral's view is that at this date what was
+urgently wanted was "prompt and frank" action. Austria should not have
+been allowed to rush upon Serbia, however just her causes for anger. On
+the other hand the German Emperor should have at once and directly
+appealed to the Czar to co-operate with him in endeavoring to secure
+such a response to reason and expression of contrition on the part of
+Serbia as would have eased off the situation, which was full of danger.
+For, with an unfriendly Entente interesting itself, no war which broke
+out was likely to be capable of being kept localized.
+
+Tirpitz was not in Berlin on July 5, but he received reports from there
+of what was happening. Neither he nor von Moltke, the Chief of the
+General Staff, was consulted, but Tirpitz declares that the Emperor saw
+at Potsdam the Minister of War, von Falkenhayn, and also the Minister of
+the Military Cabinet, von Lyncker. If so, whether or not the conference
+was technically a Crown Council, the meeting was a very important one.
+
+Tirpitz confirms Bethmann in saying that, prompted by chivalrous
+feeling, the German Emperor responded to the Emperor of Austria by
+promising support and fidelity. He declares that the Emperor William did
+not consider the intervention of Russia to protect Serbia as probable,
+because he thought that the Czar would never support regicides, and
+that, besides, Russia was not prepared for war, either in a military or
+financial sense. Moreover, the Emperor somewhat optimistically presumed
+that France would hold Russia back on account of her own disadvantageous
+state of finance and her lack of heavy artillery. The Emperor did not
+refer to England; complications with that country were not thought of.
+The Emperor's view thus was that a further extension of dangerous
+complications was unlikely. His hope was that Serbia would give in, but
+he considered it desirable that Germany should be prepared in case of a
+different issue of the Austro-Serbian dispute. It was for that reason
+that he had on the 5th commanded the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; the
+Minister of War, von Falkenhayn; the Under-Secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann; and the Minister of the War Cabinet, von
+Lyncker, to Potsdam. It was then decided that all steps should be
+avoided which would attract political attention or involve much expense.
+After this decision the Emperor, on the advice of the Chancellor,
+started on his journey to the North Cape, for which arrangements had
+already been made. The duty of the Chancellor under the circumstances
+was to consider any promise to be given to Austria from the standpoint
+of German interests, and to keep watch on the method of its fulfilment.
+The Chancellor, says his critic, did not hesitate to accept the decision
+of the Emperor, apparently imagining that Austria's position as a Great
+Power was already shaken and would collapse unless she could insist on
+being compensated at the expense of the greedy Serbians. He probably had
+in his mind the success obtained in the earlier Balkan crisis over
+Bosnia and Herzegovina. He goes on to tell us that he was not informed
+as to what the Emperor was thinking of during his tour in northern
+waters, but that he had reason to believe that he did not anticipate
+serious danger to the peace of the world. And he observes, as a
+characteristic of the Emperor, that when he was not apprehensive of
+danger he would express himself without restraint about the traditions
+of his illustrious predecessors, but the moment matters began to look
+critical his became a hesitating mood. The Admiral thinks that if the
+Emperor had not left Berlin, and if the full Government machinery had
+been at work, means might have been found by the Emperor and the
+Ministry of averting the danger of war. As, however, the Chief of the
+General Staff, the Head of the Admiralty Staff, and Tirpitz himself were
+kept away from Berlin during the following weeks, the matter was handled
+solely by the Chancellor, who, being in truth not sufficiently
+experienced in great European affairs, was not able to estimate the
+reliability of those who were advising him in the Foreign Office.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD
+
+MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM FEB. 1912 TO JAN.
+1915.]
+
+Von Tirpitz goes on to say that by July 11 the Berlin Foreign Office had
+heard that the Entente had advised yielding at Belgrade. The Chancellor,
+he declares, could now have brought about a peaceful solution, but,
+convinced as he was that the Entente did not mean war, he drew the
+shortsighted conclusion that Austria, without considering the Entente,
+might force a march into Serbia and yet not endanger the world's peace.
+His optimism was disastrous. On July 13 he (the Chancellor) was,
+according to Tirpitz, informed of the essential points in the proposed
+Austrian ultimatum. Bethmann, as already stated, says that he did not
+see the ultimatum itself until the 22nd, when it had already been
+dispatched. But he does not say that he had been given no forecast of
+its contents from the German Ambassador at Vienna. Tirpitz quotes, but
+without giving its exact date, a memorandum sent to him at Tarasp
+apparently just after the 13th. It was forwarded from the Admiralty, and
+was in these terms: "Our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, has
+ascertained privately, as well as from Count Berchtold, that the
+ultimatum to be sent by Austria to Serbia will contain the following
+demands: I. A proclamation of King Peter to his people in which he will
+command them to abstain from greater Serbian agitation. II.
+Participation of a higher Austrian official in the investigation of the
+assassination. III. Dismissal and punishment of all officers and
+officials proved to be accomplices."
+
+Tirpitz says that his first impression, when he received this document
+in Tarasp, was that Serbia could not possibly accept the terms of such
+an ultimatum. And he adds that he believed neither in the possibility of
+localizing the war nor in the neutrality of England. In his view the
+greatest care was required to reassure the Russian Government,
+especially as England would wish "to let war break out in order to
+establish the balance of power on the Continent as she understood it."
+But the Chancellor expressed the wish that he should not return to
+Berlin, for his doing so might give rise to remarks. If this be so, it
+seems to have been a very unfortunate step. The Emperor and his most
+important Ministers should all have been in Berlin at such a time.
+Bethmann's advice appears intelligible only if he thought, as is quite
+possible, that he could himself handle the negotiations best if the
+Emperor and Tirpitz were both out of the way. If so, he was not
+successful. He did not in the end respond to Sir Edward Grey's wish for
+a conference, and earlier he had failed to bridle the impulsive ally who
+was dashing wildly about. It looks as tho, however good his intentions
+may have been, he was taking terrible risks.
+
+Now this was the crucial period. Grey was doing his very utmost to avert
+war, and was even pressing Serbia to accept the bulk of what was in the
+ultimatum. As to his real intentions, I may, without presumption, claim
+to be better informed than Admiral von Tirpitz. Sir Edward Grey and I
+had been intimate friends for over a quarter of a century before the
+period in which the Admiral, who, so far as I know, never saw him,
+diagnoses the state of his intentions. During the eight years previous
+to July, 1914, we had been closely associated and were working as
+colleagues in the Cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr.
+Asquith. And in that July, throughout the weeks in question, Sir Edward
+was staying with me in my house in London, and considering with me the
+telegrams and incidents, great or small.
+
+It is a pure myth that he had, at the back of his mind, any such
+intentions as the Admiral imagines. He was working with every fiber put
+in action for the keeping of the peace. He was pressing for that in St.
+Petersburg, in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in Belgrade. He was not
+in the least influenced either by jealousy of Germany's growth or by
+fear of a naval engagement with her, as Tirpitz infers. All he wanted
+was to fulfil what, for him, was the sacred trust that had been
+committed to him, the duty of throwing the whole weight of England's
+influence on the side of peace. And that was not less the view of Mr.
+Asquith, whom I knew equally intimately, and it was the view of all my
+colleagues in the Cabinet.
+
+Germany was going ahead with giant strides in commerce and industry, but
+we had not the slightest title to be jealous or to complain when she was
+only reaping the fruits of her own science and concentration on peaceful
+arts. I had said this myself emphatically to the Emperor at Berlin in
+1906 in a conversation the record of which has already been given. There
+was no responsible person in this country who dreamt, either in 1914 or
+in the years before then, of interfering with Germany's Fleet
+development merely because it could protect her growing commerce. What
+responsible people did object to was the method of those who belonged to
+the Tirpitz school. The peace was to be preserved; I give that school
+full credit for this desire; but preserved on what terms? On the terms
+that the German was to be so strong by land and sea that he could
+swagger down the High Street of the world, making his will prevail at
+every turn.
+
+But this was not the worst, so far as England was concerned. The school
+of von Tirpitz would not be content unless they could control England's
+sea power. They would have accepted a two-to-three keel standard
+because it would have been enough to enable them to secure allies and to
+break up the Entente. Now it was vital to us that Germany should not
+succeed in attaining this end. For if she did succeed in attaining it,
+not only our security from invasion, but our transport of food and raw
+materials, would be endangered. With a really friendly Germany or with a
+League of Nations the situation would have mattered much less. It was
+the policy of the school to which Tirpitz and the Emperor himself
+belonged which made the situation one of growing danger and the Entente
+a necessity, for these were days when other nations near us were
+beginning to organize great battle-fleets. If Bethmann Hollweg's policy
+had prevailed there would have been no necessity for any such Entente as
+was the only way of safety for us. But he could not carry his policy
+through, earnestly tho he desired to do so, and thus provide the true
+way to permanent peaceful relations. I think he believed that the only
+use Britain ever contemplated making of her Navy, should peace continue,
+was that of a policeman who co-operates with others in watching lest
+anyone should jostle his neighbor on the maritime highway. He believed
+in the _Sittlichkeit_, which we here mean when we speak of "good form."
+But that was not the faith of his critics in Berlin. They wanted to have
+Russia, and if possible France also, along with their navies, on the
+side of Germany. Peace, yes, but peace compelled by fear--a very
+unwholesome and unstable kind of peace, and deadly for the interests of
+an island nation. Hence the Entente!
+
+What we had to do was to prevent, if we could, the Tirpitz school from
+getting its way, and we tried this not without some measure of success.
+Even to-day our pacifists now join with chauvinist critics of a policy
+which was pursued steadily for many years, and was that of
+Campbell-Bannerman as well as of Asquith. They reproach us for having
+entered on our path without having adequately increased our naval and
+military resources. The reproach is not a just one. It is founded on a
+complete misconception of the true military situation. It is only
+necessary to read carefully through Admiral von Tirpitz's very
+instructive volume to see that he took precisely the same view as we
+did, and as was held to unswervingly by our Committee of Imperial
+Defense. England's might lay in final analysis in her sea power. She
+needed also a small but very perfect army, capable of high rapidity in
+concentration by the side of the great French Army, in order to prevent
+the coasts of France close to our own from being occupied by an enemy
+invading French territory.
+
+In his book the Admiral refers to a letter I wrote to _The Times_ on
+December 16, 1918, pointing this out and the grounds on which the
+strategical conception was based. The Admiral expresses his agreement,
+and says that it was a fatal blunder of the German Highest Command not
+to use their submarine power at the very outbreak of the war to prevent
+our Expeditionary Force from crossing the Channel and co-operating in
+resisting the German advance towards Calais. From there Germany could
+have commanded the Channel and bombarded London.
+
+So he says, and we were quite aware all along that he might well think
+so. The other thing that he makes plain by implication is that the
+direct invasion of England was never contemplated by Germany in the face
+of our command of the sea. I had long ago satisfied myself that this was
+the German view, by a study of their military textbooks and from
+conversations with high German officers. But, what was more important
+than what I personally thought, the Committee of Imperial Defense, on
+which I sat regularly during eight years, was clear about it, and this
+after close study, and after hearing what the most eminent exponents in
+this country of a different view had to urge before them.
+
+Consequently our military policy was not doubtful. No doubt it would
+have been a nice thing could we have possessed in 1914 a great army
+fashioned and trained, not for firing rifles on the seashore, but for a
+struggle on French and Belgian soil. But such an army would have taken
+two generations at least to raise and train in peace time, and if we had
+laid out our money on it after 1870 instead of on ships, we should not
+have had the sea power which Tirpitz says gave us "bulldog" strength. In
+strategy and in military organization you can not successfully bestride
+two horses at once. He who would accomplish anything has to limit
+himself. Possibly it was because this was not clearly kept in view even
+in Germany that the volume before us is an exposition of a thesis which
+is novel in these islands, that it was not England that was unprepared,
+but Germany herself. For the confusion of objectives that led to this
+Tirpitz blames Bethmann's peace policy, the parsimony of the Reichstag,
+and the Emperor's failure to attain to clear notions about war aims.
+
+He criticizes me for saying that there was in Germany before 1914 a war
+party alongside of a peace party. It was really only the Bethmann
+group, he declares, that believed in peace being built on anything else
+than preponderance in armed power. The tradition of the German nation
+and the view of all sensible statesmen in Germany, _e.g._, Prince Buelow
+and the Emperor himself as a rule, was that the foundation of a lasting
+peace could only be laid with armaments. Now if this is so it is plain
+how the war came about. The "shining armor" oration in Austria, some
+years before war broke out, was simply one among many illustrations
+which so alarmed civilized nations that they huddled together for
+protection against this school of statesmen. Bethmann's was the true
+policy had he been allowed to carry it out. It is possible that he
+thought he had a better chance of carrying it out than could have been
+the case were they to be present, when he got the Emperor and Tirpitz to
+keep away from Berlin after the meeting at Potsdam on July 5.
+Unfortunately he underestimated the tendencies of Berchtold, Conrad von
+Hoetzendorf, Forgasch, and others in Vienna, who, with no misgivings
+such as those of Tirpitz as to the outcome, had determined on
+"_losgehen_." The proximate cause of the war was Austrian policy. A
+secondary cause was the absence of any effective attempt at control from
+Berlin. The third and principal cause was the Tirpitz theory of how to
+keep the peace, the theory that had come down from Frederick the Great
+and his father, and was barely a safe one in the hands of even a
+Bismarck.
+
+The only circumstances that could have justified Germany in her tacit
+encouragement to Austria to take a highly dangerous step--a step which
+was almost certain to bring Russia, France, and England into sharp
+conflict with the Central Powers--would have been clear proof that the
+three Entente nations were preparing to seize a chance and to encircle
+and attack Germany or Austria or both.
+
+Now for this there is no foundation whatever. Russia, whatever Isvolsky
+and other Russian statesmen may have said in moments of irritation over
+the affair of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not want to plunge into war;
+France did not desire anything of the kind; and, as for England, nothing
+was more remote from her wishes. It was only in order to preserve the
+general peace that we had entered the Entente, and the method of the
+Entente policy, the getting rid of all specific causes of difference,
+was one which had nothing objectionable in it. We urged Germany also to
+enter upon this path with us. We offered to help her in her progress
+toward the attainment of a "place in the sun." The negotiations which
+took place with Sir Edward Grey in London after my return from Berlin
+in 1912 are evidence of our sincerity in this, for they culminated in
+agreement on the terms of a detailed Treaty, under which a vast number
+of territorial questions were settled to mutual satisfaction. We did not
+either in 1912, as Admiral von Tirpitz appears to imagine, in the
+conversation at the Schloss, or later on, offer territory that was not
+our own but belonged to Portugal, or Belgium, or France. The contrary is
+evident from the fact that the British government pressed Germany to
+consent to the immediate publication of the draft Treaty, agreed early
+in 1914, when signed. All we did on both occasions was to propose
+exchanges with Germany of territory that was ours for territory that was
+hers, to undertake not to compete for the purchase of certain other
+territory that might come into the market, in consideration of a
+corresponding undertaking on her part, and to agree about zones within
+which each nation should distribute its industrial energies and give
+financial assistance to undertakings.
+
+The gallant Admiral gives an account of the meeting which took place on
+February 9, 1912, in the Emperor's Cabinet room in the Schloss between
+himself, the Emperor and myself. He represents me as making a "generous
+offer of colonial territories which the English neither possessed nor of
+which they had the least right of disposal, in order to flatter the
+Kaiser's desires." Now in this impression the Admiral was wholly wrong.
+What I spoke of was what I have just referred to, exchanges of parts of
+our own territory for parts belonging to Germany, and undertakings such
+as I have just referred to. These things I had considered the previous
+day with the Chancellor, and I do not think the Emperor was in the least
+under the impression which von Tirpitz entertained. The matter was
+indeed not one with which the Department of the Minister of Marine was
+likely to be familiar. My suggestions were made in accordance with my
+instructions, and were, of course, _bona fide_ in all respects. What I
+was pressing for was the means for making possible a slackening in naval
+construction on both sides, and for acceptance of the Entente and of our
+position in it. What I desired was to extend its friendly relations so
+as to bring Germany and Austria and Italy within them and get rid of
+anxiety about the balance of power and the growth of armaments. I think
+the Emperor throughout understood this, and certainly the Chancellor
+did. Tirpitz appears to have suspected, in an attitude in which I was
+only aiming at being friendly and even cordial, concealment of an
+encircling and aggressive purpose. After studying his book I do not
+wonder! When one rises from reading it one understands the fixity of an
+idea, which amounted to an obsession, and compelled him to believe in
+the necessity for what would have amounted to the overthrow of Britain
+as a Great Power.
+
+From the Emperor, on this as on other occasions, I met with nothing but
+the kindliest of receptions. Admiral von Tirpitz describes the luncheon
+party which preceded the conference in the Cabinet Room. He speaks of a
+certain "_spanning_" or tension which prevailed during the luncheon
+which the Emperor and Empress gave to the Berlin Cabinet and myself, and
+of restraint in the conversation. I can not say that I perceived any of
+these things, but then, of course, I was a foreigner. What I do remember
+was the general kindly feeling and the evident satisfaction produced by
+the production of the famous red champagne and great cigars with which
+the Emperor regaled his guests. For myself, special distinction was
+reserved. For, before proceeding to business, the Emperor read to me
+Goethe's poem, _Ilmenau_, of which he thought I might like to be
+reminded before we sat down to our task. He then observed that, out of
+consideration for Tirpitz, we must confer in German, while on the other
+hand this would be the harder on me because the naval matters with which
+we had to deal were not in my department, as they were in that of the
+Admiral. This was, of course, true. And then, in compensation for
+disadvantages which, as he said, would otherwise be unfair, he smilingly
+remarked that he had a plan for adjusting the balance of power on this
+occasion. He insisted on my occupying the Imperial chair, which stood at
+the head of the narrow Cabinet table, while His Majesty himself should
+sit on an ordinary chair on my left hand and the Admiral on another on
+my right. I thought that these arrangements suggested the possibility of
+a tough controversy, and as far as the Admiral was concerned it proved
+to be so. For the discussion lasted for two and three-quarter hours, and
+was fairly close. I said throughout that, while I came here to explore
+the ground with the authority of my Sovereign and his Cabinet, I had
+come, not to make a treaty at that stage, but on a preliminary voyage of
+discovery with a view to taking back materials with which the Cabinet of
+St. James's might be able to construct one, and that I had been
+delighted with the graciousness of my reception. I mention this because
+the Admiral appears not to have quite understood my position. I have no
+doubt that the Emperor understood it.
+
+At the end of the conversation I felt for once a little tired, and was
+glad when the Emperor asked von Tirpitz to drive me back to the Hotel
+Bristol. I thought the manner of the latter during the journey highly
+polite and correct, but not wholly sympathetic. I can only say that on
+my part I had endeavored to put every card I had upon the table.
+
+I have now touched on what seem to me the salient points in both of the
+volumes by these two famous statesmen. I have, I hope, brought out
+sufficiently the fact that on their own showing they were pursuing
+contradictory policies, and that it was the consequent failure to follow
+a policy that was consistent and continuous that in the end led Germany
+to the slippery slope down which she glided into war. The circumstances
+of the world before and in 1914 were so difficult, the piling up of
+armaments had been so great, that nothing but the utmost caution could
+secure a safe path. I believe the Emperor and Bethmann to have desired
+wholeheartedly the preservation of the peace. But to that end they took
+inadequate means, and the result was a disastrous failure to accomplish
+it.
+
+The disturbing presence of the policy of relying on a preponderance in
+power over England, to be gained by a great navy, to the side of which
+the smaller navies would be attracted, imposed on England the necessity
+of guarding against what was menacing the national life. As the outcome
+of this situation she was compelled, so long as Germany insisted on
+developing her naval policy, to sit down and take thought. The result of
+her deliberations may be summed up in eight propositions:
+
+  1. It was necessary, if the safety of England by sea was not to be
+  put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close
+  friendships with other nations.
+
+  2. The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the
+  maintenance of British sea power.
+
+  3. While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance
+  to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed
+  in such peril as made it desirable that we should be able to
+  render her help by land also.
+
+  4. But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were
+  great enough to make it reasonable to estimate that a small army
+  from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to
+  break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.
+
+  5. Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great
+  Britain to raise in time of peace a great army for use on the
+  Continent. The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary
+  corps of professional officers required to train and command such
+  an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task
+  were to be taken in hand in peace time. But it was possible to
+  organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary
+  Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions,
+  and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation
+  with those who were best able to throw light on them.
+
+  6. Altho more than modern and scientific military organization on
+  a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in
+  carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable
+  expansion in time of war to take place.
+
+  7. In the result, as was believed here, and as Admiral von Tirpitz
+  himself seems to have anticipated, sea power and capacity for
+  blockade would decide the issue of the war. In this respect
+  Germany seemed less well prepared than Great Britain.
+
+  8. The last thing wished for was war, and if we had to enter upon
+  it we should do so only in defense of our own vital interests, as
+  well as those of the other Entente Powers. Our entry, if it was to
+  come, must be immediate and unhesitating. For if we delayed
+  Germany might succeed in occupying the northern coast of France,
+  and in impairing our security by sea.
+
+I will conclude this chapter by appending an estimate of the Emperor
+William II, which is worth comparing with that of his German Ministers
+already referred to.
+
+[Illustration: COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN
+
+MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM DEC. 1916 TO APRIL,
+1918.]
+
+In the chapter on William II in Count Czernin's book on "The World War"
+there is a passage which may, I think, turn out to be pretty near the
+truth about the late Emperor's mood: "Altho the Emperor was always very
+powerful in speech and gesture, still, during the war he was much less
+independent in his actions than is usually assumed, and, in my opinion,
+this is one of the principal reasons that gave rise to a mistaken
+understanding of all the Emperor's administrative activities. Far more
+than the public imagine, he was a driven rather than a driving factor,
+and if the Entente to-day claims the right of being prosecutor and judge
+in one person in order to bring the Emperor to his trial, it is unjust
+and an error, as, both preceding and during the war, the Emperor William
+never played the part attributed to him by the Entente:
+
+"The unfortunate man has gone through much, and more is, perhaps, in
+store for him.
+
+"He has been carried too high, and can not escape a terrible fall. Fate
+seems to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, if it exists at all, is
+not so much his as that of his country and his times. The Byzantine
+atmosphere in Germany was the ruin of Emperor William; it enveloped
+him and clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a vast crowd of
+flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the hour of trial.
+The Emperor William was merely a particularly distinctive representative
+of his class. All modern monarchs suffer from the disease; but it was
+more highly developed in the Emperor William, and therefore more obvious
+than in others. Accustomed from his youth to the subtle poison of
+flattery, at the head of one of the greatest and mightiest States in the
+world, possessing almost unlimited power, he succumbed to the fatal lot
+that awaits men who feel the earth recede from under their feet, and who
+begin to believe in their Divine semblance.
+
+"He is expiating a crime which was not of his making. He can take with
+him in his solitude the consolation that his only desire was for the
+best.
+
+"It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into
+the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their
+effect. I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to
+terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of _si vis
+pacem, para bellum_, and by emphasizing the military power of Germany
+he endeavored to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from
+declaring war on him.
+
+"It can not be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and
+mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is
+asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the _dolus_ of making war, that
+he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up war.
+
+"Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the
+injurious effects of his behavior and to make him feel the growing
+mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two but
+dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on the
+Emperor. It is equally true that of all the inhabitants of the earth the
+German is the one least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of
+other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were perhaps but few in
+the immediate entourage of the Emperor who recognized the growing
+anxiety of the world. Perhaps many of them who so continuously extolled
+the Emperor were really honestly of opinion that his behavior was quite
+correct. It is, nevertheless, impossible not to believe that among the
+many clever politicians of the last decade there were some who had a
+clear grasp of the situation, and the fact remains that in order to
+spare the Emperor and themselves they had not the courage to be harsh
+with him and tell him the truth to his face. These are not reproaches,
+but reminiscences which should not be superfluous at a time when the
+Emperor is to be made the scapegoat of the whole world."
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: "Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege," Th. von Bethmann Hollweg.
+"Erinnerungen," Alfred von Tirpitz. Both translated into English under
+the Titles: "Reflections on the World War," and "My Memoirs."]
+
+[Footnote 5: In both cases I am writing with the books before me in the
+original.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS
+
+
+When more time has passed and heads have become cooler the critics will
+have to decide whether Great Britain was as fully prepared as she ought
+to have been for the possibility of the great struggle into which she
+had to enter in August, 1914. Hundreds of speeches have been made, and
+still more articles have been written, to demonstrate that she was
+caught wholly unready. On the other hand authoritative writers in
+Germany have made the counter-assertion that she had prepared copiously,
+not merely to defend herself, but to join in encircling and crushing
+Germany.
+
+I shall venture to submit some reasons for saying that neither of these
+views is the true one. During the whole of the period between the
+commencement of 1906 and the autumn of 1914 I sat on the Committee of
+Imperial Defense and took an active part in its deliberations. For over
+six of these eight years I was Minister for War, and I was in continuous
+co-operation with the colleagues who were, like myself, engaged in
+carrying into execution the methods which we had gradually worked out.
+Such as the plans were, the preparations which they required were
+completed before the war. As to the bulk of these preparations I speak
+from direct knowledge.
+
+The Expeditionary Force, the Territorial Force, and the Special Reserve
+had been organized under my own eye, by soldiers who had studied modern
+war upon what was in this country a wholly new principle. Before they
+took matters in hand not only was there no divisional organization, but
+hardly a brigade could have been sent to the Continent without being
+recast. For there used to be a peace organization that was different
+from the organization that was required for war, and to convert the
+former into the latter meant a delay that would have been deadly. Swift
+mobilization, like that of the Germans even in 1870, was in these older
+days impracticable.
+
+All this had been changed for the Regular Army at home by the end of
+1908, and it was after that year easy to mobilize. Other changes, also
+of a sweeping character, had been made to complete the new structure. On
+August 4, 1914, Lord Kitchener took delivery of an army in being, small,
+but not inferior in quality to the best that the enemy possessed. With
+the creation of the new armies, for which the Expeditionary Force was
+the pattern--and, indeed, with the general management of the war--I had
+very little to do. But I saw a good deal of Lord Kitchener, enough to
+impress me from the day when he became War Minister with his
+extraordinary individuality and his remarkable courage and energy, and
+to make me feel what an invaluable asset his personality was for putting
+heart into the British nation.
+
+I have referred to my own and earlier part in the matter only to make
+plain that I do not speak about it from mere hearsay. And to say this
+has been necessary, because I shall have to submit some observations
+which, if true, do not harmonize with assertions made by some of the
+critics of the successive Governments which were at work on the business
+of preparation for possible contingencies between 1906 and 1914. I will,
+however, begin by making these critics a present of a definite
+admission. We never intended to create an army capable of invading or
+encircling Germany, and we should, in our own view, have found ourselves
+unable to do so even had we desired any such thing.
+
+Our purpose was quite a different one. It was purely defensive. We knew
+how high a level of military organization had been attained in France.
+She had a large army, an army not so large as that of Germany, but
+comparable with it in quality. Her ally, Russia, also had a large army
+on the other side of Germany, altho one not so perfectly organized as
+that of France. By adding to the French military defensive forces a
+comparatively small British Expeditionary Force of very high quality,
+organized as far as possible on the principle about which von der Goltz,
+in the introduction to his famous book, "The Nation in Arms," had
+written, we could provide what that eminent writer had suggested would
+be formidable, could it be properly organized, even against the German
+masses of troops. In the introduction to his "Nation in Arms" he had
+declared that, "Looking forward into the future we seem to feel the
+coming of a time when the armed millions of the present will have played
+out their part. A new Alexander will arise who, with a small body of
+well-equipped and skilled warriors, will drive the impotent hordes
+before him, when, in their eagerness to multiply, they shall have
+overstepped all proper bounds, have lost internal cohesion, and, like
+the green-banner army of China, have become transformed into a
+numberless but effete host of Philistines."
+
+This, of course, did not mean that the little Expeditionary Force could
+by itself cope with the admirably organized and enormous German Army,
+but it did point to the growing importance in these times of high morale
+and quality, and to the value that even a small force, if sufficiently
+long and closely trained, might prove to have, if placed in a proper
+position alongside the excellent soldiers of France. A careful study had
+made us think that the addition of even a small force of such quality to
+those of France and Russia would provide the combined armies with a good
+chance of defeating any German attempt at the invasion and dismemberment
+of France.
+
+But in addition to and apart from all this, the British Navy had been
+raised before 1914 to a strength unexampled in its history, and Mr.
+Churchill had for the first time introduced in the autumn of 1911 the
+valuable principle of a war staff, fashioned with a view to the
+systematic study of modern naval war in co-operation with the forces on
+land.
+
+These naval reforms had helped to confer the fresh power which took
+shape in the blockade which was in the end to prove decisive in the
+struggle. The heads of the newly organized Military General Staff met
+the representatives of the Admiralty War Staff at systematically held
+meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defense, under the presidency of
+the successive Prime Ministers--first of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+and then of Mr. Asquith. Not only were the Ministers at the head of the
+Admiralty and the War Office present to listen to what their experts had
+to say and to assist in arriving at conclusions on the questions
+discussed at these meetings, but other Ministers (including Lord Crewe,
+Sir Edward Grey, Lord Morley, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Harcourt)
+attended regularly. The function of this committee was to consider
+strategical difficulties with which the nation might conceivably find
+itself confronted, and to work out the solutions. It was a committee the
+members of which were selected and summoned by the Prime Minister, to
+whom it was advisory. He determined the subjects to be investigated.
+Secrecy was of course essential, excepting so far as the Cabinet was
+concerned. The presence of the non-military Ministers to whom I have
+referred was a proper guarantee that from the Cabinet there was no
+desire to withhold information. Possible operations on the Continent of
+our army occupied much of the time of the committee. About the propriety
+of the conversations which took place between members of the General
+Staffs of France and England questions have been raised. But these
+conversations were concerned with purely technical matters, and doubts
+as to their justification will hardly arise in the minds of people who
+are aware what modern war implies in the way of preliminary inquiries as
+to its conditions.
+
+We were not engaging in any secret undertaking. We were merely providing
+what modern military requirements had rendered essential. Without study
+beforehand by a General Staff military operations in these days are
+bound to fail. If at any time we had, by any chance whatever, to operate
+in France it was essential that our generals should possess long in
+advance the knowledge that was requisite, and this could only be
+obtained with the assistance of the General Staff of France itself. We
+committed ourselves to no undertaking of any kind, and it was from the
+first put in writing that we could not do so. The conversations were
+just the natural and informal outcome of our close friendship with
+France.
+
+The French had said that if it was to be regarded as even possible that
+we should come to their assistance in resisting an attack, which might,
+moreover, result if successful in great prejudice to our own security in
+the Channel, we should find this study vital. Our General Staff took the
+same view, and at the request of Sir Edward Grey, who had written to
+him, I saw Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at his house in London in
+January, 1906. He was a very cautious man, but he was also an old War
+Minister. He at once saw the point, and he gave me authority for
+directing the Staff at the War Office to take the necessary steps. He
+naturally laid down that the study proposed was to be carefully guarded,
+so far as any possible claim of commitment was concerned, that it was
+not to go beyond the limits of purely General Staff work, and further
+that it should not be talked about. The inquiry into conditions thus set
+on foot was conducted by the three successive generals who occupied the
+position of Director of Military Operations--the late General Grierson,
+General Ewart, and General Wilson. Each of these distinguished soldiers
+from time to time explained the progress made in working out conceivable
+plans for using the Expeditionary Force in France and in more distant
+regions, to the full Committee of Imperial Defense, and obtained its
+provisional approval.
+
+I should like to say how much the Committee of Imperial Defense, which
+was originally a very valuable contribution made by Mr. Balfour, when
+Prime Minister, to the organization of our preparedness for war, owed
+to its secretaries. To such men as Admiral Sir Charles Ottley and, after
+his time, to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, the nation is under a great
+debt, and it was the least that could be done to include the latter in
+the thanks of Parliament to the sailors and soldiers to whom our actual
+success was due. It was he who, assisted by a brilliant staff on which
+the late Colonel Grant Duff was prominent, planned and prepared that
+remarkable War Book, which was completed in excellent time before the
+outbreak of hostilities, and which contained full instructions for every
+department of Government which could be called on to assist if war broke
+out. Not only the drafts of the necessary orders, but those of the
+necessary telegrams, were written out in advance under Sir Maurice
+Hankey's instructions. He and Sir Charles Ottley, themselves sailors,
+formed real links between the navy and the army, and did an enormous
+amount of work in co-ordinating war objectives.
+
+Of the Navy I need say nothing, for its preparations are well
+understood. Nor need I say much of the details in the reorganization of
+the army. The general principle of this was to complete the Cardwell
+system by shaping the home battalions into six great divisions, and so
+providing them with transport, munitions, stores, and medical and other
+equipment, as to make them instantly ready for war. The characteristic
+of the old British Army, as it was up to 1907, was, as I have already
+observed, that it lived in peace formations only, in small and detached
+units which would have to be refashioned into quite different formations
+before they could be ready to be sent to fight.
+
+This state of things involved much delay in mobilization. A careful
+inquiry made in 1906 disclosed that in order to put even 80,000 men on
+the Continent, a period which might be well over two months was the
+minimum required. Besides this great difficulty, the other items to
+which I have referred as required for the six divisions were not there
+in any shape even approaching sufficiency. The artillery too was
+deficient.
+
+There is no more amusing myth than the one according to which the horse
+and field artillery were reduced. The batteries which could be made
+instantly effective for war were, in fact, raised from forty-two to
+eighty-one. The personnel of this artillery was increased by a third for
+mobilization. For the first time the horse and field artillery was given
+the modern organization which Cardwell had not been able to give it. The
+establishments had been merely peace establishments. There were
+ninety-nine batteries which could parade about on ceremonial occasions,
+but if war had broken out they would have had to be rolled up, and the
+personnel of fifty-seven of them taken to produce the mobilized
+forty-two which were all that could be put into the field. The
+difficulty was got over by the organization of eighteen of the
+ninety-nine into training brigades, and the additional men needed for
+the mobilization of eighty-one fighting batteries were thus obtained. No
+doubt some of the artillery officers did not like being set to training
+work, and complained that they were being reduced. But it was a
+reduction from unreal work of parade in order to double fighting
+efficiency. Not a man or a gun of the regular horse and field artillery
+was ever reduced in any shape or form, and not only were the effective
+batteries largely increased, but over 150 serviceable batteries were
+created and made part of the Second Line, or Territorial, Army. This was
+a force which could be used either for home defense or for expansion of
+an expeditionary force of Regulars. The Militia, which was not under
+obligation to serve abroad, was abolished, and its substance was
+converted into third regular battalions, organized for the purpose of
+training and providing drafts to meet the wastage of war in the first
+and second regular battalions of their regiments. Some of those third
+battalions are said to have trained and sent out as many as twelve
+thousand men apiece in the course of the war.
+
+All these things were done under the direction of such young and
+modern soldiers as Sir Douglas Haig on the General Staff side, and as
+Sir John Cowans on the administrative side. Both of these officers
+were brought home from India for the purpose. Sir Herbert Miles, as
+Quartermaster-General, and Sir Stanley von Donop, as Master-General of
+the Ordnance also rendered much help. The newly organized General Staff
+thought the plans out under the direction, first of Sir Neville
+Lyttelton, and then of Sir William Nicholson, its successive chiefs. The
+latter and Sir Douglas Haig in addition worked out, in consultation with
+the representatives of the Dominions, the organization of their troops
+in units and with staffs and weapons corresponding as nearly as was
+practicable to our own. Systematic conferences between the British and
+Dominion War and other Ministers prepared the ground for this. Sir
+Wilfrid Laurier and General Botha and others of the Dominion Ministers
+came to London and co-operated.
+
+It is sometimes said that all these things were very well, but that we
+should have at once raised a much larger army, as in the course of the
+war we ultimately had to do. The answer is that in a time of peace we
+could not possibly have raised a large army on the Continental scale. If
+we had tried to we should have made a miserable and possibly disastrous
+failure. The utmost we could do toward it was to provide the
+organization in which the comparatively small force which was all we
+could create might be expanded after a war broke out.
+
+How this nucleus organization, on the basis of which the later
+expansions took place, was fashioned so as to afford a general pattern,
+anyone may see who chooses to expend a shilling on the purchase of the
+little volume called "Field Service Regulations, Part II." This piece of
+work took nearly three years to prepare. With the organization of which
+I have spoken, which was made in accordance with its principles, the
+whole of the task of recasting the British Army was performed by 1911.
+
+What we had by that time attained was the power to send an army of, not
+100,000 men, which was all that had originally been suggested, but of
+160,000, to a place of concentration opposite the Belgian frontier, and
+to have it concentrated there within a time which was fifteen days in
+1911, but was a little later reduced to twelve. No German army could
+mobilize and concentrate at such a distance more rapidly. So far as I
+know none of the necessary details were overlooked, and the timetables
+and arrangements for the concentration worked out, when the moment for
+their use came, without a hitch. What had been done was to take the
+old-fashioned British Army and to rid it of superfluous fat, to develop
+muscle in place of mere flesh, and to put the whole force into proper
+training. If the warrior looked slender he was at least as well prepared
+for the ring as science could make him.
+
+It is said that this army ought to have been provided from the first
+with more heavy artillery. But the reason why its artillery, and that of
+the French armies also, were of a comparatively light pattern was not
+due to any notion of economy or to civilian interference. We had enough
+money, even in those difficult days, for every necessary purpose.
+
+The real reason was that the General Staffs of both the French and the
+British Armies had advised that the campaign would probably be one in
+which swiftness in moving troops would prove the determining factor.
+Heavy artillery, and even any large number of the ponderous machine-guns
+of that period (the Lewis gun had not yet appeared), would have been a
+serious impediment to such mobility. What was anticipated was a series
+of great battles. "It was supposed by certain soldiers," says a
+well-informed military critic (Colonel A'Court Repington, at page 276 of
+his "Vestigia"), "that the war against Germany would be decided by the
+fighting of some seven great battles _en rase campagne_, where heavies
+would be a positive encumbrance."
+
+So far the staffs proved to be right, for in the early period of the war
+mobility did count for a very great deal, and it was not until later
+that trench warfare became the dominant factor, a stage for which even
+the Germans themselves, as we now know, from the memoirs of Admiral
+Tirpitz and other books, were not adequately prepared in point of guns,
+or of shells and powder, either.
+
+It is said that we in Great Britain ought, before entering on the
+Entente, to have provided an army, not of 160,000, but of 2,000,000 men.
+And it is remarked that this is what we had to do in the end. This
+suggestion does not, however, bear scrutiny. No doubt it would have been
+a great advantage if, in addition to our tremendous navy, we could have
+produced, at the outbreak of the war, 2,000,000 men, so trained as to
+be the equals in this respect of German troops, and properly fashioned
+into the great divisions that were necessary, with full equipment and
+auxiliary services. But to train the recruits, and to command such an
+army when fashioned, would have required a very great corps of
+professional officers of high military education, many times as large as
+we had actually raised. How were these to have been got?
+
+I sometimes read speeches, made even by officers who have served with
+distinction at the head of their men in the field, which express regret
+that the British nation was so shortsighted as not to have provided such
+an army before the war. They point to the effort it made later on with
+such success during the war. But to raise armies under the stress of
+war, when the people submit cheerfully to compulsion, and when highly
+intelligent civilian men of business readily quit their occupations to
+be trained as rapidly as possible for the work of every kind of officer,
+is one thing. To do it in peace time is quite another. I doubt whether
+more was possible in this direction than, in the days prior to the war,
+to organize the Officers' Training Corps, which contained over twenty
+thousand partially prepared young men, and began at once to expand to
+yet larger dimensions from the day when war broke out. For the corps of
+matured officers, required to train recruits and to command them in war
+when organized in their units, would have had to consist of soldiers,
+themselves highly trained in military organization, who had devoted
+their lives to this work as a profession. It takes many years in peace
+time to train such officers. Because they must be professional, they can
+only be recruited under a voluntary system.
+
+Now, before the war it was difficult enough to recruit even so many as
+the number we then had got, a number totally inadequate for any army
+larger than the small one we actually put into shape at home. Every
+source had been tried in my time by the able administrative generals who
+were working under me at the War Office. I say "administrative
+generals," for here comes in the source of the confusion which at times
+leads not a few--including some whose military training has been
+exclusively in the leading of troops and in strategy and tactics--to
+miss the point.
+
+Under the modern military principle, which is the secret of rapidity and
+efficiency in mobilization, duties are carefully defined and divided.
+The General Staff does not administer, and is not trained in the
+business of administration. This kind of military business is entrusted
+to the administrative side of the army, the officers of which receive a
+different kind of training. The General Staff says what is necessary.
+The administrative side provides it as far as it can. And among the
+exclusive functions of the administrative side of the War Office is the
+recruiting of personnel by the Adjutant-General and the Military
+Secretary. It is true that the Director of Military Training, who
+supervises the training of the young officer when obtained, belongs to
+the General Staff. That is because his work is educational. With
+obtaining the young officer it is only accidentally that he is at all
+concerned.
+
+When, therefore, even distinguished commanders in the field express
+regret at the want of foresight of the British nation in not having
+prepared a much larger army before 1914, I would respectfully ask them
+how they imagine it could have been done.
+
+To raise a great corps of officers who have voluntarily selected the
+career of an officer as an exclusive and absorbing profession has been
+possible in Germany and in France. But it has only become possible there
+after generations of effort and under pressure of a long-standing
+tradition, extending from decade to decade, under which a nation, armed
+for the defense of its land frontiers, has expended its money and its
+spirit in creating such an officer caste.
+
+Now, the British nation has put its money and its fighting spirit
+primarily into its Navy and its oversea forces. Why? Because, just as
+the Continental tradition had its genesis in the necessity for instant
+readiness to defend land frontiers, so our tradition has had its genesis
+in the vital necessity of always commanding the sea.
+
+Possibly if, just after the war of 1870, we had endeavored to enter on a
+new tradition, and to develop a great army, we might have succeeded in
+doing so. With forty years' time devoted to the task and a very large
+expenditure we might conceivably have succeeded. But I think that had we
+done so we should have been very foolish. Our navy would inevitably have
+been diminished and deteriorated. You can not ride two horses at once,
+and no more can you possess in their integrity two great conflicting
+military traditions.
+
+But what I am saying does not rest on my own conclusions alone. In the
+year 1912 the then Chief of the General Staff told me that he and the
+General Staff would like to investigate, as a purely military problem,
+the question whether we could or could not raise a great army. I thought
+this a reasonable inquiry and sanctioned and found money for it, only
+stipulating that they should consult with the Administrative Staffs when
+assembling the materials for the investigation. The outcome was embodied
+in a report made to me by Lord Nicholson, himself a soldier who had a
+strong desire for compulsory service and a large army. He reported, as
+the result of a prolonged and careful investigation, that, alike as
+regarded officers and as regarded buildings and equipment, the
+conclusion of the General Staff was that it would be in a high degree
+unwise to try, during a period of unrest on the Continent, to commence a
+new military system. It could not be built up excepting after much
+unavoidable delay. We might at once experience a falling off in
+voluntary recruiting, and so become seriously weaker before we had a
+chance of becoming stronger. And the temptation to a foreign General
+Staff to make an early end of what it might insist on interpreting as
+preparation for aggression on our part would be too strong to be risked.
+What we should get might prove to be a mob in place of an army. I quite
+agreed, and not the less because it was highly improbable that the
+country would have looked at anything of the sort.
+
+What we actually could produce in the form of an army had to be
+estimated, not as if we were standing alone, but as being an adjunct to
+what was possessed by France and Russia. They had large armies and small
+navies. We had a large navy and a small army. When these were considered
+in conjunction, I do not think that the hope of some of our best
+military authorities, that an aggressive attempt by the Central Powers
+could be made abortive, was an over-sanguine one.
+
+Much of what we did owe for the excellence of the Expeditionary Force,
+such as it was in point of size, and much of what we have since owed for
+the excellence of the great armies that we subsequently raised, was due
+to the unbroken work of the fine Administrative Staff, developed in
+those days, to which I have already referred. I often regret that when
+the nation gave its thanks through Parliament to the army, the splendid
+contribution made by those who prepared the administrative services was
+not adequately recognized. But this arose from the old British tradition
+under which fighting and administration were not distinguished as being
+quite separate and yet equally essential for fighting. The public had
+not got into its head the reality of the process of defining the two
+different functions with precision, and of confiding them to different
+sets of officers differently trained.
+
+The principle was a novel one in the army itself, and why one set of
+officers should be trained at the Staff College and another at the
+London School of Economics was not a question the answer to which was
+quite familiar, even to all soldiers.
+
+It is, I think, certain that for purely military reasons, even if, in
+view of political (including diplomatic) difficulties any party in the
+State had felt itself able to undertake the task of raising a great army
+under compulsory service, and to set itself to accomplish it, say,
+within the ten years before the war, the fulfilment of the undertaking
+could not have been accomplished, and failure in it would have made us
+much weaker than we were when the war broke out. The only course really
+open was to make use of the existing voluntary system, and bring its
+organization for war up to the modern requirements, of which they were
+in 1906 far short. It is true that the voluntary system could not give
+us a substantially larger army, or more than a better one in point of
+quality. The stream of voluntary recruits was limited. When the 156
+battalions of the line which existed on paper in 1906 were in that year
+nominally reduced to 148, there was no real reduction, altho some money
+was saved which was required for some other essential military purposes.
+For the remaining battalions were short of their proper strength, and
+it took all the recruits set free by the so-called reductions to bring
+the 148--some of which were badly short of officers and men alike--to
+the proper establishment required for the six new divisions of the
+Expeditionary Force.
+
+I remember well the then Adjutant-General, Sir Charles Douglas, one of
+the ablest men of business who ever filled that position in this
+country, informing me at that time that he could not raise a single
+further division to be added to the six at home.
+
+But if the voluntary system had disadvantages, it also presented us with
+advantages. The professional and therefore voluntary nature of our army,
+which, because it was professional, was always ready for sending
+overseas on expeditions, was in reality made necessary by our position
+as the island center of a great and scattered Empire. We had increased
+that Empire enormously by the possession of a voluntarily serving army.
+Whether this vast increase of the Empire has been always defensible I am
+not discussing. What I am saying is that we owe the actual increases
+largely to this, that we were the only Power in the world that was ready
+to step in at short notice and occupy vacant territory. We always had a
+much larger Expeditionary Force available for this special purpose than
+Germany or any other country. That has been our tradition, as contrasted
+with the tradition of other nations who have been limited in this kind
+of capacity by the necessity of putting their military forces on a
+compulsory basis and keeping them at home for the protection of their
+land frontiers. Ours was the method in which we had been schooled by
+experience.
+
+It is for such reasons as I have now submitted that I am wholly unable
+to assent to the suggestion that we did not look ahead, or considered
+within the years just before the war whether we were preparing to make
+the sort of contribution that our own interests and our friendships
+alike required. Sea power was for us then, as always before in our
+history, the dominant element in military policy. I have little doubt
+that we made mistakes over details. That is inherent in human and
+therefore finite effort. But I believe that we did in the main the best
+we could for the fulfilment of our only purpose, which was to preserve
+the peace of the world and avoid contributing to its disturbance, and
+also to prepare to defend ourselves and our friends against aggression.
+Talk to the public we could not, for it would have hindered and not
+helped us to do so. A "preventive war," which the Entente Powers would
+not have been so ready to meet as they became later on, might well have
+been the result. Rhetorical declarations on platforms would have been
+wholly out of place. But we could think, and to the best of such
+abilities as we and our expert advisers possessed, we did try to think.
+
+A curious legend which had its origin in Berlin, in October, 1914, has
+obtained such currency that it is worth while to make an end of it. The
+legend is that the British Military Attache at Brussels, the late
+General Barnardiston, had informed the Chief of the Belgian General
+Staff of secret plans, prepared at the War Office in London, to invade
+Belgium, and if necessary to violate her neutrality, in order to make an
+expedition, the purpose of which was to attack Germany through that
+country. The story appears to have emanated from Baron Greindl, who was
+the Belgian Minister at Berlin in 1911. He had been completely
+misinformed, no doubt in that capital, and there is no truth whatever in
+what he had been told about what he called the "perfidious and naif
+revelations" of the British Military Attache at Brussels. Him the story
+represents as having said that his Minister (by whom I presume myself,
+as the then Secretary of State for War, to have been intended) and the
+British General Staff were the only persons in the secret. I have to
+observe, in the first place, that I never during my tenure of office,
+either suggested any such plan, or heard of anyone else suggesting it.
+When the story was brought to my knowledge, which was not until
+November, 1914, I inquired at once of General Barnardiston and of his
+successor, Colonel Bridges, whether there was any foundation for it. The
+reply from each of these distinguished officers was that there was none.
+
+We were among the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, and it was of course
+conceivable that, if she called on us to do so, we might have had to
+defend her. It would be part of the duty of our Military Attache to
+remember this, and, if opportunity offered, to ascertain in informal
+conversation the view of the Belgian General Staff as to what form of
+help they would be likely to ask us for. This he doubtless did, and
+indeed it appears from what the Chief of the Belgian General Staff wrote
+to the Belgian War Minister that the former had discussed the
+contingency of Belgium desiring our help with General Barnardiston, and
+had done so gladly. But even so the conversation must have been very
+informal, for in the account of it by the Chief of the Belgian General
+Staff there are errors about the composition of the possible British
+Force which indicate that either he took no notes, or else that Colonel
+Barnardiston had not thought it an occasion which required him to obtain
+details from London. At all events, such talk as there was appears to
+have had relation only to what we ought to do, if requested by Belgium
+to help, in case of her being invaded by another Power.
+
+The documents will be found in the volume of Collected Diplomatic
+Documents relating to the outbreak of the war, presented to Parliament
+in May, 1915 (Cd. 7860). This volume includes a vigorous denial by Sir
+Edward Grey of the insinuation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+EPILOG
+
+
+The great war is over, and the Powers of the West have conquered. In the
+earlier pages I have given my own view of why they won in the tremendous
+struggle that now belongs to history. They had on their side moral
+forces which were lacking to their adversaries.
+
+Germany went into the war with a conviction that had been carefully
+instilled into her people. It was that she was being ringed round with
+the intention that she should be crushed, and that presently it would be
+too late for her to deliver herself. The lesson so taught to her was not
+a true one. She might easily have obtained guarantees of peace which
+ought to have satisfied her, without undertaking a risk which in the end
+was to prove disastrous. No one here wanted to ruin her, no one who
+counted seriously in this country. And if we did not want to, no more in
+reality did France or Russia. She brought her fate on her head by the
+unwisdom of her methods. But her people hardly desired the dangers of
+unnecessary war, and her rulers dared not have ventured these dangers
+had they not first of all preached a wrong doctrine to those over whom
+they ruled. They had their way in the end, and disaster to sixty-eight
+millions of Germans was the consequence. The calculations of their
+chiefs were bad from the beginning. It is almost certain that the best
+and most eminent among even these really desired peace. They blundered
+in method. It was not by continually flashing the saber that peace was
+to be secured.
+
+It is scarcely likely that the conditions under which this war became
+possible will recur. It is more than unlikely that they will recur in
+our time. But it is none the less worth while to consider how the
+unlikelihood can be made to approach most nearly to a certainty.
+
+Not, I think, by causing the millions of German-speaking people to feel
+that they are in chains without possibility of freedom. More certainly,
+surely, by leading them to the faith that if they will play a part in
+the great world effort for permanent peace and for reconstruction they
+will be welcomed to the brotherhood of nations. The individual German
+citizen is more like the individual Anglo-Saxon than he is different
+from him. The same hopes and the same fears animate him, and he is
+sober and industrious quite as much as we are. He has similar problems
+and similar interests.
+
+Time must pass before the angry feeling that a great struggle produces
+can die down. But there are already indications that this feeling is not
+as intense with us as it was even a short time ago. Germany made a
+colossal and unjustifiable blunder. She is responsible for the action of
+her late Government. We think so, and we are not likely to change our
+opinion on this point. The grief of our people over their dead, over the
+lives that were laid down for the nation from the highest kind of
+inspiration, will keep the public mind fixed on this conclusion. And so
+will the waste and misery to the whole world which an unnecessary war
+has brought in its train. But presently we shall ask ourselves, in
+moments of reflection, whether this ought to be our final word, and
+also, perhaps, whether some want of care on our own part, and certain
+deficiencies of which we are now more conscious than we used to be, may
+not have had something to do with the failure of other people to divine
+our real mood and intentions. I am not sure that in days that are to
+come we shall give ourselves the whole benefit of the doubt. However
+this may be, we are in no case a vindictive people.
+
+But in any view something serious is at stake. It will be a bad thing
+for us, and it will be a bad thing for the world, if the people of the
+vanquished nations are left to feel that they have no hope of being
+restored to decent conditions of existence. At present despair is
+threatening them. Their estimate is that the crushing burden of the
+terms of peace, if carried out to their full possibilities, bars them
+from the prospect of a better future. Their only way of deliverance may
+well come to seem to them to lie in the grouping of the discontented
+nationalities, and the faith that by this means, at some time which may
+come hereafter, a new balance of power may begin to be set up.
+
+Now this is not a good prospect, and the sooner we succeed in softening
+the sense of real hardship out of which it arises the better. Germany
+and Austria must pay the penalty they have incurred before the tribunal
+of international justice. But that penalty ought to be tempered by
+something that depends on even more than mercy. It is intended to be
+inflicted for the good of the world, and if it assumes a form which
+threatens the future safety of the world it is not wise to press it to
+its extreme consequences. We have to work toward a better state of
+things than that which is promised to-day. We have never hitherto kept
+up old animosities unduly long, and that has been one of the secrets of
+our strength in the world. The lessons of history point to the
+expediency of trying to heal instead of to keep open the wound which
+exists. Those who know the growth in the past of literature, of music,
+of science, of philosophy, of industry and of commerce, do not wish the
+German people to die out. It is only the ignorant that can desire this,
+and, hitherto in the course of our history, the ignorant have neither
+proved to be safe guides nor have they prevailed. To-day, as before, we
+must think of generations other than our own if we would preserve our
+strength.
+
+I hope that a time is near in which we shall no longer proclaim old
+grievances, but instead cease to dwell on the past in this case, just as
+we have ceased in the cases of the French, the Spanish, the Russians,
+and the Boers. It is best in every way that it should come to be so.
+
+It is not with any hope that these pages will satisfy the extremists of
+to-day that they have been written. They are intended for those who try
+to be dispassionate, and for them only, as a contribution to a vast heap
+of material that is being gathered together for consideration. It is
+well that those who were in any way directly connected with the story
+to which they relate should place on record what they saw. But the whole
+story in its fulness is beyond the knowledge of anyone of our time. The
+history of the world is, as has been said, the judgment of the world. It
+is therefore only after an interval that it can be sufficiently written.
+The ultimate and real origin of this war, the greatest humanity has ever
+had to endure, was a set of colossal suspicions of each other by the
+nations concerned. I do not mean that none of them were in the right or
+that some of them were not deeply in the wrong. What I do mean is that
+if there had been insight sufficient all round the nations concerned
+would not have misinterpreted each other.
+
+To us it looks as tho Germany had been inspired throughout by a bad
+tradition, a spirit older than even the days of Frederick the Great. Had
+she been wise we think that she would have changed her national policy
+after Bismarck had brought it to unexampled success in things material.
+There are not wanting indications that he himself had the sense of the
+necessity of great caution in pursuing this policy farther, and felt
+that it could not be safely continued without modification. It was no
+policy that was safe for any but the strongest and sanest of minds, and
+even for those it had ceased to be safe. The potential resistance to it
+was becoming too serious.
+
+But we do not need to doubt that there were many in Germany itself who
+saw this and did not desire to rely merely on blood and iron. The men
+and women in every country resemble those in other countries more than
+they differ from them. Germany was no exception to the rule. It is a
+great mistake to judge her as she was merely from a few newspapers and
+by the reports from Berlin of their special correspondents. Sixty-eight
+millions of people could not be estimated in their opinions by the
+attitude of a handful, however eminent and prominent, in the home of
+"_Real politik_." It is, of course, true that the Germans were taught to
+believe that they were a very great nation which had not got its full
+share of the good things of this world, a share of which they were more
+worthy and for which they were better organized than any other. But it
+is also true that we here thought that we ourselves were entitled to a
+great deal to which other people did not admit our moral title. It was
+not only Germany that was lacking in imagination. No doubt many Germans
+had the idea that we wished to hem them in and that we did not like
+them. Our failure to make ourselves understood left them not without
+reason for this belief. But dislike of Germany was not the attitude of
+the great mass of sober and God-fearing Englishmen, and I do not believe
+that the counter-attitude was that of the bulk of sober and God-fearing
+Germans. They and we alike mutually misjudged each other from what was
+written in newspapers and said in speeches by people who were not
+responsible exponents of opinion, and neither nation took sufficient
+trouble to make clear that what was thus written and said was not
+sufficient material on which to judge it. It is very difficult to
+diagnose general opinion in a foreign nation, and one of the reasons of
+the difficulty is that people at home do not pay sufficient attention to
+the fact that their unfriendly utterances about their neighbors are
+likely to receive more publicity and attention than the utterances that
+are friendly. It makes little difference that the latter may greatly
+preponderate in number. They are read in the main only in the country in
+which they are made.
+
+Neither Germans nor Englishmen were careful before the war always to be
+pleasant to each other, and the same used to be true of Frenchmen and
+Englishmen. But just as we are coming to understand why and how France
+and England misinterpreted each other systematically a century and a
+half ago, so we may yet learn how we came to present, more than a
+hundred years later, difficulties to the Germans not wholly unlike those
+which they presented to us. No mere record of the dry facts will be
+enough to render this intelligible in its full significance. The
+historian who is to carry conviction must do more than present
+photographs. He must create a picture inspired by his own study and from
+the depth of his own mind, and presented in its real proportions with
+its proper lights and shadows, as a true artist alone can present it.
+Browning has told us something worth remembering. It is at the end of
+"The Ring and the Book":
+
+                            Art may tell a truth
+    Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
+    Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
+    So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,
+    Beyond mere imagery on the wall,--
+    So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
+    Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,--
+    So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,
+    Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.
+
+The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any
+single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history
+depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only
+kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and
+exacting, can rely on having the whole of the materials before his eye,
+and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints
+depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using
+more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole.
+Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be
+selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his
+personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man
+on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great
+historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of
+the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his
+narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his
+details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for
+this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as
+much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert
+and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian.
+It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the
+materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is
+only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of
+grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or
+the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which
+are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits.
+They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits
+may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of
+what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many
+expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It
+is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we
+continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.
+
+The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the
+present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to
+collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care
+as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the
+later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to
+make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as
+necessary action is concerned.
+
+And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events
+possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one
+in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge
+her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our
+forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians have
+impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis
+XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to
+bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were
+perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible
+national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no
+doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could
+hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so.
+And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the
+mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the
+adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance
+from calamity, even at the price of violent action.
+
+We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we
+judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been
+well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an
+exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even
+so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and
+treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into
+existence, had we and others been less hasty.
+
+It is therefore a good thing to keep before us that it is at least
+possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the
+victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry
+and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms
+of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near
+East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs
+were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people
+either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no
+one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the
+likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to
+disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply
+responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy
+and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government
+can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been
+due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was
+so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not
+as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us.
+No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central
+Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to
+reparation. This the Germans do not appear to controvert. They are a
+people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do
+something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have
+also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the
+German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the
+spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to
+fall again into the mistake that Burke made.
+
+The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a
+League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the
+supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the
+absence of a League of Nations, or--what is the same thing in a less
+organized form--of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none
+are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be
+relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente
+between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for
+safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held
+in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance
+on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never
+for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If the principle is
+resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of
+aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with
+another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection
+and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification
+for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke
+out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to
+that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central
+Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this
+difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the
+Entente Powers.
+
+Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous
+number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and
+Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into
+account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war,
+but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which
+may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that
+statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough,
+it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of
+people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a
+prolonged period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our
+relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the
+Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more
+than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the
+Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly
+institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there
+is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to
+our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in
+which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone
+can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new
+balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if
+they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What
+really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is
+given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with
+us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which
+contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must
+attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is
+requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the
+people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people
+of the American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses
+on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking
+population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and
+Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to
+avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is
+for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent
+enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.
+
+How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the
+Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain
+divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to
+suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of
+the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made.
+Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling.
+The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was
+unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be
+enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in
+human nature.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Agadir incident, the, 68
+
+Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 114
+
+Alsace-Lorraine, question of, 114
+  the Kaiser on, 52, 53
+
+America, Tschirsky on, 60
+
+Anglo-French Entente, Buelow on, 56
+  Tschirsky, 59
+  views of German Emperor on, 52
+
+Armaments, difficulty of question of, 21
+  Germany's, 94, 161
+
+Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, 199
+  question of compulsory service, 198
+
+Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, 45
+  Premier and War Secretary, 50
+  presides at Imperial Defense Committee, 182
+
+Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 113
+  ultimatum to Serbia, 133
+
+
+Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, 63 _et seq._
+
+Balance of power, and the League of Nations, 222
+  principle of, 20, 22, 119
+
+Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, 144
+
+Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, 201
+
+Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
+
+Berlin, a curious legend originating in, 201
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  author's visit to, 37
+
+Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, 69, 71
+  at Potsdam conference, 151
+  author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, 71, 73, 78,
+    79, 124
+  desires preservation of peace, 161
+  his accusation against Entente Powers, 103
+  informed of Austrian ultimatum, 153
+  letter to author after the Montreal address, 93
+  loyalty to the Kaiser, 114
+  succeeds Prince Buelow as Chancellor, 112
+
+Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, 146
+
+Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, 56
+  and Britain's indefinite policy, 17
+  and the inevitability of war, 23
+  and the military party in Germany, 89
+  and Tirpitz, 145-48
+  denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, 146
+  his affection for Emperor Frederick, 148
+  his hatred of "prestige politics," 120
+  Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, 126
+
+Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, 115
+
+Bosnia, annexation of, 70, 113
+
+Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, 188
+
+Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attache at Brussels, 202
+
+Britain's command of the sea, 195
+
+British Army, the reorganization of, 47
+
+British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, 50
+  organization of, 178
+  unrecognized work of, 197
+
+British Government, the, paramount duty of, 18
+
+British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, 139, 181
+  (_See_ also Navy, British)
+
+Buelow, Prince von, author's meeting with, 38
+  on the Anglo-French Entente, 56
+  opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, 67
+  succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, 112
+
+
+Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, 113
+  informed of Berlin "conversations," 78
+
+Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, 182, 184
+  at Marienbad, 38
+
+Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, 138
+  and the Reinsurance Treaty, 126, 127
+
+Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, 70 (and note)
+
+Central Powers, the, preparations for war, 20
+  their responsibility for the world war, 22
+
+Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, 54
+
+Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, 87, 181
+
+Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, 158, 159, 177, 182
+
+Compulsory service, author's views on, 198
+
+Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, 188
+
+Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
+
+Czernin, Count, on William II., 170
+
+
+D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, 113
+
+Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, 120
+
+Democracy and war, 27
+  vindicated by the war, 108
+  (_See_ also Social Democracy)
+
+Diplomacy before the war, 35 _et seq._
+
+Disarmament, German objections to, 55, 60
+
+Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, 188
+
+Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, 199
+
+
+Education, author's activities for, 39
+
+Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, 38
+  "encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, 112
+  entertains the German Emperor, 62
+
+Einem, General von, at Windsor, 62
+  author's interview with, 38
+
+Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, 38
+
+England, a War Staff for the Navy in, 139, 181
+  commercial rivalry with Germany, 114
+  conservation of sea power and what it implied, 20, 21
+  efforts to preserve peace end in failure, 22
+  her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, 201
+  propagandists for German military party in, 24
+  reorganization of army in, 185
+  voluntary military system of, and its advantages, 199
+  (_See_ also Great Britain)
+
+England's precautions against Germany's war designs, 168-69
+
+Englishmen, defects and failings of, 28
+  psychology of, 17
+
+Entente, the, England's entry into--and the alternative, 118, 119, 162
+  policy of, 106
+
+Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Expeditionary Force (_see_ British Expeditionary Force)
+
+
+Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
+
+France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, 44
+  army of, 180
+
+_Frankfurter Zeitung_ opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, 143
+
+Free Trade, Prince von Buelow's views on, 58
+  William II. on, 54
+
+French Revolution, the, 217
+
+French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, 48
+
+
+George V., King, entertains German Emperor, 67
+
+George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, 70
+  at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+German desire of commercial development, 55, 58, 60
+  foreign policy: divided control of, 85
+
+Germans, psychology of, 40
+
+Germany, and the Agadir incident, 68
+  and the Hague Conference, 60
+  attitude of, before the war, 101 _et seq._
+  cause of her downfall, 167
+  Chauvinist party in, 81
+  commercial rivalry with England, 114
+  decides upon war, 88
+  defect of Imperial system in, 109
+  desire for commercial expansion, 103
+  Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, 142
+  her responsibility for the world war, 90
+  increases her armaments, 21, 94, 161
+  influence of General Staff, 41, 107
+  militarist party of, 39, 89, 108
+  miscalculations at outbreak of war, 83, 159
+  naval program of, 142, 156
+  new Military Law passed, 136
+  organization of her Navy, 138
+  over-ambition of, 16
+  peaceful penetration policy of, 39, 41
+  politics in: an anecdote of, 85 (note)
+  result of military spirit in, 15, 22
+  scaremongers in, 24
+  shipbuilding program of, 74
+  the new Fleet Law, 75, 79, 87, 128
+  the Press and Tirpitz, 143
+  two inconsistent policies in, 107
+  why she entered the war, 207
+
+Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," 180
+
+Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, 44
+
+Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Grant Duff, Colonel, 185
+
+Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, 202
+  ante-war policy of, 13, 17
+  deficiencies in military organization of, 46
+  enters the war, 95
+  her sea power before the war, 19
+  indefinite policy of, 17, 28, 30
+  question of her preparedness for war, 18, 177
+  the educational problem in, 39
+
+Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, 15
+  causes of, 161
+
+Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, 201
+
+Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, 44
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 64
+  at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, 182
+  Bethmann-Hollweg on, 113
+  denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, 203
+  his efforts for peace, 88, 154, 155
+  negotiates with Germany, 163
+  presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, 155
+  proposes a conference, 154
+
+Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+
+Hague Conference, the, 55
+  Germany's difficulty, 60
+
+Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, 188
+  and the reorganization of British Army, 48
+
+Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, 67
+  a visit to the United States and Canada, 37
+  addresses at Montreal and Oxford, 92, 145
+  advocates improved system of education, 39
+  and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, 48, 50, 178
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 63 _et seq._
+  becomes Lord Chancellor, 37, 87
+  "conversations" at Berlin, 72, 124
+  criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, 101 _et seq._
+  dines with the Chancellor, 77
+  entertained by General Staff, 41
+  examines organization of German War Office, 38
+  frank conversation with William II., 52 _et seq._
+  lunches with Emperor and Empress, 74
+  on military preparations, 177 _et seq._
+  post-war problems and how they should be met, 208 _et seq._
+  rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, 164
+  Secretary of State for War, 36
+  studies in Germany, 36
+  visits German Emperor, 37
+  witnesses review of German troops, 51
+
+Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, 185
+
+Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, 182
+
+Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, 77
+
+Herzegovina, annexation of, 70, 113
+
+Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, 77
+
+Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, 45
+
+
+Imperial Defense Committee, the, 158, 159, 177, 182
+
+Isvolsky, M., 113, 162
+
+
+Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 133
+
+
+Kiaochow (_see_ Tsingtau)
+
+Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von,
+  a talk with, 77
+  and the Agadir incident, 69
+
+Kitchener, Lord,
+  meets the Emperor, 68
+  personality of, 179
+
+Kitchener's Army, 50, 178
+
+
+Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, 21
+
+Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, 188
+
+League of Nations, the, 220, 222
+
+Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, 148
+
+Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
+
+Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 188
+
+
+MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, 68
+
+Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, 141
+
+McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, 87
+
+Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  at Windsor, 62
+  author's relations with, 57
+
+Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, 188
+
+Military preparations, the, 177 _et seq._
+
+Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, 38
+
+Moltke, General von, a chat with, 42
+  present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, 148
+
+Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, 68
+  attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
+
+Morocco difficulty, the, 115
+  France's request to England, 44
+
+Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
+
+
+National philosophy, German, 30
+
+Navy, British, mobilization of, 50
+  sea power the dominant element in military policy, 200
+  why strengthened and increased, 87, 129, 181
+
+Navy, German, Buelow on, 57
+  William II. and, 54
+
+Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, 196
+  chief of General Staff, 188
+
+
+Officers' Training Corps, organization of, 192
+
+Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial
+    Defense, 185
+
+
+_Panther_ sent to Agadir, 68
+
+Peace terms, the, burden of, 210
+
+Post-war problems, and how they should be met, 208
+
+Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, 131, 149
+
+
+Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, 126, 146
+
+Repington, Col. A'Court, 191
+
+Reventlow, Count, 38 (note)
+
+Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, 142
+
+Russia, army of, 180
+  her hostility to Austria, 113
+  not wishful for war, 162
+
+Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, 116
+
+
+Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, 68
+
+Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, 62
+  and the Bagdad Railway question, 65
+
+Serbia as "provocative neighbor," 23
+  ultimatum to, 133
+
+Skiernevice (_see_ Reinsurance Treaty)
+
+Social Democracy, and militarism, 108
+  in Germany, 84, 144
+
+Special Reserve, the, organization of, 178
+
+Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Stosch, and the German Navy, 138
+
+
+Tangier, William II. at, 53, 115
+
+Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, 55
+
+Teaching universities, author and, 39
+
+Technical colleges in England, 40
+
+Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, 49
+  mobilization of, 50
+  organization of, 48, 178
+
+Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, 138
+  an interview with, 74
+  and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, 141
+  criticizes author, 160
+  demands a definite policy for war, 143
+  his "Erinnerungen" discussed, 137 _et seq._
+  his influence in Germany, 82
+  informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, 153
+  mentality of, 137
+  outstanding thesis of his book, 141
+  tribute to British sea power, 161
+  visits Bismarck, 145, 148
+
+Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, 191
+
+Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
+  author's interview with, 38
+  on Anglo-French Entente, 59
+  on the English Press, 61
+
+Tsingtau as German naval base, 140
+
+Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince Buelow, 54, 57
+  Tirpitz and, 76
+
+
+United States (_see_ America)
+
+
+Voluntary system, the, advantages of, 199
+
+
+William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, 43
+  and the Agadir crisis, 69, 70
+  and the Anglo-French Entente, 52
+  Bismarck's message to, 148
+  consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, 132
+  Count Czernin on, 170
+  desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, 70, 71
+  Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, 131
+  frank speech with author, 52 _et seq_.
+  his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, 66
+  his reception in London, 68
+  incautious speeches of, 69, 117, 161
+  pays surprise visit to Bismarck, 148
+  promises support to Austria, 150
+  reads a poem to author, 165
+  reviews his troops, 51
+  Tirpitz and, 142
+  visits King Edward and King George, 62, 67
+
+Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, 68
+
+Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
+
+Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, 62
+
+
+Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, 151
+  meets author, 77
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Typographical errors corrected in text:                      |
+|                                                              |
+| Page 231: Landsdowne replaced by Lansdowne                   |
+|                                                              |
+| Unusual spellings left in the text:                          |
+|                                                              |
+|   maneuvers                                                  |
+|   altho                                                      |
+|   tho                                                        |
+|   Bethmann Hollweg versus Bethmann-Hollweg                   |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
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